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## External evaluation of the Rental Support Cash Grant Approach Applied to Return and Relocation Programs in Haiti

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*“The RSCPA is the proof of the high value and extraordinary results of inter agency coordination under government leadership”.*

**Clément Belizaire** – Government of Haiti’s Unit for Construction, Rehousing and Public Buildings

# Summary of Findings and Key Recommendations

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This report is an external evaluation of the Rental Support Cash Grant Approach/Return and Relocation Programs (RSCGA or RS) in Haiti implemented by Catholic Relief Services (**CRS**), Concern Worldwide, International Federation of Red Cross/Red Crescent Societies (**IFRC**), International Organization for Migration (**IOM**), J/P Haitian Relief Organization (**J/P HRO**) and World Vision (**WVI**). These organizations have collectively designed and implemented the RSCGA as members of the Return Working Group (**RWG**) of the E-Shelter/CCCM Cluster. The evaluation in its entirety is a joint undertaking of the **UCLBP** and the **E-Shelter/CCCM Cluster**. The WolfGroup consultancy was commissioned to undertake this evaluation, with funding provided by the Swedish International Development Agency (**SIDA**). Detailed Terms of Reference (ToR) are found in Annex 6. The evaluations team's credentials are located in Annex 7.

The evaluation was commissioned as an instrument for learning, accountability and the identification of best practices/lessons. More specifically it was designed to **determine the relevance of the approach to the broader return and relocation strategy**. Given that the evaluation was undertaken as the rental support cash grant approach continues, the results are intended to inform future rental support and cash grant activities in Haiti.

## Summary

*Overall objective: To assess the socio-economic impact and the pertinence of the rental support cash grants methodology for return and relocation in Haiti [Evaluation ToR]*

*Specific Objective: To identify lessons learned and related recommendations that could be applied on a wider scale during implementation, taking into account the particular profile and vulnerability of the target beneficiaries [Evaluation ToR]*

**The evaluators find that the RSCGA represents a tremendous achievement.** It has illustrated the courage to undertake a sensitive operational challenge, developed a methodology that ensured order over potential chaos, delivered on the promises it made to its stakeholders and beneficiaries, while ensuring that grantees were supported in making informed choices about their future.

This evaluation was asked to explore the impact of the RSCGA on grantees after one year. The results are extremely promising: **one year on, no grantees have returned to camps and 100% have autonomously found an accommodation solution**. The evaluation was unable to find evidence that the rental support approach is contributing to the development of new informal settlements. Grantees enjoyed a year's support in secure housing of their choice, using any extra money to pay down debt, pay school fees, help other family members, start small businesses, and other activities that were important at the household and community levels. The survey results suggest that up to **40% of grantees remain in the same rental accommodation for a second year**. Those that choose to change their rental solution are continuing to exercise their free choice to find accommodation solutions that reflect their financial means and personal priorities. Of the 75% that moved, 49% reported being unable to pay the rent, while 26% attributed their move to problems with the landlord.

For those grantees that left their RSCGA accommodation, their living conditions are slightly more compact, with an average of 4.5 persons (versus 4.2 for those who stayed) in a space of 1.2 rooms. A slightly higher percentage of grantees that moved reported higher criminality in their neighbourhoods, and a significantly higher percentage reported their situation was worse than that of their neighbours,

**suggesting that some families may have had to make compromises in their selection of new accommodation.** Their debt is on average double that of those that renewed their rental contract.

A key specific question of the evaluation was to clearly define a profile(s) of grantees one year after their receipt of their rental support cash grant. The data illustrates that **there are no emerging ‘profiles’ that differentiate between those that will remain in their original rental accommodation versus those that have moved.** Grantees represent a target population that lives at the poverty line defined for urban populations pre-earthquake- put simply, **grantees are the urban poor, earning less than \$2 per day.** This suggests that the remaining population in camps have similar levels of vulnerability, and that there is no means to target specific vulnerability.

**Analysis did not reveal significantly different results for grantees receiving supplemental grants, micro-insurance and training provided through the varied programming approaches of Partners.** In fairness, the survey indicated that RSCGA stakeholders were not prioritizing saving; grantees have more debt than savings and it is assumed that any liquidity at the household level will go to the most immediate priorities that they define, regardless of resources available.

The only major set of characteristics that seem determinate relate to weekly income versus weekly expenses, and debt load. **Those who left their rental accommodation appeared to have slightly higher weekly expenses than income, and their debt load appeared to be almost double the others-** though the debt load figure could include newly acquired debt due to moving. These findings have to be put in a simple context: the situation of individual grantees is a reflection of the broader economic problems in Haiti as exemplified in statistics available from various agencies. The broader success of the RSCGA must be considered in this same context: **if the overall economy does not improve, or if infrastructure and neighbourhoods are not rehabilitated, then the results of the rental support cash grant approach will be weakened.**

The evaluation revealed important effects on the indirect beneficiaries of the RSCGA. **77% of the landlords reported that they had made upgrades and investments in their property to meet programme requirements.** This impact cannot be underestimated as it affected economic, safety, and quality of life issues at all levels. It appears that **landlords reinvested about 2/3 of their rent monies from grantees in immediate upgrades and their planning for the next year included roughly the same amount as a future potential investment in further rental space.**

The challenges facing PaP residents are reflected through landlords and grantees: 85% do not see improving economic opportunities in the future. **After having received a year’s rental support, 60% of grantees will not generate enough funds to maintain the same quality of accommodation for the next year.** These grantees will resort to alternative or apparently declining standards of accommodation, risking undermining the ‘Decent but Modest’ and safe standards of accommodation described in *Helping Families, Closing Camps*. These results are to a large degree dictated by the short-term humanitarian funding opportunities available to Partners. Without access to funding with a 12- to 24- month implementation timeframe, rental support programmes cannot deal with the challenges faced by grantee families following their reintegration in neighbourhoods.

There remains almost unanimous agreement and strength of feeling that camps should be closed, and remaining IDPs should benefit from rental support cash grants. The outcomes to date illustrate substantial quantities of change and value generated by the RSCGA. Significant unexpected outcomes experienced by landlords should be

integrated into Partner reporting and future design considerations. **To strengthen further the results of the RSCGA, the GoH and development actors should be reinforcing their investments to ensure that their ambitions for the mid-term (economic, rehabilitation/reconstruction, urban planning) help to foster a more optimistic outlook for grantees and PaP residents.**

In terms of the socio-economic impact of the RSCPA, the Social Return on Investment (SROI) analysis determined that for **the Rental Support Cash Program Approach**, **there is \$1.80 US of value generated for every \$1 US invested**. The RSCGA is generating a broad range of changes, and the quantities of change is substantial—which further reinforces the importance of the high standards and quality of programmes, high levels of satisfaction amongst beneficiaries and ‘delivering on promises’. This underlines the important socio-economic impact that the rental support approach has on grantees and landlords, and clearly supporting the GoH and the return and relocation strategy.

The SROI analysis underlines three challenges to consider for the future of the RSCGA:

- Despite a large number of stakeholders benefiting from a broad range of changes, **the RSCGA implementation costs are the key obstacle to improving the SROI ratio**. Partners should explore how to streamline RSCGA approaches, while maintaining levels of quality. The SROI impact map can serve as a tool to prioritize resources towards the highest values generated and in managing the investment costs. The SROI projections presented in Chapter 5 suggest that the ratio could be almost doubled.
- The impact of the range of supplemental grants/support merit further study to determine how to optimize impact. **In purely cost-benefit terms, the SROI analysis would suggest that it would be better to offer the limited core rental grant to a larger group of grantees, rather than to offer a diverse range of grant packages to a smaller group**. The SROI ratio could increase by 17% alone if the total grant was limited to \$625, and the same resources were used to assist a pool of 7966 grantees.
- In order to optimise multi-year generation of social value (increase duration/durability of outcomes), the key factor to address is in reinforcing the levels of household income of grantees. **Partners should not see multi-year commitment to grantees as an operational task, but potentially as a key policy advocacy issue that they pursue with relevant stakeholders.**

### ***Relevance, Effectiveness, Efficiency***

*To assess the relevance of the Rental Support Cash Programme approach. In particular to what extent this approach was pertinent to the objectives of the Return and Relocation Strategy [Evaluation ToR]*

The issues of relevance, effectiveness and efficiency have been central issues throughout the evaluation. The survey instrument was invaluable in measuring the relevance of the RSCGA as perceived and experienced by grantees and landlords. The SROI analysis, with its focus on costs (investment) versus benefits (changes and the value they generate) posed critical questions about the balance between in how far the programme is achieving its purpose (**effectiveness**) against how **efficiently** outputs result from inputs.

**Relevance/Appropriateness:** concerned with assessing whether the project is in line with local needs and priorities (as well as donor policy).

**The RSCGA is evaluated as being highly relevant.** The survey results show that grantees are a homogenous group that have income levels similar to that of the urban poor pre-earthquake. As the rental support approach was designed as an integral part of the palette of options that comprise the Return and Relocation Strategy in Haiti, it has a clear niche that does not compete with other shelter and relocation programmes. The GoH of Haiti has made clear its intention to close camps, and the survey shows unanimous agreement from grantees and landlords with this objective. **If not for the RSCGA, these beneficiaries would have remained in camps.**

There do not appear to be other options to assist the remaining families to leave camps. If it wasn't for the RSCGA, the only other options will be either unplanned evictions or the construction of sufficient social housing. The former has proved to create as many problems as it solves; the latter will require years for delivery.

At the current pace of relocation it will take several years to close the camps completely. An estimated 369,000 people<sup>1</sup> remain in conditions that are degenerating rapidly as funding for traditional camp and shelter solutions is reduced. Partners suggested that the **window of opportunity to close camps using the Rental Support Cash tool is narrowing**. If the momentum to close camps is lost, the remaining camps risks becoming incontrovertible 'facts on the ground'.

Against a horizon of decreasing resources to the earthquake response, conditions in camps will presumably degrade. The GoH, donors and Partners **should prioritize solutions that either ensure minimal standards in camps, or renew strategic efforts for camp closures i.e. further implementation of the RSCGA**. Partners should reinforce this finding through **strategic advocacy with relevant stakeholders**.

The most obvious question in looking at relevance is that of the timeliness of the RSCGA: why did the decision to employ cash grants for rental solutions come so late, and why there hasn't been greater support given it by funding partners? **It would have been relevant to propose the cash grant option at least one year earlier and would have represented a means of shifting funding from camp maintenance to recovery-oriented solutions.**

***Effectiveness:** measures the extent to which an activity achieves its purpose, or whether this can be expected to happen on the basis of outputs (attribution). Implicit is the question of timeliness.*

The success of the programme is in no small part due to the design and clarity of the camp closure process, the philosophy of choice provided- and communicated to-beneficiaries, the individual support provided to families and the qualities and standards that underpin the selection and provision of rental grants. The evaluators were left with the impression that the RSCGA is overall fit for purpose and that its activities are achieving their purpose- they are *Helping Families, Closing Camps*. **In its current state, the RSCGA approach struck the evaluators as delivering results that sit somewhere between a humanitarian and development-oriented response. It could be argued that they are, to varying degrees, effectively achieving both short- and mid-term results.**

The RSCGA was evaluated as if it was a single entity, looking strategically at the results of the work of six agencies. If we examine effectiveness at a more granular level, greater questions can be posed about the 'working alliance' that is the Returns Working Group. The RWG oversight of the RSCGA can at best be seen as a collegial coordination forum, a space for general information exchange and sharing of lessons

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<sup>1</sup> CCCM/Shelter Cluster. [http://www.eshelter-cccmhaiti.info/jl/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=101&Url](http://www.eshelter-cccmhaiti.info/jl/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=101&Url)

and practices. It made space for differing visions and operational responses of its members.

While the RWG is a prime example of operational cooperation across very different agencies, it missed an opportunity to serve as a tool to develop strategic and operational harmony across Partners and their programmes and to achieve greater clarity in the intended results. If the RWG continues to serve as the key platform for overseeing the RSCGA, it should in the least develop common tools to manage data (illustrated in Chapters 2 and 4) that would enable beneficiary follow-up in a methodical and meaningful way. **The RWG has the potential to become a strategic forum to explore the recommendations of this evaluation, and pursue greater strategic and operational synergies across its members.**

***Efficiency:** measures the outputs- quantitative and qualitative- achieved as a result of inputs. This implies considering alternative approaches to achieving an output to see whether the most efficient approach has been used.*

The successes listed under effectiveness can be applied similarly here: the RSCGA Partners have clearly chosen standards-based approach in the promotion of quality and safety of accommodation for their beneficiaries, and a philosophy of providing IDPs with a choice in their future. As illustrated through the SROI analysis, the **high quality of the results observed comes at a price**: despite a large number of stakeholders benefiting from a broad range of changes, the high RSCGA implementation costs are the key obstacle to improving the resulting SROI ratio.

A more detailed examination of efficiency returns to the question of project design: are Partners aiming to most efficiently close camps and provide a time-bound support to help grantees reintegrate into neighbourhoods? Or is it the intended result to have a more enduring impact on grantees, improving resilience or leading to recovery? In this regard, the impact of the range of supplemental grants/support merit further study to clarify levels of efficiency. The survey results indicated no discernable difference across grantees of different Partner grants and supplemental support; the SROI analysis found mixed results at best. **In purely cost-benefit terms, the SROI analysis indicated that greater value would be generated through offering the limited core grant to a larger group of grantees, rather than to offer a diverse range of grant packages to a smaller group.**

## ***Strategic Engagement and Lessons***

This evaluation has represented a significant investment for the Partners, Cluster and the UCLBP. The findings are positive and the density of the evaluation is a reflection of the complexity of the context in which the RSCGA is implemented. The compiled recommendations (Section 6.5) are provided to the RSCGA stakeholders to influence strategic and operational thinking for the continuing rental support programme in Haiti and as further thinking to explore for future urban emergencies.

The evaluative process alone will not answer questions about the next steps for the RSCGA in Haiti. Entering the fourth year of the earthquake response, the GoH, RWG/Partners, and donors need to ask hard questions about how they collectively see the future of camp closures, integrate the key lessons from the RSCGA and this evaluation, and collectively determine the direction, resources and the time frame within which they intend to act. While this may seem simplistic advice, it is a reflection of discussions that the evaluators have heard from with stakeholders throughout the evaluation process. **The priority to close camps has been decided, the expertise, capacities and RSCGA exist – but it remains a challenge to rally the stakeholders and resources towards a comprehensive commitment to seeing the priority through to implementation.**

The next step forward for the Partners should be one of a disciplined and facilitated process that builds from the RWG level, then integrates GoH/donor perspectives and expectations, and is finally shaped through the adoption of a common strategy by the Partners themselves. The proposed prescription is one of a process of participative development with clear objectives, outputs and timings.

#### **Key elements that this cascading process should consider:**

- **Balancing effectiveness and efficiency:** At the Partner level, members should engage in a clear process to find a balance between the number of grantees they seek to assist and in optimising the costs of RSCGA and the package of grants and support provided. This conversation is one that is urgent, to ensure the continued **relevance** of the RSCGA to the GoH and the Return and Relocation strategy, and in ensuring the most efficient/effective use of resources.
- **Greater investment in advocacy should be a priority for the RWG:** *Helping Families* and this evaluation have illustrated the strength of the rental grant tool and its relevance to closing camps in an orderly process. Partners should focus on targeted policy advocacy for development-oriented investment in the Haitian economy, neighbourhoods and urban infrastructure. This will ensure that their work is maintaining momentum while lobbying in greater investment for the future of Haiti through development and disaster risk reduction.
- Greater clarity and harmony in the **RSCGA/RWG strategy and implementation:** the RWG would be stronger if it developed strategic and operational harmony across Partners and to achieve greater clarity in collectively defined the intended results of the RSCGA. This would include a fundamental conversation around the question of the **durability of the intended RSCGA results** This could be achieved through facilitated workshops with the goal of developing a joint vision 2013- 2015, adopting a unified approach and measurable targets and a common advocacy approach and message.
- **Bringing together GoH, donors and Partners/RWG:** through the issues raised above, and in dedicated workshops, facilitate a planning dialogue that connects the priorities of the GoH, the resources that donors intend to commit and match this with the RWG strategy and capacities for the coming 12- 24 months.

#### **What Lessons for Future Urban Emergencies?**

This evaluation has underlined the significant successes of the RSCGA as a tool. *Helping Families, Closing Camps* represents a clear investment in capturing the learning from this programme. This evaluation has added further elements that can be considered in assembling the lessons from the Haiti earthquake response and the specific value of adding rental support cash grants to the palette of existing shelter solutions.

An opportunity exists to take the RSCGA learning to further develop methods and tools, including information and planning requirements that could serve the continuing RSCGA and to serve future urban disasters. While rental cash grants- and cash grants in general- are not new, the methodology developed in Haiti is one that could be exported and adapted to other contexts. **What is lacking is an accessible toolkit that would serve new contexts, in addition to bolstering the investment made in Haiti.**

There is a Haiti-specific opportunity to **evaluate how the combination of CCCM and E-Shelter Clusters into one structure might contribute to a more efficient emergency response and the transition to recovery.** Had this merging of clusters occurred earlier, the evaluators would speculate that this could have had a positive

effect on earlier and greater commitment to a broader range of accommodation solutions for IDPs.

## **Specific Questions of the Evaluation**

### **Which socio-economic impact has the Rental Support Cash Grant on the direct beneficiaries (renter) and on the indirect beneficiaries (house owner)?**

**Findings in Brief** - The importance of the RSCGA for both groups cannot be underestimated. The grant gave recipients the ability for them to have a one year 'grace period' with secure housing of their selection, and to use any extra money to pay down debt, pay school fees, help other family members, start small businesses, and a myriad of other activities that were extremely important at the household, community, and national level. Psychologically, getting out of the camps was of inestimable value. Landlords also benefited: for many, rental income represents a necessary part of their yearly income, and indeed, some off the rental monies went towards improvements and construction. It must be said, however, **that neither group (85%) sees improving economic opportunities in the future**. Unfortunately, **for about 60% of grantees, even after having a year's rental support, it is questionable whether they will generate enough funds to maintain the same quality of accommodation for the next year and may somewhat undermine the 'Decent but Modest' proviso of the Helping Families document.**

### **What are the direct beneficiaries' criteria for selecting the neighbourhood of choice?**


**Findings in Brief** - People went back to the neighbourhood they were displaced from (80%). They were mostly concerned with finding a safe, reasonably priced house near other family and their child's school, in the same area they lived prior.

### **To what extent can the direct beneficiary access basic services?**

**Findings in Brief** - Grantees had electricity, communal latrine or toilet and basic services (health, education). The neighbourhoods also enjoyed access to most of the amenities with two interesting exceptions, police services and parks and open spaces. In general, shops, schools, and medical services were within a 10-minute walk, and many areas had street lighting.

### **How many beneficiaries are still in the same house or have found other equivalent accommodation after a year from the end of project and where do direct beneficiaries live a year after having received the Rental Support Cash Grant?**

**Findings in Brief** – One year after their receipt of the rental support cash grant, no grantees appear to have returned to camps and 100% have an accommodation of one sort or another. According to data collected from landlords, about 25% of renters have renewed their original contracts, ensuring that their level of accommodation will be equivalent; the evaluators estimate this number could be as high as 40%, if biases in the sample of grantees are considered. Of the 75% of those whose contracts ended and have moved, there are generally alternative or apparently declining standards of accommodation in general.



### **What is the profile of the families remaining in the rented house and that of ones that left it?**

**Findings in Brief**– The data illustrates that there are no emerging 'profiles' that differentiate between those still in their original rental accommodation versus those

**that have moved.** Grantees represent a target population that lives at the poverty line defined for urban populations pre-earthquake- put simply, **grantees are the urban poor earning less than \$2 per day**, who were renters pre-earthquake. Analysis did not reveal different results for grantees receiving the supplemental grants, insurance and training provided through the varied programming approaches of Partners. The only major set of characteristics that seem determinate relate to weekly income versus weekly expenses, and debt load. **Those who left their rental accommodation appeared to have slightly higher weekly expenses than income, and their debt load appeared to be almost double the others**, though the debt load figure could include newly acquired debt due to moving. These findings have to be put in a simple context: the situation of individual grantees are a reflection of the broader economic problems in Haiti as exemplified in statistics available from various agencies.

**What are the main reasons pushing direct beneficiaries to leave the rented house?**

**Findings in Brief – Lack of income.**

**What did the direct beneficiary do with the excess money following rent payment?**

Q9C1		
	Frequency	Percent
Valid		
Bought Clothes	18	4.6
Bought Documents	6	1.5
Bought Food	1	.3
Bought House	101	26.0
Bought Household Goods	1	.3
Bought Tools	5	1.3
Business	11	2.8
Construction	100	25.8
Helped Another Family	2	.5
Invest	7	1.8
Medical Care	1	.3
Paid Debts	9	2.3
Paid School Fees	77	19.8
Saved	38	9.8
Took Courses / Training	10	2.6
Total	388	100.0

**Findings in Brief - Overwhelmingly, excess money appeared directed towards commerce and micro-business investment, followed closely by payment of school fees, with purchase of food a close third.** It is useful to note that following food purchase, the next three categories were ‘deferred need’ types of activities (save, help family, pay debt) and implied a strong sense of planning and preparing.

If only considering the most important items as a first field, it was actually evenly divided between small business / commerce, and food, with school fees

mentioned 3<sup>rd</sup> most often. Given that grantees carry more debt than they have savings, and there was significant variance in the supplemental support provided by the various Partners’ programmes, it is a challenge to draw a single conclusion for what represents ‘excess money’. The informed assumption is that any liquidity at the household level is being spent by grantees.

**To what extent has the Rental Support Cash Grant encouraged private sector [LL] construction?**

**Findings in Brief -** One structural element of the RSCGA that stood out was its impact on construction. **77% of the landlords responded that they had made upgrades and investments in their property to meet Home Verification Team requirements.** This impact cannot be underestimated as it affected economic, safety, and quality of life issues at all levels. It appears that **landlords reinvested about 2/3 of their rent monies from grantees in immediate upgrades and their planning for the next year included about that amount again as a potential investment.**

**To what extent has the Rental Support Cash Grant contributed to the installation and development of new informal settlements?**

**Findings in Brief –** This study was unable to find evidence that the RSCGA contributed to the development of new informal settlements.

## Glossary of Abbreviations and Acronyms

CCCM	Camp Coordination and Camp Management
CRS	Catholic Relief Services
DMU	Data Management Unit
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
E-Shelter	Emergency Shelter
EC	Evaluation Commission
ET	Evaluation Team
GoH	Government of Haiti
GR	Grant Recipients or Grantees
IC	International Community
IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross/Red Crescent Societies
IDP	Internally Displaced Persons
IOM	International Organization for Migration
J/P HRO	J/P Haitian Relief Organization
LL	Landlord
LS	Landlord Survey Respondents
N/A	Not applicable
PaP	Port-au-Prince
RR	Recipient
RS	Recipient Survey Respondents
RSCGA	Rental Support Cash Grant Approach
RWG	Return Working Group
Sida	Swedish International Development Agency
SROI	Social Return on Investment
T-shelters	Transitional Shelters
ToC	Theory of Change
ToR	Terms of Reference
UCLBP	<i>Unité de construction de logements et de bâtiments publics</i>
WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
WVI	World Vision

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this evaluation are those of the independent consultants and are not necessarily those of the International Organization for Migration or Sida.

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# 1. Introduction

*The overall objective of the evaluation is to **assess the socio-economic impact** and the **pertinence of the rental support cash grants methodology for return and relocation in Haiti**. [From the evaluation ToR]*

This report is an external evaluation of the Rental Support Cash Grant Approach/Return and Relocation Programs (RSCGA) in Haiti implemented by Catholic Relief Services (CRS), Concern Worldwide, International Federation of Red Cross/Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), International Organization for Migration (IOM), J/P Haitian Relief Organization (J/P HRO) and World Vision (WVI) (this group referred to as the Partners). These organizations have collectively designed and implemented the RSCGA as members of the Return Working Group (RWG)<sup>2</sup> of the E-Shelter/CCCM Cluster. The WolfGroup consultancy was commissioned to undertake this evaluation, with funding provided by the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA). Detailed Terms of Reference (ToR) are found in Annex 6. The evaluations team's credentials are located in Annex 7.

The original inspiration for this evaluation was proposed by Mr. Harry Adam, head of the Haitian Government's Construction, Housing and Building Unit (UCLBP) in the course of a meeting with donors. The Cluster Coordinator in turn brought the challenge to Cluster Partners and subsequently developed the scope and objectives of the evaluation with the RWG. The evaluation was commissioned as an instrument for learning, accountability and the identification of best practices/lessons. More specifically it was designed to **determine the relevance of the approach to the broader return and relocation strategy**.<sup>3</sup> Given that the evaluation was undertaken as the rental support cash grant approach continues, the results are intended to inform future rental support and cash grant activities in Haiti. The evaluation in its entirety is a joint undertaking of the UCLBP and the E-Shelter/CCCM Cluster.

The report is presented as a working document, and is presented as follows:

- The **Methodology and Process** chapter provides an overview of the approach to the data gathering and interpretation process.
- The **Rental Support Cash Program** outlines how the program approach was designed and variously implemented by the partners.
- The **Survey Results and Analysis- Grantees 10+ Months from Receipt of Rental Support** chapter presents a profile of grantees that have received cash grants, and answers the specific question of the ToR.
- The **Socio-Economic Impact on Beneficiaries** chapter narrates the changes that the rental support cash approach delivered for its stakeholders. The same section models how potential changes in the cost and approach could optimize investment returns.
- The **Compiled Findings and Recommendations** bring together the findings and recommendations of Chapters 4 and 5.

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<sup>2</sup> The Return Working Group was established in Port-au-Prince in October of 2011 with the purpose of providing a forum where managers from different agencies implementing camp closure programs had the opportunity to discuss challenges encountered, share lessons learned and work together to establish best practice. The group is jointly chaired by the UCLBP and the Emergency Shelter/Camp Coordination and Camp Management Cluster (E-Shelter/CCCM Cluster).

<sup>3</sup> These objectives were confirmed in a workshop with partners 24.11.

The consultants reviewed more than 30 documents as part of the evaluation process. They conducted 29 interviews and focus group discussions during 6 days of site visits in Haiti. The draft results of the evaluation were presented to the Partners on 11 December 2012 in PaP. As part of the evaluation process IOM's Data Management Unit undertook a telephone survey of 386 grantees and 354 landlords using survey tools developed by the evaluation team. The wealth of data generated in this exercise is underpinned by the findings, statistical and SROI calculation, data collected in focus group discussions with grantees and landlords, observations made in the field and workshops with Partners.

## 2. Methodology and Process

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The Terms of Reference laid out an ambitious range of diverse and inter-connected objectives and specific questions. While the RWG represented a common platform for discussion, shared learning and the establishment of best practice, it did not attempt to assemble the monitoring or evaluation efforts of the respective Partners' programmes. This evaluation was therefore a first attempt to **assemble this collection of Partner approaches into a common dataset, and to undertake a *de facto* joint evaluation of the impact of Rental Support Cash Program Approach as a whole.**

The **evaluation process** included preparation and desk study of key documents, field visits, participative development of the SROI Impact Map, data collection tool development, data collection through phone surveys, data analysis, SROI calculation and reporting.

The overall objective and specific objectives are listed below. They include a brief overview of how the evaluators addressed these elements in terms of methodology and limitations, and the scope of investigation:

### Overall Objective

- To measure, based on quantitative and qualitative data, **the socio-economic impact of the Rental Support Cash Grants in terms of changes that occurred** in the lives of beneficiaries and in the neighbourhoods where they relocated.

The evaluators employed SROI methodology in order to evaluate the socio-economic impact of the Rental Support Cash Approach. SROI measures change in ways that are relevant to the people or organizations that experience or contribute to it. It provides an authoritative analysis of how change is being created by measuring social, environmental and economic outcomes. SROI uses monetary values to represent change. The resulting ratio illustrates the benefits versus the costs. Critical to this process is that **SROI is about value generated rather than money**. Money is simply a common unit and as such it is a useful way to convey value to its users. A complete introduction to SROI and its principles can be found at <http://www.thesroinetwork.org>.

*'Approximately one year after most organizations providing Rental Support Cash Grant made this option available to displaced families, the humanitarian community wishes to assess the impact of such solution in addressing the needs of the IDPs'.*

While the above quote cannot be characterised as an objective, there was a clear expectation to develop an overview or snapshot of the effects of the Rental Support Cash Program Approach on grantees, one year after having received the rental support cash grant. This timeframe had to be adapted during the field mission. A key constraint was that not all partners had started their programmes at the same time, with the result that the evaluation had to be significantly adapted in order to include the maximum range of Partner beneficiaries. **A compromise was made: the evaluation focussed on all beneficiaries who had received their cash grant at least 10 months earlier.** This change involved implications for the reliability of data collected, which are addressed in detail in Section 3.

World Vision was ultimately not included in this evaluation, as none of its beneficiaries met the 10-month criterion.

**Limitations:** the evaluators endeavoured to apply SROI principles<sup>4</sup> and approach as rigorously as possible. While the rigour of the data collection compensates for some of these concerns, there would ideally have been more time available for verification of the SROI process by its stakeholders. That said, the workshops held with Partners have been invaluable for the purposes of adapting and evolving the SROI calculation.

### Specific Objectives

- To measure, based on quantitative and qualitative data, **the socio-economic impact of the Rental Support Cash Grants** in terms of changes (that) occurred in the lives of beneficiaries and in the neighbourhoods to which beneficiaries moved to (sic).

This specific objective is largely a replication of the overall objective. The particular focus on the impact on neighbourhoods to which beneficiaries returned is addressed later in this section. This element was largely discounted as a key element of evaluation as a beneficiary/grantee that moves into a neighbourhood is no different than any other citizen/renter who moves into a given neighbourhood.

- To **identify lessons learned and related recommendations** that could be applied on a wider scale during implementation, taking into account the particular profile and vulnerability of the target beneficiaries.

There are several elements within this specific objective. In terms of lessons learned and related recommendations, the reference document is *Helping Families, Closing Camps: Using Rental Support Cash Grants and Other Housing Solutions to End Displacement in Camps*. The evaluators built the knowledge and findings of that report into the survey instrument in order to validate the key lessons and recommendations that it presents (see Section 3). At another level, the evaluators generated learning opportunities/recommendations for the on-going Rental Support Cash Approach being implemented by Partners. The SROI calculation models how changes to programming approaches could optimize the impact of such approaches.

- To assess the **relevance of the Rental Support Cash Grants approach**. In particular to what extent this approach was pertinent to the objectives of the Return and Relocation Strategy.

This specific objective concludes the evaluation by bringing together the survey results, the SROI calculation and models of how return on investment could be optimized. It situates these results in terms of the palette of options that were made available to families who lived in camps. The report reviews the recommendations made by the *Helping Families* document, and proposes additional recommendations.

### Issues Encountered in the Development and Implementation of the Evaluation

This section underlines the complexity of the evaluation and the lengthy process necessary to attain the expected results. As in any evaluation, issues emerged during the course of developing the Inception Report, and in adapting the scope of evaluation to the realities discovered during this process. The following are issues highlighted and addressed:

- **Ownership of the evaluation:** IOM was the commissioner of this Sida-funded evaluation. It was commissioned on behalf of the E-Shelter/CCCM Cluster and the Government of Haiti (UCLBP). It examined the work of the six Partners who

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<sup>4</sup> SROI principles: Stakeholder involvement; Understanding what changes; Valuing the things that matter; Inclusion only of those elements that are material; Not over-claiming; Transparency; Verifying Results.

comprise the RWG. While all these stakeholders were invited to participate to the development of the ToR, the evaluators found that the level of engagement varied widely. Significant changes were made to the timeline and process to ensure that all stakeholders were given the opportunity to comment on the draft report.

- ***De facto joint evaluation of the programming efforts of the Partners:*** All the partners undertook their own monitoring and evaluation of their respective programming in the Rental Support Cash Approach. Thus the present evaluation represents the **first attempt to undertake a holistic examination of their collective efforts**. As there was no single, common project proposal or logical framework that held together this alliance of operational partners, the evaluators depended heavily on interviews and workshops with partners to reconstruct a collective view of the intended impact, outcomes and outputs. The nature of joint evaluation also implied that different Partners would have different comfort levels with the manner in which final report would be disseminated.

The ToR proposed a limited examination of the supplemental cash grants provided by Partners, in order to avoid making potentially erroneous or contentious comparisons of variance in programming approaches and results. However, having accepted SROI as central to the evaluation methodology, this obliged the inclusion of all types of assistance provided by Partners to beneficiaries. This accounts for the investments made in the approach, and also accounts for the broad range of changes resulting.

- **Data challenges:** The **data sets provided by the partners were not standard across the Agencies**. While the RWG provided a key forum for Rental Support Cash Program Approach Partners, it **did not serve as a collective coordination or monitoring platform, nor did it develop common data management tools or standardized indicators for its members**. The data-compilation exercise was unexpectedly resource intensive. Initial datasets provided were not valid or were incomplete. As the compiled dataset was not available during the evaluation team's fieldwork, this process was managed remotely between the IOM Data Management Unit (DMU) and the evaluation team. The selection criteria of beneficiaries (10 months plus) caused revisions in how questions could be asked in the Recipient Survey. It also presented methodological challenges (see Chapter 4).
- **Survey challenges:** There were several technical challenges to overcome in effecting the survey. Consolidating multiple data sets with hundreds of variables, different languages, coding schemes, different currencies, and non-comparable naming conventions across sets required a great deal of effort to reconcile into one operational set. In some sets, key data was lacking, such as dates of program entry, and not readily available. Constructing instruments, translating and back translating them, and operationalizing an entire Phone Survey Team and Data Entry Team while not on site was a major and complex exercise, only overcome by the strong local talent as was at the IOM DMU. Probably the greatest challenge was the decreasingly accurate phone numbers used to contact Grantees who had received a Grant earliest on in the process, followed closely by the extremely short time frame for what were in effect two full random sample surveys. This problem ran through all issues of the survey from beginning, to interpreting the final results (see Chapter 4).
- **Feasibility, flexibility and timing:** In any evaluation, adjustments and reprioritisation of the ToR constitute a normal part of the inception process. The evaluators found it unusually challenging and time-consuming to influence any changes to the scope and timing of the evaluation process. This placed the evaluation process under undue pressure, for an already complex and ambitious

undertaking. The additional time provided following the presentation of the draft report, in addition to a limited extension in funding comprised solutions that balanced available resources, ambitions and optimizing outcomes.

- **Political imperative to account for effort and success:** The evaluators found that Partners were somewhat anxious to ‘prove’ the success of Rental Support Cash Grants Approach to key audiences, notably donors. The risk to evaluation integrity in such circumstances was that an evaluation could be perceived as a communication and marketing tool, more than as a learning and development instrument for the current program and potential responses to future urban disasters, thus compromising the fundamentals of the ToR. A re-thinking of the outputs/products of the evaluation were agreed to following the December workshop which, in the eyes of the evaluators, permitted an optimal balance of learning/accountability, ensuring the independence of the evaluation, and generating products that adapt to the needs of a wider range of audiences.
- **Selection of SROI methodology/mainstreaming SROI:** Considerable Partner interest in - and commitment to - the SROI methodology emerged from the SROI workshops in Port au Prince. The evaluators also understood that their proposal to use this methodology was a key factor in their selection by the commissioners.

In seeking to minimize the demands on Partners’ time during the field mission and in workshops, the **evaluators underestimated the investment required to introduce the SROI methodology to first-time users**. This was compounded by the need to invest in the development of consensus about the intended objectives of the Rental Support Cash Program among a diverse group of Partners who were using several different programming approaches and philosophies. Nonetheless, it is hoped that an indirect contribution of the evaluation may be the mainstreaming of SROI as an alternative methodology for the measurement of changes generated by humanitarian and development programming, and in measuring socio-economic impact.

### **3. Rental Support Cash Grant Approach**

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This chapter serves to introduce in broad terms the Rental Support Cash Grant Approach. The key reference document is the report *Helping Families, Closing Camps: A Tool Kit of Best Practice and Lessons Learned (Haiti 2010 – 2012)*. As that publication provides an exhaustive overview of the RS approach and accurately reflects the collective experience and conclusions of the Partners, this chapter is kept deliberately brief.

#### **Program Context and Evolution**

Rental Support Cash Grants have enabled over **14,000 families<sup>5</sup> to move from Haiti's displacement camps into safe housing**. Since October 2010, ten months after the January 12th earthquake, grants of \$500 US dollars covering one year of rent have proven to be a **rapid, effective and relatively inexpensive method of providing housing solutions**.

Questions have been raised about the availability and cost of rental property in Port-au-Prince and therefore **about the sustainability of the Rental Support Cash Grant approach**. However this report demonstrates that there is sufficient supply in the rental housing market for a further 19,000 families to benefit from grants. Moreover, despite a rise in demand, the cost of rent has slightly decreased since September 2011.

**The Rental Support Cash Grant approach is not a one-size-fits-all solution to the problems of housing the homeless in Haiti.** However, given the clear successes, and given the continuing problems of building social housing on any significant scale in Haiti, rental support has clearly emerged as a viable approach to the provision of housing. The approach should be continued, and scaled-up. [Helping Families]

The statements above effectively set the scene for the broad rationale for the RSCGA. The key intended results include:


- Closing camps in an orderly fashion, providing IDPs with choice
- Supporting grantees in the selection and move into safe housing - and implicitly, ensuring that safety standards exist
- Representing the sole option for those IDPs without land, within a broader palette of shelter solutions

The earliest efforts in RSCGA were piloted by the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement in 2010. The RSCGA was further adapted and developed by other organizations in the second year of the earthquake response. The approach was adopted following the realization that the initial palette of shelter solutions did not apply to the remaining camp residents. The original range of options included Transitional Shelter (T-Shelters), Yellow House Repair and Permanent Housing Reconstruction.


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<sup>5</sup> As of October 2012, this RSCGA has assisted a total of 23, 233 families.

The graph from *Helping Families* illustrates the breakdown of housing solutions provided to all earthquake-affected populations. The development of the RSCGA provided a solution for those camp residents who had neither homes nor land for which the existing solutions were adapted. It was assumed that these IDPs were particularly vulnerable, and that



*Graph showing housing solutions planned and delivered in Haiti since the 2010 earthquake  
[Source E-Shelter & CCCM Cluster—May 2012]*



they had been renters before the 2010 earthquake. It should be underlined that the Rental Support Cash Grant Approach was developed against a backdrop of deteriorating camp conditions and decreasing availability of funds to sustain IDPs in camps. The vision of camp closure and return to neighbourhoods was captured in the GoH Project 16/6 which aimed to allow the closure of 6 camps allowing the return of nearly 5,000 families to 16 rehabilitate neighbourhoods in PaP. Concern leveraged its experiences from the closure of Terrain Oscar camp to influence the GoH project definition.

## The Rental Support Cash Grant Approach Process

The process illustrated on this page captures how RSCGA is part of a comprehensive process that was developed for camp closures. It is a deceptively simple process that results from lengthy investment to develop a common tool and approach around which the various shelter providers could orient their work.

It should be underlined that the **RSCGA was not limited to IDPs** who chose to become renters. The approach was extended to those IDPs who wished to move in with family members. Those awaiting a yellow house repair could also benefit from the RSCGA while they waited for repair of their homes to be completed.

The RSCGA of all Partners included **two core components**:

- **\$500 US rental support cash grant transfer**
- **Surprise verification visit** 2-3 months later, confirming that the grantee was still in the rental accommodation. A second cash grant of \$125 US was provided. Partners, with the exception of IFRC, discontinued their monitoring of grantees from this point.

The grant amount was determined further to GoH guidance, and was applied consistently by all partners.

While the use of cash grants is presented as being cost-effective, the investment of partners in ensuring the effectiveness of their programs, support of beneficiary selection of accommodation and follow-up post-grant distribution **was a resource intensive process** (RS programme costs detailed in Chapter 5).

Finally, the RSCGA was not intended as a long-term solution. It was assumed that the rental support cash grant was a short-term ‘boost’ to get grantees into a safe rental solution and develop their own solution for the mid-term.

### **Supplemental Support Provided by Partners**

Each organisation determined which additional components would be delivered as a supplement to the two core grant components. Partners developed a unique package of additional support for its selected ‘beneficiary’ families that reflected the organisation’s assessments, capacities and their intended results. As noted in *Helping Families*, at the outset of these programs there was no evidence as to how best to adapt the Rental Support Cash Grant tool to the Haitian context. The specific supplemental grants are considered in detail in Chapter 5.

<b>Transportation</b> grant	<b>Education</b> grant
Various forms of <b>training</b> (livelihoods, conflict management)	<b>Protection</b>
<b>Health</b> (screening and referral)	<b>Health</b> (micro-insurance)
<b>Livelihood</b> grant	<b>Psychosocial</b> (screening and referral)
<b>Special needs support</b> (elderly, disabled, sick)	<b>Neighbourhood reconstruction</b>

*Helping Families* provides a comprehensive overview of the entire process and the challenges, opportunities and lessons of specific programme components implemented by the respective Partners.

## **4. Survey Results and Analysis- Grantees 10+ Months from Receipt of Rental Support Grant**

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This Chapter provides a complete introduction to the more technical aspects of the data collection process and analysis, followed by findings and responses to the ten specific questions defined in the ToR. These specific questions were reduced to a total of nine, in order to eliminate redundancies.

In order to respond to the requirements of this evaluation, a significant investment was required for data collection, handling and interpretation. This included preparation, data sets, sample selection, analysis strategy, survey instrument construction, and phone surveys of 386 grant recipients and 354 landlords.

### ***4.1 Overview of the Process, Methodology and Instruments***

This section includes an overview of the preparation, data sets, sample selection, analysis strategy, instrument construction, phone survey and responses to the specific questions of the evaluation ToR. The narrative charts the challenges involved and can serve as potential lessons for future similar exercises.

#### **Preparation**

During the Haiti field visit, a number of operational activities were initiated concurrently to ensure that the multiple facets and sequences necessary to implement a complex telephone survey could be accomplished in the required period.

It was confirmed that there would need to be three ‘universes’ of respondents constructed in order to capture qualitative and quantitative materials to triangulate and for comparison and analysis:

- 1) **Recipients** (RR or grantees) who received a Rental Support Cash Grant
- 2) **Landlords** (LL) renting their accommodation to Cash Grant Recipients
- 3) **Residents** of neighbourhoods where Cash Grant Recipients may have settled.

It was also determined that there would need to be a data collection survey ‘instrument’ constructed for each of the 3 noted groups, and a strategy developed to collect the information using the IOM resources available and allocated to the evaluation (the DMU Survey Telephone Unit, the DMU Data Input Unit, and potentially IOM Home Verification Teams). These arrangements were made with principals available at the DMU, and timelines discussed with staff of the DMU. It was decided not to focus on the neighbourhood residents as this would have been resource-intensive, and there were considerable logistic issues relative specifically defining and sampling in neighbourhoods and the value it would potentially add to the evaluation.

Prior to, and on arrival in Port au Prince, the overview of available materials and preliminary confirmation on the ground suggested that it was possible to move forward immediately with parts 1 and 2 above, but the survey of neighbourhoods presented many issues that required additional investigation prior to effecting any activity. Comprehensive surveys of neighbourhoods were ultimately not undertaken. Annex 5 provides supplemental focus on the neighbourhood and informal settlements dimensions, and proposes a methodology that RSCGA Partners, or IOM alone, could consider for a future investment.

One of the first issues encountered was that the previously supplied **Partner data sets were not valid, or were incomplete**. During the first joint workshop session, it became clear to the participants that the originally provided data sets (in spread sheet format) would all, with the exception of JP/HRO, need to be replaced with corrected, expanded, or updated rosters based criteria agreed in the workshop. Corrected rosters

were to be based on the more specific criteria spelled out at that meeting, mostly related to clarifying and agreeing on the program date range for selecting potential interviewees, and providing data sets with more comprehensive or selected information based on a close review of how the mechanics of the survey would be managed.

It was determined during the Workshop with Partners held in Haiti on October 24 that the beneficiary **survey frame would focus on grantees who had received the RS cash grant at least 10 months previously**. This caused some revision in how questions could be asked in the Recipient Survey, and presented methodological problems that were subsequently addressed. This selection resulted in the inclusion of 5971 grantee families and 4134 landlords.

Immediate efforts were made to ascertain where the needed data sets were located, who had access to them, and determining how to get them in the appropriate format. It was determined on review that data in the various spread sheets was generally consistently entered with the following problems noted:

- **Family ID variances** - Some data sets (CRS) assigned a unique ID to every family member; some used an IOM generated number alongside their own; some had no ID.
- Often **phone numbers were not entered** for recipients and landlords in particular.
- Some spread sheets had **as many as 120 columns of collected data**, requiring extensive vetting to determine what those columns represented and how they were sourced.
- Columns were named in **3 different languages**, English, Creole, and French across a number of spread sheets.

#### **Constraints encountered:**

- IFRC data sets lacked some key information, requiring another set of exports to include missing fields deemed necessary for the survey. IOM data specific to returns was still being prepared based on date ranges. Concern had to provide a different list set appropriate to the period specified. World Vision data had to be excised from the set due to its grantees not fitting the survey frame of 10+ months since receipt of RS cash grant.

#### **Data**

*'A significant sample of direct (IDPs) and indirect (Owners) beneficiaries will be targeted by a phone survey. A representative sample for each category of beneficiaries will be selected according to beneficiaries' estimations'* [Evaluation ToR]

It was determined during the Workshop Meeting of Partners held in Haiti on October 24 that the **sample frame would be a window composed of grantees of the Rental Support Cash Programme Approach from 10 months ago onward**. This caused some revision in how questions could be asked in the Recipient Survey, and presented a methodological problem. The data sets provided by the partners were not standard across the Agencies. For example, one Partner assigned a unique ID number to each family member, but there was no Family ID. In addition, their set did not include dates of payment for the grant. We found also that World Vision had no recipients who fell in the finally agreed upon period for inclusion, so their set was excluded entirely. The CRS set was included, but with certain caveats and weights applied later, since out of their set we were unable to determine which of the 678 recipients fell in which CRS programme period.

This selected timeframe was also at variance with some of the preparation work, and caused some modification of the final universe constructed for the survey process; there is no reason to believe that this affected the analysis or outcomes in any

important way. The issues with the CRS data set were handled through sample weighting and case exclusion where appropriate. What influenced the grantee-sampling frame the most, and gave the greatest concern, was the erosion of valid phone numbers for grantees over time, i.e. the likelihood of a phone number being active decreased over time. To account for this, questions were framed to gather useful information in a way that included those approaching, but not at, the expiration of their one-year rental contract.

In order to determine an accurate date of enrolment in the program and when a rental contract started, evaluators requested any data in electronic format that was based on an actual rental contract. We were informed that this data was only in paper copy according to Partners queried. It was then necessary to rely on the data sets provided, with some of the difficulties encountered described above.

#### ToR Annex 5 - Cash Grant Recipients Broken Out by Date of Participation

##### Cash Grant Recipients by Program Enrolment Date

Partners	Before 2011 (1+)	October 2011 (1-)	After 2011 (1-)	October
Concern	188		1925	
IFRC & Federations	2500		2600	
OIM	1300		5630	
CRS	204		474	
World Vision	1500		0	
J/P HRO	400		150	
	<b>6092</b>			<b>10779</b>

Data was cleaned, imported, and split into two separate data base files: Recipients and Landlords. These two files were created to compile correlated data from each Partner dataset. Recipients and Landlords were separated in order to construct the universe of potential interviewees for both surveys. Recipient records were selected based on program participation date range and those having an entry in the 'Recipient Telephone' field. Landlord records from this set were selected based on containing a 'Landlord Phone Number'.

Comparing columns 1 and 4 in the table below shows some differences in the numbers of recipients that were included in the final set versus the original estimates provided in the ToR. In general records that lacked a telephone number were omitted, the data sets were screened for duplicates, and other general checks were made to ascertain what column headers indicated, what the sources were for those naming conventions, and what documents they were associated with. This was done in order to determine which of the fields from each data set would be extracted and imported into one combined file so a random sample could be selected.

##### Respondents from Each Agency Included in Interview Pool

Partners	Before October 2011 (1+)	After October 2011 (1-)	Included # Recipients (10 mo +)	Included # LLs
Concern	188	1925	158	0
IFRC & Federations	2500	2600	3701	3035
IOM	1300	5630	1068	800
CRS	204	474	678	0
World Vision	1500	0	0	0
J/P HRO	400	150	353	299
	<b>6092</b>	<b>10779</b>	<b>5971</b>	<b>4134</b>

As data was selected for porting, it was assigned a unique household ID number. In some of the data sets Partners provided, there was no existing ID and overall, there was no common ID identifier. In some sets, an IOM number was used, but not consistently, or for all records in some sets. To obviate this problem, in those that had a unique ID number, it was included such that all cases can be disaggregated and linked to their source data according to whatever ID scheme was in place for that organization. This was done to insure accuracy and accountability, and to **give Partners the opportunity to compare data from the survey back to the original records so that any existing additional information can be put to use if desired.**

#### **Issues in the Handling of Partner Recipient Files:**

- **Concern:** Of the 188 records, 158 contained a recipient phone number entry.
- **IFRC:** Original estimates were based on preliminary DBMS figures. The final number was the actual data selected by date range and phone number entry.
- **IOM:** Discrepancy due to exclusion of records lacking a recipient phone number entry.
- **CRS:** In this case, all records were included because the dataset did not include a date field for program recipient payments. CRS indicated the program was closed, information archived and no staff was available to sort and append such information. The decision was taken to insure CRS recipients were included in the survey pool, regardless of when they received payments.
- **JP/HRO:** Discrepancy due to exclusion of records lacking recipient phone number.
- **World Vision:** No records were actually included in the set as on discussion during the workshop it was determined that all their recipients received payments too recently to be included in the study.

#### **Issues in the Handling of Landlord Files**

- All landlord records were split from the recipient records.
- Records without a landlord phone number entry were excluded.
- Duplicate landlord records were eliminated. **About 12% of the landlords in this set of records held from 2 to as many as 7 contracts with cash grant recipients.**

#### **Sample Selection**

Once the two database files were constructed, a sample size was determined for each. The sample size would need to be large enough such that parametric statistical techniques could be used when analysing survey data. Because it was necessary to implement two surveys, the National Education Association Sample Size Table determined to provide the most economical sampling frame (Margin of Error +/- 4%).

**Recipients** – The NEA Table suggested that for an **N of 5,971 a sample size of 361** was necessary. At that early stage of the project, it was decided to over sample in the event that the program had to expand its base due to a problem with locating valid phone numbers, and to allow for CRS cases to be excluded if necessary. It was also necessary to accommodate the possibility that the first 20 interviews would be discarded if problems arose in the actual implementation and the instrument had to be revamped.

**Landlords** – The sample size for the landlord survey was determined to be **354** using the same table. Since the Recipient Survey was well underway when the Landlord Instrument was finalized, it was deemed unnecessary to over sample.

Both compiled tables were sorted randomly, and assigned a Survey ID based on the random sort. A PDF export file was created from the database that provided a first

page of the survey, with pre-filled data. Operators called potential respondents in order, using standard calling protocols.

The assumption was made that all recipients in the sampling universe would have an equal chance of being randomly selected for an interview. This rested on the prior assumptions that regardless of financial, work, availability, or living status, all potential respondents would have a telephone, that telephone number would be the same as when the phone was originally issued, and they would be available during the calling hours of the DMU. This set of assumptions should have been tested before a broader survey such as this one was undertaken.

### **Analysis Strategy**

The initial review of the data used descriptive statistics generated for each question. As a random sample of sufficient size for both recipients and landlords was extracted, we can infer that such responses apply to the population as a whole within certain levels of reliability, confidence and margin of error.

In addition to the descriptive statistics obtained, there were additional tests run to test hypotheses or categorize relationships based on certain questions posed:

- **Cross tabulations:** Used to see if there were ways to summarize or compare data that would improve understanding and give direction to potential further tests.
- **Correlations:** Employed to determine the strength of relationships.
- **Factor Analyses:** In order to determine possible economic ‘value’ for normally non-monetary traits, a factor analysis was done to uncover those. This material will be discussed in later in this section. This was primarily used to generate information for the SROI analysis, determining the quantities that corresponded with the changes identified for stakeholders. Reflective and formative factors were uncovered.
- **Cluster Analyses:** There are some questions about the profiles of recipients who have continued to pay rent after their initial grant ended, and those that left. A cluster analysis was performed on this set.
- **ANOVA:** In addition to the cluster analyses, an ANOVA was performed on various subsets and will be described in the analysis section.

Annex 4 includes samples of printouts and tests undertaken. SPSS, Excel, and FileMaker Pro were used to handle, port, categorize, and analyse all data sets. The predominant software across all Partners was Excel, so that was the mechanism of data exchange.

### **Final Survey Percentages by Agency**

Partners	Before October 2011 (1+)	After October 2011 (1-)	Expected RS (12 + Frame)	Pool RS (10 + Frame)	Expected RS (10 + Frame)	Actual RS (10 + Frame)
Concern	188	1925	4%	158	3%	4%
IFRC & Federations	2500	2600	54%	3701	62%	49%
IOM	1300	5630	28%	1068	18%	25%
CRS	204	474	4%	678	11%	15%
J/P HRO	400	150	9%	353	6%	7%
	4592	10779	100%	5958	100%	100%

Oversampling of the CRS data set was due to the inability to break out the correct subset by date of payment because of the ready lack of that information. There was limited oversampling due to the telephone number issue overall, and the manner in which the sample list master was handled because recalls were omitted (discussed later in this section).

### **Instrument Construction**

*'Indicate how the evaluation questions were addressed and what limitations were experienced. Describe the performance indicators used, as well as the sources of information and the methods for information collection and analysis. Stakeholders' contribution to the evaluation should also be provided' [Evaluation ToR]*

There were numerous technical considerations in the construction of the instruments:

- There had to be a means to **test the reliability and consistency of responses** through internal checks.
- The time of the interview for both recipients and landlords **could not exceed roughly 20 minutes** due to cost and attention span considerations.
- A frame had to be constructed that could obtain the required number of completed surveys based on the problem of a lack of current phone numbers and **the conjectured high rate of 'dead' phone numbers**.

There were 3 question domains considered when devising questions for the survey instruments:

- Those questions used to establish the internal consistency and reliability of the instruments to collect requisite data.
- Those questions posed by the Terms of Reference directly and as amplified to construct a frame for the SROI aspect of the evaluation.
- Those questions to be answered to 'frame' the ToR set based on the context and history of the program as documented in the report *Helping Families, Closing Camps*. The ability to ground respondent answers in the context of their experience with the RSCGA to date, and the confirmation of certain program elements at the community level, demanded that the platform on which the analysis was built **include a testing of certain assumptions made in the *Helping Families* report**. The strategy to manage this was to ask questions that would add amplifying knowledge or back check outcomes related to the 'Lessons Learned' aspects of that report. Such a confirmation allowed us to triangulate data to understand the situation of current recipients, inform planners about the efficacy of certain activities, and allow planners to look to the future using field verified information.

Once the instruments were constructed, they were vetted by the RS Partners, edited, and reviewed. The instruments were translated from English to Creole, and back translated to insure accuracy, consistency, and appropriateness. When the instruments were finalised, several activities were undertaken:

- Training materials were provided to the DMU and a full training and monitoring exercise was undertaken with DMU operators. This required about one half day for the Recipient Survey.
- Survey instruments were provided to the DMU showing all fields and value lists required for each question so that data entry files could be constructed in preparation for data entry.

### **Phone Surveys – Recipients / Landlords**

*A qualitative and quantitative phone survey of target beneficiaries (direct and indirect) will be carried out. The survey will be conducted by a team of trained and experienced Haitian enumerators that will receive an additional training (2-5 days), depending on the level of difficulty of the questionnaire and final sampling protocol, before going into action. The phone survey will be executed by IOM Data Management Unit already experienced and equipped, nevertheless the full responsibility of questionnaire design, protocol sampling and tabulation plan for statistical analysis, will be of the ET [Evaluation ToR]*

Operators encountered no significant problems in implementing the phone survey. In the first 20 Recipient interviews, response rates and times, refusals, complaints, or any other problems were noted and issues corrected as necessary. During the last week of Recipient surveys, Landlord survey training was undertaken by a small group of Operators who switched to that survey. There were no significant external events occurring during the survey period that would have affected results.

This was accomplished over an approximately 12-day period by the DMU Team, in regular contact with the evaluators. The recipient survey took on average 23 minutes to complete. It became clear that as the operators became more familiar with the instrument, the time to administer decreased. Initially, many respondents were somewhat difficult to keep on task, as they wanted to share their experiences with operators. Operators were able to devise techniques that resolved this issue. The landlord survey did not face these issues, and averaged about 12 minutes to complete.

All phases were accomplished in accordance with accepted survey research techniques including oversight, cross-referencing, monitoring, data protection and confidentiality, paper handling, and review.

On implementation some issues arose with finding an adequate number of viable recipient phone numbers. The sample frame list provided to the DMU was a random sort of the entire universe of potential recipient respondents. The instruction was to call potential respondents in order, and make at least 2 callbacks after an initial attempt to contact a respondent had failed. To speed the process, it appears operators simply combed the lists to select active phone numbers on a first call, rather than scheduling callbacks. This technique could result in some skewing of the recipient respondent pool for reasons related to validity of phone numbers decreasing over time. However, it is conjectured that because calling hours for the unit were limited to business hours during the working week, that this fact subsumed the calling methodology in terms of potential skewing. Therefore it was deemed acceptable, though not recommended technically. It is presumed this potentially affected the Recipient Survey results more than the Landlord Survey results, where such problems did not arise, as the landlord population was clearly more stable.

Survey instruments were completed by hand, and data was entered by the DMU data entry team concurrent with phone surveying activities. Once all data was entered, the files were exported from the DMU system in \*.xls format in several file sets. This data was then imported into evaluators' DBMS software, and SPSS used for checking, cleaning, recoding, and analysis. There were no significant anomalies or problems with the data sets as provided, though there was evidence of entry errors that required some recoding to establish variable limits for numeric data.

It should be noted here that almost all-financial and numeric information provided by the recipients should be considered as approximate, excepting perhaps their reporting for how much rent they pay. In fact, the variance can be calculated as a percentage, based on what the recipients reported they got from a particular agency, and what the agency reports they gave. Some caution must be used in interpreting all numeric data provided as the respondents are answering questions on services they received almost one year previously. It must be considered that we are calling them 'out of the blue' and asking them questions in a format that is completely out of context for them. Then, they are subjected to a series of questions and may have no clear idea of who is asking for such information, or why. Particularly in terms of money or income questions, there is often good reason for a respondent not to answer or to be vague. Attempts were made to accommodate and control for this in two ways: 1.) back checked the reported payments from Partners with what respondents reported to see

how closely they correlated; 2.) operators evaluated the caller and made some judgements based on their observations.

Q #	Interviewer Questions	Excellent	Good	Fair	Poor	DK
I-1 a	Respondent's understanding of questions in general was:	27%	52%	12%	3%	6%
I-1 b	Respondent's interest in interview was:	23%	61%	8%	2%	6%
I-1 c	Respondents attitude during survey was:	39%	45%	9%	0%	6%
I-1 d	I would rate the overall reliability of the answers I got as:	29%	58%	3%	5%	6%
I-1 f	Total Minutes Interview:	Avg Min: 23				

As can be seen in the table above, operators considered that 87% of the respondents provided reliable information.

*Excellent and professional support for this activity was provided by Emmanuelle Deryce and Paata Matikashvili and their respective IOM Teams of Operators and Data Entry personnel.*

#### 4.1 Findings- Specific Questions of the ToR

As previously indicated, three question sets were devised to allow for triangulation, validity testing, and construction of interpretations within the broader historical framework. The three sets included: a Recipient Survey set, Landlord Survey Set, and a DMU Operator back validation set. The bulk of the questions apply to Grant Recipients, but there was a significant effort to cumulate data from landlords to cross reference material from the grant recipients, and to try to assess aspects of future reconstruction activities based on those who would most likely be making those types of investments (landlords). Narrative discussions cite RS (Recipient Survey Respondents) and LS (Landlord Survey Respondents). All monetary values are presented in USD (the exchange rate employed was 40 Haitian Gourde/USD). When reading the tabulated information, the header contains the source label.

##### Means of Validation/ Survey Validation Set

A number of questions were included in both the Recipient (RS) and Landlord (LS) surveys to allow for inter-item validation within the survey, and across both surveys via counterpoint questions. In some cases, the same question was inverted and repeated to show strength of relationship as a negative correlation, and in some, similar questions were asked to elicit positive correlations demonstrating strength of relationship, and hence validate consistency in responses.

Correlation tables were also constructed, but these descriptives are often more instructive when one is able to observe the distribution as part of a question set presentation. Full descriptives for both Surveys are found in Annex 3. The following tables are extracted from each survey and compared, so answers to specific questions in the ToR can be discussed in light of the data appropriate to the question from the perspective of the recipient, and the landlord.

##### Recipient - Within

Q #	Recipient Questions	Strongly Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Don't Know
Q-2 f	Moving out of a camp is better than staying in one if you have the choice.	89%	8%	3%	1%	0%
Q-12 c	I think the Rental Support program should be available to all families still living in camps.	92%	4%	2%	1%	1%

##### Landlord - Within

Q #	Landlord Questions	Strongly Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Don't Know
Q-2 a	I think closing camps as soon as possible is one of the most important things to do in rebuilding the metropolitan area.	85%	9%	2%	3%	2%
Q-9 c	I think the Rental Support program should be available to all families still living in camps.	88%	5%	3%	3%	2%

**Both - Across**

Q #	Recipient Questions	Strongly Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Don't Know
Q-12 a	It was very important that parks and public spaces were cleared of camps, even though many had to move elsewhere.	98%	2%	0%	0%	0%
Q #	Landlord Questions	Strongly Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Don't Know
Q-9 a	It was very important that parks and public spaces were cleared of camps, even though people had to move somewhere else.	99%	0%	0%	0%	1%

**Findings in Brief –** The above data indicates clearly that both grantees and landlords want this programme and feel the Rental Support Cash Grant Approach is a very good tool. The statistical anomaly of almost 100% agreeing with camp closures is an extremely important piece of ‘social capital’ that can be used to great advantage as programs move forward.

**Which socio-economic impact has the Rental Support Cash Grant on the direct beneficiaries (renter) and on the indirect beneficiaries (house owner)?**

**Findings in Brief -** The importance of the RSCGA for both groups cannot be underestimated. The grant gave recipients the ability for them to have a one year ‘grace period’ with secure housing of their selection, and to use any extra money to pay down debt, pay school fees, help other family members, start small businesses, and a myriad of other activities that were extremely important at the household, community, and national level. Psychologically, getting out of the camps was of inestimable value. Landlords also benefited: for many, rental income represents a necessary part of their yearly income, and indeed, some off the rental monies went towards improvements and construction. It must be said, however, **that neither group (85%) sees improving economic opportunities in the future**. Unfortunately, **for about 60% of grantees, even after having a year's rental support, it is questionable whether they will generate enough funds to maintain the same quality of accommodation for the next year and may somewhat undermine the ‘Decent but Modest’ proviso of the Helping Families document.**

The actual impact monetarily is addressed in greater detail by the SROI analysis of Chapter 5. Several quantitative elements were included below from the RS. As can be noted, owing money and saving money are highly negatively correlated, which stands to reason. This is a useful finding in terms of longer-term assessments and profiling, and will be discussed at length in a later section where use of this information is made in some further calculations.

Q #	Recipient Questions	Item	Averages or % for Items
Q-11 a	What do you estimate your family combined weekly income is?	#:	\$38
Q-11 b	What do you estimate your family combined weekly expenses are?	#:	\$35
Q-11 c	Do you owe any money? (If yes, about how much in total?)	#:	\$143

Q #	Recipient Questions	Item	Yes	No	DK
Q-11 c	Do you owe any money?		70%	29%	1%
Q-11 g	Have you saved rent money for the next year's rent?		24%	72%	3%

In terms of qualitative responses to this specific question (table below), things are illustrated more clearly. One interesting response is Q-10g. **About three quarters of the grantee respondents do not think recipients will have found a way to pay for next year's rent at the level they now live.** There is additional quantitative data expressed later to support that opinion, so it is probable many will seek less expensive lodging. Though moving out of a camp was considered the best option by 96% of the RS respondents, future opportunity was a mixed opinion. In addition, people seemed to feel strongly one way or the other about police protection and some type of negative

pressure/relations from neighbours, so in that sense moving people from the camps, although overwhelmingly supported, did give rise to some secondary issues for them.

Q #	Recipient Questions	Strongly Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Don't Know
Q-2 f	Moving out of a camp is better than staying in one if you have the choice.	89%	8%	3%	1%	0%
Q-6 a	I am safe at night when in my own rented space.	67%	12%	9%	10%	1%
Q-6 b	My neighbors do not bother me or give me trouble because I moved here from a camp.	54%	8%	1%	35%	2%
Q-6 e	I think the police are really helping to make my neighborhood a safer place to live.	50%	11%	10%	27%	4%
Q-10 g	I think most people who got Rental Support will be able to pay the next year's rent on their own.	6%	7%	31%	46%	10%
Q-12 b	Overall, I have more money and more opportunities than I did before the earthquake.	6%	8%	10%	75%	2%
Q-12 e	Overall, though, I think life in Haiti will improve in the coming years.	16%	16%	14%	30%	25%

The landlord survey responses for the question set below are instructive from a number of angles. It appears the landlords are rather evenly divided between 'yes' and 'no' for the listed questions, excepting Q-8c, regarding rental income pre-earthquake. One question answered here was regarding potential tax collection by the government on rental earnings: this did not appear to be a major concern for the landlords. Other findings indicate that about 12% of the landlords held more than one rental contract for recipients of the Cash Grant, and this group will be examined further. It appears that landlords did see some evidence of inflation in the rental market due to the pressures of the camp relocations.

Q #	Landlord Questions	Strongly Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Don't Know
Q-4 d	All that extra money coming in to the rental market really caused rental prices to rise in the metropolitan area.	40%	15%	12%	28%	6%
Q-4 a	The rent I charge my renter in this program is about the average price for anyone in that neighborhood.	45%	20%	7%	22%	6%
Q-4 e	Because of the cash grant for renters, more people in my neighborhood are renting out space.	33%	18%	10%	30%	9%
Q-8 a	I never rented out any spaces before the 2010 earthquake.	54%	1%	2%	43%	1%
Q-8 b	From what I hear, since the earthquake it is much easier to make money by renting spaces out than before.	30%	25%	14%	28%	3%
Q-8 c	I have always had rental income, even before the earthquake.	77%	8%	3%	11%	8%
Q-8 d	I depend a great deal on my rental income to make ends meet for my family and me.	58%	12%	7%	23%	1%
Q-8 e	I am worried that the government will start to tax my rental earnings because of the Rental Support Program.	16%	17%	10%	53%	5%
Q-9 e	Overall, though, I think life in Haiti will improve in the coming years.	15%	19%	8%	37%	22%

### Recommendations:

- In considering that 60% of grantees likely cannot financially maintain the same quality of accommodation for their second year, Partners must strategically and collectively decide: 1. Is this result sufficiently high? Given that the RSCGA in theory does not intend to accompany beneficiaries beyond their arrival in rental accommodation, **what is the target outcome they seek for grantees?** 2. How to cost-effectively monitor grantees in order to implement/adapt their programmes beyond 2-3 months post- cash grant receipt. 3. Whether they (and their funding partners) are in a position to act on this issue, in what ways and at what scale. 4. Can partners target vulnerable families in advance for additional programs?

### What are the direct beneficiaries' criteria for selecting the neighbourhood of choice?

**Findings in Brief - People went back to the neighbourhood they were displaced from (80%).**<sup>6</sup> They were mostly concerned with finding a safe, reasonably priced house near other family and their child's school, in the same area they lived prior.

There are two aspects of this question that can be examined and compared: 1) the reason they said they chose a place, and 2) what they actually did. In Q-9b, safety is clearly the number one issue, followed by the noted list. However, the controlling variable really appears to be the neighbourhood they lived in prior to the earthquake, which is logical. Even though the neighbourhood was fourth in importance overall, the fact of the matter was that **most people returned to the area from which they were displaced because that is the area they would have the strongest connections to-and knowledge of.**<sup>7</sup> The major difficulty in analysing the neighbourhood data throughout the survey course is that standardized neighbourhood names were not employed. In fact, when the neighbourhood responses were first tabulated, there were 197 unique names – over half the set. These were culled, corrected, and gradually sifted to create a final set of 142. This is still too many and too imprecise to analyse effectively.

Q #	Recipient Questions	Item	Averages or % for Items
Q-1 b	What neighborhood did you return to when you left the camp? (** Missing Data - 30%)	Same Different	81% 19%
Q-9 b	What were the most important reasons for why you chose to live in your current neighbourhood, beginning with the most important: (Top Three Responses per Category Tallyed Across)	Safest place to live I could afford. Best house for the money. Other family lived near by. Where I lived before the earthquake. Closer to my child's school.	57% 49% 35% 32% 30%

#### Recommendations:

- Revise the learning from *Learning Families* to reflect that IDPs largely returned to their neighbourhood of origin.
- Develop and implement standardized lists of neighbourhood names from the outset of such programmes and early in the emergency response.

**How many beneficiaries are still in the same house or have found other equivalent accommodation after a year from the end of project and where do direct beneficiaries live a year after having received the Rental Support Cash Grant?**

**Findings in Brief – One year after their receipt of the rental support cash grant, no grantees appear to have returned to camps and 100% have an accommodation of one sort or another.** According to data collected from landlords, about 25% of renters have renewed their original contracts, ensuring that their level of accommodation will be equivalent; the evaluators estimate this number could be as high as 40%, if biases in the sample of grantees are considered. Of the 75% of those whose contracts ended and have moved, there are generally alternative or apparently declining standards of accommodation in general as noted in responses to the following indicate. The responses in Q-4e and Q-10e indicate the discrepancy between those still in their same house, or those who have yet to finish their first year contract, versus those who moved.

<sup>6</sup> This finding is supported by the results of a similar investigation undertaken by IFRC in December 2012. While they report 60% of their beneficiaries are still in the same location after one year, **this figure is corrected to 37% when considering that 28% of grantees could not be found for 12-month monitoring.**

<sup>7</sup> Findings are supported by similar data of IOM's Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM).

Q #	Recipient Questions	Strongly Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Don't Know
Q-4 e	The rented space I live in is about average when compared to my neighbors living situation.	40%	27%	15%	17%	1%
	The program really gave me the choice to find the best place to rent for me and my family.	71%	15%	9%	5%	0%

The data from the group who have actually ended their contract is inconclusive about where respondents go as the neighbourhood data is missing in over half the cases. That said, it is indicative that **people in Port-au-Prince tend to stay in the same neighbourhood if possible**. Q-11f below indicates that though there is some indecision about where they will go, in general grantees will try to stay close to where they are. This is expected given the economic conditions, social / school opportunities are better in Port-au-Prince, and recipients' network of friends and family and knowledge of the area are extremely important when trying to make a living.

A more in-depth discussion of the issues surrounding this aspect of the study will be further considered in subsequent questions. On the surface, however, the 3 responses below from grantees give a pretty clear notion of how people have or will try to situate themselves.

Q #	Recipient Questions	Item	Yes	No	DK
Q-11 d	Are you in the same rental space you first moved in to?		80%	20%	0%
	Will you stay another year if you can?		58%	21%	21%
	Have you saved rent money for the next year's rent?		24%	72%	3%

From the landlord perspective, the following material is useful. The data from the landlords bears further study, as there are several apparent anomalies on the face of it. It appears that the responses to LL Survey Q-1d and Q-1e below, more accurately describes the rental situation one year on than that information gained from the recipients. It should be reiterated here that self-reported data from a group such as is under discussion has to be cross-referenced and triangulated. In this instance, the landlord data is probably more reliable than the grantee data for a number of reasons, particularly numeric or financial amounts. In triangulating our information, we know that **roughly 40% of the population in question has effectively ended their grant period**, and that is reflected in the landlord statistics. This again goes back to the issues related to viability of telephone numbers for grantees over time, and why the landlord information is considered more representative of the 10 months + sample.

Q #	Landlord Questions	Item	Yes	No	DK
Q-1 f	Did any of your renters in the program leave before their lease period had ended?		5%	95%	0%

Q #	Landlord Questions	Item	Averages or % for Items
Q-1 b	How many of your total renters received help from the Rental Support Program?	#: 549	78%
Q-1 c	How many of those renters are still within the first year of their rental agreement? How many completed their 1st year?	#: 330 Within / #: 219 Completed	60% / 40%
Q-1 d	How many renters who finished their contract with you moved?	#: 147 of 219	67%
Q-1 e	How many renters have renewed their rental agreement with you using their own funds? (9% Not sure, left, or DK)	#: 54 of 219	25%

The **landlords indicate that 73% of their grantees have completed their first year, and 27% have renewed their contracts** (excluding the 5% that left before completing their contract), representing about 1,600 families.<sup>8</sup> Clearly, and as would be expected, landlords are a much more stable pool to draw from in this regard, and the recipients are not. As can also be noted, according to the landlords, about **25% of the original group were able to renew their contracts for another year at the same location**,

<sup>8</sup> Of the sample, only 12% of the beneficiaries interviewed had received their rental grant 12 or more months previously.

indicating they were able to maintain the standard of living that corresponded to the RSCGA.


#### Recommendations:

- Partners have clearly chosen standards-based approach in the promotion of quality and safety of RSCGA eligible accommodation, and a philosophy of providing IDPs with a choice in their future. In this framework, it strikes the evaluators as acceptable that, 12 months after the receipt of their rental cash grant, grantees make decisions to choose accommodations that adapt to their financial situation-and potentially move. Partners must define what is most important: 1. That grantees are in an accommodation and have not returned to a camp; or, 2. Grantees must be in an accommodation at the standard set by the RSCGA. If it is the latter, then the commitment, funding, timeframe and tools used by the Partners must be adapted accordingly to achieve these results. Since payment scales were based on averages, it still appears **there is sufficient room for recipients to find alternative housing within their budget. There is data to suggest that the 'floor' for suitable housing is around \$170 USD.**

#### What is the profile of the families remaining in the rented house and that of ones that left it?

**Findings in Brief-** The data illustrates that **there are no emerging 'profiles' that differentiate between those still in their original rental accommodation versus those that have moved.** Grantees represent a target population that lives at the poverty line defined for urban populations pre-earthquake- put simply,

**grantees are the urban poor earning less than \$2 per day**, who were renters pre-earthquake. Analysis did not reveal different results for grantees receiving the supplemental grants, insurance and training provided through the varied programming approaches of Partners.



The only major set of characteristics that seem determinate relate to weekly income versus weekly expenses, and debt load. **Those who left their rental accommodation appeared to have slightly higher weekly expenses than income, and their debt load appeared to be almost double the others**, though the debt load figure could include newly acquired debt due to moving. These findings have to be put in a simple context: the situation of individual grantees are a reflection of the broader economic problems in Haiti as exemplified in statistics available from various agencies.

There are several aspects to this question as it presents a clear assumption to be tested: *Is there a difference in the profiles of those who leave and those who stay- or not?*

There is a significant complicating or confounding aspect to this question based on the selection 'window' chosen for our sample frame. Since the window was set at 10 months and beyond, rather than 12 months and beyond, a significant number of recipients are still within their contracts and are thus automatically considered amongst those who stayed in a rented house. This of course would tend to skew the data, but through weighting and other analytical techniques it was possible to adjust for this effect.

The following describes how this seemingly simple question was addressed, discusses some data gleaned from the survey, and offers a more global perspective about the difference, or lack thereof, in the profile of those who stay and those who go. It also will

offer what may be a simpler and more effective tool that can be used in the field to give some predictive information, rather than trying to profile.

From the recipient perspective, the strategy to test this question had several levels in sequence: 1) review the **descriptive data**; 2) look for any **natural groupings** that might exist within the population; 3) **look outside the population under review** to determine the context in general.

First, a look at some of the **descriptive data** obtained from the survey will give us an introduction to what eventually became a complex series of tests. The table represents 92% of the responses. As can be seen, respondents at this time apparently do not expect another cash grant. Nor do they consider a move to the informal settlements as viable. The low incidence of borrowing to make rent, or negotiating, confirms what was known before, and it can be said that about 15% (the DKs and the non-responses) simply don't know what they will do. It could be said that those who believe 'God will provide' would be part of that category but is a matter of bias in the observer.

Q #	Recipient Questions	Item	Averages or % for Items
Q-11 h	What will happen if you cannot pay the rent?	Landlord will evict	38%
		Move to Family	16%
		God will provide	11%
		DK	7%
		Move	7%
		Move to Province	6%
		Landlord will negotiate	4%
		NGO Grant	1%
		Borrow	1%
		Informal Settlements	1%

If we categorize the responses above into 'solution to housing problem' for 'Stay', and 'lacking solution to housing problem' for 'Leave', there is some predictive value. Two responses indicate the respondent has a clear and legitimate notion of what they will do if they cannot pay the rent: 1) Move to Family – 16%; 2) Move to Province (Family) – 6%. This represents about 22% of the respondents. For the remaining 78%, one could surmise that they will be facing the same problem that had one year before if they cannot manage to get further money to pay the rent. Basically, it appears they will seek out a local solution within their budget.

Q #	Landlord Questions	Strongly Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Don't Know
Q-6 a	I think my renter will be able to find enough money to pay rent for another year on his or her own.	6%	7%	5%	48%	33%
Q-6 b	If my renter does not pay the rent on time for the next year, I will get them out of the house immediately	28%	19%	23%	28%	2%
Q-6 c	I would let my renter pay me in monthly installments if they cannot pay the whole year's rent up front.	19%	16%	9%	53%	3%

Q #	Landlord Questions	Strongly Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Don't Know
Q-2 d	I heard there were many cases where people were able to 'trick' the NGOs to get a Cash Grant.	26%	16%	6%	27%	26%

From the landlord side, we can see that over half the landlords doubt the ability of the recipient to 'make the rent' at the level they are currently paying. They do indicate some willingness to wait a bit before evicting them, or even to negotiate some kind of instalment payment plan. It would appear that there is some room to move within the rental framework between landlords and renters, which implies there could be some viable options for both as more people move towards the end of their first year contracts. There were some indications by landlords that there suspicions of fraud occurring in the RSCGA programmes, so this would certainly have an impact on how they chose to deal with their Cash Grant renter.

For the recipients, the challenge was to try to discover if there is any sort of profile or **grouping** that would differentiate the group of those who stay and those who leave at a more detailed level of analysis. Several tests were run on the response set, to include: 1) Tests of Means (for interval level data); 2) Tests of Classification, or cluster analysis, such as K-Means, hierarchical, and discriminant. The results of these tests did not allow us to reject the null hypothesis, i.e. there is no identifiable grouping. **The situation and profile of grantees as a group appears undifferentiated, regardless of the types and numbers of variables included in the analyses (including gender, family size), livelihood grants or training provided, gender or any other particular factor.**

It seems clear this is a group with similar characteristics: 1) limited family support; 2) no property; 3) low wages or no employment, and so on. This is born out by discussions held with GoH: they described the remaining IDPs in camps as being people that faced the same problems, and had few options; those that had the means to leave camps on their own had already done so. This statement is certainly corroborated by the graph on page 11 of the *Helping Families* document, which shows upwards of 60% of those who were in the camps had exited using their own means, connections, or resources. It might have been more interesting to profile **logical profiling and grouping would be between those who left on their own, and the group we are now exploring.**

There is some very useful information that will allow us to compare in more detail some differences and similarities that emerged regarding identifiable characteristics of any particular group. One clearly stood out – the weekly income, expenses, and debt ratio between the groups.

Q #	Recipient Questions	Item	Remain	Left
Q-11 a	What do you estimate your family combined weekly income is?	#:	\$38	\$32
Q-11 b	What do you estimate your family combined weekly expenses are?	#:	\$35	\$33
Q-11 c	Do you owe any money? (If yes, about how much in total?)	#:	\$143	\$228

As is clear, the **grantees who left their rental accommodation on average carry a much higher debt load**, and their weekly expenses exceed their weekly income. This is reflected in savings rates reported between the groups:

Q #	Recipient Questions	Item	Yes	Yes
Q-11 c	Do you owe any money?		70%	77%
Q-11 g	Have you saved rent money for the next year's rent?		24%	14%

As can be noted, debt and savings are inversely related in the two groups, and this, coupled with the income issues, explains the predicament – income. The **solutions that were chosen include sharing or splitting the household into other spaces, renting a less expensive (read lower quality) space, and adapting to a lower standard of living.**

In terms of selecting a place to live, although safety remains the number one preoccupation, cost of housing was obviously a significantly increasing concern (up 11% points) for those now facing the rental market with no subsidy. It will be useful to continue to monitor rental rates in the metropolitan area as more program participants reach the end of their agreements and have to find new housing.

Q #	Recipient Questions	Item	Remain	Left
Q-9 b	What were the most important reasons for why you chose to live in your current neighbourhood, beginning with the most important: (Top Three Responses per Category Tallied Across)	Safest place to live I could afford.	57%	60%
		Best house for the money.	49%	60%
		Other family lived near by.	35%	29%
		Where I lived before the earthquake.	32%	32%
		Closer to my child's school.	30%	31%

In terms of the household profile, not much is different, except for how many live in the same space. Q-3a shows a slightly larger average family size for those that left, i.e., 4.2 versus 4.5 for those who left and found new accommodation, which may be a possible indication that there is 'doubling up'. The difference is small, so further investigation here would be useful.

Q #	Recipient Questions	Item	Remain	Left
Q-3 a	How many live in your rented space?	#:	4.2	4.5
Q-3 c	How many rooms do you have for your own family's private use?	#:	1.2	1.2
Q-3 e	How many school aged children do you have living in your space?	#:	1.9	2

In terms of a lowered standard of living, it can be seen in the chart below that those whose grant ended and who moved to a new place residence accepted a lower standard of accommodations (34% who left versus 17% of those who stayed strongly felt their living situation was worse than the 'average').

Q #	Recipient Questions	Strongly Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Strongly Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Strongly Disagree
Q-4 e	The rented space I live in is about average when compared to my neighbors living situation.	40%	27%	15%	17%	34%	17%	14%	31%
Remain: <input type="text"/>									Left: <input type="text"/>

The group who left also had a different perception about whether other recipients would be able to pay the rent on their own at the expiration of the first year's assistance.

Q #	Recipient Questions	Strongly Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Strongly Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Strongly Disagree
Q-10 g	I think most people who got Rental Support will be able to pay the next year's rent on their own.	6%	7%	31%	46%	9%	6%	20%	54%
Remain: <input type="text"/>									Left: <input type="text"/>

The conclusions to be made here are quite straightforward. The **problem facing RSCGA grantees is income versus expenses within the fluctuating market place, with a lack of employment or underemployment**. As has been noted before, the entire group of grantees remaining in the camps at the advent of the RSCGA was representative of the poorest urban class in Haiti with the least options. We know those who could have already left the camps early on using their own resources, contacts, or outside assistance. The people remaining in the camps were part of a similar socio-economic group. It is useful to look for counter-intuitive examples of difference that might have emerged, but the data to date does not show such difference, nor was it revealed by additional statistical tests such as cluster analysis.

Given the information presented above, the question could be stated: **is there information at hand that would help us profile or predict 'housing security' in some relevant way, to help us plan, project, or otherwise prepare?** The following activity/tool is suggested as a potentially efficient and useful way to 'profile' and 'predict'. It should be underlined that unless other major development activities are occurring simultaneously in neighbourhoods, the RSCGA will deliver important benefits during the first year but would only displace the housing problem for its grantees.

The following is suggested as a simple, field-based tool that could be used at any point during a program such as the RSCGA to determine the risk that the family has regarding housing security. It should be applied at the individual level, though we used it to demonstrate a specific group profile based on income and saving habits exhibited by the respondents.

This tool would probably best serve as part of the verification process, when Household Verifiers check on recipients one month to six weeks into the program. It will take about 2 minutes to collect and input the data in a handheld device, and obtain resulting information they can share with the individual, or flag for follow-up. This short

test can be done at any or multiple points in a grant period. It should be stressed that this is a tool predominantly for field use at the household level. This completed survey can be used as a baseline to validate accuracy of the tool if it is used in the future.

It includes the following four questions:

1) What is your average weekly <b>Household</b> income?	3) If any, how much money do you owe <b>in total</b> right now?
2) What are your average weekly <b>Household</b> expenses?	4) If any, how much money do you save <b>on average</b> weekly?

#### Calculation:

$$((\text{Weekly Income} * 52) + (\text{Weekly Savings} * 52)) - ((\text{Weekly Expenses} * 52) + (\text{Total Debt})) = \text{NET}$$

$$(\text{NET} - \text{Lowest Rental VR}) = \text{STATUS}$$

(Where VR is 'value range' that meets habitability and safety requirements and is estimated currently at about 170 USD / year)

#### Use

The net figure can be used to determine whether at that point in time a person is on track to have enough money to pay the next year's rent up front, as is necessary in the Haitian context. What is important to note here is to **overcome the tendency to try to collect too much data**. It is felt that these few data points represent the simplest to collect within the context of the transaction, are easiest to deal with overall, and can be used in many other calculations. There is no need to try to construct a 'household economy' survey, and using this extremely simple tool will insure one does not go astray. The Status calculation is derived by subtracting an amount equivalent to the lowest priced housing that meets program liveability criteria. In this case, after reviewing the data on rental rates, \$170 per year was selected as the lowest range.

#### Rental Profile Tool

In this way, staff can create an instant profile based on proximate data whose validity can be queried or confirmed on the spot. This test was applied to the data set under analysis to see if it could give us a profile of who was or was not on track to be able to make the next year's rental payment. Here are the statistics:

Avg\$ / USD	Yearly Income	Yearly Expense	Total Debt	NET	Lowest Rental Value Range	Status
Recipients	1994	1805	143	46	170	(124)

Q #	Recipient Questions	Item	Yes	No	DK
Q-11 g	Have you saved rent money for the next year's rent?		24%	72%	3%

What this shows in the 'Status' field is that when all respondents are included, the population shows it is short 124 USD to make the next years rent. When we actually break out the individual numbers by respondent that make up that total, we see that 229 of 389 respondents, 59%, are not on track to have enough money earned and saved to pay for the next years rent. The table below (truncated) shows the calculations for the entire set that resulted in the calculation of 59%. The far left column represents the cases by row serving as examples, omitting intermediate rows, from lowest reported yearly income to highest.

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
1	SURVEYIM	011A_USD	011B_USD	011C1_US	011_NET	011_net2	Status
4	3735	23	125	25	-5355.00	-\$5,355	Out
6	4279	6	63	1250	-4175.00	-\$4,175	Out
224	5837	38	33	116	143.75	\$144	Out
225	2580	15	11	38	157.50	\$158	Out
226	5765	13	6	132	193.00	\$193	In
228	102	13	6	125	200.00	\$200	In
229	3369	19	13	125	200.00	\$200	In
386	3913	150	38	375	5475.00	\$5,475	In
387	2013	188	75	125	5725.00	\$5,725	In

This tool is designed not as an averaging device, but for use at the household level. However, we did aggregate the statistics and reached the following conclusion based on the above information:

***The economic profile defined above indicates that about 60% of the respondents may be at risk of not being able to pay for their current rental solution in the following year.***

#### Recommendations:

- The RSCGA can only be successful if development activities in neighbourhoods are synchronized to the extent possible with the camp closure efforts. If the overall economy does not improve, or infrastructure and neighbourhoods are not rehabilitated, then the results of the rental support cash grant approach will be weakened. The GoH and donors must ensure the prioritization, financing and speed of these improvements in order to create an environment that will favour greater opportunities for neighbourhoods.
- In developing further tools and methods to monitor and adapt rental support cash grant programmes, Partners should consider using this activity/tool to better predict 'housing security' for grantees.

#### What are the main reasons pushing direct beneficiaries to leave the rented house?

##### Findings in Brief – Lack of income.

Clearly the main reason people will leave a rented house will be that they are unable to pay the rent. As noted previously, 58% of the respondents would prefer to remain in the house they are in if they can afford the rent. There are issues related to condition of the house or things about the neighbourhood that cause people to move, but this affects all renters and is not specific to grantees of the RSCGA.

Q #	Landlord Questions	Strongly Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Don't Know
Q-6 b	If my renter does not pay the rent on time for the next year, I will get them out of the house immediately	28%	19%	23%	28%	2%
Q-9 c	I think the Rental Support program should be available to all families still living in camps.	88%	5%	3%	3%	2%

In this case, both landlord and recipient appear to be aligned in their responses. One statistic of note is the number of people who will move to the Province, or in with family. Why they have not already done that, or how that particular household dynamic works, would be useful to understand. The typical hypothesis is that IDPs persist in camps in the hopes of further/better assistance from the GoH/aid agencies. This appears challenged by a separate statement: that conditions in camps are drastically worsening as a result of decreasing resources. Together this equates to: *If conditions are so poor, is the mere hope of receiving assistance compelling enough to keep IDPs in dire situations in camps?*

Q #	Recipient Questions	Item	Averages or % for Items
Q-11 e	If NO, why did you move?	No money to pay the rent.	5%
		Had problems with the Landlord	2%
		Landlord kicked me out.	1%
		1st year's lease ended.	1%
		Didn't like the house.	1%
		Didn't like the neighborhood.	1%
		It wasn't safe.	1%
Q-11 h	What will happen if you cannot pay the rent?	Landlord will evict	38%
		Move to Family	16%
		God will provide	11%
		DK	7%
		Move	7%
		Move to Province	6%
		Landlord will negotiate	4%
		NGO Grant	1%
		Borrow	1%
		Informal Settlements	1%

#### Recommendations:

- It can be assumed that the funding opportunities will decrease in the fourth year following the earthquake. As conditions in camps will presumably degrade in a funding-poor environment, Partners and donors should prioritize solutions that either ensure minimal stands in camps, or renew strategic efforts for camp closures and RSCGA. The only other options will be unplanned camp closures or the construction of sufficient social housing. The former has proved to create as many problems as it solves; the latter, if not already underway, will require 3-5 years for delivery.
- To complement the RSCGA, more efforts should be made to improve economic opportunities and to support grantee households in increasing the household income. This task should not necessarily fall to the Partners that implemented rental support cash grants, but fit within the broader sphere of recovery and development, with programmes working at smaller scale and longer timeframes.
- While it could be considered to provide a supplemental year of rental support cash grants to those unable to meet the most basic needs, this would likely undermine the driving operational philosophy of the RSCGA, and come at the expense of moving new families out of camps and into their rental accommodation.

#### To what extent can the direct beneficiary access basic services?

**Findings in Brief** - Grantees had electricity, communal latrine or toilet and basic services (health, education). The neighbourhoods also enjoyed access to most of the amenities with two interesting exceptions, police services (as respondents saw it) and parks and open spaces. In general, shops, schools, and medical services were within a 10-minute walk, and many areas had street lighting.

As can be noted elsewhere in the descriptive section of this report, there was an overwhelming agreement, strongly held, that in addition to basic services, parks and open spaces were considered essential- while only 20% indicated they had access to such an area.

Q #	Recipient Questions	Strongly Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Don't Know
Q-12 a	It was very important that parks and public spaces were cleared of camps, even though many had to move elsewhere.	98%	2%	0%	0%	0%

Q #	Recipient Questions	Item	Yes	No	DK
Q-3 d	Does your rented space, or the home it is in, have access to:	Electricity:	93%	6%	1%
		Running Water:	34%	66%	0%
		Toilet or Latrine:	97%	3%	0%
Q-5 a	The neighbourhood I live in now has:	Piped water	67%	33%	0%
		Street Lighting	91%	9%	0%
		Sewage Disposal	72%	27%	1%
		Trash Disposal	69%	31%	0%
		Park	20%	80%	0%
		Police Presence	54%	46%	0%
Q-5 b	Within 10 minutes walking time there is a:	Clinic / Medical	72%	27%	1%
Q-5 c	There is additional rental housing available in this neighbourhood:	Pharmacy	78%	20%	2%
Q-5 d	There is an active neighbourhood development group here:		58%	15%	28%
Q-5 f	There is a community group for safety issues in our neighbourhood.		29%	43%	28%
			17%	70%	13%

It is useful to note that there are some neighbourhood development groups in operation, as identified by the respondents. Why those are in operation, and what the motivating force was in their establishment probably represents a useful direction for further investigation.

Q #	Landlord Questions	Item	Yes	No	DK
Q-3 c	Does the rental space have?	Electricity:	96%	4%	0%
		Running Water:	26%	74%	1%
		Toilet or Latrine:	98%	1%	1%

Here we notice that **between the landlord and the recipient there is a high degree of correlation between amenities available**. The difference in reported access to running water between landlord and renter is of interest, but within the range of comparability.

#### Recommendations:

- Results illustrate that the minimum standards of eligibility of rental accommodations dictated by the RSCGA Partners are being enforced, appreciated by beneficiaries, and should continue as such.

#### What did the direct beneficiary do with the excess money following rent payment?

Q9C1		
	Frequency	Percent
Valid	388	100.0
Bought Clothes	18	4.6
Bought Documents	6	1.5
Bought Food	1	.3
Bought House	101	26.0
Bought Household Goods	1	.3
Bought Tools	5	1.3
Business	11	2.8
Construction	100	25.8
Helped Another Family	2	.5
Invest	7	1.8
Medical Care	1	.3
Paid Debts	1	.3
Paid School Fees	9	2.3
Saved	77	19.8
Took Courses / Training	38	9.8
Total	10	2.6

**Findings in Brief - Overwhelmingly, excess money appeared directed towards commerce and micro-business investment, followed closely by payment of school fees, with purchase of food a close third.** It is useful to note that following food purchase, the next three categories were 'deferred need' types of activities (save, help family, pay debt) and implied a strong sense of planning and preparing.

If only considering the most important items as a first field, it was actually evenly divided between small business / commerce, and food, with school fees

mentioned 3<sup>rd</sup> most often. Given that grantees carry more debt than they have savings, and there was significant variance in the supplemental support provided by the various Partners' programmes, it is a challenge to draw a single conclusion for what represents 'excess money'. The informed assumption is that any liquidity at the household level would be spent in proportions similar to those averages below.

Q #	Recipient Questions	Item	Averages or % for Items
Q-9 c	If you had money left over, what were the most important things you did with it after you paid your first years rent - in order of importance? (Top Three Responses per Category Tallied Across)	Small Business / Commerce Paid School Fees Bought Food Saved Helped Another Family Paid Debts Took Courses / Training Bought Tools	71% 59% 54% 24% 14% 12% 7% 7%

**Recommendations:**

- Findings indicate that supplemental grants that target small business development and for education are likely to have the greatest use by grantees. In the context of a target population that carries important levels of debt and few possibilities to save, it is a challenge to find the perfect grant size, as any household liquidity will likely be spent.

**To what extent has the Rental Support Cash Grant encouraged private sector [LL] construction?**

**Findings in Brief** - One structural element of the RSCGA that stood out was its impact on construction. **77% of the landlords responded that they had made upgrades and investments in their property to meet Home Verification Team requirements.** This impact cannot be underestimated as it affected economic, safety, and quality of life issues at all levels. It appears that **landlords reinvested about 2/3 of their rent monies from grantees in immediate upgrades and their planning for the next year included about that amount again as a potential investment.**

This particular question may put us in the range of ‘over attributing’ an impact and requires some caution to interpret in many different ways. As has been pointed out, there are two distinct groups of landlords – those 88% who have a single renter, and the 12% who have multiple (up to a maximum 7 reported) contracts.

There are 3 domains to this question that the survey queried:

- **Investments made to improve** the rental space to meet the requirements stipulated by the Partner’s rental support programmes and Home Verification Teams.
- **Investments actually made** in more general construction activities.
- **Planned future construction.**

As can be noted below, on average, **landlords reported that they spent just over two hundred dollars in preparing the space for rental.** If average rent is about \$400 per month, then this represents a sizeable investment in upgrading.

On the question related to more general upgrades, these were **reported as representing an investment of \$124 on average.** These could have been anything from building a fence, adding a latrine, or any number of additional constructions. The two outlays represent a goodly portion of the first year rent that was reinvested in construction or upgrade activities of some sort.

The third domain regards potential future investments in some kind of new rental construction. It appears that **landlords plan to invest as much again (\$293) in some kind of expansion of their rental holdings** as they already have invested. It also gives a bit of insight into how landlords are looking at the future rental market, i.e., **adding not one, but 2 potential rental units.**

Q #	Landlord Questions	Item	Averages or % for Items
Q-5 c	About how much did you spend in improvements?	#:	\$201
Q-7 a	About how much did you reinvest in housing upgrades?	#:	\$124
Q-7 b	How many:  Spaces will you add? (20% Yes Q7b) How much will you invest? (Subgrouped)		2 \$293

Q #	Landlord Questions	Strongly Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Don't Know
Q-4 f	I think the Rental Support Program stimulated investment in construction of additional rental housing in the metropolitan area.	33%	12%	9%	35%	10%
Q-4 c	I made some improvements on the rental space because I had to meet requirements from the NGO verifier.	77%	10%	1%	10%	1%

Q #	Recipient Questions	Strongly Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Don't Know
Q-4 c	My landlord made some improvements on my rental space because I rented from him.	61%	11%	6%	22%	0%
Q-4 e	The rented space I live in is about average when compared to my neighbors living situation.	40%	27%	15%	17%	1%

When comparing Q-4c from the LL survey with Q-4c from the RS survey, we generally find a fairly strong agreement, though it appears the landlords were a bit more enthusiastic about their supposed efforts on behalf of the renters than the renters were about what was done. Notwithstanding, the numbers are comparable.

Q #	Landlord Questions	Item	Yes	No	DK
Q-5 c	Did you spend money in rental space improvements for your renters because they got a Cash Grant?		68%	32%	1%
Q-5 d	I used the rental money I got from the Rental Support Cash Grant to build new rental spaces.		2%	97%	1%
Q-7 a	Did you use any of the rental support money to reinvest in housing upgrades?		44%	53%	3%
Q-7 b	Will you try to increase the number of your rental properties in the next year?		20%	76%	4%

The investment and expansion possibilities as expressed in Q-7b both quantitative and qualitative include all landlords but the question requires further analysis as it is possible that numeric responses from the 12% of landlords holding multiple contracts could have skewed the numbers reported.

#### Recommendations:

- The projected successful outcomes with LLs are ones that Partners should leverage and integrate into the theory of change that represents the results chain of the RSCGA. While LLs are indirect beneficiaries, the successes and run-on effects illustrate how short-term humanitarian programming can provide mid-term effects.

#### To what extent has the Rental Support Cash Grant contributed to the installation and development of new informal settlements?

**Findings in Brief – This study was unable to find evidence that the RSCGA contributed to the development of new informal settlements.**

This has apparently been a contentious issue regarding the RSCGA. Analysis of the data would indicate that this is at best anecdotal evidence being used by detractors of the approach. **There appears to be very little desire to move to an informal settlement, even if the grantee can't afford the next year's rent.** From the landlord perspective, the issue doesn't appear to be an issue for consideration.

Q #	Recipient Questions	Item	Averages or % for Items
Q-11 h	What will happen if you cannot pay the rent?	Landlord will evict Move to Family God will provide DK Move Move to Province Landlord will negotiate NGO Grant Borrow Informal Settlements	38% 16% 11% 7% 7% 6% 4% 1% 1% 1%

On the side of the landlord, there is evidence that some (less than 10%) are moving from their homes in order to rent them out, but that dynamic would have to be examined more in-depth to understand just where they might be going. Certainly the vast majority of the landlords strongly disagreed with the idea, and the 88% number is somewhat reflective of the fact that there are about 12% of landlords holding multiple rental contracts anyway.

Q #	Landlord Questions	Strongly Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Don't Know
Q-2 f	I rented my house to someone in this program so I could move somewhere else	7%	2%	3%	88%	1%

For these reasons, **it is suggested that it is highly unlikely the Rental Support Cash Grant Program is fuelling any such dynamic.**

#### Recommendations:

- While resources could be dedicated to studying informal settlements, this should not be undertaken in relation to the RSCGA.

## 4.2 Findings- Lessons from Helping Families, Closing Camps

To **identify lessons learned and related recommendations** that could be applied on a wider scale during implementation, taking into account the particular profile and vulnerability of the target beneficiaries [Evaluation ToR]

In order to ground respondent answers in the context of their experience with the Rental Cash Grant Support Program Approach to date, and the confirmation of certain program elements at the community level, the platform on which the analysis was built **included a testing of certain assumptions made in the *Helping Families* report.** The strategy to manage this was to ask questions that would add amplifying knowledge or back check outcomes related to the 'Lessons Learned' aspects of that report. Such a confirmation allows us to triangulate data to understand the situation of current recipients, inform planners about the efficacy of certain activities, and allow planners to look to the future using field verified information.

### Mass Communication: As Rental Subsidy Cash Grant programs moved up in scale, effective mass communication with beneficiaries and the general public became essential

Q #	Recipient Questions	Strongly Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Don't Know
Q-10 f	NGO's really helped me a lot to understand the Rental Support program so I knew what to do.	78%	10%	7%	4%	1%
Q-10 h	I got most of my information about the program from local media	28%	9%	14%	46%	3%

Partners clarified that effective mass communication with beneficiaries was implemented by their own staff. They employed a range of communication channels and media to disseminate information about rental support cash programmes- hence the utilisation of the term 'Mass Communication'.

### Recommendations:

- Revise *Helping Families, Closing Camps* to more accurately reflect that beneficiary communication was undertaken by Partner agencies, using a wide range of communication means.

**Camp closure programs will be successful even when 100% of families are given a rental solution and no permanent housing options are offered**

Q #	Recipient Questions	Strongly Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Don't Know
Q-10 b	The Rental Support Cash Grant really helped me when I needed it most.	92%	7%	0%	1%	0%
Q-12 c	I think the Rental Support program should be available to all families still living in camps.	92%	4%	2%	1%	1%
Q #	Landlord Questions	Strongly Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Don't Know
Q-2 a	I think closing camps as soon as possible is one of the most important things to do in rebuilding the metropolitan area.	85%	9%	2%	3%	2%
Q-2 b	The Rental Support Program is a really good way to speed up the process of closing camps.	77%	12%	5%	5%	1%
Q-9 c	I think the Rental Support program should be available to all families still living in camps.	88%	5%	3%	3%	2%

**It is very clear that people want the camps closed.** If there is one area of almost unanimous agreement and strength of feeling, it is certainly this one.

### Recommendations:

- Camp closures could potentially be politically and emotionally charged activities: the survey results show almost unanimous agreement with a continued programme of camp closure and satisfaction with the RSCGA and its philosophy of offering grantees choice in their future. The GoH, donors and Partners should capitalize on this support and focus increasingly limited resources on needs clearly defined by its stakeholders.

### Rental Homes must be Safe

Q #	Recipient Questions	Strongly Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Don't Know
Q-2 b	The NGO I worked with really helped me to understand how to find a place that was safe and appropriate.	85%	8%	3%	4%	0%
Q-2 c	The NGO I worked with was personally interested in my situation, and followed up with help or visits.	76%	12%	6%	5%	1%
Q-4 a	I feel pretty safe about the strength and safety of the building I live in, even if we have another earthquake.	52%	19%	19%	9%	2%
Q-6 a	I am safe at night when in my own rented space.	67%	12%	9%	10%	1%
Q #	Landlord Questions	Strongly Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Don't Know
Q-4 c	I made some improvements on the rental space because I had to meet requirements from the NGO verifier.	77%	10%	1%	10%	1%

The work done by the Partners and the Household Verification Teams was clearly effective and successful in ensuring that personalized support was provided to grantees as they selected and moved into housing deemed safe. This was a key element imposed in the system as it unfolded, and it was obviously effective in meeting the objectives set by Partners. Without this element of the program in place, it is likely a great number of unfortunate problems would have emerged. The RSCGA made promises, and delivered on those promises to the satisfaction of its stakeholders, down to the level of individual families. It can be argued that the **rigour applied by Partners in their approach accounts for- and perhaps justifies- the high cost of programme implementation.** Even the term 'high cost' is relative: one Partner respondent suggested that the cost of supporting an IDP in a camp is roughly \$1 USD/person/per day.

### Recommendations:

- While this finding alludes to the level of effectiveness of Partner rental support programmes, it doesn't clarify what constitutes efficiency. It would have to be explored if the RSCGA could be scaled-up, with less individual attention given to its beneficiaries, while delivering similar levels of effectiveness.

### **Modest but decent**

Q #	Recipient Questions	Strongly Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Don't Know
Q-4 b	I can keep the rented space I live in clean, comfortable, and safe for me and my family.	91%	8%	1%	1%	0%
Q-4 e	The rented space I live in is about average when compared to my neighbors living situation.	40%	27%	15%	17%	1%

This was a very important aspect to keep in mind as the program was implemented. A general challenge in return/relocation programmes is the potential disparity between the resources available to the host population, and that of the programme beneficiaries. The disparity in wealth and services between residents and returning IDPs could create hostility, resentment, and sometimes retaliation. The **RSCGA has ensured that grantees have returned to a rental home in conditions that fit the description of 'modest, but decent'.**

### **Recommendations:**

- The RSCGA has successfully managed to mitigate potential disparities between host and returning populations; the formula works, and should be continued.

Q #	Landlord Questions	Strongly Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Don't Know
Q-4 a	The rent I charge my renter in this program is about the average price for anyone in that neighborhood.	45%	20%	7%	22%	6%

### **Allow IDPs to rent from friends and family**

Q #	Recipient Questions	Item	Averages or % for Items
Q-1 g	We rented from:	Landlord: 90% Family: 3% Other: 7%	
Q #	Landlord Questions	Item	Yes No DK
Q-1 h	The person who rented from me is a family member.		4% 94% 2%

As can be seen in the statistics above, this was apparently not a particularly significant issue in this program, but it was certainly wise to preventively accommodate it in planning and implementation. Undoubtedly this facilitated a smoother implementation cycle, as Partners were free of having to be the 'rental police'. Keeping large programs such as this moving forward requires that bottlenecks or other areas of contention be considered and eliminated well ahead of time via policy, planning, and directives.

### **Recommendations:**

- Findings confirm that, while statistically insignificant, allowing IDPs to rent from families was useful for some grantees. Given that this represents a key coping mechanism for those families whose incomes will potentially not allow them to rent accommodations at the standard of the RSCGA after one year, Partners should explore how to promote this option further.

### **How to combat rental price increases – the “keep the change” approach**

Q #	Recipient Questions	Strongly Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Don't Know
Q-2 a	Being able to 'keep the change' when I negotiated my rental contract really helped me a lot to get the best price.	58%	7%	9%	25%	1%
Q-8 a	From what I hear, rental prices were higher if a Landlord knew you got Rental Support.	42%	15%	5%	35%	3%
Q-8 b	Being able to 'keep the change' if I negotiated a good rent really motivated me to search for the best situation I could get.	57%	14%	8%	20%	1%

Q #	Landlord Questions	Strongly Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Don't Know
Q-4 a	The rent I charge my renter in this program is about the average price for anyone in that neighborhood.	45%	20%	7%	22%	6%
Q-4 b	Some landlords took advantage of the people getting a cash grant, and charged a higher price for rent than the market rate.	10%	7%	4%	48%	31%

**The 'keep the change' approach was an extremely interesting choice and, in retrospect, a very well reasoned one.** It seems to have resulted in somewhat mixed feeling from both renters and landlords. Overall it has to be factored in that such a set-up took maximum advantage of the individual to assert their own bargaining position and reinforced the RSCGA philosophy of providing those remaining in camps a choice in their future. Given that some Partners provided substantial supplemental cash grants, the 'keep the change' might have struck those grantees as relatively insignificant.

In relation to Q-4a, it is unfortunate we did not ask in which direction the LL's thought the average price was skewed by the program. Follow-up calls might be useful in order to clarify this point, as it would be instructive.

#### Recommendations:

- 'Keep the change' appears to have been a well-reasoned operational choice and introduced some autonomy and bargaining power at the recipient level. From an administrative point of view, and to develop recipient program 'buy in', this is a very wise, fair, and useful inclusion at multiple levels.

#### Empowering families to make better housing choices

Q #	Recipient Questions	Strongly Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Don't Know
Q-2 b	The NGO I worked with really helped me to understand how to find a place that was safe and appropriate.	85%	8%	3%	4%	0%
Q-2 c	The NGO I worked with was personally interested in my situation, and followed up with help or visits.	76%	12%	6%	5%	1%
Q-2 d	The Landlord understood my situation with the Rental Support, and didn't try to take advantage of my situation.	51%	11%	6%	31%	1%
Q-2 e	We got the best place we could have, thinking about all the issues.	93%	5%	1%	1%	1%
Q-2 f	Moving out of a camp is better than staying in one if you have the choice.	89%	8%	3%	1%	0%
Q-4 c	My landlord made some improvements on my rental space because I rented from him.	61%	11%	6%	22%	0%
Q-8 b	Being able to 'keep the change' if I negotiated a good rent really motivated me to search for the best situation I could get.	57%	14%	8%	20%	1%
Q-10 a	The Rental Support Program was fairly implemented and properly administered, from what I saw and people say.	76%	13%	6%	4%	2%
Q-10 b	The Rental Support Cash Grant really helped me when I needed it most.	92%	7%	0%	1%	0%
Q-10 c	I received most of what I was promised by the NGOs	44%	13%	27%	15%	1%
Q-10 e	The program really gave me the choice to find the best place to rent for me and my family.	71%	15%	9%	5%	0%
Q-10 f	NGO's really helped me a lot to understand the Rental Support program so I knew what to do.	78%	10%	7%	4%	1%

Q #	Landlord Questions	Strongly Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Don't Know
Q-2 c	From what I saw and heard, I think the NGOs did a good job in implementing the Rental Support Program.	81%	12%	5%	1%	1%
Q-2 e	I trust the NGO I worked with to deliver on their promise when we signed the agreement with the renters in their program.	81%	12%	3%	2%	3%
Q-4 e	Because of the cash grant for renters, more people in my neighborhood are renting out space.	33%	18%	10%	30%	9%

It is clear from this general set of responses that **the RSCGA Partners can be commended for implementing a program that stayed true to its promise**. Certainly the sensitization and information teams were very successful in getting the message across. Q-10c for the renters would bear further investigation; there were some anecdotal indications that Partners experienced discrepancies in size/frequency of rental grants provided, so some follow-up here might be useful. The level of confidence expressed in the NGO 'agreement' process with the landlords (Q-2c and e) is also very laudable, and demonstrates a clear attention to what is often problematic in a program such as this.

### Taxation – short-term vs. long-term priorities

Q #	Landlord Questions	Strongly Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Don't Know
Q-8 e	I am worried that the government will start to tax my rental earnings because of the Rental Support Program.	16%	17%	10%	53%	5%
Q-9 d	After this experience with the earthquake, I believe my government is better prepared and more able to meet future emergencies.	14%	16%	6%	41%	24%

This taxation discussion has long-term implications, both pro and con. Taxation is always problematic, and particularly so if an international agency is seen to support or promote government policy practices that citizens deem unfair or corrupt.

Q #	Recipient Questions	Strongly Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Don't Know
Q-12 d	After this experience with the earthquake, I believe my government is better prepared to meet future emergencies.	25%	16%	13%	22%	23%

### There remain questions regarding the extent to which these camp closure programs are contributing to the growth of informal settlements

Q #	Recipient Questions	Item	Averages or % for Items
Q-11 h	What will happen if you cannot pay the rent?	Landlord will evict	38%
		Move to Family	16%
		God will provide	11%
		DK	7%
		Move	7%
		Move to Province	6%
		Landlord will negotiate	4%
		NGO Grant	1%
		Borrow	1%
		Informal Settlements	1%

Q #	Landlord Questions	Strongly Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Don't Know
Q-2 f	I rented my house to someone in this program so I could move somewhere else	7%	2%	3%	88%	1%

As discussed previously, **it does not appear that the Rental Support Cash Grant Program has affected the informal settlements or caused them to expand**. This appears to be a separate dynamic of long duration, and is more a problem of rule of law and access to appropriate cadastral information that can demonstrate ownership and history. Then, it becomes a problem of governance, policy and enforcement by GoH.

### Camp closure and the link with rebuilding neighbourhoods of return

Q #	Landlord Questions	Strongly Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Don't Know
Q-2 a	I think closing camps as soon as possible is one of the most important things to do in rebuilding the metropolitan area.	85%	9%	2%	3%	2%
Q-2 b	The Rental Support Program is a really good way to speed up the process of closing camps.	77%	12%	5%	5%	1%
Q-4 c	I made some improvements on the rental space because I had to meet requirements from the NGO verifier.	77%	10%	1%	10%	1%
Q-4 e	Because of the cash grant for renters, more people in my neighborhood are renting out space.	33%	18%	10%	30%	9%
Q-4 f	I think the Rental Support Program stimulated investment in construction of additional rental housing in the metropolitan area.	33%	12%	9%	35%	10%
Q-8 b	From what I hear, since the earthquake it is much easier to make money by renting spaces out than before.	30%	25%	14%	28%	3%

The 16/6 programme makes operational sense. As we see by the data, the majority of people return to their neighbourhood of origin, which is logical. A clear plan existed such that when you close a camp and move people out of a public space, you have an integrated plan that quickly uses that window to effect necessary infrastructure installation. If it is properly planned and executed, this process can actually 'roll' in such a way that rebuilding and real infrastructure such as water and sewerage pipes, can be constructed in a logical and progressive way.

If the camp closure project cannot be managed in harmony with that type of planning, the risk is one of simply displacing of a housing problem rather than the exceptional tool the RSCGA represents for the possibility of a logical, structured, and sequential rebuilding of Port-au-Prince and its critical infrastructure. Without a concurrent neighbourhood development and reconstruction corollary, the RSCGA's results will be weakened.

#### Recommendations:

- The need for continued investment in an integrated neighbourhood redevelopment strategy should be underlined, and the RSCGA seen as a tool and catalyst for strategic investment, planning and implementation by the GoH, its international donors, Partners and humanitarian/development actors both national and international.

#### The Government of Haiti and donors should fund further study of results for families beyond the one-year project cycle.

Q #	Recipient Questions	Strongly Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Don't Know
Q-12 d	After this experience with the earthquake, I believe my government is better prepared to meet future emergencies.	25%	16%	13%	22%	23%

Q #	Landlord Questions	Strongly Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Don't Know
Q-9 d	After this experience with the earthquake, I believe my government is better prepared and more able to meet future emergencies.	14%	16%	6%	41%	24%

This evaluation represents one such investment in the study of results of families beyond the one-year project cycle. Overall, there has been a tremendous investment in information and planning infrastructure. One only need look at the entire data handling investment of the IOM CCCM/E-Shelter Cluster investment, and its relationship to the Haitian government to understand value of this outcome, and the potential to effectively leverage this for future development in Haiti. As such, and as a key to future information and planning needs, there clearly should be an emphasis on fostering systems of information handling that support a more integrated, strategic and standardized RSCGA across Partners as they move forward. The opportunity exists, the infrastructure is in place, it would appear wise to take stock of the investment and learning made, and to incorporate the structure and functions into the existing GoH structures.

### **Recommendations:**

- An opportunity exists to take the learning from *Helping Families, Closing Camps*, the results of this evaluation and undertake the development of methods and tools, including information and planning requirements that could serve the continuing RSCGA and future urban disasters. There is a Haiti-specific opportunity to evaluate how the combination of CCCM and E-Shelter Clusters into one structure might contribute to more efficient response, and speculate on whether it could be replicated earlier and with greater commitment in similar contexts.

## 5. Socio-Economic Impact on Beneficiaries

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### 5.1 Social Return on Investment (SROI)

As introduced in Chapter 2, Social Return on Investment provides a principled approach that can be used to measure and account for a broad concept of value. While a SROI analysis will provide a headline **costs to benefits ratio**, it will also deliver a detailed narrative that explains how change is created and evaluates the impact of the change through the evidence that is gathered. It is a **story about change**, on which to base decisions, and that story is told through qualitative, quantitative and financial information. This Chapter is structured around the SROI process that narrates the story of change represented by the Rental Support Cash Programme Approach. In conducting a SROI analysis, we are able to provide insights on the socio-economic impact required by the evaluation ToR.

This first stage of this process includes: determining the stakeholders; defining the intended/unintended changes that the RSCGA will bring those stakeholders; considering stakeholder inputs/investments in the RSCGA; and, mapping the resulting outputs. This information is summarized in Table 5.1. It calculates that **Partners invested a total of \$14,363,809.50 US in the RSCGA on behalf of 5971 grantees and 4134 landlords.**

The next stage of the SROI story explores the **outcomes of the programme, specifically, what changed as a result of the RSCGA**. This begins with describing the range of real and potential changes; we consider how to measure those changes, where this information could come from; the quantity of change (i.e. the number of stakeholders than benefit from this change); and the duration of the change (how long it will last). Having mapped out a range of changes, we then develop a financial proxy for this change- what would be a financial value to this change and identify a source for this proxy. This information is summarized in Table 5.2. We calculate that a total of **\$26,097,254.13 US in present social value was generated by the RSCGA on behalf of 5971 grantees and 4134 landlords.**

In the final stages, we first undertake a ‘reality check’ in order to account other factors that influence whether the outcomes that we have analysed result from the RSCGA activities. These include **deadweight, displacement, attribution and drop off**. This information is summarized in Table 5.3. This section illustrates how some changes provide more enduring impacts, positively affecting the SROI ratio.

The final section looks at the resulting **SROI ratio that indicates that for every \$1 invested in the RSCGA, \$1.80 of social value is generated** (1.82:1, rounded down). Using the existing data, we present potential models that explore how Partners could adapt their investment and programming to optimize their SROI in future.

The complete Impact Map is provided with the evaluation report in electronic format, compiling all of the described elements in a single spread sheet. It can be used as a tool to support future RSCGA iterations, exploring how the RWG or individual Partners could adapt their programming, modelling potential results and their accompanying costs to benefits ratio.

#### Stakeholder Engagement

Stakeholders were involved in a variety of ways throughout the preparation of the SROI analysis. In the course of the 6 days field visit, 29 interviews and focus group discussions were conducted, in addition to two workshops with Partners in order to develop and refine the Impact Map. This was complemented by telephone surveys of 740 grant recipients and landlords. Draft findings were again developed with Partners

in a December workshop in PaP. This process permitted an on-going evolution of the SROI impact map, and a revision of the story of change that it represents.

In seeking to minimize the demands on Partners' time during the field mission and in workshops, the **evaluators underestimated the investment required to introduce the SROI methodology to first-time users**. This was compounded by the need to invest in the development of consensus about the intended objectives of the Rental Support Cash Program among a diverse group of Partners who were using several different programming approaches and philosophies. Nonetheless, it is hoped that an indirect contribution of the evaluation may be the mainstreaming of SROI as an alternative methodology for the measurement of changes generated by humanitarian and development programming, and in measuring socio-economic impact.

## **5.2 Who are the stakeholders? What will change for them? What Value (Investment) and Outputs?**

Table 5.1 brings together all of the elements presented in this section.

In SROI terms, **stakeholders are defined as people or organizations that effort or are affected by the activity being analysed**. Stakeholders of the RSCGA were developed initially through desk study of key documents, and then in a workshop with Partners on 24 October in Port-au-Prince. The key questions that framed the discussions around stakeholders included: *Do we need to include every stakeholder? How do we decide?* Table 5.1 includes the rationale for inclusion/exclusion of identified stakeholders.

### **Intended/Unintended Changes**

It should be noted that the development of a shared vision of the intended/unintended change for grantees was subject to lengthy discussions amongst Partner representatives participating to the SROI Impact Map workshops. **There were varying philosophies of in how far the impact of the RSCGA should be limited to getting grantees out of camps, to those who imagined their respective programme as supporting the resilience of beneficiaries and/or focusing on sustainable results.** Whatever the respective position on resilience or sustainability, the final impact map clearly illustrates that the RSCGA provides enduring results, though these changes are more consistent and significant for LLs than grantees.

### **Value and Outputs**

The following table provides the figures and calculations that were used to generate the investment costs (Value, in USD) attributed to Implementing Partners and Donors in Table 5.1. Cash grants are attributed to Partner agencies, while the RSCGA implementation costs are attributed to the donors.

The outputs (and the value of the inputs) are a reflection of the various approaches implemented by Partners. The common contribution to grantees was a rental cash grant of 500\$ followed by a payment 2-3 months later, which confirmed that the grantee was still in the rental accommodation. Different organizations provided a range of supplemental support (introduced in Chapter 3), and these are integrated into the respective cash grants and implementation costs.

Organization	Number of Beneficiaries	Total Cash Grant \$/Grantee =Total Cost (USD)	Implementation Cost/Grantee =Total Cost (USD)
Catholic Relief Services (CRS)	678	\$620 =\$420,360	\$991.75 =\$672,406.50

<b>Concern Worldwide</b>	158	\$900 =\$142,200	\$1300 =\$205,400  (Average cost of old and new programmes)
<b>International Federation of Red Cross/Red Crescent Societies (IFRC)</b>	3701	\$1000 =\$3,701,000	\$1800 =\$6,661,800
<b>International Organization for Migration (IOM)</b>	1068	\$650 =\$694,200	\$1250 =\$1,335,000
<b>J/P Haitian Relief Organization (J/P HRO)</b>	353	\$650 =\$229,450	\$881 =\$310,993
	<b>Total:</b> <b>5971</b>	<b>Total Cost of Grants:</b> <b>\$5,187,210</b>	<b>Total Implementation Cost:</b> <b>\$9,185,599.50</b>

**Table 5.1- Which Stakeholders? What Changes? What Investment (Value) and Outputs?**

Stakeholder	Included/ Excluded	Rationale	Intended/Unintended Changes	Inputs	Value (USD)	Outputs
Grantee	Included	Grantee families are the main beneficiaries who are likely to experience significant outcomes from the activities.	Grantees no longer live in camps, have chosen a <b>safe rental shelter solution</b> in better living <b>conditions</b> , and benefit from supplemental <b>cash grants and training</b> .	Time, Labour	\$0	<b>5971 grantees</b> benefit from the renal support cash grant approach (selection process, 'keep the change' and transport subsidy, livelihood, education and health support/grants)
Property Owner (Landlord)	Included	Landlords are the secondary beneficiaries who are likely to experience significant outcomes from the activities.	Landlords house a tenant with a contracted one-year rent paid up front.	Time	\$0 [to avoid double accounting, investments made by LLs were considered as outcomes of the RSCGA)	<b>4134 landlords</b> negotiate an annual rental price with Grantee and receive payment.
Government of Haiti	Included	Provide the framework within which donors and implementing partners operate, in addition to providing support to Partners in their programmes. While they are seen as enablers for the RSCGA, they did not experience specific change beyond their job responsibilities. This is consistent with advice from the SROI Network.	Implement the Return and Relocation Strategy including camp closure, focus national/international resources on neighbourhoods.	Time, human resources	\$0	All outcomes for this stakeholder are considered above.
Implementing Partners	Included	Provide the rental support cash option to IDPs who select it, in support of the GoH Return and Relocation strategy.	<b>Provide the rental support cash grant to IDPs who select it</b> , in support of the GoH Return and Relocation strategy.	The total cost of all grants provided to beneficiaries, accounting for differences across Partners	<b>\$5,187,210</b>	All outcomes for this stakeholder are considered above.
Donors	Included	Provided funding reinforcing	<b>Resource the implementation of</b>	All programme	<b>\$9,185,599.50</b>	All outcomes for this

		their priorities and those of the GoH. As the funding provided came from a range of sources, this stakeholder is a generic placeholder for funding of the implementation costs of the RSCGA.	the rental support cash program in support of the Resettlement and Relocation strategy.	implementation costs (sum of average cost per Grantee x # beneficiaries, for all Partners)		stakeholder are considered above.
Neighbourhoods and Informal Settlements	<b>Excluded</b>	These stakeholders were excluded for two reasons. There is no reason to consider that grantees as any different than other renters in a PaP neighbourhood. Survey showed no impact of the RSCGA on informal settlements.	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Commercial Actors Who Supported RSCGA	<b>Excluded</b>	Included in this category were banks, private transport and car rental agencies, telephone companies, training institutions and health insurers. In <b>order to avoid double counting</b> , these stakeholders were built into the implementation costs of Partners.	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Commercial Actors Who Were Potentially Impacted by RSCGA	<b>Excluded</b>	Included in this category were wholesalers, water sellers, de-sludging companies and local markets. While these were stakeholders affected by camp closures, their inclusion risked being 'over claiming' in terms of RSCGA effects, positively or negatively.	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Partner Staff	<b>Excluded</b>	Partner staff was excluded from the analysis. While they are as enablers for the RSCGA, they did not experience specific change beyond their job responsibilities. This is consistent with advice from the SROI Network.	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
<b>Total Investment Cost</b>					<b>\$14,372,809.50</b>	

### **5.3 What Social Change Generated- How Do We Measure it? How to Value It? How Long Will It Last?**

*What was the meaningful change that was generated?* Through discussions with stakeholders, outcomes of the RSCGA were developed with a specific focus **on what changes as a result of RSCGA activities**. The exercise of collectively defining changes is one that challenges stakeholders to think outside the comfort zone of activity-based thinking. For example, stating that, ‘Grantees received a safe accommodation’ only indicates the output. The questions, ‘So what?’ and ‘*What actually changed?*’ are typically prompts to oblige participants to identify actual changes that result from their activities, and think abstractly in terms of the real effects of programming decisions, how to measure those changes and determine financial proxies to value them.

As there was variance in the size of cash grants provided and the types of support provided by Partners, the changes that were developed with stakeholders had to accommodate the palette of potential changes enjoyed by stakeholders. **A total of 8 changes were identified for Grantees, and 2 for Landlords.**

The logic of Table 5.2 follows mirrors that which would be employed in a Logical Framework or Theory of Change exercise. Having identified a change, we imagine how to measure it and from where we would collect the data. The **quantities of change** (i.e. the number of grantees or landlords that were affected by a specific change) were developed through the RS and LL surveys data and subsequent analysis (discussed in the following section). In some cases these quantities could be extracted directly (number of students, number of new LLs); in other cases Factor Analysis was undertaken in order to develop quantities for more abstract change (feeling of safety and security, or pride, for example). Particular attention is made in projecting the duration- of how long we think that stakeholders will benefit from that change. The LL/RS survey results revealed differences in how enduring different changes can be seen over time. These results have been re-integrated into the Table 5.2 and the accompanying impact map.

The remainder of the table addresses elements that are specific to SROI and consider **how to measure and monetize the social value being generated**.

A **financial proxy** for each change is created through discussion with stakeholders. It should be highlighted that this activity of the SROI analysis can be imagined as being a question of judgement: there is no ‘right’ answer. We are looking for a proxy that best accommodates diverse evaluation stakeholders and their thinking. For example: the importance of pride in the Haitian context lead to animated discussions with stakeholders. How did this programme contribute to that pride? *More importantly, what monetary value could we ascribe to pride?* We employed stated and revealed preference to develop these monetary values. In the example of ‘pride’, a Haitian staffer of a Partner agency came up with a proxy that resonated with stakeholders: **pride is the equivalent of being able to provide your family with one hot meal per day**. Having verified this proxy, we then determine what the cost that would be, and determined a source for its monetary value. This process has been applied to the ten changes found in the Impact Map and table 5.2 below.

#### **Quantities of Social Change Generated**

The following analysis of resulting survey data was undertaken to determine if there were ‘Factors’ that could explain the sentiments that were behind responses to the various question sets in the survey instruments. Factor analysis attempts to identify underlying variables, or factors, that explain the pattern of correlations within a set of observed variables. Factor analysis is often used in data reduction to identify a small number of factors that explain most of the variance observed in a much larger number of manifest variables. In this example, we ran factor analysis on the universe of response data, resulting in the identification of 8 factors.

### Recipient Survey Questions Related by Factor

Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4	Factor 5	Factor 6	Factor 7	Factor 8
Q2B	Q6A	Q4A	Q2D	Q2A	Q106	Q8A	Gender
Q2C	Q6C	Q4B	Q6B	Q8B	Q10H	Q8C	Q4E
Q2F	Q6D	Q4C	Q10D		Q12D	Q12B	Q6E
Q10A		Q4D			Q12E		Q12C
Q10B							
Q10E							
Q10F							
Q12C							

We examined the questions that corresponded to each factor and developed a common theme for each column. These factors were in turn linked to the 10 changes identified in the SROI Impact Map and the resulting number of stakeholders affected was generated by using the average number of positive responses to the component questions/factors (expressed as Quantity in Table 5.2). It should be underlined that this process is interpretive, and is an exercise in exercising judgement.

#### Emerging Theme/Factor (F):

- F1 – Programme/Support
- F2 – Personal Safety and Security
- F3 – Content/Environment/Rental
- F4 – Fairness Embodied by the Rental Approach
- F5 – Empowerment
- F6 – Future Perspectives
- F7 – Life/Work Challenges Post-Earthquake
- F8 – Considering the Common Good

SROI Change	Factor or Other Source	Resulting Number Grantees/LL
1. Grantee feels content, enjoys the <b>safety and improved security</b> associated with living in their own rental space	<b>F2</b> – Safety and Security <b>F3</b> - My Home is my Castle	<b>4658</b>
2. Grantee <b>proud</b> of their independence and capacity to 'make ends meet'	Draw conclusions from the questions posed on their economic security? - 'are they making ends meet?' - calculation of rent vs. weekly earnings, expenses, debt F3	<b>4598</b>
3. Grantee is less stressed following reduction of their <b>debts</b> using cash grants	<b>Reduction</b> in debt (estimated 175 USD in debt by partners vs. 207 survey results) Improvement in well-being interpreted as a combination of <b>F2/F3</b>	<b>4657</b>
4. Grantee families are able to fund tuition for <b>more</b> students	Note: survey was not able to isolate the number of <b>new</b> students that resulted from the RSCGA. It was decided to	<b>1.9 students per family x 5971</b>

	use the average number of students per family, and then over-compensated through discounting this figure under deadweight [50%]	
5. Grantee feels that they have been given <b>choice</b> , that they are protected and can rely upon implementing partners	<b>F5 – Empowerment</b> <b>F4 – Playing by the Rules</b> <b>F1 – Help from ‘Outside’.</b> (The NGO factor)	<b>4617</b>
6. Grantees have access to free medical care through <b>micro-health insurance</b>	The number of grantees that reported access to medical care and/or micro insurance in the 5971 grantees: <b>12%</b>	<b>717</b>
7. Grantees are better equipped to <b>plan and control their lives</b> as a result of training received	<b>F6- Future Perspectives</b> The efforts to develop specific profiles of grantees that stay in rental accommodation or move did not reveal clear determinant factors	<b>1731</b>
8. Grantees benefit from access to <b>safe public space</b>	<b>F8– Considering the Common Good</b> In addition, the survey shows frequency of visits and importance of freeing up public space: almost 100% agreement with importance of freeing public space, average of .4 visits/week by RS/LL	<b>20.8 visits to park/per year for roughly the entire Grantee population</b>

**Table 5.2- Changes, Quantities, Financial Proxies and Calculations/Values**

Stakeholder	What changes?	How do we measure it?	Source	Quantity	Duration	Financial Proxy	Calculation	Value	Source
Grantee	Grantee feels content, enjoys the <b>safety and improved security</b> associated with living in their own rental space.	Number of beneficiaries in a rental space; Factor analysis.	Survey, monitoring data	4658	2 years	Average rental cost	Average rental paid by grantee, cross-referenced with LL results	\$389	LL/Grantee survey results
	Grantee <b>proud</b> of their independence and capacity to 'make ends meet'.	Number of beneficiaries that report improved household economy; Factor analysis.	Survey, focus group	4598	2 years	Family enjoys 1 hot meal/day	Hot meal for family (4.2 persons) @ 75 gourd x 365 days	\$2698.08	Estimate provided by Partners; average family size from survey
	Grantee is less stressed following reduction of their <b>debts</b> using cash grants.	Number of grantees reporting reduction in personal debt; Factor analysis.	Survey, focus group	4657	1 year	Half the value of average debt	Average debt of 143 USD reported by grantees in survey/ 2	\$71.50	Grantee survey results
	Grantee families are able to fund tuition for more <b>students</b> .	Number of additional students sent to school as a result of grants; Factor analysis.	Survey, focus group	11345	1 year	Average cost of school fees + material	Average monthly fee 30 USD (x 9), annual fee 180 USD	\$450	<a href="#">ACTED</a> study
	Grantee feels that they have been given <b>choice</b> , that they are protected and can rely upon implementing partners.	Number of grantees recognizing that special needs were met; Factor analysis.	Survey, focus group	4617	1 year	Cost of 2 days of social worker	Average wage of 'Mobilisateur Social' in NGO roughly 500 USD/month, therefore 2 days= 50 USD	\$50	Estimate provided by Partners
	Grantees have access to free medical care through <b>micro-health insurance</b> .	Number of grantees reporting access to free medical care; Factor analysis.	Survey, focus group	717	1 year	Insurance \$1/person/month cost	Estimated \$1/person/month x 12 x average family size of 4.2	\$ 50.40	Estimate provided by Partners
	Grantees are better equipped to <b>plan and control their lives</b> as a result of training received.	Number of grantees reporting improvements linked to training received; Factor analysis.	Survey, focus group	1731	4 years	Average price of equivalent training course on open market (avg # days of training by partners)	Estimated average of Partner cost, price of equivalent training	\$250	Average price based on estimates provided by Partners
	Grantees benefit from access to <b>safe public space</b> .	Number of grantees that take advantage of newly liberated public spaces; Factor	Survey, focus group	5971	5 years	20.4 visits/year @ cost of an ice cream cone	20.8 visits/year @ cost of an ice cream cone and a beer (1 USD)	\$20.80	Estimate provided by Partners

		analysis.							
<b>Property Owner (Landlord)</b>	<b>New landlords</b> generate rental income.	Number of landlords who started renting in the evaluation period.	LL Survey	579	2 years	Average rental cost	Average paid/received by Grantee/Landlord	\$389	LL/Grantee survey results
	Landlords invest in safe rental <b>construction and renovation.</b>	Number of rental construction and renovation reported.	LL Survey	4134	5 years	Average value of investment in renovation and construction	Average investment reported by LL in survey	\$325	LL survey results

## 5.4 Reality Check

### Deadweight, Displacement, Attribution and Drop off

The last step of the SROI calculation is contained in Table 5.3. This ‘reality check’ is to consider other factors that influence the outcomes that we have analysed from the RSCGA activities. These include **deadweight, displacement, attribution and drop off**. The table provides explanations on how these estimates were made. The percentages expressed will affect, positively and negatively, the resulting SROI ratio.

Table 5.3

Change	Deadweight <i>What would have happened without the activity?</i>	Displacement <i>What activity would we displace?</i>	Attribution <i>Who else would contribute to the change?</i>	Drop off <i>Will the outcome drop off in future years?</i>
Grantee feels content, enjoys the <b>safety and improved security</b> associated with living in their own rental space.	<b>5%</b> Given the socio-economic state of grantees, unlikely they would have otherwise left camps	0% Given that there is available rental accommodation in PaP, there is no likelihood that a grantee is displacing other renters	0% Without the RSCGA, little likelihood that its grantees would leave camps	<b>75%</b> Survey results indicate that only 25% will remain in the same accommodation at the same quality
Grantee <b>proud</b> of their independence and capacity to 'make ends meet'.	<b>5%</b> RSCGA had a significant impact on grantee capacity to make ends meet, that would otherwise not have occurred	0% No indication that increasing pride/capacity to make ends meet would come at the expense of other stakeholders	<b>5%</b> RSCGA had a significant impact on grantee capacity to make ends meet, that would otherwise not have occurred	<b>60%</b> Survey results indicated that 60% of grantees lack sufficient income to 'make ends meet' at the standard set by the RSCGA
Grantee is less stressed following reduction of their <b>debts</b> using cash grants.	<b>10%</b> Given that grantees have managed to make ends meet before the earthquake, it is likely that they would employ coping mechanisms that allow them to reduce debt and therefore stress	0% Well-being of grantees (less stress) would not be at the expense of others.	0% No equivalent formal support system exists	N/A Outcome projected for only 1 year
Grantee families are able to fund tuition for more <b>students</b> .	<b>50%</b> Survey was unable to provide a precise indication of <b>new</b> students. We compensate for this with the hypothesis that at least 50% would have invested disposable income/keep the 'change' in education costs	0% Given the volume of schools available in PaP, there is little likelihood grantee students would displace other students.	0% No equivalent education support programme exists	N/A Outcome projected for only 1 year

Grantee feels that they have been given <b>choice</b> , that they are protected and can rely upon implementing partners.	0% Without the RSCGA, the only other option would have been family support	0% Arguably, grantees of the RSCGA benefited while other IDPs did not. That said, camp closures are not being decided by Partners, so the scope of this change should be limited to Grantees	0% This outcome is directly related to the quality of programmes by Partners	N/A Outcome projected for only 1 year
Grantees have access to free medical care through <b>micro-health insurance</b> .	0% Given the low usage of provided insurance, unlikely grantees would have pursued this option on their own	0% Given the low usage of provided insurance, unlikely that this activity displaced any others	0% Unlikely that other actors have provided similar support	N/A Outcome projected for only 1 year
Grantees are better equipped to <b>plan and control their lives</b> as a result of training received.	<b>5%</b> Given the socio-economic state of grantees, unlikely they would have otherwise considered self-funded training	0% Would not displace other outcomes	0% No other options for free training were noted in the evaluation process or surveys	<b>20%</b> Project that the impact of training drops off by 20% per year over a 4-year period
Grantees benefit from access to <b>safe public space</b> .	0% Assume that the public spaces used by grantees/LLs are in the same neighbourhoods as camp closure result finding)	0% Access to safe public space is not at the expense of other outcomes	0%	0% All things remaining equal, access to public space should not change
<b>New landlords</b> generate rental income.	0% As we focus on those who became LLs as a result of the RSCGA, no deadweight	0% Given the surplus of rental accommodation, this outcome would not displace another	0% As we focus on those who became LLs as a result of the RSCGA, no other attribution	75% Survey results indicated that only 25% of grantees will stay in current accommodation
Landlords invest in safe rental <b>construction and renovation</b> .	<b>33%</b> As this is a split between investment to ensure rental property meets RSCGA standards and further investment, estimate 1/3 would have occurred despite RSCGA, i.e. with non-RSCGA renters	0% This was a change directly related to and as a result of the RSCGA. Did not displace other outcomes	0% As this is a split between investment to ensure rental property meets Partners standards and further investment, estimate 1/3 would have occurred despite RSCGA, i.e. with non-RSCGA renters	0% Little likelihood that this investment will depreciate in value beyond the discount rate of 3.5%

## 5.5 Calculating the SROI- and Modelling Alternatives

### Future Value and Discount Rate

Projecting future value of outcomes is required for those changes that were defined as having duration of over one year. These six outcomes were identified as having a multi-year impact and are listed in order of decreasing financial importance:

- Landlords invest in safe rental **construction and renovation** (\$4,500,892.50 US)
- Grantee **proud** of their independence and capacity to 'make ends meet' (\$3,706,507.54 US)
- Grantee feels content, enjoys the **safety and improved security** associated with living in their own rental space (\$2,151,704.88 US)
- Grantees are better equipped to **plan and control their lives** as a result of training received (\$1,213,604.1 US)
- Grantees benefit from access to **safe public space** (\$620,984 US)
- **New landlords** generate rental income (\$281,538.75 US)

The attached impact map illustrates these calculations.

### Actual SROI Ratio

*SROI is more than just a number-* but a number is the final outcome.

Calculation of the Social Return on Investment for the Rental Support Cash Program Approach uses the following formula:

$$\text{SROI Ratio} = \frac{\text{Present Value}}{\text{Value of inputs}} = \frac{\$26,097,254.12}{\$14,363,809.50} = 1.82 \text{ or rounded to } 1:1.80$$

For the Rental Support Cash Program Approach, there is \$1.80 US of value generated for every \$1 US invested.

### What Could Change RSCGA Impact- How to Optimize the SROI Ratio?

It is clear that **there is no 'silver bullet' solution in how to optimise social value being generated by the RSCGA**. The concept and design of the approach was adapted and developed by Partners since 2010, framed by parameters including available funding, the imperative to close camps and Partner capacity and programming philosophy. The recommendations offer up ideas on how optimization of the SROI ratio could be achieved.

The following table models the impact of changing on one or more elements of the SROI calculation in order to explore how the resulting ratio could be optimized:

Changed Parameter(s)	Resulting Ratio
Double the number of grantees/landlords (and grants costs), double the resulting quantities of change, while <b>maintaining the same implementation costs</b>	3.43: 1
Increase the resilience of Grantees- resulting in 3 year duration for ' <i>Grantee proud of their independence and capacity to make ends meet</i> ' AND reduce implementation cost by 50%	2.84: 1

<b>Reduce implementation cost by 50%</b>	2.67 : 1
<b>Household income increases, thereby eliminating drop-off</b>	2.38 : 1
<b>Limit grant to \$625, provide support to 7966 grantees with same investment cost and proportional increase in quantities of change</b>	2.09: 1
Limit grant to a standard \$625 per recipient for 5971 grantees (investment limited to \$3,731,875 US, implementation costs unchanged)	2.02: 1
Double the number of students (22690)	1.99 : 1
Increase the resilience of Grantees- resulting in 3 year duration for ' <i>Grantee proud of their independence and capacity to make ends meet'</i>	1.93 : 1
Enhance programming to Grantees (limited to programming changes), therefore achieving <i>minimum</i> 3-year duration for all changes	1.45: 1
Focus on new landlords- the RSCGA only takes new landlords	1.14 : 1
Optimize the training to increase the quantities in: 'Grantees are better equipped to plan and control their lives as a result of training received'	1.90 : 1
Provide 2- year subsidy to Grantees who cannot make ends meet	1.50: 1

#### What conclusions can we draw?

**There is no such thing as a ‘good’ or a ‘bad’ SROI ratio.** We are able to provide an authoritative analysis of how change is being created by measuring social, environmental and economic outcomes. The resulting ratio illustrates the benefits versus the costs. This ratio should be seen as a complement to the overall results of the surveying undertaken, the findings from this analysis and the recommendations that follow. In developing the SROI calculation for the RSCGA, it is clear that **despite significant quantities of change being delivered, the investment costs are the limiting factor to improving the SROI ratio.**

The simulations indicated in red are potential means by which Partners could feasibly increase their SROI ratio. Given that the quantities of change are already high, an improved ratio will result from increasing numbers of grantees (and, proportionally, the resulting change) while reducing grant and implementation costs. This could almost double the SROI ratio to 3.43: 1 if the number of RSCGA beneficiaries were doubled, while maintaining the same implementation costs. By limiting the provided grants to \$625 US and thereby supporting 7966 grantees, the ratio would increase by 17% to 2.10: 1.

We can try and understand key factors that underpin the resulting ratio, or in observing what changes generate the greatest/least change and present hypotheses for why this might be occurring. A few observations:

- **The RSCGA is generating a broad range of changes, and the quantities of stakeholders benefiting is substantial.** This should not be overlooked- and further reinforces the findings of the survey- high standards and quality of programme, high levels of satisfaction amongst stakeholders, ‘delivering on promises’. The changes include typically ‘intangible’ outcomes including pride, personal safety and well-being and reduced levels of stress.

**Recommendations:** the quality, standards and operational philosophy of the RSCGA should be maintained.

- **Landlords**, described in the ToR as indirect beneficiaries, **can be seen as taking full advantage of the RSCGA in order to improve the quality of their rental accommodation and in further investments.** LL investment in safe rental construction and renovation represents the second most significant change in financial terms (\$4,500,892.50 US over 5 years).

**Recommendations:** the RSCGA is making a significant impact on landlords. This is an unexpectedly important contribution to neighbourhood rehabilitation that is otherwise not accounted for in Partner publications, and presumably provides a representative snapshot of broader private sector investment in reconstruction. Understanding how the GoH and development actors could further stimulate such investment could positively influence availability of rental properties, potentially reducing prices- and therefore increasing accessibility- to those citizens who have low incomes.

- The **supplemental support** (livelihoods grants, training, health insurance) **delivers mixed value.** Education is likely over-represented, and is the greatest value generated by these supplemental grants; micro-health insurance and the outcome linked to training were represented in lower quantities and generated relatively little social value for grantees. This reinforces the survey results’ finding that no discernable difference is found for those that received the basic core grants, vs. those grantees that benefited from a broader range of Partner support.

**Recommendations:** the impact of the range of supplemental grants/support merit further study to determine how to optimize impact. **In purely cost-benefit terms, this SROI analysis would suggest that it would be better to offer the limited core grant to a larger group of grantees, rather than to offer a diverse range of grant packages to a smaller group.**

- **Despite several changes identified as multi-year in duration**, deadweight and drop-off calculations have significantly decreased the value generated.

**Recommendations:** to optimise multi-year generation of social value, the key factor to address is in reinforcing the levels of household income of grantees.<sup>9</sup> As recommended in the survey findings, and to balance this recommendation, if the overall economy does not improve, or infrastructure and neighbourhoods are not rehabilitated, then the results of the rental support cash grant approach will be weakened.

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<sup>9</sup> The logic for this recommendation is that two factors tended to dominate these calculations: 25% of grantees move after one year as they adapt their financial realities to the level of accommodation set by RSCGA; 60% have insufficient household income to pay current rental rates.

- Despite a large number of stakeholders benefiting from a broad range of changes, the **RSCGA implementation costs are the key obstacle to improving the SROI ratio.**

**Recommendations:** explore how to streamline RSCGA approaches, while maintaining levels of quality. The SROI impact map can serve as a tool to prioritize resources towards the highest values generated and in managing the investment costs.

## 6. Compiled Findings and Recommendations

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At a Glance - Issues, Findings and Recommendations		
Specific Question/Issue	Findings	Recommendation
Which socio-economic impact has the Rental Support Cash Grant on the direct beneficiaries (renter) and on the indirect beneficiaries (house owner)? [From SROI impact evaluation]	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>For the Rental Support Cash Program Approach, there is \$1 US of value for every \$1 US invested.</li> <li>The RSCGA is generating a broad range of changes, and the quantities of stakeholders benefiting is substantial.</li> <li>The quality of service/programmes underpins a series of key changes that generate substantial social value-safety and improved security, pride, choice and confidence in Partners account for more than a third of the value generated.</li> <li>Landlords, described in the ToR as indirect beneficiaries, can be seen as taking full advantage of the RSCGA in order to improve the quality of their rental accommodation and in further investments.</li> <li>The supplemental support (livelihoods grants, training, health insurance) delivers mixed value.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The quality, standards and operational philosophy of the RSCGA should be maintained.</li> <li>RSCGA is making a significant impact on landlords. This is an unexpectedly important contribution to neighbourhood rehabilitation that is otherwise not accounted for in Partner publications, and presumably provides a representative snapshot of broader private sector investment in real estate. Understanding how the GoH and development actors could further stimulate such investment could positively influence availability of rental properties, potentially reducing prices- and therefore increasing accessibility- to those citizens who have low incomes.</li> <li>The impact of the range of supplemental grants/support merit further study to determine how to optimize impact. In purely cost-benefit terms, this SROI analysis would suggest that it would be better to offer the limited core grant to a larger group of grantees, rather than</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>Despite several changes identified as multi-year in duration</b>, deadweight and dropoff calculations have significantly decreased the value generated.</li> <li>Despite a large number of stakeholder benefiting from a broad range of changes, the <b>RSCGA implementation costs keep the SROI ratio at parity</b>.</li> </ul>	<p><b>to offer a diverse range of grant packages to a smaller group.</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>To optimise multi-year generation of social value, the key factor to address is in reinforcing the levels of household income of grantees.</b> As recommended in the survey findings, and to balance this recommendation, if the overall economy does not improve, or infrastructure and neighbourhoods are not rehabilitated, then the results of the rental support cash grant approach will be weakened.</li> <li>Explore how to streamline RSCGA approaches, while maintaining levels of quality. The SROI impact map can serve as a tool to prioritize resources towards the highest value generated.</li> </ul>
Which socio-economic impact has the Rental Support Cash Grant on the direct beneficiaries (renter) and on the indirect beneficiaries (house owner)? [From Survey Findings]	<p>Grantees and landlords want this programme and feel the Rental Support Cash Grant Approach is a very good tool. The statistical anomaly of almost 100% agreeing with camp closures is an extremely important piece of 'social capital' that can be used to great advantage as programs move forward.</p> <p>The importance of the RSCG for both groups cannot be underestimated. The grant gave recipients the ability for them to have a one year 'grace period' with secure housing of their selection, and to use any extra money to pay down debt, pay school fees, help other family members, start small businesses, and a myriad of other activities that were extremely important at the household, community, and national level. Psychologically, getting out of the camps was of inestimable value. Landlords also benefited: for many, rental income represents a necessary part of their yearly income, and indeed, some off the rental monies went towards improvements and construction. It must be said, however,</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>In considering that 60% of grantees likely cannot financially maintain the same quality of accommodation for their second year, Partners must strategically and collectively decide: 1. Is this result sufficiently high? Given that the RSCGA in theory does not intend to accompany beneficiaries beyond their arrival in rental accommodation, <b>what is the target outcome they seek for grantees?</b> 2. How to cost-effectively monitor grantees in order to implement/adapt their programmes beyond 2-3 months post- cash grant receipt. 3. Whether they (and their funding partners) are in a position to act on this issue, in what ways and at what scale. 4. Can partners target vulnerable families in advance for additional programs?</li> </ul>

	<p>that neither group (85%) sees improving economic opportunities in the future. Unfortunately, for about 60% of grantees, even after having a year's rental support, it is questionable whether they will generate enough funds to maintain the same quality of accommodation for the next year and may somewhat undermine the 'Decent but Modest' proviso of the Helping Families document.</p>	
What are the direct beneficiaries' criteria for selecting the neighbourhood of choice?	<p><b>People went back to the neighbourhood they were displaced from (80%). They were mostly concerned with finding a safe, reasonably priced house near other family and their child's school, in the same area they lived prior.</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Revise the learning from <i>Learning Families</i> to reflect that IDPs largely returned to their neighbourhood of origin.</li> <li>Develop and implement standardized lists of neighbourhood names from the outset of such programmes and early in the emergency response.</li> </ul>
How many beneficiaries are still in the same house or have found other equivalent accommodation after a year from the end of project and where do direct beneficiaries live a year after having received the Rental Support Cash Grant?	<p><b>One year after their receipt of the rental support cash grant, no grantees appear to have returned to camps and 100% have an accommodation of one sort or another.</b> That said, of those whose contracts ended, about 25% have renewed their original contracts, ensuring that their level of accommodation will be equivalent. Of the 75% of those whose contracts ended and have moved, there are generally alternative or apparently declining standards of accommodation in general as noted in responses to the following indicate.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Partners have clearly chosen standards-based approach in the promotion of quality and safety of RSCGA eligible accommodation, and a philosophy of providing IDPs with a choice in their future. In this framework, it strikes the evaluators as acceptable that, 12 months after the receipt of a rental cash grant, grantees make decisions to choose accommodations that adapt to their financial situation and potentially move. Partners must define what is most important: 1. That grantees are in an accommodation and have not returned to a camp; or, 2. Grantees must be in an accommodation at the standard set by the RSCGA. If it is the latter, then the commitment, funding, timeframe and tools used by the Partners must be adapted accordingly to achieve these results. Since payment scales were based on averages, it still appears <b>there is sufficient room for recipients to find alternative housing within their budget. There is data to suggest that the 'floor' for suitable housing is around \$170 USD.</b></li> </ul>
What is the profile of the	The data illustrates that <b>there are no emerging 'profiles'</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The RSCGA can only be successful if development</li> </ul>

<p>families remaining in the rented house and that of ones that left it?</p>	<p><b>that differentiate between those still in their original rental accommodation versus those that have moved.</b> Grantees represent a target population that lives at the poverty line defined for urban populations pre-earthquake-put simply, <b>grantees are the urban poor earning less than \$2 per day</b>, who were renters pre-earthquake. Analysis did not reveal different results for grantees receiving the supplemental grants, insurance and training provided through the varied programming approaches of Partners. The only major set of characteristics that seem determinate relate to weekly income versus weekly expenses, and debt load. <b>Those who left their rental accommodation appeared to have slightly higher weekly expenses than income, and their debt load appeared to be almost double the others</b>, though the debt load figure could include newly acquired debt due to moving. These findings have to be put in a simple context: the situation of individual grantees are a reflection of the broader economic problems in Haiti as exemplified in statistics available from various agencies.</p>	<p>activities in neighbourhoods are synchronized to the extent possible with the camp closure efforts. If the overall economy does not improve, or infrastructure and neighbourhoods are not rehabilitated, then the results of the rental support cash grant approach will be weakened. The GoH and donors must ensure the prioritization, financing and speed of these improvements in order to create an environment that will favour greater opportunities for neighbourhoods.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• In developing further tools and methods to monitor and adapt rental support cash grant programmes, Partners should consider using this activity/tool to better predict 'housing security' for grantees.</li> </ul>
<p>What are the main reasons pushing direct beneficiaries to leave the rented house?</p>	<p><b>Lack of income.</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• It can be assumed that the funding opportunities will decrease in the fourth year following the earthquake. As conditions in camps will presumably degrade in a funding-poor environment, Partners and donors should prioritize solutions that either ensure minimal stands in camps, or renew strategic efforts for camp closures and RSCGA. The only other options will be unplanned camp closures or the construction of sufficient social housing. The former has proved to create as many problems as it solves; the latter, if not already underway, will require 3-5 years for delivery.</li> <li>• To complement the RSCGA, more efforts should be made to improve economic opportunities and to support grantee households in increasing the household income. This task should not necessarily fall to the Partners that implemented rental support cash grants, but fit within the</li> </ul>

		<p>broader sphere of recovery and development, with programmes working at smaller scale and longer timeframes.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>While it could be considered to provide a supplemental year of rental support cash grants to those unable to meet the most basic needs, this would likely undermine the driving operational philosophy of the RSCGA, and come at the expense of moving new families out of camps and into their rental accommodation.</li> </ul>
To what extent can the direct beneficiary access basic services?	Grantees had electricity, communal latrine or toilet and basic services (health, education). The neighbourhoods also enjoyed access to most of the amenities with two interesting exceptions, police services (as respondents saw it) and parks and open spaces. In general, shops, schools, and medical services were within a 10-minute walk, and many areas had street lighting.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Results illustrate that the minimum standards of eligibility of rental accommodations dictated by the RSCGA Partners are being enforced, appreciated by beneficiaries and should continue as such.</li> </ul>
What did the direct beneficiary do with the excess money following rent payment?	<p><b>Overwhelmingly, excess money appeared directed towards commerce and micro-business investment, followed closely by payment of school fees, with purchase of food a close third. It is useful to note that following food purchase, the next three categories were 'deferred need' types of activities (save, help family, pay debt) and implied a strong sense of planning and preparing.</b></p> <p>If only considering the most important items as a first field, it was actually evenly divided between small business / commerce, and food, with school fees mentioned 3<sup>rd</sup> most often. Given that grantees carry more debt than they have savings, and there was significant variance in the supplemental support provided by the various Partner's programmes, it is a challenge to draw a single conclusion for what represents 'excess money'. The informed assumption is that any liquidity at the household level would be spent in proportions similar to those determined as priorities.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Findings indicate that supplemental grants that target small business development and for education are likely to have the greatest use by grantees. In the context of a target population that carries important levels of debt and few possibilities to save, it is a challenge to find the perfect grant size, as any household liquidity will likely be spent.</li> </ul>

To what extent has the Rental Support Cash Grant encouraged private sector [LL] construction?	<p>One structural element of the RSCGA that stood out was its impact on construction. <b>77% of the landlords responded that they had made upgrades and investments in their property to meet Home Verification Team requirements.</b> This impact cannot be underestimated as it affected economic, safety, and quality of life issues at all levels. It appears that <b>landlords reinvested about 2/3 of their rent monies from grantees in immediate upgrades and their planning for the next year included about that amount again as a potential investment.</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The projected successful outcomes with LLs are ones that Partners should leverage and integrate into the theory of change that represents the results chain of the RSCGA. While LLs are indirect beneficiaries, the successes and run-on effects illustrate how short-term humanitarian programming can provide mid-term effects.</li> </ul>
To what extent has the Rental Support Cash Grant contributed to the installation and development of new informal settlements?	<p><b>This study was unable to find evidence that the RSCGA contributed to the development of new informal settlements.</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>While resources could be dedicated to studying informal settlements, this should not be undertaken in relation to the RSCGA.</li> </ul>
<b>Helping Families/Lessons Learned</b>		
Mass Communication: As Rental Subsidy Cash Grant programs moved up in scale, effective mass communication with beneficiaries and the general public became essential	<p>Partners clarified that effective mass communication with beneficiaries was implemented by their own staff. They employed a range of communication channels and media to disseminate information about rental support cash programmes- hence the utilisation of the term 'Mass Communication'.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Revise <i>Helping Families, Closing Camps</i> to more accurately reflect that beneficiary communication was undertaken by Partner agencies, using a wide range of communication means.</li> </ul>
Camp closure programs will be successful even when 100% of families are given a rental solution and no permanent housing options are offered	<p><b>It is very clear that people want the camps closed.</b> If there is one area of almost unanimous agreement and strength of feeling, it is certainly this one.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Camp closures could potentially be politically and emotionally charged activities: the survey results show almost unanimous agreement with a continued programme of camp closure and satisfaction with the RSCGA and its philosophy of offering grantees choice in their future. The GoH, donors and Partners should capitalize on this support and focus increasingly limited resources on needs clearly defined by its stakeholders.</li> </ul>

Rental Homes must be Safe	<p>It can be argued that the <b>rigour applied by Partners in their approach of promoting safe and appropriate accommodation accounts for- and perhaps justifies- the high cost of programme implementation.</b> Even the term 'high cost' is relative: one Partner respondent suggested that the cost of supporting an IDP in a camp is roughly \$1 USD/per person/per day.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>While this finding alludes to the level of effectiveness of Partner rental support programmes, it doesn't clarify what constitutes efficiency. It would have to be explored if the RSCGA could be scaled-up, with less individual attention given to its beneficiaries, while delivering similar levels of effectiveness.</li> </ul>
Modest but decent	<p>The risk of potential disparity between the resources available to the host population, and that of the programme beneficiaries was well managed. The <b>RSCGA has ensured that grantees have returned to a rental home in conditions that fit the description of 'modest, but decent'.</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The RSCGA has successfully managed to mitigate potential disparities between host and returning populations; the formula works, and should be continued.</li> </ul>
Allow IDPs to rent from friends and family	<p>As can be seen in the statistics above, this was apparently not a particularly significant issue in this program, but it was certainly wise to preventively accommodate it in planning and implementation.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Findings confirm that, while statistically insignificant, allowing IDPs to rent from families was useful for some grantees. Given that this represents a key coping mechanism for those families whose incomes will potentially not allow them to rent accommodations at the standard of the RSCGA after one year, Partners should explore how to promote this option further.</li> </ul>
How to combat rental price increases – the “keep the change” approach	<p><b>The ‘keep the change’ approach was an extremely interesting choice and, in retrospect, a very well reasoned one.</b> Given that some Partners provided substantial supplemental cash grants, the ‘keep the change’ might have struck those grantees as relatively insignificant.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>‘Keep the change’ appears to have been a well-reasoned operational choice and introduced some autonomy and bargaining power at the recipient level. From an administrative point of view, and to develop recipient ‘buy in’ to the programme, this is a very wise, fair, and useful inclusion at multiple levels.</li> </ul>
Empowering families to make better housing choices	<p>It is clear from this general set of responses that <b>the RSCGA Partners can be commended for implementing a program that stayed true to its promises.</b></p>	
Taxation – short-term vs. long-term priorities	<p>Taxation is always problematic, and particularly so if an international agency is seen to support or promote government policy practices that</p>	

	<p>citizens deem unfair or corrupt. It is clear that in this case, most respondents, be they landlords or renters, do not see the government as a particularly strong force in the current situation.</p>	
Camp closure and the link with rebuilding neighbourhoods of return	<p>The 16/6 programme makes operational sense. Without a concurrent neighbourhood development and reconstruction corollary, the RSCGA risks becoming an ineffective stand-alone.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The need for continued investment in an integrated neighbourhood redevelopment strategy should be underlined, and the RSCGA seen as a tool and catalyst for strategic investment, planning and implementation by the GoH, its international donors, Partners and humanitarian/development actors both national and international.</li> </ul>
The Government of Haiti and donors should fund further study of results for families beyond the one-year project cycle.	<p>This evaluation represents one such investment in the study of results of families beyond the one-year project cycle. Overall, there has been a tremendous investment in information and planning infrastructure. One only need look at the entire data handling investment of the IOM CCCM/E-Shelter Cluster investment, and its relationship to the Haitian government to understand value of this outcome, and the potential to effectively leverage this for future development in Haiti. As such, and as a key to future information and planning needs, there clearly should be an emphasis on fostering systems of information handling that support a more integrated, strategic and standardized RSCGA across Partners as they move forward. The opportunity exists, the infrastructure is in place, it would appear wise to take stock of the investment and learning made, and to incorporate the structure and functions into the existing GoH structures.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• An opportunity exists to take the learning from <i>Helping Families, Closing Camps</i>, the results of this evaluation and undertake the development of methods and tools, including information and planning requirements that could serve the continuing RSCGA and future urban disasters. There is a Haiti-specific opportunity to evaluate how the combination of CCCM and E-Shelter Clusters into one structure might contribute to more efficient response, and speculate on whether it could be replicated earlier and with greater commitment in similar contexts.</li> </ul>

The evaluators would like to thank the Rental Support Cash Program Approach Partners, the E- Shelter/CCCM Cluster and the IOM Haiti team for their tireless efforts in supporting this evaluation.

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<http://www.theWolfgroup.org>

## Annex 1 – Documents Consulted

### Documents

- *Displacement Tracking Matrix V2.0 Update*, Haiti E-Shelter/CCCM Cluster, 31 August 2011
- *Documents from the CCCM/Shelter Cluster website*: <http://www.eshelter-cccmhaiti.info/jl/index.php>
- *Helping Families, Closing Camps: Using Rental Support Cash Grants and Other Housing Solutions to End Displacement in Camps*, Emmett Fitzgerald, 2012
- *Les activités de retour et relocalisation face au marché locatif de la capitale haïtienne*, E-Shelter/CCCM Cluster/IOM/J/P HRO, March- June 2012
- *Lessons Learned and Best Practices: The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies Shelter Programme in Haiti 2010-2012*, Peter Rees-Gildea, 2012
- *Process Map: Return and Relocation Project, Place Saint Pierre and Place Boyer*, IOM, January 2012
- *Return and Relocation Programme: Study of the programme's impact on the lives of participating families opting for cash grant rental support 12 months after moving out of internally displaced person's camps*, IFRC, December 2012
- *Shelter and CCCM Needs Analysis and Response Strategy- Haiti 2012*, E-Shelter/CCCM Cluster, 2012
- *Stratégie de Fermeture des camps et de Retour dans les quartiers*, UN Humanitarian Country Team Haïti, August 2012
- *Stratégie de Retour et de Relocalisation*, Inter Cluster Coordination and UN Humanitarian Country Team Haïti, January 2011
- *Support for Housing Rehabilitation and Reconstruction: Progress and Issues*, UNHABITAT, January 2012

### Internal Documents

- *Range of internal documents by Partner agencies of the Rental Support Cash Grant Approach*

### Other Publications

- *Cash-based responses in Emergencies*, Humanitarian Policy Group Report No 24, January 2007, Paul Harvey, ODI.
- *The Use of Cash and Vouchers in Humanitarian Crises*, DG ECHO funding guidelines. European Commission, DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR HUMANITARIAN AID – ECHO, March 24<sup>th</sup> “009
- *Enquête IOM – ACTED. Intentions des Déplacés, Haïti*, Undated
- *Defining Disaster Resilience: A DfID Approach Paper*, UKAID. Undated

- *Proposed Project Restructuring of Port au Prince Neighbourhood Housing Reconstruction Project Grant from the Haiti Reconstruction Fund May 3, 2011 to the Republic of Haiti, World Bank, October 11, 2012*

## Annex 2 – Evaluation Planning

Date	Activity description Raj	Activity description Jeremy	Activity description Charles	Sida	Goals
Sunday 21-Oct-12	Arrival to Haiti				
22-Oct-12	9:00 AM: CCCM & E-Shelter Briefing at the UCLBP office  10:30 AM: UCLBP Briefing at the UCLBP office				Discussion on the evaluation, expectations, political realities; feasibility of accounting for all project outcomes.
	Visit of building verification process Visit to the contract signature activity Visit to a camp (next target with return strategy implementation) Visit to an informal settlement				Get an overall picture of the project implementation activities, neighbourhood of resettlement.
23-Oct-12	8:00 AM field visit <b>Jalousie 1</b> sector (Focus group with beneficiaries, owners, ASEC/CASEC, community leaders) <b>IOM</b>	9:00 AM Roundtable with donor/partners organizations (SIDA, AFD, USAID, UE, ECHO, CIDA, AECID, BID, WB, UNDP, UN Habitat,	Work with IOM DMU and/or partners	Katrina with Raj and Carin	First semi-structured interviews to inform ET's understanding of stakeholders and outcomes that they perceive; As compiled

	<p>11:00 AM field visit <b>Centre ville</b> (Focus group with beneficiaries, owners, ASEC/CASEC, community leaders) <b>IOM</b></p> <p>1:30 PM Field visit <b>Delma 33</b> (Focus group with beneficiaries, owners, ASEC/CASEC, community leaders) <b>CONCERN</b></p> <p>3:00 PM field visit <b>Mais gate</b> (Focus group with beneficiaries, owners, ASEC/CASEC, community leaders) <b>IFRC</b></p>	<p>UNOPS, ARC et IFRC)</p> <p>13:30 PM PtV Mayor : M. Claire lydie Parent, office of PtV mayor.</p> <p>16:00 PM DPC representative: Joelle Fontilus Plus city council representative, CdM office.</p>	a with Jere my	database was not provided by IOM, contact by ET with partner organizations to facilitate this process	
24-Oct-12	9: 00 AM Day-long kick-off workshop with 5 partner organizations (CRS and GoH did not attend); also built-in session on identifying the key joint lessons learned from the Rental Support Programme			Introduction to SROI; Development of Impact Map and financial proxies; Prioritizing lessons learned to build them into the survey and evaluation	
25-Oct-12	<p>8:00 AM <b>Concern</b> field visit/focus group</p> <p>2:00 PM <b>CRS</b> Field visit/focus group</p>	<p>8:00 AM <b>WVI</b> Field visit/focus group</p> <p>2:00 PM <b>JP/RHO</b> field visit/focus group</p>	Work with IOM DMU and/or partners	Katari na with Jere my	Data collection to inform SROI Impact Map and financial proxies; development of data collection instrument
26- Oct-12 <b>(international)</b>	8:00 AM Working group discussion with IFRC, IOM and CONCERN to finalize the SROI impact map				Limited participation due to weather

<b>holiday for UN)</b>			
	4:00 PM wrap up meeting with EC/SIDA		Discussion on revisions to ToR, timeline, budget (Cluster/Sida/IOM CoM)
<b>27-Oct-12</b>	Departure from Haiti		
<b>21-Nov-12</b>	<b>Phone survey data collection completed and sent to ET</b>		
<b>30-Nov-12</b>	<b>Draft Report Submitted to IOM</b>		All the partners including donors will receive the draft report for comments
<b>8-Dec- 12</b>	<b>IOM Sends Compiled Comments to ET</b>		Process should include at least two meetings of partners
<b>11-Dec-12</b>	<b>Workshop with Partners in PaP</b>		Further commenting on draft report
<b>21-Jan-13</b>	<b>Revised Draft Submitted to EC</b>		IOM to lead commenting by Partners
<b>28-Jan-13</b>	<b>IOM Sends Compiled Comments to ET</b>		Telcon as required to clarify comments
<b>30-Jan-13</b>	<b>Final Products Submitted to EC for Approval</b>		

## Annex 3 – Survey Instruments

**Wolf Group / IOM Evaluation Team**

Refused / Quit / Wrong Phone

**Rental Support Cash Grant Survey**

Hello, I am contacting you from the office of the IOM Data Management Unit in Port au Prince. We would like to ask you a few questions about your situation now, experiences with, and opinions about the Rental Support Cash Grant Program. Is this (read below listed respondent's name)? (if no, ask if that person is available). Is it OK to ask a few questions? It will only take us about 10 minutes. (If NO, ask if you can call back.) (If NO, ask why not and note reason in space at bottom of this page.)

IOM Interviewer : \_\_\_\_\_ ID # : \_\_\_\_\_

Respondent (HoH):	Survey ID:
Telephone :	
Commune :	
Sector / Neighbourhood:	

Callbacks:

	Date	Time	Notes
1			
2			

### Questionnaire

#### Q1 - Cash Grant / Rental

Question	Response
a) What camp did you move from?	
b) What neighbourhood did you move to?	
c) When?	Month / Year:
d) How much money did you receive from the Rental Cash Support Program?  (Read Grant parts to get subtotals)	Rental Support: _____ Transportation / Moving: _____ Control Visit _____ Other financial support _____
e) How much money did you pay for:  (estimated transport expense OK)	Rent _____ Transportation / Moving _____
f) We rented from:	Landlord Family Other: _____

Reason for refusal or non-completion of survey:

I'm going to read some statements about the Rental Support Grant, and I am going to ask you to respond using the scale 'Strongly Agree, Somewhat Agree, Agree, Somewhat Disagree, and Strongly Disagree (**do not prompt for a DK answer**)

**Q - 2**

- a) Being able to 'keep the change' when I negotiated my rental contract really helped me a lot to get the best price.  
**strongly agree / somewhat agree / somewhat disagree / strongly disagree / DK**
- b) The NGO I worked with really helped me to understand how to find a place that was safe and appropriate.  
**strongly agree / somewhat agree / somewhat disagree / strongly disagree / DK**
- c) The NGO I worked with was personally interested in my situation, and followed up with help or visits.  
**strongly agree / somewhat agree / somewhat disagree / strongly disagree / DK**
- d) The Landlord understood my situation with the Rental Support, and didn't try to take advantage of my situation.  
**strongly agree / somewhat agree / somewhat disagree / strongly disagree / DK**
- e) We got the best place we could have, thinking about all the issues.  
**strongly agree / somewhat agree / somewhat disagree / strongly disagree / DK**
- f) Moving out of a camp is better than staying in one if you have the choice.  
**strongly agree / somewhat agree / somewhat disagree / strongly disagree / DK**
- g) I think the Rental Support Program is the best way to get people out of the camps.  
**strongly agree / somewhat agree / somewhat disagree / strongly disagree / DK**
- h) My landlord really rented me his house so he could move to an informal settlement.  
**strongly agree / somewhat agree / somewhat disagree / strongly disagree / DK**

**Q – 3** Now, I'm going to ask you a few questions about your current rented space and living situation.

Question	Response
a) How many live in your rented space?	#
b) Is your rented space part of someone else's private home?	YES / NO
c) How many rooms do you have for your own family's private use?	#
d) Does your rented space, or the home it is in, have access to:	Electricity YES / NO Running Water: YES / NO Toilet or Latrine: YES / NO
e) How many school aged children do you have living in your rented space?	#
f) What kind of roof does the building where your rented space is have?	Tin Concrete Other

**Q - 4**

- a) I feel pretty safe about the strength and safety of the building I live in, even if we have another earthquake.  
**strongly agree / somewhat agree / somewhat disagree / strongly disagree / DK**
- b) I can keep the rented space I live in clean, comfortable, and safe for me and my family.  
**strongly agree / somewhat agree / somewhat disagree / strongly disagree / DK**
- c) My landlord made some improvements on my rental space because I rented from him.  
**strongly agree / somewhat agree / somewhat disagree / strongly disagree / DK**
- d) I plan on staying in my present location for as long as I can keep paying the rent.  
**strongly agree / somewhat agree / somewhat disagree / strongly disagree / DK**
- e) The rented space I live in is about average when compared to my neighbours living situation.  
**strongly agree / somewhat agree / somewhat disagree / strongly disagree / DK**

**Q – 5** Now I am going to ask you some questions about your neighbourhood. Answer Yes or No or give a number.

Question	Response
a) The neighbourhood I live in now has:	Piped water YES / NO Street Lighting YES / NO Sewage Disposal YES / NO Trash Disposal YES / NO Park YES / NO Police Presence YES / NO
b) Within 10 minutes walking time there is a:	Clinic / Medical YES / NO Pharmacy YES / NO
c) There is additional rental housing available in this neighbourhood:	YES / NO / DK
d) There is an active neighbourhood development group here:	YES / NO / DK
e) About how many schools are within a 10 minute walking distance of your home?	#
f) There is a community group organized to watch out for safety issues in our neighbourhood.	YES / NO / DK
g) I am a member of a group organized watch out for safety issues in our neighbourhood.	YES / NO / DK

**Q - 6**

- a) I am safe at night when in my own rented space.  
**strongly agree / somewhat agree / somewhat disagree / strongly disagree / DK**
- b) My neighbours do not bother me or give me trouble because I moved here from a camp.  
**strongly agree / somewhat agree / somewhat disagree / strongly disagree / DK**
- c) There is a lot of criminality, theft, and violence in my neighbourhood.  
**strongly agree / somewhat agree / somewhat disagree / strongly disagree / DK**
- d) There are a lot of attacks on women in my neighbourhood.  
**strongly agree / somewhat agree / somewhat disagree / strongly disagree / DK**
- e) I think the police are really helping to make my neighbourhood a safer place to live.  
**strongly agree / somewhat agree / somewhat disagree / strongly disagree / DK**

**Q – 7** Now I am going to ask you some questions about the Rental Support Program.

Question	Response
a) What NGO gave you money?  (Allow multiple selections, prompt if asked)	CRS Concern World Vision Croix Rouge IOM JP / HRO Don't Remember Other
b) Have you been helped with any other specific programs besides a Rental Support Program offered by NGO's?  (Allow multiple selections, prompt if asked)	Livelihoods Program Life Skills Business Skills Education Grants Neighbourhood Reconstruction Micro-Health Insurance Other

**Q - 8**

- a) From what I hear, rental prices were higher if a Landlord knew you got Rental Support.  
**strongly agree / somewhat agree / somewhat disagree / strongly disagree / DK**
- b) Being able to 'keep the change' if I negotiated a good rent really motivated me to search for the best situation I could get.  
**strongly agree / somewhat agree / somewhat disagree / strongly disagree / DK**
- c) The landlord we rented from tried to cheat us on the rental contract at first.  
**strongly agree / somewhat agree / somewhat disagree / strongly disagree / DK**
- d) I know some people were able to 'trick' the system to get Rental Support, even when they weren't eligible.  
**strongly agree / somewhat agree / somewhat disagree / strongly disagree / DK**

**Q - 9** Now I am going to ask you some general questions about leisure time, budgeting money, and the program.

<b>Question</b>	<b>Response</b>
a) How many times per week do you and/or your family go to a park or public space to enjoy yourselves?	#
b) What were the three most important reasons for why you chose to live in your current neighbourhood, beginning with the most important:  (Read choices, prompt memory) (1 <sup>st</sup> choice = 1, 2 <sup>nd</sup> choice = 2, etc.)	Where I lived before the earthquake. Best house for the money. Other family lived near by. Closer to my workplace. Closer to my child's school. Safest place to live I could afford. Agency/program obliged me to live there. Other
c) If you had money left over, what were the three most important things you did with it after you paid your first years rent - in order of importance?  (Prompt with choices if they do not name 3) (1 <sup>st</sup> choice = 1, 2 <sup>nd</sup> choice = 2, etc.)	Bought Food Bought Clothes Paid School Fees Bought Tools Took Courses / Training Helped Another Family Paid Debts Saved Other

**Q - 10**

- a) The Rental Support Program was fairly implemented and properly administered, from what I saw and people say.  
**strongly agree / somewhat agree / somewhat disagree / strongly disagree / DK**
- b) The Rental Support Cash Grant really helped me when I needed it most.  
**strongly agree / somewhat agree / somewhat disagree / strongly disagree / DK**
- c) I received most of what I was promised by the NGOs.  
**strongly agree / somewhat agree / somewhat disagree / strongly disagree / DK**
- d) The way the Rental Support Cash Grant program was implemented was **NOT** corrupt.  
**strongly agree / somewhat agree / somewhat disagree / strongly disagree / DK**
- e) The program really gave me the choice to find the best place to rent for me and my family.  
**strongly agree / somewhat agree / somewhat disagree / strongly disagree / DK**
- f) NGO's really helped me a lot to understand the Rental Support program so I knew what to do.  
**strongly agree / somewhat agree / somewhat disagree / strongly disagree / DK**
- g) I think most people who got Rental Support will be able to pay the next year's rent on their own.  
**strongly agree / somewhat agree / somewhat disagree / strongly disagree / DK**
- h) I got most of my information about the program from local media.  
**strongly agree / somewhat agree / somewhat disagree / strongly disagree / DK**

**Q – 11** Now we have a few questions about how you make ends meet.

Question	Response
a) What would you estimate your total family combined weekly income is?	#
b) What would you estimate your total family combined weekly expenses are?	#
c) Do you owe any money? (If yes, about how much in total?)	YES / NO \$
d) Are you in the same rental space you first moved in to?	YES / NO
e) If NO, why did you move?  (Only one answer, read choices if necessary)	1 <sup>st</sup> year's lease ended. No money to pay the rent. Had problems with the Landlord Landlord kicked me out. Didn't like the house. Didn't like the neighbourhood. It wasn't safe. Other: _____
f) If YES, will you stay another year if you can?	YES / NO
g) Have you saved rent money for the next year's rent?	YES / NO
h) What will happen if you cannot pay the next years rent?  (Read choices - Check all that apply)	Landlord will evict me. Landlord will negotiate a different arrangement. NGO's will give me another grant. God will provide. I will move in with my family in another house. I will move to the informal settlements. Borrow money. Don't know. Other: _____

We're almost done. Now I would like to ask you just a few more questions.

**Q - 12**

- a) It was very important that parks and public spaces were cleared of camps, even though a lot of people had to move somewhere else.  
**strongly agree / somewhat agree / somewhat disagree / strongly disagree / DK**
- b) Overall, I have more money and more opportunities than I did before the earthquake.  
**strongly agree / somewhat agree / somewhat disagree / strongly disagree / DK**
- c) I think the Rental Support program should be available to all families still living in camps.  
**strongly agree / somewhat agree / somewhat disagree / strongly disagree / DK**
- d) After this experience with the earthquake, I believe my government is better prepared and more able to meet future emergencies.  
**strongly agree / somewhat agree / somewhat disagree / strongly disagree / DK**
- e) Overall, though, I think life in Haiti will improve in the coming years.  
**strongly agree / somewhat agree / somewhat disagree / strongly disagree / DK**

**Q – 13** Would you like to add any brief comments? (Control for one sentence, do not engage respondent)

Thank you very much for your participation in this survey. We appreciate your time.

**For Interviewer post interview:**

**I - 1**

- a) Respondent's understanding of questions in general was:      Excellent / Good / Fair / Poor
- b) Respondent's interest in interview was:      Very Strong / Moderate / Disinterested
- c) Respondents attitude during survey was      Positive / Neutral / Upset / Angry
- d) I would rate the overall reliability of the answers I got as:      Very Accurate / OK / Very Inaccurate

e) Total Minutes Interview: \_\_\_\_\_

**I - 2**

**Interviewer Comments:**



**Ankèt sou Sibvansyon lajan pou lokasyon kay**

Bonjou, mwen se yon ajan k'ap kontakte ou pou inite jesyon done OIM nan Pòtoprens. Nou ta renmen poze ou kèk kesyon sou sitiaysyon ou kounye a, sou eksperyans ou ansanm avèk opinyon ou sou Pwogram sibvansyon lajan pou lokasyon kay. Eske m'ap pale avèk (di non repondan an) ? (Si non, mande si repondan an disponib). Eske mwen ka poze ou kèk kesyon, sa ap pran environ 10 minit? (Si NON, mande si ou ka rele aprè.) (Si NON, mande poukisa epi ekri rezon an dèyè.)

**Moun OIM k'ap poze kesyon :** \_\_\_\_\_ **Rs ID # :** \_\_\_\_\_

<b>Moun k'ap reponn kesyon (CF)</b>
ID CF:
<b>Telfon :</b>
<b>Komin :</b>
<b>Sekte/ Katye:</b>

**Rapèl:**

	Dat	Lè	Nòt
1			
2			

**K1 - Sibvansyon Lajan / Lokasyon kay**

<b>Kesyon</b>	<b>Repons</b>
g) Nan ki kan ou te soti?	
h) Nan ki Katye ou te ale?	
i) Ki lè?	Mwa / Ane:
j) Konbyen kòb ou te resevwa a pati Pwogram Sibvansyon lajan pou lokasyon kay la?  (Li chak tip sibvansyon yo pou ou ka gen total chak)	Sibvansyon Lajan: _____ Transpò / Demenajman: _____ Vizit kontwòl (kèk semèn apre) _____ Lòt sipò finansye : _____
k) Konbyen kòb ou te peye pou:  (Estimasyon depans transpò OK)	Lwaye _____ Transpò / Demenajman _____
l) Konbyen moun ap viv nan lojman an avèk ou ?	#

m) Nou lwe nan men:	Pwopriyetè/Mèt Kay Fanmi Lòt:
---------------------	-------------------------------------

Rezon pou refi oswa fin konplete ki pa nan sondaj:

Mwen pral li kèk deklarasyon sou Program sibvansyon lajan, epi m'ap mande ou reponn avèk: Dakò Nèt, Yon ti jan dakò, Dakò, Yon ti jan pa dakò ak Pa Dakò di tou (pa **mande pou yo reponn PK**)

#### K - 2

- i) Paske mwen te kapab "kenbe monen an" lè mwen negosye kontra lokasyon mwen an, sa te vreman ede mwen jwenn pi bon pri.  
**dakò nèt / yon ti jan dakò / yon ti jan pa dakò / pa dakò di tou / PK**
- j) ONG ki te travay avèk mwen ede m` pou mwen byen komprann koman pou mwen jwenn yon kote ki an sekirite epi ki apwopriye.  
**dakò nèt / yon ti jan dakò / yon ti jan pa dakò / pa dakò di tou / PK**
- k) ONG ki te travay avèk mwen te vreman enterese ak sitiasyon mwen, epi yo fè swivi avèk èd oswa visit.  
**dakò nèt / yon ti jan dakò / yon ti jan pa dakò / pa dakò di tou / PK**
- l) Mèt kay la te komprann sitiasyon mwen avèk Sibvansyon lajan an, e li pa t' eseye pran avantaj sou sitiasyon mwen.  
**dakò nèt / yon ti jan dakò / yon ti jan pa dakò / pa dakò di tou / PK**
- m) Si yon moun gen chwa a, kite yon kan pi bon ke rete nan youn.  
**dakò nèt / yon ti jan dakò / yon ti jan pa dakò / pa dakò di tou / PK**
- n) Mwen panse ke pwogram sibvansyon lajan pou lokasyon kay se meyè jan pou plis moun kite kan yo pi rapid epi ak bon jan sekirite.  
**dakò nèt / yon ti jan dakò / yon ti jan pa dakò / pa dakò di tou / PK**

**K – 3** Kounye a, mwen pral poze ou kèk kesyon sou espas/pyès chanm ou lwe a anssam avèk sitiayson lavi ou.

Kesyon	Repons
g) Konbyen moun ap viv nan espas/pyès kay ou lwe a avèk ou ?	#
h) Eske espas/pyès kay ou lwe a fè pati kay prive yon lòt moun?	WI / NON
i) Konbyen pyès/chanm ou genyen pou itilizasyon fanmi ou?	#
j) Eske kay kote ou lwe espas/pyès la a genyen:	Elektrisite WI / NON Dlo tiyo: WI / NON Twalèt oswa latrin: WI / NON
k) Konbyen timoun ki gen laj pou ale lekòl ap viv nan kay la avèk ou?	#
l) Kijan do kay batiman kote ou lwe pyès kay la fèt?	Tòl Beton Lòt

#### K - 4

- f) Mwen santi mwen trè ki an sekirite sou fòs la ak sekirite nan biling lan m ap viv nan, menm si nou gen yon lòt tranbleman tè  
**dakò nèt / yon ti jan dakò / yon ti jan pa dakò / pa dakò di tou / PK**
- g) Mwen kapab kenbe espas kote m'ap viv la pwòp, konfòtab, epi an sekirite pou mwen anssam ak fanmi mwen.  
**dakò nèt / yon ti jan dakò / yon ti jan pa dakò / pa dakò di tou / PK**
- h) Mèt kay la fè kèk amelyorasyon nan espas mwen lwe a paske mwen lwe kay la nan men l'.
- dakò nèt / yon ti jan dakò / yon ti jan pa dakò / pa dakò di tou / PK**
- i) Mwen gen plan rete nan kay kote mwen ye kounye a pou osi lontan ke mwen kapab peye lwave.  
**dakò nèt / yon ti jan dakò / yon ti jan pa dakò / pa dakò di tou / PK**
- j) Kay mwen rete a mwayen pa rapò ak kay vwazen mwen yo.  
**dakò nèt / yon ti jan dakò / yon ti jan pa dakò / pa dakò di tou / PK**

K – 5 Kounye a, mwen pral poze ou kèk kesyon sou katye ou. Reponn Wi oswa Non oswa bay yon nimewo.

<b>Kesyon</b>	<b>Repons</b>		
h) Katye kote m'ap viv kounye a genyen:	Dlo Tiyo NON Poto Limyè NON Eliminasyon dlo ize NON Eliminasyon fatra NON Pak NON Prezans lapolis NON	WI /	/
i) Nan yon distans mache 10 minit, ou jwenn:	Clinik / Medikal NON Famasi NON	WI /	/
j) Genyen lòt lojman pou lwe nan katye sa a:	WI /	NON /	
PK			
k) Nan katye a, gen yon gwoup devlopman aktif/òganizasyon lokal:	WI /	NON /	
PK			
l) Konbyen lekòl ki nan yon distans mache 10 minit de lakay ou?	#		
m) Genyen yon gwoup lokal òganize ki ede bay sekirite nan katye nou an.	WI /	NON /	
PK			
n) Mwen se manmb yon gwoup òganize pou veye pwoblèm sekirite ki genyen nan katye nou an.	WI /	NON /	
PK			

Q - 6

f) Se mwen menm ki an sekirite nan mitan lannwit lè nan espas pwòp mwen lwe

dakò nèt / yon ti jan dakò / yon ti jan pa dakò / pa dakò di tou / PK

g) Vwazen mwen yo pa anbete mwen oswa chèche m' kont paske mwen te soti nan yon kan.

dakò nèt / yon ti jan dakò / yon ti jan pa dakò / pa dakò di tou / PK

h) Genyen anpil pwoblèm kriminalite (volè, vyolans, kadejak) nan katye mwen an.

dakò nèt / yon ti jan dakò / yon ti jan pa dakò / pa dakò di tou / PK

i) Genyen anpil atak sou fanm nan katye mwen an.

dakò nèt / yon ti jan dakò / yon ti jan pa dakò / pa dakò di tou / PK

j) Mwen panse lapolis ap vreman ede pou fè katye mwen an yon kote ki sekirité pou moun viv.

dakò nèt / yon ti jan dakò / yon ti jan pa dakò / pa dakò di tou / PK

K – 7 Kounye a, mwen pral poze ou kèk kesyon sou sipò sibvansyon lajan pou lokasyon kay. .

<b>Kesyon</b>	<b>Repons</b>
c) Ki ajans ki te ba ou sibvansyon ou a oswa sibvansyon ou yo?  (Aksepte plizyè seleksyon, bay chwa yo si yo mande ou)	CRS Concern World Vision OIM JP / HRO Pa sonje Lòt
d) Eske ou resevwa èd nan lòt pwogram spesifik an plis de Sibvansyon lajan pou lokasyon kay ke ONG yo te ofri?  (Aksepte plizyè seleksyon, bay chwa yo si yo mande ou)	Pwogram sibsistans Fòmasyon konpetans lavi Fòmasyon konpetans biznis Sibvansyon edikasyon Rekonstriksyon Katye Asirans Micro Sante Lòt

**K - 8**

- e) Soti nan sa m 'tande, pri lwave yo te pi wo si yon mèt kay te konnen ou te resevwa Rental Sipò pou.
- dakò nèt / yon ti jan dakò / yon ti jan pa dakò / pa dakò di tou / PK**
- f) Paske mwen te kapab "kenbe monnen an" si mwen te negosye yon bon lwave, motive mwen anpil pou mwen jwenn pi bon sitiyasyon mwen te kapab jwenn.
- dakò nèt / yon ti jan dakò / yon ti jan pa dakò / pa dakò di tou / PK**
- g) Mèt kay la nou lwe soti nan te ese ye tronpe nou sou kontra lwave a nan premye.
- dakò nèt / yon ti jan dakò / yon ti jan pa dakò / pa dakò di tou / PK**
- h) Mwen konnen gen kèk moun ki te nan kan yo ki te ese ye triche system nan pou yo te ka jwenn yon sibvansyon lajan, menm lè yo pat elijib.
- dakò nèt / yon ti jan dakò / yon ti jan pa dakò / pa dakò di tou / PK**

**K - 9** Kounye a mwen pral mande ou kèk kesyon jeneral sou amizman, ekonomi lajan epi pwogram nan.

<b>Kesyon</b>	<b>Repons</b>
d) Konbyen fwa nan yon semèn ou menm oswa pitit ou ale nan yon pak oswa yon espas piblik pou nou amize nou?	#
e) Ki 3 rezon pi enpòtan ki te fè ou chwazi viv nan katye kote w'ap viv kounye a:  (Li chwa yo, mande yo sonje rezon yo) (1 <sup>e</sup> Chwa = 1, 2 <sup>zièm</sup> chwa = 2, etc.)  (li tout chwa pou twa tèt yo nan lòd >)	Se te kote mwen tap viv anvan tranbleman de tè a Pi bon kay pou lajan an. Lòt fanmi tap viv tou pre. Li pi pre kote m'ap travay la. Li pi pre lekòl pitit mwen.. Kote pi sekirité ke mwen te gen mwayen peye. Ajans/pwogram lan te oblige mwen abite la. Lòt.
f) Si ou te genyen lajan ki te rete, ki 3 bagay pi enpòtan ou te fè avèk li apre ou te fin peye premye ane lwave kay ou a – mete rezon pi enpòtan an avan ?  (Bay chwa repons yo, si yo bay 3 rezon yo) (1 <sup>e</sup> chwa = 1, 2 <sup>zièm</sup> chwa = 2, etc.)	Achte Manje Achte Rad Peye frè lekòl Peye dèt Lòt  Pran kou / Fòmasyon Ede yon lòt fanmi Achte zouti Fè ekonomi  (li tout chwa pou twa tèt yo nan lòd)

**K - 10**

- i) Dapre sa mwen wè ak sa moun di, yo te byen aplike pwojè sipò finansye pou lokasyon kay yo e yo te byen jere li.

**dakò nèt / yon ti jan dakò / yon ti jan pa dakò / pa dakò di tou / PK**

- j) Pwogram sibvansyon lajan pou lokasyon kay la ede m anpil lè mwen te plis bezwen sa.

**dakò nèt / yon ti jan dakò / yon ti jan pa dakò / pa dakò di tou / PK**

- k) Mwen recevwa nan men ONG yo tout sa yo te pwomèt.

**dakò nèt / yon ti jan dakò / yon ti jan pa dakò / pa dakò di tou / PK**

- l) Jan Pwogram sibvansyon pou lokasyon kay la te etabli PAT kowonpi.

**dakò nèt / yon ti jan dakò / yon ti jan pa dakò / pa dakò di tou / PK**

- m) Pwogram sa te ban mwen chwa pou mwen jwenn pi bon kay pou mwen ansanm ak fanmi mwen.

**dakò nèt / yon ti jan dakò / yon ti jan pa dakò / pa dakò di tou / PK**

- n) ONG yo te ede m' anpil pou mwen ka komprann Pwogram sipò pou lokasyon kay la pou mwen te kapab konnen sa pou mwen fè.  
**dakò nèt / yon ti jan dakò / yon ti jan pa dakò / pa dakò di tou / PK**
- o) Mwen panse ke majorite moun ki resevwa sibvansyon lajan sa ap kapab peye lwavey ane k'ap vini an apre kòb sibvansyon an fini.  
**dakò nèt / yon ti jan dakò / yon ti jan pa dakò / pa dakò di tou / PK**
- p) Mwen jwenn majorite enfòmasyon sou pwogram nan nan men media lokol yo (radio/televizyon).  
**dakò nèt / yon ti jan dakò / yon ti jan pa dakò / pa dakò di tou / PK**

**K - 11** Kounye mwen pral poze ou kèk kesyon sou jan w'ap fè pou ou viv ak depans ou yo.

<b>Kesyon</b>	<b>Repons</b>
i) Konbyen kòb ou estime revni konbine total fanmi ou ye pa semèn?	#
j) Konbyen kòb ou estime depans konbine total fanmi ou ye pa semèn?	#
k) Eske ou gen dèt lajan? (Si wi, konbyen kòb environ?)	WI / NON HTG
l) Eske ou nan menm kay ou te premye ale a?	WI / NON
m) Si NON, poukisa ou demenaje?  (Yon sèl repons, bay chwa yo si li nesesè)	Lwavey 1 <sup>e</sup> ane an fini. Pa genyen kòb pou peye lwavey a. M te gen pwoblèm ak Mèt Kay la. Mèt Kay la te mete mwen deyò. Mwen pat' renmen kay la. Mwen pat' renmen katye a. Li pat sekirité. Lòt: _____
n) Si WI, eske w'ap rete yon lòt ane si ou kapab?	WI / NON
o) Eske ou fè ase ekonomi pou lwavey ane k'ap vini an?	WI / NON
p) Kisa k'ap rive si ou pa kapab peye lwavey lòt ane yo?  (Li chwa yo – Cheke sa ki aplike yo)	Mèt kay la ap mete mwen deyò. Mèt kay la ap negosye yon lòt aranjman. ONG yo ap ban mwen yon lòt sibvansyon. Bondye ap ede m. Mwen prale nan yon lòt kay ak fanmi mwen. Mwen prale nan yon etablisman enfòmèl. M'a prete kòb Pa konnen. Lòt: _____

Nou preske fini. Kounye a, mwen pral poze ou kèk lòt kesyon.

**K - 12**

- f) Li te enpòtan anpil ke yo te retire kan yo nan pak ak espas piblik yo, menm si anpil moun te oblige ale yon lòt kote.  
**dakò nèt / yon ti jan dakò / yon ti jan pa dakò / pa dakò di tou / PK**
- g) An jeneral, kounye a mwen gen plis kòb ak plis posibilité pase anvan tranbleman de tè a.

**dakò nèt / yon ti jan dakò / yon ti jan pa dakò / pa dakò di tou / PK**

h) Mwen panse ke pwogram sipò sibvansyon lajan pou lokasyon kay la dwe disponib pou tout fanmi ki toujou ap viv nan kan yo.

**dakò nèt / yon ti jan dakò / yon ti jan pa dakò / pa dakò di tou / PK**

i) Apre eksperyans sa, mwen kwè ke gouvènman mwen an prepare pi byen e yo gen plis posibilité pou reponn ak ijans ki ka pase.

**dakò nèt / yon ti jan dakò / yon ti jan pa dakò / pa dakò di tou / PK**

j) An jeneral, menm si, mwen panse ke lavi an Ayiti pral amelyore nan lanne k'ap vini

**dakò nèt / yon ti jan dakò / yon ti jan pa dakò / pa dakò di tou / PK**

**Q – 13** Eske ou ta renmen ajoute kèk brèf kòmantè ? (Kontwole pou se yon sèl fraz, pa angaje moun k'ap reponn kesyon yo)

Mesi anpil pou patisipasyon ou nan ankèt sa. Nou kontan anpil deske ou te pran tan reponn kesyon yo!

**Pour moun kap poze késyon yo, apre entèvyou a:**

**I - 1**

- e) Konpreyansyon repondan an te genyen de késyon yo te: Ekselan / Byen / Ase Byen / Fèb
- f) Enterè repondan an nan entèvyou a te: Vreman Anpil / Modere / Pa enterese
- g) Atitud repondan an pandan ankèt la te: Pozitif / Nòmal / Boulvèse / An Kòlè
- h) Mwen ta note fyabilitè repons yo: Trè egzat / OK / Trè inegzat

e) Total Minit Entèvyou a: \_\_\_\_\_

**I - 2**

**Komantè ajan:**

**Wolf Group / IOM Evaluation Team**

Refused / Quit / Wrong Phone

**Landlord Rental Support Cash Grant Survey >F Text VL (Refused / Quit / Wrong Phone)**

Hello, I am contacting you from the office of the IOM Data Management Unit in Port au Prince. Is this (XXXXXX, read below listed respondent's name)? We would like to ask you a few questions about your experience with your renter or renters who participated in the Rental Support Cash Grant Program. This is the program run by NGO's such as IOM, IFRC, Concern, JP/HRO and CRS that gave rental support money to people so they could move out of a camp. Our records show you rented to one or more of these people. Is it OK to ask a few questions? It will only take us about **10** minutes.

(If NO, ask if you can call back.) (If NO, ask why not and note reason below.)

IOM Interviewer : \_\_\_\_\_

L ID # : >F Pre Filled LL ID

<b>Respondent (Landlord):</b> >F Pre Filled LLName calc	Survey ID: >F Pre Filled Survey ID
<b>Telephone (Landlord) :</b> >F Pre Filled LL Phone	(Est. Contracts): >F Pre Filled Contracts
<b>Commune (Landlord): &gt; F Text Field VL (Communes)</b>	

**Callbacks:**

	Date	Time	Notes
1			
2			
3			

Questionnaire

**Q1** - Rental Contract (Renter = Household)

Question	Response
n) How many total renters do you have?	# >F Number
o) How many of your total renters received help from the Rental Support Program?	# >F Number
p) How many of those renters are still within the first year of their rental agreement?	# >F Number
q) How many of those renters <u>finished</u> their contract with you and <u>moved</u> ?	# >F Number
r) How many of those renters have <u>renewed</u> their rental agreement with you using their own funds?	# >F Number
s) Did any of your renters in the program leave before their lease period had ended?	YES / NO >F Text VL (Yes / No) Why? >F Text
t) If yes, why?	
u) The person who rented from me is a family member.	YES / NO >F Text VL (Yes / No)

Reason for refusal or non-completion of survey:

>F Text

If landlord has more than one renter, ask them to think about the average family situation, and experience they had with them.

I'm going to read some statements about the Rental Support Program, and I am going to ask you to respond using the scale 'Strongly Agree, Somewhat Agree, Agree, Somewhat Disagree, and Strongly Disagree (**do not prompt for a DK answer**)

**Q – 2 >F Text for each Q2 VL (strongly agree somewhat agree somewhat disagree strongly disagree DK)**

- o) I think closing camps as soon as possible is one of the most important things to do in the rebuilding process the metropolitan area.  
**strongly agree / somewhat agree / somewhat disagree / strongly disagree / DK**
- p) The Rental Support Program is a really good way to speed up the process of closing camps.  
**strongly agree / somewhat agree / somewhat disagree / strongly disagree / DK**
- q) From what I saw and heard, I think the NGOs did a good job in implementing the Rental Support Program.  
**strongly agree / somewhat agree / somewhat disagree / strongly disagree / DK**
- r) I heard there were many cases where people were able to 'trick' the NGOs to get a Cash Grant.  
**strongly agree / somewhat agree / somewhat disagree / strongly disagree / DK**
- s) I trust the NGO I worked with to deliver on their promise when we signed the agreement with the renters in their program.  
**strongly agree / somewhat agree / somewhat disagree / strongly disagree / DK**
- t) I rented my house to someone in this program so I could move somewhere else.  
**strongly agree / somewhat agree / somewhat disagree / strongly disagree / DK**

**Q – 3 Rental contract occupants. (If more than one family, think about the 'average' family)**

Question	Response
m) How many people live in your rented space?	# <b>&gt;F Number</b>
n) How many rooms does the renter have for his or her own family?	# <b>&gt;F Number</b>
o) Does the rental space have? <b>&gt;F Text VL (Yes / No) &gt;&gt;</b>	Electricity YES / NO Running Water: YES / NO Toilet or Latrine: YES / NO
p) What kind of roof does the rental space have?	Tin / Concrete / Other <b>&gt;F Text VL (Tin, Concrete, Other)</b> Why type if other: <b>&gt;F Text</b>

**Q – 4 >F Text for each Q4 VL (strongly agree somewhat agree somewhat disagree strongly disagree DK)**

- k) The rent I charge my renter in this program is about the average price for anyone in that neighbourhood.  
**strongly agree / somewhat agree / somewhat disagree / strongly disagree / DK**
- l) Some landlords took advantage of the people getting a cash grant, and charged a higher price for rent than the market rate.  
**strongly agree / somewhat agree / somewhat disagree / strongly disagree / DK**
- m) I made some improvements on the rental space because I had to meet requirements from the NGO verifier.  
**strongly agree / somewhat agree / somewhat disagree / strongly disagree / DK**
- n) All that extra money coming in to the rental market really caused rental prices to rise in the metropolitan area.  
**strongly agree / somewhat agree / somewhat disagree / strongly disagree / DK**
- o) Because of the cash grant for renters, more people in my neighbourhood are renting out space.  
**strongly agree / somewhat agree / somewhat disagree / strongly disagree / DK**
- p) I think the Rental Support Program stimulated investment in construction of additional rental housing in the metropolitan area.  
**strongly agree / somewhat agree / somewhat disagree / strongly disagree / DK**

**Q – 5 Rental contract payments. (If more than one family, think about the 'average' family)**

Question	Response
a) How much does your renter pay per year for rent?	# <b>&gt;F Number</b>
b) About how many square meters of rental space would you estimate they have? (Just a rough estimate)	# <b>&gt;F Number</b>

c) Did you spend money in rental space improvements for your renters because they got a Cash Grant?	YES / NO <u>&gt; F Text</u> <u>VL (Yes / No)</u>
(If YES) About how much did you spend in improvements?	Amt: <u>&gt; F Number</u>
d) I used the rental money I got from the Rental Support Cash Grant to build new rental spaces.	YES / NO <u>&gt; F Text</u> <u>VL (Yes / No)</u>
(If YES) How much did you invest in total?	Amt: <u>&gt; F Number</u>

**Q – 6** Thinking about my average renter who received a Rental Support Grant:

**>F Text for each Q6 VL (strongly agree somewhat agree somewhat disagree strongly disagree DK)**

- a) I think my renter will be able to find enough money to pay rent for another year on his or her own.  
**strongly agree / somewhat agree / somewhat disagree / strongly disagree / DK**
- b) If my renter does not pay the rent on time for the next year, I will get them out of the house immediately.  
**strongly agree / somewhat agree / somewhat disagree / strongly disagree / DK**
- c) I would let my renter pay me in monthly instalments if they cannot pay the whole year's rent up front.  
**strongly agree / somewhat agree / somewhat disagree / strongly disagree / DK**

**Q – 7** Use of Income.

Question	Response
a) Did you use any of the rental support money to reinvest in housing upgrades? (If yes – about how much)	YES / NO <u>&gt; F Text</u> <u>VL (Yes / No)</u> Amt: <u>&gt; F Number</u>
b) Will you try to increase the number of your rental properties in the next year? (If Yes – how many spaces will you add? And about how much will you invest?)	YES / NO <u>&gt; F Text</u> <u>VL (Yes / No)</u> # Spaces: <u>&gt; F Number</u> Amt Invest: <u>&gt; F Number</u>

**Q – 8** **>F Text for each Q8 VL (strongly agree somewhat agree somewhat disagree strongly disagree DK)**

- a) I never rented out any spaces before the 2010 earthquake.  
**strongly agree / somewhat agree / somewhat disagree / strongly disagree / DK**
- b) From what I hear, since the earthquake it is much easier to make money by renting spaces out than before.  
**strongly agree / somewhat agree / somewhat disagree / strongly disagree / DK**
- c) I have always had rental income, even before the earthquake.  
**strongly agree / somewhat agree / somewhat disagree / strongly disagree / DK**
- d) I depend a great deal on my rental income to make ends meet for my family and me.  
**strongly agree / somewhat agree / somewhat disagree / strongly disagree / DK**
- e) I am worried that the government will start to tax my rental earnings because of the Rental Support Program.  
**strongly agree / somewhat agree / somewhat disagree / strongly disagree / DK**

We're almost done. Now I would like to ask you just a few more questions.

**Q – 9** **>F Text for each Q9 VL (strongly agree somewhat agree somewhat disagree strongly disagree DK)**

- k) It was very important that parks and public spaces were cleared of camps, even though a lot of people had to move somewhere else.  
**strongly agree / somewhat agree / somewhat disagree / strongly disagree / DK**
- l) Overall, I have more money and more opportunities than I did before the earthquake.  
**strongly agree / somewhat agree / somewhat disagree / strongly disagree / DK**
- m) I think the Rental Support program should be available to all families still living in camps.

**strongly agree / somewhat agree / somewhat disagree / strongly disagree / DK**

- n) After this experience with the earthquake, I believe my government is better prepared and more able to meet future emergencies.  
**strongly agree / somewhat agree / somewhat disagree / strongly disagree / DK**

o) Overall, though, I think life in Haiti will improve in the coming years.  
**strongly agree / somewhat agree / somewhat disagree / strongly disagree / DK**

**Q – 10** Would you like to add any brief comments? (Control for one sentence, do not engage respondent)

## >F Text

Thank you very much for your participation in this survey. We appreciate your time.

### **For Interviewer post interview:**

**>F Text** VL (Use as appropriate for questions a – e)

1 - 1

- i) Respondent's gender was: Male / Female

j) Respondent's understanding of questions in general was: Excellent / Good / Fair / Poor

k) Respondent's interest in interview was: Very Strong / Moderate / Disinterested

l) Respondents attitude during survey was Positive / Neutral / Upset / Angry

m) I would rate the overall reliability of the answers I got as: Very Accurate / OK / Very Inaccurate

f) Total Minutes Interview: >F Number

I - 2

### **Interviewer Comments:**

## >F Text

## Akèt sou mèt kay nan kad subvansyon lwave

Alo, se inite jesyon done biwo OIM nan Pòtoprens ki rele w. Èske ou se (XXXXX, site non moun ki nan lis pou reponn yo)? Nou ta renmen poze'w kek kesyon sou eksperyans lwe ak moun ki patisipe nan program sibvansyon lwave. Se program ke ONG tankou OIM, LAKWA WOUJ, Concern, JP/HRO ak CRS pou bay sibvansyon lwave pou moun yo ka kite kan yo. Rejistre nou ta montre ke ou lwe a youn osinon plizye nan moun sa yo. Ou pa gen problem poun ta poze w kèk kesyon? Sa ka pran nou yon **10** minit konsa.

(Si se NON, mande si ou ka rele ankò.) (Si se NON, mande poukisa epi note repons la.)

Anketè OIM : \_\_\_\_\_

L ID # : \_\_\_\_\_

Moun k'ap reponn nan (Propriété):	Kod ankèt la:
Telefon (Propriété) :	( kontra estime):
Komin (Propriétés):	

Rele ankò:

	Dat	Lè	Nòt
1			
2			
3			

Kesyonè

K1 - Kontak lwave (Lokatè = Kay)

Kesyon	Repons
v) Konbyen lokatè total ou genyen?	#
w) Konbyen total nan moun ki lwe nan men w ki te resevwa èd nan <u>program sibvansyon lwave</u> a?	#
x) Konbyen nan moun ou llwe sa yo ki toujou nan premye ane lwave a?	#
y) Konbyen nan moun sa yo ou te lwe ki te <u>fini</u> ane lwave a epi ki te <u>soti</u> ?	#
z) Konbyen nan moun sa yo ki te <u>renouvre</u> lwave a ak pwòp fon pa yo?	#
aa) Èske gen moun nan moun sa yo kin an program nan ou lwe ki avan fèm nan bout?	WI / NON Poukisa?
bb) Si se wi, poukisa?	WI / NON
cc) Moun mwen lwe a se fanmi m.	WI / NON

Rezon pou derefize osinon pa fini ankèt la:

Si mèt kay la gen plis pase yon sèl moun ke li lwe, mande sa li panse osijè de sitiyasyon fanmi an **an mwayèn**, epi eksperyans yo te fè avèk yo.

Mwen pral li kèk deklarasyon sou Pwogram Sibvansyon Lwave a, e mwen pral mande w pou reponn ak 'Dakò Nèt, Yon ti jan dakò, Dakò, Yon ti jan pa dakò, ak pa dakò ditou (pa fè prese pou yon repons PK)

K - 2

u) Mwen panes ke fèmen kan pi vit ke posib se youn nan bagay ki pi enpòtan nan pwosesis pou rekonswi zòn capital la.

**Dakòt nèt / Yon ti jan dakò / Yon ti jan pa dakò / Pa dakò ditou / PK**

v) Program sibvansyon lwave a se vrèman yon bon mwayen pou fèmen kan yo pi rapid.

**Dakòt nèt / Yon ti jan dakò / Yon ti jan pa dakò / Pa dakò ditou / PK**

w) Daprè sa mwen wè ak sa mwen tande, mwen panes ke ONG fè yon bon travay nan tabli program subvansyon lwaye a.

**Dakòt nèt / Yon ti jan dakò / Yon ti jan pa dakò / Pa dakò ditou / PK**

x) Mwen te tande ke te gen plizyè ka kote moun yo tronpe ONG yo pou yo te ka jwenn lajan sibvansyon.

**Dakòt nèt / Yon ti jan dakò / Yon ti jan pa dakò / Pa dakò ditou / PK**

y) Mwen kwè nan ONG ke mwen te travay ak li a pou li respekte promes li le nou te siyen kontra ak moun k'ap lwe ki nan program li an.

**Dakòt nèt / Yon ti jan dakò / Yon ti jan pa dakò / Pa dakò ditou / PK**

z) Mwen te lwe yon moun kin an program nan kay pa m nan pou mwen te ka al rete yon lòt kote.

**Dakòt nèt / Yon ti jan dakò / Yon ti jan pa dakò / Pa dakò ditou / PK**

**K – 3** Okipan lwaye a. (Si se plis pase yon fanmi, pane a kantite fanmi an “mwayèn”)

<b>Kesyon</b>	<b>Repons</b>
q) Konbyen moun k ap viv kote ou met nan lwaye a?	#
r) Konbyen chanm moun ki lwe a gen pou li ak fanmi li?	#
s) Eske lwaye a gen:	Kouran WI / NON Dlo tiyo: WI / NON Twalèt osinon Latrin: WI / NON
t) Ak kisa tèt kay nan lwaye a fèt ?	Tòl / Beton / Lòt ki kalite si lòt:

**K - 4**

q) Kòb kay mwen mande moun ki ap lwe nan program nan se preske menm ak kòb moun peye an mwayèn nan katye sa a.

**Dakòt nèt / Yon ti jan dakò / Yon ti jan pa dakò / Pa dakò ditou / PK**

r) Kék mèt kay pran avantaj sou moun k'ap resevwa lajan sibvansyon, epi yo fè yo peye pi chè ke pri ki sou mache lwaye a (pri nòmal la.)

**Dakòt nèt / Yon ti jan dakò / Yon ti jan pa dakò / Pa dakò ditou / PK**

s) Mwen te fè kék amelyorasyon nan espas la pou m te ka respekte kritè ONG yo ap vreifye yo.

**Dakòt nèt / Yon ti jan dakò / Yon ti jan pa dakò / Pa dakò ditou / PK**

t) Tout lajan sa a k'ap antre nan mache lwaye a vrèman fè kay vin pi chè nan zòn capital la.

**Dakòt nèt / Yon ti jan dakò / Yon ti jan pa dakò / Pa dakò ditou / PK**

u) Paske gen lajansibvansyon pou moun k ap lwe kay, plis moun nan katye a ap mete espas yo nan fèm.

**Dakòt nèt / Yon ti jan dakò / Yon ti jan pa dakò / Pa dakò ditou / PK**

v) M panse ke program sibvansyon lwaye a fè moun envesti nan konstrksyon plis kay pou lwe nan zòn capital la.

**Dakòt nèt / Yon ti jan dakò / Yon ti jan pa dakò / Pa dakò ditou / PK**

**Q – 5** Pèman kontra lwaye. (Si se plis pase yon fanmi, pane a kantite fanmi an "mwayèn")

Kesyon	Repons
e) Konbyen kòb moun ki enfèmen an peye pou 1 an lwaye?	#
f) Konbyen mèt kare konsa ou estime key o ta ka gen konsa? (Yon estimasyon konsa konsa)	#
g) Èske ou te depanse lajan pou amelyore espas ou a paske moun ki nan lwaye a te gen sibvansyon lwaye.  (Si WI) Konbyen kòb konsa ou te depanse pou fè amelyorasyon?	WI / NON  Konbyen:
h) Mwen te itilize lajan lwaye ke men te fè nan program sibvansyon lwaye pou m bati lòt espas pou lwe.  (Si WI) Konbyen kòb ou te envesti an total?	WI / NON  Konbyen:

**K – 6** Pandan w ap panes a konbyen moun ki lwe nan menw kit e resevwa yon lajan sibvansyon lwaye:

d) M' panse ke lot ane moun ki lwen nan men m ap gen ase lajan pou l peye poukонт li pou yon lòt ane.

Dakòt nèt / Yon ti jan dakò / Yon ti jan pa dakò / Pa dakò ditou / PK

e) Si moun ki anfème a pa peye lwaye a a lè lòt ane, m'ap degèpi l touswit.

Dakòt nèt / Yon ti jan dakò / Yon ti jan pa dakò / Pa dakò ditou / PK

f) Si moun ki lwe nan menm nan peye mwen pa mwa paske li paka peye tout ane a davans.

Dakòt nèt / Yon ti jan dakò / Yon ti jan pa dakò / Pa dakò ditou / PK

**K– 7** Sa lajan touché a fè.

Kesyon	Repons
c) Ou pat itilize pyès nan kòb sibvansyon an pou pout e reenvesti nan ranje kay? (Si WI – Konbyen konsa)	WI / NON  Konbyen:
d) Èske w'ap monte kob kay lòt ane? (Si WI – Konbyen espas w ap ajoute? Epi konbyen kòb konsa ou ka envesti ?)	WI / NON  # Espas: Kantite envesti:

**K - 8**

f) Mwen pat konn lwe pyès espas mwen yo avan tranblemannè 2010 la.

Dakòt nèt / Yon ti jan dakò / Yon ti jan pa dakò / Pa dakò ditou / PK

g) Dapre sa mwen wè, li vin pi fasil pou fè kòb nan lwe moun kay.

Dakòt nèt / Yon ti jan dakò / Yon ti jan pa dakò / Pa dakò ditou / PK

h) M te konn toujou fè kòb, menm avan tranblemannè a.

Dakòt nèt / Yon ti jan dakò / Yon ti jan pa dakò / Pa dakò ditou / PK

i) Mwen depann anpil de lajan ki rantre nan lwaye a poum pran swen fanmi m ak tèt mwen.

Dakòt nèt / Yon ti jan dakò / Yon ti jan pa dakò / Pa dakò ditou / PK

j) Mwen pè pou gouvènman an pa mete enpo sou rantre lwaye akoz de program sibvansyon lwaye a.

Dakòt nèt / Yon ti jan dakò / Yon ti jan pa dakò / Pa dakò ditou / PK

Nou preske fini. Kounye a m'ap poze w kèk lòt kesyon ankò.

**K - 9**

p) Li te enpòtan anpil ke plas ak espas piblik yon pat gen kan sou yo ankò, menmsi yon pakèt mount e dwe al rete lòt kote.

**Dakòt nèt / Yon ti jan dakò / Yon ti jan pa dakò / Pa dakò ditou / PK**

q) Toudabò, mwen vin gen plis lajan ak plis opòtinite ke m te genyen avan tranblemann tè a.

**Dakòt nèt / Yon ti jan dakò / Yon ti jan pa dakò / Pa dakò ditou / PK**

r) M panse ke program sibvansyon lwavey a te dwe disponib pou tout moun ki nan kan.

**Dakòt nèt / Yon ti jan dakò / Yon ti jan pa dakò / Pa dakò ditou / PK**

s) Apre eksperyans ak tranblemann tè a, m ret kwè gouvènman peyim nan pi byen prepare e vin kapab fè fas ak lòt ijans.

**Dakòt nèt / Yon ti jan dakò / Yon ti jan pa dakò / Pa dakò ditou / PK**

t) Toudabò tou, mwen panse Ayiti ap amelyore nan ane k'ap vini la yo.

**Dakòt nèt / Yon ti jan dakò / Yon ti jan pa dakò / Pa dakò ditou / PK**

**K – 10** Ou pa ta renmen ajoute yon ti kòmantè tou kout? (Kontrole se yon sèl fraz, pa angaje moun k ap reponn nan) \_\_\_\_\_

Mèsi anpil pou patisipasyon w nan ankèt sila a. Nou apresye tan ou.

**Pou anketè aprè entèvyou:**

**A - 1**

n) Enkoni moun ki konsene a te : Gason / Fi

o) Moun k ap reponn kesyon yo konprann an jeneral: Ekselan / Bon / Pa trò mal / Mal

p) Enterè moun k'ap reponn nan entèvyou a: Fò anpil / Modere / Pa enterese

q) Konpòtman moun k ap reponn nan pandan ankèt la te Pozitif / Net / boulvèse / Fache

r) Mwen tap note fyabilite repsons yo tankou: Trè fyab / OK / Pa fyab ditou

f) Total Minite entèvyou a: \_\_\_\_\_

**A - 2**

**Kòmantè anketè:**

## **Annex 4 – Survey Data Sets**

This survey data set has been made available in electronic format to those Partners who would like to use it for further analysis and work. The data set has been constructed in such a way that Partner specific records can be extracted and matched back to original identifiers if necessary, though responses to all survey questions at the individual level are to be treated as confidential. Respondents were informed that no responses would affect services or assistance they might receive in the future, nor would the information be used in any negative personal way.

There remains a wealth of information to be extracted from this effort. It is estimated that this data set will not go ‘stale’ for approximately 6 months. Analyses and conclusions drawn would probably be highly valid within that frame.

### **Quantitative Recipient Survey Data Responses**

Q #	Recipient Questions	Item	Averages or % for Items
Q-H	Gender:		Male: 45% Female: 55%
Q-1 b	What neighborhood did you return to when you left the camp? (** Missing Data - 30%)		Same: 81% Different: 19%
Q-1 d	How much money did you receive from the Rental Support Program?	Rental Support: Transportation / Moving: Contro Visit: Other: Total:	\$500 \$25 \$150 \$107 \$782
Q-1 e	How much money did you pay for?	Rent: Transportation / Moving: Total:	\$389 \$21 \$410
Q-1 F	How many people live in your house?	#:	4.2
Q-1 g	We rented from:	Landlord: Family: Other:	90% 3% 7%
Q-3 a	How many live in your rented space?	#:	4.2
Q-3 c	How many rooms do you have for your own family's private use?	#:	1.2
Q-3 e	How many school aged children do you have living in your space?	#:	1.9
Q-3 f	What kind of roof does the building where your rented space is have?	Tin: Concrete: Other:	44% 56% 0%
Q-5 e	How many schools are within a 10 minute walk from your home?	#:	3.3
Q-7 a	What NGO gave you money?	Croix Rouge: IOM: CRS: JPH/RCO: Concern: DK: Other: World Vision:	49% 26% 13% 6% 3% 2% 1% 0%
Q-7 b	Have you been helped with any other specific programs besides a Rental Support Program offered by NGO's?	Micro-Health Insurance: Business Skills: Life Skills: Livelihoods Program: Education Grants: Neighborhood Reconstruction:	12% 9% 6% 2% 2% 0%
Q-9 a	How many times per week do you and/or your family go to a park or public space to enjoy yourselves?	#:	0.4
Q-9 b	What were the most important reasons for why you chose to live in your current neighbourhood, beginning with the most important: (Top Three Responses per Category Tallied Across)	Safest place to live I could afford: Best house for the money: Other family lived near by: Where I lived before the earthquake: Closer to my child's school:	57% 49% 35% 32% 30%
Q-9 c	If you had money left over, what were the most important things you did with it after you paid your first years rent - in order of importance? (Top Three Responses per Category Tallied Across)	Small Business / Commerce: Paid School Fees: Bought Food: Saved: Helped Another Family: Paid Debts: Took Courses / Training: Bought Tools:	71% 59% 54% 24% 14% 12% 7% 7%
Q-11 a	What do you estimate your family combined weekly income is?	#:	\$38
Q-11 b	What do you estimate your family combined weekly expenses are?	#:	\$35
Q-11 c	Do you owe any money? (If yes, about how much in total?)	#:	\$143
Q-11 e	If NO, why did you move?	No money to pay the rent: Had problems with the Landlord: Landlord kicked me out: 1st year's lease ended: Didn't like the house: Didn't like the neighborhood: It wasn't safe:	5% 2% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1%
Q-11 h	What will happen if you cannot pay the rent?	Landlord will evict: Move to Family: God will provide: DK: Move: Move to Province: Landlord will negotiate: NGO Grant: Borrow: Informal Settlements:	38% 16% 11% 7% 7% 6% 4% 1% 1%
Q #	Recipient Questions	Item	Yes No DK
Q-3 b	Is your rented space part of someone else's private home?		49% 50% 1%
Q-3 d	Does your rented space, or the home it is in, have access to:	Electricity: Running Water: Toilet or Latrine:	93% 6% 0% 34% 66% 0% 97% 3% 0%
Q-5 a	The neighbourhood I live in now has:	Piped water: Street Lighting: Sewage Disposal: Trash Disposal: Park: Police Presence:	67% 33% 0% 91% 9% 0% 72% 27% 1% 69% 31% 0% 20% 80% 0% 54% 46% 0%
Q-5 b	Within 10 minutes walking time there is a:	Clinic / Medical Pharmacy:	72% 27% 1% 78% 20% 2%
Q-5 c	There is additional rental housing available in this neighbourhood:		58% 15% 28%
Q-5 d	There is an active neighbourhood development group here:		29% 43% 28%
Q-5 f	There is a community group for safety issues in our neighbourhood.		17% 70% 13%
Q-5 g	I am a member of a group for safety issues in our neighbourhood.		1% 98% 1%
Q-11 c	Do you owe any money?		70% 29% 1%
Q-11 d	Are you in the same rental space you first moved in to?		80% 20% 0%
Q-11 f	Will you stay another year if you can?		58% 21% 21%
Q-11 g	Have you saved rent money for the next year's rent?		24% 72% 3%

## Qualitative Recipient Survey Data Responses

Q #	Recipient Questions	YES		NO		
		Strongly Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Don't Know
Q-2 a	Being able to 'keep the change' when I negotiated my rental contract really helped me a lot to get the best price.	58%	7%	9%	25%	1%
Q-2 b	The NGO I worked with really helped me to understand how to find a place that was safe and appropriate.	85%	8%	3%	4%	0%
Q-2 c	The NGO I worked with was personally interested in my situation, and followed up with help or visits.	76%	12%	6%	5%	1%
Q-2 d	The Landlord understood my situation with the Rental Support, and didn't try to take advantage of my situation.	51%	11%	6%	31%	1%
Q-2 e	We got the best place we could have, thinking about all the issues.	93%	5%	1%	1%	1%
Q-2 f	Moving out of a camp is better than staying in one if you have the choice.	89%	8%	3%	1%	0%
Q-4 a	I feel pretty safe about the strength and safety of the building I live in, even if we have another earthquake.	52%	19%	19%	9%	2%
Q-4 b	I can keep the rented space I live in clean, comfortable, and safe for me and my family.	91%	8%	1%	1%	0%
Q-4 c	My landlord made some improvements on my rental space because I rented from him.	61%	11%	6%	22%	0%
Q-4 d	I plan on staying in my present location for as long as I can keep paying the rent.	58%	8%	8%	25%	1%
Q-4 e	The rented space I live in is about average when compared to my neighbors living situation.	40%	27%	15%	17%	1%
Q-6 a	I am safe at night when in my own rented space.	67%	12%	9%	10%	1%
Q-6 b	My neighbors do not bother me or give me trouble because I moved here from a camp.	54%	8%	1%	35%	2%
Q-6 c	There is a lot of criminality, theft, and violence in my neighborhood.	9%	11%	7%	69%	4%
Q-6 d	There are a lot of attacks on women in my neighborhood.	6%	4%	5%	78%	6%
Q-6 e	I think the police are really helping to make my neighborhood a safer place to live.	50%	11%	10%	27%	4%
Q-8 a	From what I hear, rental prices were higher if a Landlord knew you got Rental Support.	42%	15%	5%	35%	3%
Q-8 b	Being able to 'keep the change' if I negotiated a good rent really motivated me to search for the best situation I could get.	57%	14%	8%	20%	1%
Q-8 c	The landlord we rented from tried to cheat us on the rental contract at first.	13%	6%	7%	72%	3%
Q-8 d	I know some people were able to 'trick' the system to get Rental Support, even when they weren't eligible.	13%	7%	2%	41%	38%
Q-10 a	The Rental Support Program was fairly implemented and properly administered, from what I saw and people say.	76%	13%	6%	4%	2%
Q-10 b	The Rental Support Cash Grant really helped me when I needed it most.	92%	7%	0%	1%	0%
Q-10 c	I received most of what I was promised by the NGOs	44%	13%	27%	15%	1%
Q-10 d	The way the Rental Support Cash Grant program was implemented was NOT corrupt.	49%	12%	11%	19%	9%
Q-10 e	The program really gave me the choice to find the best place to rent for me and my family.	71%	15%	9%	5%	0%
Q-10 f	NGO's really helped me a lot to understand the Rental Support program so I knew what to do.	78%	10%	7%	4%	1%
Q-10 g	I think most people who got Rental Support will be able to pay the next year's rent on their own.	6%	7%	31%	46%	10%
Q-10 h	I got most of my information about the program from local media	28%	9%	14%	46%	3%
Q-12 a	It was very important that parks and public spaces were cleared of camps, even though many had to move elsewhere.	98%	2%	0%	0%	0%
Q-12 b	Overall, I have more money and more opportunities than I did before the earthquake.	6%	8%	10%	75%	2%
Q-12 c	I think the Rental Support program should be available to all families still living in camps.	92%	4%	2%	1%	1%
Q-12 d	After this experience with the earthquake, I believe my government is better prepared to meet future emergencies.	25%	16%	13%	22%	23%
Q-12 e	Overall, though, I think life in Haiti will improve in the coming years.	16%	16%	14%	30%	25%
Q #	Interviewer Questions	Excellent	Good	Fair	Poor	DK
I-1 a	Respondent's understanding of questions in general was:	27%	52%	12%	3%	6%
I-1 b	Respondent's interest in interview was:	23%	61%	8%	2%	6%
I-1 c	Respondents attitude during survey was:	39%	45%	9%	0%	6%
I-1 d	I would rate the overall reliability of the answers I got as:	29%	58%	3%	5%	6%
I-1 f	Total Minutes Interview:	Avg Min:		23		

## Quantitative Landlord Survey Data Responses

Q #	Landlord Questions	Item	Averages or % for Items
Q-H	Gender:	Male: 66% Female: 34%	
Q-1 a	How many total renters do you have?	#: 701	
Q-1 b	How many of your total renters received help from the Rental Support Program?	#: 549	78%
Q-1 c	How many of those renters are still within the first year of their rental agreement? How many completed their 1st year?	#: 330 Within / #: 219 Completed	60% / 40%
Q-1 d	How many renters who finished their contract with you moved?	#: 147 of 219	67%
Q-1 e	How many renters have renewed their rental agreement with you using their own funds? (9% Not sure, left, or DK)	#: 54 of 219	25%
Q-3 a	How many people live in your rented space per family?	#: 1588	4.1
Q-3 b	How many rooms does the renter have for his or her own family?	#: 493	1.3
Q-3 d	What type of roof does the rental space have?	Tin: 36% Concrete: 62% Other: 2%	
Q-5 a	How much does your renter pay per year for rent? *	#: \$396	
Q-5 b	About how many square meters of rental space would you estimate they have? (Just a rough estimate - M2)	#: 13.7	
Q-5 c	About how much did you spend in improvements?	#: \$201	
Q-5 d	How much did you invest in total?	** Insufficient Responses	**
Q-7 a	About how much did you reinvest in housing upgrades?	#: \$124	
Q-7 b	How many: Spaces will you add? (20% Yes Q7b) How much will you invest? (Subgrouped)	2 \$293	

Q #	Landlord Questions	Item	Yes	No	DK
Q-1 f	Did any of your renters in the program leave before their lease period had ended?		5%	95%	0%
Q-1 h	The person who rented from me is a family member.		4%	94%	2%
Q-3 c	Does the rental space have?	Electricity: Running Water: Toilet or Latrine:	96% 26% 98%	4% 74% 1%	0% 1% 1%
Q-5 c	Did you spend money in rental space improvements for your renters because they got a Cash Grant?		68%	32%	1%
Q-5 d	I used the rental money I got from the Rental Support Cash Grant to build new rental spaces.		2%	97%	1%
Q-7 a	Did you use any of the rental support money to reinvest in housing upgrades?		44%	53%	3%
Q-7 b	Will you try to increase the number of your rental properties in the next year?		20%	76%	4%

## Qualitative Landlord Survey Data Responses

Q #	Landlord Questions	YES		NO		
		Strongly Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Don't Know
Q-2 a	I think closing camps as soon as possible is one of the most important things to do in rebuilding the metropolitan area.	85%	9%	2%	3%	2%
	Q-2 b The Rental Support Program is a really good way to speed up the process of closing camps.	77%	12%	5%	5%	1%
	Q-2 c From what I saw and heard, I think the NGOs did a good job in implementing the Rental Support Program.	81%	12%	5%	1%	1%
	Q-2 d I heard there were many cases where people were able to 'trick' the NGOs to get a Cash Grant.	26%	16%	6%	27%	26%
	Q-2 e I trust the NGO I worked with to deliver on their promise when we signed the agreement with the renters in their program.	81%	12%	3%	2%	3%
	Q-2 f I rented my house to someone in this program so I could move somewhere else	7%	2%	3%	88%	1%
Q-4 a	The rent I charge my renter in this program is about the average price for anyone in that neighborhood.	45%	20%	7%	22%	6%
	Q-4 b Some landlords took advantage of the people getting a cash grant, and charged a higher price for rent than the market rate.	10%	7%	4%	48%	31%
	Q-4 c I made some improvements on the rental space because I had to meet requirements from the NGO verifier.	77%	10%	1%	10%	1%
	Q-4 d All that extra money coming in to the rental market really caused rental prices to rise in the metropolitan area.	40%	15%	12%	28%	6%
	Q-4 e Because of the cash grant for renters, more people in my neighborhood are renting out space.	33%	18%	10%	30%	9%
	Q-4 f I think the Rental Support Program stimulated investment in construction of additional rental housing in the metropolitan area.	33%	12%	9%	35%	10%
Q-6 a	I think my renter will be able to find enough money to pay rent for another year on his or her own.	6%	7%	5%	48%	33%
	Q-6 b If my renter does not pay the rent on time for the next year, I will get them out of the house immediately	28%	19%	23%	28%	2%
	Q-6 c I would let my renter pay me in monthly installments if they cannot pay the whole year's rent up front.	19%	16%	9%	53%	3%
Q-8 a	I never rented out any spaces before the 2010 earthquake.	54%	1%	2%	43%	1%
	Q-8 b From what I hear, since the earthquake it is much easier to make money by renting spaces out than before.	30%	25%	14%	28%	3%
	Q-8 c I have always had rental income, even before the earthquake.	77%	8%	3%	11%	8%
	Q-8 d I depend a great deal on my rental income to make ends meet for my family and me.	58%	12%	7%	23%	1%
	Q-8 e I am worried that the government will start to tax my rental earnings because of the Rental Support Program.	16%	17%	10%	53%	5%
Q-9 a	It was very important that parks and public spaces were cleared of camps, even though people had to move somewhere else.	99%	0%	0%	0%	1%
	Q-9 b Overall, I have more money and more opportunities than I did before the earthquake	7%	6%	9%	77%	2%
	Q-9 c I think the Rental Support program should be available to all families still living in camps.	88%	5%	3%	3%	2%
	Q-9 d After this experience with the earthquake, I believe my government is better prepared and more able to meet future emergencies.	14%	16%	6%	41%	24%
	Q-9 e Overall, though, I think life in Haiti will improve in the coming years.	15%	19%	8%	37%	22%
Q #	Interviewer Questions	Male	Female	DK		
I-1 a	Respondent's gender was:	64%	28%	8%		
		Excellent	Good	Fair	Poor	DK
I-1 b	Respondent's understanding of questions in general was:	31%	54%	6%	1%	8%
		Very Strong	Moderate	Disinterested	DK	
I-1 c	Respondent's interest in interview was:	16%	71%	3%	10%	
		Positive	Neutral	Upset	Angry	DK
I-1 d	Respondents attitude during survey was:	54%	35%	2%	1%	8%
		Accurate	OK	Inaccurate	DK	
I-1 e	I would rate the overall reliability of the answers I got as:	25%	63%	1%	11%	
I-1 f	Total Minutes Interview:	Avg. Min		12		

## Grant Recipients Who Have Completed Contract Split Out

Quantitative Responses Comparing Full Set (**Remain**) with Those Who have Completed Their Contract (**Left**)

Q #	Recipient Questions	Item	Remain	Left
Q-H	Gender:	Male: Female:	45% 55%	54% 46%
Q-1 e	How much money did you pay for?	Rent:	\$389	\$396
Q-3 a	How many live in your rented space?	#:	4.2	4.5
Q-3 c	How many rooms do you have for your own family's private use?	#:	1.2	1.2
Q-3 e	How many school aged children do you have living in your space?	#:	1.9	2
Q-9 b	What were the most important reasons for why you chose to live in your current neighbourhood, beginning with the most important: (Top Three Responses per Category Tallied Across)	Safest place to live I could afford. Best house for the money. Other family lived near by. Where I lived before the earthquake. Closer to my child's school.	57% 49% 35% 32% 30%	60% 60% 29% 32% 31%
Q-11 a	What do you estimate your family combined weekly income is?	#:	\$38	\$32
Q-11 b	What do you estimate your family combined weekly expenses are?	#:	\$35	\$33
Q-11 c	Do you owe any money? (If yes, about how much in total?)	#:	\$143	\$228
Q-11 e	If NO, why did you move?	No money to pay the rent. Had problems with the Landlord 1st year's lease ended. Landlord kicked me out.		49% 26% 14% 11%
Q #	Recipient Questions	Item	Yes	Yes
Q-11 c	Do you owe any money?		70%	77%
Q-11 d	Are you in the same rental space you first moved in to?		80%	0%
Q-11 g	Have you saved rent money for the next year's rent?		24%	14%

Selected Qualitative Response Comparisons Between Full Set and Those Completing (Note legend)

Q #	Recipient Questions	Strongly Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Strongly Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Strongly Disagree
Q-4 e	The rented space I live in is about average when compared to my neighbors living situation.	40%	27%	15%	17%	34%	17%	14%	31%
Q-6 a	I am safe at night when in my own rented space.	67%	12%	9%	10%	66%	20%	0%	14%
Q-6 b	My neighbors do not bother me or give me trouble because I moved here from a camp.	54%	8%	1%	35%	51%	6%	3%	40%
Q-6 c	There is a lot of criminality, theft, and violence in my neighborhood.	9%	11%	7%	69%	14%	9%	6%	66%
Q-6 e	I think the police are really helping to make my neighborhood a safer place to live.	50%	11%	10%	27%	63%	11%	6%	17%
Q-8 a	From what I hear, rental prices were higher if a Landlord knew you got Rental Support.	42%	15%	5%	35%	46%	11%	6%	34%
Q-8 d	I know some people were able to 'trick' the system to get Rental Support, even when they weren't eligible.	13%	7%	2%	41%	12%	3%	6%	37%
Q-10 g	I think most people who got Rental Support will be able to pay the next year's rent on their own.	6%	7%	31%	46%	9%	6%	20%	54%
Q-12 e	Overall, though, I think life in Haiti will improve in the coming years.	16%	16%	14%	30%	17%	17%	14%	23%
Remain:					Left:				

## Annex 5 – Challenges of Neighbourhood/Informal Settlements Survey

*Neighbourhoods' residents will be randomly sampled. The sampling will have to be statistically significant and will have to cover at least 3 neighbourhoods where most of the return occurred and 3 neighbourhoods of the most recent new informal settlements. The neighbourhoods will be chosen based on the prevailing security situation. Attempts will be made to ensure that neighbourhoods will be representative of all the partners' program involved and attempts will be made also to maintain a fair gender and age balance among the interviewees.*

*The methodology of investigation for the neighbourhoods will have to be included in the incipient report. Field visits will be part of the data collection methodologies and these will include direct on-site observations, semi-structured interviews and/or focus groups and phone surveys (direct and indirect beneficiaries).*

*Field visits will be part of the data collection methodologies and these will include direct on-site observations, semi-structured interviews and/or focus groups and phone surveys (direct and indirect beneficiaries).*

This aspect of the ToR has been extensively discussed, with several issues becoming apparent as the problem was explored in the course of the field mission. The problems associated with the survey approach were significant at several levels, but the main question was whether a survey of a stratified geographic random sample was the right 'tool' and method to get the information required. The following were issues of concern:

- 1) Logistically it is extremely difficult, and quite costly.
- 2) This may be a case of using the wrong tool in the wrong context.
- 3) There are some inherent dangers and security issues involved.
- 4) Data validity is highly questionable.

The question posed before effecting a survey in the informal settlements could be stated as 'what is the 'buy in' for someone to answer random questions from an unknown outsider about activities that are essentially illegal, and known to be so? (i.e. illegally occupying land.)

It may be that, **this problem is an investigative one, NOT a survey one**. Even if one asked random people, randomly selected in a random neighbourhood questions such as are designed to answer the question set, there is absolutely no incentive to answer / to give a correct answer / and especially to give an answer that might incriminate themselves. This would render the validity of the data suspect.

Additionally, **answering questions such as this in a public forum could put some people in actual danger** should there be a consequence local residents could attribute to the team and respondents in such a survey.

Logistical concerns, developing a stratified geographic random sample in an unstructured area, and many other issues make such an undertaking extremely difficult, costly, and perhaps not worth all the effort if the data extracted is not reliable, or puts people at risk during its collection.

Further discussions about how to go about this task were undertaken to try to see if some better way might exist to approach this very important, and difficult, problem. Some avenues were discussed, but one in particular offers the best solution in the most logical, cost effective, safest way that will insure data collected is valid.

There were several efforts made to try to figure out just what a neighbourhood and an ‘informal settlement’ might represent, as these were parts of a similar problem. A short afternoon field trip in the environs of Port-au-Prince revealed the complexity of the problem, along with the difficulty of investigating more closely as Hurricane Sandy struck the region. With that avenue constrained, some further discussions were held with principals at the DMU and Cluster to see just how data could be obtained that met the needs of the ToR in a valid, economical, safe, and useful way.

The first question to be answered was what was a ‘neighbourhood’, and what was an ‘informal settlement’. Both, it seems, shared the same characteristic, i.e., these were not defined or bounded places, but existed as somewhat amorphous developments across the metropolitan area and along its periphery. How would one discover how to even approach doing some kind of sampling in such an environment that could be construed as truly ‘random’?

### **Proposed Steps in Implementing a Neighbourhood / Informal Settlement Survey**

Before embarking on this very ambitious project, the following points should be considered and decisions based on a clear understanding of the risks and costs versus the value of the potential result. A definite scoping process will give sufficient information for decision makers to determine if the investment will be worth the intended result.

In developing the framework for a full on random sample with face-to-face interviewing the following points should be clearly examined and considered at each stage before moving forward as the investment is extremely large.

- 1) Determine that a random sample survey will acquire the data needed with the following issues clearly understood:
  - a. Security for Interviewers and Respondents can be guaranteed.
  - b. Cost / logistics / staff overhead is clearly enumerated.
  - c. Time frames and potential problems clearly charted.
- 2) Determine how to stratify the areas under consideration in order to sample correctly:
  - a. Identify Information Resources – Obtaining valid maps of neighbourhoods and informal settlements is an extreme challenge, but the resources are potentially available within the DMU, based on new technology and aerial mapping.
  - b. Get the Data – It is likely that Port-au-Prince and indeed Haiti has been well photographed via plane, satellite, and apparently even drone, particularly over the period since the earthquake. The best set may be the drone photographs existing within the DMU itself, but this is unconfirmed.
  - c. Set a Frame - Since in many, if not most, cases informal settlements are outgrowths or extensions of some existing settled areas, one would need to access photographs or maps of the same geographic area over time to compare new development with old.
  - d. Demarcate the Maps – if aerial maps are found and compared, areas of interest should be demarcated.
  - e. Select a Sample – the population within the demarcated boundaries of the maps should be estimated by demographers, and a sampling frame then determined based on this estimation. It will probably fall in the 380 household range.
  - f. Grid the maps – Using GIS software, the demarcated areas should be gridded out, and GPS points snapped for each grid intersection and tabulated.
  - g. Select the sample – once the GPS grid points in the demarcated areas have been tabulated, they should be randomly sorted, and the first 380 GPS points should serve as the starting point for a Survey Team to identify the closest occupied residential building where they might find a suitable respondent.

- h. Using accepted randomization techniques at the selected GPS points such as tossing a coin or throwing dice, valid households can be selected as close as possible to the GPS point.
- 3) Identify an eligible respondent based on pre-determined criteria.

In brief, the above technique would insure that a proper geographically stratified random sample survey was effected, without the need for street names, neighbourhood designations, or any other similar overlays that are highly unlikely to be available or reliable if they were. It is technically feasible given the availability of GPS devices and the fact that most 'Home Verification' practitioners are very adept at using the technology.

In additional discussions with IOM principals a significant bit of information came to light that might very well change the entire notion of doing a random sample survey as described above. It is understood that there is planning on going within the Haitian Government, in conjunction with the DMU, to accomplish a large scale registration of all residents in these areas. If that is the case, it is suggested that a question sub-set relevant to reconstruction be piggy-backed on to that effort to achieve what is unusual in such circumstances, i.e. rather than a survey, one could capture all necessary data by census.

This is a once in many year opportunity to capitalize on, and the results possible through this avenue would obviate every single counter argument made against doing a survey in the areas under question, while giving significant data of unparalleled accuracy and scope. Rather than pursue a survey strategy at this time, it is suggested that all efforts be directed towards determining the possibility of including all survey questions under the auspices of the census effort. Should that not be possible, the above noted strategy could be deployed, albeit with a great deal less confidence in the outcome.

## Annex 6 – TOR

### Advertisement

#### Open International Competition (OIC)

#### **CONSULTANCY FOR EXTERNAL EVALUATION OF THE RENTAL SUPPORT CASH GRANT APPROACH applied to Return and Relocation programs in Haiti**

**COUNTRY OF DESTINATION:** Haiti (Port-au-Prince and field visits in earthquake-affected areas).

**DESCRIPTION:** External evaluation of the Rental Support Cash Grant approach applied to Return and Relocation programs in Haiti.

In the complexity of the humanitarian earthquake response in Haiti especially during the implementation of the Return and Relocation strategy and camp closure, the key strategic role of Rental Support Cash Grants offered a solution for the most vulnerable that did not have access to land or a house in need of repairs/to be reconstructed.

By introducing the Rental Support Cash Grants into the palette of options for the return of displaced population, the humanitarian actors were able to work with every family living in selected camps and find with them better living solutions than the ones they had in camps, taking into consideration their particular vulnerability.

For more information on Rental Support Cash Grant Approach, please refer to CCCM & E-shelter Cluster Website: [Here](#)

**POSTING DATE:** 4<sup>th</sup> September 2012

**DEADLINE FOR SUBMISSION:** 17 September 2012

**START OF ASSIGNMENT:** 01 October 2012

International Organization for Migration (IOM) hereby invites qualified associations/individuals/firm to submit proposal for consulting services to carry out the External Evaluation of the Rental Support Cash Grant approach applied to Return and Relocation programs in Haiti

The core evaluation team will ideally be comprised of a maximum of two international consultants. The core team will be supported by the Evaluation Commission and by the IOM Data Management Unit during the evaluation period.

#### CONSULTANT PROFILES

- a) The team leader will possess at least 10 – 15 years of professional experience in international program and project evaluation of relevance to emergency response. He/she will also have a strong record in leading and/or conducting evaluations (required).
- b) Advanced university degree in specialized fields of social sciences and/or anthropology with related experiences in emergency response in urban affected area, natural disaster management, IDP management.
- c) Professional experience/expertise in the field of Livelihood, Shelter construction, Camp Coordination and Urbanization is recommended.
- d) Strong knowledge of the United Nations, including previous work experience or assignments for the UN (required).
- e) One team member will have experience in data analysis, gender analysis or gender evaluation methodologies (required).
- f) Excellent oral communication and report writing skills in French (required) and English (preferred).
- g) Other team members will have professional experience in emergency programs and project evaluation (preferred).
- h) Evaluation team should preferably be composed of members of the ALNAP network (preferred).

- i) The evaluation team is expected to adhere to the DAC Evaluation Quality Standards and UNEG norms, standards and ethical guidelines.

Preference will be given to evaluation teams that are multicultural with appropriate gender balance and geographic representation.

COMPLETE TORs OF THE EVALUATION CAN BE DOWNLOADED ON RELIEFWEB OR [Here](#)

## APPLICATION PROCESS

The Evaluation Terms of Reference (ToR) specifying the details of this assignment and the proposal should be elaborated on the basis of the information below.

The proposal shall be produced in French and it will include:

- Updated CV of evaluation team members clearly stating the specific experience related to the above mentioned qualifications.
- Samples of previous evaluation work, preferably relevant to the subjects of this evaluation.
- A technical proposal comprehensive of work plan, evaluation team member responsibilities toward the evaluation, work methodology and a detailed budget, as specified in the ToR.
- Contact details for three references from clients with previous contracting experience with the team leader.

No remuneration will be made to companies/individuals for preparation and submission of their proposals.

### Conflict of interest

Any of the members of the evaluation team, shall not have any existing or potential conflict of interest in undertaking the assignment. By conflict of interest is meant, in particular, that any individual member of the evaluation team has been involved in the planning or implementation of any parts of the object under evaluation, nor has, or has had any financial or similar interest in the object of the evaluation which can affect the outcome of the evaluation.

Any conflict of interest which may potentially harm the independence of the evaluation shall be stated in the proposal, providing detailed information on the character and scope of previous association with either the object of evaluation, or persons involved in the intervention. In such cases the proposal should include details on how this conflict of interest would be dealt with, if the proposal were to be selected.

All enquiries regarding this advertisement and the **proposal** shall be addressed to the IOM contact person, **Ms. Valeria Falaschi**, at the following e-mail address [vfalaschi@iom.int](mailto:vfalaschi@iom.int) with copy to **Mr. Jusselme Damien**, [djusselme@iom.int](mailto:djusselme@iom.int).

## **Terms of References**

### **External evaluation of the**

### **Rental Support Cash Grant approach applied to Return and Relocation programs in Haiti**

#### **I. Introduction**

Following the 7.0 magnitude earthquake that devastated Haiti on 12 January 2010, more than 1.5 million individuals were estimated displaced in some 1,500 camp sites.<sup>10</sup>

The humanitarian response in post-earthquake Haiti was coordinated through the Cluster approach, which aims at improving the effectiveness of the humanitarian response by ensuring coordination, promoting partnership among different stakeholders (including the Haitian Government) and by encouraging greater predictability and accountability. The different Clusters provided coordination among stakeholders, including the GoH, donors, and humanitarian agencies.

Under the coordination of the Camp Coordination and Camp Management (CCCM) and the Shelter Clusters, humanitarian actors provided different shelter/housing solutions to help families leave camps. Broadly-speaking these solutions have fallen into four categories:

- **Transitional Shelters (T-shelters):** Provision of medium-term shelter lasting between 3 and 5 years (10 in same case).
- **Yellow House Repairs:** Rehabilitation of damaged houses.
- **Permanent Housing Reconstruction:** Construction of new houses replacing demolished houses (permanent housing reconstruction in general was hindered by land tenure issues).
- **Rental Support Cash Grants:** Provision of rental subsidies to allow beneficiaries to rent a property of their choice for one year (*piece kay*).

In the complexity of the humanitarian response in Haiti, the key strategic role of Rental Support Cash Grants was to offer a solution to the most vulnerable that did not have access to land (the vast majority of those living in camps were renters before the earthquake).

By introducing this option, the humanitarian actors were able to work with every family living in camps taking into consideration their particular situation. Through this particular solution entire camps were closed.

In Haiti at least six agencies<sup>11</sup> implemented camp closure and Rental Support Cash Grant programs in 2011:

- Catholic Relief Services (CRS)
- Concern Worldwide
- International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC)
- International Organization for Migration (IOM)
- J/P Haitian Relief Organization (J/P HRO)
- World Vision International

Analysis done on return projects revealed that 95% of beneficiaries were choosing Rental Support Cash Grant as their return option, thus confirming that those who in 2011 still remained in camps were not house/land owners but tenants. The Return and Relocation Strategy, adopted by the Haitian

<sup>10</sup> IOM, Displacement Tracking Matrix, July 2010

<sup>11</sup> A Return Working Group was established in Port au Prince in October of 2011 with the purpose of providing a forum where managers from different agencies implementing camp closure programs had the opportunity to discuss challenges encountered, share lessons learned and work together to establish best practice. The Government is represented in the Returns Working Group by Clement Belizaire, Director head of the Relocation and Neighborhood Rehabilitation Section of the UCLBP and Program Director of the 16/6 Program.

Country Team (HCT)<sup>12</sup> in January 2011, was the first official document to include Rental Support Cash Grant as a return option.<sup>13</sup>

Approximately one year after most organizations providing Rental Support Cash Grant made this option available to displaced families, the humanitarian community wishes to assess the impact of such solution in addressing the needs of the IDPs.

## **II. External evaluation objectives**

The evaluation is intended as a post-evaluation (one year after the first rental subsidies were provided).

The evaluation aims at: A) identifying lessons learned and good practices B) providing recommendations to the Haitian Government, NGOs and international stakeholders to adjust (if necessary) the return and relocation approach, C) serving as an accountability tool towards the donors, and D) influencing future emergency programs in urban environments like that of Haiti.

The overall objective of the evaluation is to assess the socio-economic impact and the pertinence of the rental support cash grants methodology for return and relocation in Haiti.

The evaluation specific objectives are:

1. To assess the relevance<sup>14</sup> of the Rental Support Cash Grants approach. In particular to what extent this approach was pertinent to the objectives of the Return and Relocation Strategy.
2. To measure, based on quantitative and qualitative data, the socio-economic impact of the Rental Support Cash Grants in terms of changes occurred in the lives of beneficiaries and in the neighborhoods to which beneficiaries moved to.
3. To identify lessons learned and related recommendations that could be applied on a wider scale during implementation, taking into account the particular profile and vulnerability of the target beneficiaries.

The evaluation will have to respond to the following questions for each specific objective:

### **To assess the relevance of the Rental Support Cash Grants approach**

- To what extent do Rental Support Cash Grants represent an appropriate solution for IDPs when compared with other approaches proposed in the relocation and return strategy?

### **To measure the socio economic impact of the Rental Support Cash Grants approach**

- Which socio-economic impact has the Rental Support Cash Grant on the direct beneficiaries (renter) and on the indirect beneficiaries (house owner)?
- What are the direct beneficiaries' criteria for selecting the neighborhood of choice?
- How many beneficiaries are still in the same house or have found other equivalent accommodation after a year from the end of project?
- Where do direct beneficiaries live a year after having received the Rental Support Cash Grant (same/different house? Same/different neighborhood?)

<sup>12</sup> The Humanitarian Country Team (HCT), under the leadership of the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC), is the centre-piece of the humanitarian coordination architecture established by Humanitarian Reform. The HCT is composed of organizations that undertake humanitarian action in-country and that commit to participate in coordination arrangements.

<sup>13</sup> The Return and Relocation Strategy Approved by the Haitian Country Team (HCT) plus all the relevant information and tools will be made available to the evaluators in due course. Most of the documents can also be downloaded from the E-Shelter and CCCM cluster website at [www.eshelter-cccmhaiti.info](http://www.eshelter-cccmhaiti.info)

<sup>14</sup> For the purpose of this evaluation **Relevance** is defined as the extent to which the objectives and/or project purposes of a project/programme remain valid and pertinent either as originally planned or as subsequently modified.

- What is the profile of the families remaining in the rented house and that of ones that left it?
- What are the main reasons pushing direct beneficiaries to leave the rented house?
- To what extend the direct beneficiary can access basic services?
- What did the direct beneficiary do with the excess money following rent payment?
- To what extend has the Rental Support Cash Grant encouraged private sector's construction?
- To what extent has the Rental Support Cash Grant contributed to the installation and development of new informal settlements?

### **III. Evaluation Phases**

1. Preparation phase: review of secondary sources, literature and statistics and submission of inception report
2. Field work: debriefing meeting with stakeholders, questionnaires design, surveys, organization of focus groups
3. Data Analysis and draft report
4. Dissemination of findings (workshop) and final report

### **IV. Methodology**

#### **1. Preparation phase**

##### **Documentation review and inception report**

All necessary information will be provided to the evaluators upon signature of the contract between the Evaluation Team (ET) and Evaluation Commission<sup>15</sup> (EC). Existing data base from partners will be shared upon ET request.

An inception report will be submitted by the ET to the EC for approval.<sup>16</sup> The inception report will include evaluation tools (i.e. survey questionnaires), methodology and evaluation work plan as per model in annex 4.

#### **2. Field work**

##### **Briefing meeting**

Briefing meeting will be held with CCCM/Shelter/Housing stakeholders as part of the evaluation exercise. This will serve the purpose of enhancing the ET understanding of the program and share expectations for the Evaluation. Stakeholders will have an opportunity to explain their activities, the methodologies applied, linkages with related government entities, partnerships, coordination mechanisms and program achievements. The stakeholders will present past Return and Relocation programs and eventually current ones.

During the briefing meeting the evaluation methodology, including the evaluation work plan and tools, will be presented by the ET to the stakeholders.

The Evaluation Team will meet stakeholders individually, if necessary, to clarify information or gather further data relevant to the evaluation.

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<sup>15</sup> The Evaluation Commission is composed by a representative of the Unité de Construction de Logements et Bâtiments Publics (UCLBP), the CCCM & Shelter cluster leader and selected NGOs.

<sup>16</sup> The inception report provides the evaluators with an opportunity to verify that they share the same understanding about the evaluation (methodology, approach) and clarify any misunderstanding at the outset.

The evaluation criteria will be based on the OECD-DAC best practices and on the criteria mentioned in Annex 2. Those criteria will guide the drafting of the semi-structured interview templates and the survey questionnaires.

### **Data collection**

Field visits will be part of the data collection methodologies and these will include direct on-site observations, semi-structured interviews and/or focus groups<sup>17</sup> and phone surveys (direct and indirect beneficiaries).

A qualitative and quantitative phone survey of target beneficiaries (direct and indirect) will be carried out. The survey will be conducted by a team of trained and experienced Haitian enumerators that will receive an additional training (2-5 days), depending on the level of difficulty of the questionnaire and final sampling protocol, before going into action. The phone survey will be executed by IOM Data Management Unit already experienced and equipped, nevertheless the full responsibility of questionnaire design, protocol sampling and tabulation plan for statistical analysis, will be of the ET.

A significant sample of direct (IDPs) and indirect (Owners) beneficiaries will be targeted by a phone survey. A representative sample for each category of beneficiaries will be selected according to beneficiaries' estimations (see Annex 5).

Neighborhoods' residents will be randomly sampled. The sampling will have to be statistically significant and will have to cover at least 3 neighborhoods where most of the return occurred and 3 neighborhoods of the most recent new informal settlements. The neighborhoods will be chosen based on the prevailing security situation. Attempts will be made to ensure that neighborhoods will be representative of all the partners' program involved and attempts will be made also to maintain a fair gender and age balance among the interviewees.

The methodology of investigation for the neighborhoods will have to be included in the incipient report.

### **3. Data Analysis and Draft Report**

Data collected through the different approaches will be synthesized and analyzed. Data from the different primary sources (interviews, beneficiary survey, videos, maps) will be triangulated with data obtained from secondary sources (published reports), observations and any other data sources to produce a comprehensive report that adequately addresses the Evaluation requirements.

The first draft report will be written in French, in accordance with the format given in Annex 3. It shall be submitted by electronic transmission (MS Word 7.0 or higher) to the EC, which will submit their remarks and comments within 3 working days.

### **4. Dissemination of findings (workshop) and final report**

The final phase of the project involves the presentation of the findings of the evaluation and training/workshop on Results-Based Management (RBM) that will enable the GoH and stakeholders to incorporate the data and findings into the national strategy and into the management of its programs. The evaluation findings will be presented in Powerpoint in Port au Prince.

The ET will submit a final report, incorporating comments and remarks made during the presentation of the evaluation, to the EC within 5 working days. Approval of the document should be granted by the EC within 5 working days.

The final evaluation will be documented in a written report in both French and English.

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<sup>17</sup> The sample will be consistent and randomly chosen among neighborhood residents, service providers, community leaders.

## V. Evaluation Chronogram

Activity	Party Responsible	Week						
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1. Review secondary sources, literature and statistics	External experts							
2. Finalize specific evaluation objectives, methodology (including survey questionnaire) and implementation framework. Finalize survey questionnaire and focus group interview. Finalize the inception report for approval. Debriefing meeting.	EC and External experts							
3. Carry out data gathering (phone surveys, focus group etc...)	IOM DMU & External expert							
4. Analyze surveyed questionnaires, and records of interviews & discussions	External experts							
5. Draft and Finalize the report in French for EC approval	UCLBP and CCCM & E-Shelter Cluster and External experts							
6. Present evaluation findings at workshop	External experts							
7. Include workshop comments in the final report	External experts							
8. Approval of final report, layout, printing and distribution of the final report	CCCM & E-Shelter Cluster							
9. Translation of the document in whether English (January 2013)	External experts							

### Estimated start and end date of evaluation

Beginning of October 2012 to early December 2012.

Between 4 to 5 weeks of field work.

## VI. Evaluation team

1 Evaluation team leader (senior)

2. Evaluation team member (senior or junior)

Suitable consultants will preferably be identified through the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance (ALNAP) network.

## VII. Roles, Responsibilities, and Coordination

### The Evaluation Commission

- Provision of copies of all documents related to the program under a confidentiality signed agreement
- Facilitate the contact with resource personnel and with actors involved in the project
- Enumerators and logistic for phone survey plus statistic analysis (IOM DMU)
- Local transportation
- Approval of draft and final reports
- Final report lay out, printing and delivering to actors' involved in the project including donor/s

### The Evaluation Team

- Document and second source documents analysis


- Evaluation tools and methodology design (including final phone survey sampling protocol, the design of the survey questionnaires and of the tabulation plan for statistical analysis for the phone survey).
- Evaluation field activities
- Draft report writing
- Evaluation finding presentation in PowerPoint and workshop
- Final report writing and translation
- International transportation and accommodation.

## **VIII. Budget**

The total budget should not exceed 50,000 USD

## Annexes

### Annex 1: MAP OF RETURN LOCATION



## **Annex 2: EVALUATION REPORTS FORMAT**

### **Executive Summary**

Length: 5-6 pages

The executive summary is an essential part of the report: it is influential and has higher readership than the main body of the report. It should focus on the main purpose and issues of the evaluation and clearly indicate the main conclusions, lessons learnt and specific recommendations. Cross-references should be made to the corresponding page or paragraph numbers in the main text that follows.

The executive summary should contain information on: (a) Purpose of the evaluation; (b) Context of the evaluation; (c) Methodology; (d) Analysis of main results; (e) Conclusions and recommendations.

### **Introduction**

Length: 1-2 pages

Briefly describe the purpose of the report and the scope and context of the project being evaluated. Acknowledgements to those who contributed to the evaluation can be included.

### **Findings**

Length: this is the longest section of the report around 30 pages

Findings constitute statements based on the information collected. The core of the report should follow the following evaluation criteria, describing the facts and interpreting or analyzing them in accordance with the key questions pertinent to each criteria.

- i. Relevance: whether the design of the approach was originally, and still is, sound, i.e. it targets the real needs and problems of the intended beneficiaries.
- ii. Impact: refers to the wider outcomes for target beneficiaries as well as for a larger group of persons or for society as a whole; the successes and failures in achieving the overall objectives, and the main reasons why.

### **Methodology**

Length: 3 pages

Indicate how the evaluation questions were addressed and what limitations were experienced. Describe the performance indicators used, as well as the sources of information and the methods for information collection and analysis. Stakeholders' contribution to the evaluation should also be provided.

### **Conclusions and recommendations**

Length: 3-6 pages

Conclusions describe the results achieved and how they compare with the expectations set out during project planning and design phases. Recommendations are statements derived from the evidence that prescribe who should do what in the future, and provide suggestions for introducing improvements and/or identify matters for follow-up. Wherever possible, for each key conclusion there should be a corresponding recommendation.

The ultimate value of an evaluation depends on the quality and credibility of the recommendations offered. Recommendations should therefore be as realistic, operational and pragmatic as possible; that is, they should take careful account of the circumstances currently prevailing in the context of the project, and of the resources available to implement them locally.

### **Annexes**

The report should generally include the following annexes:

1. The Terms of Reference of the evaluation
2. The composition of the evaluation team (CVs should be shown, better if summarized)
3. Return and Relocation strategy
4. Technical annexes (e.g. statistical analyses)
5. Map of project area, if relevant

6. List of persons met/organizations consulted
7. Literature and documentation consulted

### **Annex 3: EVALUATION PRINCIPLES**

The evaluation should be conducted according to the following general evaluation standards and principles:

- 1) RELEVANCE:** make the project/programme more responding to problems to be solved to what extent the project/programme continues to make sense in light of current reality, and to what extent its objective and project purposes remain valid and pertinent.
  - Is the project/programme consistent with external reality (which can include living conditions of the target group(s), national and regional government policies, administrative capacities or institutional and cultural factors)? Have Gender mainstreaming issues been taken into account?
  - What were the references used for assessing the “reality” and how objective are they? What does support this assessment, e.g., government documents, media reports, donor mission reporting, UN documents?
  - Is the project/programme implementation strategy consistent with stated objectives and IOM priorities and mandate? Is it complementary to other agencies and government activities?
  - Are the global context and the problems to be solved still the same (unless the project/programme managed to solve them)?
  - Are there any elements which could lead to the conclusion that the overall objective or (one of) the project purposes have to be dropped, revised, amended or new ones added in order to make the project/programme more in line with the current reality and needs?
  - To which extent does it already become evident that additional or complementary activities/projects need to be implemented to?
- 2) IMPACT:** how activities of the project/programme contributed to a change in a situation, intended or unintended, positive or negative, and what the project/programme was expected to bring.
  - Is the project/programme document sufficiently well designed to identify which impact was expected from the project/programme and attributable to it?
  - As actually measuring a change in the situation may be complex and expensive, how can you identify and measure it in a way that can be verified? Are there sufficient observable elements, evidences and/or data which could lead to a firm conclusion about the impact of the project/programme and exclude alternative explanations?
  - Either positive or negative, does the impact come from the project/programme activities, from external factors or from both? What would have occurred without the project/programme?
  - What do the target groups and other stakeholders perceive on themselves to be the impact of the project/programme?
  - Does the impact only concern the target population or is another population affected by the activities of the project/programme? What can be observed in terms of gender balance and impact?
  - Were there any impacts that were not foreseen by the project/programme? Is there a possibility to draw conclusions, in addition to the impact on the target group, on a global impact at the social level, political level, economic level, or on institutional capacity?

**Annex 4. EVALUATION WORKPLAN FORMAT:**

Evaluation MILESTONE	PLANNED ACTIVITIES	Timeframe by day			
		1	2	3	4
1.	1.1.				
	1.2.				
	1.3.				
	1.4.				
	1.5.				
2	2.1.				
	2.2.				
	2.3.				
	2.4.				
	2.5.				
3	3.1.				
	3.2.				
	3.3.				
	3.4.				
	3.5.				

**Annex 5:** Direct beneficiaries (approx.), IDP received the Rent Cash Grant Support before and after October 2011

Partners	Before	October	2011	<b>After October 2011 (1-)</b>
	(1+)			
Concern	188			1925
IFRC &				2600
Federations	2500			5630
OIM	1300			474
CRS	204			0
World Vision	1500			150
J/P HRO	400			
	<b>6092</b>			<b>10779</b>

## Annex 7 – Credentials of the Consultants

### Raj Rana – Team Leader

Rue Hugo-de-Senger 3, 1205 Geneva, Switzerland

Tel: ++41 22 575 4954

Email: [raj@theWolfgroup.org](mailto:raj@theWolfgroup.org)

Nationality: Swiss & Canadian

Languages: English, French, German, Russian

As owner of the WolfGroup Consultants and team leader for this consultancy, Raj brings 15 years of international experience with over 70 projects in 30 countries. His focus is on evaluating organizations and facilitating initiatives to enhance their strategies, structures, processes, partnerships, and culture. As a Certified Professional Facilitator ([CPF](#)) he brings tools and processes to foster the types of exchanges and reflection and in capturing the rich outcomes of such discussions through graphic recording. Raj completed his professional and graduate studies in architecture in Canada, and is an Accredited Practitioner of Social Return on Investment ([SROI](#)- ongoing). Raj is Canadian/Swiss and speaks English and French.

**Country experience (onsite evaluation/assessments and capacity development):**  
Afghanistan, Armenia, Bangladesh, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Burundi, Cambodia, Croatia, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Georgia, Guatemala, **Haiti**, Indonesia, Iraq, Israel (including oPt), Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Maldives, Malaysia, Mongolia, Mozambique, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation (North Caucasus), Rwanda, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Thailand, Ukraine.  
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### Jeremy Condor – Senior Evaluator

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Nationality: British

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Jeremy Condor is a specialist in strategic planning and the design of humanitarian response programmes, with a strong background in monitoring and evaluation. He has a considerable experience in emergency response evaluations as the result of natural disasters and conflict situations. He is an acknowledged expert in accountability and evaluation systems development and implementation, and results orientated (ROM) monitoring.

Jeremy's recent clients in evaluation have included UNRWA, IRC, BBC World Service Trust, DRC, the SDC, the EC, UNDP, DFID and Dutch Cooperation.

**Country experience (onsite evaluation/assessments and capacity development):**

**Europe & the Caucasus:** Armenia, Albania, Romania, Bulgaria, Belarus, Georgia, Ukraine, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Moldova, Turkey, UK, France, Switzerland, Austria, Germany

**Middle East:** Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, Syria

**Asia:** Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Cambodia, India, Sri Lanka, Mongolia, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam

**Africa:** Angola, Burundi, Congo (DRC), Cote d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Liberia, Mali, Tunisia, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Sudan, Morocco, Nigeria, Zambia

**Americas/Caribbean:** Canada, Chile, El Salvador, **Haiti**, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, USA

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Languages: English, Spanish, Kiswahili

Charles' educational background includes a Master's Degree in Sociology, with a focus on Demographics and Survey Research. He has had extensive overseas experience in the humanitarian assistance field (15+ years), and has accomplished numerous deployments and postings with NGO's, Agencies, and members of the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement. Such missions have included extensive survey research, data collection, instrument design, implementation strategy, and final interpretation and reporting, as well as large-scale registrations, multi-sector evaluations, and design and implementation of management and reporting systems for same.

**Country experience (onsite evaluation/assessments and capacity development):**  
Canada, US, Dominican Republic, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda, Liberia, Sudan, Israel / West Bank, Russian Federation (NCA), Georgia, Albania, Serbia, Kosovo, Macedonia.

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