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Institut d'Etudes Politiques (IEP), Paris • International Organization for Migration (IOM)



## Towards Reconciliation

**An Evaluation of IOM's Integrated Project for the Return and Reintegration of 500 LRA Reporters Through Information, Counseling and Referral Services (ICRS)**



IOM International Organization for Migration

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Cover Photo: Amnesty Campaign sticker on the front door of a business in Gulu.

All photos were taken by Karla Berg and Frances Caller during the field trip to Uganda from April 19-April 26, 2004.

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## Acronyms

AA	Amnesty Act
AC	Amnesty Commission
CBO	Community Based Organization
DANIDA	Danish International Development Agency
DfID	Department for International Development
DRT	Demobilization and Resettlement IEP Teams
EU	European Union
GMAC	Give Me a Chance
GUSCO	Gulu Support the Children Organization
GoK	Government of Kenya
GoS	Government of Sudan
GoU	Government of Uganda
HDI	Human Development Indicator
ICRS	Information Counseling and Referral Services
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IEP	Institut d'Etudes Politiques, Paris
IGA	Income Generation Activity
IOM	International Organization for Migration
KICWA	Kitgum Concerned Women's Association
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
MDRP	Multi-Country Millennium Demobilization and Reintegration Program
NGO	Non Governmental Organization
PR	Public Relations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNRF II	Ugandan National Rescue Front II
UPDF	United Peoples' Defense Forces
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WFP	World Food Programme
WV	World Vision

## Political Map of Uganda

# UGANDA



Political Map of Uganda in *Protracted conflict, elusive peace: initiatives to end the violence in Northern Uganda*, ACCORD Issue 11, March 2002.

# Executive Summary

This report, the product of a four-month study by students at the *Institut d'Etudes Politiques* (IEP) in Paris, is an evaluation of the International Organization for Migration's (IOM) '*Integrated Project for the Return and Reintegration of 500 LRA reporters through Information, Counseling and Referral Services (ICRS) – Implementation of the Amnesty Act 2000*'. This IOM project began in June 2002 and was initially expected to end in December 2003 but it was extended until September 2004. Much of the reintegration elements of the project have been carried out in Uganda, whilst repatriation and reception activities took place in both Sudan and Kenya with staff training also occurring in Nairobi.

The key IOM objective was to contribute to the efforts being undertaken by the Government of Uganda (GoU), the Amnesty Commission (AC)/district Demobilization and Resettlement Teams (DRT), local communities and international organizations, and to consolidate peace, confidence building, stability and reconstruction in Northern Uganda, mainly through the following activities:

- Rehabilitating, reintegrating and resettling 500 reporters and children in Northern Uganda, specifically in the districts of Gulu, Kitgum and Pader
- Enhancing the technical capacity of the AC to implement the provisions of the Amnesty Act 2000 for the reintegration of reporters into normal civilian life in Uganda

IOM invited the IEP Team to evaluate and make recommendations regarding both the project as stated in the initial project proposal and the subsequent changes that occurred up to December 2003. The initial analysis of the IEP team focused on three levels of analysis: project design, relevance of changes and implementation. These criteria were developed after a close examination of guidelines that are an integral part of IOM evaluations. Subsequent to the field research, which took place between April 19 and April 26, 2004, the IEP Team expanded the analysis to six major domains: (1) project coherence, (2) project management and coordination, (3) advocacy mechanisms and information diffusion, (4) return and reintegration and (5) capacity building and (6) impact and sustainability. This evolution was a result of extensive documentation review and field research which threw light on certain aspects of the project that were relevant and needed to be highlighted in the final evaluation.

The IEP Team found that the IOM program has had a positive impact on its beneficiaries, and has achieved most of the intended objectives. However, it would be productive for the project and future projects to address some gaps identified. The following boxes show some strengths and weaknesses of the project, which are important in identifying lessons learned:

## Strengths

- IOM has shown excellent flexibility during project implementation.
- Information dissemination played a key role in the choice made by rebels to report.
- The overall objective of enhancing the technical capacity of the AC, in particular through the development of an extensive and harmonized database on reporters, has been successfully achieved.
- The precedent set by this project is important in raising the hope and self-confidence of reporters and communities alike in the peace process.
- Major successes can be attributed to effective coordination of stakeholder communication.

## Weaknesses

- The project design lacks strong definition of the role of the AC.
- The ongoing conflict and the consequent insecurity prevailing in Acholiland present a serious challenge to successful return and reintegration.
- Accessibility has proved to be a major obstacle in building the capacity of local support networks.
- Some aspects of the resettlement component of the project were underestimated, namely the content of the resettlement kits and medical aid to the reporters.

### **Lessons learned**

- The success of reporter reintegration varies greatly according to reporter profiles and the receiving communities' characteristics.
- Capacity building of local institutions, especially the AC and local NGOs, is key to ensuring the continuity of the activities post project life.
- Continuous communication throughout the life of the project is a crucial coordination mechanism.
- Flexibility and connectedness are crucial in such projects because of the diverse needs of reporters and the fluctuating political context.
- Community sensitization is a major factor to successful reintegration of reporters.

The implementation of this project proved tremendously challenging due to the deteriorating security conditions in Northern Uganda. The prevalent insecurity jeopardized some of the project's important aspects, most notably reintegration. Despite these odds, IOM successfully implemented the project. Moreover, the project could be considered as a pilot project since it is the first project to involve both the AC and the repatriation of reporters. In such a scenario, the evaluation of this project will serve as an important guide to help IOM identify areas for improvement in projects that repatriate, rehabilitate and reintegrate reporters in conflict situations. The IEP team hopes that the lessons learned and recommendations provided will be useful in improving the impact of efforts towards peace in Uganda through assistance brought to both reporters and their communities.

**Based upon the findings of this study, key recommendations have been made. Whilst some are clearly specific to the project in question, others are more general and may be applied to other, similar projects.**

→ Improve communication and participation

- **Monthly meetings** to improve inter-agency and stakeholder communication and coordination.
- **Efficient system of classification and report filing** for information access and sharing.

→ Clarify AC role and develop capacity building

- **Define long-term reintegration and monitoring support** in consultation with the AC, donors and implementing partners to ensure common understanding of roles and expectations.
- **Reinforce technical capacity** of the AC by encouraging the Government of Uganda to ensure that trained staff remains within the AC, especially the IT, Communication and PR officers who were employed through this project.
- **Strengthen infrastructural capacity of the DRT Mbale office** through the financing/provision of a vehicle to enhance their monitoring activities.

→ Enhance the capacity of local NGOs

- Impetus towards **capacity building of local NGOs** with longer term infrastructural support in project implementation.
- **GUSCO** could be assisted in dealing with high risk categories.

→ Devote more attention to effective reintegration

- **Distinguish between different categories of reporters** and the resulting differing needs.
- **More individual in-depth counselling** prior to departure of reporters.
- **Conduct large-scale community sensitization** prior to reporters' return where feasible.
- **Find new ways to trace families** and reunite reporters with their relatives such as linkages with other databases detailing relative's whereabouts, e.g. UNICEF database
- **Give more attention to variations between the contents of NGO resettlement packages** before reporters are received through greater cooperation between implementing partners.
- **Pay more attention to income-generating activities** by providing options more relevant to reporters' needs.

→ Reinforce the publicity of the AA vis-à-vis reintegration

- **Continued publicity of successful reintegration** through subsequent information campaigns and cleansing ceremonies targeting as wide an audience as possible.
- **Long-term information campaigns** to contribute to deeper community sensitization.

# 1. Background

## Uganda at a glance

Uganda, known as the “pearl of Africa,” achieved independence from the United Kingdom in 1962. Boasting the source to the Nile River and bordering on Lake Victoria, Uganda is rich in fertile soil and natural beauty. It is also, however, one of the poorest countries in the world with a HDI rate of 0.489, thus ranking 148 out of 175 countries.<sup>1</sup> Per capita income in 2003 was estimated to be at about \$259. Life expectancy at birth dropped from 47 years in 1990 to only 43 years in 2001. The percentage of the population with improved access to water remains relatively low with 52 percent in 2000 (45 percent in 1990). Nevertheless, over the last couple of years Uganda has made substantial progress in terms of development: infant mortality dropped from 100 per 1,000 in 1990 to 79 per 1,000 in 2001, total adult literacy rose from 56 percent in 1990 to 67 percent in 2001, total youth literacy increased from 70 percent in 1990 to 79 percent in 2001 and GDP per capita grew an average of 3.6 percent since 1995<sup>2</sup>. Unfortunately, these positive changes are not representative of a blanket improvement in development throughout the country. The continuation of a long-standing rebellion in Northern Uganda has indeed worsened the lives of most Northern Ugandans and exacerbated the geographical development divide.

### Rebellion in Northern Uganda

For the past 18 years the Acholi people of Northern Uganda, namely Gulu, Kitgum and Pader districts, have been the victims of a brutal, unrelenting rebel insurgency. Innocent civilians have been killed or mutilated and thousands of children have been abducted, forced into combat and subjected to torture and sexual violence. It is now estimated that about 80 percent of the entire Acholi population are internally displaced, living in camps with little food and poor sanitation.<sup>3</sup>

Since 1986, Joseph Kony's rebel Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) has carried out attacks across the north, ostensibly in an attempt to overthrow the government of President Yoweri Museveni. A large portion of this army consists of children who were abducted from the Northern area and forced to fight against their own tribes, families and friends.

Whereas other districts of Uganda are peaceful and on the way to development, these northern areas are dramatically affected by the conflict that continues to present a serious barrier to any stabilization of the region. Years of civil war constitute a considerable drain on national resources and have resulted in a highly insecure and divided society, widespread population displacement and the complete collapse of the economy and infrastructure in the affected northern districts.

Before the year 2000 the response from the Ugandan capital of Kampala had been military intervention. The crisis was perceived in the capital as a local disorder that did not require major national attention. However, under growing national pressure, in particular from the Acholi people themselves, and international pressure Kampala has become increasingly willing to address the issue, as demonstrated by the signing of the Amnesty Act in 2000.

Whilst the LRA remain a key target group under the Amnesty Act, the original aim was to impact upon a wider range of rebel groups, both small and large, that had been operating in various frontier districts. Notable successes as a result of the Amnesty Act have been the surrenders of the relatively large UNRF II, and of the NUFM/A and WNBF groups, demonstrating the extent to which the Amnesty Act has had a national impact.

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<sup>1</sup> Human Development Report 2003, UNDP.

<sup>2</sup> World Bank: Uganda Country Brief, August 2003

<sup>3</sup> [www.irinnews.org](http://www.irinnews.org)

## **The Amnesty Act**

On December 8, 1999, the Governments of Uganda (GoU) and Sudan (GoS) signed a peace agreement to stop supporting foreign rebel factions residing in their respective countries and conducting incursions across the shared border. In Uganda the agreement was soon followed by a Declaration of Amnesty aimed at ending almost two decades of armed confrontation and establishing peace, security and economic growth throughout the affected regions. This declaration led to the creation of an Amnesty Commission (AC), consisting of a central body based in the capital as well as decentralized offices and Commissioners, to ensure the implementation of the Act and charged with overseeing the decommissioning, demobilization, resettlement and reintegration of former combatants (referred to as reporters). The AC is supported by Demobilization and Resettlement Teams (DRT) that operate at the district level.

## **The IOM Project**

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### **IOM**

It is in order to respond to the specific situation in Northern Uganda, and to assist the AC in its work that IOM decided to act through the '*Integrated Project for the Return and Reintegration of 500 LRA Reporters through Information, Counseling and Referral Services (ICRS) - Implementation of the Amnesty Act 2000.*'

IOM was created in 1951 to assist states in addressing the migration challenges of the time. Post-conflict assistance through implementation of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programs has become a growing field in recent years. Concerning demobilization of former combatants and reintegration, IOM has acquired extensive experience since 1992 through participation in a number of projects in the context of the management of post-conflict situations. Specific IOM activities include registration, documentation and processing; pre-reintegration health screening; transportation and return to home villages; training skills for alternate forms of livelihood; provision of basic tools and implements needed to start livelihood; counseling, information and referral service and the provision of a reintegration fund in specific settings in order to facilitate a quick and flexible community micro-project funding mechanism.<sup>4</sup>

### **The project strategy and its components**

This ICRS project in Northern Uganda, funded principally by USAID, presents a condensed version of IOM's strategy for socio-economic reintegration of persons in need of new forms of livelihood.

The key objective of this project was to contribute to the efforts being undertaken by the GoU, the AC/DRT, local communities and international organizations, and to consolidate peace and confidence building, stability and reconstruction in Northern Uganda by:

- Rehabilitating, reintegrating and resettling 500 reporters and children in Northern Uganda, specifically in the districts of Gulu, Kitgum and Pader.
- Enhancing the technical capacity of the AC to implement the provisions of the Amnesty Act 2000 for the reintegration of reporters into normal civilian life in Uganda.

It was hoped that the successful reintegration of 500 reporters within their communities through the collaborative assistance of the AC, local and international partners would contribute to further the momentum and dialogue for sustained peace in the region, and the project reflects this through its numerous partnerships, not only with implementing NGOs, but also through the close cooperation with traditional social networks in the area. As such, the following partners were involved in the implementation of the project: IOM: field, Kampala, Nairobi, and Geneva; World Vision Uganda (WV); Give Me a Chance (GMAC); DRTs; Gulu Support the Children Organization (GUSCO); the International Rescue Committee; KICWA; and traditional leaders.

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<sup>4</sup> [www.iom.int](http://www.iom.int)

The project was initially conceived as a 12 month project. Changes were however subsequently made and the project was extended to September, 2004. Subsequent to the decisions made during the IEP Team's meeting on March 17, 2004 with Christophe Franzetti, IOM Evaluation Officer, Office of the Inspector General; and Damien Thuriaux, Program Officer, Labor Migration Service Area who was also the original Project Development Officer/Project Coordinator, this evaluation will consider the original project and the various changes up to December 2003.<sup>5</sup>

## Expected results

The intended results for the original 12 month period, with an estimated budget of 425,819 USD (refer to Appendix 2) were:

- 300 LRA reporters living in Southern Sudan returned, issued with Amnesty Certificates and reintegrated into civilian communities in Uganda.
- 200 Acholi reporters including women and former child soldiers living in irregular situations in Kenya returned, issued with Amnesty Certificates and reintegrated into civilian communities in Uganda.
- Enhanced technical capacity of the AC in order to implement the provisions of the Amnesty Act 2000 and to screen, counsel and re-integrate 500 reporters into their communities.
- Capacities of relevant government institutions, local communities, civil society organizations and local NGOs in post-conflict situations strengthened and built in order to develop appropriate strategies for current and future reintegration of reporters.
- Scope for conflict mitigated and basis for conciliatory dialogue supported, thus enhancing USAID's Intermediary Result 9.2 "conflict mitigated and reduced", contributing to USAID Strategic Objective 9: "More effective and participatory governance."

## Subsequent changes to the project

The project was revised during implementation to allow all reporters of concern to the AC to be included, not only those from the LRA. It was also widened in its geographical scope following the worsening of the conflict.

Three major changes are integral to the prolongation of the project:

1. Operation Iron Fist, a prolonged GoU military offensive in the region in June 2002, meant that fewer rebels were able to access the Juba reporting center in South Sudan, resulting in fewer reporters than originally anticipated. As a result, the implementing partner World Vision concentrated on reporters within Northern Uganda, rather than repatriated reporters. In order to qualify for support, these reporters had to have been in Sudan previously, or have been abducted for at least four months.
2. The reduced numbers of reporters arriving from Sudan allowed for a budgetary re-allocation which resulted in an Information Dissemination Campaign.
3. In Kenya, processing of reporters was delayed until January 2003 due to the Kenyan Presidential elections.<sup>6</sup>

A fourth adaptation made later was the inclusion of Mbale as an area for reintegration following requests from reporters to return to areas outside Acholiland. As a result, a new implementing partner had to be found as World Vision was not working in the area. Give Me a Chance (GMAC) was selected.

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<sup>5</sup> The meeting was held at the IOM Paris office.

<sup>6</sup> This explanation was given by IOM during the IEP Team's meeting with them on March 17, 2004 at IOM Paris.

## **2. IEP Team Methodology**

The IEP Team, using skills refined during the IEP development workshop, spent time devising extensive indicators that could be used as a basis for both quantitative and qualitative research, as well as providing key support for later analysis. These indicators were elaborated to provide a compilation of both detailed and overarching areas of research, which proved to be a very useful tool during the field trip (see appendix 5).

The majority of the research was done through two main activities: documentation review and field research. The documentation review proved to be the major method for determining quantitative data, whilst qualitative data was mainly gathered during the field trip. The research methodology originally focused on three main themes: project design, implementation and relevance. After the field trip, for analysis purposes, these themes were expanded and redefined as: project coherence, management and coordination, advocacy mechanisms and information diffusion, return and reintegration, capacity building and impact and sustainability.

### **Documentation Review**

Whilst the majority of information was collected during the field trip, the IEP Team also carried out detailed documentation reviews prior to visiting Uganda, which concentrated on local and international news reports, studies conducted on the LRA conflict and the Amnesty Act, previous reintegration projects in post-conflict situations and previous IOM projects, as well as various other documents widely available over the internet, in books, in newspapers and in journals. This review enabled the IEP Team to gain insights into the conflict itself and the nature of the challenge met by IOM prior to the Uganda visit.

Following the field trip, during which three members of the IEP Team traveled to Uganda and were able to collect further documentation from IOM, its implementing partners and the AC, the documentation review continued on a more project-specific basis, as the IEP Team reviewed monthly reports from implementing partners, quarterly reports from the IOM project officer, reports detailing the information campaign and activities of the AC, and other documents such as examples of screening questionnaires from the AC, IOM in Nairobi, and the implementing partners. This was crucial for quantitative data since much of the information indicating the material impact of the project, in terms of capacity building, repatriation and reintegration, was within this documentation. Analysis of these documents allowed the IEP Team to accumulate quantitative data such as numbers of reporters repatriated, screened and entered into the AC Database, as well as the levels of participation in training programs and family reunification.

### **Field Research**

Contact with IOM in Kampala was key with regard to the organization of the field trip. Not only did the office provide logistical support, but they were also able to ensure that the vast majority of people that the IEP Team had requested to meet with were scheduled for meetings, despite the limited time span of the field trip. Both in-depth interviews and focus groups were conducted in an effort to collect data for later analysis. The, in-depth interviews were held with IOM Kampala, the GoU, donors, implementing partners (GMAC, GUSCO, WV), AC and district DRTs and beneficiaries from both the Mbale and the Gulu caseloads. Focus groups were also held with beneficiaries from both sites, including one focus group consisting purely of child-mothers in Gulu. In addition, the IEP Team was able to conduct two focus groups with family and community members in a reporter host-community in Mbale District.

Whilst the field trip was in preparation, the IEP Team also began contacting key stakeholders outside Uganda for interviews, namely IOM Kenya and IOM Sudan, UNICEF Sudan, and DfID Sudan, as well as the Ugandan High Commissioners in both Kenya and Sudan. This was in an effort to gain input from those crucial partners that the IEP Team would not be able to meet personally during the field visit. IOM Kenya in particular was able to provide important details with respect to information diffusion regarding both the Amnesty Act and the IOM project and the screening processes that took place in Nairobi. Meetings held with IOM Officers from Geneva

prior to departure provided the IEP Team with vital insights into both the functioning of IOM as an institution and the project under evaluation. The team was also able to conduct an informational interview with the Director of the *Centre Français d'Etudes Ethiopiennes*, a researcher and renowned author on Ugandan conflicts.

## **Focus groups and beneficiary interviews**

Interviews with beneficiaries in both Gulu and Mbale allowed the IEP Team to consider the project from the perspective of the reporters. They were able to narrate their experiences as well as provide insights into the greater conflict and reconciliation context in which the project is managed. The focus groups, which were semi-structured and based around themes that the IEP Team had previously identified, also allowed for some verification and a general assessment of information provided during more detailed interviews with reporters.

IOM had previously contacted specific reporters in Mbale requesting that they attend the meeting. However, word of mouth meant that several reporters, not only those who had been invited, turned up. As a result, the IEP Team interviewed an initial group of reporters, and then conducted a focus group with a number of reporters who had come in order to participate, despite not being included among those that had been requested to attend.

The community focus groups in Mbale allowed the IEP Team to assess the impact of the project on the wider community, and the extent to which reintegration and community sensitization had taken place. Reporters in Gulu were chosen on a 'first come, first serve' basis within the Receiving Centers. All those that participated in focus groups and interviews had volunteered following a general on-the-spot request upon the IEP Team's arrival at the Centers.

During interviews and focus groups in Mbale, the reporter leaders acted as interpreters for those who did not speak English. In Gulu, staff members of the implementing partners acted as interpreters.

## **Implementing partner, donor and other stakeholder interviews**

The IEP Team also met with each of the implementing partners in an effort to gain insights into the practicalities of the project implementation once reporters had been repatriated. Whilst these interviews provided details of the coordination mechanisms and management of the project, they also offered useful opportunities to discuss the general impact of the program and its importance in the context of ongoing conflict.

Input from the GoU was provided through an interview with the Permanent Secretary for the Ministry of Internal Affairs who was able to provide information not only regarding the conflict but also the position of the GoU with regard to efforts for peace and reconciliation.

The AC and its local representatives, the DRTs, were also interviewed, allowing the IEP Team to ascertain the extent to which capacity building had taken place, as well as to gauge the level of interaction between IOM, implementing partners and the AC both nationally and locally.

In Gulu, the IEP Team was able to discuss with traditional leaders as well as members of the Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative, each of whom offered crucial insights into the conflict itself and the value of the project in terms of its local impact.

Interviews with donors, mainly USAID but also the EU, also provided information regarding the greater context behind the logic of the project, whilst giving details of reporting mechanisms used by IOM, budget management and the extent to which donors felt that the project had been effective.

The IOM Kampala Chief of Mission, Project Officer, Financial Officer and former Project Development Officer/Project Coordinator provided not only an interview, but were constantly available for discussion and clarification, both in Kampala and in the field, allowing for ongoing verification during and after the field trip.

### 3. Evaluation of Project

The IEP Team chose to organize its evaluation of the project around six themes mentioned before, namely (1) coherence, (2) management and coordination, (3) advocacy mechanisms and information diffusion, (4) return and reintegration, (5) capacity building and (6) impact and sustainability. The IEP Team's evaluation focuses on these themes, as in the light of the information gathered, they allowed for an accurate overview of the strengths and weaknesses of the project.

- The **coherence of the project**, as it refers both to the original project and its evolution, is a key element given the changes and constraints faced in the project implementation. This section provides an opportunity to assess the relevance and effectiveness of the changes.
- Due to the number and variety of partners involved in the project, it is necessary to assess the degree of **coordination** and the quality of the **management** by IOM.
- The IEP team also chose to concentrate on **advocacy mechanisms and information diffusion** because the advocacy and information component of the project was often quoted both by IOM's partners and the beneficiaries during the field work.
- The **return and reintegration** element of the project, as well as that of **capacity building**, had to be analyzed in terms of effectiveness since both these elements represent the continuing goals of IOM's project.
- Lastly, the evaluation would not be complete without mentioning the **impact and sustainability** of the project. Both IOM and the IEP team acknowledge, however, that due to limited time and resources such an evaluation will be limited in depth and scope.

## Coherence: project evolution, fluidity and flexibility

Strengths	Weaknesses
<p><i>Project design</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>▪ Relevant choice of LRA as target group</li><li>▪ Insecurity and poverty addressed in design</li><li>▪ Participatory approach with regard to implementing partners and local social structures</li></ul> <p><i>Project Evolution</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>▪ Excellent flexibility displayed to overcome unforeseen obstacles</li><li>▪ Original project aims still valid despite the changes as the project is helping build support networks and community awareness, which is a step towards creating a mental barrier against the LRA</li></ul>	<p><i>Project design</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>▪ Long-term political support not established</li><li>▪ AC's role not clearly defined</li><li>▪ Reporter feedback incorporated after project design</li><li>▪ Heterogeneous categories and needs of reporters not identified</li></ul> <p><i>Project Evolution</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>▪ Lack of consultation and information by GMAC vis-à-vis reporters</li></ul>

The ongoing validity of the IOM project would appear to confirm the validity of the initial project design. Three main issues were addressed in the design of the original project, namely insecurity, poverty and the specificities of the LRA conflict. Whilst these elements have remained particularly challenging in a context that meets both conflict and post-conflict criteria, the IOM project has been able to show an extraordinary ability to adapt in order to meet and overcome multiple and generally unpredictable obstacles.

Whilst numerous rebel groups were targeted under the Amnesty Act, the IOM project initially aimed to cater purely for LRA reporters. Such a choice was relatively ambitious, given the size and nature of the LRA. However, with this in mind, the success of the project could set an important precedent for the Amnesty process contributing to the continued stabilization of the cross border relationship with Sudan and Kenya and increasing the credibility of the AC, whilst demonstrating the Government's ongoing commitment to peace in Acholiland.

However, shortly after the beginning of project implementation, the situation in Northern Uganda deteriorated drastically. The GoU's military intervention, Operation Iron Fist, created major hurdles and was an important impediment in project implementation. The operation made safe access to Pader and Kitgum, districts which had been identified in the project as key areas for return and resettlement, impossible. Following Operation Iron Fist intervention, ongoing instability and insecurity meant that implementation became especially difficult.

The IEP Team recognizes the unpredictability of such situations, and the challenges posed; at the time of project design there appears to have been a strong consensus among aid workers in Uganda that the situation was stable and distinctly 'post-conflict' and the GoU did in no way indicate that a military intervention was to take place. As such, the **project design was ambitious but in no way unreasonable**. Nevertheless, given the close working relationship between IOM and the AC, it could have been fruitful to attempt to ascertain a stronger level of political support for the project prior to implementation.

Legitimate long-term political support is key to successful implementation, along with a clear definition of the AC's role.

The project's efforts at capacity building have been highly successful; however, **uncertainty remains regarding the long-term role of the Amnesty Commission**. Government support for the Amnesty Commission appears to fluctuate, as demonstrated by successive but temporary and increasingly weak Amnesty laws. As a result, the Amnesty Commission was strongly in need of the capacity building support that the IOM project offered. However, the initial quandary remains: The Amnesty Commission as an institution is

relatively weak, yet without a definite long-term role donors are reluctant to fund further capacity building measures.

The project also aimed to **overcome the challenges posed by poor socio-economic conditions**, raising the issue of reintegration into poverty. The IOM project recognizes that in such circumstances a balance must be struck between assistance to reporters and assistance to the receiving community so that reporters are neither "rewarded" nor seen as a burden to their communities. For successful reintegration in such conditions it is crucial to make reporters aware of the environment into which they are reintegrating, such as the reality that jobs are scarce and insufficient education makes any professional training difficult. The initial project design did indeed aim to ensure that the benefits of the project were felt by the receiving communities as well as the individual reporters and the proposals for reporter training, such as bicycle repair, were originally based on an analysis of what would prove useful to reporters once reintegrated into their communities<sup>7</sup>.

However, **the project was weaker with regard to identifying different categories of reporters and hence different needs**. Already distinct in their capacity as ex-LRA rebels, a further distinction can be made within the group: the LRA consists of both volunteers and abductees. As a result, the IOM project aimed to reintegrate both reporters who had been abducted as children and reporters who originally volunteered to join the LRA. The profiles of these groups were very different and whilst the original project design aimed at targeting reporters from outside Uganda, who were presumed to have been with the LRA for a relatively long period of time, the distinction between volunteers and abductees was not sufficiently made. In particular, those reporters who were identified in Nairobi – many of whom had originally volunteered for the LRA - were distinct because of the length of time they had passed abroad, the urban lifestyles they had adopted whilst in Nairobi and their ages.

Such differences are crucial when identifying needs; as such, more attention could have been given to differences of age, gender, experiences in the bush, time spent abroad, and vulnerabilities such as serious illness, handicaps and dependents.

Differentiating categories of reporters is crucial in the identification of their needs and expectations.

The lack of differentiation is possibly due to the fact that **reporter feedback came after the project design**: instead, standards from previous projects were used to estimate needs and ways for responding to them (types of training to offer, counseling, re-education into civil life, use of camps, etc.).


This resulted in some shortfalls, such as a perceived lack of assurances on the part of the reporters when undergoing the screening process. As a result, some refused to provide details about their activities whilst with the LRA for fear of reprisals from the GoU or from their own communities. This reluctance appears to have led to the exclusion of several LRA reporters from the project who, as a result, failed to qualify for Amnesty.

Nevertheless, IOM did rely on a participatory approach with regard to implementing partners and local social structures. A particularly good example of this is the involvement of traditional leaders and the conducting of traditional cleansing ceremonies in Acholiand. These ceremonies are built on existing traditional beliefs and structures, and are important both for the reporters and the communities as they provide for a unified activity whereby the de-humanization process employed by the LRA is seen to be countered, and where the communities accept the reporters as victims rather than criminals.

Yet despite the difficulties and serious obstacles, the **original project has remained valid**: firstly because even in insecurity and without long-term support, **repatriation and counseling are not activities which must wait until peace comes to the region**. But even more significantly, the project is creating a support network and a communal awareness which increasingly

The project's core strength was its ability to adapt in an unstable context.

<sup>7</sup> NB. The original project was only for Gulu area, where WV helped design and identify bicycle repair, which seems to be useful. Problems with levels of education occurred subsequent to project changes in Mbale.



constitutes a mental barrier against LRA efforts to brain-wash new abductees. The project has also contributed to a grass-roots preparation of communities for a potential mass return of LRA reporters, and hence for mass reconciliation. Moreover, as the project continues, and good faith in the AC grows, this project could motivate increasingly high-ranking commanders to consider surrender. The project thus aims not only to reintegrate reporters in the given conditions but also to change and influence the environment into which they return. Thus far information dissemination has been the most effective method for change and as such should be increased.

One of the core strengths of the IOM project has proven to be its **enormous flexibility**. The project has consistently demonstrated an ability to both **identify and adapt to unforeseen contextual changes**. Whilst the overall aim has remained the same, IOM, together with its implementing partners, has been able to identify hurdles and issues that require action and adaptability and have proposed appropriate steps to integrate these elements into the project without fundamentally changing direction in terms of its aims and objectives.

This ability to change has ensured a certain fluidity and rationale to the project itself. This fluidity can be distinguished in the 'stages' of each change, the initial identification of possible paths to deal with emerging obstacles and changing needs, the approach to implementation of changes and ongoing cross-referencing with end-aims. The three major changes to the project are evidence of this flexibility.

- The first is the choice of Mbale as a second destination for reporters. This was decided in response to the emerging profiles of reporters screened in Nairobi, whereby many requested to return to Mbale District. IOM was able to rapidly identify a new implementing partner in order to enable this caseload of reporters to return to an area outside Acholiland, the destination envisaged by IOM in the original project design. This also resulted in the opening of a new AC office in Mbale, and greater local capacity for the AC, a key aim of the IOM project.
- The second is the decision to target populations within Uganda by accepting reporters that had either been to Sudan, or who had been with the LRA for over 4 months. This, in response to a lower-than-predicted rate of return from Juba, was proposed by World Vision in discussion with the Amnesty Commission, who is responsible for defining criteria for Amnesty. IOM's rapid acceptance of the proposal and subsequent budgetary changes demonstrate great flexibility both with regard to actual activities and with regard to funding and budget management. This decision meant that despite a low level of return from Juba, the project was still able to attain the original end-aim of receiving and giving Amnesty to a maximum number of reporters.
- The third major modification, connected to this change in target population, was the decision to hold an information campaign in Acholiland subsequent to general publicity organized by the AC. The information campaign became a fundamental element of the project, with an enormous impact not only on the LRA, but also on the Acholi community in terms of community sensitization, and the way the LRA reporters are perceived within the area.

The project's ability to adapt demonstrates a particular internal coherence. Furthermore, changes made to the project are backed up with detailed efforts to make each change an integral part of the project according to a long-term vision rather than as an appendix to it.

However, some shortfalls could have been avoided. Problems have been identified regarding the differentiation between the caseloads in Acholiland and in Mbale, but solutions have not always been found quickly. GMAC in particular has experienced problems with the caseload in Mbale due to, according to reporters, a general lack of consultation by the NGO with regard to the level of support provided, training courses offered and distinctions between individual needs. Despite extensive information being provided by the IOM prior to return, some reporters also cite a **lack of information upon arrival as being responsible for confusion** regarding their options and what they should expect, leading to tension between the reporter group and the NGO. Whilst the conditions of life in Mbale were made clear to returnees, both by the IOM and by the Mbale DRT during a visit to reporters in Nairobi, certain reporters still felt that upon arrival, events did not take place as they had expected. Some feel that there are many more reporters 'waiting' in Nairobi to see how successful the project is prior to reporting. The Mbale reporters feel strongly that 'all of us' should be brought home and that problems with GMAC may be acting as a disincentive for others to report.

#### **Lessons learned**

- Legitimate long-term political support is crucial to successful implementation.
- A participatory approach is essential in identifying the needs of reporters and for the efficiency of reintegration activities.
- Flexibility, ability to adapt and connectedness are vital in such projects.
- Strong definition of the AC's role is important in ascertaining the extent to which the capacity of the AC should be built.

## Management and coordination

Strengths	Weaknesses
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>▪ Maximum interaction with agencies during project design</li><li>▪ Efficient coordination by IOM with implementing partners through regular field visits</li><li>▪ Good reporting system and information sharing between partners</li><li>▪ Mbale revision example of good coordination between stakeholders</li><li>▪ Good project management further strengthened through the involvement of international resources</li><li>▪ Ability to correctly manage resources</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>▪ Line of communication not optimal for identification of tools and courses for Mbale caseload</li><li>▪ Insufficient coordination for standardization of reintegration packages</li><li>▪ Weak definition of coordinating roles between IOM and AC</li></ul>

IOM has from the very inception of the project, **maintained a participative and inclusive approach** towards the project with regard to implementing partners, donors and other interested parties such as religious and traditional leaders.

Continuous communication throughout the life of the project was a crucial coordination mechanism. In discussing the successes and challenges of the project, stakeholders have repeatedly emphasized the importance of communication. Many of the project weaknesses are the result of a communication breakdown. Contrarily, major successes can be attributed to the effective coordination of stakeholder communication.

During the initial project design, **maximum interaction with agencies** that were only peripherally involved in the project was a contributing factor to the successful elements of project coordination. Interaction with UNICEF, the EU, DANIDA and DfID during the project development assured that the project would be complementary to, rather than overlapping with other on-going projects in Acholiand. UNHCR in Kenya assisted IOM and the AC twofold by providing an estimation of the number of ex-combatants in Nairobi and posting information concerning the dates of the Amnesty screening in their camps. This ad-hoc interaction was successful and indicates that

a continued and established cooperation between IOM and UNHCR could prove mutually beneficial for both organizations.

During the implementation of the project, effective coordination by IOM was facilitated by **regular field visits** of the IOM Chief of Mission, the IOM Project Development Officer/Project Coordinator and AC Senior Communications Officer and Public Relations staff. WV, GUSCO, and GMAC staff emphasized the importance of personnel visits to the project sites.

The on-site IOM project officer in Gulu was mentioned as particularly influential not only for the smooth coordination of information-sharing and project management, but also in building a spirit of cooperation between the implementing partners. **Consistent report submission** was crucial to the project, and ensured smooth information flows between all parties. Each implementing partner and the AC were requested to submit quarterly and monthly reports to IOM who then consolidated these reports for submission to USAID. These reports provided not only written confirmation of the project progress, but also a backstopping mechanism for potential gaps, such as the smaller than expected number of cleansing ceremonies by traditional leaders as evidenced in their limited expenditures (namely due to insecurity). Additionally, the reports allowed for new information to be consistently cross-referenced to the project objectives to ensure that changes and adaptations adhered to the original aims of the project. There was one instance of a lack in timely report

submission due to a temporary staffing limitation at IOM Kampala during a transition period, where the Project Development Officer/Project Coordinator was also Acting Chief of Mission. This problem could have been both anticipated and prevented had the field project officer been trained to take over this capacity at an earlier date. As the timely submission of reports has been seen to be a crucial element in good management and cooperation, such a delay should be avoided in the future.

The regular submission of reports at all levels also helped to identify confusion over the burn-rate fund-releasing mechanism used by USAID. Having identified the concern, the confusion was quickly rectified and funds were distributed efficiently thereafter. Reports were also an opportunity for IOM to express needs for additional funding or for a better distribution of funds between the different implementing partners. Through the use of excel spreadsheets, which were submitted to USAID with each report, USAID was kept fully informed of the financial situation of the different implementing partners.



Regular field visits by IOM have ensured good working relationships with the implementing partners.

IOM has also maintained a **good relationship with the Government of Uganda, in particular with the AC**: the emphasis on a balanced relationship between IOM and the AC was fundamental for successful coordination during all phases of the project. The GoU's continuing support for the overarching aim of conflict mitigation, and a determination to encourage Ugandans to return home contributed to ongoing Government support for the project.

In coordination, as elsewhere, good definition of roles has led to strengths while **weak definition of roles has led to some uncertainties**. IOM

initially trained three AC/DRT staff in ICRS in Nairobi and transferred these responsibilities to the district DRTs afterwards. Subsequent field visits made by the AC Senior Communications Officer to the DRT offices eased the flow of information both within the AC and between the AC and partners and encouraged an effective coordination in the updating and cross-referencing of the database. Nevertheless, while IOM and the AC are to be praised for their 50%-50% balanced relationship, a more precise delineation of roles for all stakeholders, accompanied by corresponding support for their application, could help smooth project management. An example of this is the confusion regarding AC's role in counseling, reintegration and referral activities.

Effective coordination and open communication allowed for maximum flexibility, resulting in rapid identification of obstacles and success.

A key element of IOM's effective coordination and open communication between all parties is the **ability to identify new needs, adapt the project and rapidly implement the new components<sup>8</sup> in cooperation with implementing partners**. For instance, once it became apparent that fewer reporters would return from Sudan, WV was quick to put forward an alternative proposal, which IOM was equally quick to respond to. Accordingly, by coordinating with the AC, WV and GUSCO, the defined parameters for reporter inclusion in the program were re-examined and adjusted to meet the bulk of the newly identified internal demand.

In terms of the beneficiaries, the Mbale caseload also demonstrates the benefits of effective coordination and ongoing evaluation of changing needs. The shift in the resettlement of the reporters to Mbale District was the result of an expressed desire on the part of the reporters. This information surfaced during the screening process in Kenya and was quickly transmitted to IOM and the AC who addressed it and made the ensuing adjustments following consultation with and approval from USAID. The coordination of these adjustments was handled efficiently, as indicated by the consistent and timely renegotiation with the donor concerning budget adaptations. Regarding such financial resource management, **IOM proved highly successful in the management and allocation of funds** from USAID. Despite the many changes that occurred and the new

<sup>8</sup> See the part on "Coherence: project evolution, fluidity and flexibility" for more details.

activities that resulted, IOM reallocated funds as necessary for each of these new activities without exceeding the initial budget. (Refer to Appendix 2).

While there was predominantly good communication during the implementation stage there was a slight deficiency in coordination between all stakeholders during the planning phase. Examples of areas where a greater level of coordination would have been beneficial are the training aspect of the Mbale caseload and a more rapid standardization of benefits packages. Time was extremely limited and after WV identified that it would be unable to be the implementing partner in Mbale, GMAC was quickly identified and in the space of six weeks produced a project plan and arranged for the logistics of its implementation. This ability to coordinate the change on the part of IOM/AC is commendable. However, **as a result of the limited time, there was an oversight in the training section of the budget**, which resulted in a lack of funds to purchase tools for the training graduates. IOM acknowledges that a default verification method of line-item budget analysis coordinated by IOM could have anticipated and thus prevented this.

Regarding the standardization of packages, whilst reporters in the IOM project were informed that they would receive no monetary assistance upon arrival, conflicting information about parallel benefits programs of the GoU/AC overshadowed this information. As the GoU/AC is currently experiencing a backlog regarding payment to reporters, it would perhaps have been **beneficial to have coordinated an analysis and potential revision of their benefits program prior to implementation of the IOM project**. However, IOM has played a leading role in the national harmonization of Amnesty Commission packages, a direct result of the IOM project activities in Gulu. Whilst the Amnesty Commission does not always have sufficient funding to provide packages, and partner NGOs remain free to provide such packages as they see fit, the Amnesty Commission has nevertheless strongly encouraged the use of a standard package at national level.

Overall, good project management and coordination was further strengthened through the **involvement of IOM's international resources** in the project, both in Kenya and at IOM headquarters in Geneva. The IOM regional office in Kenya provided assistance in both the design and implementation of the screening process in Nairobi. It was also instrumental in training the AC/DRT staff through hands-on involvement in the screening process. IOM headquarters assisted by ensuring the quality and uniformity of all reports submitted to donors and in the provision of an information officer for one week to assist in the creation and development of more technical aspects of the information campaign.

#### **Lessons learned**

- Effective coordination and open communication allowed for maximum flexibility, resulting in rapid identification of obstacles and success.
- Continuous communication throughout the life of the project was a crucial coordination mechanism.
- Many of the project weaknesses are the result of a communication breakdown. Similarly, major successes can be attributed to effective coordination of stakeholder communication.

## Advocacy mechanisms and information diffusion

Strengths	Weaknesses
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>▪ Information campaign successful in communicating to the reporters and communities</li><li>▪ Various media used for diffusing information</li><li>▪ AC personnel brought in to conceive and implement the information campaign</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>▪ Delayed publication of AC Quarterly Newsletters and brochures</li><li>▪ Radio advocacy in Kitgum and Pader could not take place due to lack of funds and problems with receiver</li><li>▪ Community sensitization in Mbale remains low in comparison to Gulu</li><li>▪ Many reporters did not have realistic expectations of the resettlement reality</li></ul>

**Advocacy and information diffusion has played a major role** in the project on both the individual and community level. Interviews carried out by the IEP Team in which reporters cite radio programs and newspaper advertisements about the Amnesty Act clearly demonstrate the crucial role of information diffusion and advocacy.

The information campaign was successful in communicating to the above groups for at least two reasons. Firstly, personnel were brought in to take part in the **conception and implementation of the campaign**, including the employment of a Senior Communications Officer and PR Officer at the AC during IOM's project, the visit to Uganda of the Mass Communication Officer from IOM Geneva and the presence of UNVs to support and train stakeholders on information dissemination. Secondly, the **wide range of media used** contributed to a successful campaign. Media included radio dramas, jingles and talk shows, as well as 20 sensitization workshops and seminars, brochures, pamphlets, magazines and newspapers were all used to explain some element of the Amnesty process. Furthermore, the attempt to use several languages in order to achieve wider communication was particularly relevant. For example, the Amnesty Act was translated into 7 local languages and the booklet "Act of Forgiveness" was translated into Luo, having been produced in English.

Clearly some media were more effective than others as a means of communication. **Radio is known to have reached not only local communities, but also rebels in the bush.** This is verified by the fact that during the talk shows a number of calls were received from rebels indicating that rebels do indeed have radios and are able to listen, although this may be limited to the higher ranks of the LRA. The radio dramas, aired 3 times per day, 5 days per week for 3 months, were reported to be particularly useful and UPDF commended the radio station (Radio Mega, based in Gulu) for the quality of its drama. Furthermore, these programs appear to have had a particularly positive impact on Acholi children. Many child reporters were exposed to radio broadcasts and other media prior to their abduction by the LRA, meaning that they were aware of their rights regarding Amnesty, as well as the reception centers run by GUSCO and WV. This exposure has formed a crucial psychological barrier, encouraging abducted children not to simply give up, but to resist LRA efforts at brainwashing and to take full advantage of any opportunity for escape, in the knowledge that there is a functioning support network available to them upon return.

Whilst the choices of both radio and newspapers appear to have been very successful, there have nevertheless been some delays and obstacles. A key element in advocacy regarding Amnesty is **the AC Quarterly Newsletter**. Unfortunately, budgetary constraints meant that the proposed start-date of July 2003 had to be postponed until April 2004. **Brochures were similarly delayed** for funding reasons. Moreover, subsequent


The information campaign was fundamental for encouraging reporting.

to the information campaign, radio advocacy could not take place due to a lack of specific funds for this in Kitgum and Gulu and current problems with the radio transceiver. Given the importance of radio, these are problems that should be rectified as quickly as possible.

The methods used for information dissemination appear to have been carefully chosen in order to have maximum effect and, for the most part, that seems to be the case. Less relevant to beneficiaries, however, is the **internet website**. Obviously the GoU is keen to advertise Amnesty as far a field as possible, in the knowledge that some ex-rebels, particularly from older rebellions, are in a position to use the internet. However, within the scope of the IOM project's target beneficiaries, the impact appears to be negligible, partly because even during the April 2004 field visit of the IEP Team on-going service provider problems meant it was not functioning, but also very few LRA reporters and relevant community members have access to internet. The internet is, however, a relevant tool to communicate to the international community – including Acholi emigrants living abroad, some of whom are strongly involved in the peace process - and particularly potential donors. It has also been a useful tool within the Amnesty Commission, facilitating internal communication and contributing to a sense of solidarity between the various offices.

The importance of the advocacy efforts and in particular the information campaign run in Acholiland is emphasized in comparing the levels of community sensitization between Acholiland and Mbale District<sup>9</sup>. Whilst the vast majority of Acholi civilians – adults and children – are now familiar with, if not the details of the Amnesty Act, at least the role of the NGO reception centers, **Mbale reporters still cite community resentment as a problem**. In Acholiland, traditional leaders were consulted on reporters' reinsertion and a number of community sensitization workshops for community leaders have been organized together with IOM and the AC in Gulu and Kitgum. These workshops allowed themes such as child protection, preparation for community reinsertion of reporters and human rights to be discussed so that the traditional leaders were then able to play a key role themselves in passing this information on to communities. This transfer of information was mainly done through community meetings organized specifically to familiarize communities with the plight of LRA abductees and the issues surrounding return and resettlement. The fact that 283 people attended these meetings in 4 sub-counties of the Gulu municipality between 27<sup>th</sup> January and 30<sup>th</sup> January 2003<sup>10</sup> testifies to the wide-reaching impact that the sensitization strategy has had in Acholiland, supported by the extensive radio and newspaper efforts.

In Mbale, however, community sensitization remains lower due to the nature of the reporters that are returning to the area. This lack of sensitization is partly a result of time limitations imposed upon the local implementing partner, GMAC. GMAC simply did not have time to mobilize large-scale support from the community, having been identified as a partner in February 2003, with the first caseload of reporters arriving in March 2003. Reporter documentation from IOM Nairobi arrived late and funds were limited, having been transferred rapidly from the funds originally allocated to WV. Bearing in mind that many communities themselves are poor, the result was that they expected a high level of support from the project to accompany returning reporters. When it became clear that reporters were not returning with money, or with extensive resettlement kits, the reporters came to be perceived more as a burden than a blessing, engendering feelings of rejection in many reporters.<sup>11</sup> The reporters' initial return to



**Community sensitization is a key factor to successful reintegration of reporters as demonstrated by varying methods and their ensuing results.**

<sup>9</sup> So far 13 of the 18 districts in Mbale have been sensitized.

<sup>10</sup> IOM report to USAID, Oct 2002- Feb 2003.

<sup>11</sup> See section on Reintegration in this report for further details.

home communities in GMAC's 4x4 vehicles did not support the reporters' claims that they were returning home with nothing, leading to some mistrust between communities and reporters regarding exactly how much support the reporters had received, and how much they had made public.

This issue highlights the **importance not only of community sensitization, but also of the necessity for correct information diffusion with regard to expectations**. Many reporters coming from Kenya to Mbale did not have realistic expectations of the reality that awaited them upon their return but **this cannot be considered as a result of insufficient pre-departure briefing on IOM's part**.<sup>12</sup> IOM organized one week of pre-departure briefings by the DRT in Mbale through individual and group sessions explaining thoroughly the reporters' responsibilities and the reality of the poverty that they were reintegrating into. The reporters each signed a Return Declaration Form to attest to the fact that they knew there would be no monetary incentive in returning. Both the Ugandan High Commission in Kenya<sup>13</sup> and USAID<sup>14</sup> confirm that adequate pre-departure briefing was carried out. Certain reporters admit to having made false statements regarding alleged promises made to them with regard to the support they would be receiving. These statements were later retracted after discussion with IOM. 24 reporters did decide not to return after learning of the reality of return<sup>15</sup>, which demonstrates that the message was communicated effectively in the pre-departure briefing and high expectations can be put down more to reporters' efforts to gain as much as possible from the opportunities presented by the project, rather than misleading information during pre-departure briefing.

Many reporters did not have realistic expectations of the resettlement reality but this is not a result of insufficient pre-departure briefing on IOM's part.

The importance of information dissemination also points to **the importance of distinguishing between the different nature of both receiving communities and the reporters themselves**. The realities of conflict are only too familiar for the Acholi population; whereas Mbale remains distant both geographically and psychologically from the LRA conflict. As a result, the attitudes to both the conflict itself, and those that fight in it are very different. The problem is compounded by the different natures of reporters in the two areas, as Mbale has received adult reporters, most of whom had volunteered to join various rebellions<sup>16</sup>.

#### Lessons learned

- Advocacy and information diffusion has played a major role in the project.
- Community sensitisation is a key factor to successful reintegration of reporters.
- The information campaign was fundamental for encouraging reporting.

<sup>12</sup> The reporters returning to Acholiland from both Sudan and within Uganda were much more realistic than those returning from Kenya concerning their reintegration, most fearing possible re-abduction. Pre-departure briefing did not therefore present the same challenges as in Kenya.

<sup>13</sup> This information was obtained from Didas Twinomugisha, Second Secretary, Ugandan High Commission in Kenya during a telephone interview on 13<sup>th</sup> May 2004.

<sup>14</sup> This information was obtained from USAID Kampala, during the IEP Team's mission to Uganda.

<sup>15</sup> This figure was provided by Alice Kimani, IOM Nairobi by e-mail on 13<sup>th</sup> May 2004.

<sup>16</sup> This issue is treated at length in the following section

## Return and reintegration

### Strengths


- Uniform screening questionnaires and language interpreters
- Efficiency of repatriation
- Despite insecurity, consistent efforts made for family tracing and reunion

### Weaknesses

- Insecurity has affected numerous elements of the project, particularly resettlement and reintegration
- Reintegration kits not standardized
- Low medical aid to reporters during the resettlement period
- Insufficient support for activities in Mbale

The return component of the project includes the screening, registration, documentation, referral and repatriation of the reporters. Reintegration refers to the resettlement of the reporters and their economic and social reintegration into host communities.

Table 1. Return and reintegration achievements<sup>17</sup>.



**The screening process was facilitated by the use of uniform questionnaires**, designed by the AC with the help of IOM. The use of a unique questionnaire for all reporters both facilitated the development of a unified – hence easily usable- database on reporters and guaranteed reporters an equal screening. Although the questionnaires and the database are written in English, the former soldiers were offered to be screened in English, Swahili or Ugandan local languages by an interpreter, so as to make sure they were screened in a language they mastered.

**The project was particularly efficient in repatriating reporters** as it went beyond its revised objectives. Indeed, the project proposal planned for '200 Acholi reporters from Kenya repatriated' and '58 LRA reporters from Sudan repatriated'. But at the end of December 2003, 210 reporters and 83 dependents had been repatriated from Kenya; and 77 reporters and 10 dependents from Sudan. Moreover the repatriation process was carefully planned as only the reporters identified as fit enough to travel during the pre-departure medical screening were entitled to repatriation. Those who were sick were taken care of at IOM's Medical Unit until they were allowed to travel.

<sup>17</sup> Numbers provided by Stephen Edyegu and Damien Thuriaux in Quarterly Report

**Insecurity has to various extents affected numerous elements** of the project, in part the screening, registration and documentation of the reporters but also their repatriation and resettlement and most importantly their reintegration.

Ongoing insecurity in Acholiland has made the registration and documentation of the reporters in Uganda increasingly difficult. In a large portion of the Northern districts of Uganda, travel is simply not possible. As a result, AC/DRT staff cannot travel outside the main municipalities to register and document reporters. Consequently, only the reporters who come directly to the municipalities are registered and documented<sup>18</sup>. Insecurity means, however, that even reporters find it difficult to reach safe areas such as Gulu. Documentation has also suffered from a demand for re-issuing of Amnesty Certificates following rebel attacks in villages and IDP camps where certificates have been lost or burnt<sup>19</sup>.



Newcomers at the World Vision centre receive their 'welcome kits'

Admirable efforts have been made in order to try to overcome the obstacles posed by such insecurity, notably GUSCO and WV have resorted to **attempting to locate families over the local radio**<sup>20</sup>, as insecurity continues to block efforts for family reunification. Though attempts at family tracing and reunion are systematically made for each reporter by implementing partners, the achievements to date of family reunification are not meeting the project's initial expectations. For example, between June and September 2003, WV could only trace some twelve out of fifty-five families within Gulu District, and were able to visit just six<sup>21</sup>. Access around Gulu is limited to six to ten kilometers around the municipality<sup>22</sup>. Family deaths and forced population movement – often into IDP camps – has added to the difficulties.

The IEP Team was told by every reporter interviewed in Acholiland that their biggest fear was insecurity and re-abduction by the LRA. The desire to remain either within the reception centre or in Gulu Town itself, rather than return to families in villages and IDP camps, was strong or adds to the difficulties of reintegration efforts.

Insecurity has not been the only challenge to successful reintegration. Discrepancies between activities and levels of support provided between the various implementing partners became clear only once project implementation began. In particular, the use of independent criteria and/or lack of foresight for resettlement packages led to a **clear need for some harmonization and standardization of packages**. Some reporters voiced concerns regarding the contents of the resettlement packages<sup>23</sup> as within what should have been the same kits, one reporter received new clothes, whilst another received second hand ones, some reporters got two mattresses and others got four. This contradiction was not recognized until the reporters themselves called attention to the fact, at which point WV was obliged to reduce its kit to come into line with GUSCO's kits.

The ongoing conflict and the consequent insecurity prevailing in Acholiland presents one of the greatest challenges regarding the success of return and reintegration activities of the project.

<sup>18</sup> AC Kitgum Office, to AC Kampala Chairman, 1/06/02- Monthly report June 2002

<sup>19</sup> The AC-Gulu Report presented to the IOM evaluation IEP Team- 23/04/04

<sup>20</sup> 24/04/04: Sam Kilara, Michael Oruni, World Vision Gulu

<sup>21</sup> IOM report to USAID, Interim Quarterly report (1 June- 30 September 2003) to USAID, Integrated Project for the Reintegration of 258 Uganda reporters of Concern for the AC.

<sup>22</sup> Interview held on 20/04/04 with Luther Bois Anukur, Programs Director ; Grace R. Onyango, psychosocial Specialist ; Joseph Nabwii, Program Financial Analyst ; World Vision Kampala

<sup>23</sup> Focus group discussions, Mbale, 22/04/04.

More problems arose regarding the resettlement kits in Mbale as GMAC was not able to fulfill its initial undertakings. Reporters stated during interviews that they had been told they would be given sugar, soap and toilet paper once a week but instead they only received these goods once a month. Similarly, GMAC initially promised reporters 7 kilograms of maize each month but in the end they only received maize every three months. As it seems unclear why this has been the case, some confusion on the part of the reporters and the existence of tension between the reporters and GMAC is understandable.

Whilst the IEP Team recognizes that long-term and/or serious medical attention was not one of the undertakings of the project, further problems arose from a **perceived lack of medical aid** provided to the reporters during the resettlement period, particularly in Mbale. This was due to a lack of financial means of the implementing partners and in particular of GMAC. For example, one of the reporters in Mbale was only provided with aspirin when thought to be suffering from appendicitis. Such possibilities could have been foreseen by the project, particularly bearing in mind the urban lives many of the Nairobi reporters had been leading.

The **obvious differences between the reporters, as well as the different environments into which they were reintegrating, has had a major impact on the extent to which successful reintegration** was achieved. For example, the majority of Acholiland reporters was abducted as children and is still young. As such, they are more likely to be accepted by their family and community than reporters returned to Mbale, namely older reporters who volunteered to join the LRA rebellion. Expectations upon returning to civil life are also drastically different, as most Acholi reporters simply want security, whilst the all-adult reporters in Mbale have far higher expectations of support. The land issue has further complicated reintegration in Mbale, as reporters expecting to return to their own land have frequently found that their family have sold it, passed away, or moved out of the area. The fact that most reporters are usually not self-sufficient even after receiving some form of training has weakened reintegration. This has partly contributed to a noteworthy number of final rejections and expulsions, or at least feelings of uneasiness that have pushed some reporters to move out of their communities and return to Mbale Town itself where some have maintained 'Nairobi life-styles', namely sleeping rough and resorting to prostitution, provoking considerable concern amongst the local inhabitants<sup>24</sup>. Clearly this is not an issue in Acholiland, where the majority of the population is in IDP camps and reporters and locals alike are in an equally bad situation.

Some aspects of the resettlement component of the project were not given sufficient attention prior to project implementation, such as the content of the resettlement kits and the level of medical aid provided to reporters.

The comparison does however illustrate **the important role of the local community**: reintegration in Acholiland has been greatly supported by the active involvement of the Acholi traditional leaders, namely through the holding of tradition cleansing ceremonies<sup>25</sup>.


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<sup>24</sup> Focus group discussion, Mbale, 22/04/04.

<sup>25</sup> Focus group discussion, WV center in Gulu, 24/04/04.

Date of ceremony	Place of ceremony	Number of reporters participating
23/04/2003	Gulu, Gulu	100
25/04/2003	Kitgum	99
19/07/2003	Unyama, Gulu	69
27/09/2003	Koro, Gulu	62
Various	Homestead based	52
Total		382

Table 2. Major cleansing ceremonies in Acholiland<sup>1</sup>



Whilst recognizing the extent to which the project has provided overall benefits, **more support was needed with regard to the Mbale caseload.** Whilst interaction with GMAC has been good, input into the original proposal for reintegration was on the whole insufficient on IOM's part, possibly hampered by the lack of a local IOM office in Mbale. The overall result of income generation activities in Mbale has proved inadequate as they have not yet provided the reporters means of self-sufficiency. Unemployment is thus widespread and many do not yet have permanent accommodation. Whilst reporters acknowledge the skills offered as useful and pertinent in principle, it was a clear oversight on the part of both GMAC and IOM not to have included funds for tools and necessary equipment in the original project proposal for Mbale. This is now being rectified, however the delay has caused tension between GMAC and reporters, who feel that information from GMAC has been lacking. In particular, following a refusal by the local Government Community College to accept reporters with low levels of primary education, GMAC was forced to identify alternative training courses. These courses were not the professional courses that the reporters had been led to expect, causing confusion and resentment on the part of some. There is a general feeling that, had the reporters been kept informed of both the changes and the reasons behind them, there would have been greater levels of understanding and patience. GMAC was also late to identify the particular needs of certain categories of reporters, such as elderly or handicapped, and was at first unable to offer any alternative to the five practical skills-training courses. Whilst a solution was found, namely the provision of grain mills to certain communities, reporters felt that there had been a lack of consultation on the part of GMAC with both the reporters and the communities, leading to concerns as to whether the correct communities had been identified to benefit from these machines. For example, electric grain mills were initially provided to communities but some of these communities did not have access to electricity. GMAC in the end had to exchange these mills for diesel powered ones, adding to the general sense of uncertainty and delay<sup>26</sup>.

The reintegration of reporters is uneven according to both the region and reporters' profiles. In Mbale reporters remain vulnerable, whilst in Acholiland there is greater acceptance, but sustainable reintegration is threatened by ongoing insecurity.

#### Lessons learned

- Important to give sufficient attention to the content of the resettlement kits and level of medical aid provided to reporters prior to project implementation.
- The ongoing conflict and the consequent insecurity prevailing in Acholiland present one of the greatest challenges regarding return and reintegration.
- The reintegration of reporters is uneven according to both the region and reporters' profiles.

<sup>26</sup> IGA community members and reporters focus groups

## Capacity building

### Strengths

- Technical capacity building of AC in documenting and creation of database successful
- Training in Nairobi had a trickle-down effect
- AC capacity and credibility increased through information campaign
- Local capacity built within Gulu district

### Weaknesses

- Monitoring capacity of AC hampered by accessibility and infrastructural constraints
- Limited AC staff is a constraint
- Capacity of local institutions, communities outside Gulu is very weak

One of the major successes of the project has been the **enhancement of the technical capacity of the AC through the provision of important infrastructural, technical and human resources support**. This assistance has strengthened the skills and strength of the AC staff in dealing with the Amnesty Act. In particular, DRTs are now able to conduct screening, documentation, data entry, issuance of certificates and sensitization activities. To date, DRT Gulu has documented and issued certificates to 3,261 reporters.<sup>27</sup> This is a direct result of the training provided at IOM Nairobi to the DRT Gulu and Kitgum resettlement officers. The AC IT coordinator, who also undertook the training in Nairobi, has played a pivotal role in developing and updating the database on a monthly basis.

The overall objective of enhancing the technical capacity of the AC has been successfully achieved. It has obtained expertise towards fulfilling its mandate for the documentation of reporters, the creation of the database and in asserting its importance within the Amnesty process.

This is another important output as the development of this database has equipped the GoU with reliable access to previously unavailable information and created a potentially useful monitoring tool for the Amnesty Act. These developments have contributed to establishing the AC as an important actor in the repatriation and rehabilitation process.



The AC office in Mbale has played a key role in the reception and reintegration of reporters from Nairobi

Furthermore, **the training in Nairobi has created a trickle-down effect**: the DRT Gulu staff has trained two Gulu IOM staff members and one Gulu DRT staff member in ICRC mechanisms, and the AC IT Officer provided training in Mbale, Arua and Gulu in the utilization of the database. The enhanced capacity of the AC as a whole clearly demonstrates the far-reaching impact that this training has had.

Another key aspect of the capacity building was **infrastructure support**. For example, Gulu and Kitgum DRT's were provided with a computer for data entry and a Polaroid camera and films for documentation of reporters. This equipment has greatly helped in fast tracking the provision of Amnesty Certificates.

An integral part of efforts to build AC capacity in fact resulted from

<sup>27</sup> Interview with Esther Atim, Senior Resettlement Officer, DRT Gulu

one of the project changes. The information campaign in Acholiland has **contributed to heightened community awareness regarding the AC and added to the AC's capacity to conduct advocacy**. Previous advocacy efforts made by the AC had had a limited impact, as became clear from feedback provided by the Mbale caseload that had mostly traveled from Sudan. These reporters were for the most part unaware of the specificities of the Amnesty Act until their arrival in Nairobi. Unfortunately, the AC did not possess the required financial and human resources to be able to conduct advocacy on a sufficiently large scale.

Thanks to the three-month information campaign, there have been two considerable achievements in building the capacity of the AC. Firstly, the AC has been equipped with adequately skilled staff through the recruitment of a Senior Communications Officer, enabling it to conduct community awareness campaigns. The competence and capabilities of this staff have been clearly demonstrated through the success of the information campaign. In particular, the Senior Communications Officer was extensively involved in identifying gaps in the campaign and in conceiving its design and implementation. Advocacy has been understood to play an important role in the project, and in the future, the AC should have the necessary experience to conduct subsequent information campaigns. The information campaign that resulted from the IOM project therefore played a huge role, and has been strongly supported by the IOM. Not only did IOM individuals participate in the campaign itself, but an IOM Information Officer traveled from Geneva to offer expertise with regard to the planning stages of information campaigns.

Secondly, the awareness of the AA and consequently of the functions of the AC have had several positive implications for the work of the AC. Since the community members and the reporters were better informed they were able to respond constructively to the DRTs and thus indirectly to the wider project. For example, talk-shows with ex-LRA reporters (some of whom had been senior commanders) and reporters from another rebel group, the UNRF II, accentuated the credibility of the Amnesty process and the AC, targeting both the LRA rebels in the bush and the communities. This increase in credibility helped dispel reporters' fears that the AC may be used as a manipulative tool by the GoU. The information campaign also helped in building a network of partners, which the AC lacked capacity to do alone. For example, there are cases of reporters contacting traditional leaders in order to surrender, who then in turn informed the AC so as to facilitate the safe surrender of these individuals.

The participation of the AC in the information campaign contributed two-fold to capacity building: not only has it enhanced awareness regarding the AA and strengthening its credibility but it has also built the AC's advocacy capacity.

However, despite the overall success of capacity building within the AC, some limits also need to be addressed. Firstly, there are several **shortcomings in the role of the AC in the actual reintegration, counseling and referral process**. This pertains to one of the overall results expected from the project, which states, "Technical capacity of the AC to implement the provisions of Amnesty Act 2000 and to screen, counsel, refer and reintegrate 500 reporters into the communities enhanced."<sup>28</sup> The lack of this occurring perhaps reaffirms the uncertainty over the long-term role of the AC during the writing of the project proposal. The weakness of the AC in counseling stems from the fact that implementing partners such as WV have a comparative advantage in this domain due to their prolonged experience in providing psycho-social support to reporters. Although the AC was involved in reintegration activities, limited staff numbers is one of the reasons it has been unable to have a substantial role in providing assistance pertaining to long-term reintegration activities. Moreover, in both Gulu and Mbale, the NGOs rather than the DRTs have been more closely associated in the training activities. For example, IGAs in Mbale were chosen by IOM, GMAC and reporter representatives and the DRT was not included in some aspects of the project development in Mbale, such as the budget formulation, mainly due to time constraints.<sup>29</sup>

Furthermore, the **AC's monitoring capacity remains weak**. Whilst in Gulu this can be attributed to insecurity and the ensuing lack of accessibility to reintegrated reporters, in Mbale it is mainly due to

<sup>28</sup> ICRS Project proposal, p. 23, May 2002.

<sup>29</sup> Interview with DRT Mbale, April 21, 2004.

infrastructural limitations as the DRT office does not have a vehicle to monitor community projects in areas outside Mbale and is thus reliant upon GMAC for mobility.

**Regarding the capacity building of local actors, activities were concentrated only in Gulu due to lack of access.** There are various positive aspects: WV got important infrastructural assistance through the funding of the adult centre in Gulu and the project provided for training of community caregivers, which was a very important step in strengthening the capacity of local communities. Around 42 caregivers and 4 CBOs were trained, all belonging to various parts of Gulu district,<sup>30</sup> and the Children as Peace Builders club in Gulu was provided with 8 calabashes,<sup>31</sup> which they use to sensitize their community on peace. WV was also able to conduct community sensitization seminars to help the communities cope and handle reporters, such as the seminar that was held in Bungatira sub county attended by 27 community members.

Capacity of local NGOs and training of volunteer community caregivers occurred only in Gulu.

There have been no activities in Kitgum and Pader due to the lack of accessibility.

Not only has access been an important hurdle faced by WV and GUSCO in training for caregivers in Pader and Kitgum districts, but even recruitment in these areas is problematic. Inaccessibility has considerably undermined the impact that these activities could have had outside the Gulu municipality and consequently has not resulted in greatly strengthened capacity of local communities. Even within Gulu district, the actual impact of the training of volunteer community caregivers is unclear due to the prevailing security conditions. However, it is clear that building the capacity of local NGOs has fulfilled the objective of developing "appropriate strategies for current and future reintegration of the reporters"<sup>32</sup> as stated in the project proposal. For example, the adult center will have a long term impact on the peace process in Acholi land.

#### **Lessons learned**

- The project has been instrumental in building technical capacity of the AC in order to fulfill its mandate and in asserting its importance within the Amnesty process.
- Enhancing the capacity of local actors, especially local NGOs, is crucial for building their long term ability in dealing with the reporters.

<sup>30</sup> World Vision Gulu list of caregivers trained.

<sup>31</sup> IOM quarterly report, June- September.

<sup>32</sup> Page 23 of project proposal.

## Impact and Sustainability

### Strengths

- Project has raised hopes and self-confidence of reporters and their communities
- Project has demonstrated that local reconciliation is possible, which has boosted credibility of the Amnesty process

### Weaknesses

#### Impact

- Overall impact is dependent on external factors like political stability, GoU politics and level of insecurity

*The long term sustainability is less assured*

- Sustainability of capacity building doubtful
- End of the IOM project may lead to a sharp decrease of financial assistance that will result in a decrease in activities
- Reporters are not yet self-sufficient
- AC monitoring capacity still weak

Unfortunately, limited time, budget and access to beneficiaries have prevented the IEP Team from conducting any detailed analysis of impact and sustainability. The purpose of this section is therefore to highlight main areas of concern regarding the overall impact and the ability for the project to continue **in the future**.

In order for this project to be judged worthwhile, both financially and time-wise, some demonstration of long-term impact is important. The long-term impact is unfortunately **highly dependent on external factors, namely political stability, GoU policies and levels of insecurity** that might prevent the achievement of long term objectives. Nevertheless, the IEP Team is persuaded that the IOM project has successfully impacted the greater conflict situation in so far as it **has raised hope and self-confidence of both reporters and communities**, contributing to efforts to prepare for peace in the future. It has demonstrated that local reconciliation is possible and this has been **key in boosting credibility in the wider Amnesty process**, as well as supporting ongoing local and national efforts for peaceful reconciliation in Acholiland.

**Successful reintegration has a positive impact both on reporters and communities.** It works both as an incentive for escapees considering surrender and as a psychological support for future abductees. The same mechanism is impacting communities, where successful reintegration leads to acceptance of further reintegration, whereas failures might strongly affect confidence regarding reconciliation. In the long-term, the potential impact is enormous – not only does it minimize the number of vulnerable individuals that the LRA is able to brainwash, thus increasing the chances of large-scale desertion from the rebellion, but it also lays the foundations for a potential national reconciliation in a truly post-conflict environment.

Children in WV rehabilitation center in Gulu.



Whilst the project appears to have had a relatively large impact, **long-term sustainability is less assured**. Capacity building has for the most part taken place successfully and has played a major role in the successful implementation of the project. However, the extent to which this will be self-sustainable is doubtful. Whilst material facilities and credibility remain, the end of the IOM project, if not replaced by other support, be it donor or Government-led, will lead to a sharp decrease of financial assistance that will inevitably result in a decrease in activities. Furthermore, the future of the AC in particular remains highly dependent on a continued renewal of the Amnesty Act. Yet the AC is one institution which, with the necessary capacity, could assure longer-term monitoring and support with regard to reintegration, which has so far been particularly weak. Efforts are clearly hampered by insecurity in the North, whilst Mbale has experienced problems of a more socio-

economic nature. Reporters are not yet self-sufficient and it is not clear how likely this is to change in the near future.

Thus the real sustainability of the project appears to lie in the existence of new projects in the same field. If it is still early to make any assessment regarding further projects, IOM has at least identified important issues for any future efforts in the area of demobilization and reintegration, and the AC and IOM have jointly developed a proposal for larger scale information outreach campaign.

#### **Lessons learned**

- The real sustainability of the project appears to lie in the encouragement of new projects in the same field.
- Successful reintegration has a positive impact both on reporters and communities. It works both as an incentive for escapees considering surrender and as a psychological support for future abductees.
- The project has raised hope and self-confidence of both reporters and communities, contributing to efforts to prepare for a possible future peace.

## 4. Recommendations

### Improve communication and participation

Inter-agency and stakeholder communication and **coordination could be improved through scheduled monthly meetings**. Recognizing the important role that effective communication played in the identification of the need for project revisions (for the reintegration location of the Kenya caseload and for the parameters of inclusion for the reporters already in Uganda), monthly meetings could help increase this positive aspect of coordination. It would be beneficial to implement these meetings from the design phase of the project in order to systematically designate, agree upon and support the roles and tasks of each stakeholder. For example, the role of the AC in comparison with the implementing partners with regard to follow-up/monitoring of reinserted reporters. These meetings could also help to eliminate overlaps, conflicting information/projects (such as the GoU/AC benefit packages for reporters) and oversights (such as the lack of a line item delineating tools in the GMAC training budget). It is evident that increased face-to-face time could also enhance overall information sharing and clarification of any possible confusion during all phases of the project's life.

**An efficient system of classification and report filing is crucial** for information access, retention and sharing. Considering the project's multiple revisions, such a system for each of the implementing partners' reports and official correspondences could prove beneficial not only during monitoring and evaluation phases of the project but also as a reference for other similar IOM projects outside Uganda and for similar IOM and non-IOM (MDRP) projects within Uganda. This system could include compulsory points to be addressed by each partner, standardized deadlines for report submission and potentially a template to make information collation easier. It would also be a means of ensuring continuous submission of reports from all necessary partners. If such a system had been in place a smoother transfer of responsibilities at IOM during the Chief of Mission transition phase may have been facilitated. Due to the project's multiple revisions, some dates, approvals and implications were not always clear; increased organization of official reports and documentation is therefore paramount.

### Clarify AC role and develop capacity building

Enhancing the AC could potentially ensure the sustainability of the project in the longer-term, something the AC itself is strongly aware of. As a result, there appear to be differing interpretations as to what the AC's role is and should be. Whilst the project is clear about IOM intentions regarding capacity building, **stronger definitions of roles for long-term reintegration support and monitoring should have been included**, following consultation with the AC, donors and implementing partners, so as to ensure that all parties had a common understanding of their roles and expectations of the project.

The challenge for sustaining the technical capacity of the AC lies in maintaining the level currently achieved by this project. This could be done by installing a checks and balances system, for example, by ensuring that the staffs trained through the project sign a contract obliging them to work for the AC for a requisite amount of time. This draws from the fact that the DRT Resettlement Officer resigned from his post for alternative employment a few months after having received training. It is also vital that the remaining DRT Gulu staff train as many people possible within the AC network. Moreover, **the IT, Communication and PR officers should be maintained within the AC**, even though they were hired through this project, as they could provide valuable assistance for the work of the AC after the end of this project. Whilst it is recognized that the AC as an employer suffers from competition from a richer private sector, future projects should assist the AC in maintaining the capacity built, such as in information dissemination, database screening and referral, rather than dispersing support in other areas like reintegration and counseling where the AC does not seem to have the comparative advantage.

The **infrastructural capacity of the DRT Mbale office could be strengthened** through the financing/provision of a vehicle that could enhance their monitoring activities after the end of the project.

During this project, the DRT office has been dependent on GMAC for transportation in order to follow up on IGAs. This recommendation is of course subject to a stronger definition of the long-term role the office has to play in the Amnesty process.

## **Enhance the capacity of local NGOs**

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Further impetus could be given towards **building the capacity of local NGOs**. GUSCO works with child reporters and future assistance could provide them with either logistical or financial support in dealing with high risk categories such as disabled children, orphans, child mothers and children with HIV/ chronic illnesses. GMAC would also benefit from longer term support and assistance in project implementation.

## **Devote more attention to effective reintegration**

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**Differentiating categories of reporters is crucial in the identification of their needs and expectations.** The project aimed to reintegrate both reporters who had been abducted as children and reporters who originally volunteered to join the LRA. The profiles of these groups were therefore very different; in particular: age, length of time passed abroad, urban lifestyles adopted for those who fled to Nairobi and vulnerabilities such as serious illness, handicaps and dependents.

With regard to repatriated reporters, the possibility of **more individual in-depth counseling prior to departure** could help reporters overcome the psychological barriers that are preventing them from understanding the realities they will face upon their return.

**Large-scale community sensitization must be conducted prior to reporters' return** unless, as in Acholiland where the abduction and return process is ongoing, it is impossible. Since the involvement of local leaders in the community sensitization process is paramount and radio programs also have a widespread impact, these factors should be thoroughly included before attempting the reintegration of reporters into their families or communities.

There is an urgent need for finding **new ways to trace families** and reunite reporters with their relatives. In the event of family displacement, families whose children are abducted could be encouraged to report to the AC office or NGO centers in order to signal their movements. Linkages to databases such as that of UNICEF could be provided to the AC and implementing partners' staff, in order to facilitate the tracing of the reporters' families once abductees arrive in the centers.

More attention must be given to the resettlement aspects of the project. The **content of the resettlement kits must be harmonized**, to meet standards as defined by the Amnesty Commission. This would prevent dissatisfaction and perceived discrepancies between reporters and would also allow for timely distribution of packages. The level of medical aid to reporters in transit center needs to be re-assessed, as funds have thus far proved insufficient to cater to the health needs of the reporters. Whilst this does not fall directly under the IOM mandate, it is nonetheless something that should be taken into account when drawing up future project proposals with implementing partners.

In view of the longer-term challenges, **more attention must be paid to income-generating activities** in reference to what options the reporters have. Time should be allocated to economic market studies, so as to identify what skills are needed locally to then adapt the training and tools provided to economic realities. The capacities of the reporters themselves must then be weighed against this information and the entire process should be done using ongoing consultation with reporters during all project stages, ensuring sufficient information and explanations for each decision that is taken.

## **Reinforce publicity of the AA and reintegration**

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
The **publicity of successful reintegration** is particularly useful as an incentive both for rebels to report and for communities to welcome returnees. This publicity should continue through subsequent information campaigns and through cleansing ceremonies that target as wide an audience as possible. Radio broadcasts in which reporters have spoken about their experiences have proven to be particularly persuasive.

**More long-term information campaigns should be supported.** These would contribute to deeper sensitization of communities regarding the nature of the conflict, the issues involved in reintegration and the role of the Amnesty Commission, as well as increasing awareness of the Amnesty Act among rebel groups. It would be important to make sure that implementing partners' and AC offices' locations are known by the population in general and the UPDF in particular so that everyone is able to advise or receive potential reporters.

## APPENDICES

### Appendix 1: IOM project sustainability: triggering an autonomous process

The impact that the IOM project might achieve is always uncertain due to insecurity that can easily destroy achievements that required extensive resources and energy. Despite this, if nothing is done the situation can only worsen. IOM activities seem indeed relevant in trying to trigger a positive movement towards peace. If no major obstacles occur (i.e. insecurity), the movement triggered might self-perpetuate demonstrating the sustainability of the project.



## Appendix 2: Cost efficiency

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Covered area	Analysis	Examples	Lessons learned	Recommendations
Expected cost-efficiency regarding achieved cost-efficiency <i>refer to Table 1 and Table 2</i>	<p>Difficult to assess the project cost efficiency given the changing expected results</p> <p>Need for flexibility: adapt the budget and reallocate it to the different implementing partners according to the changes</p> <p>If expected result are not realistic, the budget might be revised to target a smaller caseload but with better qualitative results</p>	<p>IOM spent more than expected due to the launching of the information campaign, which was not foreseen in the revised project proposal.</p> <p>A part of World Vision budget was transferred to GMAC</p> <p>Budget later allocated to the information campaign resulted in a better understanding of the AA.</p> <p>Among the 158 reporters attending vocational trainings, only 8 have been employed. Should have made more money available to ensure employment (tools, more appropriate vocational trainings)?</p>	<p>In the context of instability, the project mechanisms must remain very flexible, so that spending can vary from initial predictions.</p>	<p>In each case of project revision, produce a clear statement delineating new objectives and outputs to achieve, as well as funds available and designated to reach these results.</p> <p>Implementing partners should remain flexible regarding budget allocated due to working in conflict situation.</p> <p>Donors should be aware of the characteristics of conflict situations, and as such be ready to adapt the budget.</p> <p>During the implementation: need to carry out efficiency studies to identify ineffectiveness and to consider reallocation of funds when appropriate.</p>

spending	<p>A detailed list of spending is required prior to the implementation to avoid:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ misunderstandings</li> <li>▪ inefficient allocation of funds</li> </ul>	Misunderstanding between IOM and GMAC regarding inclusion of tools within GMAC budget	Need to require line item descriptions of large activity costs in the budget	Systematic check of list of expenditure and price related to each item/service
fund releasing	Delays regarding fund releasing to implementing partners have negative impact on the project's timeframe and implementation	World Vision experienced a delayed in fund releasing, a problem for the conduct of the project, but self-induced	Lack of coordination/understanding between WV, USAID and IOM regarding fund releasing	Should have agreed on fund releasing timeline and pre-condition prior the implementation of the project
financial accounting and monitoring	<p>Financial reports have been provided on a monthly basis by implementing partners and quarterly reports with financial statement made by IOM to USAID</p> <p>Project funds did not meet the threshold for in-depth financial auditing/accounting obligations</p>			Auditing and accounting procedures should be systematically included in the project proposal despite low threshold.

**Table 1. Project implementation matrix (extract from the project proposal)**

Donor Organization	Activity	Budget in US\$
<b>USAID</b>	• Provide adequate and timely funds for project activities.	399.999
<b>EUROPEAN UNION</b>	• Provide adequate and timely funds for project activities	20,060
<b>IOM</b>	• Provide adequate and timely funds for project activities	5,760
<b>UNICEF</b>	• Provide support for registration, documentation, medical screening and transport of children, adult females and adult males under the age of 25	
<b>CIDA/other potential donors</b>	• Provide adequate and timely funds for project activities	
<b>WFP</b>	• Increase current assistance to implementing partners proportionally to the increase in beneficiaries.	
<b>Other IOs , NGOs and operational agencies</b>	• Partnership modalities identified to ensure a non duplicative approach	

**Table 2. Use of USAID funds**

	<b>budget estimation (in project proposal) in USD</b>	<b>% of estimated budget</b>	<b>budget estimation (after revision) in USD</b>	<b>% of revised estimated budget</b>	<b>spending in USD up to December 03</b>	<b>% of total spending</b>	<b>% of spending out of revised allocated budget</b>
<b>IOM</b>	200 924	50.23 %	200 924	50.23 %	212 880	55.12 %	106 %
<b>World Vision</b>	176 633	44.16 %	60 300	15.07 %	62 421	16.16 %	104 %
<b>GMAC</b>	0	0.00 %	116 333	29.09 %	107 354	27.80 %	92 %
<b>Traditional leaders</b>	22 442	5.61 %	22 442	5.61 %	3 539	0.92 %	16 %
<b>Total</b>	399 999	100.00 %	399 999	100.00%	386 194	100.00 %	97 %

**Table 3. Budget regarding results**

results expected from the project proposal	results expected after revision	overview of achievements through December 2003	
		Total since project implementation	Achievement rates as per the project targets
200 Acholi reporters from Kenya repatriated	200 Acholi reporters from Kenya repatriated	210 and 83 dependants from Kenya repatriated	105% of planned Kenya caseload repatriated
300 LRA reporters from Sudan repatriated	58 LRA reporters from Sudan repatriated	77 and 40 dependants from Sudan repatriated	132% of revised Sudan caseload repatriated
500 reporters rehabilitated	258 reporters rehabilitated	419 (210 Mbale and 209 Acholiland)	162% of total planned caseload rehabilitated
500 reporters reinserted and reintegrated	258 reporters reinserted and reintegrated	332 (193 Mbale, and 139 Acholiland)	128.6% of total planned caseload
Budget: 425 819 USD	budget: 425 819 USD	Spending: 386 194 USD	

## Appendix 3: Chronology

MONTH	EVENT	LOCATION	PARTIES INVOLVED
<b>2001</b>			
<b>January</b>	General Amnesty for rebels who renounce rebellion and surrender to the Ugandan authorities		GoU
<b>2002</b>			
<b>June</b>	Project revision: Due to the UPDF's "Operation Iron Fist", the target goal went from 300 reporters to 58. Revision of the budget. Money from Sudan component redirected to the AA information campaign, and for better screening and documentation at the local level.		
<b>June</b>	Peace Agreement between GoU and rebel group UNRF II, following dialogue since 1998		GoU, UNRF II
<b>Fall</b>	Project revision: Screening process in Kenya postponed to January 2003 because of upcoming elections as the GoK was reticent to admit the presence of LRA rebels.		
<b>September</b>	Project revision: Discussions to set up the project in Mbale as some reporters refuse to go back to Northern provinces or come from Mbale.		DRT Mbale, IOM, WV
<b>2003</b>			
<b>January</b>	Screening of some of the future Mbale caseloads	Nairobi, Kenya	IOM
<b>January 27-30</b>	Community sensitization on AA and child protection in Gulu municipality and 4 sub county. 283 participants total		
<b>January 20-7 February</b>	Registration process, 588 reporters registered in Kenya.		
<b>February</b>	WV announces cannot extend its services to Mbale. Negotiations between IOM/GMAC begin and GMAC identified as implementing partner.		WV; IOM, GMAC
<b>March 30</b>	1 <sup>st</sup> caseload of reporters travel to Mbale from Kenya	Mbale	
<b>April 26</b>	Gulu cleansing ceremony for 100 reporters	Gulu	Reporters and Ker Kwaro Acholi
<b>May 03</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>New caseload travels from Kenya to Mbale</li> <li>Kitgum cleansing ceremony for 99 reporters.</li> </ul>	Mbale	
<b>July 07</b>	Reporters brought in to Mbale for training	Mbale	Reporters in Mbale, GMAC
<b>July 19</b>	Cleansing ceremony in Unyama, Gulu, 69 reporters		Reporters and Ker Kwaro Acholi
<b>September 27</b>	Cleansing ceremony in Koro Gang Kal, Gulu, 62 reporters		Reporters and Ker Kwaro Acholi
<b>December</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Officially planned end of the project</li> <li>4<sup>th</sup> project revision: extension of the project until September 2004 to reintegrate new reporters in Sudan, and help WV reintegrate reporters.</li> </ul>		
<b>2004</b>			
<b>April 19-26</b>	Representatives of the Sciences-Po evaluation team field trip		
<b>September</b>	Revised date for the end of the project		

## **Appendix 4: Focus group questions**

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*These are the general overarching questions. The prompts under certain sections were used to help guide conversation, but are by no means exhaustive or definitive.*

### **Stakeholders: (donors, implementing partners, GoU, and AC)**

#### 1. Project Design:

- How do you feel about the design of this project?
- Was your comparative advantage taken into consideration during the design phase?

#### 2. Relevance:

- How do you feel about the project's evolution?

#### 3. Implementation:

- How well has this project addressed the needs of the target population?
- What do you feel are the strengths and weakness of the project?

### **Reporters:**

#### 1. Participation:

- How did you come to be a participant in this group?
- How did you find out about your rights under the Amnesty Act?
- Were you asked your opinion on the decisions made by the project leaders? And were they taken into consideration?
  - ✓ Location
  - ✓ Training programs
  - ✓ Cleansing ceremony

#### 2. Return:

- Were you well prepared for your return?
  - ✓ pre-departure information vs. reality in your host community
  - ✓ counseling
  - ✓ search for family members

#### 3. Life in the community:

- How do you feel in your community?
- Were the project activities useful?

### **Host community members:**

#### 1. Life in the community:

- What are the current issues in your community?
- Has the arrival of reporters affected your life?

#### 2. Participation:

- How did you become aware that reporters were moving to your community?
- Were you asked your opinion on the decisions made by the project leaders? And were they taken into consideration?
  - ✓ Selection of your community to host
  - ✓ Type of training activities
  - ✓ Cleansing ceremonies
  - ✓ Location of reporters in community (land distribution)
- Did you take part in activities with the reporters? Did you find these activities useful

## Appendix 5: Interview Questions/Indicators

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### Part 1: Validity of design

<u>Overarching questions</u>	<u>Questions</u>	<u>Elements to deal with</u>
<b><u>General context in Acholiland</u></b>  Was the specific context of Uganda sufficiently analyzed prior to the design and included within the design?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Was the economic, social and political context sufficiently taken into consideration?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Specificities of economic conditions in Acholiland, reintegration of reporters into poverty</li> <li>- Strength of civil society, organization of communities</li> <li>- In Uganda: stability of the government, rebel groups; in/with the neighboring countries: Kenya, Sudan, RDC</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Has the "emergency" specificity of the project been sufficiently assessed?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Possibilities of changes linked to the ongoing conflict foreseen?</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Has the specificity of LRA methods (children's abduction, massacres in camps/villages ...) been sufficiently taken into consideration?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Feelings of shame/post traumatic stress disorder</li> <li>- Preference for resettlement rather than reintegration</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Has the socio-psychological situation in Acholi communities been sufficiently taken into consideration?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Difficulty of the affected communities to forgive</li> <li>- Possible rejection from communities to receive reporters</li> <li>- Community's perception of reporters: necessary workforce or a burden? Abducted children or criminals?</li> </ul>
<b><u>Targeted population</u></b>  How was the targeted population chosen?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>What were the criteria for choosing LRA rebels in Sudan &amp; Kenya rather than LRA rebels in Uganda?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Strategic/geopolitical reasons?</li> <li>- Security reasons?</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Were the selection criteria for screening fair?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Adapted to AA norms?</li> <li>- Has the vulnerable population sufficiently been taken into account? Disabled, female soldiers, dependants...</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Has a feasibility study been done before the project?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>How was the caseload of reporters assessed?</li> <li>How was the budget estimated?</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Is a participative approach recommended?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Was the target population included into the participative approach?</li> </ul>
<b><u>GoU and the Amnesty Act</u></b>  What are the reasons for the choice of working within the AA? Was the structure chosen effective and relevant?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Were the capacity and the willingness of the GoU to be part of this project sufficiently taken into account?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Is the project a priority for GoU?</li> <li>Relationship between AA and GoU (support, institutional competition, exact status and power of the AC).</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>In terms of efficiency, was it preferable to work within the framework of the AA rather than autonomously?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Administrative constraints vs. use of existing mechanisms;</li> <li>Reinforcement of the legitimacy of the State /AA</li> <li>Distribution of the role between the AA and IOM</li> </ul>
<b><u>Stakeholder's concerns (donors + implementing partners)</u></b>  Were the willingness and capacities of stakeholders sufficiently taken into consideration? Were stakeholders associated in the elaboration of the project?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Was the project proposal adapted to USAID expectations? EU expectations?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>What was the mandate given by donors to IOM?</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Have the GoS and GoK been integrated in the construction of the project design?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Consulted before or after project elaboration?</li> <li>Corresponds to their needs?</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Were other INGO's(WV, IRC...) and local NGOs' (GUSCO? KICWA ...) capacities and concerns sufficiently considered in the project proposal?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>How were the INGOs and local NGOs chosen</li> <li>Were they included in the elaboration process?</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Were traditional leaders' capacities to take part of this project sufficiently evaluated?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>How were the leaders/ the communities chosen?</li> <li>Who assessed their role? IOM, leaders, both, other...</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Has the project document been subjected to stakeholder input process?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>How and where was the project document elaborated?</li> <li>Elaborated in collaboration with other stakeholders?</li> </ul>

<b><u>Coordination mechanisms</u></b>  Were the coordination mechanisms sufficiently determined and foreseen?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What are the mechanisms for the communication and sharing of the collected database between implementing partners?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Was the communication between different implementing partners automatic?</li> <li>- Was it sufficient and relevant?</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• How were the roles of the implementing partners differentiated and distributed?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Work to be made either done twice, or not done.</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What was the supposed involvement of the different governments?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Providing data</li> <li>- Informing on domestic political changes that might affect the project...</li> </ul>
<b><u>Interactions with other agencies</u></b>  Was the project coherent with development activities in the country?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Is the project coherent regarding MDGs, PRSPs, and ongoing projects from other agencies?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Was it taken into consideration at some point?</li> </ul>
<b><u>Lessons learned from other projects (IOM and other donors)</u></b>  Were previous experiences considered?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• How are the lessons learned with other donors in Uganda and through IOM HQ?</li> </ul>	
<b><u>Development agency standards: IOM and USAID</u></b>  Does the project fit in the donor's methodology concerning project design?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Is the project proposal document designed according to IOM/USAID project handbooks?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Relevant information on monitoring, indicators, budget</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Does the project correspond to IOM/USAID general objectives, priorities and expertise?</li> <li>• Is the methodology appropriate?</li> </ul>	
<b><u>Coherence</u></b>  Did the project design manage to avoid incoherencies?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Consensus on concepts linked to ICRS?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Same understanding of work to implement?</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Inconsistencies within the strategy?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Contradiction between the tasks; &amp; information sources</li> <li>- Time inconsistencies</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Did the project proposal contain sufficient information about the evaluation?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Assessment of quarterly and final reports</li> <li>- Assessment of documents proving achievements made</li> <li>- Does the project document list all results that prove the achievement of purposes (list of indicators)?</li> </ul>
<b><u>Evaluation process</u></b>  Has the evaluation been accurately foreseen?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Have sufficient time and resources been allocated to evaluation?</li> </ul>	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Do overall objectives and proposed activities properly address the problems to be solved?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Enough activities?</li> <li>- Superfluous activities?</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Was a clear planning of activities established?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Existence of a precise timeline?</li> <li>- Distribution of activities during implementation?</li> </ul>

## Part 2: Relevance of the evolution of the project

<u>Overarching questions</u>	<u>Questions</u>	<u>Elements to deal with</u>
<b>1. Recognition of need for change and ensuing project redevelopment</b>		
<b><u>Contextual</u></b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Were ongoing political situations in the 3 countries consistently analyzed &amp; considered for their potential effect on the project?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Kenyan elections = not considered</li> <li>- Operation iron fist = unpredicted and unknown</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Did the project revisions and their objectives effectively respond to the contextual challenges encountered?</li> </ul>	

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What evidence is there of continued government support for the project (&amp; AC)?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Renewal of AA and Sudan/Uganda agreement</li> <li>- Key definitions of AC, DRT and IOM responsibilities</li> </ul>
<b><u>Institutional</u></b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Do the changes to the project still reflect the expressed objectives and priorities of IOM?</li> <li>• Were stakeholders and beneficiaries included in the changing decision-making process?</li> </ul>	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Were the evolving strengths and weaknesses of the AC and DRTs taken into consideration during the progression of the project?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Role of the Amnesty Commission = practice vs. theory</li> <li>- Are they actually conducting their job? Who are they reporting to? How much responsibility are they given and how much are they taking?</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Were the project changes the result of budgetary constraints?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Budget allocation redirected due to time constraint (i.e. spend it or lose it)</li> </ul>
	<b>2. Management of the changes and implementation</b>	

<b><u>Management:</u></b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Were responsibilities transferred to the AC/DRT as capacities were built?</li> <li>• What methods were used to ensure proper transfer of information regarding project design changes?</li> </ul>	
<b><u>Flexibility/Adaptation:</u></b>	<p>Were the evolving needs of the beneficiaries identified and answered?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Limited response in North/Sudan</li> <li>- Kenyan reporters did not want to return to Acholiland</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• How clear is it that additional or complimentary activities/ projects are necessary to complete the current project while at the same time responding to the level of the problems to be solved?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Limits of infrastructure = radio advocacy / development programs for project communities</li> <li>- Are an appropriate number of people being demobilized, is there a need for more ICRS activities and locations</li> </ul>
<b><u>Information/Documentation</u></b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• How current is the information at each stage?</li> <li>• How is the information gathered, documented?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Does the project itself provide new information concerning needs, aims and context?</li> <li>- Based on this information are there visible gaps in the projects design and implementation?</li> <li>- Is it implemented in the broader, changing context?</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Is the information consistently cross-referenced to the project's objectives?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- How many monthly situation reports were produced? And what was done with them?</li> </ul>

### **Part 3: Implementation**

<u>Overarching questions</u>	<u>Questions</u>	<u>Elements to deal with</u>
<b>1. Effective Implementation of the Project Outputs: To what extent the project's implementation produced desired global output</b>		
<b><u>Information, counseling and referral services (ICRS)</u></b>  Examining whether the ICRS component achieved the desired results for the target group	<u>Return</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Were the screening, registration, documentation, counseling and referral activities for the reporters sufficiently well-defined and implemented in order to reach the desired result of reintegration?</li> </ul>	<u>Information</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Did information provided to the potential reporters in Kenya and Sudan build up their confidence in their rights under the Amnesty Act, the AC and the project?</li> <li>- Did it therefore play a part in their decision to report?</li> <li>- Were the project activities documented and was advocacy carried out in the districts in order to sensitize the community about the reporters' arrival?</li> </ul>

	<p><u>Screening</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Were the screening guidelines uniformly applied?</li> <li>- Did the screening staff collect sufficient evidence as to the identity of the reporter?</li> </ul>
	<p><u>Registration</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Were as many reporters registered and issued with Amnesty Certificates as IOM had hoped?</li> <li>- Were there any constraints in registering the reporters?</li> </ul>
	<p><u>Documentation</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Was there wide-scale documentation on the reporters and the children who had been registered?</li> <li>- How has this data been used subsequently?</li> </ul>
	<p><u>Pre-departure briefing and counseling</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Did reporters receive sufficient preliminary information so as to know what to expect on arrival in Uganda?</li> </ul>
	<p><u>Transport assistance</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Was the trip back to Uganda carefully prepared?</li> </ul>
<p><u>Reintegration</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Were reporters and children received, counseled and reunited back to their families and provided with skills development or educational training for economic survival?</li> <li>• Were the conditions of reintegration of the reporters and children optimal?</li> </ul>	<p><u>Resettlement</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Were the reporters referred to the appropriate implementing partner?</li> <li>- Were the reporters resettled according to their preferences?</li> <li>- Were the reporters resettled in a manner that fulfilled their immediate and basic socio-economic needs?</li> </ul>

		<p><u>Family reunion</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Did the project allow for the maximum amount of reporters and children possible to be reunited with their families? What obstacles were encountered?</li> <li>- Were the families sufficiently prepared to receive the reporters?</li> <li>- Were the reporters apprehensive about returning to their families and home community?</li> </ul> <p><u>Social reintegration into families and communities</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Were reconciliation ceremonies organized?</li> <li>- How are these ceremonies perceived by both the reporters and the host community?</li> </ul> <p><u>Income generation activities</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Was there planning on Income Generating Activities prior to departure of the reporters?</li> <li>- Did the mapping of socio-economic and employment profiles of the reporters assist in the identification of viable reintegration opportunities for them?</li> <li>- Were the reporters and children provided with skills/education so as to be able to support themselves and bring some capacities to their communities?</li> </ul> <p><u>Database</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Is the database a useful operational tool that harmonizes all previous databases?</li> <li>- Has the database been coordinated, consolidated and updated constantly?</li> </ul>
<p><b><u>Capacity Building</u></b></p> <p>Did the project result in the building up of the capacities of the different implementing partners regarding the AA, ICRS and reintegration processes and mechanisms?</p>	<p><u>Amnesty Commission</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Has the official staff become stronger in implementing the Amnesty Act thanks to this project?</li> </ul>	<p><u>Capacity building of the AC staff in ICRS mechanisms</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Was the AC effectively trained in providing ICRS?</li> <li>- Could the AC take an active part in the reintegration and ICRS activities?</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• How substantial was the assistance provided by IOM to the AC?</li> </ul>	<u>Capacity building of staff in IT</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Did IOM assist the AC IT staff in technical matters related to the database?</li> <li>- Was the AC IT staff able to act autonomously in building the database and is this database operational?</li> </ul>
	<u>Government institutions</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Was infrastructural capacity of the GoU strengthened?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- How many government counterparts were trained or briefed on the AC?</li> <li>- Feedback from GoU counterparts.</li> </ul>
	<u>Local communities</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Were the capacities of the community built to cope with and handle the reporters and children?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Were activities related to reconciliation useful in equipping the community in dealing with the reporters (including training of CBOs and caregivers)?</li> <li>- Was counseling by CBOs an effective method to reintegrate the reporters?</li> </ul>
	<u>Civil society organizations and local NGOs</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Did the project lead to strengthened capacity for action for WV and GMAC?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Was the capacity of WV strengthened with the project?</li> <li>- Was the capacity of local partners and NGOs to assist in reintegration improved?</li> </ul>

<b>2. Effective and efficient Project Management:</b> How well was the project managed to produce the desired results and to what extent do these results justify the costs incurred?		
<u>Technical backstopping</u> Did the project coordinators provide substantial technical assistance for improving the implementation of the project?	<u>Technical monitoring and supervision by the IOM Regional Office and IOM HQ</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What role did the IOM Regional Office in Nairobi and IOM HQ in Geneva play in <del>project monitoring technical backstopping</del></li> </ul>	<u>IOM Regional Office</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Did the IOM Kenya Office facilitate coordination meetings with GoK?</li> <li>- What role did IOM Kenya play in the second revision of the project?</li> </ul>

<b><u>Monitoring and Evaluation</u></b>  What role did monitoring and evaluation of the project play in its effective implementation?	project monitoring, technical backstopping and in providing other inputs?	<u>IOM HQ</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Did HQ sufficiently monitor the activities of the project?</li> <li>- Was timely response provided to the advice solicited by IOM Kampala?</li> </ul>
	<u>IOM Kampala's role in following the M&amp;E process</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Did IOM Kampala rigorously supervise or evaluate monitoring activities conducted by both the AC and the other implementing partners?</li> </ul>	<u>Monitoring activities related to the USAID/ AC/ World Vision</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Did the reports provide narrative updates on return and reintegration processes and the problems encountered?</li> <li>- Did IOM ask for reasons when the established goals were not met according to the defined timeline?</li> <li>- Did IOM Uganda provide timely and substantive quarterly reports to USAID?</li> </ul>
<b><u>Cost effectiveness of the project</u></b>  Did the funds spent give the possibility to reach at least the expected results of the project	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What was the role of fund release in the effectiveness of the project?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Were funds released by IOM and USAID as planned?</li> <li>- What was the impact of delayed fund release?</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What was the role of financial accounting in the effectiveness of the project?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Were the implementing partners briefed in modalities for IOM financial reporting?</li> <li>- How many times was financial accounting carried out?</li> <li>- Were invoices and bills provided in all financial reports?</li> </ul>
<b><u>Leadership and human resources</u></b>  Measuring the importance of leadership and management of human resources in achieving the desired results of the project?	<u>Effective leadership by IOM Kampala</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Did the IOM head / project manager display good leadership skills essential to the successful implementation of the project?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Were channels of communication constantly open within the IOM structure?</li> <li>- Were the project leaders responsive to their staff?</li> <li>- Was responsibility sufficiently delegated from top to bottom throughout the course of the project?</li> </ul>

	<p><u>Management of human resources</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Was staff recruitment based on merit and those best suited to the project</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Was the staff well-chosen for their respective jobs?</li> <li>- Did the project coordinator have sufficient experience in implementing/ coordinating reintegration projects?</li> <li>- Was the staff chosen on time and did they have enough motivation and capacity? Were they briefed sufficiently?</li> </ul>
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## **Appendix 6: Sources**

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### **Reports:**

Name	Author	Receiver	Date of creation
Interim (Quarterly ) Report to USAID- Integrated Project for the return and reintegration of 258 Ugandan reporters of concern to the AC.( Period: 31 October 2002-28 February 2003)	IOM	USAID	
Interim Quarterly Report( 1 March-31 May) to USAID- Integrated Project for the return and reintegration of 258 Ugandan reporters of concern to the AC.	IOM	USAID	28/08/03
Interim Quarterly report (1 June- 30 September 2003) to USAID, Integrated Project for the Reintegration of 258 Uganda reporters of Concern for the AC	IOM	USAID	
Report on review of WV activities	S. Edyegu, IOM Gulu	D.Thuriaux, IOM Kampala	10/06/2003
Project progress report- June September 2003,			
Monthly report June 2002	AC Kitgum Office	AC Kampala Chairman	1/06/02
Monthly report November-December 2002	AC Kitgum Office	AC Kampala Chairman	23/01/03
Report on the Field Visit to Kitgum, Pader and Arua Offices	F.T Ocungi, SCO AC Kampala	AC Secretary D.Thuriaux, IOM Kampala	27/03/03
Monthly report for the month of March 2003	F.T Ocungi, SCO AC Kampala	AC Secretary D.Thuriaux, IOM Kampala	31/03/03
Monthly report for April 2003	F.T Ocungi, SCO AC Kampala	AC Secretary D.Thuriaux, IOM Kampala	30/04/03
Monthly report for July 2003	F.T Ocungi, SCO AC Kampala	AC Secretary D.Thuriaux, IOM Kampala	30/07/03
Monthly report for August 2003	F.T Ocungi, SCO AC Kampala	AC Secretary D.Thuriaux, IOM Kampala	5/09/03
Monthly report for September 2003	F.T Ocungi, SCO AC Kampala	AC Secretary D.Thuriaux, IOM Kampala	06/10/04
Monthly report for October 2003	F.T Ocungi, SCO AC Kampala	AC Secretary D.Thuriaux, IOM Kampala	1/11/03
Monthly report for November 2003	F.T Ocungi, SCO AC Kampala	AC Secretary D.Thuriaux, IOM Kampala	1/12/03
Monthly report January-February 2004	F.T Ocungi, SCO AC Kampala	AC Secretary D.Thuriaux, IOM Kampala	10/03/04
Monthly report for October 2004	F.T Ocungi, SCO AC Kampala	AC Secretary D.Thuriaux, IOM Kampala	10/04/04

Report of the meeting with IOM/AC/Uganda High Commission on the registration process of the ex-combatants caseload in Kenya			11/02/03
The AC-Gulu Report presented to the IOM evaluation IEP Team	AC Gulu	IEP IEP Team	23/04/04
Report on Reconciliation Process by Ker Kwaro Acholi	Ker Kwaro Acholi, with assistance of IOM	IEP IEP Team	25/04/04
Uganda Children of War Rehabilitation Programme - Monthly report for November 2003	S.Kilara, WV Gulu	G. Onyango, WV Kampala	1/11/03
Uganda Children of War Rehabilitation Programme- Annual report June 2002-May 2003	WV		
A Brief Report About the Project	Management Committee, Muyembe sub county	IEP IEP Team	22/04/04

**Interviews of stakeholders and scholars:**

**In Uganda:**

Date of the interview	Organization	Name of the interviewee	Position in organization
19/04/04	Ministry of Internal Affairs	S.P. Kagoda	Permanent Secretary
19/04/04	AC Kampala	Hon. Justice P.K.K Onenga Damien Kato J.K. Kasule	Chairman Secretary IT Assistant
20/04/04	World Vision Kampala	L.B. Anukur G.R. Onyango J. Nabwii	Programs Director Psychosocial Specialist Program Financial Analyst
20/04/04	European Union Kampala	F. Van Acker	
20/04/04	USAID Kampala	C.Jenkins S. Ayoo	Conflict and Reintegration Advisor Conflict Advisor
20/04/04	IOM Kampala	D.Thuriaux S. Edyegu Michael K.Irani	Program Officer Program Officer Finance Chief of Mission
21/04/04	DRT Mbale	J.T Karugaba	DRT Head
21/04/04	GMAC Mbale	H. Musaka	Program coordinator
21/04/04	Reporters	Victoria Akello Buzela Isimail-Sulait	Reporter leaders Mbale
23/04/04	Acholi Religious Leaders' Peace Initiative	Arch Bishop J-B Odama	Chairman
23/04/04	DRT Gulu	E. Atim	Senior Resettlement Officer
24/04/04	WV Gulu	S.Kilara M.Oruni	
24/04/04	GUSCO Gulu	J. Tiboa B.Arach	Program Coordinator Administrative Officer Program Officer
25/04/04	Acholi Traditional Leaders (Ker Kwaro Acholi)	David Onen Acana II	Paramount Chief Associate

**From Paris:**

Date of the interview	Organization	Name of the interviewee	Position	Mean of interview
20/04/04	IOM Regional Office, Nairobi	A.Kimani	Senior Project Development Assistant	Telephone & e-mail
10/05/04	French Center for Ethiopian Studies	G.Prunier	Director	In person, in Paris
13/05/04	High Commission of Uganda in Kenya	D. Twinomugisha	Second Secretary	Telephone

**Interviews of reporters in Uganda:**

Date of interview	Place of interview	Interviewees
22/04/04	GMAC, Mbale	4
22/04/04	GMAC, Mbale	4
22/04/04	GMAC, Mbale	4
24/04/04	GUSCO, Gulu	5 child mothers, 2 teenage boys
24/04/04	WV, Gulu	2 child mothers
24/04/04	WV, Gulu	4 under 18 year old

**Focus group discussions in IGA communities in Uganda:**

Date of focus group	Place of focus group	Participants
22/04/04	GMAC, Mbale	12 participants
22/04/04	IGA communities	14 participants: 13 community members (10 male, 3 female), 1 male reporter
22/04/04	IGA communities	12 participants: 10 community members, 1 female reporter, 1 representative from the executive community

**Other documents received from IOM:**

Type of document	Date of creation	Author	Receiver	Content/topic
Letter		D.Thuriaux, IOM Kampala	Randolph Harris, USAID	Explaining proposed changes
Official letter		Hon Justice P.K.K Onega, AC Kampala	IOM Chief of Mission	Request for extension of selection criteria
Letter/report	29/03/04	D. Thuriaux, IOM Kampala	Randolph Harris, USAID	Proposition to extend the project until 09/04
Letter/report	04/07.03	D.Thuriaux, IOM Kampala	Moses	Indication of activities and timetable regarding information campaign
Work plan	April 2002	AC Kampala		AC work plan for the financial year 2002/2003
Letter		F.T. Ocungi, Senior Communication Officer, AC Kampala	D.Thuriaux, IOM Kampala AC Secretary	Visits to Kitgum, Gulu, Kasese and Mbale
Minutes	10/?/03			Proposal review meeting at AC Commission Board
Survey form		AC-GoU		Form for Former Ugandan Combatants

### **Internet sites:**

- [www.iom.int](http://www.iom.int)
- [www.usaid.gov](http://www.usaid.gov)

### **News websites:**

#### International:

- [www.allafrica.com](http://www.allafrica.com)
- [www.reliefweb.com](http://www.reliefweb.com)
- [www.irinnews.org](http://www.irinnews.org)
- [www.c-r.org](http://www.c-r.org)

#### National:

- [www.monitor.co.ug](http://www.monitor.co.ug)
- [www.newvision.co.ug](http://www.newvision.co.ug)

### **About programs and projects in Uganda**

- [www.km-net.org](http://www.km-net.org)
- [www.c-r.org/progs/uganda.shtml](http://www.c-r.org/progs/uganda.shtml)
- [www.c-r.org/accord/uganda/accord11/index.shtml](http://www.c-r.org/accord/uganda/accord11/index.shtml)
- [www.ichrdd.ca/english/commdoc/publications/women/Girls/execsummary.html](http://www.ichrdd.ca/english/commdoc/publications/women/Girls/execsummary.html)
- [www.Amnestycom.go.ug](http://www.Amnestycom.go.ug)
- [www.mdrp.org/countries/sp\\_uganda.htm](http://www.mdrp.org/countries/sp_uganda.htm)

### **General website regarding demobilization/reintegration:**

- [www.bicc.de](http://www.bicc.de)
- [www.dcaf.ch](http://www.dcaf.ch)
- [www.idpproject.org/links/links.htm](http://www.idpproject.org/links/links.htm)

### **Different organizations' evaluation criteria:**

- [www.iom.int/search/query.idq?CiRestriction=Evaluation](http://www.iom.int/search/query.idq?CiRestriction=Evaluation)
- [www.iom.int/en/PDF\\_Files/evaluation/Eval\\_Guidelines.pdf](http://www.iom.int/en/PDF_Files/evaluation/Eval_Guidelines.pdf)
- [www.oecd.org/document/32/0,2340,en\\_2649\\_34435\\_1900640\\_1\\_1\\_1\\_1,00.html](http://www.oecd.org/document/32/0,2340,en_2649_34435_1900640_1_1_1_1,00.html)
- [www.oecd.org/dataoecd/9/50/2667294.pdf?](http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/9/50/2667294.pdf)
- [www.stone.undp.org/undpweb/eo/evalnet/docstore3/yellowbook/](http://www.stone.undp.org/undpweb/eo/evalnet/docstore3/yellowbook/)
- [www.undp.org/eo/](http://www.undp.org/eo/)
- [www.worldbank.org/oed/oed\\_approach.html](http://www.worldbank.org/oed/oed_approach.html)
- [www.worldbank.org/oed/oed\\_cae\\_methodology.html](http://www.worldbank.org/oed/oed_cae_methodology.html)
- [www.unhcr.ch](http://www.unhcr.ch)