

A Steward of Police Reform
Understanding Two-Year Labour of IOM Police Project in Aceh

Mid-Term External Evaluation Report
“Support for National Police Reform in Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam”

**“NAD Addendum to the Project:
Strengthening The Indonesian National Police
Through Institution Building – Phase II”**

IOM-The Royal Netherlands Embassy-The European Commission

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TABLE OF CONTENT

| | |
|---|------------|
| EXECUTIVE SUMMARY | I |
| FOREWORD | III |
| CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION | 1 |
| A. Purpose of Evaluation | 2 |
| B. Scope of Evaluation | 3 |
| C. Method of Evaluation | 4 |
| 1. <i>Profile of Respondents</i> | 4 |
| 2. <i>Interview Method</i> | 6 |
| 3. <i>Contents of Interview</i> | 6 |
| 4. <i>Process, Venue and Length of Interview</i> | 8 |
| 5. <i>Other Sources of Data and Information</i> | 9 |
| 6. <i>Information and Data Organisation</i> | 10 |
| 7. <i>Organisation of Chapters</i> | 10 |
| CHAPTER II PROGRAMME DESIGN AND MANAGEMENT | 11 |
| A. Design of Programme | 11 |
| 1. <i>Assumption of NAD Police Project</i> | 11 |
| 2. <i>Sensitivity to Aceh Specificity</i> | 13 |
| 3. <i>Sensitivity to Gender Issues</i> | 14 |
| 4. <i>Involvement of Community Groups & Civil Society Organisations</i> | 14 |
| 5. <i>Human Resources</i> | 16 |
| B. Management of NAD Police Project | 17 |
| 1. <i>Organisational Communication</i> | 19 |
| 2. <i>Informal Communication</i> | 21 |
| 3. <i>Management Focus</i> | 24 |
| 4. <i>Management Performance</i> | 30 |
| 5. <i>Information Management, Internal Monitoring and Reporting</i> | 45 |
| 6. <i>Resources Management and Infrastructure</i> | 51 |
| 7. <i>Management of Change</i> | 52 |
| C. Recommendation | 54 |
| CHAPTER III TRAINING IN HUMAN RIGHTS AND COMMUNITY POLICING | 57 |
| A. Training Materials and Contents | 59 |
| B. Atmosphere of Training | 61 |
| C. Process and Method of Teaching | 61 |
| D. From ‘Knowing’ to ‘Embodying’ Knowledge | 62 |
| E. Quality of Trainers | 65 |
| F. Quality of Training Participants | 67 |
| G. Notes on Officers’ Exemption from Training | 71 |
| H. Notes on Local Content | 71 |
| I. Notes on Gender | 74 |
| J. Recommendation | 76 |
| CHAPTER IV IMPACT TO DATE | 79 |
| A. NAD Police Personnel after Training | 79 |
| B. Police-Community Relationship | 80 |
| C. Expectation of Community Members | 83 |
| D. Roles of Community in Police Reform | 84 |
| E. Impact of Community-Policing Programme | 86 |

| | |
|---|------------|
| F. NAD Police Project in the Present Aceh Constellation | 91 |
| 1. Return of Day-to-day Normalcy | 91 |
| 2. Challenges for Substantive Peace | 93 |
| G. Priority for NAD Police Project's Next Step | 96 |
| H. Recommendation | 97 |
| EPILOGUE | 100 |

TABLE OF GRAPH, DIAGRAM, BOX, TABLE

| | |
|---|----|
| TABLE 1 Area Coverage for Interview and Observation | 5 |
| TABLE 2 Characteristics and Number of Respondents | 5 |
| TABLE 3 Group Characteristics and Focus of Interview | 7 |
| TABLE 4 Description of NAD Police Project | 25 |
| TABLE 5 Valuation of of NAD Police Project's Levels of Performance | 26 |
| TABLE 6 Distinctions between Two Types of PP NAD Activity/Objective | 29 |
| TABLE 7 Description of Specific Objective 1 | 31 |
| TABLE 8 Description of Specific Objective 2 | 35 |
| TABLE 9 Description of Specific Objective 3 | 37 |
| TABLE 10 Description of Specific Objective 4 | 41 |
| TABLE 11 Entry-with-Payment to SPN Seulawah | 42 |
| TABLE 12 Matrix of PP NAD Activities by Levels of Institutionalisation&Control | 45 |
| TABLE 13 Types of Monitoring Agency | 50 |
| TABLE 14 Numerical Coverage of Training & Other Activities | 58 |
| TABLE 15 Perceived Attributes of Good Trainer and Bad Trainer | 67 |
| TABLE 16 Participants' Impression of Human Rights and Community Policing Training | 70 |
| TABLE 17 Difference between INP Strategy and Community's Expectation | 84 |
| TABLE 18 Recommendation for NAD Police Project Timeline | 99 |
| | |
| DIAGRAM 1 IOM Support Police Reform Organisational Chart | 18 |
| DIAGRAM 2 Flow of Training of Trainers | 57 |
| | |
| GRAPH 1 Quality of Teaching and Implementation | 64 |
| GRAPH 2 Perception of Community-Police Relationship Before and After MoU | 82 |
| | |
| BOX 1 Exchanges on Adat-based Solution to Domestic Violence | 75 |
| BOX 2 Sharia or Positive Law? | 89 |
| | |
| ANNEX 1 Terms of Reference for Midterm External Evaluation | |
| ANNEX 2 Report of Field Activities | |

Executive Summary

Purpose of Evaluation

The objective of this mid-term external evaluation is to independently appraise the performance of the *Support for Police Reform in Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam* Project during the period of July 2006-July 2008, in terms of its effectiveness, efficiency, impact to date and its potentials for sustainability. The project is managed by the IOM Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam Police Project (hereafter PP NAD).

Method of Evaluation

- The evaluation was conducted between 1 July 2008 and 15 September 2008. The Evaluation Team (two evaluators and one field assistant) conducted field visits to all districts in Aceh (except Simeuleu), Jakarta, and Lembang, West Java.
- Ground data were gathered through personal and group interviews with 427 persons consisting of groups of police, community members, IOM and PP NAD staff and other stakeholders. Data were also collected through a variety of participant observations on PP NAD's activities and infrastructure.
- Documentary data were gathered through review of project proposals, reports, training materials, terms of reference, correspondence, academic papers, etc.

Key Findings

- **Project design:** PP NAD stands on at least four assumptions that (1) cultural reform of NAD Police is pursued through re-training of NAD police, (2) the re-training is expected to change police's conduct and practices, (3) police reform is carried out by re-embedding the police in community life, and (4) peace process in Aceh will not suffer from a serious setback.
- **Management:** High levels of achievement are concentrated in activities that are institutionally more structured, like customised training in Human Rights (HR) and Community Policing (CP). It is over this class of activities that PP NAD has clear directive control. The less PP NAD has directive control, the lower the levels of its achievement. At the lowest level is its support for police recruitment reform, if because changes in recruitment practices are beyond PP NAD's directive control. In between the two are activities like establishment of community-police forums, if because PP NAD has some degree of directive control, although not as high as its directive control over activities like HR and CP training. This pattern points to an imperative that (1) the Project's design (logical framework) needs to be revised, and (2) PP NAD needs to pay serious attention to strategy of staging and sequencing in conducting activities which by definition are institutionally less structured and not entirely within its directive control.
- **Training in HR and CP:** This has come to be known as a landmark of IOM among police personnel in Aceh. PP NAD's cascading method proves highly effective and efficient for training 8,000 police personnel and 6,000 new recruits. As an activity that is institutionally structured and entirely within PP NAD's directive control, HR and CP training is in general well prepared, delivered, monitored and evaluated on a day-to-day basis. It is well received by

participants and has equipped them with basic knowledge and normative attitudinal standards required by the present stages of peace process in Aceh. However, the high quality of classroom training principally concerns *cognitive* aspects (to know), and its impacts on police's *conduct and practices* (to do) are still to be expected. While lying beyond PP NAD's directive control, there is a need for PP NAD to supplement the training with a monitoring system capable of systematically keeping track of changes in police's daily conduct and practices.

- **Impact to date:** There are two salient points. *First*, the return of day-to-day normal life to Aceh has brought with it an expectation of the police's less agitating attitudes, and HR and CP training has equipped them with attitudinal standards in line with community's expectation. Instead of reprimanding, the police are now smiling. This so-called "smile campaign" has been successful, but police's professional competence in problem-solving is believed to remain low. Community members in particular expect enhanced professional competence to be part of police's smiles. Otherwise, smiles will not help the implementation of CP. *Secondly*, the early stages of CP implementation have brought some social encounters between many previously conflicting groups. This hardly appears in PP NAD's calculation and reports, and it is important to pay close attention to this unintended beneficial consequences. On the other hand, the adoption of Aceh *adat* as an entry point to CP has been pursued with too much optimism. It is less clear whether the end results will be as beneficial as expected, if because PP NAD and *Polda* NAD have not really delved into the complexities of *adat*. There is real possibility that what started as optimism may end up with PP NAD and *Polda* NAD falling prey to a re-traditionalisation of Aceh.
- **On Gender and Local Contents:** *On Gender* – The adoption of gender mainstreaming approach is creditable within its own criteria or textbook standards. The term 'gender' has been used, with or without its proper meaning. Despite, or precisely because of it, the programmatic idea of gender mainstreaming remains alien to most police personnel and community members. The problem lies less in the values being advocated by gender mainstreaming than in its lack of appreciation of subtle distinctions and gradations that are bound to be so important within Aceh cultural context. That is why the police interviewed attest that it is remote from the real problems they have to deal with in their day-to-day works. *On Local Contents* – There are three issues that make up local contents, i.e., *adat*, Islamic *sharia*, and history of conflicts. PP NAD's engagement with *adat* and *sharia* has been attempted, even if it is far from being satisfactory. Among the three, the least engaged is the history of conflicts. PP NAD's reticence may be a matter of strategy, in that by taking a roundabout route in the form of cultural approach to *adat* and *sharia*, traumas of conflict are expected to be gradually mitigated. This is less assuring, as the roots of Aceh problem lie more in the history of bitter conflicts than in *adat* and *sharia*.

Recommendation

- **Project design**
Project design, hence also the logical framework, to be reviewed and revised to distinguish between objectives that are achievable through more institutionally structured activities and those through less institutionally structured activities.

The revision to be reflected in revised indicators, targets, expected results and criteria of achievement.

- **Management**

The existing PP NAD organisational structure in relation to IOM SINP Unit to be retained, and the terms of reference (ToR) for related staff personnel to be reviewed and revised to comply with the requirements arising from the revised design and its functional consequences.

- **Training in HR and CP**

1. Refresher courses for ‘training of trainers’ (ToT) to be conducted as the first priority, with particular attention to the need to incorporate three dimensions of education process (cognitive, affective, practical), as distinct from the existing focus on cognitive aspects.

2. More serious efforts to be made to integrate HR substantive contents into the training process at *Sespim* (School for Middle-Ranking Officers) from which all *Kapolres* (District Police Chief) and staff, including those for NAD, are recruited.

- **Impact to date**

1. Monitoring instrument for keeping track of changes in police’s daily conduct and practices at *Polsek* (police sub-district) and *Polres* (police district) levels to be devised. This instrument to be designed for individual conduct and practices rather than for organisational development.

2. PP NAD’s supports for reform in recruitment policies and practices to be followed-up with a formation of a task-force to speed up the action plan and implementation of recruitment reform.

3. PP NAD to cultivate CP information dissemination forums as a way of developing ‘critical mass’ to nurture a sense of ownership and external monitoring of police’s daily conduct and practices.

- **On Gender**

Gender-related problems in NAD to be catalogued with a view to employing them as sensitising devices on gender mainstreaming approach that remains alien to both police personnel and ordinary community members. It is expected that these cases are not simply straitjacketed into gender mainstreaming concepts. Rather, gender mainstreaming approach to be re-devised through sensitive staging and sequencing more capable of taking into account real gender-related problems in NAD.

- **Local Contents**

Approach to *adat* as CP strategy to engage trustworthy CSO elements and other experts in attempt to critically assess the pros and cons of the approach. This critical assessment is to equip PP NAD and *Polda* NAD with a deeper understanding of the intricacies involved in the strategy and with a greater awareness of both the intended and unintended consequences of using *adat* as an entry point.

- **Timeline**

What have been achieved to be continued until the 2009 timeline, by paying proper attention to relevant suggestions in this evaluation and the earlier ones. For the Project’s objectives that can be achieved only through less institutionally structured activities and/or activities that are not entirely within the directive control of PP NAD, what have been started during the past four semesters deserve to be extended beyond 2009.

Foreword

This mid-term external evaluation of the *Support for National Police Reform in Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam* Project was conducted between July 1, 2008 and September 15, 2008. It was commissioned by the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) and carried out in accordance with the agreement between the IOM and the Donors (Documents ASIE/2006/121-819, p. 2, and the Royal Netherlands Embassy Contribution Agreement, August 1, 2006, p. 2). Its nature is external and independent, in that the Evaluation Team is not and has never been part of the Donors and of IOM as the executing agency of the project, except of course for its being under the terms of contract during the evaluation period. In addition, both the IOM and the Royal Netherlands Embassy and the European Commission as the Donors were neither involved nor have interfered with the evaluation task, except of course with their marvellous supports as resource persons, administrative facilitators and logistics providers for this evaluation. In one of group interviews with police personnel in Takengon, Aceh, the Project Officer of the NAD Police Project was in attendance for documentation purposes, but in no way has he interfered with the process. The same NAD Police Project Officer also joined informal discussions between the Team and a group of women during a Community-Policing dissemination gathering in the district of Bireun.

For this evaluation's purposes, the Team conducted field visits to all districts in Aceh (except Simeuleu) for observation of training sessions, training facilities and interviews with police personnel, community members, women, youth, children, non-governmental organisation and civil-society organisation members. The community members included in the interview were made up of those who more or less have been involved in Community-Policing dissemination activities, as well as those who have not. The Team also conducted interviews and discussions with members of the media, other organisations and stakeholders, as shown in 'Profile of Respondents'. Interviews were also conducted with senior police officers at the NAD Police Headquarters, Indonesian National Police Headquarters in Jakarta, and the School for high and middle-ranking police officers in Lembang, West Java.

Special notes on Aceh *adat* and gender in the context of Aceh's special autonomy are suggested, especially in relation to the implementation of Community Policing. For this purpose, interviews were conducted with legal and paralegal advocacy groups for women, special units for women and children in police districts, *adat* representatives in several *gampongs*, religious leaders and officials at the Council for Aceh *Adat*.

Learning from accounts about conflict-stricken areas in Indonesia, of which Aceh is one, the Team was well aware that traumatic memories of violence related to gross violations of human rights are more than psychological incidents; they are political in nature. With this concern in mind, the Team interviewed some groups of women, children and youth (between 13 and 21 years of age) whose families have been victims of armed conflicts in Aceh. In several *gampongs*, groups of ex-combatants were also included in the interviews.

After the devastation caused by the tsunami in 2004, it may not be grossly mistaken to say that the people in Aceh have become the most interviewed persons in Indonesia. With the arrival of many national and international agencies also came all ventures of mapping, survey, research, assessment, evaluation, etc., all involving some modes of inquiry either by the use of questionnaire, interview, focus group discussion or other techniques. From the Team's exposures to Aceh in the wake of the 2004 tsunami, for instance, it was not unusual to hear this expression: "We've been visited by many people asking all sorts of question; we know how to answer, how to mislead or even deceive them". This posed tremendous methodological challenges and the choice of methods for this evaluation was made in virtue of this problem.

Another constraint was the narrow timeline for an evaluation covering such a geographical spread with such difficult grounds and sociological complexities. No less challenging were the enormous piles of documents to be reviewed. Despite all these constraints, the insightful dialogues with NAD police personnel and community groups, and the tremendous supports lent by IOM and NAD Police Project in particular, have made this evaluation possible.

The Evaluation Team has two members: Karlina Supelli and B. Herry-Priyono. A local assistant, Edi Syahputra, helped the two evaluators during the field research in Aceh. The daunting tasks for this evaluation were lightened by many persons of good will. Special thanks go to the INP Deputy Chief (*Kom.Jen.Pol* Makbul Padmanegara) and the NAD Police Chief (*Ins.Jen.Pol* Rismawan), and many senior police officers within INP Headquarters and *Polda* NAD for their tireless assistance. The same also go to many police rank-and-files, whose insightful responses during group interviews have been indispensable. Invaluable supports were granted by Hagar Ligtoet and Said Fazili from the Royal Netherlands Embassy in Jakarta, Karoly Soos from the European Commission in Jakarta and John Penny (Head of Europe House office) in Banda Aceh. Thankful expressions are due to Steve Cook (IOM Chief of Mission), Sarah Domingo (IOM National Project Manager), Monica Tanuhandaru (IOM SINP Programme Coordinator) and many more persons within the IOM circles in Jakarta for making this evaluation possible.

The NAD Police Project staff deserve more than thankful expressions. *Ibu* Pengasih Gaut as the NAD PP project manager, Yulia Sudjarmiko, Ari Bassin and all PP NAD staff members have made the daunting tasks of this evaluation not only bearable but sometimes enjoyable. It was during one of those internal weekly meetings in mid-August 2008 that *Ibu* Gaut as "head of the PP NAD tribe" shared her view in a typically humorous candour: "We don't feel you the evaluation team as strangers evaluating us..., only by the end of the day are we usually caught red-handed, because you've slotted your questions in the course of all our activities". In truth, it was the NAD PP staff members, including the drivers, who have made the Team cope steadily with the bewildering evaluation tasks.

Interviewing ordinary members of community during field visits was like a journey into the inner sanctum of Aceh. The Team took special efforts to interview many independent groups apart from those invited by police district chiefs. Many persons, who prefer their identities to remain anonymous, have made these interviews possible. Special thanks go to *Ibu* Samsidar and *Ibu* Dinny Jusuf, ex-commissioner

and former secretary general of National Commission on Violence against Women (*Komnas Perempuan*) respectively, for their invaluable and insightful inputs.

The supports of all these persons and institutions by no means diminish the great help of Edi Syahputra, an environmentalist-turn-local assistant during field visits. Not only has he helped with the interviews but has also introduced the two evaluators to the splendour of Aceh natural landscapes.

Jakarta, 21 October 2008.

Respectfully submitted by

Karlina Supelli, PhD.

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Chapter I

Introduction

“We’re so used to standard questions, that we know how to mislead and deceive the questioners”.

(Community members, Interview, Aceh, July 2008)

“After MoU,¹ both parties are restraining from each other”. These words were spoken not by one but many community members during separate interviews. “Both parties” refers to the Indonesian Armed Forces (hereafter TNI) and Police on the one side, and the Free Aceh Movement (hereafter GAM) on the other. The Helsinki Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) includes among others an agreement that GAM was to disarm and demobilise its forces. The process that began in early October 2005 was then separately followed by demobilisation of all non-organic forces of the Government of Indonesia from the Province of Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam.²

Although the sundering of the Police from the Military chains of command had begun on April 1, 1999,³ the so-called ‘Security Sector Reform Programme’ was yet to reach Aceh, especially due to the enactment of martial law followed by a state of civil emergency. During the period between 1999 and 2004 police activities were no different from the preceding military operations. The police operation for “law and order” called ‘*Sadar Rencong* Operation’ (1999-2004) was just another name for a string of similar gross violations of human rights perpetrated during the preceding military operations.⁴

The advent of the historic Peace Agreement could not but compel the Indonesian National Police (INP) to immediately introduce police reform to the Province of Aceh. The idea of engaging IOM to support capacity building within the NAD Police (hereafter *Polda* NAD) was made known as early as March 2005, and the design for this support was already devised in May 2005. IOM has extensive experiences in supporting reform of the Indonesian National Police, mostly through systematised

¹ MoU (Memorandum of Understanding) refers to the Peace Agreement between the Government of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement signed in Helsinki, August 15, 2005, after over 30 years of blood-shedding conflicts.

² Among others were 5,333 police and mobile brigade personnel (*Press Release of Chief of NAD Police*, Inspector General Drs. Bahrumsyah, SH., December 31, 2005). *The Aceh Monitoring Mission Press Release* (November 25, 2005) noted the withdrawal of 25,221 Indonesian Armed Forces personnel and 4,700 Police personnel.

³ Presidential Decree No. 2/1999. At the structural levels, the reform was instituted through Decree MPR/VI/2000, Decree MPR/VII/2000, and Law No. 2/2002 on the Indonesian National Police which stipulates the roles of Indonesian Armed Forces for national defence (under the Ministry of Defence) and that of the Indonesian National Police for security and public order (directly under the President).

⁴ *Banda Aceh Legal Aid Press Release* No. 02/SP/III/LBH/2000 (March 10, 2000); see also Amnesty International, *Indonesia: Operasi-operasi Militer Baru, Pola Lama Pelanggaran HAM di Aceh – Indonesia: New Military Operations, Old-style Violations of Human Rights in Aceh* (AI Index: ASA 21/033/2004 – October 2004).

training in community policing (hereafter CP) and human rights (hereafter HR) for police personnel throughout Indonesia.

The real events were of course not as neat as a scheme. As if reminded by the real plight lying ahead, myriad challenges began to crop up one after the other. Before the signing of the Peace Agreement, IOM at the invitation of *Polda* NAD organised a three-day workshop on human rights for the middle-level management staff within *Polda* NAD. The workshop was organised at the *Polda* NAD Police School in Seulawah, August 7-9, 2005. Not only were human rights principles considered “a big taboo” among police personnel,⁵ but the persisting climate of suspicion was so strong as to guarantee the Sisyphean nature of IOM Police Unit’s tasks in introducing them to the basic principles of HR and CP. Even up until the period of this evaluation, it was not unusual to find police personnel who see some groups within Acehnese society as enemies of the police: “We refuse to have anything to do with them even in the name of Community Policing, for our blood was then so cheap (*halal*) for them”.

The first test came with the approaching democratic elections for a new Aceh Governor in December 2006. Many were anxious at the return of violence, and not a few observers described the precarious political climate as “the second critical period of peace process”. Supported by Partnership for Governance Reform, IOM, and the Royal Netherlands Embassy, *Polda* NAD set up a working group comprising of various elements in Acehnese society, with a special task of monitoring events leading to the local elections as well as training police personnel in all districts in the management of peaceful elections.

Nothing is sweeter than a pleasant surprise. The surprise was the relatively peaceful election. Before moving forward, however, it is important to bear in mind what took place in mid-2006. As if spurred by a hope that was too remote even one year earlier, the *Support for Police Reform in Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam* Project (hereafter PP NAD) was launched in July 2006, funded by the Royal Netherlands Embassy (RNE) and the European Commission (EC) and implemented jointly and in parallel with the RNE-funded *Strengthening the Indonesian National Police through Institution Building* Project.

The grounds for the Project’s design were prepared by the Rapid Appraisal Mission in *Polda* NAD carried out by IOM and the Indonesian National Police Headquarters (October 19-24, 2005), the donor-police workshop facilitated by Partnership for Governance Reform held in Banda Aceh (October, 26-27, 2005), Need Assessment Mission undertaken by IOM and Indonesian Survey Circle (December, 3-10, 2005) and, no doubt, lessons learned from IOM’s ongoing cooperation with the Indonesian National Police.

A. Purpose of Evaluation

This mid-term external evaluation appraises the performance of the *Support for Police Reform in Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam* Project managed by the IOM PP NAD

⁵ IOM Police Reform Project, Draft Concept Note, Outline of ‘Support to Policing in Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam’, August 18, 2005, p. 4.

during the first half of its 2006-2009 period. The specificity of Aceh in terms of its history of armed conflicts, its special-autonomy status and its post-disaster conditions following the 2004 tsunami were taken into consideration. It puts these factors within the following two seemingly opposing trends. One is the socio-political change that has been taking place in accelerating and non-linear ways, a phenomenon that is likely to have some impacts on Acehnese society in general and the work of PP NAD in particular. The other is the persistence of stagnant elements within Acehnese society that are likely to give rise to new challenges – these are challenges whose responses demand PP NAD to equip itself with more serious analysis.

Against this backdrop, this evaluation will present not only the strengths and weaknesses, successes and failures, of PP NAD's performance, but it will also indicate some of its implications for PP NAD as a consequence of its interface with the specificity of Aceh. Some recommendations are suggested in virtue of this perspective. It is hoped that what have been achieved can be learned as a reference for best practices. The lessons learned from PP NAD's performance during the first half of its period can be used not only as a new footing for its continuation until July 2009, but also and perhaps more importantly as a basis for developing a sense of ownership on the part of *Polda* NAD, INP and the Acehnese society. Indeed, without engaging community members from within the larger Acehnese society, police reform in Aceh is bound to be barren.

B. Scope of Evaluation

Based on the terms of reference (ToR) for this evaluation (see Annex 1), the Evaluation Team (hereafter the Team) paid close attention to the way the PP NAD management has shown its performance in the assigned projects. Has the overall objective been consistently pursued? Is the initial design sufficiently open to revision in attempt to take into account new challenges arising from project implementation or from the unintended consequences unforeseen in the initial design? Attention was also given to the way HR and CP training has been prepared, delivered in a classroom setting, and regularly assessed to accommodate Aceh's specific context? No less crucial is the extent to which HR and CP training has beneficial impacts not only on police personnel as direct beneficiaries but also on peace-building process in Aceh. It is also important to identify potentially adverse consequences that may arise from the implementation process, any adverse consequences unanticipated by the PP NAD management.

In a more manageable form, the ToR for this evaluation is organised into the following three issues:

1. PP NAD Management

- a. Has the PP NAD Management achieved its targets as planned in ways that are effective and efficient?
- b. To what extent is the PP NAD Management sensitive to new challenges and opportunities, and does it pay sufficient attention to the issue of sustainability?
- c. What are the strengths and weaknesses of the present PP NAD Management?

2. Contents and Process of HR and CP Training for Police Personnel

- a. To what extent does the training in HR and CP help police personnel improve their knowledge, perspectives and skills?
- b. How conducive is the learning and teaching process during the training? What are the strengths and weaknesses?
- c. In what way has the outcome of the training been nurtured to affect changes in daily conduct? Is there any mechanism to monitor its impact on daily practices?

3. Impact to date

- a. To what extent does the training in HR and CP have beneficial impacts on daily conduct and policing practices?
- b. What changes in police's conduct are identified by community members, and how do these changes conform to the HR and CP standards?
- c. How do community members and police personnel see the state of police-community relationships before and after the Helsinki Agreement? What possible improvement in police-community partnership is to be developed in the future?

C. Method of Evaluation

Evaluation is a task broader than both assessment and data description. This distinction implies several points. *First*, evaluation presupposes assessments that in turn can only be done after data gathering. *Secondly*, the broad nature of evaluation warrants a process beyond both data description and assessment. *Thirdly*, the moves from data description to assessment *en route* to evaluation make up a string of processes requiring a wider landscape of vistas and deliberations.

In this sense, specific data gathering and assessment methods are adopted not for their own sake, but for purposes of helping broaden the horizons of deliberation process required by the evaluation task. No doubt, the choice of method is also affected by other factors.

With two evaluators and one local assistant covering the whole Aceh Province, and with the narrow evaluation timeline between July 1, 2008 and September 15, 2008 to cover all administrative and logistic preparations, field visits, interviews, document reviews, analysis and completion of the Report Document, the Team decided to use interview method. Both group and personal interviews were conducted in Jakarta, Lembang (West Java), and all districts of Aceh except Simeulue and Gayo Luwes for reason of time limitations.

1. Profile of Respondents

One among methodological devices commonly used to save time and resources is the application of an appropriate sampling technique. However, any sampling technique requires a series of preparations, of which the most important is a careful mapping of characteristics distinguishing one group of population from another. In place of

sampling application, the Team travelled far afield to cover as many areas as possible, as shown in the following list (TABLE 1).

TABLE 1
Area Coverage for Interview and Observation

| List of Area Coverage | |
|--|---|
| <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Jakarta 2. Lembang, West Java 3. Kota Banda Aceh 4. Aceh Besar-Jantho 5. Aceh Besar-Seulawah 6. Calang-Aceh Jaya 7. Meulaboh-Aceh Barat 8. Darul Makmur-Nagan Raya 9. Blang Pidie-Aceh Barat Daya 10. Tapaktuan-Aceh Selatan 11. Singkil-Aceh Singkil | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 12. Kutacane-Aceh Tenggara 13. Takengon-Aceh Tengah 14. Bener Meriah 15. Bireuen-Bireuen 16. Lhokseumawe 17. Lhoksukon-Aceh Utara 18. Langsa & Aceh Timur 19. Kualasimpang-Aceh Tamiang 20. Sigli-Pidie 21. Sabang-Pulau Weh |

- While not visited by the Team, both police personnel and community leaders from Bener Meriah travelled to Takengon for interview.
- While no interview was arranged for Gayo Luwes, the Team visited one of the Polsek
- Another unarranged interview was spontaneously conducted in Polsek Djuli, Bireun.

The following table (TABLE 2) shows the characteristics and number of respondents interviewed during field visits. In total, there were 427 persons interviewed.

TABLE 2
Characteristics and Number of Respondents

| Group Characteristics of Respondent | Number |
|---|--------------|
| Police: - High-ranking officers - Middle-ranking officers - Rank-and-files | 178 |
| IOM: - Police Project NAD - Head Office Jakarta - IOM NAD (other units) | 24 8 3 |
| Civil Society Organisation, Media, Adat, Religious & Local Community Leaders: Women, children, human rights group, community development, anti-corruption, university students, environmentalists, ex-combatant women association, Islamic students association, journalists, <i>ulema</i> , <i>Tuha Peut</i> , <i>Imeum Mukim</i> , <i>Keuchik</i> , MAA, Youth, KPA | 199 |
| NAD Police Project Donors: Royal Netherlands Embassy, European Commission (Aceh & Jakarta) | 4 |
| International Organisations | 2 |
| Government Representatives | 5 |
| Experts on Aceh & Civil Society | 4 |
| TOTAL | 427 |

2. Interview Method

Within the methodological constraints noted above, in-depth interview was preferred to other methods for the following reasons:

- Interview technique requires less preparation than, for instance, a questionnaire. A proper questionnaire entails a string of pre-tests and re-tests to ensure the acceptability of its degree of validity. The structured format of questionnaire has its virtue but, unless being carefully crafted through a series of pre-tests and re-tests, its questions often fail to elicit responses that are sought out in the first place.
- Compared to other methods, in-depth interview gives ample room for interviewer(s) to probe further in the quest for quality information. This point is particularly relevant to Aceh. Long and bitter conflicts, the Helsinki Peace Agreement, and the devastation caused by the 2004 tsunami have brought Aceh into the gaze of world-wide attention. With it was the arrival of many national and international agencies or organisations conducting all types of survey, research, impact assessment, evaluation and others, all intended to draw out one type of information or another. Not surprisingly, people in Aceh are by now so accustomed to answering all sorts of question to the point of saturation. As expressed by many interviewees, “We’re so used to standard questions that we know how to mislead and deceive”. Among police personnel, the following is not unusual: “Unless being probed further, we the police are clever in answering what is deemed good according to the rules”.
- Unless being carefully crafted, questionnaire is bound to struggle with the above problem. No less importantly, a broader horizon of vistas warranted by an evaluation task is also more likely to be enhanced by familiarity with the nuances of interview responses, and this can best be secured through probing during in-depth interview.
- These following examples may be taken as an additional reason why in-depth interview has a superior advantage over other methods. In many interviews with community members, a question pertaining to their agreement and disagreement with Islamic *sharia* was raised. There was hardly any negative response. Only when being probed further about their positions on the “cutting-off hands” punishment, most expressed their disagreement. This shows the importance of familiarity with the dilemmas and nuances involved in their responses. To take another example, at the start of each interview with police personnel and community members, some questions were posed concerning the quality of police-community relationships before and after the Helsinki Peace Agreement, and they were asked to give scores on the scale between 0 and 10 – 0 for extremely bad quality, 10 for extremely good one. Not surprisingly perhaps, most groups gave rather high scores. But when the same question was raised again at the end of interview, there was no group that did not revise the initial valuation into much lower scores. Questionnaire method can easily elicit the first response, but is highly likely to struggle with the intricate nuances that lead to the revised valuation.

3. Contents of Interview

In terms of content, the interview was guided by criteria as to why certain questions are more central to be addressed to a particular group than to others. For this purpose,

a list of groups to be interviewed and their areas of “experiential expertise” was drawn. Of course, group characteristics and their respective “experiential expertise” were purposively devised by considering the types of data required for this evaluation (see Chapter I, B).

The types of question asked to police personnel who have participated in HR and CP training were mainly focused on the process, atmosphere and materials of training, the quality of trainers, personal experiences during training, and the impact of training on their daily conducts. Other questions about, say, the way their superiors treat them or how community members see them (and vice versa), as well as how they see the current situation in Aceh, were also raised. However, these questions were raised with a view to understanding better their experiences of HR and CP training. The same is true with community members who were presented with questions about their experiences of police conduct. Other questions were raised to deepen the principal issues characteristic of a particular group’s “experiential expertise”.

With different thematic focus for each interview, cross-check was done by asking other groups some information that has been given by a particular group. It is through this process that information deemed important for the evaluation task was cross-checked and pursued further. The following table (TABLE 3) presents the thematic focus assigned to each interview group, and the diversity of group characteristics also shows direct beneficiaries and stakeholders of PP NAD.

TABLE 3
Group Characteristics and Focus of Interview

| Group/Person | Focus of Interview |
|--|---|
| Training participant (police) | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Contents, process and atmosphere of training, quality of trainers, experience of participating in training - Impact of training on daily conduct and practices |
| Trainer (police) | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Experience of teaching, quality of trainees, atmosphere of training, support from superiors - Impact of training on daily conduct and practices |
| Police district chief/deputy | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Monitoring system for police daily conduct and HR-CP guideline/policy - Impact of training on daily conduct and practices |
| Chief of <i>Polda</i> NAD | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Policy for police reform sustainability based on HR and CP - Reform of recruitment policy and practice |
| Deputy Chief of National Police | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - NAD police reform within National Police reform and the roles of PP NAD in it |
| Senior Police Officers at Indonesian National Headquarters | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Policy and implementation of CP |
| NAD Senior Police Officers | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Institutional and organisational supports for <i>Polda</i> NAD reform - Relationship between PP NAD and <i>Polda</i> NAD |
| Senior officers at NAD police districts/sub-districts | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - HR and CP incorporation into functional units of police work - Monitoring system for police daily conduct and practices after HR and CP training |
| Head of Police Education & | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Integration of HR and CP into curriculum |

| Group/Person | Focus of Interview |
|---------------------------------|--|
| Training Intuitions | - Pedagogy (androgogy) in police education |
| Community Members | - Experience of police daily conduct/practices and work - Quality of police-community relations |
| CSOs, NGOs, Students | - Experience of police daily conduct/practices and work - Involvement in NAD police reform |
| Children and Youth | - Experience of police daily conduct/practices and work - Contents of trauma towards police, TNI, GAM |
| Adat and religious leaders | - Dynamics and problems in <i>adat</i> -religion-positive law relations - Role of <i>adat</i> in Aceh's future |
| Woman groups | - Experience of gender perspectives in police daily conduct and work - Tensions in <i>adat</i> -religion-gender relations |
| NAD Government staff | - HR and CP-based police reform within NAD Provincial Governance - Police in present Aceh political constellation |
| Victims of armed conflicts | - Contents of trauma towards police, TNI, GAM - Expectation for trauma healing |
| Ex-combatants and KPA | - Experience of relations with police before and after MoU |
| Academic | - Intricacies in <i>adat</i> -religion-positive law interactions as manifest in Aceh cultural, social and economic problems - Current hidden tendencies for Aceh future |
| PP NAD CEO and staff | - PP NAD management system and daily working atmosphere - PP NAD vision and complexity of programme implementation |
| IOM CEO and staff | - Vision and complexity of IOM work for support for police reform - PP NAD within overall IOM's mission in Indonesia |
| PP NAD donors | - Expectation to PP NAD - Issues in need of special attention for evaluation |
| IOM and PP NAD consultants | - Contribution of respective expertise to PP NAD |
| Intergovernmental organisations | - Link and interface between respective activities and PP NAD projects |
| Political parties | - Present political constellation in Aceh - Police in present Aceh political constellation |

Note: Questions specific to a particular “expert” group are also addressed to other groups as a way of probing and cross-checking; questions related to gender issues were usually raised in all interviews with all groups.

The information gathered through these focus-based interviews not only makes up the starting point for assessment and evaluation process, but also forms a landscape of broader vistas that, despite un-codified, is of paramount importance to this evaluation.

4. Process, Venue and Length of Interview

Interviews with groups of police respondents were conducted in their respective offices from early July to the end of August 2008 in Jakarta, Aceh and Lembang (West Java). The length of these personal and group interviews ranged from 45

minutes to 2 hours. They were usually conducted during working hours, but on some occasions also on Saturdays and Sundays.

Interviews with community members were conducted in various venues, such as coffee houses, canteens, *meunasah* (local mosque), private houses and Police District offices (*Polres*) for those who joined the interviews at the invitation of police district chiefs (*Kapolres*). All these interviews took place between early July and the end of August 2008, either in the morning, afternoon, evening, or even beyond midnight, depending on the availability of the groups or persons. The length of interviews ranged from 1.5 to 4 hours, including on Saturdays and Sundays.

As with PP NAD manager and staff, the interviews, the length of which ranged from 45 minutes to 1.5 hours, were conducted throughout the month of July 2008 in PP NAD office, coffee houses, restaurants, and various police training centres all over Aceh. Especially with the PP NAD manager, interviews were conducted several times up until the end of August 2008.

The interviewing of all these groups and persons was carried out by the Team (2 evaluators and 1 local assistant). At the start of every interview, the Team usually introduced themselves, explaining the purpose of the interview and giving assurance about the confidentiality of information given, identities of interview participants and details of meeting venues. The Team proceeded thereafter with some ice-breaking for more conducive interactions. Only then was the first light question posed, followed by a string of focused questions, including probing questions necessary to bring out quality information.

5. Other Sources of Data and Information

Information was also gathered through review of various documents, like training manuals, books on HR and CP, IOM documents in the forms of proposal, report, terms of reference, correspondence pertaining to PP NAD, etc. This was supplemented with a review of media reports on CP, human rights situation in Aceh with particular attention to police's conduct and practices, some public perception surveys on policing practices, audiovisuals used for HR and CP training and CP dissemination meetings, as well as materials showing live police-activities in dealing with emergency situations like public protests.

Review was also done on several official documents, like Law No. 2/2002 on Indonesian National Police, SKEP 737/X/2005 on the implementation of CP and its guidelines in SKEP 431, 432, 433, and the revised version of SKEP 737 (approved September 2008), the National Police Strategic Plan 2005-2009 and the Strategic Plan (revised) April 2007, Working Paper on the National Police Grand Strategy, The Police Grand Strategy 2005-2025, the Helsinki Memorandum of Understanding-15 August 2005, Law of the Republic of Indonesia No. 29/2006 on Governing Aceh, NAD *Qanuns* in particular *Qanun* No. 11/2004 on the roles of police in Aceh, and other *Qanuns* particularly on Islamic *sharia* and the roles of *adat*. The Team also reviewed some academic accounts of current socio-political conditions in Aceh, with a view to special problems faced by women and children both before and after the 2005 Peace Agreement, especially in relation to the revival of *adat* and the implementation of Islamic *sharia*.

Throughout the field visits, the Team also conducted so-called participant observation by attending HR and CP training in many training centres, joining end-of-the-day evaluation sessions with trainers, supervisors, observers and minute takers, as well as participating in the preparation of upcoming training sessions. Of course, on-site observation was also conducted on the conditions of many training centres and the NAD Police School in Seulawah. In the districts of Blang Pidie and Bireun, the Team was presented with a rare opportunity to attend and observe large gatherings of CP information dissemination for community members. In Jakarta, the Team had a privilege of attending a roundtable discussion organised by the National Police Working Group drafting the ‘Guideline for the Strategy and Implementation of Community Policing’.

6. Information and Data Organisation

Every interview was instantly recorded in the form of hand-written notes, with all key expressions recorded in verbatim. All information gathered makes up piles of enormous data. Some are more relevant than others for the evaluation task. It was through a series of classifications and re-classifications based on thematic focus (see TABLE 3) that these enormous data began to be organised. At the end of each interview day, the Team took time to discuss the “harvests of the day” and classify new information according to thematic focus. The links between one category of information and the other gradually began to show up, and these intricate links eventually make up what may be called, for lack of a better term, a “landscape of vistas” so crucial for the evaluation task.

This also proved to be a useful way of preparing for the next interviews. Not only was certain data or information being weighed and assessed, but their patterns of relationship could gradually be discerned in an increasingly manageable fashion. Various tables, graphs, narratives, verbatim expressions presented in this report were organised through this process.

7. Organisation of Chapters

The main findings of this report will be organised into the following three parts, (1) programme design and PP NAD management; (2) programme implementation; and (3) impact to date. Additional findings will be incorporated into one of these three parts depending on their categorical affinity.

Chapter II

Programme Design and Management

“It’s easy to build training centres, IOM has the money and what we do is watch over the contractors. But how to build partnership..., or change police conduct? That’s not easy, even with all IOM’s money. We know all these things only from doing and trying to do”.

(PP NAD Project Assistant, Interview, Aceh, July 2008)

Effectiveness, efficiency and impact of PP NAD’s programme are three main criteria guiding the task of appraising in this evaluation. The criteria of effectiveness, efficiency and impact include many things. Among others is the extent to which the initial design is sufficiently open to new challenges and opportunities arising from the way the programme has been implemented.

A. Design of Programme

Every design, including that of PP NAD, is founded upon certain assumption, regardless of whether it is explicitly stated or remains hidden. The evaluation process started with a review of conceptual assumptions underlying the overall design of PP NAD, i.e., assumptions upon which PP NAD’s choice of activities is founded. These assumptions, if in part, can be deciphered from the PP NAD Logical-Framework, IOM-Donors’ letter of agreement and also from the types of PP NAD ongoing activities whose assumptions are hardly stated in any documents.

1. Assumption of NAD Police Project

Based on review of key documents, the following four points may be understood as the main assumptions underlying PP NAD:

a. Cultural Reform through re-training of police personnel

This assumption is best understood within the context of three-pronged reform of the Indonesian National Police that includes structural, instrumental, and cultural aspects. It is within the cultural dimension of reform that the “re-training of police personnel” is best understood. Given that the notion of ‘re-training’ (as part of education) reflects an ‘agency approach’ to a problem, this assumption reveals an interesting point. Not only does this assumption show a belief that structural and instrumental changes are insufficient, but it also reflects a fitting awareness that organisational changes (structural dimension) and changes in law or legislation (instrumental dimension) are neither identical with nor immediately affect changes in police behaviour, conduct or daily practices. It is revealing to learn that ‘culture’ is understood here not in an abstract sense of “system of values” but in terms of the contents of day-to-day

practices and habits. By implication, this also means that “the proof of the pudding is in the eating”, i.e., the proof of police cultural changes can be no other than changes in their daily behaviour, conduct and practices. Indeed, PP NAD’s focus on police re-training (based on HR and CP) can be a promising vision. It is also strategic, in the sense that re-trained police personnel may lead to the indispensability of structural and instrumental changes, if because the existing structure and instruments gradually become outdated to accommodate the re-trained personnel.⁶

b. Re-training in ‘knowledge’ is expected to change ‘conduct and practices’

From various documents on PP NAD’s design, it is interesting to observe another layer of assumption, in which new knowledge in CP and HR basic principles is expected to have direct impact on police daily conduct and practices. It is unclear, however, how the moves from ‘new knowledge’ (*to know*) to ‘new conduct/practices’ (*to do*) are ensured, say, through a training in habitual daily conduct/practices or through a monitoring system. Nowhere in the documents is this crucial point made explicit. Not surprisingly perhaps, this shortcoming seems to have become a real concern at the operational level, as subsequently observed by the Team. The declining number of complaints from community members is immediately taken by police personnel as proof of improvement in their daily policing practices. This is unfortunate, for community members are reluctant to report to the police for two main reasons. One is, to use their own words, “we report of a stolen goat, but we soon lose a cow”. The other is, “of course we hardly report to the police, for we prefer to go to *keuchik* [head of village]”.

It is perhaps also relevant to learn from the following interview accounts given by one of senior police officers in charge of police education:

“From the point of view of CP syllabus, IOM notion of new knowledge is to implement CP through Community-Police Forum (CPF). When CPF is absent, the police are at loss. That’s why a series of MoUs [between district regents, police district chiefs, and other community stakeholders – ET] have been organised. But with these MoUs, CPF runs the risk of being turned into a fixed institution, while what is meant by ‘forum’ is actually ‘a forum in mind’, and this could be done under a tree, in coffee houses, in *meunasah*, and so forth. The goal is to identify local problems to be solved together. It’s better not to make the partnership a formal institution. To make this partnership formal will only bring friction, say, between *adat* and positive law. Remember, rule is in the end a matter of consensus”.

c. Police Reform is carried out by re-embedding the police in local community

It is rather clear from several documents that this re-embedding is done through a strategy of forging police-community partnership to safeguard public order. As will be clear, this, despite its merits, may turn out to be a one-track objective inattentive to many unintended consequences. For instance, the rhetoric of partnership may easily slip into a new way of doing intelligence work. This possibility is not suggested out of nothing, as “CP is a new way of doing intelligence work” is exactly part of the suspicion among not a few members of community, even more in several districts previously afflicted by bitter conflicts, like the districts of Pidie and Bireun.

⁶ It may not be grossly mistaken to understand the issuance of SKEP 737/X/2005 (after some classroom trainings had been conducted) as an example of this need (IOM Programme Manager’s speech, ‘Implementation of Community Policing using an Aceh-Culture Approach’, Banda Aceh, April 24, 2008)

d. All the above assumptions stand on another assumption that peace process in Aceh will not suffer from a setback

From the logical framework, it is rather clear that PP NAD is quite sensitive to two layers of peace process. The first is the minimal-formal notion of peace, which is reflected in the return of the routine and normal daily life. This, for instance, refers to a sense of safety for children to go to or return from school, or for ordinary people to go out after the dusk, or for men to spend their evenings in coffee houses. The second layer refers to a state of peace in substantive term, like how the gap in resources allocation is being addressed, the state of relationships between community members and groups previously known as GAM, between police and GAM factions, between local political parties, or between police-military and community members in the context of past traumas. It is within this second layer of peace process that potentials for a new conflict have not entirely disappeared. This does not seem to have been taken seriously as a problem, if because this problem requires serious efforts in social analysis. Not unexpectedly perhaps, PP NAD seems reticent to step into this delicate issue, for instance by incorporating past traumas into training materials or into CP dissemination process.

2. Sensitivity to Aceh Specificity

PP NAD's openness to cultural issues most relevant to Aceh is something worth noting. When PP NAD activities were set in motion, many discussions about Islamic *sharia* as well as about other issues related to Aceh cultural specificity also began to be conducted. Not a few parties interviewed acknowledge that police training administered by IOM PP has a competitive superiority over other previous trainings organised by other agencies.

This advantage in contextualising HR and CP within Aceh cultural specificity is worth continuing. It is very likely, however, that this virtue needs more serious and systematic approach backed by adequate intellectual reflections on the part of both PP NAD and *Polda* NAD to understand the intricacies involved. The following example is illustrative.

Around early 2008, when a change in approach to CP implementation was discussed at the INP level, a new step was suggested to discontinue the strategy of establishing CPF as an institutional set-up and, in place of it, to make use of the existing community forums. PP NAD responded to this shift in strategy by conceiving the Aceh *adat* as an entry point.⁷ Unfortunately, this change is not as uncomplicated as it first appears. From various interviews with community members, it is clear that there are many dilemmas involved in this reorientation, all pointing to several unintended adverse consequences unforeseen by PP NAD (*this issue will be taken up in details in the discussion on 'Impact of PP NAD', Chapter IV*).

⁷ From various interviews with both police personnel and community members (whose substance is corroborated by PP NAD Project Manager), the idea of making use of *adat* as an entry point for CP in NAD was originated from one of the NAD middle-ranking police officers, who has for some time been adopting this approach in his daily work.

3. Sensitivity to Gender Issues

Once ‘gender-sensitive perspective’ is required as a *sine-qua-non* in almost all agenda of reform, some risks also begin to be lurking in the wings. Among others are:

- The requirement to adopt gender perspective is dealt with through the formality of raising quota for women’s attendance in public meetings; and
- The requirement to adopt gender perspective is managed through ‘gender mainstreaming’ which tends to stand on the “one-size-fits-all” principle. Despite its merits, this approach is less likely to take into consideration the roles of Acehese women during the periods of armed conflicts and post-tsunami, or even the roles of women in peace process.

PP NAD’s sensitivity to these risks has its virtue, in that its cautious attitudes prevent PP NAD from falling into an either/or stance. On the one hand, based on various interviews, what is advocated by gender mainstreaming approach seems to remain alien to the worldview of Acehese *adat* and Islamic *sharia*. On the other, the principle of gender mainstreaming has no small potentials to genuinely transform some of *adat* and *sharia* practices antithetical to women’s rights. Even in its cautiousness to avoid an either/or stance, PP NAD seems to have opted for the gender mainstreaming approach. It is here that there is a clear need for PP NAD to refine its approach by taking into account real experiences in the Aceh settings, for instance, by placing these experiences within a staging-and-sequencing strategy. In other words, police’s experiences of gender problems in their day-to-day work are not something that can simply be brushed aside, but rather to be taken into account by inserting a tactic of gradualness into PP NAD’s gender mainstreaming approach (*this point will be taken up in detail in ‘Special Note on Gender’, Chapter III, I*).

4. Involvement of Community Groups & Civil Society Organisations

It is clear from the design that police reform – of which CP is the prime principle – is intended to transform the entire police *modus vivendi* (way of life) and *modus procedendi* (way of proceeding) “from the militaristic style to a civilian character”. This warrants brief clarification. In its conceptual evolution, the antithesis of ‘civil’ is not ‘militaristic’ but, rather, ‘barbarous’. As such, the widely used opposition between ‘civilian’ and ‘military’, despite its lack of precision, is certainly intended to point to some resemblance between militaristic and barbarous styles of conduct. But why this resemblance? The most likely answer lies in the notional evolution in which the *use of force* has gradually been replaced by the *use of law* as a standard of civility. It is within this evolution that the agency charged with the use of force (i.e., the military) is seen to be at variance with the standard of civility, hence the opposition between ‘civil’ and ‘militaristic’.⁸

⁸ Without going too far, it is worth noting cursorily that the terms ‘civil’, ‘civilian’, ‘civility’, ‘civilised’, all are rooted in Latin word *civis* (citizen), from which are formed other Latin terms like *civitas* (political community), *civilis* (features of citizens’ way of life – ‘civil’ in English), or *civilitas* (of citizens’ culture and manners – ‘civility’ in English). All were used to distinguish between those living in a polity (under rules of law, including an organised military) and those without polity (in a state of nature). From all these etymological origins came the term ‘civil society’

It is also within this context that serious attention to the incorporation of civilian values into the once-militaristic police organisation has been taken as a *sine-qua-non* for police reform. It needs to be borne in mind that there is no guarantee that groups, associations or organisations claiming to embody ‘civilian’ values are by default champions of civility. Based on the Team’s past and current experiences and involvements in the world of CSOs and NGOs in Indonesia, not a few of these self-proclaimed civil society organisations are often more uncivilised and self-serving than some military units; rather than showing commitment to day-to-day labour of change, what they are after now and then is sheer limelight and publicity. On the other hand, it is hard to deny that the values represented by some trustworthy CSOs can be the most strategic entry point for the police to learn how to shake off the legacy of ‘militaristic’ values. Here lies the importance of critically engaging some genuinely committed and trustworthy CSOs – and not any CSOs or NGOs – into the agenda for police reform.

Tracing back the evolution of PP NAD’s activities, there seem to be several stages of CSO involvement:

- IOM arrived in Aceh at the invitation of a CSO called *Partnership for Good Governance and Reform* (March 25, 2005).⁹ Several parties like the INP and *Polda* NAD solicited for the vast-experienced IOM to conduct preparatory discussions in anticipation of peace building process in Aceh.
- In the process of classroom training delivery, IOM-created PP NAD began to engage many persons representing the voices of local community, and these persons acted as observers, speakers or seminar participants.
- At the same time as this mid-term evaluation, a research team from Syah Kuala University, Banda Aceh, was conducting ‘impact evaluation’ on PP NAD’s activities. No less importantly, PP NAD in tandem with *Polda* NAD were also conducting so-called ‘Ramadhan roadshow’ in which lecturers from the Islamic Institute (IAIN) Ar-Ranniry were travelling all over Aceh to help disseminate the principle of CP among villagers.

These ways of involving CSOs have a promising prospect. From on-site observation of training process and review of curricula, syllabi and training materials, however, CSO engagement is more of observing in nature than of participating to jointly shape the training contents. This is also true with the types of CSO involvement in CP dissemination process.

There seems to be a need for PP NAD to identify some committed and trustworthy CSOs known to have critical and independent views toward police conduct. Of

(English) or *société civile* (French), both are direct translations from the term *societas civilis* in Latin. *Societas civilis* was a term coined by Leonardo Bruni, a fifteenth-century Italian Renaissance thinker, to translate Aristotle’s Greek term, *koinonia politiké* (political community). The antithesis of ‘civil’ (like in ‘civil society’) is not ‘militaristic’ but ‘barbarian’ (Latin: *barbaricus*). Although etymological genesis and modern doctrine are to be kept distinct, the current popular opposition between ‘civilian’ and ‘military’ is certainly lacking in precision.

⁹ IOM Police Team, Draft, ‘Support for National Police Reform in Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam’, August 18, 2005, p 5.

course, this identification is done with a view to their inclusion in the discussions of training materials, monitoring system and of issues related to the broader concern of Acehese society. This may also prevent PP NAD and *Polda* NAD from falling into like-and-dislike criteria in matters of CSO involvement. In an interview with one of PP NAD personnel, for instance, it was rather unfortunate to learn this view: “NGOs are not stakeholders in PP NAD”.

While it is true that not all CSOs have genuine and trustworthy commitment to civilian values, what is expected is more than simply inviting some members of these CSOs to be observers in police training and public meeting. Rather, what seems expected is for some of these committed and trustworthy CSOs to play active roles in shaping the contents of training and public meeting, of which being observers is only part. Indeed, the following view taken from a group interview may sound too lofty yet not completely out of court:

“Police reform in Aceh needs custodians, and they must guard jealously. This can only come from independent groups within CSOs. Of course, IOM’s priority today is police training, but is there a way for IOM to help develop such custodian groups? Not for other reasons but for police reform! Otherwise, I’m afraid police reform in Aceh will fail. Without them, the police will simply say “we’ve changed” but go back to their hiding places and nowhere is found the evidence of change”.

Not surprisingly, engaging CSOs also proves to be part of PP NAD’s mandate. The message seems clear: police reform can hardly be carried out without jealous and watchful eyes.

5. Human Resources

What is to be noted here is confined to the involvement of NAD police personnel within PP NAD’s activities, especially in HR and CP training. It does not include PP NAD internal human resources, an issue to be discussed separately under the rubric of ‘PP NAD Management’ (*Chapter II, B*).

The Team is well aware that a project design is not necessarily disproved simply by demonstrating the contrary taken from experience, for the term “experience” is often used (or rather, abused) as a sheer cover-up for complacency or even incompetence in carrying out the design. At the same time, it is worth noting that the principal question concerning PP NAD’s design is the issue of effectiveness. It is effective in the sense that the very design functions beneficially as the principal guide to all activities at the level of practice. In this sense, it is not completely unjustified to suggest the following points to be considered in the revision of the Project’s design:

- Some of the first-cohort local trainers from the first ToT (Training of Trainers) were chiefs of police sub-districts in Aceh (*Kapolsek*). It was admitted by both PP NAD and many training participants that they were the best graduates of ToT and subsequently acted as quality trainers. Despite their competence, many police district chiefs (*Kapolres*) raised objections to the inclusion of their subordinates (*Kapolsek*) as trainers, on the grounds that this inclusion too often takes them away from field operations. By a management *fiat* from the Chief of *Polda* NAD (*Kapolda*), they now cease to be trainers, again albeit their competence as trainers. When this evaluation was still underway, PP NAD has

successfully managed to organise four more batches of ToT, so that by now there are 243 trainers in HR and CP available – or 110.5% of the rates of achievement from the initial target.

- The cascading method employed in HR and CP training is praiseworthy. In a sense, this method is a modification of cell system for affecting organisational changes in an onion-like process. However, its merits greatly depend on the levels of discipline and sustained capacity to transmit quality knowledge. When these requirements are relatively absent, what tends to occur is a phenomenon of “the lower, the poorer”. Indeed, the first ToT was characterised by quality teaching and learning process, with all the richness of lively discussions full of insightful arguments and counter-arguments. As if being dragged down by the law of stratificational gravity, what is left at the lowest layer is little more than conformity to HR and CP textbooks. It is not unusual then to find that some trainers simply evade tough questions by rallying the whole class to give big applauses to the questioners. The applauses certainly give an appearance of appreciation to the questioners, but it is also a way of evading the questions. Or, to take another example, in the process of teaching, trainers often mention foreign terms easily found in the textbook, like ‘trafficking’, ‘apartheid’, ‘gender’ or ‘discrimination’. Once these terms are mentioned, the trainers call out: “It is clear, isn’t it!”, without in any way explaining the meaning of the terms. To change the cascading method is certainly not wise. The most realistic way to address this problem is to conduct regular refresher courses for trainers, especially at the middle and lower levels.

B. Management of NAD Police Project

To begin with, it is important to reiterate that the objective of PP NAD is to support police reform in Aceh within the framework of support for the implementation of the Helsinki Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement.


The issue of PP NAD Management under evaluation therefore concerns the extent to which it has performed its mission to achieve the above purpose. In its execution, PP NAD is led by a Project Manager (hereafter NAD PM), who is directly responsible to the Programme Manager (hereafter PM). In turn PM is directly under the desk of IOM Chief of Mission.

The NAD PM is assisted by a Senior Project Assistant (SPA) and a group of staff (project assistants, liaison assistants), administrative assistant and Project Officer (PO). In addition, NAD PM is supported by several consultants with consultative roles, i.e., gender consultant (vacant at the time of mid-term evaluation), HR and CP consultants, international consultants for police recruitment and psycho-social assessments supported by parallel consultants at the levels of INP Headquarters and *Polda* NAD. Prior to this evaluation, there were also some international consultants for short-term arrangements to help evaluation of management and gender. In terms of logistics and infrastructure, PP NAD is supported by the Office of Resources Management as part of NAD IOM.

At the national level (IOM Support Police Reform Unit), there is under PM a desk of Programme Coordinator (PC) with the tasks of coordinating IOM projects funded by the Royal Netherlands Embassy – the project is called “Strengthening Indonesian National Police through Institution Building” (SINP). PC has a coordinative line but no direct authority over PP NAD, in the way that PM NAD has also a coordinative line but no direct authority over PC. As clear from the organisational chart for the overall IOM Police Unit, the links between NAD Project Manager (NAD PM), NAD Senior Project Assistant (SPA), Administrative Assistant (AA), and Project Officer (PO) are characterised by direct organisational lines (straight lines), whereas the consultative roles of consultants are shown in dotted lines.

This note on organisational lines (see DIAGRAM 1) is suggested to estimate some possible confusion that could possibly arise from some organisational muddling-through. For instance, it may happen that, for one reason or another, some experts begin to act beyond their roles, while management officers are hard pressed to act simply as consultants.

DIAGRAM 1
IOM Support Police Reform Organisational Chart



Source: IOM (Support Police Reform Unit) Organisational Chart (undated)

How is the above management system being performed to achieve the main objective in supporting police reform in Aceh? For the purpose of evaluation, so-called communication-related issues are organised into ‘organisational communication’ and ‘informal communication’.

1. Organisational Communication

a. The setting-up of management unit devoted to the day-to-day work of PP NAD is commendable, precisely because the focus and intensity of PP NAD's activities require managerial guarantee at the operational level. It is clear that the nature of PP NAD's existing activities is very unlikely to be effectively managed from the Jakarta high-office. A possible tendency that PP NAD is then consequentially uncontrollable or off-track from the design – due to managerial rupture from the Jakarta-based central management – may have had happened in the past, but the team is of an opinion that the present PP NAD management is far from such a tendency. There is indeed a real need for the PP NAD management to be genuinely embedded in the Aceh setting, either in terms of ideas, day-to-day organisation of activities or in terms of geographical pace. No doubt the genius of latest information technology can be harnessed for supporting the work of PP NAD, but it cannot in any way replace the advantages of physical proximity and direct interactions.

b. Both NAD PM (and PP NAD) and Programme Coordinator/PC (and IOM SINP) need to be in coordination under the Programme Manager (PM). The overall structure of management (see above organisational chart) clearly shows that (i) PC has coordinative lines to NAD PM, in the way that NAD PM also has coordinative lines to PC; (ii) in terms of formal organisational position, NAD PM (and PP NAD) are on a par with PC (and SINP); and (iii) both PC (and SINP) and NAD PM (and PP NAD) are, in terms of coordination, equally under and both directly responsible to PM.

c. Although sometimes there seems to be some incongruence between organisational lines and job description (ToR) for some functional positions, the Team is of an opinion that the present management structure and organisational lines are capable of balancing the following two seemingly opposing needs. On the one hand, there is no doubt that PP NAD needs to remain within the vision and programme of SINP. This need is well addressed by direct responsibility of NAD PM to PM. On the other hand, the work of PP NAD indispensably needs the application of subsidiarity principle as well as a high degree of embeddedness within the specificity of Acehnese society. This need is guaranteed and hedged by the existing management unit institutionally organised for the work of PP NAD. If there is any notion that this arrangement does not guarantee the development of mutual learning process, it arises less from the present management structure than from the low degree of optimal utilisation of the existing monthly reports, evaluation reports, internal monitoring mechanism and regular coordination meetings between related parties.

d. Down to the management of PP NAD, the desk of Senior Project Assistant/SPA is of crucial importance to the day-to-day working of PP NAD. The desk of SPA and how its role being performed have effectively linked up both the management and communication lines spanning from the highest to the lowest levels. No less importantly, the SPA desk has acted as an effective bridge for possible gaps that may arise between various levels of task execution.

e. While the lines of authority within PP NAD management have been made clear on paper (see DIAGRAM 1 – *the organisational chart was supplied by PP NAD Senior Project Assistant/SPA as of July 2008*), it is on this issue that some misunderstanding seems to have occurred on some occasions. Among many project assistants (PA) in

local training centres, for instance, the Team observed some confusion concerning the roles of experts. On the one hand, based on ToR the roles of an expert seem to be more than consultative in nature. On the other hand, based on the organisational chart the position of an expert is within the same category of consultants. It is apparently this dilemma which has given rise to confusion among PAs. There is indeed an urgent need for PP NAD to clear up this dilemma, if because the issue remains confusing among PAs. Of course, all this is not for clarity's sake, but because organisational unclarity seems to have created an un-conducive climate for collegiality. This is also true with regard to the experts' areas of expertise. When there was a vacancy for the role of gender consultant, for instance, an "expert" stepped in to fill the gap, even if 'gender' is less of his/her area of expertise. This may come from the emergency needs or the emergency nature of certain activities as much as from the good will or enthusiasm for PP NAD's mission. Nevertheless, it seems clear that PP NAD needs to stay faithful to its organisational structure, if because this is what is understood by all personnel within PP NAD management, including by all PAs in far-away training centres. This is not to deny any ideas to change the organisational structure needed for improvement, but any changes need to be communicated in a clear way to all parties within PP NAD.

f. On the other hand, there also seems to be problem in which regular staff officers, for one reason or another, can only act as if in mere consultative roles. The clearest example is the role of Project Officer (PO). Based on organisational chart and PO's job description, the desk of PO is under the direct line of NAD PM, assisting the latter in many tasks, and in no way is the role merely consultative. Apparently due to lack of proper access to day-to-day working mechanism as well as to regular reports, the roles of PO appear to be rather discomfited. There seems to be a real need to clarify the roles of PO, if not on paper then in practice.

g. For some time PP NAD has conducted a regular weekly internal meeting for its staff in Banda Aceh. Based on interviews with PP NAD staff, this weekly meeting seems to have had tremendous beneficial impacts. Not only is the technicality of day-to-day tasks being discussed, but there is real possibility that other non-technical issues are being shared and discussed, like personal experiences in work, intellectual insights, analysis, and no less importantly communication problems related to cultural sensitivity and interpersonal relations. One week before this evaluation started, a special meeting was attended by all PP NAD personnel, including trainers and drivers. A meeting of the kind was held for the first time, and all agreed that this meeting has had beneficial impacts on the PP NAD collegiality. Many forms of misunderstanding can be cleared up, provided that all parties are open to feedback without any judgemental attitudes.

h. With regard to the leadership of NAD PM, the Team has arrived at the following conclusion. *First*, the work, roles and leadership of the present NAD PM deserve genuine appreciation from IOM in Jakarta, PP NAD donors, NAD IOM, *Polda* NAD, INP Headquarters, and other PP NAD stakeholders. *Secondly*, the admirable quality, commitment and competence of the present NAD PM are likely to be put to a finest optimum by being accompanied – as different from being administratively assisted – by trustworthy experts. In mutual confidence and genuine trust, such trustworthy experts could be of invaluable supports for the continuation of the present NAD PM's quality leadership. For this purpose, what seems merited is less the availability of

consultants – these experts are not to replace consultants – than a possibility of genuinely insightful and fruitful dialogues with trustworthy experts on an *ad hoc* or non-permanent basis.

2. Informal Communication

It is important to understand all the strengths and loopholes in organisational communication suggested above within the context of the following issues in informal communication:

a. In many respects, the genuine achievements of the present PP NAD can hardly be understood without acknowledging the conducive relationships between NAD Project Manager (NAD PM) and Programme Manager (PM). This point is by no means suggested to belittle the hard work, supports and commitment of others in both PP NAD and IOM Central Office in Jakarta. Hard work, supports and commitment notwithstanding, it is clear that the level of mutual trust and open communication between NAD PM and PM have remarkably worked as a crucial factor in bringing PP NAD to its present achievements. The quality of relationships between PP NAD and PM has fruitfully worked to mitigate communication-related problems that may have arisen from organisational structure as much as from interpersonal misunderstanding and miscommunication.

b. The quality relationships between NAD PM and PM seem also to have worked beneficially to weather adverse consequences for PP NAD, which may arise from petty rumours, intrigues or mislaid interventions not uncommonly found in office politics. The steadfastness of both NAD PM and PM is an admirable management virtue to be sustained. This managerial steadfastness is not to be taken as inflexibility to new ideas, suggestions, feedbacks or criticisms, for all this needs to be cultivated and placed by both NAD PM and PM within the context of common good for PP NAD.

c. Within the scope of PP NAD Management, the leadership of the present NAD PM is an issue that merits special notes. After the completion of Ms. Susan Malone's term as NAD PM, the commencement of the current NAD PM seemed to have brought a new outlook to PP NAD.

d. As in the case of INP reform, *Polda* NAD reform needs to be understood as a process with all its staging and sequencing. To compel *Polda* NAD – which only 3 years earlier were still entangled in conflicts – to transform their “militaristic” conduct into a “civilian” character in a few years is like expecting a toddler to become a mature adult in so short a time. The issue of process with all its staging and sequencing is crucial. Here comes the importance of a PP NAD leadership familiar and conversant with the Indonesian or Acehnese police worldview, outlook, approach, habits, practices and malpractices; in short, ‘police grammar’. No doubt the same leadership needs to understand well the civilian values toward which the current state of *Polda* NAD is to be reformed. Nevertheless, at this early stage of *Polda* NAD reform, the Team is of an opinion that a PP NAD leadership more familiar with ‘the police grammar’ is a real priority over any alternative less familiar with ‘the police grammar’. If this appears controversial, the controversy comes from a strategic

urgency for PP NAD to enter through ‘police door’ in order to come out of ‘civilian door’.

e. It is more likely that, for the next one year at least, the present NAD PM leadership is well equipped to deal with the above need. This is corroborated, for instance, by one of PP NAD donors who admits that “the appointment of the present PM is extremely helpful, commanding respect from *Polda* NAD as much as from the public; this is a very good move”. Similar view can easily be found among senior and middle-ranking police officers and rank-and-files throughout Aceh. It comes as no surprise then, as many parties believe, that the present relationships between PP NAD and *Polda* NAD are in a cordial state. Of course, cordial relationships can easily slip into complacency, and not a few concerned parties interviewed for this evaluation expect that the supports PP NAD lends to *Polda* NAD are to be of critical supports.

f. There is another important reason rarely acknowledged. PP NAD is a project to support the Aceh peace process through capacity building of *Polda* NAD, especially through re-training (re-education) of police personnel in human rights and community policing. What is rarely appreciated is the fact that the present NAD PM is an ex-police officer whose vast experiences are not confined to high-profile field operations. Directly pertinent to PP NAD concern is the NAD PM’s long experiences and rich expertise in police education. The present PP NAD leadership is endowed with astute understanding about the intricacies of education process, education cycle, and how all this involves not only ‘cognitive knowledge’ but also ‘embodied practices’ for an education to affect changes in police daily conduct. This point needs to be highlighted, in view of the fact that questions about management usually revolve only around the technicalities of organisational effectiveness and efficiency. In short, the Team is of an opinion that the present PP NAD leadership makes up an optimal combination of managerial skills for the present state of PP NAD and genuine expertise in police education that is at the heart of IOM approach in supporting *Polda* NAD reform.

g. Strength and weakness can be likened to twin sisters. The following notes on shadows are suggested to put all the above points into perspective:

- As leadership style in a profession does not change overnight, so the style of police leadership is not altered instantly simply with the person assuming the position and roles of manager in a civilian organisation. It is the traces of this police leadership style that seem to have baffled not a few PP NAD staff. This needs to be put into perspective. On the one hand, there are many who, instead of being puzzled, begin to learn how to be leaders in a steadfast and decisive manner. On the other hand, there are some who perceive the same steadfastness and decisiveness as indistinguishable from harshness, for indeed it is not easy to distinguish between ‘firm’ and ‘harsh’.
- The NAD PM leadership, with its high degree of managerial steadfastness and decisiveness and substantive competence in police education, may not find it easy to coordinate things through delegation and subsidiarity. While this may have stemmed from naturally superior competence and expertise, it is virtuous for NAD PM to cultivate possible cadre formation, for instance, by assigning some capable staff members once in a while to chair weekly meeting. The

resolute style of NAD PM may also easily create anxiety on the part of the staff to freely share their ideas.

- The NAD PM leadership, which is strongly based on clear organisational structure, may also find it hard to forge collaboration with organisations with less hierarchical and organisational clarity, like many NGOs or other organisations with looser management. For instance, it may not be natural for the clearly structured PP NAD then to be in smooth collaboration with other IOM NAD units characterised by different styles of management and different areas of involvement. In addition, the same style may also find it difficult to adjust to new positions added to the existing management structure. This delicate issue, however, is more ambiguous than others. That is, all these shadows in the NAD PM style of leadership may also come less from the traces of the leadership background in police institution than from the differences in personal style common in all walks of life.
- It is not entirely clear how collaboration between PP NAD and other IOM Units in Aceh is conducted. No doubt, meetings and information sharing among IOM Units' project managers have been done on a case-to-case basis. Differences in mandate for each Unit may also make more regular collaboration as something not quite natural. Based on interviews, however, there seem to be possible ways for collaboration. *First*, PP NAD could forge some link with the Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration Unit (DDR) in terms of encouraging both ex-combatants and police personnel to actively participate in various social events organised by PP NAD and DDR. *Secondly*, PP NAD could cultivate collaboration with AJP (Aceh Justice Project) for some joint-reflections on Aceh *adat*, as the latter has been working on it. Of course this is in spite of the fact that AJP is part of UNDP rather than of IOM.

h. In fairness, no matter how clear management structure and job description for each personnel is, the quality of interpersonal interactions also deeply affects PP NAD management. The following three points pertaining to communication-related issues among PP NAD staff members are worth noting: (a) the importance of interpersonal approach; (b) the importance of cultural sensitivity; and (c) the importance of inclusiveness.

- **Importance of interpersonal approach:** From interviews with almost all PP NAD personnel, it is clear that interpersonal communication plays a central role in the conduciveness of working climate. What is seen by most staff members as communication that is constructive for collegiality is ways of communicating that are not judgmental and not offensive, but reminding and encouraging. By contrast, being judgmental, offensive, derogatory, insulting and looking down on others are seen as the sure path to inconducive working climate. All this is not to be taken as a petition for lenience. All staff personnel interviewed for this evaluation insist that personal feedback and correction must be given, but to be given not in public, let alone in judgmental and offensive tones, but in ways that are personal, discreet, serious and non-judgmental.
- **Importance of Cultural Sensitivity:** What is meant by cultural sensitivity here refers not to the climate of interactions and communication between Indonesian and non-Indonesian staff. The diversity of cultural backgrounds even among

Indonesian staff members creates no small potential for some misunderstanding detrimental to a sense of collegiality within PP NAD. For a person coming from a certain cultural background, for instance, to be given correction in public may not be a problem, but not for many Acehnese staff personnel who concede that, “As Acehnese, it is insulting to be corrected in front of other staff”. The same is true with misunderstanding due to cultural insensitivity among Indonesian and non-Indonesian staff. For instance, the word ‘*bulé*’ is an expression many non-Indonesians (non-Asian) consider derogatory and insulting (perhaps equivalent to ‘*negro*’ in the US), even if not intended by the speaker. Equally, to call others who are much older with mere names, and not with ‘*bapak*’ or ‘*ibu*’, may be considered improper or impolite, even if this way of addressing is considered polite or even affectionate in Western cultures. Of course, what is noted here does not concern propriety for propriety’s sake. Rather, as confided by many during personal interviews with PP NAD personnel, misunderstanding due to cultural insensitivity creates interpersonal prejudices averting genuine collaboration and a sense of collegiality. This delicate point on informal communication is not to be stretched too far, for often the problem lies less in cultural insensitivity than in personal immaturity.

- **Importance of Inclusiveness:** From differing levels of involvement, there seems to be unanimous expectation among PP NAD staff to have more sense of ownership. They wish to be included in owning the PP NAD vision rather than simply executing tasks at the operational level. This may appear as a tall order. But it may be commendable to integrate this expectation into weekly meetings, for instance, by injecting more reflections and analyses into the agenda.

3. Management Focus

The PP NAD overall objective to “support the peace process and implementation of the MoU signed between the Government of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement through the reform of policing in the province of Aceh” is specified into 4 specific objectives, which in turn are operationalised through several activities according to the nature of each specific objective. The table (TABLE 4) on the following page shows how this overall objective is organised into specific purposes and activities.

‘Management focus’ in this report concerns the extent to which PP NAD’s performance has covered all four project specific objectives in a balanced manner and in accordance with the work-plan. If it has, what is the state of the balance? Or, alternatively, does the present state of PP NAD reflect a hierarchy of priorities?

TABLE 4
Description of NAD Police Project

| Overall Objective | Specific Objectives | Activities |
|--|--|--|
| Support for national police reform in Aceh | 1. To promote and contribute to the implementation of the principles and concepts of community policing among police officers and management staff, through the organisation of customised training sessions and the establishment of Police-Community Forums; | 1.1 Development and delivery of customised training for police officers in Community Policing; |
| | | 1.2 Establishment of Community-Police Forums; |
| | 2. To integrate international human rights standards into <i>Polda</i> NAD policies and daily practices, through the organisation of customized training sessions for police officers and their commanders; | 2.1 Development and delivery of customised training for police officers in HR |
| | 3. To improve <i>Polda</i> NAD's quality of training, through capacity-building within the Provincial Police School (<i>Sekolah Polisi Negara</i> – SPN) and the enhancement of <i>Polda</i> NAD's training facilities | 3.1 Capacity building to <i>Polda</i> NAD for the development of in-house training, through the provision of technical support to the Provincial Police School (SPN) and to the relevant police research and education institutions; |
| | | 3.2 Enhancement of the Police School's training facilities |
| | | 3.2 Construction of training centres in key districts. |
| 4. To assist <i>Kapolda</i> in improving <i>Polda</i> NAD's recruitment policies and practices, through a review of current recruitment policy in the context of Chapter 3.2, Reintegration into Society, Article 3.2.7 of the MoU | 4.1 Improved recruitment practices and policies enabling <i>Kapolda</i> to recruit quality personnel, who agree to conduct policing along the principles of community policing and human rights | |

Source: PP NAD Logical Framework (ASIE/2006/121-819)

Based on document reviews, interviews, field observations, participant observations and other sources, the Team has arrived at a conclusion that the present PP NAD is characterised by a hierarchy of priorities, as shown in the following table (TABLE 5). To help understand the table, the level of performance for each activity in all 4 specific objectives is valued with a score ranging from 0 to 10 – score 0 denoting the lowest level of performance, whereas 10 the highest. The valuation is of course given by the Team after assessing various data and, no less importantly, a “landscape of vistas” once all data are taken altogether.

A caveat is needed. The scores represent what the Team considers as the levels of performance in PP NAD activities up until the period of this evaluation and in no way are they to be interpreted as the state of affairs independent of the Team's valuation.

TABLE 5
Valuation of of PP NAD Levels of Performance

| | Specific Objectives | Activities | Score | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----------------------------------|---|---|-------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|----|
| | | | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
| Support for police reform in Aceh | 1. To promote ... CP training-CPF | 1.1 CP Training | | | | | | | | | | X | |
| | | 1.2 CPF Establishment | | | | | X | | | | | | |
| | 2. To integrate HR...HR training | 2.1 HR Training | | | | | | | | | X | | |
| | | 2.2 Support for integration into policies & practices | | | X | | | | | | | | |
| | 3. To improve quality of training | 3.1 SPN capacity building | | | | | X | | | | | | |
| | | 3.2 Improvement of TCs | | | | | | | | | X | | |
| | 4. To assist recruit policies&practices | 4.1 Recruitment review | | | | | | | | | X | | |
| | | 4.2 Support recruitment reform | | X | | | | | | | | | |

As clear from TABLE 5, the present state of PP NAD management is characterised by a hierarchy of priorities rather than by equilibrium of project activities. There are four areas of project activity showing high levels of performance, and this may also indicate on which areas the PP NAD management has had its focus:

1. Customised training in basic Community Policing concepts (score: 9)
2. Customised training in basic International Human Rights standards (score: 8)
3. Improvement of *Polda* NAD training facilities (score: 8)
4. Evaluation of *Polda* NAD recruitment policies and practices (score: 8)

Within the low levels of performance are the following PP NAD activities:

1. Support for integration of International Human Rights standards into policies and daily practices of *Polda* NAD (score: 2)
2. Support for reform in *Polda* NAD recruitment practices (score: 1)

In between are activities characterised by moderate levels of performance:

1. Establishment of Community-Police Forums (score: 4)
2. Capacity building for the Seulawah Police School (score: 4)

No doubt, what is parsimoniously presented in TABLE 5 reveals some and at the same time omits other aspects. The following are issues that are not immediately shown in the snapshot presented in the table:

- a. The category of activities in the above table is closely devised on the basis of the four specific objectives with its 2009 timeline as stipulated in the PP NAD Design. The valuation in scores is based on the progress of PP NAD activities up until the period of this evaluation (July-August 2008, or fourth semester of PP NAD).
- b. The strategy of staging and sequencing adopted by PP NAD management in achieving certain targets is not fully represented in the above valuation snapshot. For instance, the establishment of CPF (activity 1.2) is pursued at least through the following five (5) stages and sequences:

- Stage I: **CPF concept introduction** consisting of (i) training of police personnel; and (ii) discussions involving police personnel, PP NAD and CPF experts.
- Stage II: **CP information dissemination** among community members: (i) workshops for police personnel, experts, community leaders and members; and (ii) CPF information dissemination through joint-activities between police personnel and community members facilitated by *Polda* NAD, such as sports and *hikayat* festivals (*hikayat* is a Malay term for popular epic).
- Stage III: **Use of adat** within police-community partnership scheme.
- Stage IV: Development of **best practices through pilot projects** in two or three selected areas, which are then adopted as examples of success and failure within six months.
- Stage V: **Advanced learning process** based on best practices, reflections and evaluation, modification and adjustment of CPF practices in other areas in Aceh.

The above staging and sequencing make up a realistic view of CPF process and at the same time show that the outcome of CPF can hardly be harvested in a short period of timeline. This point is noted in order that the score-based valuation in TABLE 5 is interpreted with great caution. It is too optimistic to expect quality partnership between police and community to be achieved within the 2009 timeline, if because what is involved is not simply the establishment of CPF in name but to form and foster a quality partnership process on the scale of a province. This is what seems to have been meant by the reorientation of CPF concept done by the INP leadership: that CPF is not a ‘new institutional setup’ but a ‘partnership principle’. The above staging and sequencing also shows PP NAD’s awareness about what is involved in this reorientation.¹⁰

- c. The above proviso is also applicable to the specific objective related to capacity building for the Seulawah Police School (see TABLE 5, activity 3.1).
- d. On closer inspection, TABLE 5 shows a highly interesting pattern worthy of special attention, and this pattern is summed up as follows:
- *the more a project target is within PP NAD’s directive control and initiative, the more likely PP NAD has management focus;*
 - *the less a project target is within PP NAD’s directive control and initiative, the less likely PP NAD has management focus.*

But, what is meant by “PP NAD’s directive control”? And what does it mean when we say that HR and CP training is more within the directive control of PP NAD than, say, the directions of community-police partnership in CPF? As will be clear, this issue turns out to be directly connected with the extent to which the nature of a certain project activity is more institutionally-structured than other activities. In turn, the two are connected with the tangible and intangible nature of each specific objective of the project. In short, ‘PP NAD’s directive control’, ‘institutionally-structured nature of

¹⁰ Discussions of the new CPF strategy began in mid-2007 and resulted in the revised version of SKEP/737/X/2005, *The Implementation of Community Policing Strategy in the Performance of INP’s Duties* (September 2008).

activity' and the 'tangibility of specific objective' make up three concepts that are highly important for understanding PP NAD's performance.

As these three concepts will be recurring in the succeeding discussions, it is necessary at this point to clarify these concepts. Instead of elaborately discussing them, TABLE 6 presents the characteristics of each concept.

TABLE 6
Distinctions between Two Types of PP NAD Activity/Objective

| Type of activity | Characteristics | Example from Present Activities |
|--|--|---|
| More institutionally structured | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Customised proceeding of process, methods and contents of HR & CP training. • Regularised framework of monitoring and evaluation of HR & CP training. • Clear framework within which HR & CP trainers educated & recruited. • Clearly defined contents of training. • Formal contract, defined costs, clear timetable for construction of training centres. • Possible regularised internal monitoring of police conduct. • Clear scheme for PP NAD's financial support. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ⇒ Fixed manuals, textbook, regular timetable, defined pre & post-tests, lesson-plan, etc. ⇒ Day-to-day and regular timetable of continuous monitoring and evaluation of HR & CP training. ⇒ Presence of ToT, cascading framework, refresher course. ⇒ CP for middle-rank officers; CP & HR for <i>bintaras</i>. ⇒ Construction of 23 decentralised TC, provisions of training facilities. ⇒ Presence of Provost, Inspector for General Monitoring (<i>Irwasum</i>). ⇒ Systematic allocation of budgeting through clearly defined bookkeeping. |
| Less institutionally structured | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Indeterminate contents and directions of participants' perception and belief during CP dissemination. • Indeterminate contents, degree, directions and quality of police-community partnership. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ⇒ Difficulty in ascertaining the congruence between what PP NAD means and what CPF participants understand; type of issues raised during CPF-related activities. ⇒ Difficulty in knowing the degree and quality of community-police partnership process. |
| More within PP NAD's directive control | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • HR & CP training designed, organised, delivered, supervised and monitored by PP NAD. • Training methods determined by PP NAD. • Allocation of financial support in the hands of PP NAD. • Who to be invited to CP dissemination shaped by PP NAD. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ⇒ Design of manuals, ToT, lesson-plan, end-of-day training evaluation. ⇒ Training sessions, lesson hours, contents of training, choice of training methods. ⇒ Allowance for trainees, honorarium for trainers, purchase of TC building materials. ⇒ Quota for women in CPF-related activities |
| Less within PP NAD's directive control | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PP NAD has no control over CP & HR training within INP training institutions. • No control over INP structural and instrumental changes. • No control over contents of comprehension among CP dissemination participants, over contents of belief in gender perspective. • No control over process of changes in police conduct and practices. • No control over adoption of monitoring instrument for changes in conduct & practices | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ⇒ Difficulty in integration of CP & HR into curricula, job transfer, rotation of trainers, monitoring of teaching-learning process. ⇒ Difficulty in changing recruitment policies, in CP & HR-related policies. ⇒ Difficulty in police-community partnership, adoption of gender perspective & roles of women in CPF-related activities, adoption of Guideline for CP Implementation. ⇒ No reliable records of changes in police daily conduct and practices. ⇒ Absence of monitoring instruments, CSOs & community participation in monitoring police practices. |
| More tangible | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Visible and technical nature of building training centres. • Measurable nature of cognitive grasp of HR & CP knowledge. • Written documents on <i>Polda</i> NAD recruitment policies. • Measurable nature of financial balance sheet, vouchers, etc | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ⇒ Construction of TC, provision of training facilities & materials. ⇒ Availability of training pre & post-tests. ⇒ Completion of recruitment evaluation report, guideline for CP implementation. ⇒ Availability of bookkeeping on financial spending for project activities. |
| Less tangible | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Non-technical nature of process of incorporation of HR & CP principles into police daily conduct and practices. • Non-technical nature of the degree and quality of police-community partnership. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ⇒ Absence of criteria for implementation of HR & CP principles in daily conduct & practices. ⇒ Difficulty in knowing the degree of police-community partnership; degree of sense of ownership among police & community |

4. Management Performance

The pattern suggested above is substantively germane to and has direct bearings on the performance of PP NAD management. The link may be observed from the levels of performance in PP NAD activities that have been carried out to achieve the four specific objectives stipulated in the Project Design.

The following is a closer look on each specific objective of PP NAD.

■ Specific Objectives 1

To promote and contribute to the implementation of the principles and concepts of community policing among police officers and management staff, through the organisation of customised training sessions and the establishment of Police-Community Forums.

It is evident from TABLE 7 on the following page that insofar as it concerns specific objective lying within PP NAD's directive control and initiative ("*to promote and contribute to the implementation of the principles and concepts of community policing among police officers and management staff through the organisation of customised training sessions*"), its target is realised at a respectably high level of achievement. In all likelihood, the target set in the Project Design will also be easily achieved within the 2009 timeline. By contrast, when specific objective involves activities lying outside (or, rather, not entirely within) PP NAD's directive control and initiative ("*the establishment of Police-Community Forums*"), its realisation of the target and expected results is at low or moderate levels. This important pattern deserves further notes.

a. Establishment of Community-Police Forums¹¹

The criteria of success or failure for CPF establishment should not be put on equal terms with that, for instance, for improvement or enhancement of *Polda* NAD training facilities, either in terms of timeline, effectiveness or efficiency. The reason is plain. Establishment of CPF involves staging and sequencing (see 5 stages of CPF) that is much more complex and multifaceted. It involves not only less procedural processes but also involves loose groupings or persons whose orientations lie beyond the directive control of *Polda* NAD and PP NAD. Indeed, CPF involves a great number of groups within Acehnese society whose visions and interests are beyond the control of *Polda* NAD and PP NAD, such local political parties, *adat* leaders, NGOs, CSOs, ex-combatants, KPA, religious groups, ordinary community members, NAD Provincial Government, women's groups, children, victims of past conflicts, etc. No less important is the fact that the notion of 'partnership' in CPF is made up of a series of processes more indeterminate than the technicality of building training-centres or even the institutionally structured nature of customised training in HR and CP. In this sense, the present state of PP NAD performance with regard to CPF establishment cannot easily be appraised by using criteria of effectiveness, efficiency and timeline that are applicable to, for instance, "improvement of training facilities".

¹¹ The term "establishment of CPF" is used here in accordance with what is used in the Project Design, although it has lost its notional precision since the reorientation of CP strategy by the INP in 2008.

TABLE 7
Description of Specific Objective 1

| | Expected Results | Target/ Output indicators | Target Realised |
|--|--|---|--|
| 1. 1 Customized training in CP for police officers and commanders | 1.1 up to 8,000 police personnel – total number of police officers in the target area* – trained in and fully familiar with CP principles. <i>*In 2005; close to 14,000 in 2008. * ASIE/2006/121-819 & Outline of IOM-POLRI Cooperation: up to 4,500 officers trained in CP and 4,500 trained in HR. *Discrepancies & inconsistencies will be taken up in detail in Chapter II, B-5.</i> | 140* police officers selected to be ToT in CP, HR & teaching techniques. <i>*ASIE *Outline: 110 CP ToT & 110 HR ToT (RNE) and Refresher Course 70 CP ToT & 70 HR ToT (EC) Refresher Courses: 140 ToT after end of Year 1 *Outline: refresher course for national trainers prior to 1st batch NAD ToT</i> | 129 CP Trainers <i>Note: Number of resigned trainers unrecorded in the report</i> |
| | | Up to 8,000 <i>Polda</i> NAD officers trained in CP (and HR) under the supervision of IOM | Still to be expected |
| | 1.2 Policing practices are modified and consistent with CP principles | Consultations to design CPF strategy; round table discussion to design CPF strategy | Discussions to design CP strategy with adat approach; <i>Note: No information on systematic monitoring of changes in police daily practices; impact monitoring of PP NAD training activities by UNSYIAH.</i> |
| | 1.3 CP is adopted as an institutional strategy for reform | Number/type of policies, political statements, speeches in relation to CP | Drafting ‘Guideline to Implementing CP with Acehese Culture Approach’; SIPPOP workshop for middle-ranking officers. |
| 1.2 CPF Establishment | 1.4 Strengthened cooperation between the community and the police force through establishment and support of CP | Up to 135 Community Forums established and operational; 10,125* police officers & community members to be trained prior to CPF establishment <i>*ASIE/2006/121-819. *Outline: 11,825 + 910 CP awareness raising</i> | 22 CPFs established; MoU signing at 10 districts. <i>Note: Some of the CPFs ineffective (3rd interim report); no further information.</i> |
| | | | 945 Middle/high rank officers attended CP & CPF workshop 255 Police & community members attended workshop on CP with culture/adat approach 44 ToT in CP new strategy |
| | | Number of community members participating in CPFs; number of meeting held, type & quality of issues addressed; regularity of meetings; | 11,362 community members attended CP dissemination, worshop. <i>Note: Mostly in the form of public events, more substantial dialogues on ‘partnership’ not yet sufficiently conducted.</i> |
| | 1.5 Gender dimension is reflected in CPF-related activities; gender issues raised | Number of women participating in CPFs; level of women participation during CPFs; number of gender issues addressed during CPFs. | 32% women trainers; 14% CPF participants are women; Hikayat Festival organised by Polwan (police women); 1 discussion on <i>the Role of Women and Adat Institutions for CP Implementation using Aceh-Culture Approach</i> * <i>Note: Gender issues rarely addressed in CPF activities; *1 gender-related issue (out of 18) pointed out in the discussion the other 17 mainly on adat and CP (Report, April, 24, 2008).</i> |

Source: Project documents (reports, logical-framework, plan of action), interviews, participant observations (July-August, 2008).

In all likelihood, this problem seems to come less from the lack of commitment on the part of PP NAD than from the nature of activity itself or, to use a technical language from the academic world, “the nature of reality” (*further discussions on CP and CPF will be suggested in the section on ‘Impact of CP Programme’ in Chapter IV-E*).

b. Community Policing in Police’s Daily Conduct and Practices

The same pattern seems to have characterised activities that are expected to “change policing practices along CP principles” (activity 1.2). As noted in the discussions on ‘Assumption’ (Chapter II, A-1), the design for this project is burdened with a rather unfortunate conception about education. That is, training in *new knowledge* of HR and CP principles is expected to have direct impacts on *new conduct and practices* in HR and CP. The moves from the former to the latter are and have never been clear, and indeed this issue has been a perennial conundrum in the world of ‘education’. Even more, four- and five-day training in HR and CP respectively is more properly called ‘workshop’ rather than ‘course’ in a strict sense. It is encouraging that NAD PM is well aware of this problem. Indeed, as a child who *knows* that reading-habit is good (after being told by her/his mother) does not immediately *practise* reading-habits, so police personnel who have just acquired *new knowledge* in HR and CP principles cannot be expected to immediately have *new HR and CP-based practices* in policing.

This problem can be taken as pointing to the following imperatives:

- The Project’s assumption about ‘training’ as part of ‘education process’ seems to be in need of a serious revision, especially with regard to the notion that *new knowledge* is expected to be in direct link with or to produce *new conduct and practices*.
- If the discrepancies between ‘to know’ and ‘to do’ are to be solved by means of a monitoring system on police’s daily conduct (see *Logical Framework* for activity 1.2), it is precisely this monitoring system that is still absent. It is well taken that IOM SINP Unit in collaboration with INP and CSN-CREST has been devising an instrument for monitoring the INP organisational development, and the instrument is known as SIPPOP. SIPPOP is expected to ensure the adoption of democratic values into police institutional management, especially by involving police personnel in the assessments of institutional performance. The instrument has been tried out by the INP Institute for Education and Training (*Lemdiklat*) and Police School for Middle-Ranking Officers (*Sespim*) in some police districts and sub-districts. Despite its merits, SIPPOP is a monitoring instrument for institutional performance rather than for individual conduct and practices. The SIPPOP also urgently needs to be made less complex and more intelligible to police personnel especially at sub-district level rather than at district level or *Sespim*. Ever since the tryouts, it has not been entirely clear whether feedbacks have been incorporated for further modification of SIPPOP.
- It is remarkable that PP NAD has successfully organised some meetings between *Polda* NAD, *Adat* leaders and CP stakeholders in Aceh to produce a draft on *The Implementation of Community Policing by using Aceh-Culture Approach* (as per April 2008). Once this draft is adopted as the ‘Guideline for CP Implementation’, the need for monitoring system is even more real. Without such a monitoring system, the July 2009 timeline for activity 1.2 (with expected result “policing practices are modified and consistent with CP principles”) is bound to be too optimistic.

- To sum up, insofar as it concerns the organisation of customised training, it is clear that PP NAD has effectively and efficiently achieved high levels of performance. The fact that PP NAD is still to train 6,000 new police recruits (this number was not part of the initial Design) is very unlikely to alter its sound performance in the organisation of customised training. However, if the criteria of effectiveness and efficiency also include impacts of HR and CP training on changes in police's daily conduct and practices, there is yet to be a monitoring system capable of ensuring the fulfilment of this expectation.

c. 'Partnership' in Community Policing

The notion of partnership and how in the passage of time it is being experienced by both police personnel and community members involve even more thorny questions. Nowhere is the issue of effectiveness and efficiency more difficult to answer than in objectives like this one. To show the occurrence of community-police partnership by referring to activities like the signing of MoU, *hikayat* festivals or CP information dissemination gatherings is useful, but it runs the risk of, to use a metaphor, mistaking 'wedding day' for a 'marriage'; in short, mistaking an *event* for a *process*. Given the complexity of the issue, the following points seem worth noting:

- The importance of CP staging and sequencing
The scheme for staging and sequencing has been implied even in the unrevised version of SKEP 737/10/2005. The SKEP 737 includes the following stages: "internal strategy, external strategy, and CP development". In spite of this staging, and based on various interviews as well as participant observations, it seems clear that the 2009 timeline is too optimistic. The reason lies not in the lack of hard work or commitment on the part of PP NAD, but in the intricate nature of forging partnership process between police and community itself.
 - i. Indeed, even in terms of terminological grasp, there is still widespread confusion among police personnel at all levels. Some see CP as a new name for *Babinkamtibnas*, others view it as a replacement of *Babinsa*, still others see it as an institution like *LKMD* during the New Order regime (Council for Community Resilience), for several others it is a way of policing community (*pemolisian masyarakat*), while for some a new principle of partnership.
 - ii. These sorts of confusion are not unusual in any programme to introduce a new value to a large-scale population. But this also indicates that, even when armed with a carefully designed staging and sequencing, CP and CPF are at this point still in their infancy. Unless this problem is addressed, PP NAD management is likely to run the risk of mistaking a tree for a forest. For instance, *hikayat* festival is then easily seen as a successful feat in CP inculturation rather than as part of CP information dissemination process, as well conceived by NAD PM.
 - iii. All this shows that at this very stage, CP is still in its infancy and its growth can only be flanked with serious reflections.
- The link between staging/sequencing and police conduct
Since the quality of partnership is deeply affected by real changes in police's conduct/practices, the absence of criteria for identifying changes in police's conduct and practices also poses serious problems in determining the quality of partnership. Of course, it takes two to tango: the quality of police-community

partnership can hardly be conceived without taking the conduct of community members into account. Nevertheless, this important point is less an issue in the project design.

- Analysis to safeguard CP staging and sequencing
The above two points lead us to another, i.e., the management of staging and sequencing needs to be supported with a body of adequate analyses on the process of changes in police conduct/practices and the intricacies of ‘partnership’ within Aceh cultural context and experiences of bitter conflicts. Two areas of expertise most needed are expertise in education (especially on the embodiment process of knowledge) and socio-cultural analysis (especially on the intricacy of partnership process).

To put all the above points into perspective, the achievement of PP NAD in CPF up until the period of this evaluation lies principally in introducing the term and concept of ‘community policing’ (*Polmas*) to police personnel and also in disseminating it among community members, especially groups considered as stakeholders like *keuchiks*, *tuha peut* representatives and Provincial Government. But among those in remote areas, the term ‘community policing’ is yet to be heard of.

To sum up, questions about community-police partnership are still to be dealt with by PP NAD. This challenge is taxing, for what is called partnership itself does not rest within PP NAD’s directive control, in the way that the organisation of customised training in HR and CP does. For instance, how the ‘Guideline for CP Implementation’ is translated into a series of fruitful processes of community-police partnership is something that is not entirely within PP NAD’s directive control. Even more vexing is the fact that there is yet to be a monitoring system for this intricate process at the district and sub-district levels.

In many respects, what characterises specific objective 1 is also applicable to specific objective 2.

■ Specific Objective 2

To integrate international human rights standards into NAD Police policies and daily practices, through the organisation of customised training sessions for police personnel and their commanders.

Despite the involvement of other groups, the organisation of customised training in HR also lies within the directive control and supervision of PP NAD. The target of training 8,000 police personnel is more than likely to be achieved even before the 2009 timeline.

TABLE 8
Description of Specific Objective 2

| | Expected Results | Target/ Output Indicators | Target Realised |
|---|--|---|--|
| 2. Customized training for police officers in HR | 2.1 up to 8,000 police personnel in <i>Polda</i> NAD trained in and fully familiar with international human rights standards | 140 police officers selected to be ToT in CP, HR & teaching techniques | 114 HR Trainers. <i>Note: Number of resigned trainers unrecorded.</i> |
| | | Refreshing Courses for ToT after end of Year 1 | Still to be expected. |
| | | 8,000 <i>Polda</i> NAD officers trained in HR | 7,209* Rank-and-files (bintaras). *as per August 2008. <i>Note: Middle-rank officers not trained in HR, only in CP.</i> |
| | | Acehnese context reflected in training manuals | Local Content workshop. <i>Note: Still characterized by ‘cut and paste’ approach.</i> |
| | 2.2 Policing practices modified to respect HR standards | Develop method to evaluate changes in police daily conduct; access to public complain service in place; | IOM SINP consultancy on public complaint mechanism still unseccesfull at INP Headquarter level. |
| | 2.3 Human rights principles incorporated into <i>Polda</i> NAD’s policies | Number/types of policy published, political statements, speeches in relation to HR; organisational changes; professional Integrity Team (INP, Kompolnas, CSOs) established to monitor implementation of public complaint mechanism. | No specific information apart from sporadic changes towards less militaristic attitude during arrest/interrogation, and in relationship between superior-subordinate; IOM SINP facilitation for INP-CSOs-Kompolnas* on public complaint mechanism still unsuccessfull at INP Headquarter level. *INP National Commission |
| | | HR integrated in the police education & training curricula | A package of 30 HR lesson-units integrated by <i>Lemdiklat</i> into SPN curricula |
| | 2.4 Gender perspective is addressed in relation to HR and policing | Number of attendants; number of hours dedicated to gender-based violations; specific knowledge on gender-based HR violations; number of specific training materials distributed; quality of discussions related to gender issues | 32% Women trainers; Roadmap on gender, gender modules used in training; specific session for gender-based violations & vulnerable groups; roundtable discussion on LoGA, gender, sharia (2006). <i>Note: Aceh local content not yet sufficiently addressed.</i> |

Source: Project documents (reports, logical-framework, plan of action), interviews, participant observations (July-August, 2008).

a. As in the case of CP, however, “integration of international human rights standards into NAD Police policies and daily practices” is another question. It cannot be said to have been achieved simply by referring to the completion of HR training. Again, as in the case of CP, the problem seems to lie in (i) the absence of an educational process bridging the gap between *knowing* HR principles and *practicing* HR principles and/or (ii) the absence of a monitoring system to oversee and ensure the narrowing gap between the two in daily practices. Unless these two elements are present, the

question of “integration of international human rights standards into NAD Police policies and daily practices” tends to be a moot point, either in terms of effectiveness, efficiency or in terms of timeline. This problem is more vexing with widespread grievances among rank-and-files, or in their own words, “The strongest resistance comes from our superiors; they also keep treating us in ways that are completely opposed to human rights”. This is not surprising, considering that these so-called superiors or middle-ranking officers in fact received only training in CP, but not in HR (*this last point will be taken up further in Chapter III*).

b. It is true that up until the period of this evaluation, IOM SINP Unit has lent remarkable supports to *Lemdiklat* to incorporate HR and CP principles into the curricula of all police schools, including that in Seulawah (to be started in the 2008 school year). But this problem remains acute for HR and CP trainees who have graduated from police schools before 2008. If, as indicated in Logical Framework, the “integration of HR standards into NAD Police policies and daily practices” is to be evidenced by the presence of “political statements, number/types of policy issued and organisational changes”, this is a mismatch, for the presence of the latter is a thin basis for concluding the occurrence of the former. From various interviews with police personnel, police district chiefs/deputies and senior officers at *Polda* NAD, it is not far-fetched to conclude that these “political statements and policy documents” are thin on the ground. Even at the Seulawah Police School, many so-called “militaristic practices” are still to be seriously addressed.

All this reveals a more discernible pattern that the levels of PP NAD performance depend on:

- The tangibility of specific objectives set in the design – e.g., organisation of customised training in HR principles is more tangible than (support for) integration of HR principles into police’s daily practices;
- The difference in types of change in conduct or practices being targeted by reform – e.g., it is less demanding for police personnel to participate in HR training funded by non-police institution than for them to stop racketing traffic violators;
- The degree of PP NAD’s control over the directions and participants of activities – e.g., organising classroom trainings involving participants, trainers, observers and PP NAD project assistants lies more within NAD’s directive control than integrating HR principles into *Polda* NAD policies and police daily practices.

These three elements need to be adopted as part of the criteria for assessing efficiency and effectiveness of PP NAD management. This point is also suggested as a caution for the snapshot valuation presented in TABLE 5. Indeed, some specific objectives are more tangible than others, so that the questions of effectiveness, efficiency and timeline can be answered in a straightforward manner. As for other objectives that are less tangible, there are two possibilities worth noting. *First*, it seems rather clear that PP NAD needs to cultivate more avenues to bring these less tangible objectives into serious attention; otherwise the use of indicators suffers from mismatch. *Secondly*, it is also important to note that the distinction between more tangible and less tangible objectives is not part of the design itself, and apparently this flaw has given rise to

some confusion. This points to an imperative that the design be revised to incorporate an appreciation of gradations and distinctions between more tangible objectives on the one hand, and less tangible objectives on the other. In turn, this also includes a need to distinguish between the criteria of effectiveness, efficiency and timeline for more tangible objectives and that for less tangible ones.

This may also explain why there has been some confusion in reporting. The absence of a distinction between the two has flattened the use of indicators of achievement for both more tangible and less tangible objectives. The tendency is to invent indicators for less tangible objectives which in fact have no bearings on what is intended to indicate. In methodological terms, it “does not measure what is intended to measure”.

■ Specific Objective 3

To improve Polda NAD’s quality of training, through capacity building within the SPN and the enhancement of Polda NAD’s training facilities.

Again, the patterns suggested in the preceding discussions of objectives 1 and 2 are also discernible here. But there are some qualifications.

TABLE 9
Description of Specific Objective 3

| | Expected Results | Target/ Output Indicators | Target Realised |
|---------------------------------------|--|--|---|
| Capacity building for SPN Seulawah | 3.1 SPN’s curriculum is revised | CP & HR are integrated into SPN’s curriculum | A package of 30 HR lesson-units integrated by <i>Lemdiklat</i> into SPN curricula. Note: working group for SPN/ Polda NAD capacity building, consultancy, recommendations for SPN’s policies & practices still to be expected. |
| | 3.2 SPN trainers trained and familiar with CP & HR | 60* SPN trainers trained in CP and HR as well as participatory teaching method <i>*ASIE; Outline: 120 (60 in CP and 60 in HR)</i> | 28 and 22 SPN trainers trained in CP and HR respectively; introduction to participatory teaching method |
| SPN training facilities | 3.3 <i>Polda</i> NAD’s training facilities are improved at the SPN level and new dormitory constructed | 1 training centre & dormitory constructed; provisions of training facilities & equipments | Completed |
| Construction of training centres | 21 Training centres & dormitories constructed; Provisions of training facilities & equipments | All training centres, dormitories, training facilities & equipments handed over to <i>Polda</i> NAD | Completed; 23 Decentralised Training Centres & Dormitories Note: Poor quality of building materials subjected to refurbishment |

a. Training facilities in all police districts and SPN Seulawah:

Despite involving other parties like *Polda* NAD Headquarters or contractors, to improve training facilities is clearly a tangible and visible activity almost entirely lying within the directive control of PP NAD. The construction of all training centres has been completed and handed over to *Polda* NAD as planned. From on-site observation of these training centres, however, it seems that the quality of building materials is such that some parts of the facilities are not sufficiently durable, like toilets, toilet doors, classroom walls, windows, etc. Some have been revisited and currently under repair. This may be a minor problem but in need of some attention, for it affects the way financial resources are economically used.

Some police districts have creatively used training centres for multi purposes. When there are no HR or CP trainings, some of these training centres are open for other activities, like police-community meeting or gathering of all police personnel. This practice needs to be encouraged for efficiency's reasons.

b. Training facilities at SPN Seulawah

As in other districts, the training centre at SPN Seulawah has also been constructed and handed over to *Polda* NAD. Based on field visits and brief survey of the SPN facilities, however, support for improvement of training facilities at SPN needs to include more than simply having a training centre constructed like in other police districts. This broader coverage may be beyond what is mandated to PP NAD. But, given the existing grim conditions of SPN facilities (classrooms, toilets, library, etc), the Team is of an opinion that extended supports to this key education institution in *Polda* NAD deserve some discernment.¹²

c. Capacity Building for SPN Seulawah

As in other PP NAD activities whose process and outcome are less measurable and tangible, the level of PP NAD performance in supporting capacity building for SPN Seulawah is more nuanced than it first appears. The following are some points worth noting:

- In various documents of the project, PP NAD is expected to train 120 SPN trainers in HR and CP. When PP NAD was conducting the training for SPN trainers, however, SPN had only 50 trainers. Of this number, 28 have received training in HR and 22 in CP. This arrangement seems strange, and it is indeed unfortunate. Why are not all 50 trained in both HR and CP? This question is also applicable to police officers who only receive training in CP but not in HR. It is true that training materials for CP have a chapter on “Human Rights for Community Policing”, but this is certainly insufficient for trainers and officers who are expected to have a superior understanding of HR. For trainers, who by definition are part the education process of future police on a day-to-day basis, Human Rights (HR) needs to be conceived as a principle and foundation for all police conduct and practices, and not simply as a concept in relation to CP.
- In one of field visits to SPN in mid-July 2008, a senior trainer showed a list of 80 trainers available at SPN. Several of them have attended the IOM SINP training of trainers (ToT) in Wisma Kinasih, Bogor, West Java, although some

¹² This point may be compared with the findings of Villeneuve, Rustika, Nurjani, *Indonesian National Police's Recruitment & Basic Training Policy Review for Polda NAD*, June 12, 2008, p. 27.

have since been transferred to other areas. Even if all these 80 trainers are to be trained in both HR and CP, the quantitative target in all likelihood will be met by the 2009 timeline. In *Evaluation Report of IOM Project Part I-Phase II on Strengthening the INP through Institution Building* (May-August 2007), it is noted that IOM ToT is in “an endless game of catch-up with continuously rotating personnel” (p. 23). In other words, a high turnover among trainers has made the availability of trainers in HR and CP unstable. This problem seems less vexing for SPN Seulawah. By the end of the fourth semester of the project, PP NAD has on average achieved 90% of its targets in HR and CP training for police personnel throughout Aceh. This somewhat lessens the problem arising from high turnover. That is, even if the newly arrived trainers to SPN have not received ToT in HR and CP, it is more than likely that those coming from Aceh have at least received training in basic principles of HR and CP in their respective districts. Of course, this excludes 6,000 new police recruits, but these new recruits are also very unlikely to be assigned to SPN as trainers in the near future.

- Based on interviews with several trainers at SPN, it is clear that training in HR and CP organised by IOM has also fruitfully introduced them to participatory methods of teaching. This, to borrow their words, “equips us with a new way of teaching and managing classes with persuasion instead of instruction, and this makes learning process less boring, even more by engaging students in case study”. Even if unintended, this may also become a way of gradually phasing out the once entrenched militaristic style of teaching. The benefits of IOM style of teaching is so important for SPN trainers that it is imperative for PP NAD to be in routine contact with SPN to oversee the risks of having new trainers with no acquaintance with both HR and CP training as well as with participatory method of teaching.
- However, it remains important to note that all this does not necessarily reflect the quality of training. For example, on August 13, 2008, the Team was presented with a golden opportunity to conduct participant observation of a ToT at SPN Seulawah. The ToT was organised by *Lemdiklat* (Police Institute for Education and Training). There were 5 national trainers from *Lemdiklat* and another one currently working as a consultant to PP NAD. The ToT was mainly funded by IOM SINP Unit, and not under the administrative arrangements or coordination of PP NAD. All the proceedings were there, but the training atmosphere was less than conducive, e.g., low punctuality, high rotation among participants. In the words of a trainer, “morning participants are different from mid-day participants, and different ones come in the afternoon”. Twenty (20) participants were registered for this training, but there was never any full attendance. When the afternoon sessions were supposed to start at 14.00, for instance, no participant showed up. Only after 30 minutes, 8 participants were in attendance. From the list of attendance, there were 13 participants for morning sessions. It is indeed difficult to call it quality training.

There were of course many factors responsible for this condition. It is true that the ToT was not under the directive and responsibility of PP NAD, but the above example is suggested to illustrate what could possibly happen to a training of trainers at SPN Seulawah. This point is even more relevant, since all

this capacity building will sooner or later have to be the responsibility of *Lemdiklat*, with or without any supports from IOM SINP Unit, PP NAD or other agencies.

- It is hard to understand the above point without putting it within a wider and more serious problem that seems to have been besetting SPN Seulawah for a long time. As noted in the Report on *Indonesian National Police's Recruitment and Basic Training Policy Review for Polda NAD* (Villeneuve *et al.*, June 12, 2008), the problem concerns a serious “moral problem within Selawa’s [*sic.*] Instructors” and “a serious lack of motivation” (p. 17). In turn, this is closely related with “no selection process to be an instructor” at SPN Seulawah (p. 83). Many key informants familiar with SPN Seulawah conceded that “the problem has been there for some time”, and “in fact most trainers are in Seulawah not to be proper trainers; they are personnel implicated in rather serious misconducts or malpractices in their previous jobs, and the way to punish or save them is by transferring them to SPN; they have no competence to be trainers, they are problematic and outcast”. It is hard not to conclude that, in Aceh at least, ‘education’ has not been playing a central role in police organisation. It should come as no surprise therefore that this marginal role of education will in turn obstruct the ideals of reform within police organisation itself (*This point will be taken up further in the discussion on ‘Recruitment’*).

As in the discussions of specific objectives 1 and 2, the above qualification is suggested to put the score 8 for “the enhancement of *Polda* NAD’s training facilities” and 4 for “capacity building within SPN” into perspective.

■ Specific Objective 4

To assist Kapolda in improving Polda NAD’s recruitment policies and practices, through a review of current recruitment policies in the context of Chapter 3.2, Reintegration into Society, Article 3.2.7 of the MoU.

Like the previous three, specific objective 4 is also made up of activities lying within the directive control of PP NAD as well as those outside. The levels of PP NAD performance in the former are easily identified, whereas those in the latter are less assuring.

a. Review of *Polda* NAD’s Recruitment Policies and Practices

By June 2008, the report of *Polda* NAD’s recruitment policies and practices was completed and available for further analysis.¹³ It is worth noting that this review was conducted by a team whose principal members are familiar with the ins-and-outs of police life and profession – they have been part of police organisation, one is still an active officer. The Report reveals insightful and detailed information that perhaps can hardly be obtained by a team without any police backgrounds. The Report has been submitted to Chief of *Polda* NAD (*Kapolda*) and PP NAD is awaiting any follow-up from *Kapolda*. There are at least three steps involved in specific objective 4: (1)

¹³ Villeneuve, Rustika, Nurjani, *Indonesian National Police's Recruitment and Basic Training Policy Review for Polda NAD*, Banda Aceh: International Organisation for Migration (IOM), June 12, 2008.

Report of recruitment review; (2) Preparatory measures for action plan by *Polda* NAD supported by PP NAD; (3) Implementation of recruitment reform with its staging and sequencing. The first step has been remarkably accomplished, whereas the second and third are still to be expected.

TABLE 10
Description of Specific Objective 4

| | Expected Results | Target/ Output Indicators | Target Realised |
|---|---|---|--|
| Review of recruitment policies and practices | Improved recruitment practices and policies enabling <i>Kapolda</i> to recruit quality personnel, who agree to conduct policing along the principles of CP and HR | Review document on recruitment; recruitment discussed by working group; new guidelines for Recruitment policies; recommendation adopted | Evaluation report submitted to <i>Polda</i> NAD for further steps; <i>Other steps still to be expected</i> |
| | | <i>*Note from ASIE:</i> Recruitment-related activity to be carried out with Partnership for Good Governance & Reform | <i>Still to be expected</i> |
| Psychosocial assessment | Completion of psycho-social assessment report | | Assessment report still to be submitted to and approved by <i>Polda</i> NAD; workplan for implementation of recommendations; design of psycho-social test for CPOs recruitment |

b. Problems in reforming recruitment policies and practices

Based on document reviews, interviews and other sources of information, the following points deserve serious attention:

- Payment for Entry to SPN
It has been common knowledge among community members that, in their words, “we cannot become police without paying tens of millions”. When further questions were raised concerning the amounts involved, various responses given by community members amount to payments ranging from 30 to 80 million Indonesian rupiah (IDR). These are the amounts believed to be necessary for a single applicant to enter SPN Seulawah. Of course, perception and fact must be kept distinct. Yet it is seldom to find perception that is entirely disconnected from some factual evidence in reality. This is well corroborated by the Report on *Indonesian National Police’s Recruitment Review for Polda NAD*. In it the percentage of police personnel who admitted entry-with-payment is even higher than the level of perception among community members, as clearly presented in TABLE 11 on the following page.

The table shows that 95% of police personnel included in the ‘Recruitment Review’ admitted that they have paid certain amounts of money for their entries to SPN Seulawah, as compared to 80% among community members who believed the presence of entry-with-payment. The same Report also mentions

that these payments range between 10 and 70 million IDR (p. 24). This seems to have been a systematic practice for so long time that, as many police personnel conceded, “We know not where or to whom all the money go”, and “corruption in recruitment has been a police mafia from one generation to another”.

TABLE 11
Entry-with-Payment to SPN Seulawah

| Respondent | Level of Admission |
|---|--------------------|
| Police rank-and-files (<i>bintaras</i>) | 95 % |
| Community members | 80% |

Source: Villeneuve, Rustika, Nurjani, *Indonesian National Police’s Recruitment & Basic Training Policy Review for Polda NAD* (June 12, 2008), p. 25.

As if following the logic of investment in business, this paves the way for the next chains of malpractice: “Of course, the first thing to do after graduating from SPN is to recover the initial investment [*balik modal* is the commonly used term], then after break-even start the next exploits for further uplift”. This is also explicitly mentioned in the Report on *Indonesian National Police’s Recruitment Review for Polda NAD*, albeit in a guarded tone: “Would it be possible that the first priority of a *Bintara* could be the reimbursement of his admission fees to his parent [*sic.*] or whoever made the money available? How much time will it take to reimburse an average of 38,000,000 IDR with a monthly salary of 1,700.00 [*sic.*] IDR?”¹⁴ (p. 25).

- Nepotism in Entry to SPN

Aside from the use of payment, another common route to entry noted by many community members and police personnel is collusion and nepotism. There is even a common term for this, “*polisi turunan* (police by heredity)”. That is, in the words of some community members, “Their ancestors were police, their grandfathers were police, their fathers were or are police and now the children are also police”. Of course these words are intended not as homage to the family-tree professional competence but as a cynicism toward malpractices embroiled in police recruitment. Coupled with problem of entry-with-payment, nepotism also seems to have been rampant at all levels of recruitment process.

Even if the problems of entry with payment or collusion and nepotism are no more than a widespread perception (as different from fact), it is clear that both INP and *Polda* NAD cannot but exert extra efforts to prove it otherwise, for this widespread grim perception deeply affects public credibility of police in the eyes of the public. This problem, for instance, will work as a stumbling block for CP programme, if because the quality of police-community partnership depends very much, or even starts with, community’s confidence in police credibility. In short, although the issue of recruitment reform is categorically

¹⁴ What is meant of course is not 1,700.00 IDR, but 1,700,000 IDR.

distinct from CP programme, problems in recruitment will have far-reaching implications for the rise and fall of CP programme.

- Quality of SPN Students

As in a domino effect, what characterises the first line in the chain of events directly affects the succeeding lines; characteristics of the upstream are reflected in the downstream. This is true with the effect of SPN recruitment practices on the lives and works of NAD police personnel. The problem can be boiled down to the issue of quality. The following illustrations are taken from various information sources and interviews with key informants at SPN Seulawah and with those well acquainted with problems besetting SPN Seulawah.

First, while the rules on recruitment are there on paper, all key informants interviewed for this purpose conceded that the quality of recruits is low. Some simply shrugged off submissively, while others gave more candid accounts. The following is a poignantly insightful grievance expressed by one of the officers at SPN:

“If all come here with payments, let’s accept it for a while as a fact so hard to change. But, even from within these malpractices, there is actually a clear chance to change something. If all pay, then we can choose the bright candidates instead of the brainless; both come through payments anyway. What is ironic is, those admitted here are the brainless, not the bright group. So, this is stupidity committed twice: *first*, entry with payment and *second*, the brainless club being admitted. Had the bright ones been admitted, even if they also make payments, at least that is stupidity committed only once...”

Secondly, the resulting compromise seems less than what is sensible to common sense. It is not the types of compromise more or less still acceptable, but even the most elementary skills are then being compromised. As recounted by a SPN trainer, “due to all forms of malpractice in recruitment, it is not unusual to find students who cannot read, and illiteracy is not limited to one case”. Then other concessions to basic requirements follow, or in the words of another SPN trainer, “stubbornness, slowness and thickness are rampant to the point of pathological”. It is not surprising that the emphasis in daily training is then given on physical aspects. To cite yet another SPN trainer’s words that perhaps are more distressing than descriptive, “Since it is very agonising to teach new concepts or knowledge to these students, it is their muscles that are trained day after day; as a result, SPN is not quite training future police, rather it turns students into boxers”. All this makes up a vicious circle so hard to break. As recounted by still another SPN trainer: “Difficulty in teaching new knowledge breeds an emphasis on physical trainings; then an overdose of physical trainings makes them fall asleep right away upon their arrival in class”. This condition is perhaps an exception rather than the rule. The rule, according to some senior officers at INP Headquarters, is that all police schools should have substantially reduced all physical emphasis in training. Without proper external monitoring system, however, the vicious circle is unlikely to be broken.

Thirdly, as obviously noted in the Report on *Indonesian National Police’s Recruitment Review for Polda NAD*, there are several policies that are plainly discriminatory, like the “candidate should be handsome, beautiful and very

attractive” (p. 19). But more extreme discrimination is the criterion that “a female candidate to be a virgin”, and the way to ensure it is “for female applicant to undergo a physical medical exam where a doctor will have to confirm if the candidate is a virgin or not (hymen test)” (p. 19). In full agreement with the *Report*, all these discriminatory criteria are to “be removed all together” (p. 19).

- Quality of SPN Trainers

As noted also in the *Report* (p. 83), there seem to be no clear criteria or clear selection process to be an instructor at SPN. To put this within all the above discussions, it may be clear by now why this has been the practice at SPN Seulawah for some time. But what has been the practice at SPN Seulawah may not be an exception either, for even at the higher levels of police training, this problem is not entirely absent, as recounted by some senior officers at the School for Police Staff and Leaders (*Sespim*), Lembang, West Java: “Trainers at many police schools are mostly people who are there by accident, not because they want to or because they have competence as trainers”. Of course, this problem is interwoven with others problems ranging from low incentives and welfare, absence of promotion, low motivation, low quality of students, and poor facilities and infrastructure. It is important to note that within police organisation, teaching competence has not been recognised as a legitimate basis for rank promotion. This vicious circle is reinforced by the fact that there is no external or independent agency playing the roles of monitoring body for the quality of police education at SPN Seulawah. As expressed by a middle-ranking police officer, “education can transform a police person, but the question of who monitors SPN is also very important, and this role cannot be played by police institution itself, there must an external and independent body”.

All the above points about ‘recruitment’ may not reveal anything new. Not a few earlier reports and a special report on *Indonesian National Police’s Recruitment Review for Polda NAD* (June 12, 2008) have also noted similar points. In the context of PP NAD performance, all this strengthens an interesting pattern which has been suggested more than once. Within the scope of objectives and activities that are more or less within the directive control of PP NAD, the levels of performance are characterised by convincing rates of achievement, either in terms of effectiveness, efficiency or timeline. Less convincing are the rates of achievement for objectives and activities that lie outside the directive control of PP NAD. The less-tangible nature of these latter objectives points to a need for PP NAD to pay close attention to the intricacies of process that requires staging and sequencing.

To sum up, the following two points capture what has been achieved by PP NAD:

1. Based on the trends up until the fourth semester of the Project, the strength of PP NAD lies in the tangible objectives and activities in which PP NAD has a high degree of directive control and supervision. Among others, the organisation of customised training in HR and CP and enhancement of *Polda NAD*’s training facilities belong to this category.
2. With regard to the objectives whose achievement involves some intricate processes and whose proceedings are not entirely within PP NAD’s directive control or supervision, the rates of achievement are less assuring. This less

assuring rate of achievement can be redressed if (a) PP NAD exerts more efforts in approaching parties known to have considerable influence over the directions of change in areas targeted by the Project’s specific objectives; (b) PP NAD exerts its energy and resources in serious analysis and reflections on the process of change in areas that are less tangible and visible, such as the onion-like nature of partnership in CP, the complexity of process involved in the moves from ‘to know’ to ‘to do’ among police personnel, and the like; (c) the timeline for the less tangible objectives is reset within a more realistic period.

In a more graphic form, the following table (TABLE 12) presents a summary of the performance of PP NAD in all four specific objectives by means of a matrix.

TABLE 12
Matrix of PP NAD Activities by Levels of Institutionalisation & Control

| | More Institutionalised | Less Institutionalised |
|--------------|--|--|
| More Control | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • customised training for police officers in Community Policing; • customised training for police officers in HR • Design & use of gender perspective in training process • Increased knowledge in gender-based HR violations • improvement of training facilities at SPN and in all police districts • evaluation of recruitment practices • assessment of psycho-social and mental problem for stress management | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Number of women in <i>Polmas</i> dissemination process • Preparation of CPF |
| Less Control | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • capacity building for SPN Seulawah • change in recruitment practices • Moment of CPF formation • Number of policy changes related to HR • Police organisational changes • Integration of HR into police education | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • integration of CP principles & international HR standards into <i>Polda</i> NAD policies and daily practices • Adoption of gender perspective in CPF & daily policing practice • Partnership activities through CPF • Participation of women in CP-related activities |

5. Information Management, Internal Monitoring and Reporting

The diversity and intensity of activities conducted by PP NAD create an enormous build-up of documents containing all kinds of data, information, miscellaneous records and notes. PP NAD also produces various training materials and information pertaining to the specificity of Aceh, such as booklets on Aceh institutions and the roles of *adat* leaders, information on Islamic *sharia* and its problems, and recently documents on Aceh *hikayat*.

a. Information Management

It is praiseworthy that every meeting and activity related to the project, no matter how small, is always documented with necessary highlight on some important points. All

these records, however, are not always indicated with clear dates of the reported activities or meetings, and this presents some difficulty for anyone trying to use them as references.

It is also worth noting that reports of classroom training, data on training participants and trainers, training materials and records of training pre-test and post-test are all documented in a systematic and readable way. Based on personal interviews with project assistants (PA) during field visits, it is clear that they have been in regular contact with each other, and this has beneficial impacts on their reporting tasks. New information is shared through this communication. The main problem cited by several PAs is writing reports in English, especially for new PAs.

Most of PP NAD documents, including printed correspondence, are neatly stored in electronic form. This ensures the speed of distribution and circulation, but at the same time also demands careful classification of subjects necessary for speedy re-search and re-trial. This careful classification of subjects (itemisation) is something that is in need of close attention, including many records that are not designated with dates of activities.

To what extent has PP NAD been making use of the enormous data and information amassed so far, especially for purposes of capacity building of its staff and for project development? Based on interviews with PP NAD staff, this question is pertinent, as access to data is not equally distributed among the staff. There is a tendency that data or information are only accessible on emergency requests, for instance, for report writing. On the one hand, this problem may simply be a matter of technicality. After its move to the compound of *Polda* NAD's new Headquarters, PP NAD is yet to have an internal network that enables it to have access to a shared disk available in IOM NAD office. Up until the period of this evaluation, a series of attempts to develop a database accessible to all PP NAD staff have not yielded promising results. On the other hand, this problem also seems closely related with the hierarchical system of information distribution organised along the hierarchical system of management. As a result, even a staff member in charge of some tasks requiring detailed data may not have easy access to it.

b. Internal Monitoring and Reporting

Questions about monitoring and reporting are more complicated than the problems arising from information management. PP NAD internal monitoring system is made up of (1) weekly reports from project assistants (PAs) to Senior Project Assistant and NAD PM; (2) monthly reports on the development of the Project written by Programme Manager (PM); (3) six-month interim reports for donors. Document ASIE/2006/121-819 requires PP NAD to submit (4) yearly financial and narrative reports (pp. 12-13); (5) mid-term and final external evaluations; (6) final audit upon the completion of the project; and (7) *ad hoc* reports if/as requested by the European Commission.

Up until the fourth semester of the NAD Police Project, all this reporting has been carried out and accomplished according to the agreement, except yearly narrative reports that the Team has not come across. These yearly reports are expected to present the state of six-monthly performance starting from the commencement of the

Project – the first yearly report to be submitted at the end of July 2007, the second at the end of July 2008.

The pattern presented in Matrix (TABLE 12) has direct bearings on internal monitoring system and reporting. Insofar as certain objectives of the project involve activities whose proceedings are institutionally structured and within the directive control and supervision of PP NAD, the performance of monitoring system and reporting is more assuring. By contrast, when certain objectives involve activities whose proceedings are less tangible, less institutionally structured and not entirely within the directive control and supervision of PP NAD, the performance of monitoring system and reporting is less assuring. This less assuring performance is closely related to the intricate nature of targeted process and change not easily shown in quantifiable indicators, and this difficulty apparently has given rise to indicator mismatch.

The following points on monitoring system and reporting deserve close attention:

- Within the first category (more control, more institutionally structured, more tangible) are activities like organisation of customised training in HR and CP, construction and improvement of training centres/facilities, and review of police recruitment policies and practices. The quality of monitoring system and reporting for these activities is in general characterised by proper attention to details and respectable degree of effectiveness and efficiency. The organisation of customised training in HR and CP, for instance, has been carried out under close supervision, and most innovative ideas and feedbacks given during end-of-the-day evaluation have been well integrated to improve the quality of the upcoming sessions. Monitoring is continuously conducted on a day-to-day basis while the training is underway, and weekly reports are written thereof. The results of training pre-test, post-test and daily test are carefully documented.
- Within the second category (less control, less institutionally structured, less tangible) are, for instance, activities that are expected to cultivate and nurture community-police partnership or activities expected to bring the integration of HR principles into police's daily conduct and practices. As repeatedly noted, these are activities involving more complex proceedings and whose outcome cannot be pinned down easily to technical and quantifiable indicators. This is true even if careful staging and sequencing has been adopted in organising these activities. Since the complex nature of these activities does not seem to have been explicitly taken into account, it is not surprising that the monitoring system and reporting is characterised by less convincing quality. Or, as also noted repeatedly, if some indicators of achievement are suggested, there is a tendency that these indicators do not indicate what is meant to indicate. No doubt, this is aggravated by the fact that the directions of these activities are not entirely within the directive control and supervision of PP NAD. This fact is not entirely PP NAD's fault. Quantitative indicators are useful, but this problem is very unlikely to be addressed by mere quantification. Inadequate understanding of this indicator-related problem seems to have brought an over-optimism that may serve the purposes of reporting, but the intricacies of the process remain unreported and unaddressed.

For instance, the 2nd Interim Report mentions the establishment of 22 CPF in many districts, and then the 3rd Interim Report gives accounts of why several CPFs do not function as expected. But the 4th Interim Report mentions again the establishment of 22 CPFs and put it under the rubric of “Strengthening Cooperation...” (points 2.1.3 – 2.1.3.1, pp. 7-8), without giving any accounts of the state of affairs of those non-functioning CPFs. There is no account of whether the ‘new CP strategy’ noted in the 4th Interim Report has been adopted to reorient these non-functioning CPFs, or whether these CPFs have simply withered away. This point is suggested to show that while PP NAD has managed to learn from experiences, no qualitative accounts of the learning process have been given in the report. No amount of statistics or quantifiable indicators will substitute the need for these qualitative accounts.

- The reporting seems also to have been constrained by some inconsistencies in the project documents, like Document ASIE/2006/121-819, ‘Project Proposal: Strengthening *Polda* Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam through Institution Building’, and ‘Outline of IOM-INP Cooperation Plan for Support to NAD Police funded by EC and RNE’. These two documents, for instance, define ‘refresher courses’ differently. The ‘Outline of IOM-INP Cooperation Plan’ Document seems to refer to “CP (and HR) trainers from INP, who have been trained at the early stages of the project, shall take Refresher Courses and shall be responsible to train new personnel from NAD Police under the guidance and supervision of IOM” (p. 4). What is meant is evidenced from Table-5 of the same document (“Chart of Implementation Flow for ToT in HR/CP”) – *this chart is included in Chapter III of this evaluation*). Document ASIE/2006/121-819, on the other hand, refers to the first batch of 140 trainers trained in Aceh to be given Refresher Courses one year after their first ToT. These two documents also refer to different numbers of police personnel to be trained. Tables 3 and 4 in the ‘Outline of IOM-INP Cooperation Plan’ Document and of the ‘Project Proposal’ (un-page-numbered, p. 10) seem to have been devised on the basis of identification of the needs for targeted police districts according to the agreement with the Chief of *Polda* NAD, but the numbers targeted in these tables are quite different from those in Document ASIE/2006/121-819. This confusion is also reflected in the Logical Framework of ASIE/2006/121-819.
- Despite their technical nature, all these forms of inconsistency, probably arising from inattention in the initial design, need to be addressed. All this does not seem to greatly affect the performance of PP NAD which pursues “up to 8,000 personnel” to be trained in HR and CP. There is in fact a surplus of ToT, as PP NAD is referring to the target set by the ‘Outline of IOM-INP Cooperation Plan’ Document (i.e., 220 ToT; 110 in the ‘Project Proposal’), whereas Document ASIE/2006/121-819 sets a target of only 140 ToT. Meanwhile, the reason why refresher courses have not been conducted by PP NAD up to the fourth semester is apparently due to the fact that most trainers from ToT (semesters 1 and 2) have been transferred to other areas outside Aceh. This of course is beyond the control of PP NAD, although partly also due to the selection process of trainers at the early stages of the project. At these early stages, many ToT participants were police sub-district chiefs (*Kapolsek*). They were counted among the best trainers. After acting as quality trainers for some time, however, there were some objections raised by several *Kapolres* (police

district chief) on the ground that the roles of trainer have frequently taken many *Kapolsek* away from their day-to-day duties. In response, *Kapolda* NAD (Chief of *Polda* NAD) has instructed all *Kapolsek* in NAD to refrain from being trainers.

In retrospect, while the Project's design has indiscriminately set both more tangible and less tangible objectives as a mandate for PP NAD, PP NAD is less in position of achieving the latter at the levels it has done in the former. Despite the fact that PP NAD gravely needs to pay closer attention to the intricacies of process involved in the latter objectives, the problem lies less in the lack of efforts or commitment on the part of PP NAD than in the fact that PP NAD is less in control of the intangible and institutionally unstructured proceedings through which the latter objectives can be achieved. This has direct impacts on monitoring system and reporting. In the absence of a distinction between more tangible and less tangible objectives, the monitoring system and reporting has, not surprisingly, performed more convincingly in the former and less convincingly in the latter.

To offer a signpost as to where the monitoring task by PP NAD is to be situated within the overall monitoring system, TABLE 13 on the following page presents a summary of three distinct monitoring agencies, i.e., inner-circle, internal, and external agencies. To further clarify their roles, each category of monitoring agencies is placed within the types of monitoring activities to be done, which in turn are situated within the proposed timeline.

TABLE 13
Types of Monitoring Agency

| Monitoring Agency | | Timeline | | |
|-------------------|--|---|--|---|
| | | July 2009 | July 2010 | July 2011 |
| Inner Circle | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Polda NAD • PP NAD | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Polda</i> NAD, PP NAD, CSOs (in consultative roles): Working Group to devise instrument to monitor police daily conduct & practices. • Try-out period. • Adoption, active use, information dissemination. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Polda</i> NAD: Internal monitoring in use & regularly administered. • External monitoring to be tried-out and re-devised. • Public complaints registered & followed-up. • Suggestion for improvement discussed & implemented. <p align="center">⇒ PP NAD: consultative</p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Polda</i> NAD: comprehensive evaluation, impact assessment on police-community relationship. <p align="center">⇒ PP NAD: Exit</p> |
| | | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • INP • IOM SINP • Kompolnas | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • INP Headquarters • IOM SINP (facilitator) • <i>Kompolnas</i> • PP NAD |
| Internal | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CSOs in consultative roles | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CSOs in consultative roles | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CSOs in monitoring-partnership roles | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CSOs in monitoring-partnership roles |
| External | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CSOs/NGOs • Community • Media • Other stake-holders | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PP NAD (Facilitator) • SINP (Facilitator) • CSOs/NGOs • Community • Media • Other stakeholders <p>Task: These agencies to jointly develop critical mass for external monitoring.</p> <p align="center">⇒ PP NAD: Staying</p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Critical mass activated; • Access to activated public complaint mechanism through complaint box, radio, telephone, short message service, other mechanisms. • Suggestion for improvement discussed at CPF on routine basis & implemented. <p align="center">⇒ PP NAD: Phasing-Out → Consultative Roles</p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ongoing external monitoring of policing practices. <p align="center">⇒ PP NAD: Exit</p> |
| | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CSOs/NGOs • Community • Media • Other stake-holders | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CSOs/NGOs • Community • Media • Other stakeholders | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CSOs/NGOs • Community • Media • Other stakeholders |

6. Resources Management and Infrastructure

Overall, the availability of logistics, financial resources as well as human resources seems to have been utilised in a relatively disciplined manner, with their allocation being managed in a relatively effective and efficient way. As in any other areas, PP NAD resources management is also characterised by some ambivalences:

a. Centralised Management of Resources

The centralised nature of financial and logistics management certainly has advantages, of which streamlined utilisation of human resources is one. In many respects, centralised logistics and procurement for all IOM projects, of which PP NAD is part, not only make the provision leanly organised, but also prevent unnecessary misuse of resources. This has its downsides of course. The continuous need to process things at centralised administrative desks creates not infrequent bureaucratic hassles. When there are lapses in the coordination between project management and resources management, unnecessary delay in resources provision is likely to occur. This is particularly relevant to PP NAD, with all its intense field activities requiring speedy responses. For instance, it is understandable to prescribe the photocopying of all training materials to be done in Banda Aceh and only then be dispatched to destined areas. But this is likely to be inefficient, and late delivery of training materials can only be occasionally expected.

b. Management of Incentives

Financial management is not within the scope of this evaluation, nor is it part of what is assigned to the Team. This, however, does not mean that there is no need to raise recurrent issues that were encountered during the evaluation.

First, it was the issue of incentive that kept on resurfacing during field visits and interviews. For the purposes of gathering information from those outside the arrangements of PP NAD and *Kapolres* (Police District Chiefs), the Team sought out several avenues to meet many independent groups, like KPA groups, ex-combatants, ex-GAM members, children, women, and some other groups in remote areas. Under the directive of IOM financial management, compensation or token in the form of cash was to be given to all interview participants. But IOM prescribes that each payment must be supplied with accurate record of name, address, telephone number and signature of each interview participant. The problem is not the payment itself, for everyone was certainly delighted to receive the cash. Rather, there were many who expressed their suspicions on the requirement of recording their identities. It might be argued that there is no need to heed this kind of suspicion. But it is clear that a way must be found as to how the intention to compensate their lost time for interviews does not thwart the necessary oblique methods employed for gathering more accurate data and information. For group interviews with so-called politically sensitive groups, for instance, one way of solving this problem is perhaps by requiring the interviewer simply to provide records of the number of attendants. In short, rules in financial management are to serve data gathering, not the other way around.

Secondly, based on field observation, it seems clear that PP NAD needs to discern the possibility of extending its funding supports for refurbishment of SPN Seulawah's facilities and capacity building for PPA unit (special unit for women and children; *see*

Notes on Gender, Chapter III, I) in many police districts. Indeed, many police districts are not equipped even with proper personnel and basic facilities for PPA. In addition, in order to safeguard the course of *Polda* NAD reform, it is important for PP NAD to properly nurture the development of external groups or agencies capable of independently monitoring the process of reform. Even if this is beyond PP NAD's mandate, it is not entirely imprudent for PP NAD to spend a meagre amount of its strong financial resources for nurturing and empowering such groups.

c. The Move of PP NAD to *Polda* NAD Compound

Many concerned parties express their agreement with the move of PP NAD office to a quarter within the compound of *Polda* NAD. Their approval is not without basis. Precisely because the *raison d'être* of PP NAD is to support *Polda* NAD reform, the move facilitates better coordination for planning, discussions and other joint activities. On the other hand, many parties also express their concern with the move. The move could easily weaken the mediating roles that PP NAD is currently playing in facilitating better relationships between community and police in Aceh in the context of peace process.

This dilemma is worth noting, yet the Team is of an opinion that at this stage of the Project, the setting of PP NAD office within *Polda* NAD is unlikely to create major problems. What needs to be seriously discerned is that, when the reform of *Polda* NAD is gradually heading towards civilian values, PP NAD as part of an independent international organisation (IOM) should maintain its independence as expected by wider constituents of Acehnese society.

7. Management of Change

This is the point where PP NAD management is to be placed within a broader context. It is also at this point that a sense of realism is warranted, if because the directions of change in Acehnese society are not entirely within the directive control of PP NAD management, nor is it within the directive control of CSOs or NGOs. The capacity of PP NAD to manage and accommodate changes will improve the levels of its present achievements, and at the same time also strengthen its supports for police reform in Aceh in the expected directions.

It is within this perspective that the matrix presented above (TABLE 12) has particular relevance, of which the following points deserve some attention:

a. Upon the commencement of NAD Police Project, the CP strategy of partnership was based upon Police Decree (SKEP) 737/X/2005. The partnership principle was to be embodied in Community-Police Forums (CPFs), and CPF was understood as a new institutional setup. However, the very notion brought many problems at the level of implementation, especially in many areas outside Aceh. This, in turn, led to a series of debates and discussions within the INP circles. The crux can be boiled down to one question: How is partnership in community policing to be understood?

b. While the revision was still underway, PP NAD did not waste time and swiftly responded to this new challenge. Reorientation within PP NAD led to a revision, and

it was decided to discontinue the establishment of CPF as a new institutional setup. This swift response can hardly be separated from the crucial roles played by the present NAD PM, who has a thorough understanding of CP issues through some involvements in the initial development of the concept within the Indonesian setting, either as an active police officer or as a consultant to IOM SINP Unit before being appointed as NAD PM. There are several steps taken by PP NAD in response to this change in CP strategy:

- Step 1: PP NAD conducted revision on the meaning of CPF and integrated the new notion into classroom training;
- Step 2: PP NAD and *Polda* NAD sought out potentials for an entry point of community-police partnership within the existing community setup. *Adat* arrangements like *tuha peut*, *sarak opat* and others were identified as these existing forums;
- Step 3: PP NAD facilitated *Polda* NAD and *adat* leaders to hold a series of meetings to produce a guideline for CP implementation using Acehnese culture approach;
- Step 4: PP NAD facilitated *Polda* NAD and *adat* leaders for information dissemination on community-police partnership using Acehnese culture approach;
- Step 5: Information dissemination on community-police partnership was immediately followed by the signing of agreement (MoU) between stakeholders and this is considered as the formalisation of partnership.

c. The above reorientation involves major substantial changes in CP strategy which points to an imperative: CPF is not to be understood as a new forum or institutional setup but, rather, as a partnership principle whose proceedings can only be developed and nurtured in a series of processes. This change cannot but give a sense of relief, but at the same time also presents a greater challenge. For, there was indeed a real tendency to see the establishment of CPF as proof that community-police partnership has been accomplished. It was against this background that the new vision is like awareness that, for lack of a better metaphor, the glee of a wedding day is indeed not proof of a successful marriage. It is within this new awareness that PP NAD began to revise the contents of training manuals, agenda of discussions, and other materials on CP and CPF, both inside and outside classroom training.

d. As noted, the changing conception of community-police partnership, from *event* (“wedding day” – establishment of CPF) to *process* (“marriage” – community-police partnership), brings PP NAD come face to face with a greater challenge. It is at this point that PP NAD begins to struggle. The problem lies in the tendency of PP NAD to confuse *event* with *process*. Without paying due attention to the logic of process, for instance, PP NAD slips back to hastening the organisation of MoU, which in one way or another makes up another *event*. In response to this new and greater challenge, what is needed is for PP NAD to (1) conduct sufficient analysis and reflections on the logic of process with the stages and sequences involved in a process; (2) devise the staging and sequencing for the less tangible objectives; (3) plan activities according to numbers 1 and 2. No less important is some calculation of various possible intended and unintended consequences arising from all activities.

e. All the above accounts need to be supplemented with a note on *Hikayat* and *Nizam* Festivals. Although not part of the original design of the project, *Hikayat* and *Nizam* Festivals can be considered as a sign of PP NAD astuteness in employing Aceh cultural specificity for CP information dissemination. It is important to bear in mind that what is important is neither the contest nor the quality of *hikayat* or *nizam* itself, but the opportunity to draw together diverse groups and people for a social encounter (*this point will be taken up further in the discussions on 'Impact', Ch. IV*). *Hikayat* and *Nizam* festivals deserve supports, although some respondents also express their concern that information dissemination through art events could easily slip into political propaganda rampant during the New Order regime. At this very stage of the Project, however, this damaging potential is very limited and it is recommendable for PP NAD to include other parties or persons for necessary feedbacks. The Team was fortunate to obtain several samples of these *hikayat* entries, and it is clear that it is not the literary quality that is prominent but, rather, a deep yearning for peace. There is a note of caution. While it is prudent to channel energies for venturing on new and greater challenges, it is recommendable for PP NAD not to spend too much of its energies for public events. It is true that the success of these events may relish a sense of achievement on the part of PP NAD, but it is important not to forget the underlying process which usually can only be grasped through subtle qualitative appraisals and valuations.

The patterns implied in the above illustrations are also applicable to other objectives set in the project design. Out of all these accounts, there is perhaps one simple key to unlock the puzzle: to confuse *event* with *process* is like mistaking wedding day for a marriage. It is by learning this distinction that PP NAD is likely to begin preparing itself for greater challenges.

C. Recommendation

1. PP NAD's organisational structure and status in relation to IOM SINP to be retained as is now. Both to be in coordination lines equally under the authority of Programme Manager (NPM). This is to ensure PP NAD to be within IOM's vision to support the INP reform and at the same time to be genuinely embedded in subsidiarity principle within the specificity of Aceh.
2. Learning process and coordination between parallel units to be ensured by optimal utilisation of monthly reports, regular meetings, meeting minutes and inter-unit correspondence between managers and coordinators and other related parties.
3. Inconsistencies between Project's documents (i.e., Document ASIE/2006/121-819, Document Outline of IOM-INP Cooperation, and Project Proposal) to be immediately addressed, especially with regard to targets of HR and CP training as well as how refresher courses for ToT to be conducted.
4. IOM PP NAD and IOM Support Police Reform Unit to immediately conduct a strategic programming involving all concerned parties, with the principal agenda of revising PP NAD's design. The following guideline to be considered as a suggestion:

Guideline for IOM PP NAD's Strategic Programming

Objective: To review and revise the design and assumption of the Project. Review and revision to be based on discussions and reflections of the findings and key points suggested by the 2008 evaluations (mid-term external evaluation and impact evaluation).

Stakeholders: IOM PP NAD and IOM Support Police Reform Unit (managers and all staff members), *Polda* NAD and INP (key representatives, decision makers), PP NAD Donors, CSO representatives and other groups familiar with PP NAD's activities and Aceh situation.

Output: Revised design, logical framework and work-plan to ensure the effectiveness and efficiency of PP NAD's next steps.

Proceeding: There are two steps, both to be facilitated by external facilitator(s) familiar with both PP NAD's activities and Aceh situation. *First*, to discuss and reflect on the findings and recommendations suggested by the 2008 evaluations, and to arrive at some key points to be taken as a basis for revising the Project's design, logical framework and work-plan. *Secondly*, to conduct revision of the Project's design, logical framework and work-plan.

Length: Three (3) days

Step I: First Day

(To be attended by IOM Support Police Reform Unit including PP NAD, *Polda* NAD, INP, PP NAD Donors, other stakeholders)

09.00 – 10.30: Presentation of the 2008 Mid-Term External Evaluation and Impact Evaluation, discussion and reflection.

11.00 – 12.30: Presentation of the 2008 Mid-Term External Evaluation and Impact Evaluation, discussion and reflection.

14.00 – 16.00: Discussions to arrive at some key points necessary for revision of the Project's design.

16.30 – 17.00: Resume of the day and how the key points to be used for revising the Project's design.

Step II: Second and Third Days

(To be conducted internally by IOM Support Police Reform Unit including PP NAD)

Objective: To review and revise the Project's assumption based on the preceding day's key points, and the revision consequentially to be reflected in the revised logical framework, work-plan, target, indicators, etc.

Second Day:

1. Methodology of Strategic Planning (Way of Proceeding).
2. Review of key points and their implications for the revision of the design.
3. Review and revision of design's assumption, formulation of revised assumption.
4. Discussion on the implications of design's revised assumption for logical framework and each of 4 specific objectives of the project.

Third Day:

1. Review of each specific objective, particular attention to identifying the nature of each specific objective: some objectives can only be achieved through less institutionally structured activities than others, or through activities not entirely within PP NAD's directive control → identification of the nature of each specific objective.
2. Devising staging and sequencing for each specific objective, defining targets, indicators, expected results, timelines for each stage and sequence in each specific objective.
3. Pulling together all specific objectives with all their respective details (targets, indicators, expected results, timelines) into a shared new logical framework for PP NAD.

5. Some Terms of Reference (ToR) for PP NAD's staff to be reviewed and revised in line with the new logical framework, with special attention to distinctions between lines of authority, coordination, and consultation to prevent organisational confusion and muddling-through.

6. PP NAD to underline the significance of HR and CP training as the main pillar of its supports for the INP reform in Aceh and to underscore the HR and CP training as part of education process for police personnel in Aceh. Endowed with expertise and long experiences in police education, the present NAD PM is to be encouraged to assert more in cultivating innovative ideas to bring the existing HR and CP training into proper education process, with special attention to be given to capacity building at SPN Seulawah. Given the centrality of capacity building to IOM's mission, the leadership of the present NAD PM to be extended until the 2009 timeline.

7. NAD PM to be granted necessary liberty to invite on-call experts on an *ad hoc* basis for exchanges of ideas related to the mission and common good of PP NAD.

8. PP NAD to give special attention to the importance of cultural sensitivity and interpersonal communication skills for more healthy development of collegiality.

9. PP NAD's internal monitoring and reporting system to pay closer attention to differences in the nature of each specific objective: between ones achievable only through more institutionally structured activities and those only through less institutionally structured ones, between activities whose directions lying within PP NAD's control and those without, between activities warranting quantifiable indicators and those requiring qualitative ones. This is to prevent PP NAD from falling into categorical mismatch and random quantification in its internal monitoring and reporting. The challenge for PP NAD's internal monitoring and reporting lies in capturing qualitative nuances of its activities.

10. PP NAD to exert more energies and resources on social, political and cultural analysis of the intricacies of process as different from event, of Aceh latest political, cultural and social conditions in which its activities are situated, and of intended and unintended consequences arising from its activities (beneficial or detrimental).

Chapter III


Training in Human Rights and Community Policing

“Gradually I realise, learning human rights is not a matter of head [pointing to head] but of heart [pointing to chest]. It is soul-searching, a struggle with our own work as police, with police’s dark past”.

(HR Trainer, Interview, Aceh, July 2008)

It is worth reiterating that customised training in HR and CP constitutes the main pillar of PP NAD’s strategy in supporting cultural changes within the grand scheme of the INP reform. This is unmistakably clear from the assumptions of the Project (*see* Chapter II, A-1). In organising the customised training, PP NAD employs a cascading method reflected in the training of trainers (ToT). In terms of numerical attainment, this cascading method has enabled PP NAD to produce quickest possible results. The way PP NAD carries out this method can be glanced from the following diagram:

DIAGRAM 2
Flow of Training of Trainers



Source: “Outline of IOM-INP Cooperation Plan for Support to NAD Police funded by EC and RNE” (undated)

During two-thirds of the Project’s period (July 2006 – July 2008), PP NAD management has accomplished 84.9% of its targets in HR training and 82.3% in CP training, the latter includes training in CP for 633 middle-ranking officers. With 243 personnel already trained as trainers (129 trainers in CP and 114 in HR), problem of trainers resigning or being transferred to other areas is unlikely to seriously affect the present levels of performance to achieve the overall target.

TABLE 14
Numerical Coverage of Training & Other Activities
(July 2006 – July 2008)

| Activities | Semester | | | | Total |
|--|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|---------------|
| | 1 st | 2 nd | 3 rd | 4 th | |
| Training of Trainers | | | | | |
| CP | 20 | 21 | 64 | 24 | 129 |
| HR | 22 | 21 | 51 | 20 | 114 |
| CPF | - | - | - | 44 | 44 |
| Training of Trainers SPN Seulawah | | | | | |
| CP | - | - | - | 28 | 28 |
| HR | - | - | - | 22 | 22 |
| Rank-and-files (<i>Bintaras</i>) | | | | | |
| Basic CP | - | 649 | 1,602 | 3,702 | 5,953 |
| Basic Principles HR | - | 1,155 | 653 | 4,987 | 6,795 |
| Middle-ranking officers | | | | | |
| CP for Commanders | - | 125 | 330 | 178 | 633 |
| CPF workshop on CP-adat | - | - | - | 945 | 945 |
| Community members | | | | | |
| CPF MoU, dissemination | - | 3,881 | - | 7,496 | 11,377 |
| Community members & Police | | | | | |
| CPF workshop on CP-adat | - | - | - | 255 | 255 |

Source: Interim Reports & Monthly Progress Report (July 2007 – July 2008)

PP NAD numerical achievement is important (see TABLE 14). Even when 6,000 new police recruits from the 2005-2008 period are factored in, PP NAD training has covered 48% of the total number of police personnel in Aceh. In quantitative terms at least, this rate of coverage is more than sufficient to create a critical mass potentially capable of preventing a setback. To put it in a broader context, it is encouraging that IOM SINP Unit has in parallel also trained (in the same HR and CP training) more than 25% of police population in many areas of the country. Given the integration of HR and CP into the curricula of 21 Police Schools (SPN) and other institutions of police education in Indonesia, and given the prominence of HR and CP issues in the discussions within the Schools for high- and middle-ranking officers (from which all *Kapolda* and *Kapolres* are recruited), many police officers and rank-and-files interviewed for this evaluation believe that, in their own words, “CP and HR-based policing may have reached a point of no return”.

Of course, the belief based on numerical calculus may turn out to be too sanguine. For, while number does matter, sheer numerical achievements do not necessarily correspond with qualitative changes. Despite this problem, the fact that PP NAD has successfully trained half of all police rank-and-files (*bintara*) in Aceh in basic principles of HR and CP is a remarkable achievement not to be taken lightly. This also needs to be understood in view of the fact that day-to-day policing work is almost entirely dependent on direct interactions of these rank-and files with

community members from all walks of life. It is also these *bintaras* who are expected to personify the venerable ethos of police discretion on the ground.¹⁵

Do the rates of this numerical achievement ensure sustainability of the INP reform? This question is too thorny to answer. One of CP trainers in Aceh responded to this issue with an insightful view: “Initial steps have been taken, and there is no way of slipping back to the dark past. The question is not whether police can change but, rather, whether police personnel who have received training for free are determined enough to safeguard and nurture what we have achieved in these initial steps”. Of course, determination is easier said than done.

Against this backdrop, this chapter is organised into the following parts: (1) contents and process of training; (2) internalisation of new knowledge in HR and CP; (3) human resources; (4) special notes on local contents, gender, and officers’ exemption from HR training.

A. Training Materials and Contents

1. PP NAD adopts the same training materials as those used by IOM SINP Unit for police training in other areas in Indonesia, no doubt with necessary modification or addition to accommodate the specificity of Aceh (*this point will be discussed separately*). It is worth noting that during training of trainers, participants also receive additional coaching in participatory methods of teaching, interpersonal skills and basic computer. All training materials are presented in electronic form (power-point) and each training participant receives one copy of textbooks in HR and CP. Aside from written materials, there are also training materials delivered in the form of role play, demonstration of know-how and case study. All materials are systematically organised and structured in so-called ‘lesson plan’ for trainers, including the exact timing and timetable for each session and chapter of the HR and CP textbooks.

Adjustment and improvement on teaching method and style are based on feedbacks and suggestions given during end-of-day evaluation, in which trainers, supervisor, observer and PP NAD project assistant are present. The points discussed during daily evaluation are used to prepare trainers for the following day’s sessions. The evaluation usually ends with a discussion on the next chapters in line and how adjustments and improvement to be incorporated.

2. All materials are available in abundance, and they are well arranged in a neat, systematic and detailed order, including the sequencing required for the flow of the training. Continuous monitoring and oversight are recapitulated during end-of-the-day evaluation and necessary points are taken up for preparing next-day sessions. During field visits, it was indeed very moving to witness how trainers are deeply engrossed in preparing next-day sessions until deep into the night, assisted by supervisor and project assistant. From the desks of IOM high-office and donors, it may be the aggregate results that matter, but it is worth reminding that the real process of change

¹⁵ See Markas Besar POLRI, *Rencana Strategis Kepolisian Negara Republik Indonesia tahun 2005-2009*, No. Pol. 9, 2007, 26 April 2007, p. 24 (hereafter *Renstra 2005-2009*).

is made up of the ordinariness of efforts often blotted out by questions about the tangibility of results and immediacy of impacts. In addition, manuals for gender mainstreaming developed at the start of the fourth semester of the Project have also been adopted for ToT. These manuals, which are rich in method of learning by demonstration, are valuable additional materials. In brief, teaching preparation, learning process, training materials, methods of delivery, or monitoring and evaluation have all been conducted through a well managed system that ensures the quality of training. All this, including pre-test and post-test for participants, is neatly documented.

3. A number of loopholes and drawbacks noted by earlier evaluation reports will not be rehearsed here, like competence gap among trainers, use of too many foreign terms in textbooks and manuals, insufficiency of examples drawn from local and national context, overlapping contents between HR and CP textbooks, too short duration of training, need of more attractive presentation (*power-point*), typos, etc. All these self-evident drawbacks no doubt need to be attended.¹⁶ Based on participant observation of many training sessions, there is also a particular confusion that needs to be sorted out, and this comes from differences between trainers and supervisors in responding to tough questions raised by participants. These tough questions usually concern issues in human rights, Aceh specificity, gender, and community-police partnership. While this problem can be sorted out during end-of-the-day evaluation, it also shows the importance of refresher courses for trainers.

4. Some of earlier evaluation reports note that the duration of training – 4 days for HR and 5 days for CP – is too short. While this problem deserves attention, the Team is of an opinion that the training is in fact more of a short workshop than a proper course (Latin: *cursus*). If what is meant by this HR and CP training is ‘course’, then 4 days for HR and 5 days for CP no doubt are too short for a proper course, but they are acceptable for short workshop. As for trainers, it is recommendable that refresher courses are conducted by focusing on key themes selectively chosen from training materials they have received during their ToT, but these key themes are to be discussed in depth.

5. The Team is of an opinion that the role of training is to impart new knowledge in HR and CP basic principles (*cognition*). Based on many interviews with training participants, trainers and officers, however, it is somewhat clear that this brief training is expected to have immediate impacts on police’s daily conduct (*practice*). This of course is a tall order. There is no such a thing as immediate impact in education (*this point will be taken up further in the section on ‘From Knowing to Embodying Knowledge’*). One way to accommodate this expectation is perhaps by reducing the amount of training materials and, in its place, inserting a learning process through field exposure. For instance, of the total 5 days of CP training, the first two days are spent for introduction and some basic themes in CP. Then the third day is entirely spent for exposure, which then to be taken up as a starting point for reflections while continuing the next themes on the fourth and fifth days.

¹⁶ Based on interviews with PP NAD staff and IOM SINP Unit officer, revision seems to have been underway, but up until the completion of this evaluation, no single copy of these revised textbooks and manuals was successfully obtained by the Evaluation Team.

B. Atmosphere of Training

There is no doubt that the level of enthusiasm among participants is very assuring. There are of course some participants in every training session showing lack of enthusiasm, but it is quite evident that they are overwhelmed by the climate of enthusiasm dominant in the class. The abundance of training textbooks and materials, stationery and other training logistics is something that is highly applauded by all participants. In some districts, the training is usually distracted by sudden cuts of electricity or by extreme humidity due to insufficient number and/or capacity of air-conditioners, especially in training centres located in the vicinity of coastal areas. A number of drawbacks already noted in earlier evaluation reports will not be rehearsed here, and these drawbacks need to be attended.

Whence does all this enthusiasm come? Ever since the first participant observation of classroom training in the district of Jantho, this question has been intriguing. Only after many more participant observations and interviews did an interesting pattern show up. In many respects, the high level of enthusiasm among participants is due not only to the learning and teaching methods employed by PP NAD, but also to the fact that ever since these *bintaras* left SPN, they have never received any other organised classroom trainings. Then prolonged and bitter conflicts virtually prevented these rank-and-files from receiving additional training. In a poignant and ironic account shared by a *bintara* who was delighted to have received PP NAD training, “After SPN, we the *bintaras* never received anything like this; that’s why even if IOM trains us how to be a burglar, we will still be very enthusiastic. This training is indeed a new phase in our lives, and we feel grateful for we can learn again now”.

The above account could be read as something that modulates PP NAD achievements. But in all likelihood, it points to something more profound that so far is either unnoticed or taken for granted: that the present condition is so ripe and fertile for PP NAD to lend supports to a large-scale transformation of knowledge about policing. Indeed, this so-called ‘cognitive vacuum’ among police personnel is a very strategic entry point for PP NAD to accomplish its noble mission. It is within the context of this ‘cognitive vacuum’ that the customised training in HR and CP has been successfully conducted by PP NAD. No doubt, this achievement cannot be separated from the roles and commitment of project assistants (PA) in every training centre. It is these PAs who on a day-to-day basis manage and organise the training in all districts in NAD, playing the mediating roles between PP NAD and police districts, and ensuring that all daily monitoring and weekly reporting are carried out. Based on various interviews with these PAs, there is an expectation that communication with PP NAD management staff can be conducted in more constructive ways. This point deserves immediate attention, for the climate of communication is often characterised by fear on the part of PAs or by some confusion on the roles of experts or consultants.

C. Process and Method of Teaching

It is worth noting that several participants of PP NAD’s training have had experiences of attending other trainings organised by other agencies. Based on interviews with them, it is clear that IOM seems to have successfully devised training contents and

methods that are more appealing than those by other organisations. What impressed the participants most is the participatory methods of teaching and learning that enable them to be active participants and free to raise questions, opinions, views, comments, criticism, etc. Of course, they give high mark on these participatory methods also because, at least for a few days, they can escape from the strict hierarchy of police commando they have to endure day after day in their places of work.

Through participatory methods, participation can also be managed or even induced by trainers. What has been widely used, for instance, is for a trainer to spontaneously ask a participant to read loudly some sentences shown on the screen, then another participant to give one example or two taken from daily policing practices. Only an uncreative trainer will fail to induce participation from a great number of participants in the course of one-day training sessions. Group discussions, group reporting, role-play, demonstration of know-how and case study can all be creatively harnessed for participatory learning and teaching. Part of this participatory method is also a consensus for observing rules on punctuality, break time, etiquette and other codes of conduct during the training. Indeed, all this is what has been adopted in all training centres in Aceh.

Of course, some show more quality than others. And the participatory method is not without its weakness. For instance, participatory method demands a high level of self-confidence on the part of trainers to manage the class and training process. A nervous trainer with low command of training materials is bound to be a target of disapproval, if not inside then outside the training sessions, as widely found during participant observations. Participatory method is also held back by time limitations. For instance, before an important and perhaps controversial topic is sufficiently discussed, time has run out. In the words of many participants, “Many interesting and sensitive topics or questions are simply frozen and remain unanswered”. Or again, based on participant observations, what happens quite often is that a trainer mentions a term or concept, then spontaneously asks a participant to give example. Although the example does not illustrate the concept, or sometimes even contradicting, the trainer hurriedly shuts the moment by exclaiming, “Okay, give a big applause! Clear isn’t it”. Then the trainer moves on to another topic.

D. From ‘Knowing’ to ‘Embodying’ Knowledge

In the course of training sessions, internalisation of cognitive knowledge seems to be carried out by means of role-play, demonstration of know-how, case study, and class review of previous-day materials at the start of a new day and class resume at the end of a training day. Many participants share that these methods have greatly helped them learn and remember. Of these methods, role-play and demonstration of know-how have been constantly cited as the most useful means of internalisation.

Despite the above advantages, it is important to remember that this training, taken as a whole, is a learning process at the cognitive level (*cognitive*). It needs to be distinguished from a learning process at the level of practice and experience (*experiential*). In other words, it is a distinction between ‘*to know*’ and ‘*to do*’. This

distinction is something so important in education but is often set aside in training projects.

How far is the distance between ‘to know’ and ‘to do’ among police personnel who have received training? This is another question that has been intriguing from the first series of interviews with police personnel who have received training. Deprived of the luxury of arriving at more conclusive answers through a method of repeated observation on a day-to-day basis and for a long period of time, the above question was inserted into every interview with these ex-participants. Towards the end of each interview, the following question was posed:

“With all those strengths and weaknesses, how would you rate the value of what is taught during the training? Good or bad? If you have to rate it on the scale from 0 to 10, how high or low would you rate? – 10 being the best, 0 the worst”.

After a few minutes of discussion among themselves and an answer given, another question was raised:


“Well then, from the teaching you have learned during the training, how would you rate its implementation on the ground or in daily practices? How much do you see that the teachings have been implemented? Also between 0 and 10, please.”

The differences between the two might have been expected, but the way the two differ remains interesting to observe. GRAPH 1 on the following page presents an interesting pattern.

Of course, *perception* is one thing, *fact* is another. What is shown in the graph is simply how ex-participants perceived and rated the value of teaching in HR and CP (blue line) and the value of implementation in daily practices (red line). At most, perception can be used only as a proxy to gauge the possible state of affairs at the level of fact. The actual state of affairs may, but also may not, be represented by the patterns in the graph. Given this proxy, the graph reveals some interesting points:

1. On average, ex-participants gave impressive scores to the value of teachings they have received during HR and CP training. As clear in the graph, the scores range from 6 to 10, and no group of ex-participants have assigned score 5 or below. In a way, the impressive scores can be taken as high approval towards the competence of PP NAD in organising and delivering HR and CP training.
2. Ex-participants of training gave poor scores to the quality of implementation of HR and CP teachings in daily practices. The scores range between 0 and 4, and no group have assigned score 5 or above. In many respects, these low scores can be interpreted as an admission or self-assessment on how poorly they or their fellow police have implemented the training they have received in their day-to-day policing works.
3. This pattern also indicates that ex-participants themselves perceive a clear distinction between ‘to know’ and ‘to do’, and the discrepancies between the two cannot simply be bypassed. When, during interviews, they were asked about the length of time needed for the classroom teaching in HR and CP to be implemented in their daily practices, they answered that it would be between 5 and 15 years. This may also show that “integration of HR and CP principles into police daily practices” (as set in the Project Design) is highly unlikely to be achieved within the 2009 timeline.

GRAPH 1
Quality of Teaching and Implementation



Source: Interviews with police personnel who have received HR and CP Training, Aceh (July-August 2008)

4. As noted, this is a crucial issue involved in education process, and this issue needs to be seriously attended by PP NAD. Put in the context of the INP Reform, it is true that cultural strategy of reform needs changes in cognition (new knowledge) in line with the end goal of reform. New knowledge notwithstanding, there is still another key process equally crucial, i.e., education process to embody new habits (*new habitual practices*) in line with *new knowledge* already learned cognitively. In the language of classical education, the education process to bridge the gap between ‘to know’ and ‘to do’ is called *repetitio* (repetition). In the language of the graph, it is this education process to embody new habitual practices through the exercises of repeated upright actions that is likely to bring the lower line (red line) closer to the higher line (blue line).

5. It is therefore rather clear that to expect classroom training to have immediate impacts on police daily practices is a tall order and unrealistic. If in puzzlement PP NAD has not successfully achieved this objective, it is because this objective demands PP NAD to do something that is either beyond its directive control or something that needs a longer timeline. To sum up, even from ex-participants we learn a yawning gap between ‘to know’ and ‘to do’. PP NAD seems to have been remarkably successful in delivering the customised training to affect changes in ‘to-know’. Questions as to how ‘to-know’ (*new knowledge*) gradually turns into ‘to-do’ (*new conduct/practices*) can only be answered by using other criteria and by adopting a longer timeline.

E. Quality of Trainers

In-depth interviews with trainers also revealed several issues no less interesting than those shared by other groups. There was hardly any trainer who did not admit that both the contents and teaching methods required by PP NAD’s customised training make up “a new experience” and even for some, “an extraordinary experience”. They shared how they have been going through learning experiences themselves, ever since they received ToT and then started to teach and how their way of teaching has been constantly monitored and evaluated. Indeed, if INP is to start addressing its notorious lack of attention to the education of its rank-and-file members, it is recommendable to begin by learning from the experiences of these trainers.

1. It may be surprising, but it is true that only by teaching through participatory methods did these trainers gradually realise that “to teach is not the same as giving command and instruction”. It is this realisation that makes them start learning how to listen. It is also through this process that they seem to gradually realise that their principal role is more of facilitators than that of instructors. Only after some experiences of teaching did many also come to realise that interpersonal skills are of paramount importance to police work. How many teaching sessions are needed for them to feel at ease and confident enough to teach? In their own words, “On average, it is only after 4-5 series of trainings or 20-25 teaching sessions” that they feel to “have sufficient command of training materials and gradually confident enough to stand in front of the class”.

2. Despite this learning process among trainers, many ex-participants complain that the climate of the class usually becomes dull or distracted when the trainers are their colleagues from the same police districts/sub-districts. It is due less to the way they teach than the ex-participants' familiarity with the trainers' daily misconducts. In their own words, "Their daily misconducts are far too unsuitable for teaching in the class". Or, "there is no way to raise problems or cases that implicate our superiors, for the trainers are just subordinates like us". Predictably, the training atmosphere becomes more formal or even tense when the trainers are their own superiors, for a climate of self-censorship is then preventing them from freely raising their views, questions or criticisms. This is the case of day-to-day hierarchy of commands spilling over into classroom. Many ex-participants concede that they prefer trainers who come from other police districts.

3. A more serious problem that keeps on resurfacing is rooted in the INP organisation itself. It is the peculiar system of INP job transfer and rotation that deeply affects the quality of trainers in Aceh. It is not unusual to find that precisely at the time when a trainer is reaching professional maturity in teaching, he/she is transferred to other area and stops being a trainer. This is also true with many trainers at SPN Seulawah. It is beyond the control of PP NAD to immediately solve this problem. As noted (see Chapter II, B-4 on 'SPN Seulawah'), this is even closely related to a much more fundamental problem besetting the entire INP, i.e., the marginal status of education in Police organisation.

4. Fortunately, insofar as it concerns the availability of trainers, PP NAD is less likely to be greatly affected by the above problem, although the quality of training tends to be compromised. Up until the period of this evaluation, PP NAD has successfully conducted four cascading series of ToT. In terms of quality of trainers, however, there seems to be considerable differences between the first and the subsequent ToTs, with the latter showing signs of declining quality. Of course, quality comes with teaching experiences, but it also requires that the subsequent ToTs in the cascading order are as sound as the preceding ones. The impact of this declining quality is far-reaching. For example, there is a worrying tendency that certain key concepts in both HR and CP suffer from shrinking or depleted meanings in the hands of trainers from the latter chains in the cascading order (cf. *the example of 'vulnerable group' in Notes on Gender*).

With regard to ToT, there is another puzzling problem that needs urgent redress: Why are trainers who receive training in HR not also trained in CP, and vice versa? This may come from misinterpretation of the wording in the Project Design. There is no reason why trainers are not trained in both HR and CP, and not in either HR or CP. From various participant observations of training sessions, it is clear that many questions raised by participants can only be adequately responded by trainers who have sufficient command of both HR and CP. Indeed, the two assume each other.

5. To sum up, what are the characteristics of those considered "good trainers" and "bad trainers"? The following table (TABLE 15) presents examples taken from literal expressions (verbatim) shared by ex-participants of HR and CP training.

TABLE 15
Perceived Attributes of Good Trainer and Bad Trainer

| Good Trainers | Bad Trainers |
|--|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • commanding training materials and less reliance on textbook • eloquent and appealing before the class • not freezing or evading questions causing participants' disappointment • giving many examples and use them to explain difficult concepts • involving participants through challenging questions • sense of humour • explaining foreign terms clearly • good conducts outside classroom • knowledge of Acehnese language and able to link concepts to Acehnese proverbs • using body language in explaining something • matching participants' critical questions with good answers • treating participants not as subordinates • giving caring attention to those who look sleepy or bored • open to corrections and feedbacks before the class | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • poor command of training materials and too reliant on textbook, only reading what is written on screen • if the conduct outside the class is bad, the teaching also stinks • nervous, mumbling and bad public speaking • bossy and domineering way of teaching • mispronouncing foreign terms or difficult words • unable to explain foreign terms • not explaining the topic, but talking about himself/herself • boasting about his/herself or his/her own achievements • giving discouraging comments and looking down on participants • evading tough questions by asking the class to clap • poor knowledge of Aceh situation • avoiding exchanges of arguments before the class • unappreciative of participants • running after textbook targets • no female trainers |

Source: Interviews with ex-participants of training in HR and CP, Aceh (July-August 2008)

F. Quality of Training Participants

As noted, training in HR and CP organised by PP NAD seems to be taking place within the context of 'cognitive vacuum' among police personnel in Aceh. The new knowledge offered by PP NAD (i.e., human rights and community policing) is a strategic entry point to the reform process of a *Polda* (*Polda* NAD) that has just come out of long and bitter conflicts. In other words, the 'cognitive vacuum' that has been there for some time makes up a fertile ground ensuring that the training is not only gravely needed but also will be well received. 'Cognitive vacuum' in itself is of course insufficient without all PP NAD's logistics and infrastructural supports and the quality of training which has enjoyed wide approval among many concerned parties.

How this fertile ground has been seized by PP NAD, and how it has been harnessed for instilling new knowledge in policing work, cannot of course be separated from the

quality of reception by police personnel as training participants themselves. On this count, the following points deserve attention:

1. It is worth reiterating that the high level of enthusiasm among training participants needs to be understood within the context of both cognitive vacuum and distinctive organisation of the training by PP NAD. It is like shattered cogs being pulled together again into a wheel. This way of seeing their experiences may sound idiosyncratic, but that is perhaps because we tend to see reform process in the technical language of management. Indeed, if only the rich nuances of their experiences were given a chance to appear in the equation, perhaps management scorecard will begin to learn how to appreciate what is less measurable in the process of police reform. For many ex-participants, being together in a classroom and learning together in a participatory atmosphere for several days is something that seems to have reawakened their lost *esprit de corps*. Not only does this sense of camaraderie show up during break time, but it is also evident during the simple concluding rites of the training. It is recommendable for PP NAD to cultivate this concluding rite and turn it into affective moments for police's camaraderie. It does not take extra energies or resources, for instance, to turn the core principles of HR and/or CP into a new pledge pronounced by all participants at this concluding rite. The pledge can be fruitfully conceived of as a new way of continuously bringing *Tribrata* into realisation (*Tribrata* is police oath). Indeed, the concluding rite of the training is another fertile ground to be harnessed for inducing affective moments. PP NAD does not seem to have cultivated this real possibility.

But, what have these affective moments to do with the training and police work? The answer is plain. Knowledge does not turn into practice in a robotic way, as much as *new knowledge* in HR and CP also does not become HR and CP-based *new practices* in an automatic way. For cognitive knowledge to be embodied and gradually become practices, the moments 'to-feel' are very crucial, and this is what has been completely forgotten by the modern system of education. Of course, turning the concluding rite into *affective moments* does not guarantee anything, but it can at least be a reminder that the noble value of HR and CP principles will remain an arid cognitive game unless it is felt and gradually embodied into new practices. It is this intricate process that seems to have been bypassed by those who expect immediate impacts on police's daily practices. As for the possibility of turning the core of HR and CP principles into a new pledge, there is a need for PP NAD to be vigilant, for the likelihood is equally high that such moments simply turn into a verbal ritual.

2. As the growth of a seed into blossom depends on the quality of the soil, so the quality training organised by PP NAD does not stand alone apart from the quality of its participants. It is here that the consequences of many thorny problems in police recruitment are felt acutely. This is of course beyond the directive control of PP NAD, but it is suggested here simply to reiterate the urgency of reforming recruitment policies and practices for SPN Seulawah. The following account from a female teenager interviewed for this evaluation may have been shared in anger, but it bears some relevance: "If the way they enter the Police is illegitimate, the quality is of course illegitimate, and what they do is also illegitimate". 'Quality' is an *omnibus* concept; it can be used to serve many purposes at once. It is used here simply to refer to basic capacities to understand training materials. It may sound too deploring, but there is a derogatory term among training participants all over Aceh to poke fun at

those who are considered slow: *PDI* – shorthand for *Penurunan Daya Ingat* (literally, ‘deteriorating memory’).

3. Despite enthusiasm, they widely share that the main obstacle to implementing what they have learned is their own superior, especially at the middle levels, or district level. In the words of a *bintara*, “It’s like a thick wall we cannot climb”. Or, the following words are common among *bintaras* in many areas in Aceh: “After *Polmas* (CP) training, we realise the gap between militaristic police and partnership police is like the difference between night and day. But once we step out of the training room, we face our superiors who remain militaristic”. In a group interview with police personnel working in several remote villages, a sense of deep-seated anger towards their superiors was even manifest in helpless accounts: “What should we do? We have tried hard enough to do what is taught in the training, and we try to do it in far-away villages... nothing there, no facilities, but I keep on being blamed by my superior, I stand accused, I’m about to be removed now, that means I am cast out”. Whenever this sort of problem is being raised in training sessions, the trainers cannot help but give brief comments: “We are only teaching what is expected of us”. In short, there are widespread demands among the *bintaras* that their superiors also be trained, including in human rights principles (HR). In words that may express their helplessness, “If 3 chapters are taught to us *bintaras*, our superiors must be given 6 chapters”.

4. Dilemma of training allowance: Daily training allowance (100,000 IDR) given by PP NAD to each participant is certainly not without basis. As expected, no one showed displeasure or disagreement. Recompense for being taken away from work for 4 and 5 days is sensible, although it can easily be said that every personnel already receives monthly salary. To consider it as a refund for their travel expenses is a form of generosity, although it can easily be argued that attending training is part of police profession in Aceh. Indeed, this is not something that can be judged easily. When the training was conducted for the first time, there was perhaps hardly any participant aware of the presence of training allowance, for it was (and still is) given at the end of the training. Since then the news of training allowance has been spreading fast and wide among police *bintaras*. It is almost certain that participants of subsequent trainings were aware of this allowance before they arrived on the first day. It is important to note that 100.000 IDR *per diem* is quite an amount for most *bintaras*, and no doubt the amount has augmented their meagre salaries. This point is suggested as a simple reminder that wide expectation seems to have been growing among police personnel: that any IOM projects, even if for their own professional development, always involve pecuniary incentives. This tendency may not be damaging for the moment, yet it is recommendable to monitor its potentials in diverting the original purposes of Police Project NAD.

5. To sum up, how have ex-participants perceived the training in HR and CP in general? The following table (TABLE 16) presents literal accounts (verbatim) commonly found in the interviews.

TABLE 16
Participants' Impression of HR and CP Training

| Positive Impressions | Negative Impressions |
|--|---|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • This IOM training is extraordinary • We receive three precious <i>tas</i> (Indonesian for 'bag') from IOM: <i>legalitas, proportionalitas, necessitas</i> (legality, proportionality, necessity). • Before training, we had only S-1: <i>senjata</i> (weapon), now we have S-3: <i>senyum, sapa, salam</i> (smile, friendliness, greeting) – Note: S-1 stands for strata 1 (academic degree equivalent to Bachelor), S-2 for strata 2 (Master degree), S-3 for strata 3 (PhD). • It gives us a new theory, so that we know international standards, and this makes us self-confident. • Many of us are surprised that criminals also have human rights, now we know they do. • Many of us know for the first time that there is such a thing as vulnerable groups and they must be prioritised. • This training teaches us that police work requires politeness, propriety and decency. • After training, I conclude that the most important for police are interpersonal skills and discretion. • Now I know what to do and not to do • We're pleasantly surprised to learn that subordinates like us have rights not to follow superiors' order if it contradicts our conscience. • Learning CP makes us realise that police must be experts in local culture (<i>ahli budaya</i>). • Only after learning CP do we realise that community can help police work • We are taught how to learn in participatory process • This IOM training is well organised and with first-rate facilities. • I was lazy to attend at first, for I thought it was just the boss' order, but now I know why it's important. • The more role-play and demonstration, the easier for us to understand training materials. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Many of us don't like trainers from our own <i>Polres</i> (police district), for we know their daily misconducts; that distracts the learning process. • Some of us get bored, because the trainers don't know enough of the materials. • S-1, S-3, or S-100 is useless unless our superiors are also trained in HR • Many elderly participants and young too suffer from <i>PDI</i> (<i>penurunan daya ingat</i> – deteriorating memory). • Of course I like the allowance, but that could also divert our motives. • The training teaches us many cautions and we have to be careful, but in practice that makes us fall prey to bigger manipulations from community members. • Without improvement to our welfare, all those good teachings won't get implemented. • Effectiveness of implementation depends on police welfare. |

Source: Interviews with police participants of HR and CP training, Aceh, (July-August 2008).

G. Notes on Officers' Exemption from Training

The problem noted in the preceding section ('Quality of Training Participants', Chapter III, F) strengthens doubt about the merits of exempting middle- and high-ranking officers from training in HR, as set in the Project Design. Middle and high-ranking officers do receive training in CP by method of 'roundtable discussion', but not in HR. While it is true that materials in CP training contain elements of HR, it is clear that the compressed nature of CP training makes the status of HR too peripheral to the point that virtually all high and middle-ranking officers do not receive training in HR.

This is very unfortunate, since officers are first-line supervisors charged with the roles of directing, guiding and supervising all *bintaras* (rank-and-files) in day-to-day policing work (*Renstra* 2005-2009, p. 24). And within the context of the INP restructuring towards decentralised police service, *Polres* (Police District) and middle-ranking officers stand at the very heart and forefront of this process. That is, through so-called 'Basic Operational Units' they make up the main actors of both operational and managerial functions for ensuring public order in a given district. In all respects, they play key roles in the management of *Polda* NAD reform and the way they perform even becomes a barometer for the success and failure of *Polda* NAD reform.

Based on interviews with key informants at *Sespim* (Police School from which most *Polres* chiefs are recruited), HR and CP are two issues of discussion among officers. Many differences remain unresolved, especially on the concept of 'community policing', and the discussions remain unfocused and unsystematic. In the words of an officer, "We cannot assume that HR and CP have by now been properly and adequately understood by these officers in this school". Against this backdrop, it is recommendable for IOM SINP Unit to establish closer collaboration with *Sespim*, especially in devising and developing appropriate training materials for middle and high-ranking officers. Not only in CP, but also and especially in HR, from which officers have been exempted so far. Emphasis on CP is no doubt important, but perhaps more important is an adequate understanding of HR, which in the end makes up the principle and foundation of CP. It is more substantive integration that seems to be needed.

H. Notes on Local Content

'Local content' is a term referring to what makes up the specificity of Aceh. In the present conditions, it is not completely baseless to use the term to refer to three principal issues, i.e., history of armed conflicts and post-conflict situation, *adat* institutional setup, and Islamic *sharia*. To reflect these local contents in HR and CP training materials is no simple process, for it cannot be done simply by way of cut-and-paste method.

Attempts at better understanding of local contents into training materials and how some problems are involved therein are suggested in the following points:

1. Courageous attempts at this integration have been made by PP NAD from the early stages of its involvement, especially through a series of workshops on Aceh *adat*, Islamic *sharia* and traumatic experiences of armed conflicts.¹⁷ In one of these workshops, local contents were richly discussed, save for some strong resistance to discussing human rights violations and implementation of *sharia*. Many points could be developed further for training purposes. This, however, requires special expertise not only in Aceh context but also in education process that may prevent local contents from merely being pasted on some presumably related materials in the training.

2. Among the three local contents, issues on Aceh *adat* and Islamic *sharia* appear to have been discussed during HR and CP training. How are these sensitive issues being discussed? This intriguing question has also guided reviews of documents and participant observations. The following example may be illustrative. In one of CP training sessions, a trainer began to give some words on the link between human rights and *sharia* after covering several topics in CP. He asked a participant to mention three *Qanuns* regulating the implementation of *sharia* in Aceh. The participant did it elaborately but splendidly. The trainer then made a summary of these three *Qanuns* and their respective sanctions for violations. Then a question was posed to the whole class: “Does caning violate human rights?” The class momentarily fell silent, for everyone was perhaps baffled by the question. After a few seconds, the trainer answered his own question: “No, caning doesn’t violate human rights, because it has been authorised by the *Qanun*”. Then he moved on to another topic.

The above example is not confined to one training session or one district. If the target of “Aceh context to be reflected in training manuals” is pursued by means illustrated in the above example, then it is less than acceptable. Not only is it misleading, but its effects can even be counterproductive. Take another example as a comparison. Having learned that the above case was repeated in another district, the same question was posed to a group of trainers in an interview. The answer was instantly given: “No, caning doesn’t violate human rights if it’s done in a closed door. If done in an open place, it does violate human rights, yes it does... for it brings shame and disgrace”. These two examples are cited simply to show that, while local contents have been touched upon, it is still far from what is intended in the project design. If any, what is shown in the above two examples can even bring detrimental effects. Of course, this cannot be done unless PP NAD spends energies in serious intellectual reflections.

3. More assuring is perhaps what has been done on local contents pertaining to *adat*, especially after a series of discussions, seminars and workshops on ‘Implementation of CP using Aceh-Culture Approach’ between February and April 2008. However, there is similar problem as to how to avoid counterproductive effects. There seems to be no other way than for PP NAD to support the ongoing process of developing community-police partnership with careful analysis and reflections on the intricacies of *adat* contents and the onion-like nature of partnership (*this point will be taken up further in Chapter IV*). Within this concern is also a need take into account some potential unintended impacts that may arise, of which suspicion toward CP as a way of doing new intelligence work is currently growing. It may be too taxing, but the following expectation from one of PP NAD donors is fitting: “PP NAD needs to

¹⁷ One of the Evaluation Team members was present in one of these workshops in 2006.

spend more time and energies in serious thinking, rather than simply doing activism on the ground”.

4. Among the three local contents, the issue of past conflicts is the least engaged one. This attitude is perhaps unintentional, or perhaps a form of cautiousness or play-safe. Nevertheless, if the mission of PP NAD is “to support the implementation of MoU through police reform in Aceh”, this cautiousness could easily be taken by the public as a form of avoidance from its mission, precisely because the root causes lie in the collective scars brought about by bitter armed conflicts. Or, to give a benefit of doubt, PP NAD’s mission is pursued through roundabout routes of cultural approach to *adat* in the hope that the bleeding scars of long and bitter conflicts will be gradually fading away with the passage of time.

PP NAD’s reticence may be closely related to a wider climate of avoidance. For some, this wider climate gives the respectability of reticence, while for some others distrust:

- It is common to find reticence towards any talks or questions about past conflicts on the grounds that they will unnecessarily disturb the existing flow of day-to-day routines. Many concede that even if the present situation is still far from so-called “just peace”, it is “at least less agitating, and it is enough to sustain our day-to-day lives”. The following account is common among police personnel and community members: “It’s better not to talk about past conflicts; they will only upset the present normal situation”.
- It is equally common to find some forms of guarded resentments among police personnel who have received HR and CP training. When asked about the present state of relationships between police and ex-GAM members, many showed their displeasure: “The situation is unclear now, it was clear and the enemy was also clear then”; or, “I refuse to have anything to do with ex-GAM, even under my superior’s order, or even in the name of community policing, why should we get friendly to them now, while our blood was cheap (*halal*) then?”

How to address this sensitive and delicate problem during training sessions is of course a difficult question. Not only because the issue concerns the bitterness of conflicts, but also because any discussions about them will inevitably give rise to many difficult moral questions that make both HR and CP trainers caught unprepared. To deal with this problem in direct way during the training of *bintaras* is indeed potentially explosive. However, it is perhaps worth trying in one of the sessions during two-week ToT. A live dialogue and a search for reconciliation, for instance, could be carefully conducted, with a hope that the span of two weeks provides a more reflective and settled climate for cultivating some solutions to this sensitive problem. Perhaps there are objections to this idea, on the grounds that it is difficult to find resource persons who have successfully cultivated and embraced their experiences of bitter conflicts in a mature way. But, based on worthwhile encounters with many persons of good will during the course of this evaluation, finding such resource persons is not beyond probability.

I. Notes on Gender

Throughout the recorded history of Aceh, women's involvement in public affairs has never been an exception. To say that it was a rule is far-fetched, but to see it an exception is certainly misguided. In the past, many Acehnese women were acting as *uleebalang*, war commanders or queens. Among ordinary people, there were *Teungku Inongs*, women publicly known as wise, virtuous and steeped in religious knowledge as woman *ulemas*. It is worth noting that although never part of *adat* structure, *Teungku Inong* had extraordinary public influences. She was widely sought after, for her blessings were a key to any decisions affecting public life and larger population.

If all this appears mythical, it is mainly because the past has become misty, or perhaps because the present contains a desire to break too fast with the past. Here comes a twist so common in history: just because something was venerated in the past is no reason in its favour; it may in fact be a reason against it. With this *realpolitik* also comes the present paradox. As with all paradox, the hardest part is not to answer but to conceive the question. The question is a form of dilemma. On the one hand, it will be hard to find *adat* leaders and *ulemas* who will not acknowledge the central roles of women in Aceh's past. On the other hand, it is the same *adat* leaders and *ulemas* who adamantly restrict women from playing roles in public life by means of *Qanuns* and Islamic *sharia*. This dilemma may just be another face of a perennial irony: venerability always brings with it the seeds of its own dethronement.

Back to the soil of Aceh in July and August 2008. Based on various interviews, the roles of women in community life have never been a serious problem, at least at face value. Only when asked whether they would support women for public offices, ambiguity began to appear. By the time some further questions were posed, what is expected of women is rather clear. In several villages, especially along the west coast, most *tuha peut* have woman members. A question was posed: "What do woman members of the *tuha peut* do? Are their roles or authority the same as that of male members?" All, women and men, gave the same answer: "Women look after womanly affairs". What they mean by womanly affairs are "courses in sewing, cooking and children healthcare", and the like. Women's roles in community problem-solving also seem minimal. A woman active in advocacy work for women's issues described the relationships between Acehnese women and *adat* leaders as follows:

"They always say: "*adat* must be put back to its place, *adat* must be rectified, girls must be taught propriety again". These words by a *keuchik* were greeted by other *keuchiks* with a chorus of agreements. For us, Acehnese women, it's perhaps easier to run for a Governor than to be counted in *adat* deliberations".¹⁸

¹⁸ PP NAD conducted a one-day discussion on 'The Role of Women and *Adat* Institutions for CP Implementation using Aceh-Culture Approach' (April 4, 2008). The finding, among others, was that "Women are welcome to be members of *adat* institutions and participate in dispute resolutions. But, women need to be trained to understand *adat* rules and customs" (See PP NAD's *Short Note* on the discussion, April 4, 2008). Unfortunately, this was the only gender-related issue – out of 18 – pointed out in the *Note*; the rest are issues related to *adat* and *Polmas*.

If “*adat* is to be put back to its place and rectified”, how will *adat* leaders guarantee a protection system to prevent women from falling victims? The following box (BOX 1) presents interesting exchanges taken from one of group interviews.

BOX 1 **Exchanges on Adat-based Solution to Domestic Violence**

In a group interview with 5 community leaders (CL), of which one is a woman, the Evaluation Team (ET) raised a string of questions on problem-solving through *adat*. Among others was a problem of domestic violence:

ET: “What happens if there is a case of domestic violence?”

CL₁: “Bring it to *adat*, to be solved by *adat*, not by police”.

ET: “If next week the violence is done again?”

CL₂: “Bring it again to *adat*”.

ET: “What if the violence does not stop, it keeps on and on, how many times should we come and solve through *adat*?”

CL₂: “*Adat* solves problems through peace, reconciliation. We cannot ask how many times, that’s a wrong question, for there is no limit to reconciliation”.

ET: “What is the guarantee that the violence will not be repeated?”

CL₃: “Reconciliation and consensus need no guarantee, for the couple have made promise before *adat* leaders, that’s the guarantee!”

It was the moment when the woman (W) was shaking her head in disbelief, and she gave a comment:

W: “Nay, that’s what has been happening often, so often without any guarantee, no guarantee whatsoever that things will stop some day”.

Then came some heated arguments, and the *adat* leaders stick to their stance that *adat* law cannot be turned into positive law.

Source: Group Interview, Aceh, July, 2008.

The most harmless but barren way of not getting involved or implicated in situations like in the above example is to introduce the concept of ‘gender-based justice’ by means of gender mainstreaming. It is this harmless approach that has been adopted by PP NAD. Being harmless, however, it seems to have been sterile to the point of barrenly detached from Aceh social, political and cultural contexts. The adopted gender manuals mention that gender is a concept related to cultural issues, but how it is related to Aceh’s culture and conditions is something yet to be spelled out. No doubt, this harmlessness in approach reduces the potentials that could embroil PP NAD into unsettling relationships with *adat* leaders. And of course, *adat* leaders have been among the principal participants in many activities carried out by PP NAD, such as CPF information dissemination gatherings. At the same time, to equip police personnel with new knowledge at a bare minimum also runs the risk of creating depleted and impoverished interpretations.

Therefore, if the question is whether or not PP NAD has introduced gender-related issues, the answer is affirmative. If, however, the question is whether PP NAD has helped police personnel and training participants adequately understand gender-based injustices in Aceh, the answer is less assuring. It comes to no surprise therefore that most trainers, training participants and many officers interviewed for this evaluation

gave rather similar responses to those given by *adat* leaders recounted in BOX 1. In other words, there are yet to be clearer and more acceptable ways as to how repeated cases of, say, domestic violence, are to be solved. In fairness, the existing gender manuals are imaginative and of good quality, at least within its own criteria. But, as many police themselves conceded, these gender manuals seem substantively too detached from gender-based real problems faced in their day-to-day policing works.

Those in charge of the Unit for Women and Children (PPA, formerly RPK) in several police districts shared the same problem. Some even conceded that they have very limited knowledge of how to handle cases of violence against women and children, as they never received special training. Some *Polres* have decent PPA facilities, with rooms especially designed for children. Many others, however, have even no precincts for PPA, and they resort to office backyards to process cases of violence against women and children. In most police sub-districts in Aceh, these cases are handled by male police personnel for lack of woman police (*polwan*), often they are done in interrogation quarters under the gaze of everyone around.

Introduction to the concepts of gender mainstreaming is highly important but insufficient for understanding local contents, although it is equally true that developing local contents is also not easy unless one has an adequate understanding of gender mainstreaming. Take the concept of ‘vulnerable group’ as an example. According to international human rights standards, women under special circumstances are part of vulnerable group, but ‘vulnerable’ (*rentan*) is in no way equal to ‘weak’ (*lemah*). When a trainer said before the class, “I’d feel insulted to be included in vulnerable group, for this denigrates women”, a cloud of confusions descended upon the class, followed by exchanges between trainers. Resolving gender-based injustices within Aceh socio-political dynamics may be beyond PP NAD’s mission. Rather, what is expected is for PP NAD to incorporate gender-related problems concretely faced by police into discussions during HR and CP training.

J. Recommendation

1. PP NAD to conduct refresher courses for trainers in the near future.¹⁹ *First*, the length of refresher course is approximately 10 days, with a priority to clear up differences in the way trainers understand basic concepts in both HR and CP. *Secondly*, to review and deepen key topics in both HR and CP, including changes in CP strategy (from CPF as a new institutional setup to CPF as partnership principle). *Thirdly*, in terms of method, it is recommendable to cultivate the possibility of introducing ‘experiential method’ through exposure. For instance, trainers to go for one full day to traditional markets, coffee houses, *meunasahs*, etc to listen to and catalogue ordinary people’s expectation of the police as well as various cultural issues related to local contents (e.g., on *adat* and *sharia*). The outcome of exposure to be discussed in group and reflected upon at the higher levels in plenary sessions. *Fourthly*, to try out well managed discussions on traumas and history of conflicts. The

¹⁹ Apparently refresher course was done only at the initial stages (of SINP national programme), by repeating all ToT materials for another two weeks. Since then no other refresher courses have been conducted.

safest proceeding is perhaps by first cataloguing forms of violence and human rights violations, and then analyse them in terms of unjust resources distribution. Emergent moral problems to be conceived of and understood within HR and CP principles. To prevent the proceeding from being mere cognitive exercises, it is recommendable for the second part to cultivate the affective dimension of the conflicts by, for instance, inviting a trustworthy resource person to share his/her experiences of the conflicts. For all these purposes, the service of one competent facilitator or two is needed.

2. PP NAD to cultivate the devising of an instrument to systematically and regularly monitor changes in conduct and practices of police personnel who have received HR and CP training. It is important to bear in mind that the type of knowledge most relevant to most police personnel is less analytical than practical in nature. In the latter, ‘embodiment process’ of cognitive knowledge is the key. Discrepancies between ‘to know’ and ‘to do’ cannot be narrowed down by other means than by an ‘embodiment process’ through *repetitio* (repetition) well known in the classical education. What to repeat or exercise are new actions and habits derived from new knowledge in HR and CP, to the point that new habits become instinctive. A systematic monitoring instrument to safeguard this embodiment process at the levels of *Polsek* and *Polres* is therefore highly crucial. Representatives from *Polda* NAD, *Polres* and *Polsek*, expert groups, and CSOs need to be involved in devising this instrument. The administering of the instrument is to be systematic and regular. This is also a way of responding to the questions of impact of the training on police’s daily conduct and practices, which have been raised time and again.

3. PP NAD to cultivate the possibility of making the concluding rites of the training in HR and CP as a special moment for the training participants to pronounce again their police oath. But this time, instead of repeating the oath they have known, it is recommendable that all participants pronounce the core principles of HR or CP (depending on the training just concluded) as a pledge. The pledge to be conceived of as a new way of bringing *Tribrata* into gradual fruition. For this purpose, it is recommendable for PP NAD to condense both HR and CP principles into short pronounceable formula.

4. PP NAD to give closer attention to the importance of HR in the training of NAD police officers (as different from rank-and-files), including HR dimensions in CP training. In tandem with it is the need for IOM SINP Unit in particular to forge closer collaboration with *Sespim* and *Sespati* in devising and developing appropriate training materials in HR and CP for middle and high-ranking officers. The existing emphasis on managerial skills has its merits, but not to be maintained at the expense of adequate understanding of HR principles. What is needed is more substantive integration than simply HR concepts being touched upon cursorily in CP training. As noted in this Report, there are widespread complaints among rank-and-files (*bintaras*) that officers do not receive HR training and are disrespectful of HR principles.

5. PP NAD to pursue more persuasive supports for *Polda* NAD’s recruitment reform as a short- or medium-term priority. For, *first*, it concerns the first line in the domino-like chains of police’s quality in NAD and, *secondly*, persisting corruption, collusion and nepotism in police recruitment present disadvantages for the credibility of the police in conducting CP programme.

6. On gender issues: PP NAD to forge collaboration with expert groups or experts who are familiar with gender-related injustices arising from the application of *adat* and *sharia*. The principal agenda is to review the existing practices and devise new possible avenues for more just solutions, including the roles of the police therein. What is needed is not simply expertise in gender mainstreaming concepts and HR principles, but expertise in the intricacies of gender issues in Aceh culture. In the framework of CP implementation, it is also important to be aware about so-called ‘ascending sanction’, in which perpetrators are given heavier sanctions for repeated transgressions/violations.²⁰ The scheme is to include police’s roles in ensuring the observance of the ascending sanctions.

In this regard, PP NAD needs to facilitate a series of dialogues between woman police (*Polwan*) and women in village areas. PP NAD has so far been cultivating collaboration with *polwan* to disseminate CP among secondary school students. This effort is to be extended to include women in village areas, with a special focus on identifying gender-related problems in these areas. These problems will make up a rich catalogue which in turn can be fruitfully used for training materials. Supports from Aceh ordinary women, in terms of contents of problem and networking, are highly important for transforming the existing gender injustices in Aceh. It is recommendable that identification of gender-related problems is not only conducted in Banda Aceh, for problems taken from remote areas present much richer problems than those simply from Banda Aceh. Based on the Evaluation Team’s exposure to Aceh during and after conflict-periods, it is instructive to learn that women actively participate in community’s deliberations, but they will only share openly many hidden stories of gender-related problems with their fellow women. In many respects, women are even more observant of many security problems in their villages, and this will make a strategic entry point for *polwan*. The problem is the scarcity of *polwan* in Aceh, i.e., approximately only 400 *polwan* out of the total 14,000 police personnel. Most of these 400 *polwan* are mainly assigned to administrative jobs.

²⁰ Sanctions are usually based on agreements. They range from counsel and advice, warning, public apology followed by *peusijuk* (a ritual meal provided by the perpetrators), fines, compensation, ascending to excommunication from *gampong*, expulsion from *gampong*, stripping-off of *adat* titles, and other sanctions agreed upon before *adat* authorities.

Chapter IV

Impact to date

“Community policing won’t inevitably enhance police’s competence. Rather, it is police’s professional competence that surely will help community policing come into being”.

(Community leader, Banda Aceh, August 2008)

Questions about the impact of PP NAD’s endeavour bring the discussions in all the preceding chapters into a broader context of efforts to strengthen peace process in Aceh. This no doubt is an immensely broad issue, and any attempt to deal satisfactorily with it is bound to suffer from deficiencies. What follows is an attempt to offer some points for deliberation. All are based on findings that are partly discussed in the preceding chapters, but no less importantly on a broader vista gained during the course of evaluation. This chapter is organised into the following sections: (1) policed personnel after HR and CP training; (2) community-police relationship and how community members see the state of affairs; (3) the roles of community members in police reform; (4) the impacts of CP programme; (5) PP NAD within the present Aceh constellation; and (6) the roles of PP NAD in police reform.

A. NAD Police Personnel after Training

Despite some drawbacks noted in Chapter III, it is not overdrawn to say that customised training in HR and CP has become a landmark among several PP NAD activities. This achievement can hardly be understood without taking into account at least three factors, i.e., cognitive vacuum among police personnel after long conflicts, the institutionally structured nature of the training and PP NAD’s directive control over its execution, and skilful management of the training by PP NAD. Put within three-dimensional process in education (cognitive, affective and practical), the training concerns the cognitive aspect. Therefore, if the question is whether this cognitive training has affected changes in the affective and practical dimensions, the answer cannot easily be pinned down. And the reason lies less in the quality of PP NAD management than in the fact that changes in affective and practical dimensions rest beyond the scope of PP NAD’s directive control. This brings home an unsettling truth that, as noted, there is yet a regular and systematic monitoring system to be found in every *Polres* (police district) and *Polsek* (police sub-district) to oversee the process of changes in daily practices among police personnel who have received the training. In other words, having learned and experienced training in HR and CP, these police personnel return to their daily works without any feedback mechanism to help them continually relate what they have learned with what to do, and vice versa. In the absence of a monitoring mechanism, questions of impacts are too early to answer.

It may be possible for PP NAD to suggest some monitoring tools and, after a series of tryouts and modification, persuade *Polda* NAD to adopt them for all *Polres* and *Polsek*. It is important to note, however, that such monitoring instrument be devised and formulated in uncomplicated terms that their simplicity suits the practical outlook of police personnel on the ground. The less elaborate the time needed, and the less a special team needed, the better. As noted, a tool called SIPPOP has been developed to monitor organisational development. While it has its merits, it is intended to monitor organisational development and couched in complex terms and proceedings that are likely to be incomprehensible to police personnel at *Polsek* level.

This is also applicable to other PP NAD activities which attempt to support changes in practices and not only in knowledge, like recruitment practices or capacity building for SPN trainers.

It is only when regular and systematic monitoring has been conducted for a sufficient period of time that the question of impact of training on daily practices can realistically be answered. In all likelihood, reliable data on impacts can also hardly be obtained through a questionnaire asking police personnel or community members in a snapshot survey about changes in daily conducts or practices. Data from snapshot questionnaire may give an idea about *perception* of changes, but in no way it is to be taken as *fact* of changes. Fact about changes in conducts and practices can only be obtained accurately through a series of observations and monitoring within a sufficient period of time.

B. Police-Community Relationship

Any expectations of HR and CP training to have immediate impacts on police daily conducts and practices need to be put within the context of peace and reconciliation process after long and bitter conflicts. In a way, police personnel are expected to play vanguard roles in the reconciliation process between conflicting parties as much as between the police and community members. Since this is too tall an order, it is not inapposite to start from a lower ground, i.e., the state of relationships between police and community members. For this purpose, a question was posed during the last part of each group interview with community members and police personnel who have received HR and CP training.

“Given the state of community-police relationships in the past and present as you have described, how would you rate the relationship in the past? Like a teacher who grades our children’s homework between 0 and 10 – 0 being very bad and 10 perfect – what score would you give to the community-police relationships before the MoU?²¹

A similar question, but this time on community-police relationship after MoU, was also raised afterwards. Although the responses must be treated as *perception* rather

²¹ The term ‘MoU’ was used for two reasons: (1) Expressions “Before MoU” and “After MoU” have been widely used by both ordinary members of community and police personnel; (2) It was preferable to “Before or After HR and CP Training”, as most community members were not aware that IOM has been training NAD police personnel in HR and CP.

than *fact* of community-police relationships, GRAPH 2 presents a highly interesting picture.

1. As shown in the graph, community members gave low scores on community-police relationships prior to MoU, indicated by pink line (lowest score: 0, highest score: 5). As for community-police relationships after MoU, the same community members put higher scores, as shown by maroon line (lowest score: 2, highest score: 6).


2. Among police personnel, the perceptions are no less interesting. With regard to the quality of community-police relationships before MoU, they gave scores ranging from 0 to 6, but with on average higher than those given by community members, as shown by light-green line. As for that after MoU, police personnel put quite high scores between 7 and 9.

3. Different valuations between the two groups in the graph show a consistent pattern that in the eyes of community members, the quality of community-police relationships is at much lower levels than that given by police personnel. This is true for both before and after MoU. It is revealing that police personnel tend to have more favourable images of community-police relationships than community members. Does this mean that police personnel are more self-assured, or community members less self-assured? Or, does this mean the former overrate the relationships, or the latter underrate? GRAPH 2 is far from capturing such an intricate issue. But it is clear that the graph reveals a snapshot of rather sharp discrepancies between police personnel and community members in seeing the quality of community-police relationships before and after MoU.

4. This brings home a lesson so relevant for community-police partnership agenda in community policing (CP). Since CP agenda by definition assumes partnership with community, while community members see the quality of community-police relationships still on average at low level, there seems to be no way but for the police to exert more efforts to narrow the gap. Assuming that by launching CP the police are the party making the first move, the above graph may also point to an imperative for police personnel to tone down their inflated self-images.

5. Zooming closer onto the figures, it is interesting to observe peculiar patterns characterising some districts formerly known to be the fiercest grounds of conflict, like Pidie and Bireun, and to a degree also Lhokseumawe. On reaching these areas, all four lines descend sharply and drop to the lowest levels for respective categories. This pattern is consistent for both groups as well as for both periods of time, before and after the MoU. The following is a nagging question, but it is worth heeding. Can the improved images of community-police relationships (from before to after MoU) be accounted for by the impacts of HR and CP training on police conduct? Any definitive answer, affirmative or otherwise, may be like barking up the wrong tree. It is important to remember that HR and CP training has been conducted within the post-MoU context which, in one way or another, has brought some normalcy to the flow of day-to-day life, with or without HR and CP training among police personnel. At best, it can only be suggested that the training has been properly preparing police personnel to adjust to the less agitating political climate after MoU. As recounted by a NAD police officer, "Have the police been changed by the training? Positive results of training cannot be expected in a short time. But one thing is clear, after MoU police's attitudes have been shifting from conflict to peaceful situation".

GRAPH 2
Perception of Community-Police Relationship Before and After MoU



Source: Interviews with community members and police personnel, Aceh (July-August, 2008)

C. Expectation of Community Members

Despite some scepticism towards HR and CP training, community members who are aware of the training generally show noticeable enthusiasm. With enthusiasm also comes expectation. Whether the contents of their expectation are similar to that of the police or of PP NAD is something worth pursuing in the later part of this section. Even among several members of NGOs known to have been most critical of police conduct, it is not unusual to hear a voice of hope. In one of group interviews with NGO members, there was this striking view from an activist addressed to his fellow activist: “One dictum we must scrap is “the police cannot change”; we must believe that the police can change and get better”.

If there are some signs of change, what are they? Most community members agree that the “police no longer scold or hound at us now, they smile”. However, when probed further as to whether police personnel today are more responsive and skilful in problem-solving, they concede that no significant changes have been taking place. This is an acerbic expression widely used by community members throughout Aceh: “If we report to the police, instead of getting back a goat we lost, we will lose a cow”. Since a cow is dearer than a goat, the phrase is intended to mean that in most cases they prefer to avoid the police for fear of being extorted. Most community members also concede that many other police malpractices remain persisting, e.g., racketing and swindling of event organisers or traffic violators, discrimination against the poor, favouring the rich or government officials, red tapes, involvement in illegal logging, arrogance among young personnel, traffic violations by police themselves, etc.

In the eyes of community members the most noticeable change is, “these days, the police smile”. This ‘smile campaign’ is not unimportant, and many regard that it gives an appearance of friendly and welcoming attitudes after years of posturing. Smile of course can be a mask hiding the ugly face, and most community members are not unaware of this possibility. What should come after the smile campaign? When this question was posed, in one way or the other they pointed to the urgent need of real improvement in police’s professional competence. In their words, this means “no more discrimination against the poor, no more extortion, racketing or swindle, no more collusion, fast document processing, speedy handling of theft and robbery”, and the like. All this is not without self-criticism, as they also admit that it is community members themselves who often resort to shortcuts, for instance, by bribing the police or by other backdoor deals.

This has some bearings on community-police partnership. Through partnership, the police expect community members to play active roles in promoting public order, for instance, by preventing street justice, reporting criminal cases, law transgressions and violations, etc. However, many among community members argue that they will respond to this police’s expectation only when they see that police personnel have become more trustworthy. They conceded that “we start having trust and confidence only if our reports are followed up in a professional way, so that we won’t waste time, or the police even turn us into suspects”.

As implied in *The INP Grand Strategy 2005-2025*, “good images” make up the first step in winning the confidence of the general public for successful community

policing (Recommendation for the Short Term 2005-2010, *Grand Strategy 2005-2015*). As noted, community members welcome police's smiles as an encouraging sign. If popular reception of police's smiles is taken to mean a relative success of image building, then the good-images target has relatively been achieved in Aceh. However, ordinary members of community are not unaware that good images are often a story of the triumph of hope over experience. That is why they insist that improvement in professional competence among police personnel lies not outside but at the centre of "good images". At this point, there is indeed a possibility of real differences between the staging and sequencing held by INP and what is expected by community members. For community members, the "strive for excellence" targeted by INP for the period of 2016-2025 is too distant to match the ongoing smile campaign. This point is crucial and compelling. In the absence of real improvement in police's professional competence, there is a real possibility that the smile is gradually taken as a mask that hides the persisting ugly face. This in turn will thwart the process of police reform itself.

It was not uncommon to find community members who insist that, after police's smiles, they are less concerned about *Polmas* (community policing) than about real improvement in police's professional skills and competence in daily policing works. In the words of a community leader, "Community policing will not inevitably enhance police's professional competence. Rather, it is police's professional competence that surely will help community policing come into being".

TABLE 17
Difference between INP Strategy and Community's Expectation

| INP Strategy 2005-2025 | Community's Expectation |
|--|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 2005-2009: image building, winning trust and confidence of the public through "care for society" by starting <i>Polmas</i>; • 2010-2015: making <i>Polmas</i> effective; • 2016-2025: strive for excellence. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Smiling police; • Real improvement in police's professional skills and competence; • Enhanced public images of police and community's trust and confidence in police → possibility of partnership. |

Source: INP Grand Strategy 2005-2025 & Interviews with community members, Aceh (July-August, 2008)

D. Roles of Community in Police Reform

Among others, the absence of a regular and systematic mechanism to monitor the process of changes in police's daily conduct/practices seems to be a decisive factor responsible for training participants to slip back to old practices and habits. Even by assuming the presence of such a system or even by assuming this system has been administered for some time in all *Polsek* and *Polres*, monitoring conducted by concerned parties outside the INP organisation is indispensable. Is this external

monitoring mechanism available? The answers are almost identical: “It is through complaint box, telephone, short-message service (SMS), letters and other forms of report from community members”. There is nothing new in all this, and they have been adopted for some time to no systematic effect. Within Aceh society, all this mechanism is even less effective, given the fact that many complaints and reports go not to the police but to *keuchik*.

In the absence of such an external monitoring system, the following idea may be worth considering:

1. As has been done in the existing training sessions, some community members act as participant observers throughout the training process, including taking part in end-of-the-day evaluation. Based on individual interviews with these observers, it is interesting to find how they admit their own attitudinal changes after observing and interacting with police participants during the training.

2. Some of them seem genuinely perceptive and articulate. Having witnessed how police personnel responded enthusiastically to the training, and having gained some acquaintance with them during the training, these observers could become potential candidates for helping CP information dissemination. That is, they are to be invited not only to attend ‘CP information dissemination forum’ as presently practiced, but to be actively engaged in designing both the forms and contents of what to be disseminated. In this way, the contents of dissemination process concern less about informative aspects of CP than about testimonies given by some observers. For instance:

- “I am a witness to how police personnel have been trained in HR and CP”. Then he/she shares how the training is done, atmosphere of learning process, the enthusiasm of participants, and most importantly the 1-2-3 substantive and core contents of HR and CP training given to police personnel;
- “We can consider the training as a new pledge by the police to reform their policing works based on HR and CP principles”;
- “How is it possible for us to support and safeguard this reform? Would it be possible for us to develop a critical mass to ensure that the new pledge gradually comes to fruition?”

3. Of course, the above scheme can only be effectively carried out if the proposal to turn the concluding rites of the training into ‘affective moments’ is simultaneously acted upon (see Chapter III, F). This way of conducting dissemination process is useful for creating *critical mass* and a sense of ownership of the community-police partnership agenda among police personnel and CSO members. Given serious preparation, it may not be too long before similar groups of critical mass at the lower levels are also developed. This process can also be harnessed for reactivating the existing means of reporting through telephone, letters, complaint box, SMS, etc. Within this context, there is also a need for PP NAD to facilitate some networking between the police and local media, especially community radio for purposes of community-police communication. Document *Outline of IOM-POLRI Cooperation to Plan for Support to NAD Police funded by EC and RNE* (undated) has in fact noted the importance of this external monitoring by community members. What is lacking is, the existing dissemination forum seems to be little more than ‘mobilisation’ of a

great number of people without any clear attempt at directing them into a critical mass.

4. Another PP NAD activity that is potential to be developed into external monitoring is so-called *Safari Ramadhan* (*Ramadhan Roadshow*) during the 2008 fasting month for the Moslem (September 2008). It was collaboration between *Polda* NAD and the Islamic Institute Ar-Raniry. In response, PP NAD suggested that the agenda of the roadshow is CP dissemination in *meunasah* (*gampong* mosque) throughout Aceh. Lecturers in Faith Propagation (*Dakwah*) were first introduced to CP basic principles then they were asked to develop these principles in their respective *ramadhan* sermons. Based on participant observation, the Ar-Raniry lecturers seemed to show enthusiasm. However, two points are worth noting. *First*, there were no direct interactions between the lecturers and police personnel, and this prevents the former from having direct acquaintance with the way the latter experienced HR and CP training. *Secondly*, the roles of Ar-Raniry lecturers were limited to information dissemination about CP rather than monitoring.

5. Another avenue is a joint training for CP police personnel and the members of *tuha peut*, which is still in the process of realisation. This could be a more promising ground for recruiting several observers. Indeed, PP NAD needs to put more efforts to identify several trustworthy observers who can help turning mere dissemination forum into the development of critical mass.

E. Impact of Community-Policing Programme

As the customised training in HR and CP has been conducted on a routine basis in an institutionalised and structured way, it is not surprising that PP NAD also began to devote its energies to venture on a programme that really presents greater challenges to its creativity. This programme is *Polmas* (community policing). To what extent has the programme brought beneficial impacts? In every respect, it is definitely too early to offer conclusive view, as *Polmas* itself is still in its infancy. Some problems seem to have presented PP NAD with lessons, and many more will certainly pose greater challenges in the future.

1. Ever since PP NAD facilitated *Polda* NAD and *adat* leaders to come together for an agreement on *adat* forum as an entry point to *Polmas* in April 2008, both PP NAD and *Polda* NAD have been brought face to face with one of the most intricate issues in their engagement with Aceh society: *adat*. ‘Adat’ is an *omnibus* concept. Like ‘culture’, it serves several or even any purposes at once and therefore it has a tendency to become an empty shell without any definite substance. Like in other communities, so-called *adat* (custom) refers to fabric of living standards evolving from what have been considered as embodied virtues in community life. As living standards, the often unwritten nature of *adat* does not prevent its shaping force from being as real as rain and as concrete as war. Indeed, appeal to official texts, be they religious, positive-legal or cultural, is more often than not simply a way of formally justifying *adat* that remains un-codified. That is why any attempts to formalise and codify *adat* are bound to suffer from irrelevance. As insightfully suggested by an

Acehnese academic in an interview, “*Adat* is simultaneously elusive and slippery. There is no way to institutionalise virtues represented in *adat*, for virtues have no institution. Virtue comes from integrity of living daily life within a community”.

2. Like in many other cultural communities in Indonesia, *adats* ceased to breathe their lives when the New Order regime instituted Decree No. 5 in 1979. By this law the regime was regimenting community life down to village levels. For Aceh, the implication was dire. The roles of *keuchik* were replaced by the administration of village head under the direction of regent (district head). During the long period of armed conflicts in Aceh, village head was a figure only in name, for he/she was simultaneously suspected by TNI/Police as a GAM secret agent and by GAM as a spy on the side of TNI/Police. The roles of *tuha peut* also faded away along with the increasingly commanding dictate of LMD (Council for Village Consensus) and LKMD (Village Resilience Council).

3. In the aftermath of MoU, ‘Aceh consciousness’ as nurtured by GAM during the conflicts remains alive. It was formalised through Decree No. 11/2006 (on Law on the Governing of Aceh). It is important to understand ‘Aceh consciousness’ beyond the issue of cultural and ethnic identity. It is to be understood better as a claim that Aceh is a political entity different from the centre, Jakarta. Demands for autonomy or the current predominance of local political parties in Aceh politics are part and parcel of this ‘Aceh consciousness’.

4. Is Aceh *adat* coterminous with Aceh consciousness? In the words of an Acehnese academic conversant with Aceh problems, “*Adat* is an archaeological artefact, it is now an empty shell that can be filled with anything, by anyone, with any dreams”. This acerbic line does not imply pejorative meanings of *adat*; it is suggested here to indicate the thorny problems awaiting any forms of engagement with *adat*. If *adat* refers to embodied virtues in community life, *Tuha Peut* can be understood as the personified embodiment of *adat*. In other words, *adat* is the institutional face of community virtues, whereas *Tuha Peut* the personal face of the same virtues.

5. In the absence of some unambiguous notion of community-police partnership for CP programme, the police are at present in a stage of mapping and identifying figures considered to hold influence and authority within local communities. It is in this mapping and identifying process that the police’s attention is directed to *Tuha Peut* or other *adat* fabric in Aceh like *Sarak Opat*. Thus arise the following intricate problems:

- While the elusive meaning of *adat* and the genealogy of *Tuha Peut* do not seem to have been sufficiently understood, the police rush to employ *Tuha Peut* to institutionalise community-police partnership in CP. Based on reviews and participant observation in some initial activities that have been conducted, the nature of institutionalisation takes the form of guidance from the police to *Tuha Peut* leaders rather than that of partnership. It is of course too early to assess the process, as the first stages of CP information dissemination are still underway. But it may not be far-fetched to say that what is taking place is less ‘information dissemination’ than ‘mobilisation’.
- Some key informants interviewed for this purpose argue that the police cannot but need community’s supports, but not always within the scheme of *Polmas*.

The need inevitably comes from the highly complex Police-TNI-Community relationships after the MoU that are characterised by a triangle of suspicions. A high-ranking INP officer with vast experiences in so-called Aceh problems gave the following accounts:

“In Aceh, TNI still have rather strong suspicions toward ordinary people, to the point of seeing most Acehnese as enemies who any time could make an agitating resurgence. As for the police who are developing partnership with community and implementing *Polmas* in Aceh, they fear TNI’s animosity towards them. This is made more complicated by the fact that under special autonomy, NAD Governor has constitutional authority over the appointment of *Kapolda* (Chief of NAD Police).”

Similar sentiments were widely shared by many police personnel, community members and activists in Aceh interviewed for this evaluation. Some senior officers at INP and *Polda* NAD Headquarters as well as most officers in Aceh conceded that this problem is salient. It is important to understand and monitor this problem, for it is not beyond possibility that *Polmas* could be turned into an avenue for a return of old habits *à la* the New Order; through LKMD then, *Polmas* now.

- For sure, the approach noted above is not typical of the New Order, for it was subsequently also done by GAM with another fatal consequence. In the words of an Acehnese academic, “GAM did the same thing then, with a dream of reviving *adat* institutional arrangements. But what they did was just cooking wrong materials with wrong ingredients”. This point is suggested as a reminder that blunders have been committed by both the New Order regime and GAM. Indeed, good intention is not enough, for good intention bereft of adequate understanding of Aceh *adat* and its intricacies can lead to fatal consequences. *Polmas* is no exception, and it is not immune to this tendency. That is why there seems to be every reason to see *Polmas* in more nuanced ways. It is true that community-police partnership in safeguarding public order is the principal goal of *Polmas*. But PP NAD cannot but be vigilant about many unintended adverse consequences that may lurk in the wings of *Polmas* activities, one of which is a growing suspicion that *Polmas* is a new way of conducting intelligence work.
- With regard to *adat*, it is important to put the above notes within historical context. Already in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, *adat* rules had been applied. In the words of a researcher, it was a “law at the will of any reigning Sultan”, so that in many respects it was the same as “the Law of Sultan”.²² Within the present socio-cultural dynamics in Aceh, *adat* is formally justified as a means of resolving conflicts or disputes between community members (*Qanun* No. 4/2004, article 4e). For many community members, resolving minor disputes through *adat* brings some benefits, for, in their own words, it “potentially trims down vengeance. If one is sentenced in jail or prison, he/she will take revenge after release”. However, they expect that the police do not interfere too far, again in their own words, “like in many cases, after things got solved through *adat*, police grab and turn them into cases of positive law”. This

²² See Ayang Utriza, ‘Hukum Adat vis-à-vis Hukum Islam: Adakah Penerapan Syariat Islam di Kesultanan Aceh Abad XVI-XVII?’, paper presented to PSIK, Paramadina University, Jakarta, 20 August, 2008.

view can be taken to mean that if the police wish to do *Polmas* through *adat*, they not only need to understand the contents of *adat*, but also respect the subsidiarity principle. As for the police, the main problem with this practice is that the sanctions applied by *adat* have no clear standard, for they are based on agreements that may vary from one village to another. Agreements based on *adat* need to be constantly monitored, as, in the words of community members critical of the present situation, they contain seeds of re-traditionalisation:

“If IOM wishes to facilitate the police to use *adat* for CP, it first has to do serious and careful analysis. *Keuchik* and most *adat* leaders always refer to the past only, as if they want to turn the clock of Aceh back to the past”.

If there appears to be a meeting point between *Polmas* and community’s needs, it is because community members are anxious about the existing climate they describe as a “vacuum of legal certainty”. Thus, on the one hand, they are alarmed by the application of Islamic *sharia* that is so uncultivated or grossly misconceived. On the other hand, community members are disappointed with positive law. The following Box (BOX 2) presents an illustration for this sort of confusion.

BOX 2 **Sharia or Positive Law?**

In an interview with nine community members (CM), the Evaluation Team (ET) posed a set of questions on *sharia*.

ET: “In your experiences, are there times when you feel conflicts between sharia and positive law? Or, perhaps the experiences of other community members in this area, young or old”.

CM₁: “Definitely there are, and either one must be removed”.

ET: “Is there no way of combining the two?”

CM₁: “Well, it is possible but hard to implement”.

ET: “If you were personally to choose, which one would you choose, sharia or positive law?”

Then came lively discussions among themselves, two of them are women. The Evaluation Team was eagerly listening to the exchanges, when another participant spoke out:

CM₂: “We’d prefer *sharia* because it is Aceh”.

ET: “Who should monitor and enforce the sharia? Wilayatul Hisbah/WH [Sharia Police] or State Police?”

They looked puzzled while engaged in lively discussions again. After a few minutes, another person gave a reply:

CM₃: “State Police”.

ET: “State Police? Any particular reasons?”

CM₃: “Because *WH* are toothless, they can’t do anything”.

ET: “Are State Police capable of doing anything? Can they do it?”

Another sense of puzzlement revisited the corner of a canteen where the interview was conducted until deep into the night. The exchanges were lively, but no clear answer was given in the end.

Source: Group interview with community members, Aceh (July 2008)

The illustration presented in BOX 2 indicates that enthusiasm shown by community members should in no way be taken as proof of direct correspondence between police’s motives and that of community members. It is true that implementation of *Polmas* need not assume any uniformity of motives among its stakeholders. What is suggested here, rather, is that discrepancy of motives among stakeholders is something that needs to be carefully attended, for it contains seeds of adverse unintended consequences that may not have been anticipated in the design.

- Based on various interviews, the following tendencies deserve special attention:
 - i. While on paper *Polmas* is intended to be a new approach to community-police partnership, not a few community members see it as “a new way of doing espionage at cheaper costs” or “a way of making community life adopt the police’s outlook”. Given the history of long and bitter conflicts, these suspicions are not entirely unfounded.
 - ii. While on paper *adat* institutional arrangements are seen as the most strategic entry point for community-police partnership, not a few community members express their concern that the closeness of the police to *Tuha Peut* will lead to rampant corruption among *Tuha Peut* members. Instead of partnership, many young community members fear that what will arise is a vicious process in which *adat* leaders ruthlessly re-traditionalise Aceh society. In it, the police will certainly enjoy some legitimation from *adat* leaders, but at the expense of Aceh’s future.
 - iii. While on paper *Polmas* is defined as the first step towards partnership, not a few community members see it as a way for the police to raise budgets. In other words, what started as a noble dream may end up with a *proyek* to siphon off new funds (*Note*: the word ‘*proyek*’ [project] has some pejorative connotation in popular parlance in Indonesia).²³

All the above notes are suggested not to belittle the hard works of those who have been admirably re-studying Aceh *adat*. Hard work notwithstanding, it is important to remember that *adat* is much more indeterminate than it first appears. Indeed, *adat* and its *tuha peut* could be likened to a blank slate. Precisely because it is a blank slate, it can be quickly turned into an arena for fierce power struggle: those who shape its contents will decide the future of Aceh. Unless the above problems are seriously addressed, it may not be surprising that *adat* as an approach to CP will slip back to become a means of erecting an order not unlike the New Order except in name. On this count, IOM PP NAD’s enthusiasm in facilitating “*Polmas* through *Tuha Peut*” is in need of serious reflections. As strongly expressed by an expert in Aceh *adat* interviewed for this purpose:

“IOM is not supposed simply to follow blindly the wishes of *Polda* NAD. IOM PP cannot but play critical roles. The problem is, at present *Polda* NAD is not intellectually equipped with competence to understand the complexities of *adat*. This *Polmas* programme must be safeguarded by groups who understand *adat* in critical ways, and this is likely to come from CSO members. Yes, IOM should ask for their help. If IOM is too late to play this critical role, things will descend into old practices. Indeed, IOM is prone to manipulation by *Polda* NAD instead of helping *Polda* NAD to transform itself”.

²³ Upon approval from the Indonesian Parliament, the INP has been receiving budgets for *Polmas* activities. In the INP 2008 Work Plan, for instance, *Polmas* budgets amount to 999,881,000 IDR for INP Headquarters and 153,520,784,000 IDR for all *Polda* in Indonesia. These huge amounts are much smaller compared to the 2007 budgets that were poorly allocated in most *Polres* in Indonesia. Given widespread complaints about the lack of funds among police personnel on the ground, this poor budget allocation is ironic. Based on interviews with Head of Community Service Bureau (*Binamitra*) at INP Headquarters, every *Polres* in Indonesia receives 300,000,000 IDR for *Polmas* programme for the 2008 fiscal year.

This account may be compared with another view shared by a high-ranking INP officer who has vast experiences in Aceh.

“Aceh needs a special concept of *Polmas* that engages all parties. For this purpose, *Polda* NAD needs to be assisted by a team capable of managing the intricate relationships between INP, TNI, *adat* leaders, Provincial Government, KPA and ordinary people. The development of this team cannot be entirely entrusted to INP, but also to thinkers within INP, academic institutions and other groups of experts, and some elements within Civil Society. Without thorough socio-cultural analysis, the implementation of *Polmas* will instead bring the partnership back to the past”.

Of course, to understand the intricacies of *adat* may be beyond PP NAD’s mission. Given the fact that appropriate implementation of *Polmas* presumes an adequate understanding of *adat* and its intricacies, *Polmas* programme is not free from the following tasks:

1. Supported by PP NAD, *Polda* NAD needs to conduct serious reflections on the substantive contents of *adat*. Unless this is done, both *Polda* NAD and PP NAD run the risk of using false indicators in their approach to *adat*.
2. This endeavour is likely to be possible only if PP NAD and *Polda* NAD engage persons or groups known to have critical appreciation and a thorough understanding of *adat*. This is more likely to come from CSO networks, of which women’s groups are one. This point is suggested in the hope that it is not re-traditionalisation that will take place but, rather, a re-orientation of Aceh to the future by staying true to its cultural heritage.
3. There is also an urgent need for PP NAD to pay close attention to the intricate relationships between ‘important persons’ (*orang penting*) and ‘influential persons’ (*orang berpengaruh*) within *gampong* communities. *Adat* leaders may be ‘important’ but not necessarily ‘influential’ figures. Even more, when *tuha peut* members are appointed by *keuchik*, as is the case in several *gampongs*, many community members express their concern that the way it is done is undemocratic.

F. NAD Police Project in the Present Aceh Constellation

How to understand PP NAD’s place within the present Aceh constellation? This of course is too broad a question to be dealt with within the narrow timeline for this evaluation. The following ‘signifiers’ are suggested with a caveat that their nature is more speculative than all other accounts presented in the preceding sections.

1. Return of Day-to-day Normalcy

From travelling through many rural and urban areas, or coastal and mountainous districts, there was one particular image demanding to stay evident. It is the return of day-to-day flow of normal life. It was heartening to see children going to or returning

from school with a sense of safety, women rushing to the field or market without hesitation, or coffee house crowded with male customers in late evenings, or youth going outdoors after dusk.

Sceptics may argue that this normalcy simply masks its history of bitter conflicts. But there is no doubt that its return is so important for ordinary members of community, to the point that when they were asked about some reconciliation measures (like that adopted in South Africa or Belfast), they claimed that such measures are not their priority. No doubt there were considerable differences between areas formerly characterised by less and more bitter conflicts (e.g., Pidie, Bireun, Lhoksukon), as much as between middle-class and lower-class groups. Despite these differences, it may not be overdrawn to say that maintaining day-to-day routine normalcy is sufficient for sustaining what is widely perceived as ‘peaceful condition’ by ordinary members of community.

Again, sceptics may argue that such a state of affairs is little more than ‘shallow peace’. For sure, this claim is not entirely mistaken. But it is equally important not to ignore what is understood by ordinary members of community as the minimal prerequisites for the notion of ‘peace’. It is also within the context of this minimal requirement for peace that PP NAD’s activities need to be understood.

To return to the question: how to understand PP NAD within this equilibrium of the minimal?

a. By means of training in HR and CP principles, PP NAD has been admirably equipping NAD police personnel with basic knowledge and normative attitudinal standards that are precisely called for by the ‘equilibrium of the minimal’ among ordinary members of community. If, up until the period of this evaluation, PP NAD’s training has merely made police personnel show their smiles, these smiles are not unimportant for community members.

b. PP NAD activities in, say, CP information dissemination needs to be understood not simply in instrumental terms of pursuing the targets of the Project, but also in terms of creating, if unintentionally, room for social encounters between previously opposing parties. If in the preceding section PP NAD was forewarned of some unintended *detrimental* consequences, this point is suggested here to encourage PP NAD to pay close attention to some unintended *beneficial* consequences. These social encounters, if created unintentionally by PP NAD activities, may escape the attention of the management scorecard in the hands of IOM or Donors. However, it is highly important to remember that these social encounters will in turn create processes capable of bringing down or even taking away the atmosphere of suspicion and animosity. This is true for community members as well as for police personnel.

c. Take the following accounts from a training observer (a community member) as an example: “I used to hate and loathe police personnel. Now I have for several times been asked by IOM to be training observer. During training, of course I get along with the police. I myself am surprised that my hatred is much lower now. I begin to realise that these people are not without good will or intention, and now I am no longer hesitant to meet the police”.

d. On a larger scale, this unintended beneficial consequence is discernible in *Hikayat* Festivals. The festivals usually turn into light-hearted and cheerful atmospheres, and soon all participants and spectators begin to be absorbed in an atmosphere of togetherness. What is important is no longer the quality of the *hikayats* being recited but, rather, the fact that such events have all potentials for creating, if unintendedly, amazing social encounters. In many respects, this unintended beneficial consequence is even much more important than how the objective of CP dissemination is being achieved through *Hikayat* Festivals.

e. All this is by no means to discount the substantive quality of peace or, for lack of better term, ‘deep peace’, as distinct from ‘shallow peace’. Rather, it would be unfortunate to miss out the ordinariness of peace process that may lie outside the targets stated in the scorecard of the Project. Given the background of bitter conflicts in Aceh, it is true that the deeper the fall, the higher the expectation – the fiercer the conflicts, the more buoyant the hope for peace. It is this springboard effect that may tend to blot out the importance of the ordinariness of peace process. This is also a reminder that criteria for impact assessments need to take all these less measurable processes into account.

2. Challenges for Substantive Peace

In tandem with the necessary appreciation of the equilibrium of the minimal, it is important to raise questions whose answers can only be obtained by going beyond the appearance of no-conflicts. For, indeed, the appearance of peace may simply mask the bitterness of conflicts. One way of understanding this issue is by deciphering the complex constellation of political forces in Aceh that may affect the sustainability of day-to-day routine of normal life as much as the potentials for more substantial peace.

a. Aside from the return of day-to-day normal life, another effect directly related to the MoU is the decline in the use of weapons as a means of achieving political goals. In place of it, it is formal political party that is now being employed. This can easily be interpreted as a mere shift in means without any significant changes in ends, i.e., separation from the Republic of Indonesia. In all likelihood, this way of seeing the issue is deficient. In the words of many community members interviewed for this purpose, “That kind of view is nothing more than the view of Jakarta’s people who are nervous at the present dynamics of local politics in Aceh”. The diversity of political parties in today’s Aceh is characterised by differences in ideology and political outlook, including among several groups formerly associated with GAM. In *realpolitik*, all these differences make up not only political demarcation but also real opposition. In many respects, all these differences, tension and opposition make up equilibrium of forces preventing potential conflicts from bursting out. There is no need to view this state of affairs as flawed; in *realpolitik* it is very common to find ‘peace’ being sustained not by *positive* energies but by equilibrium of *negative* forces.

Against this backdrop, the more crucial question is not whether Aceh will remain part of Indonesia – this question is remote from the political horizons of most ordinary Acehnese. Rather, the question is how the existing equilibrium of political forces in today’s Aceh does not disrupt the salience of day-to-day normal life. This includes

how the existing equilibrium constellation opens the door for deepening the quality of peace process. The deepening of substantive contents of peace includes, among others, redistribution of resources, genuine reconciliation, poverty reduction and alleviation, improvement in education, job creation, etc.

b. Where are the police in this constellation? The same question should also be applied to TNI. It is too taxing to answer this question convincingly. But, on the basis of some reflections for this evaluation's purposes, several points can be suggested. While local groups are channelling their political energies through local parties, the police show properly restrained attitudes by focusing more on public order. As for the TNI, they are looking at the situation with jealousy and anxiety due to their own preoccupation with the problem of separation.²⁴ In this complex dynamics, the NAD Provincial Government (*Pemda* NAD) seems to have become hostage, although to a degree remain thriving in channelling some initiatives to sustain development projects and the normalcy of daily routine life among ordinary Acehnese. Of course, this constellation is not typical of Aceh; it is part of the *realpolitik* everywhere. Based on interviews, it is not far-fetched to conclude that the groups most influential in today's Aceh are politicians and bureaucrats, followed by religious leaders who begin to get nervous at the declining supports for Islamic *sharia*.²⁵ This constellation makes up an interesting picture, and it is on such equilibrium of forces and tension of characters that the river of events in Aceh turns. As in other political constellations, what seems clear is that the future of Aceh politics will again be characterised by equilibrium of elite forces – through weapons then, through party rivalry now.²⁶

This politics of elite equilibrium is well reflected in the new patterns of control over economic resources. From tracking down some evidences for this evaluation, for instance, it is clear that the holders of most development and infrastructure projects in today's Aceh always include ex-combatant groups. This in turn shows that there is growing rivalry and competition among bureaucrats (both civilian and military), politicians, external business tycoons and new groups of ex-combatants. On this politico-economic issue, it is common to hear these words: "What's happening now is simply a change of actors". When these words were spoken by some during group interviews, it was not unusual to hear this riposte: "No, it is not a change of actors, but expansion of actors, for TNI and Police remain involved". But, perhaps with a sense of more realism, an Acehnese academic conversant with Aceh *realpolitik* shared his view on this issue with a pensive tone:

²⁴ Aside from some public statements made by TNI high-ranking commanders in local media, TNI Headquarters through TNI Information Bureau avows that TNI remains vigilant at the revival of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) through GAM Party, now Aceh Party ('Ancaman Separatisme Makin Nyata', *Magazine TNI Patriot*, 16 August 2007). Similar statements, if no reference to specific political party, was issued by the Commander of Iskandar Muda Territorial Zone on the occasion of the third anniversary of the Helsinki Peace Agreement in Banda Aceh (15 August 2008).

²⁵ Most community members interviewed for this evaluation conceded that the declining supports for *sharia* are mainly due to the incompetence of *Sharia* Police (*Wilayahul Hisbah*). The Evaluation Team's conclusion on the dominant influence of politicians, bureaucrats, and religious leaders in Aceh society is corroborated by DEMOS, *Masalah-masalah dan Pilihan-pilihan Demokrasi Aceh: Menuju Demokrasi Bermakna berbasis Hak Asasi Manusia*, Laporan Eksekutif, 30 April 2007, p. 29.

²⁶ For comparison, see International Crisis Group, 'Update Briefing', *Asia Briefing*, No. 81, Jakarta/Brussels 9 September 2008.

“Well, those from the established social classes will of course see with some cynicism the involvements of ex-combatants in all projects in Aceh. In fact, it is common phenomena about class metamorphosis, class revolution. They took arms then, they do something else now. Some become politicians, others merchants, still others contractors. This is common everywhere during periods of transition. The question is not whether these KPA people grab infrastructure projects, but whether they evolve into professional merchants, contractors, serious business people, genuine statesmen, or simply brokers, gangsters, thugs or robbers”.

c. Where is PP NAD in this constellation? It is important to remember that PP NAD is in Aceh to support *Polda* NAD reform. Therefore the question needs to be shifted: where are *Polda* NAD in this constellation? This question is more or less similar to what is noted above (see 2b). There seems to be a tendency that *Polda* NAD is hostage in the existing equilibrium of elite forces leading to Local Elections in 2009, if because tensions between the Central Government in Jakarta and GAM leaders have not been entirely resolved.²⁷

It seems that the most strategic option for *Polda* NAD is to remain focused on capacity building, especially on the types of capacity building directly enhancing police’s professional competence and the deepening quality of public order. Here comes the relevance of expectations shared by many community members: “After smiles, the next urgent agenda for the police is improvement in professional competence”,²⁸ including competence in dealing with vigilante groups and organised crimes like illegal logging, corruption, drugs-related problems, and armed criminal syndicates. All this may appear too limited, but real and serious capacity building is something that has a surety of impact, even if the impact cannot be harvested in a short time. This in turn affects the quality of public order that is so intimately linked with the quality of peace process.

How to put this limited focus on capacity building within the overall constellation of power struggle and the growing competition of control over economic resources? This question is disheartening. What is suggested is this simple strategy: it is to prevent potential sharp conflicts from taking their course by putting them within the framework of the deepening quality of public order.²⁹ Quality of public order is of course unattainable unless the police are professionally much more competent. But

²⁷ These tensions mainly concern differences in interpretation of so-called ‘NAD autonomy’, issue on representative envoy (*Wali Nanggroe*), and several unresolved points on MoU implementation.

²⁸ The contextual basis for this point can be found in the scheme devised by the candidate to INP Head to revise the *INP Grand Strategy* that establishes this following order of priority: image, trust, strive for excellence. The candidate to INP Head plans to conduct revision by putting emphasis not only on image, but also on society’s needs (Point 1 of Policy Implementation, presented before Working Committee III, Indonesian Parliament, 23 September 2008).

²⁹ An illustration taken from field observation is telling. In the course of events leading to the 2009 Local Elections in Aceh, rivalry between competing local parties has been rising, with display of party symbols and flags crowding out public spaces. Then came some incidents: tearing down others’ party flags, party flag raising in undesignated sites, etc. In one of NAD districts, all these incidents have incited many party leaders and politicians. The local police chief responded in a professional way: instead of instructing his personnel to take off these flags, he contacted party leaders by requesting them politely but firmly, that they, with the assistance of the police, should remove all of their flags and put them in designated places.

competence will remain a distant dream unless seriously cultivated and nourished through capacity building.

d. At last, questions about the roles of PP NAD in this overall constellation can also be addressed with a sense of realism and modesty. From all the above discussions, it is clear that PP NAD's authoritative competence mainly lies in the organisation of customised training for capacity building of the police. This, however, is not to be taken to mean that other activities like *Polmas* dissemination or perhaps *Polmas* pilot project are not within the competence of PP NAD. If PP NAD appears to be less equipped in managing these activities, it is more likely because the criteria applied to the organisation of training is unfittingly adopted to rate the success and failure of activities which by definition warrant different criteria. As noted, by facilitating *Polmas* dissemination PP NAD has remarkably helped the opening of social encounters crucial to psycho-social processes of reconciliation. But, isn't it true that other organisations are also capable of doing it, perhaps even better than PP NAD? This question, however, misses out one key point. The strength of PP NAD lies in its competence to link the contents of HR and CP training with the engagement of police personnel within the context of social encounters created by these activities. On this count, PP NAD has competitive advantages over others. Of course this does not reduce the urgency for PP NAD to start giving attention to serious analysis and reflections on the logic of intricate processes involved in these activities.

e. To sum up, with all the strengths and weaknesses, PP NAD's competence in the organisation of customised training and its experiences in creating room for social encounters between police personnel and community members have tremendously contributed to the unfolding story of hope in Aceh. It is for this hope that PP NAD has become a steward of a noble message: that a peaceful Aceh is not impossible, nor is it improbable. That is why it is worth belabouring.

G. Priority for NAD Police Project's Next Step

Having elaborately discussed several aspects of PP NAD's endeavour in Aceh, the Evaluation Team is of an opinion that the following order of priorities deserves special consideration for the remaining period of the Project. Many recommendations that have been suggested in the preceding chapters and will be offered in the last part of this chapter need to be placed within the scheme of the following priority, no doubt with their importance to be arranged according to their respective categorical affinity.

- **Priority I:**
There is no doubt that PP NAD needs to continue the organisation of customised training in HR and CP, by giving due attention to many critically relevant notes suggested in this evaluation and previous evaluations. These notes are suggested in the hope that PP NAD cultivates them in the process of developing more robust training models that are not only beneficial to *Polda* NAD in the following period of the Project, but also to the learning process of other *Polda* in Indonesia. While this training is categorically distinct from the implementation of *Polmas*, it needs to be borne in mind that the link between the two is closer than it first appears. As noted, the enhanced capacity and competence of police personnel have direct links to the way community members are willing to consider more seriously the agenda

of partnership initiated by the police. No less importantly, PP NAD needs to cultivate rather urgently the availability of a monitoring system for those who have received the training. This seems to be the weakest link between the process of knowing in the classroom setting (*cognitive*) and the process of practicing the new knowledge in day-to-day policing work (*practical*).

As for the other activities whose nature are less structured, less institutionalised and not entirely within the directive control of PP NAD, the following order of priorities merits consideration:

- **Priority II:**
PP NAD needs to continue its supports for the incorporation of HR and CP principles into police's daily conduct and practices. As noted above, this priority is suggested in line with the weakest link that seems to have characterised the status of customised training in HR and CP within the overall process of police reform. This is also suggested in response to the persisting question about the impacts of training on police's daily conduct and practices. In truth, this question itself is too early to be raised, for there is no such a thing as immediate impact in education process.
- **Priority III:**
PP NAD needs to continue its supports for the reform of recruitment policies and practices at SPN Seulawah. There is no doubt that this reform will be intractable. But this reform is key to the overall future of *Polda* NAD and Aceh society, if because it concerns the very first line in the domino-like effect of Aceh police's quality. PP NAD's supports for this reform may be done by facilitating the formation of a task force for action plan in the very near future.
- **Priority IV:**
Supports for the community-police partnership programme. It seems important for PP NAD to set more modest targets, if because the development of community-police partnership involves long, gradual and intricate processes. At this initial stage, it seems sufficient for CP information dissemination to be directed to (1) the development of critical mass, (2) development of social encounters between conflicting parties in the past, (3) sustaining the deepening quality of these social encounters, and (4) development of dialogues between the police and CSOs for reflections on the above three points.

H. Recommendation

1. Directly related to HR and CP training, PP NAD to devise a monitoring instrument for keeping track of changes in police's conduct and practices at *Polsek* (police sub-district) and *Polres* (police district) levels. This instrument is to be designed for police's conduct/practices rather than for organisational development. It is important for the devising of this instrument to involve not only the police and experts, but also local community members and CSOs. The administering of the instrument is also to involve these groups. This is also a way of developing necessary collaboration between the police and community members/CSOs, a collaboration that could prove vital when the time has come for IOM to start the phasing-out stages.

2. Related to the recommendation on PP NAD's supports for recruitment reform (see Chapter III), PP NAD to persuade *Polda* NAD to involve experts and CSOs in the devising of action plan for SPN Seulawah's recruitment reform as much as in the implementation and monitoring of new recruitment policies and practices. This is also a way of developing necessary collaboration between the police and community members/CSOs, a collaboration that could prove vital when the time has come for IOM to start the phasing-out stages.

3. PP NAD to cultivate the CP information dissemination as a way of developing critical mass. Aside from nurturing a sense of ownership, this critical mass is to be developed as part of external monitoring mechanism on police's daily conduct and practices. It is also through this critical mass that the existing mechanism of report through telephone, letters, SMS, etc to be revived. For the purposes of turning CP information dissemination into a process of developing critical mass, PP NAD to actively engage HR and CP training's observers who come from community groups and CSOs. During CP dissemination, some of these training observers who show trustworthiness and articulation to play roles in informing community members of what the police have received during the training, and how community members to lend supports in making the contents of the training gradually come to fruition.

4. PP NAD to deliberately turn various large-scale gatherings into space of social encounters between many previously conflicting groups. *Hikayat* Festivals and CP information dissemination forums are example of such moments. It is recommendable for PP NAD to give attention to such moments (i) by including groups known to have been on opposing sides in the past, rather than those already known or favoured by PP NAD and *Polda* NAD – even if this is not part of its mandate, PP NAD may cultivate this avenue through some possible collaboration with, say, DDR; (ii) by closely monitoring the quality of interactions during these events; and (iii) by regularly assessing the detrimental and beneficial impacts of these events in qualitative terms.

5. In tandem with *Polda* NAD, PP NAD to actively engage trustworthy CSOs and experts in critically assessing the pros and cons of *adat* approach as CP strategy. This critical assessment is to better equip PP NAD and *Polda* NAD with a deeper understanding of the intricacies involved in using *adat* as an entry point to CP. No less important is that this critical assessment is to equip PP NAD and *Polda* NAD with a greater awareness of both intended and unintended consequences in using *adat*.

6. In tandem with *Polda* NAD, PP NAD to actively engage trustworthy CSOs and experts in critically discussing real tensions between *sharia* and *adat* on the one hand, and positive laws on the other, the dilemma of which is widely experienced by both community members and police personnel. The discussions need to be directed to helping the police how to deal with these tensions in their daily policing works. This is in view of the fact that many community members themselves consider the tensions as a “vacuum of law”.

7. As for a recommendation for the timeline, the table on the following page (TABLE 18) may be worth discerning. As shown in the table, what are included in each year-category refer to activities to be retained and those to be phased out.

TABLE 18
Recommendation for NAD Police Project Timeline

| | Timeline for PP NAD | | | |
|-----------------------------|---|--|---|--|
| | July 2008 | July 2009 | July 2010 | July 2011 |
| CP, HR, CPF Training | <p align="center">RETAINED</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> PP NAD: HR & CP training. <i>Polda</i> NAD to supply Trainers. | <p align="center">RETAINED</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> HR-CP training organised by PP NAD in tandem with <i>Polda</i>/POLRI training institutions. CPF training to be carried out by PP NAD in tandem with <i>Polda</i> NAD & CSOs/community. Consultation on monitoring system/mechanism on police daily conduct & practices: PP NAD, SINP, <i>Polda</i>, POLRI, CSOs, <i>Kompolnas</i>. Monitoring instrument/mechanism in use and accessible to the public. | <p align="center">PHASED-OUT</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> HR-CP training to be carried out within and by <i>Polda</i>/POLRI training institutions. CPF training to be carried out by <i>Polda</i> NAD in tandem with CSOs/community. Police training to be monitored by POLRI Board of Curricula and independent institutions (<i>Kompolnas</i>, CSOs). CPF training to be monitored by <i>Polda</i> NAD, CSOs/community. <p align="center">⇒ PP NAD: consultative</p> | <p align="center">EXIT</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> HR-CP training to be carried out within and by <i>Polda</i>/POLRI training institutions. CPF training to be carried-out by <i>Polda</i> NAD in tandem with CSOs/community. Police training to be monitored by POLRI Board of Curricula and independent institutions (<i>Kompolnas</i>, etc.). CPF training to be monitored by <i>Polda</i> NAD, CSOs/community. <p align="center">⇒ PP NAD: comprehensive external evaluation</p> |
| CPF activities | <p align="center">RETAINED</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <i>Polda</i>, PP NAD, CSOs/NGOs, community, media, other stakeholders. Training of CPF officers, tuha peut members, CP dissemination information. | <p align="center">RETAINED</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> CPF Pilot Project in several areas in Aceh. Monitoring, evaluation, improvement. Best practices adopted & implemented in selected areas of Aceh. <p align="center">⇒ Parties involved: PP NAD, <i>Polda</i> NAD, CSOs, community, media, and other stakeholders.</p> | <p align="center">PHASED-OUT</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Implementation of best practices in wider areas of Aceh. Monitoring, evaluation, improvement. <p align="center">⇒ Parties involved: <i>Polda</i> NAD, CSOs, community, media, and other stakeholders;</p> <p align="center">⇒ PP NAD: facilitator & consultative</p> | <p align="center">EXIT</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> CPF activities including monitoring, evaluation, improvement. <p align="center">⇒ Parties involved: <i>Polda</i> NAD, CSOs, community, media, and other stakeholders;</p> <p align="center">⇒ PP NAD: comprehensive external evaluation</p> |
| Recruitment | <p align="center">RETAINED</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Working group & action plain established. Working group to devise new recruitment policy. <p align="center">⇒ Parties involved: <i>Polda</i>, PP NAD, CSOs/NGOs, community.</p> | <p align="center">RETAINED</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Try-out of new recruitment policy & practices. Information dissemination of new policy & practices. Monitoring & evaluation of try-out process. <p align="center">⇒ Parties involved: PP NAD, <i>Polda</i> NAD, CSOs/community, media, and other stakeholders.</p> | <p align="center">PHASED-OUT</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> New recruitment policy adopted and implemented: <i>Polda</i> NAD; Monitor & evaluation of recruitment practices: <i>Polda</i>, PP NAD, CSOs/NGOs, media, community, and other stakeholders. <p align="center">⇒ PP NAD: facilitator & consultative</p> | <p align="center">EXIT</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> On-going monitoring of recruitment practices: <i>Polda</i>, CSOs/NGOs, community, media, and other stakeholders. <p align="center">⇒ PP NAD: comprehensive external evaluation</p> |

Epilogue

“Initial steps have been taken..., the question is whether what we’ve learned is being looked after”.

(Police rank-and-file, Interview, Aceh, July 200)

When the Helsinki Peace Agreement was still a pocket of fragile hope in the aftermath of long and bitter conflicts in Aceh, it was the collaboration between the Donors and IOM that brought PP NAD into being. The collaboration was of course a child of many motives. It was due to the poise of courage as much as to the favour of timing that the diversity of motives, instead of arresting, has begotten an invaluable learning process. The so-called Aceh experience opens a new vista and lesson to Indonesia how bitter conflicts could be brought to an end by means of coming together on equal footing. The reality of peace, however, is not made up of a single agreement but a series of processes as laborious as life itself.

It was on such accidents of timing that Aceh presented the Indonesian National Police (INP) with a fertile ground for its newly cherished strategy of police reform: *Polmas* (community policing). It is an idea that public order is an outcome of partnership between community and police. Like any partnership, *Polmas* is a process and not an event, quite in the way that marriage is much larger than a wedding day. What came next was a project managed by PP NAD to support *Polda* NAD’s reform. Within this project are various activities designed to achieve some specific objectives. Among them is customised training in the basic principles of Human Rights (HR) and Community Policing (CP). The training is better understood as re-education of NAD police personnel for purposes of police reform. While it can also be seen as personal capacity building independent of CP, the training was from the start conceived as part of the cultural dimension of police reform based on the idea of CP; hence the training materials on CP which in turn embodies HR principles. This poses daunting challenges to the police to learn what is assumed and involved in partnership with community, as these challenges can only be responded by ending old habits of authoritarian politics.

Since its commencement in July 2006, it has been gradually clear that reality is not as neat as a design. Some activities in the project are by nature more institutionally structured and within the directive control of PP NAD than others. Customised training in HR and CP is a case in point, whereas implementation of CP is an example of the less institutionally structured activity that is also not entirely within the directive control of PP NAD. As elaborately presented in this Evaluation Report, it is rather clear that by mid-2008 certain patterns were evident.

First, the Programme design is characterised by indiscriminate criteria, in that it does not distinguish objectives that are achievable through more institutionally structured activities from those through less institutionally structured activities. By randomly applying similar criteria of effectiveness, efficiency and the 2009 timeline, the latter category of activities is bound to appear less convincing.

Secondly, this deficit in the design is reflected in the performance of PP NAD management. In the former category of activities, PP NAD has achieved remarkable results, whereas in the latter less evident. It is increasingly clear that this difference in the levels of achievement is rooted less in the complacency of PP NAD than in the indiscriminate criteria inherent in the design. Here comes an imperative for a revision of the design as much as for PP NAD to understand better the intricacies of change processes involved in the less institutionally structured objectives, such as the implementation of *Polmas* or integration of HR and CP principles into police's daily conducts and practices. How to effectively and efficiently conduct these less institutionally structured activities can only be learned more from doing and trying to do than from the dictate of IOM and/or Donors' high offices.

Thirdly, after belabouring on the project for two years, it does not take too long for PP NAD to be hard pressed with questions of impact. This indeed is a legitimate question for an agency whose *raison d'être* is to effect police reform in Aceh. In a word, the most remarkable impact is the way in which police personnel in Aceh have been equipped with basic knowledge and new normative attitudinal standards essentially required by the initial stages of peace process. This is no small achievement. It may be less pleasing than immediate changes in police's daily conducts and practices. Such immediate changes, however, have never occurred in the entire history of human education. Impact on daily conduct and practices should be asked within a longer period of timeline and, as noted repeatedly in this Report, it requires more than it first appears. It warrants an appreciation as much as attention to subtle gradations and distinctions, staging and sequencing, a sense of timing and relevance, all involved in any process of change.

Enter a question of sustainability. After the 2004 tsunami, Aceh has become a focus of international attention. With it also came the politics of funding which gradually has been affecting Acehnese society. There is hardly any activity by donor-driven projects that does not involve some forms of pecuniary incentive, and IOM PP NAD is no exception. How a sense of ownership has been developing in this climate is a vexing question that finds no easy answer. What is clear is that this issue should be taken seriously into account when the time has come to carry out a gradual phase-out and handover of IOM projects to the INP. Since exit is certain, the question for a prudent management is not to exit or to stay, but rather how the exit is to be gradually carried out for the optimal accomplishment of the mission intended by the *raison d'être* of PP NAD. As presented in the last part of the preceding chapter (see TABLE 18), it is increasingly clear that by mid-2008 what have been achieved so far deserve to be continued until the 2009 timeline. And, for the questions of impact on police's daily conduct and practices to be realistically answered, what have been started during the past four semesters deserve to be extended beyond 2009. It is important that gradual handover needs to ensure the involvement of competent and trustworthy CSO groups and experts in capacity building and monitoring process.

This brings home a lesson so precious for the INP, IOM and Donors. Should similar projects be started in other post-conflict areas in Indonesia, it is imperative for the bearers of the projects to heed at least the following two points. *First*, that police reform is not only about structural or instrumental adjustments but perhaps more importantly about reforming the cognitive, affective and practical contents of police's conduct and practices. This brings us face to face with what is involved in education

process, with its intricacies of staging and sequencing, with its requirements of regular and systematic monitoring system. It is unfortunate that ‘education’ (as different from ‘schooling’) does not seem to have a central place in the *modus vivendi* (way of life) and *modus procedendi* (way of proceeding) of the Indonesian National Police. *Secondly*, that education process is closely intertwined with CP agenda. If partnership is the heart of CP, while CP presumes the roles of community in policing work, then CP cannot be done unless police personnel are re-embedded in community life. This re-embedding process, however, is bound to fail unless the professional competence of police personnel is greatly enhanced. Without it, re-embedding police personnel in community life can easily turn into a license for reviving old habits rampant during the authoritarian era. Indeed, training in HR and CP does not presume *Polmas*, but *Polmas* presumes education process of police personnel, of which training in HR and CP is part.

Only then can the INP hope to have contributed to peace process. As for PP NAD, it is apt to reiterate what has been noted earlier: “It is for this hope that PP NAD has become a steward of a noble message: that a peaceful Aceh is not impossible, nor is it improbable. That is why it is worth belabouring”.

As for the rest, *vita supplet*.³⁰

³⁰ *Vita supplet* is a Latin expression for “let life supply what is lacking”.

ANNEX 1



IOM International Organization for Migration
OIM Organisation Internationale pour les Migrations
OIM Organización Internacional para las Migraciones

TERMS OF REFERENCE - MID-TERM EXTERNAL EVALUATION

“Support for National Police Reform in Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam (NAD)”

1. Background

Since the separation of the Indonesian National Police (INP) from the Military, the INP have made genuine efforts to reform and adapt themselves to the norms and expectations of a rapidly democratizing and modernizing Indonesian society. While democratic policing is a relatively new concept for Indonesia, substantial results have been achieved and the senior police leadership has shown a continuous and resolute commitment towards reform. International actors have played an important role in supporting and facilitating the INP’s reform process and the momentum gained calls for further support so as to ensure sustainability of the progress made and smooth transfer to the INP.

IOM has been the lead agency working with the INP to support national police reform, with support from the Royal Netherlands Embassy (RNE). In 2003, IOM and the RNE launched the project “**Strengthening the Indonesian National Police Force through Institution-Building**” (2003-2009). Following the positive results of the first phase of the project, the Government of the Netherlands and IOM launched Phase II, for which IOM and POLRI signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on 24 February 2005, which was renewed in June 2006. The MoU provides the institutional framework for IOM/INP cooperation in the field of technical assistance, capacity-building and training in community policing (CP) and human rights (HR) for law-enforcement officers and communities.

Building on the success of IOM’s national police reform program, “**Strengthening the Indonesian National Police Force through Institution-Building**” (2003-2009), and IOM’s Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the INP providing for cooperation in the field of technical assistance, capacity-building and training in community policing (CP) and human rights (HR) for law-enforcement officers and communities, in July 2006 IOM, the European Commission (EC) and the RNE jointly launched the project “**Support for National Police Reform in Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam**”, extending the national program’s activities into a post-conflict and peace-building context. After more than 18 months of project implementation, IOM is commissioning a mid-term external evaluation to evaluate the relevance and performance to date of project implementation and make some recommendations for its second phase.

2. Project Description

The project’s overall objective is to support the implementation of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed between the Government of Indonesia (GoI) and the Free Aceh Movement, through the reform of policing in the province of Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam (Polda NAD). Its purposes are:

- to promote and contribute to the implementation of the principles and concepts of community policing among police officers and management staff, through the organization of customized training sessions and the establishment of Police-Community Forums;
- to integrate international human rights standards into Polda NAD policies and daily

practices, through the organization of customized training sessions for police officers and their commanders;

- to improve Polda NAD's quality of training, through capacity-building within the Provincial Police School (Sekolah Polisi Negara - SPN) and the enhancement of Polda NAD's training facilities;
- to assist Kapolda in improving Polda NAD's recruitment policies and practices, through a review of current recruitment policy in the context of Chapter 3.2, Reintegration into Society, Article 3.2.7 of the MoU.

This 36-month project focuses on five main activities: (1) Development and delivery of customized training for police officers in Community Policing; (2) Establishment of Community-Police Forums; (3) Development and delivery of customized training for police officers in Human Rights; (4) Capacity-building to Polda NAD for the development of in-house training, through the provision of technical support to SPN and to the relevant police research and education institutions; as well as for the improvement of recruitment practices; and (5) Enhancement of the Police School's training facilities and construction of decentralized training centers in key districts.

Expected results include:

- Up to 8,000 police officers in Polda NAD trained in and fully familiar with community policing principles and international human rights standards, and having successfully integrated these principles into their daily operational practice;
- Community Policing adopted as an institutional strategy for reform by Polda NAD's policies including within its organizational structure and recruitment procedures;
- Human Rights principles incorporated into police education and training curricula and successfully integrated within the operational culture of training institutions;
- Strengthened cooperation between the community and the police force through the establishment and support of Community Policing Forums;
- Enhanced training facilities at the SPN and in the field; and improved training policies and practices;
- Improved recruitment practices and policies enabling Kapolda to recruit quality personnel, who agree to conduct policing along the principles of CP and HR.

By contributing to the reorganization and modernization of local police forces in Aceh, the project will support the implementation of the relevant provisions of the MoU as well as encourage the development of the rule of law and democracy in the post-conflict context. Developing a professional and accountable police service practicing a new style of policing responsive to the needs of local communities is increasingly recognized as important for sustainable security and secure, long-term economic development. A police service supported by the community and capable of arresting insecurity can have a far-reaching impact in enabling future economic and political development. A police force that is seen to have changed its character, making a break from repressive practices of the past and working in partnership with communities from which it was historically been removed, will have profound symbolic resonance in post-conflict Aceh.

3. Objectives of the Mid-term External Evaluation

The objective of the mid-term external evaluation is to evaluate the overall performance and achievements of the NAD project to date, in line with its objectives and project purposes. In particular, the evaluation will consider the relevance, performance, and outputs of the project implementation and make some recommendations for its second phase:

- **Relevance:** Evaluate the pertinence of project objectives and purposes, in relation to the expected impact of the project, target groups, indirect and direct beneficiaries;
- **Performance:** Evaluate the project's *effectiveness* (to what extent has the project produced its desired results); evaluation of project *efficiency* (to what degree have

resources been optimized during the project implementation and has the project achieved a satisfactory level of cost-effectiveness); *timeliness* (appropriateness of activities' planning);

- **Outputs and outcomes to date:** Evaluate the project impact to date and potential for sustainability. As requested by the donors, the evaluation will pay particular attention to the overall impact of the project to date on and its contribution to the consolidation of the peace process and strengthening of the rule of law in the conflict-affected province. It will also make some recommendations to improve monitoring of the project's overall impact and to enhance synergies with other relevant programs implemented in Aceh (including i.a. IOM's Post-Conflict Reintegration Program and UNDP's Program for Improved Access to Justice).

In particular, the evaluation will:

- Assess progress to date towards the project's purposes and objectives:
 - Consider the extent to which the project's outputs and activities are contributing to its stated purposes and objectives, and whether they are still relevant and realistic (taking into account the project's complementarity with other relevant programs implemented in Aceh);
 - Consider the contribution of the purposes to the project's overall objective;
 - Consider whether any new risks and assumptions have been identified or are emerging;
 - Assess progress to-date in comparison with the project's action plan;
 - Assess the likelihood of the project achieving its purposes and objectives in the agreed timeframes and budget, and make recommendations accordingly.
- Assess the quality of the inputs provided to date:
 - Consider technical support and project management, including, but not limited to, administrative support, financial management, and consultants;
 - Consider the NAD project's relationship to: the national police project, related projects in IOM, related projects outside IOM, the beneficiaries, the donor(s);
 - Consider operational arrangements, including, but not limited to, between IOM and INP;
 - Consider activities undertaken and internal outputs used as tools for the project, including but not limited to master trainers, facilitators, training modules, resource materials, monitoring and evaluation tools, and reports;
 - Assess the internal and external monitoring strengths and weaknesses;
 - Consider whether the grant contract documents and previous evaluations at the national and Aceh level have been appropriately followed and considered.
- Assess outputs and outcomes to date:
 - Consider the quality, range and effectiveness of the interventions and methodology pursued;
 - Consider the gender dimension of the project and make some recommendation for improved gender mainstreaming, if applicable;
 - Consider the risk and challenges.
- Make recommendations on possible improvements which could be practically implemented during the remainder of the project, in particular in the areas of monitoring and mechanism in place to document and evaluate the overall impact of the project.

4. Methodology

The Evaluation Team will conduct a qualitative and quantitative assessment of the project's progress to date through extensive deskwork and fieldwork. Specific activities to be undertaken by the Evaluation Team will be determined by the Team Leader, in close consultation with IOM, the European Commission and the Royal Netherlands Embassy.

Activities will include, but may not be limited to, the following:

- a) Review project documents and publications/outputs relating to the program; including the grant contract documents and attachments; working documents; progress updates and reports; minutes; training curricula; previous EC, RNE and internal evaluations conducted at the national and Aceh level; etc.; and other relevant external documentation;
- b) Conduct interviews and/or focus group discussions with IOM staff, EC, RNE and key stakeholders directly and indirectly involved as implementing partners (e.g. Kapolri, Kapolda NAD, INP Deputy Human Resource, INP/SPN Trainers, Head of SPN, Kapolsek, Kapolres, community leaders, and cultural leaders) and other organizations working in a similar field of work (e.g. Imparsial, Partnership for Governance Reform, Pro-Patria, UNDP, the World Bank);
- c) Conduct interviews and/or focus group discussions with beneficiaries (including police officers, senior police leadership and local community members);
- d) Conduct interviews and/or focus group discussions with relevant key stakeholders at the provincial and grass root level (and national level as necessary) such as the Governor of NAD, Head of BRR, Head of BRA, Provincial and district parliaments members, Donor(s), International agencies in Aceh, Partnership for Governance Reform, KOMNAS HAM Aceh, KOMNAS PEREMPUAN, Media, relevant NGOs, especially those working in Aceh (e.g. LBH, LBH-Apik, RPUK, Flower, Kontras, NU, Muhammadiyah, Imparsial, Pro Patria, Police Watch) and CSOs;
- e) Conduct field visits to meet with stakeholders and beneficiaries in a wide variety of districts throughout Aceh, and evaluate ongoing projects (e.g. HR and CP trainings, ToTs, CPF trainings, and internal project monitoring).

5. Presentation of Results and Reporting

The output of the evaluation will be a comprehensive draft report in both English and in Bahasa Indonesia (including an Executive Summary), outlining the methodology pursued and main findings of the evaluation, including lessons learned and recommendations for the remaining duration of the project.

A specific chapter will be dedicated to the overall impact to date of the project on and its contribution to date to the consolidation of the peace process and strengthening of the rule of law in the conflict-affected province, including the specific recommendations on how to improve monitoring of the project's overall impact. In this regards, recommendations should include suggestions to update the logical framework, if applicable.

The findings of the draft report will be submitted to IOM for review and input. Based on IOM's feedback the team will integrate the inputs into the report and submit the final evaluation report before finalization and submission of the final report.

The findings and recommendation will be presented to the donors forum and the Chief of the Aceh Police and Chief of the National Police, in a forum consist of project steering committee members.

Updated logical framework will be attached as an annex.

6. Evaluation Team: Selection, Formation and Qualification

The evaluation will be undertaken by a team of independent experts, consist of two experts selected by IOM in consultation with the donors. IOM will facilitate the selection process and provide administrative and logistics support to the evaluation team.

The Evaluation Expert will have experience in monitoring and evaluation, with a sociology/anthropology background and/or a good command of data collection and interviewing techniques. He/she will be familiar with project management or have

experience in similar capacity building projects in post-conflict environments. He/she must have a good understanding of the Aceh context and fully understand the nature of the program, which are highly politically sensitive. An essential requirement is good knowledge and background on Indonesian police/justice sector reform, media, CSOs, NGOs. The Evaluation Expert is expected to have a good rapport with both the Indonesian civil society and the National Police (POLRI). A good knowledge of Bahasa Indonesia is an advantage.

7. Resources and timing

Timeframe: June 2008 - August 2008

(1 week to prepare for the evaluation; 4 weeks for field visits in Aceh and interviews in Aceh and Jakarta; 2 weeks for collecting and review of documents; 2 weeks to write the draft evaluation report; 1-2 weeks to prepare final report and update the Logframe)

Total of 75 days

ANNEX - 2

Field Visit July – August 2008 Midterm External Evaluation Support for National Police Reform in Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam (NAD)

| | Date 2008 | Activity | ET | Respondent | Venue/ location | Remarks Male/Female |
|-------------------|-------------|-------------------------------|---------|---|-------------------|---------------------|
| Jakarta | | | | | | |
| | 12 June | Meeting - IOM Country Manager | KS, BHP | S. Cook | IOM office | M:1 |
| | 3 July | Meeting - RNE | KS, BHP | H. Ligtvoet, S. Fazili | RNE | F: 1; M:1 |
| | | Meeting - POLRI | KS, BHP | Deputy Chief of INP | Mabes Polri | M: 1 |
| | 4 July | Interview POLRI | KS, BHP | Head of Police Education & Training Institution, IOM consultant | Mabes Polri | M: 2 |
| | 5 July | Meeting - EC | KS, BHP | K.Soos | Coffee shop | M:1 |
| | 6 July | Travel JKT-BA | KS, BHP | | | 3h delayed |
| Banda Aceh | | | | | | |
| | 7 July | | | | | |
| | 08.30- | Meeting - PP | KS, BHP | PM, PSO, SPA | PP office | F:2; M:1 |
| | | Interview Polda NAD | KS, BHP | Chief of Polda NAD, Head of Personnel Bureau | Polda NAD | M:2 |
| | | Interview PP | KS, BHP | PSO | BA | M:1 |
| | 22.30 | Interview NAD Government, CSO | KS, BHP | NAD Governor Staff, Demos | BA | M:2 |
| | 8 July | | | | | |
| | 09.00- | Interview PP | KS, BHP | SPA | BA | F:1 |
| | | | KS | PA | BA | M:1 |
| | | | KS | PA | BA | F:1 |
| | | Interview PP | KS | Consultant | BA | F:1 |
| | | | BHP | PA | BA | F:1 |
| | | | BHP | PA | BA | M:1 |
| | | | BHP | PA | BA | M:1 |
| | -19.00 | Interview CSO | KS, BHP | Kontras | Kontras office | F:1 M:1 |
| | 9 July | | | | | |
| | 09.00- | Interview EC | KS, BHP | HO | Europe House | M:2 |
| | | Interview IOM | KS, BHP | Livelihood personnel | PP office | F:1 |
| | 15.30 | Interview Polda NAD | KS, BHP | Head of law division, Head of partnership div | Polda NAD | M: 2 |
| | 16.00-17.00 | Logistic Preparation | KS, BHP | IOM PP Staff | PP office | |
| Jantho | | | | | | |
| | 10July | | | | | |
| | 09.00-12.00 | Class Observation | KS, BHP | HR Session | Jantho TC | F: 7 M: 23 |
| | | Interview Polres | KS, BHP | Chief of police district | Polres Aceh Besar | M:1 |
| | | Class Observation | KS | HR Session | Jantho TC | F: 7 M: 23 |
| | | Interview PP | BHP | PA | TC | M:1 |
| | | Group Interv - Trainers | KS | Police officers | Polres | M: 6 F: 1 |

| | Date 2008 | Activity | ET | Respondent | Venue/ location | Remarks Male/Female |
|---------------------|-----------|--------------------------------------|-------------|---|----------------------------------|---|
| | | Group Interv- Trainees | BHP | Police officers | Polres | M: 8 |
| | | ObservationTC infrastructure | BHP, KS | | Jantho | |
| SPN Seulawah | 10July | | | | | |
| 13.30-15.00 | | Group Interv - SPN Trainers | KS, BHP | Senior Trainers, | SPN | M: 4 |
| BA | 10July | | | | | |
| | | Interview NGO | KS, BHP | Woman activist, NGO for children | BA | F: 1 M: 1 |
| 19.30-22.30 | | Group Interv - NGOs | KS, BHP | Journalists, women NGOs, students, | BA | M: 10 F: 4 |
| 09.00- | 11July | Interview UNDP, Aceh Justice Project | KS, BHP | Consultant, Program Officer | UNDP BA | F: 1 M: 1 |
| | | Interv IOM | KS, BHP | Finance | IOM office BA | F: 1 |
| 16.30 | | Interv PP NAD | KS, BHP | PM | PP office | F: 1 |
| | | Interv - expert | KS | NGO | BA | F: 1 |
| 18.00 - 22.00 | | Briefing | ET | KS, BHP, ES | BA | |
| 07.00 | 12July | NAD Road Trip | ET | KS, BHP, ES | Road trip postponed until Jun 15 | Miscommunication between IOM PP and logistics |
| | | Document review | ET | KS, BHP, ES | BA | |
| 10.30- | 14July | Interview Poldada NAD | KS, BHP | Head of Poldada education&training unit | PP office | M: 1 |
| | | Interview PP | KS, BHP | Consultant | PP office | M: 1 |
| | | | BHP | Consultant | PP office | F: 1 |
| | | | KS, BHP | Consultant | PP office | F: 1 |
| | | Tele-Interv gender expert | KS | Komnas Perempuan | BA | F: 1 |
| 22.00 | | Briefing - ET | KS, BHP, ES | | BA | |
| Calang | 15July | | | | | |
| 13.00- | | Interv Polres | KS | Head Operational Bureau | Polres | M: 1 |
| | | Group Interv Community | KS | Religious, Adat & Community Leaders | | M: 3 |
| | | Group Interv Trainers | KS | Head police subdistrict, Trainers | Polres | M: 7 |
| | | Interview PP | BHP | PA | Polres | M: 1 |
| | | Group Interv Trainees | BHP | Trainees | Polres | M: 8 |
| | | Class Observation | BHP | 30 trainees | Polres | M: 30 |
| | | ObservationTC infrastructure | | | | |
| 16.30 | | Group Interv community | KS, BHP, ES | Youth, women, adat leaders, head of village | Private house | M: 4 F: 3 |
| Meulaboh | 15July | | | | | |
| 21.00-23.30 | | Group Interv community | KS, BHP, ES | teachers, students, imeum mukim, tuha peut | Coffee shop | M: 7 F: 2 |
| 09.00- | 16July | Group Interv community | KS | Head of village, religious & adat leaders, women representative | Polres | M: 3 F: 1 |
| | | Group Interv Polsek | KS | Chief of police subdistricts | Polres | M: 5 |
| | | Group Interv Polres | KS | PPA personnel (Women & Children Service Unit) | Polres | F: 5 |

| | Date 2008 | Activity | ET | Respondent | Venue/ location | Remarks Male/Female |
|--------------------|-----------|------------------------------------|--------------|--|-----------------|---|
| | | Group Interv Trainers | BHP | Trainers | Polres | M:3 |
| 11.00 | | Group Interv Trainees | BHP | Trainees | Polres | M: 3 |
| Nagan Raya | 16July | | | | | |
| 13.00- | | Interview Polres Nagan Raya | KS, BHP, ES | 1 Head of operational, 1 head of partnership, 1 head of administration Bureaus | Polres | M: 3 |
| | | Group Interv Trainers Nagan Raya | KS | Trainers | Polres | M: 4 |
| | | Group Interv community | BHP, KS, ES, | Adat leader, head of village, women representative | Polres | M: 2 F: 1 |
| 17.00 | | Group Interv Trainees | BHP | Trainees | Polres | M: 6 |
| | | ObservationTC infrastructure | BHP, KS, ES | | | |
| Blang Pidie | 17July | | | | | |
| 10.40-11.30 | | Community Policing meeting | KS, BHP, ES | Head of partnership bureau, head of operational bureaus, police personnel, community members | Polres | 25 people; mostly police personnel, 4 community members |
| 11.30- | | Group Interv community | KS | Head of village, women & adat representative | Polres compound | M: 3 F: 1 |
| | | Group Interv Trainers | KS | Head of subdistrict, trainer | Polres | M: 2 |
| | | Group Interv Trainees | BHP | Trainees | Polres | M: 6 |
| | | Group Interv community | KS, BHP, ES | Business woman, political party member, KPA, youth, ordinary villagers | Privat house | M: 4 F: 2 |
| 17.00 | | ObservationTC infrastructure | KS, BHP, ES | | Blang Pidie TC | Kasat Samapta Blang Pidie/ Trainer |
| Tapaktuan | 17July | | | | | |
| 20.00-23.00 | | Group Interv community | BHP | Activists | Café | M: 3 Facilitated by Jesuit Refugee Service |
| | 18July | | | | | |
| 08.20- | | Polres | KS, BHP, ES | Chief of police district | Polres | M: 1 |
| | | Group Interv Trainers | KS | Trainers | Polres | M: 4 |
| | | Group Interv Trainees | BHP | Trainees | Polres | F: 3 M: 3 |
| 12.30 | | Group Interv community | ES | Religious, community, adat leaders, women's representative | Polres compound | M: 3 F: 1 |
| 13.00-17.00 | | Travel: Tapaktuan - Singkil | | | | |
| Singkil | 19July | | | | | |
| 08.00- | | Group Interv Trainers | KS | Chief of police subdistrict, Trainers | Polres | M: 3 |
| | | Group Interv Trainees | BHP | Trainees | Polres | F: 2 M: 5 |
| | | Group Interv community | ES | Community members | | F: 1 M: 2 |

| | Date 2008 | Activity | ET | Respondent | Venue/ location | Remarks Male/Female |
|--------------------|--------------|--|-------------------------|---|------------------------------------|--|
| | | Interview Polres | KS, BHP, ES | Deputy chief of police district | Polres | M: 1 |
| 14.00 | | Group Interv NGOs | KS, BHP, ES | Activists | NGO Office | M: 4 F: 4 |
| 14.00-18.00 | | Travel: Singkil - Kutacane | | | | |
| Kutacane | 20July | | | | | |
| 08.00- | | Interview Polres Kutacane | KS | Deputy chief of police district | Polres | M: 1 |
| | | Group Interv Trainers | KS | Chief of police subdistrict Trainers | Polres | M: 4 |
| | | Group Interv Trainees | BHP | Trainees | TC Kutacane | F: 1 M:4 |
| 11.00 | | Group Interv community | ES | Religious, community, adat leaders, women's representative, villagers | TC Kutacane | F: 2 M: 6 |
| 11.00-20.00 | | Travel: Kutacane - Takengon | KS, BHP, ES, IOM driver | 2 police personnel stopped & interrogated the team as a 'routine procedure'. The team interviewed the chief of police sub-district. | Rikit Gaib check point, Gayo Luwes | M:2 |
| | | | | | | |
| Takengon | 21July | | | | | |
| 08.00 | | Interview Polres | KS | Takengon Deputy chief of police district | Polres | M: 1 |
| | | Group Interv NGO | KS | Legal & paralegal activists | NGO office | F: 4 M: 1 |
| | | Group Interv - Trainers | KS | Trainers / Takengon | Polres | M: 3 F: 1 |
| | | Group Interv Trainers | KS | Trainers / Bener Meriah | Polres Takengon | M: 3 F: 1 |
| | | Interview PP | KS | PA Takengon | Polres | 1 |
| | | Group Interv Trainees | BHP | Trainees Takengon | Polres | F: 1 M: 3 |
| | | Group Interv Trainees | BHP | Trainees Bener Meriah | Polres Takengon | F: 1 M: 2 |
| | | Interview PP | BHP | PA Bener Meriah | Polres Takengon | M: 1 |
| | | Group Interv Kapolsek | BHP | Chiefs of police subdistrict | Polres Takengon | M: 2 |
| | | Interview Police | BHP | Head of operational bureau/Bener Meriah | Polres Takengon | M: 1 |
| 15.30 | | Group Interv community | ES | Religious, community, adat leaders, women's representative, villagers from Takengon & Bener Meriah | Polres compound | F:3 M:9 |
| 08.30-11.00 | 22July | Travel: Takengon - Bireun | | | | |
| Bireun | 22July | | | | | |
| 10.30-11.00 | Juli, Bireun | Interview police officer | KS, BHP | Subdistrict police personnel | Polsek Juli | M: 1; unscheduled interview |
| 12.30- | Bireun | Attending CP information dissemination | KS | Community members, community leaders, women's representatives; 6 women interviewed | District meeting room | More than 250 people attending the event; MoU Signing postponed. |
| | | Group Interv | BHP | Trainers | District meeting | M: 3 |

| | Date 2008 | Activity | ET | Respondent | Venue/ location | Remarks Male/Female |
|--------------------|---------------|-----------------------------------|-------------|--|-------------------------|--|
| | | Trainers | | | room | |
| 16.30 | | Group Interv community | BHP, ES | Community members | Villager's house | F: 4 M: 11 |
| Lhokseumawe | 22July | | | | | |
| 20.40-21.35 | | Trainers' teaching preparation | KS | Trainers, PA, supervisor | Hotel Lido | M: 3 F: 1 (supervisor) |
| | 23July | | | | | |
| 09.00- | | Group Interv activists | KS | Activists & lawyers from several districts in NAD | Facilitated by LBH APIK | M: 3 F: 6 |
| | | Interview PP | KS | PA | TC | 1 |
| | | Group Interv Polres | KS | Deputy chief of police sub-district, intelligent officer, head of administration bureau & head of partnership bureau | Polres | M: 3 F: 1 |
| | | Interview Polres | KS | Head of PPA unit | Polres | F: 1 |
| | | Group Interv Trainers | KS | HR Trainers | Polres | M: 2; Only 1 CP local trainer currently active, as 3 others were disqualified by IOM PP due to teaching incompetency |
| | | Group Interv Trainees | KS, BHP | Trainees | Polres | M: 4 F: 1 |
| | | Class Observation | BHP | Trainees, trainers, supervisor, observer | TC | M: 24 F: 1 supervisor M: 1 observer |
| | | ObservationTC infrastructure | BHP, KS, ES | | | |
| 17.30 | | Group Interv community | ES, BHP | Religious, community, adat leaders, women's representative | Polres | F: 1 M: 3 |
| 20.30-23.30 | | Group Interv community | KS, BHP, ES | Community members | Café | M: 7 F: 2 Victim of HR abuse, KPA, activists, villagers, youth. |
| Lhoksukon | 24July | | | | | |
| 10.30 | | Interview PP | KS | PA | TC | 1 |
| | | Class observation | BHP | Trainees, trainers, supervisor, observer | TC | M: 30 M: 2 trainers M: 1 supervisor M: 1 observer |
| | | ObservationTC infrasructure | BHP, KS, ES | | | |
| | | Logistic Preparation | ES | | | |
| 12.00 | | Interview Polres | KS | Chief of police district | Polres | M: 1 |
| 12.00-15.00 | | Travel: Lhoksukon - Langsa | | | | |
| Langsa | 24July | | | | | |

| | Date 2008 | Activity | ET | Respondent | Venue/ location | Remarks Male/Female |
|---------------------|---------------|--|-------------|---|-------------------|--|
| 15.45 | | Interview PP | KS | PA | TC Polres | F:1 |
| | | CP Class observation, | BHP | Trainees, trainers, supervisor, observer | TC Polres | M: 30 M: 2 trainers F: 1 supervisor M: 1 observer M: 1 minutes taker |
| | | Participant observation of end of the day evaluation | BHP | Trainers, supervisor, PA, observer, minutes taker, | Polres Langsa TC | |
| | | ObservationTC infrastructure | BHP, KS, ES | | | |
| | | Interview Polres | KS | Chief of police district | Polres | M: 1 |
| | | Group Interv trainers | BHP | Trainers | TC | M: 2 |
| | 25July | | | | | |
| 08.00- | | Group Interv Community | ES | Religious, adat leaders, women's representative | Polres | F: 2 M: 2 |
| | | Group Interv Trainees | BHP | Trainees | Polres | M: 6 F: 2 |
| 10.00 | | Interview Polres | KS | Chief of police district | Polres | M: 1 |
| Kualasimpang | 25July | | | | | |
| 11.00- | | Interview Polres | KS | Chief of police district | Polres | M: 1 |
| | | Group Interv Trainees | BHP | Trainees | TC | M: 4 |
| | | Interview PP | BHP | PA | TC | M: 1 |
| | | Group Interv community | ES, BHP | Religious, community, adat leaders, women's representative | TC | F: 3 M: 2 |
| | | ObservationTC infrastructure | BHP, KS, ES | | | |
| 16.30 | | Participant observation in end of training ceremony. | KS, BHP | Trainees, trainers, deputy chief of police district | TC | |
| 17.00-20.30 | | Travel: Kuala Simpang - Medan | | | | Hotel tiara |
| Medan | 26July | Travel MDN-JKT | KS, BHP | | | 2h delayed |
| | | Travel MDN-BA | ES | | | |
| Jakarta | | | | | | |
| 10.00-15.00 | 4 Aug | Interview - thematic experts | KS, BHP | Experts on Aceh socio-political condition pre & post conflict | Café | M: 2 |
| 12.30-14.30 | 5 Aug | Interview - Partnership | KS | Executive Director | Café | M: 1 |
| 15.00-17.00 | | Interview - thematic expert | KS, BHP | Experts on civil society | University campus | F: 2 |
| | 6 Aug | Interview - IOM | KS, BHP | National Program Manager | IOM JKT Office | F: 1 |
| 11.00-17.30 | 8Aug | Travel JKT-BA | KS, BHP | | | GA 146 |
| Sigli | | | | | | |
| 11.15-13.10 | 9 Aug | Group interv community | KS, BHP, ES | Head of village, KPA, ex-combatants, villagers. | Village in Pidie | F: 4 M: 8 |

| | Date 2008 | Activity | ET | Respondent | Venue/ location | Remarks Male/Female |
|------------------------------|---------------|---------------------------------|-------------|---|------------------------|---|
| | 14.10-16.20 | Group interv community | KS, BHP, ES | Local teachers, KPA, ex-combatants, head of village, tuha peut, imeum mukim, villagers. | Village in Pidie | F: 5 M: 15 |
| BandaAceh | 11 Aug | | | | | |
| | | Interview MAA | KS, BHP | Head of MAA | BandaAceh | M: 1 |
| | | Discussion PP | KS, BHP | PA | BandaAceh | |
| Sabang | 12Aug | | | | | |
| | | Interview PP | KS | PA | Sabang | |
| | | Training Observation | BHP | Trainees, trainers, supervisor | Sabang TC | M: 33 |
| | | ObservationTC infrastructure | BHP, KS | | | |
| Jantho | 13Aug | | | | | |
| | | Group interv rank-files | KS, BHP | Babinkamtibmas from different villages | Polres | M: 10 |
| SPN Seulawah | | | | | | |
| | | Class Observation | KS, BHP | 3 SPN trainers, 3 National trainers (SPN ToT by Lemdiklat, supported by IOM SINP) | SPN Seulawah | F: 1 trainer M: 3 SPN M: 2 trainers |
| | | Observation SPN Infrastructure | BHP, KS | | | |
| Banda Aceh | 14Aug | | | | | |
| | | Group interv BRR | KS, BHP | 1 BRR manager 1 contractor 1 security officer/TNI | BRR office, Banda Aceh | M: 3 |
| | | Interview IOM | KS, BHP | DDR personnel | IOM BA office | M: 1 |
| | | Discussion PP | KS, BHP | PM | IOM NAD PP | |
| | 15Aug | | | | | |
| | | Attending NAD PP weekly meeting | BHP | | PP office | |
| | | Data analysis | KS | | PP office | |
| | | Group interv teenagers & youth | KS, BHP, ES | Age between 13 and 22 years (victims of conflict) | Café | F: 7 |
| | 16Aug | Interview political party | KS, BHP, ES | Woman activist, member of local political party | Ulee Kareng | F:1 |
| Travel BA-JKT Jakarta | 17Aug | | | | | |
| | 20Aug | Interview IOM unit INP | KS, BHP | National Project Coordinator | Jakarta | F:1 |
| | 21Aug | Interview POLRI | KS, BHP | Head of Partnership Bureau | Mabes POLRI | M:1 |
| Lembang | 25Aug | | | | | |
| | | Interv Sespim IOM unit INP | KS | Senior Trainers, Consultant | Lembang Bandung | M: 3 M: 1 |
| Jakarta | 26Aug | | | | | |
| | | IOM SINP | KS | Staff | Jakarta | M:1 |
| Banda Aceh | 27Aug | | | | | |
| | | Workshop - observation | KS | SIPPOP monitoring system | Polda Banda Aceh | Chiefs of police districts, Polda managers, PP NAD PM & staff |
| | | Interview | KS | Head of local political | Banda Aceh | M:1 |

| | Date 2008 | Activity | ET | Respondent | Venue/ location | Remarks Male/Female |
|---------------|-----------|------------------------|----|--|-----------------|----------------------------|
| | | Local Political Party | | party | | |
| | 28Aug | Workshop - observation | KS | Safari Ramadhan Polda NAD-Unsyiah-IAIN Ar-Raniry | Banda Aceh | M:29 F: 1, trainer |
| | | Workshop - observation | KS | Sippop monitoring system | Polda NAD | Chiefs of police districts |
| | | Interview | KS | Chief of police districts | Polda NAD | M:5 |
| | | Interview - IOM | KS | Staff | | F: 1; M: 1 |
| | 29Aug | Discussion - PP | KS | Consultant | IOM Office | M:1 |
| | | Interview BRA | KS | Head of BRA | BRA Office | M:1 |
| Travel BA-JKT | 29Aug | | | | | GA |

| Police | CSO/community/Media/Political Party/Women's Representative | IOM PP | IOM JKT | IOM NAD | Donors | IGO | Gov |
|--------|--|--------|---------|---------|--------|-----|-----|
| 178 | 203 | 24 | 8 | 3 | 4 | 2 | 5 |

Note:

ET: Evaluation Team

KS: Karlina Supelli

BHP: B. Herry-Priyono

ES: Edi Syahputra

IO: International Organisation

Gov: Government

PP: Police Project

M: Male

F: Female