

# Evaluation report



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# RAVEL

**Evaluation of the The Regional Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration Programme for £tranded Migrants in Egypt and Libya**



International Organization for Migration (IOM)  
Organisation Internationale pour les Migrations (OIM)  
Organización Internacional para las Migraciones (OIM)



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GENEVA

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## Table of Contents

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS.....	5
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.....	7
INTRODUCTION: REGIONAL MIGRATION BACKGROUND.....	11
History of Regional Migration Patterns .....	11
Migration after the Arab Spring.....	12
Main Migration Routes .....	14
RAVEL.....	17
IOM .....	17
AVRR.....	17
RAVEL .....	19
Implementation and changes .....	20
STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS .....	24
IOM .....	24
EU/Italian government.....	24
Countries of Transit Authorities.....	25
Egypt .....	25
Libya.....	25
Country of Origin Authorities.....	26
Ethiopia .....	26
Sudan .....	26
South Sudan.....	26
Embassies .....	27
Non-governmental referral partners .....	27
Other organizations .....	27
Migrants.....	28
EVALUATION OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY .....	29

Objectives of the Evaluation .....	29
Evaluation Methodology .....	29
Background research .....	29
Data gathering outside field visits .....	29
Cairo Field Visit .....	29
Ethiopia Field Visit .....	31
Problems encountered .....	32
Limitations of the methodology .....	32
RESULTS OF THE EVALUATION .....	34
Strengths .....	34
NEED FOR AVRR .....	34
PROGRAM FLEXIBILITY .....	34
STAFF ADAPTABILITY .....	35
STRONG REFERRAL NETWORK.....	36
RELATIONSHIP WITH GOVERNMENT IN LIBYA .....	37
Weaknesses.....	37
GENERAL .....	37
CAPACITY-BUILDING .....	37
PRE-DEPARTURE .....	38
REINTEGRATION .....	39
RECOMMENDATIONS.....	43
General.....	43
Capacity-building.....	43
Pre-departure.....	43
Reintegration .....	44
CONCLUSION: RELEVANCE, EFFECTIVENESS AND SUSTAINABILITY .....	46
Relevance .....	47
Effectiveness .....	49

Sustainability.....	52
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	58
ANNEX I: ToRs.....	60
ANNEX II: LIST OF PEOPLE INTERVIEWED.....	64
ANNEX III: LIST OF STANDARD QUESTIONNAIRES FOR CoDs .....	66
ANNEX IV: LIST OF STANDARD QUESTIONNAIRES FOR CoOs.....	77

## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

<b>AMERA</b>	The African and Middle East Refugee Assistance
<b>AVRR</b>	Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration
<b>BSS</b>	Business Skills Training
<b>CBO</b>	Community-Based Organization
<b>CoO</b>	Countries of Origin
<b>CoT</b>	Countries of Transit
<b>DCIM</b>	Department for Combatting Illegal Migration
<b>DSA</b>	Daily Subsistence Allowance
<b>EC</b>	European Commission
<b>EU</b>	European Union
<b>FeMSEDA</b>	The Federal Micro and Small Enterprises Development Agency
<b>GDP</b>	Gross Domestic Product
<b>ICRS</b>	Information, Counseling and Referral Services
<b>IOM</b>	International Organization for Migration
<b>LIMO</b>	Regional Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration Programme for Stranded Migrants in Libya and Morocco
<b>MENA</b>	Middle East and North Africa
<b>MiMOSA</b>	Migrant Management & Operational Systems Application
<b>Mol</b>	Ministry of Interior
<b>MSE</b>	Micro and Small Enterprise

<b>NGO</b>	Non-Governmental Organization
<b>PoC</b>	Person of Concern
<b>RAVEL</b>	Regional Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration Programme for Stranded Migrants in Egypt and Libya
<b>SOPs</b>	Standard Operating Procedures
<b>SSWA</b>	Secretariat of Sudanese Working Abroad
<b>TRIM</b>	Programme for the Enhancement of Transit and Irregular Migration in Libya
<b>TVET</b>	Technical Vocational Education and Training
<b>UNICEF</b>	United Nations Children Fund
<b>VoT</b>	Victims of Trafficking

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report is the result of an external evaluation of IOM's Regional Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration Programme for Stranded Migrants in Egypt and Libya (RAVEL) program conducted by five students from the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies (IHEID) in Geneva in collaboration with IOM.

RAVEL is a regional AVRR program managed by IOM's country office in Cairo, Egypt, funded by the European Union and co-funded by the Government of Italy, with the overall objective of supporting the national and civil society effort to stem irregular migration along the Eastern Migration Route, and assisting vulnerable migrants through a comprehensive AVRR program ex-Libya and ex-Egypt. Specifically, the RAVEL program aims (1) to strengthen the capacity of key government entities and civil society organizations to facilitate AVRR, in line with internationally recognized norms; (2) to enhance inter-regional cooperation and encourage coherent program delivery in origin, transit and destination countries; (3) to build the capacity of government and civil society to assist returnees' sustainable reinsertion and reintegration in major countries of origin (Sudan, South Sudan, Ethiopia, Niger, Mali and Ghana); (4) to assist 715 stranded migrants, by facilitating AVRR ex-Libya and Egypt, in close cooperation with national authorities, civil society and UN agencies; and (5) to assist 841 migrants in evacuation ex-Libya.

RAVEL was implemented during a time of instability in both countries of transit (CoTs) and countries of origin (CoOs),<sup>1</sup> including South Sudan's gain of independence, the revolution in Egypt, and the civil war in Libya, which all took place in 2011. This required a high degree of flexibility and adaptability from IOM and its partners. The program started in February 2011 and was initially planned for an 18-month period. The Libyan civil war in 2011 caused a one-year postponement of the AVRR component in Libya, in light of the need of emergency evacuation, which led to a first no-cost extension from 18 to 30 months until 31 July 2013 and a second no-cost extension until 31 December 2013.

As a result of the latest RAVEL extension and various delays in program implementation, this evaluation took place before all planned activities had been

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<sup>1</sup> For the purpose of this evaluation, CoTs include Egypt and Libya and CoOs include South Sudan, Sudan, and Ethiopia.

completed. In general, the evaluation consisted of preliminary research, document analysis, field visits to Egypt and Ethiopia, data gathering, and production of this final report. The focus of the evaluation is on three main criteria for success: relevance, effectiveness, and sustainability.

The evaluation concluded that the program was highly relevant to the situation in which it was implemented, and that all of its five specific objectives contributed to that relevance.

A strong referral system in Egypt and cooperation between IOM and DCIM in Libya showed the importance of capacity-building activities. Similarly, international cooperation was deemed essential for the successful implementation of the program and will facilitate possible future projects. Moreover, high demand for services under RAVEL in both Egypt and Libya demonstrated the relevance of AVRR in the region. Similarly, evacuation ex-Libya and collective reintegration for migrants from Niger, Mali, and Ghana was a relevant reaction to the Libyan civil war in 2011, which necessitated an emergency response to the dangers facing stranded migrants there. Finally, the reintegration component of the program was found to be relevant to migrants' situation and international migration issues, despite the fact that the implementation of reintegration activities was sometimes problematic. The relevance of the program was enhanced and maintained by its adaptability to the changing situation, as is best exemplified by the response to the Libyan civil war.

The program was also mostly found to be very effective, as beneficiaries used the services formulated in the project outputs, leading to the benefits formulated in the project outcomes (although it should be noted that activities under specific objective (2) had not been implemented at the time of this evaluation and could therefore not be assessed).

Program effectiveness was largely due to very strong referral mechanisms in both Egypt and Libya, which allowed the total number of returns to reach 761 by May 2013, thus exceeding the target caseload of 750. Moreover, although some activities under specific objective (3) - namely capacity-building of civil society and government - were only partially implemented, capacity-building activities in Ethiopia proved to be effective. Indeed, workshops enjoyed high attendance and received a vast majority of positive feedbacks.

With respect to the evacuation ex-Libya, the target specified in the project documents was an *a posteriori* figure, but effectiveness is demonstrated by the fact that IOM, in coordination with the donor, was able to respond quickly to the crisis in one of the target countries by reallocating resources on the basis of the most pressing life-saving needs of third-country nationals. This response included not only evacuation, but also community-based reintegration in the most affected regions.

Finally, it was not possible to assess the effectiveness of certain aspects of the reintegration component of the program because final aggregated data were not yet available at the time of writing. Furthermore, an assessment of the success of reintegration support would require considerable resources in order to investigate in-depth the social, economic and cultural consequences in a variety of different countries of origin, which present different reintegration challenges.

While in general the RAVEL program was found to be effective in promoting reintegration and providing alternatives to onward migration, individual cases showed that exceptions remained. A proportion of returnees, most importantly in South Sudan, failed to claim their reintegration assistance, which could call into question the feasibility of the reintegration in countries where lack of infrastructures often makes the reintegration process quite burdensome. Other factors could be the misunderstanding of reintegration procedures, loss of contact, or onward migration.

The sustainability of the outcomes of RAVEL was found to be strong in some aspects of the program, even if an entirely government-run AVRR program is often too ambitious a goal in countries with limited resources and pressing priorities. Referral networks, awareness-raising and capacity-building activities were found to be a strong point for sustainability, as they serve as a basis to facilitate future AVRR programs and migrant-related activities, and various referral partners in Egypt and DCIM in Libya expressed their willingness to continue their efforts because they recognize the value of AVRR as an effective migration management tool. Indeed, in countries where IOM has been providing for a longer amount of time, such as in Libya, cooperation proved stronger and smoother, as exemplified by the setting up of a mechanism to issue exit visas free of charge for all migrants assisted by IOM.

The impact of RAVEL on attitudes towards migrants, for instance among governmental stakeholders, is a crucial aspect of the legacy of the program and was judged to contribute to sustainability. It was also found that awareness-raising activities should be diversified for optimal impact to target lower levels of government as well. Indeed, front-line officers at Immigration bureaus are the ones interacting on a daily basis with migrants regularizing their residence permits or seeking an exit visa. Their role is essential in facilitating the return process and therefore their formal training and sensitization should be ensured. In terms of reintegration, this is best assessed over a longer period than is possible within the frame of this evaluation. What can be said, however, is that the size of the monetary reintegration assistance was widely perceived to be too little to ensure a sustainable reintegration, and that a returnee's decision to remain in the CoO is dependent upon the success of their businesses. Indeed, this aspect has already been addressed by IOM in the design and implementation of subsequent programs, which ensure a more consequent reintegration package.

Overall, the program was found to be satisfactory in all three criteria of the evaluation, and performed particularly well in its capacity-building, voluntary return, and evacuation components (specific objectives 1, 4, and 5). The full text of the evaluation below identifies detailed positive and negative aspects of the RAVEL program in addition to conclusions formulated in terms of relevance, effectiveness, and sustainability. It also provides detailed recommendations for future programs, which are summarized in a table at the end of this document.

## INTRODUCTION: REGIONAL MIGRATION BACKGROUND

It is important to understand the migratory background of the region under consideration in order to analyze the circumstances, notably those resulting from the Arab spring, which brought about the need for the Regional Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration Program for Stranded Migrants in Egypt and Libya (RAVEL) program.

### History of Regional Migration Patterns

Trans-Saharan migration pre-dates the present nation-states and has been common for economic, political, religious and social reasons (De Haas, 2008, p.15). This mobility decreased when borders were arbitrarily drawn through colonialism, only to resume after independence. Although North African states imposed more restrictions on emigration than on immigration until the 1970s, the post-war economic growth in Europe led to a guest-worker boom, especially from 1967 until 1972, and many Maghrebis migrated to Europe where they worked in sectors such as industry, mining, housing construction and agriculture (De Haas, 2007, p.9). This changed with the 1973 Oil Crisis, which resulted in an economic recession in Europe and the implementation of restrictive immigration policies, which have persisted until today. At the same time, there was massive labor recruitment in Arab oil countries (ibid, p.10).

The 1991 Gulf War was a major turning point resulting in the return of many migrants, including those from the Maghreb, to their countries of origin (ibid, p.14). Consequently, the number of Maghrebis migrating to Europe increased in the 1990s. In 1992, Libya's pan-African policies in response to the arms embargo imposed by the UN Security Council led to a large flow of sub-Saharan migrants to Libya, which was only augmented by numerous conflicts in many African countries (De Haas, 2006). Since 2000, migrants from sub-Saharan Africa have increasingly been joining the Maghrebis in crossing the Mediterranean to Europe. According to De Haas, "sub-Saharan Africans [...] have now overtaken North Africans as the largest category of irregular boat migrants (2008, p.9). They transit through North African states, traditionally Libya, but increasingly through a variety of other countries because of increased xenophobia in Libya, which has led to stricter immigration regulations (De Haas 2008, p.16). However, many migrants from sub-Saharan Africa who intend to transit through North Africa on their way to Europe, and recently also

to Israel, end up becoming stranded in their countries of transit when their resources become depleted (De Haas 2007 p.19). Indeed, of an estimated 65,000-120,000 sub-Saharan Africans entering the Maghreb per year, only 20-38 per cent eventually make it to Europe (De Haas 2008, p. 9). An increase in trans-Saharan migration was recorded between 2005 and 2010: the total number of migrants went from 22.1 to 26.6 million (IOM, p.9, 2011). Currently, scholars such as Bredeloup and de Haas, have questioned the status of North African states, specifically Libya, as simply transit states. According to Bredeloup (2012), the status of Libya changed from a transit nation to a destination country in the 1980s when the Ghaddafi regime offered many employment opportunities. According to the International Centre for Migration/Policy Development (ICMPD) between 100,000 to 120,000 irregular migrants crossed the Mediterranean each year, of which 35,000 came from sub-Saharan countries (De Haas, 2007, p.36) transiting through North African countries. Many migrants dwell in North Africa without any intention to get to Europe while others are stranded on their way to a final destination and may become prey to smugglers (UNODC, 2010, p.6).

Intra-regional migration flows in North Africa comprises in a larger part of irregular migration than regular migration (ibid, p.6). In the early 2000s, it was estimated that a minimum of 100,000 irregular migrants were living in Egypt, including a large number of asylum-seekers from the Horn of Africa (ibid., p.7). IOM estimated in 2008 that between 1.0 and 1.2 million irregular migrants were living in Libya (IOM, 2008, p.30). Egypt hosts a large number of Sudanese migrants and Cairo specifically hosts a large number of asylum seekers coming from the horn of Africa. In the early 2000s, it was estimated that a minimum of 100 000 irregular migrants were living in Egypt (ibid,p.7).

Finally, trans-Saharan migration is comprised of multiple movement patterns drawn by migrants belonging to various categories. Sub-Saharan migrants have developed specific migration corridors toward the countries of the Maghreb.

#### Migration after the Arab Spring


Apart from a minority movement in Tunisia, migration to Europe was not accelerated by the Arab revolts; it has on the contrary persevered on existing trends and patterns (Fargues and Fandrich 2012). The crisis in Libya and Syria however resulted in large outflows of migrants seeking refuge. By the summer 2011, an approximate 1,128,985 people

fled Libya to go to Tunisia, Egypt, Niger, Algeria, Chad, Sudan and also Italy and Malta (ibid, p.4). Consequently, the Arab spring generated important forced migration flows within the trans-Saharan region (Oxford, 2012, p.1). This new form of constrained mobility and forced migration has been labelled as a 'migration crisis' by both the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the UNHCR. Although there is no formal definition of the term, a migration crisis is used to describe a massive outflow of migrants resulting from a crisis (IOM, 2011). Notably, the Libyan revolution caused one of the largest migration crises in modern history (ibid). In its core, this meant that the crisis required IOM's mandate and expertise to assess the needs of specific migrants stranded in Libya and other North African states, facilitate their travel documents, conduct a medical examination and arrange for return and reintegration (Oxford, 2012).

These migrants can be divided in three categories; the first category of migrants fleeing Libya comprised of those seeking shelter in neighboring African countries, approximately 422, 912 most of whom have returned to Libya (ibid, p.4). The second category comprised of migrant workers from sub-Saharan countries. The third category is that of refugees, although they were not registered as refugees because Libya is not a party to the 1951 Geneva Convention. Mostly originating from Sudan, Somalia, Eritrea and other African countries, a majority of these refugees found themselves stranded in Libya, Egypt, Tunisia or Algeria (ibid, p4). Overall, the Arab crisis has re-affirmed traditional migration flows but also caused migrants to change between categories. As mentioned above, labor migrants from third countries were forced to flee Libya as refugees.


Finally the crisis has caused migrants to enter forced migration flows and reduced mobility. The Arab spring forces us to recognize the diversity in the migrant categories. The intra-regional outflow of migration caused by the Arab spring impacts not only the countries where these migrants are stranded or to which they flee (i.e Tunisia, Libya, Egypt) but also their countries of origin, which not only depend on their remittances but must also learn to reintegrate 'forced' returnees (Oxford, p.3, 2012).

## Main Migration Routes



(De Haas, 2006)

In general, while those who can afford it travel to North Africa by plane, the majority of trans-Saharan migrants take overland routes (De Haas, 2008, p.17). There are three main migration routes from Africa to Europe: the West African route, the North and East African route, and the Eastern Mediterranean route. On the West African route, migrants usually enter the Maghreb from Niger and then move on to coastal cities in Morocco, Libya, Algeria, or Tunisia, from where they cross the Mediterranean by boat to the Canary Islands, the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla or different Italian islands, such as Lampedusa or Sicily (Baldwin Edwards, 2006, p.10; De Haas, 2008, p.17). In the West of the African continent, there has recently been an increase in migrants sailing directly from the West African coast to the Canary Islands, due to stricter border controls and policing in the Mediterranean and North Africa (De Haas, 2006). Migrants on the Eastern Mediterranean route transit mainly through Turkey from where they either cross by boat to Italy, Cyprus or Greek islands or enter into Greece via Istanbul (Baldwin-Edwards, 2006, p.10).



(Altai Consulting, 2013)

The East African route is of greatest relevance to this evaluation, mainly with regards to Egypt and Libya as both transit and destination countries. In addition to a shift of trans-Saharan routes to the East, an increase in the number of migrants and refugees moving from East Africa via North Africa to Europe and Israel has been witnessed in recent years (Pitea 2010: 6). The main countries of origin are Sudan, Somalia, Eritrea and Ethiopia and the migrants usually enter Egypt by boat, car, truck, bus, camel or on foot at the border with Sudan and then either take the sea route to Europe directly from Egypt or via Libya (De Haas, 2006). Their main points of arrival are Malta and various Italian islands, such as Lampedusa, Pantelleria, and Sicily (Baldwin-Edwards, 2006, p.10). Recently, however, Israel has become the main destination country for migrants transiting through Egypt. Between 1,200 and 1,500 people enter Israel irregularly every month, most of them being smuggled in by Bedouin tribes (Pitea, 2010, p.6).

The journey from sub-Saharan Africa through North Africa to Europe or Israel takes between one month and several years and is usually made in stages, since migrants often have to settle temporarily to work and save enough money to continue their journey (De Haas, 2008, p.17). The cost of migration is high, both financially and in terms of the risks migrants face while crossing the Sahara and the Mediterranean. According to De Haas

(2008), “[i]n the process of crossing the Sahara to North Africa, migrants spend hundreds of dollars on bribes, smugglers, transportation, and daily necessities” (p.18). Once they reach the North African countries of transit, they pay up to USD 5,000 for a boat crossing to Europe and between USD 500-700 for being smuggled to Israel (Pitea, 2010, p. 6).

### IOM

Established in 1951, IOM is the leading inter-governmental organization in the field of migration and works closely with governmental, inter-governmental and non-governmental partners.

IOM focuses on migration management, facilitating migration as a factor of development worldwide, ensuring the well-being of migrants and gathering data on migration. Its work includes the provision of services to migrants requiring international assistance, and it aims at respecting and upholding the human rights of migrants worldwide. Its mandate also includes the provision of advice to governments and support to states and civil societies to facilitate migration, irregular migration management, and counter-trafficking. Its additional mandate is to take part in humanitarian missions where necessary, as demonstrated recently in Libya and Haiti; it has also been involved in the post-conflict phases to protect migrants worldwide, although protection is not part of the IOM mandate.

### AVRR

RAVEL is an Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration (AVRR) program of IOM, a core activity of the organization for three decades. AVRR programs have greatly evolved and now encompass a broad range of services that aim towards the sustainable return and reintegration of migrants in their countries of origin (CoO).

Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration (AVRR) is one of many migration management services IOM offers to migrants and governments. It aims to better enable the orderly, humane and cost-effective return and reintegration of migrants who are unable or unwilling to remain in host countries and who wish to return voluntarily to their countries of origin. As one of the organization's core activities, AVRR is embedded in the IOM Constitution under Article 1(d):

“to provide similar services as requested by States, or in co-operation with other interested international organizations, for voluntary return migrations, including voluntary repatriation”.

Moreover, policies, guidelines, and implementation of AVRR programs have also been dealt with in three IOM Council documents.<sup>2</sup> AVRR programs are a key element in responding to irregular migration in transit countries combined with other measures, such as capacity-building support and offering humanitarian assistance to stranded migrants. Similarly, IOM provides technical and other support to governments for improved management of return, and facilitates return migration dialogue among home, transit and host countries.

AVRR programs target various types of migrants (i.e. irregular migrants, failed asylum seekers, asylum seekers who decide to drop their asylum request, refugees who decide to return home, legal migrants who do not have the means to return to their CoO, labor migrants terminating a contract, etc.) many of whom are often vulnerable (victims of trafficking (VoTs), elderly, unaccompanied minors, migrants with health needs) and in need of assistance. AVRR, however, is based on the sole concept of 'voluntariness', meaning that a migrant must freely decide to return to his or her CoO. The protection of migrants' human rights is also a key factor of IOM when implementing AVRR programs.

AVRR programs function according to a three-phase process: a) pre-departure assistance and travel preparations, b) assistance during travel to the CoO, and c) post-arrival reintegration assistance. To implement these various phases, IOM relies at every stage on various partners, including governmental authorities (identification of migrants, facilitation of return and reintegration), other international organizations, in particular the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and non-governmental organizations.

During the first phase, with the help of various partners, IOM identifies migrants who want to return to their country of origin. Migrants are first interviewed and medically examined. Once it has been decided that a migrant will benefit from AVRR, IOM coordinates with the IOM mission in the CoO and the headquarters and organizes travel arrangements. The migrant is kept informed about the process and receives detailed explanation about their return.

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<sup>2</sup> IOM Return Policy and Projects: A Contribution to Combating Irregular Migration, MC/InF/222 (1992); IOM Policy Concerning its Assistance to unsuccessful Asylum Seekers and Irregular Migrants Returning to Their Countries of Origin, MC/Ex/InF/51 (1996); Policies and Practices with Respect to Rejected Asylum-Seekers, MC/InF/236 (1997).

The second phase consists of providing travel assistance to the migrant during their journey from the transit or destination country to their CoO, including airport assistance upon departure and arrival. Special assistance to vulnerable migrants, such as unaccompanied minors or migrants with health needs (e.g. medical escorts) is provided if needed.

During the last phase, the migrant is provided with information and counseling on reintegration by the IOM office in his/her country of origin, as well as in-kind reintegration assistance. This last phase also includes follow-up by the IOM office.

### RAVEL

RAVEL is a regional AVRR program managed by IOM with the overall objective to support the national and civil society effort to stem irregular migration along the Eastern Migration Route and to assist vulnerable migrants through a comprehensive AVRR program ex-Libya and Egypt. It started in February 2011 and is funded by the European Union and co-funded by the Government of Italy.

Through RAVEL, IOM can build on its experience from previous programs in the region, namely the European Commission (EC)-funded “Program for the Enhancement of Transit and Irregular Migration in Libya” (TRIM) and the “Regional Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration Program for Stranded Migrants in Libya and Morocco” (LIMO). Specifically, the RAVEL program aims to strengthen the capacity of key Government entities and civil society organizations to facilitate AVRR, in line with internationally recognized norms; to enhance inter-regional cooperation and encourage coherent program delivery in origin, transit and destination countries; and to build the capacity of Government and civil society to assist returnees’ sustainable reinsertion and reintegration in major countries of origin (Sudan, South Sudan, Ethiopia, Niger, Mali and Ghana). The target groups are migrants in Libya and Egypt, predominantly from East and West Africa, who wish to return to their home country but lack the means of doing so. These include irregular and stranded migrants, rejected asylum-seekers and other vulnerable migrants. Priority is given to those who are most vulnerable, such as Victims of Trafficking (VoT), unaccompanied minors, and migrants in detention.

The targets of the RAVEL program involve providing return and reintegration assistance to 715 stranded migrants in Libya and Egypt and assisting 841 migrants from Niger, Mali and Ghana with evacuation ex-Libya. Though the program was initially created

for an 18-month period, the Libyan civil war in 2011 caused a modification of the activities to include evacuation and a one year postponement of normal AVRR from Libya, and therefore led to a no-cost extension from 18 to 30 months, until 31 July 2013. A further no-cost extension prolonged the project until 30 December 2013.

*Implementation and changes*

The RAVEL program has five specific objectives, which in practical terms translate into a number of activities, as illustrated by the table below.

Specific Objectives	Activities
<b>1. To strengthen the capacity of key Government entities and civil society organizations to facilitate AVRR, in line with internationally recognized norms</b>	(i) Organize 2 training courses targeting national authorities and civil society organizations in Libya
	(ii) Conduct a service mapping exercise in Egypt
	(iii) Organize an inter-Ministerial workshop in Egypt
	(iv) Conduct 10 awareness raising sessions (targeting Egyptian authorities, NGOs and Embassies in Cairo)
<b>2. To enhance inter-regional cooperation and encourage coherent program delivery in origin, transit and destination countries</b>	(i) Organize a study tour to a select EUMS
	(ii) Develop, translate, print and distribute SOPs for AVRR ex-Egypt
	(iii) Develop, translate, print and distribute a region-specific AVRR manual
<b>3. To build the capacity of Government and civil society to assist returnees' sustainable reinsertion and reintegration in major countries of</b>	(i) Undertake 3 site visits (each) to 4 select areas of return in Sudan to instigate ICRS establishment
	(ii) Organize 2 workshops in Sudan to

<b>origin (Sudan, South Sudan, Ethiopia, Niger, Mali and Ghana)</b>	instigate ICRS establishment
	(iii) Hold 4 workshop in Ethiopia, to establish a reintegration network (comprised of Governmental and non-governmental stakeholders)
	(iv) Support local authorities/NGOs to deliver 8 training programs to promote returnees' economic reinsertion
	(v) Recruit/Deploy IOM Staff to support and monitor AVRR beneficiaries' reintegration, and provide each returnee with in-kind assistance (valued at Euro 485)
	(vi) Set up local reintegration mechanisms to support evacuees from Libya in Niger, Mali, and Ghana
<b>4. To assist 715 stranded migrants, by facilitating AVRR ex-Libya and Egypt, in close cooperation with national authorities, civil society and UN agencies</b>	(i) Develop, translate, print and distribute IEC material in Libya and Egypt
	(ii) Identify and provide 715 stranded migrants with pre-departure, transit, post arrival and reintegration support ex-Libya and Egypt
<b>5. To assist 841 migrants in evacuation ex-Libya</b>	(i) Identify and provide 841 stranded migrants with pre-departure, transit, post arrival assistance support ex-Libya

The program was implemented during a period of instability in both countries of transit/destination and CoOs and it was largely affected by various external factors. One of the most significant events was the Libyan civil war in 2011, which made it impossible to implement any activities planned under RAVEL and caused IOM to freeze AVRR operations from the country for over a year, until they could be resumed in March 2012. As a result, the program not only underwent a one year no-cost extension, including a budget revision, but IOM also received authorization from its donors to re-allocate part of the AVRR resources to

emergency evacuation ex-Libya. Evacuation targeted 841 migrants from Libya to their CoOs of Niger, Ghana and Mali, where they received collective re-integration support. Further consequences of the Libyan civil war included the disruption of civil-society organizations and a slower pace of institutional stabilization, which hampered capacity-building activities and the creation of an effective referral network. However, IOM Tripoli was able to establish a successful collaboration with the Department to Combat Illegal Migration (DCIM) at the Ministry of Interior in Libya, which refers detained migrants to IOM. This cooperation contributed to the possibility of resuming AVRR activities in March 2012.

In Egypt, the political and security situation remained volatile after the 2011 revolution, which affected the RAVEL program. Such a situation limited the capacity of the governmental stakeholders to develop a more effective dialogue on sustainable solutions for stranded migrants. Additionally, it led to a high turnover of focal points at the MoI. Finally, frequent demonstrations on Tahrir square, where the Egyptian emigration office is located, made the implementation of certain phases of the return process difficult.

Nevertheless, IOM Cairo managed to establish a strong referral network in Egypt, consisting of CBOs, NGOs, and embassies, which led to a significant increase in demand for AVRR ex-Egypt. As a result, and through a second no-cost extension, the caseload for Egypt was increased from 350 to 490 returns, with the agreement of the European Commission (EC), while the number for Libya was reduced from 365 to 250. Moreover, the screening form was modified in order to capture specific vulnerabilities and provide enhanced assistance to these cases, while prioritizing their return. As such, 38 Victims of Trafficking (VoTs), 2 medical cases, one unaccompanied minor (UAM), and 43 migrants in administrative detention (or breach of immigration laws) were assisted with return and reintegration under RAVEL until May 2013.

Challenges facing the program were also witnessed in the CoOs. For instance, the independence of South Sudan in 2011 complicated activities planned under RAVEL, especially given that the institutional capacities of the new country were understandably still limited, and that coordination between Sudan and South Sudan was difficult. Furthermore, the security situation in Mali, particularly in the area of Gao, complicated the implementation of community reintegration activities.

The combination of these external factors led to some delays in the activities planned under RAVEL. Capacity-building activities, such as the inter-ministerial workshop in Egypt and visits and workshops in CoOs, were postponed, as it was decided that the impact would be higher in a more advanced stage of the program. Similarly, the study tour for senior Libyan, Sudanese, Southern Sudanese and Ethiopian Government officials to Italy was delayed and is now expected to take place in June 2013. The development, translation, and printing of Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for AVRR ex-Egypt and of a region-specific AVRR manual was also delayed.

## STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS

Various stakeholders were involved in the RAVEL program and it is therefore fundamental to understand their interests and objectives in taking part in this program. The purpose of this section is therefore to list the stakeholders involved and provide a short analysis of the factors contributing to their collaboration with IOM.

### IOM

The organization was described above and is the main implementing actor of the RAVEL program. Within the RAVEL program, IOM's aims include the promotion of migrants' human rights, the regulation of regular migration, and facilitating sustainable voluntary return and reintegration to countries of origin.

### EU/Italian government

RAVEL is co-funded by the European Union and the Italian government. Both have a strong interest in funding the RAVEL project that contributes to regulating the influx of immigrants from North and Sub-Saharan Africa to Europe, and to Italy in particular. Italy is often an entry point for migrants transiting through Libya and for some transiting through Egypt.

The EU and some individual European states have been developing cooperation partnership with North Africa in particular around the various migratory challenges they present. This cooperation takes mainly two forms: common declarations and cooperation agreements, which often involve development assistance in exchange for increased migration control on the part of North African states (such as the Barcelona Declaration of 1995).

In addition to cooperation partnerships, the EU and European states have been financing projects seeking to address these migratory challenges, including RAVEL.

In the context of RAVEL, IOM works closely with both the European Union and the Italian government. The IOM and the Italian Ministry of Interior (Moi) enjoy good relations and Italy was chosen as a study tour in the project to share best practices.

## Countries of Transit Authorities

### *Egypt*

IOM's main AVRR partners in the Egyptian government are the Ministry of the Interior, in particular the Nationality, Immigration and Passport Administration (a.k.a. Mugamma).

Government cooperation with IOM pertains to the referral of migrants in administrative immigration detention and the issuance of exit visas for migrants' return.

Egypt is a transit country for migrants on their way to Europe, and immigration flows are particularly strong in urban centers, which often suffer from overpopulation. Strict immigration policies mean that many migrants are detained for residing in Egypt without the necessary authorization or for unlawful entry into the country as specified in the Law of Entry and Residence of 1960.

The Egyptian government has an interest in working with IOM as the program enables it to ease pressures related to irregular migration on its territory in a humane and dignified manner. Additional benefits of the program for the government are access to capacity-building provisions from IOM and knowledge-sharing with international actors and other governments.

However, the current political context in the aftermath of the revolution and the subsequent instability could have encouraged other concerns being given priority over migrant issues. In addition to this, due to the novelty of AVRR programming in Egypt, there is still a need to consolidate IOM's role in this field and raise the awareness of governmental counterparts at all levels (including front line officers) on the advantages of AVRR as a migration management tool.

### *Libya*

In the aftermath of the crisis, IOM's main partner in the Libyan government is the Department for Combatting Illegal Migration (DCIM), which is part of the Libyan Ministry of Interior. DCIM refers migrants in administrative detention to IOM for voluntary return. Migrant numbers in detention have been especially high since the civil war in 2011.

Similarly to Egyptian authorities, Libyan governmental partners have a stake in working with IOM on the provision of AVRR services, as it helps in the management of irregular migratory flows.

However, wide governmental reforms since 2011 meant more difficult communication with IOM. Some detention facilities are still run by militias, which constitutes an obstacle to IOM's access to detainees, as IOM only works with the DCIM-controlled centers.

### Country of Origin Authorities

Countries of Origin benefit from the program as it supports them in reintegrating their nationals in the social and economic life of their region. Different countries face different challenges in terms of institutional capacity, and economic and political situations, which can lead to different degrees of priority being given to returnee issues.

#### *Ethiopia*

The Federal Micro and Small Enterprises Development Agency (FeMSEDA) is an autonomous federal government institution in Ethiopia that provides Basic Business Skills (BBS) training to returnees in cooperation with IOM Ethiopia. Additionally, the Ethiopian micro and small enterprise (MSE) development office and the technical vocational education and training (TVET) institutes also provide services to returnees as Ethiopian nationals.

#### *Sudan*

The Secretariat of Sudanese Working Abroad (SSWA) was the main government focal point in Sudan working to provide migrant services. IOM Sudan worked with the SSWA to push for the establishment of an Information Counseling and Referral System (ICRS) in Khartoum.

#### *South Sudan*

Government capacity is still developing following the recent independence of South Sudan in 2011, and as such collaboration with government entities in the country regarding RAVEL is difficult. However, the South Sudanese Embassy in Egypt showed strong interest in the program by providing travel documents free of charge for vulnerable cases and issuing any other needed documentation prior to departure.

### *Embassies*

Generally, CoOs embassies in Egypt have a stake in collaborating with the programme to return their nationals to their CoO. This means that they are mostly keen to provide the necessary documents for their return.

### Non-governmental referral partners

Referral partners in Egypt include a non-governmental organization called the African and Middle East Refugee Assistance (AMERA), and members of migrant communities including religious leaders and psychosocial workers.

AMERA's mandate is to assist refugees and asylum seekers with psychosocial and legal services. AMERA refers clients willing to return to their countries of origin to IOM. Additionally, AMERA assists IOM with the assessment of protection concerns regarding migrants' potential refugee status to ensure that the applicant is informed of the situation in the CoO and of the protection measures available in Egypt. AMERA and IOM cooperate on a daily basis and the NGO is a key partner in the program.

Community leaders and community workers are involved in counseling and community support for migrants, and refer migrants from their communities who are often vulnerable and therefore likely to be interested in the return process offered by IOM. Cooperation with IOM enables them to offer support to individual migrants from their communities, provide relief to their own communities and additionally helps them strengthen their standing in their work within those communities. Community leaders often do not have specific training in migration issues.

### Other organizations

The UNHCR collaborates closely with IOM. For instance, when refugees decide to forgo their status and return to their CoOs, if circumstances permit, UNHCR can delegate the return process to IOM, on a case-by-case basis or through joint repatriation projects targeting recognized persons of concern (PoCs). Under RAVEL, UNHCR refers asylum seekers and people whose files are closed and who have requested return services. In Addis Ababa and Juba, transit centers managed by UNHCR offer accommodation and food provision while migrants wait for transportation to their onward destination.

Collaboration with IOM means that UNHCR can benefit from IOM's voluntary return program for refugees willing to forgo their refugee status, instead of setting up their own

program where relevant. Cases with refugee status remain under the sole mandate of UNHCR.

The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), mandated with child protection, collaborates with RAVEL in cases involving unaccompanied minors, in which they support the Egyptian government in conducting a best interest determination process and in appointing legal guardians.

Collaboration with IOM allows for RAVEL support to be accessible to unaccompanied minors. UNICEF’s aim is first to protect the child, and as such the agency can also effectively veto returns in cases involving unaccompanied minors.

### Migrants

Migrants are the core beneficiaries of the RAVEL program. RAVEL aims to have a lasting impact on its beneficiaries. Not only should it evacuate returnees from an unstable environment, but it should also provide for the opportunity to access capital for professional start-ups, receive skills training, and/or seek medical care within the reintegration allowance.

## EVALUATION OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY

### Objectives of the Evaluation

This evaluation is the result of collaboration between IOM and the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies (IHEID) in Geneva. Five students were tasked with conducting an external evaluation of the RAVEL program on the basis of the Terms of References agreed upon by both parties (cf. annex). The evaluation work consisted of preliminary research, document analysis, field visits to Egypt and Ethiopia, data gathering, and production of a final report. This was conducted in line with IOM's Data Protection Principles.

The objectives of the evaluation were revised after fieldwork to focus on three main criteria for success: relevance, effectiveness, and sustainability (cf. *infra* for the working definitions).

### Evaluation Methodology

#### *Background research*

Preliminary work for the evaluation included research on migration patterns and policy in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and Sub-Saharan Africa using both academic and non-academic (from UN agencies and NGOs) sources. Based on this research, the evaluation team drew up country profiles for each of the five main countries of focus: Egypt, Libya, Sudan, South Sudan, and Ethiopia.

Additionally, the team familiarized itself with RAVEL through program-specific documents, which were requested after studying the logical framework. Complementary information on AVRR was provided by IOM headquarters in Geneva as well.

#### *Data gathering outside field visits*

Data was also gathered by means of standardized questionnaires, which were sent out to IOM offices other than Cairo and Addis Ababa, such as Sudan, South Sudan and Ethiopia, and occasionally through Skype interviews.

#### *Cairo Field Visit*

A sub-team composed of three students travelled to Cairo to visit the IOM office overseeing the RAVEL program, and to meet different stakeholders involved therein. Time

was split between three main types of activities: observation, interviews, and a focus group discussion.

### **Observation**

The first day of the trip was spent within the IOM office in Cairo and started with a tour of the different sections participating in the implementation of RAVEL. The evaluators also sat in on interviews with migrants representing all parts of the pre-departure process: the initial interview using the personal data form; the second, post-approval, meeting, in which the details of the return and reintegration process were explained; and the third and final pre-departure briefing, in which those details were reiterated and logistics discussed.

Other observation activities included an extensive tour of the Passport, Nationality and Immigration section at the Mugamma building at Tahrir square, where migrants and case workers obtain visas for legal exit from Egypt. The evaluation team also visited officials who cooperate with IOM workers both on visa issues and in the referral of detainees.

### **Interviews**

Interviews were conducted with five IOM workers/collaborators in Cairo closely linked to the RAVEL program. Standard questionnaires were used for all interviews and adapted to suit specific roles within the program and to allow for a deeper understanding of issues raised in the resulting discussion.

Interviews were also used to gather information from one key member of the referral network, and for embassies, using questionnaires specifically targeted at community leaders and embassy staff respectively.

### **Focus Group**

A focus group was organized bringing together eight community leaders and community workers who formed part of the referral network for RAVEL. The discussion was based on a prepared list of questions and adapted to delve into issues that emerged from the answers.



### *Ethiopia Field Visit*

A sub-team composed of two students travelled to Addis Ababa to visit the IOM office overseeing the RAVEL program, and to meet different stakeholders involved as described above. Time was split between two main types of activities: interviews and site visits.

#### **Interviews**

Interviews were conducted in a number of settings. Five returnees voluntarily came to the IOM Addis office in order to speak with us and were interviewed in a group of three returnees and another of two. The same questions were posed to all returnees and then were answered individually.

Though interview questionnaires were prepared in advance and we maintained a structure to the interview, we also followed certain streams of thought and adjusted our questions in relation to the returnee's responses.

#### **Site Visits**

The first site visit conducted was to a transit center in Addis Ababa that accommodates migrants waiting for onward transportation to other parts of the country. The visit allowed us to assess the facilities and services provided to migrants in transit. Although at the time of the visit no RAVEL returnees were present at the return center, we were told that returnees on average do not spend more than two days at the transit center before onward transportation. The center was ideally located between IOM and the airport, which facilitates contact between IOM and the returnees staying at the center. Meals were provided as well as beds in gender-segregated open rooms.



Transit center in Addis Ababa

In order to see examples of returnee reintegration, we visited one migrant at her dairy product store and another at her vocational training program in an embroidery school. Both returnees hosted us and spoke with us for roughly an hour.

We also had the opportunity to visit Mekele, a city in the northeast of Ethiopia close to the Eritrean border and the city that receives the most returnees after Addis Ababa. We experienced scheduling difficulties with one returnee who we were unable to meet, but visited a returnee in her foodstuffs store and another returnee, and a former victim of trafficking, who produces and sells traditional Ethiopian dresses. All the returnees whom we interviewed were women, which fits the general migration profile in the region.

Finally, we met with an organization called Agar, working in Addis Ababa with victims of trafficking (VoTs) and the elderly. Its efforts are to rehabilitate and reintegrate VoTs and work in partnership with IOM Ethiopia, as will be discussed.

#### *Problems encountered*

An interview with an official from the Egyptian Mol was rescheduled and ultimately conducted by an IOM worker in Cairo who then sent the minutes to the evaluation team. Moreover, concerns with the uniformity of official discourse meant that one embassy organized an interview with a staff member who was not dealing with the RAVEL program on a daily basis.

With the exception of two questionnaires submitted by the Sudanese office, we received no replies to any of our further attempts at contact. An interview with the Federal Micro and Small Enterprises Development Agency (FeMSEDA) in Ethiopia scheduled during the field visit was cancelled by FeMSEDA due to a scheduling conflict. Three phone calls were made to the contact person supplied by IOM Ethiopia, without response.

#### *Limitations of the methodology*

The focus on Egypt and Ethiopia, countries of demonstrable success, may lead to a positive bias in those cases in the results of the evaluation.

In Ethiopia, there was possible selection bias, as all returnees interviewed during this visit were selected by IOM Addis staff. The returnees who were interviewed often represented ‘success stories’ of Ethiopian returnees, in addition to the Ethiopian experience representing a success story for the project as a whole. Project Implementation was made difficult in Sudan and South Sudan due to resource constraints and circumstantial factors

(i.e. South Sudanese independence). In comparison, RAVEL implementation in Ethiopia was relatively efficient and returnees were able to benefit more sustainably from the program.

IOM staff were present during all interviews and focus groups with third parties in Cairo. While we agreed to this and it proved very useful in establishing contact and clarifying technical points, we cannot exclude the possibility of limitations on the views expressed. For interviews conducted in Ethiopia, an IOM colleague provided Amharic-English translation. It is possible that some information was lost in translation, as answers were often summarized in the interest of time.

As a result of the latest RAVEL extension and various delays in program implementation this evaluation took place before all planned activities were completed. The main consequence of this is on activities under specific objective 2 (to enhance inter-regional cooperation and encourage coherent program delivery in origin, transit and destination countries).

The methodology did not include interviews with donors. In retrospect it could have been useful to have the inputs from another group of stakeholders.

Finally, although we did receive questionnaire responses from all of the CoO IOM missions contacted, it should be noted that the evaluation may be affected by the limited response to requests for information from some country offices. The general information made available to the evaluators in reports is used wherever pertinent.

Based on the above methodology used to gather information, the following are the results of the evaluation.

## RESULTS OF THE EVALUATION

### Strengths

#### *NEED FOR AVRR*

The relevance of AVRR in the region is beyond doubt. High numbers of stranded migrants in Egypt and Libya create a strong need for mechanisms for voluntary return and reintegration to CoOs. RAVEL was the first program offering AVRR in Egypt, and the strong demand for such assistance - which came to light once the referral network was fully in place - demonstrates the relevance of such initiatives in that country. In Libya, RAVEL became all the more relevant following the 2011 civil war and subsequent detention of many stranded migrants whose only option for freedom was to return to their CoOs.

RAVEL was also especially well-suited to issues in Egypt as it offered AVRR coupled with other components, which were provided through other projects also conducted from the IOM Cairo office. Issues linked to counter-trafficking and migrants' health could thus be addressed thanks to the presence of other programs at IOM Cairo. This made the program into an even more apt response to the specific challenges encountered.

Migrants interviewed in Ethiopia were in general terms satisfied with the possibility offered by the program because their situation in the host country had become very difficult, especially as it came at a time when they feared for their security (i.e. during the Arab Spring). Lack of economic opportunities and discrimination in the transit countries, including harassment on racial grounds and persistent unemployment were all cited as factors driving the decision to return.

#### *PROGRAM FLEXIBILITY*

RAVEL was implemented during a time of great instability in both CoTs and CoOs. Most significant for the program was the independence of South Sudan, the revolution in Egypt, and the civil war in Libya, which all took place in 2011. The program was successful at adapting to these challenges. Returns to South Sudan constitute the largest part of returns conducted from Egypt under RAVEL. IOM Cairo was able to establish good relations with the new Egyptian government and resume effective collaboration with Mugamma' staff and detention facilities. Finally in Libya, collaboration with the Department to Combat Illegal

Migration (DCIM) a department of the Libyan MoI, was successful after the civil war, and enabled the return of an estimated 250 individuals under RAVEL as of May 2013.

The Libyan civil war of 2011 severely disrupted the program, but through prompt agreement with the donors, IOM Tripoli was able to redirect funds under RAVEL from AVRR to evacuation of migrants ex-Libya, which again demonstrated flexibility. This allowed for the evacuation of 841 migrants from Libya to their CoOs of Niger, Ghana, and Mali. Moreover, the reintegration component was not eliminated altogether, but modified into a collective reintegration system in cooperation with NGOs, and with UNDP in Ghana.

IOM Cairo also recruited a case-worker and community outreach officer from one of the migrant communities after encountering problems related to cultural misunderstandings in a specific case. This position proved to be a success resulting in improved relations with migrant communities and with as Egyptian government employees. This is supported by the evaluation team's findings on the ground.

Another challenge for IOM Cairo was the increased demand for AVRR under RAVEL as a result of the effectiveness of the referral network (cf. *infra*). Given the situation in Libya, return quotas were promptly adjusted in Cairo to accommodate the rise in demand, and selection criteria were ultimately imposed in order to prioritize the most vulnerable migrants.

Other changes to the program demonstrating flexibility include the addition of a budget line dedicated to unforeseen costs, mostly health-related, including the compulsory yellow fever vaccine required for all Southern Sudanese returning to their country.

#### *STAFF ADAPTABILITY*


Another strong positive aspect of the RAVEL implementation has been the ability demonstrated by IOM staff to adapt to the working environment of different actors involved in the project, including members of migrant communities, embassy representatives, and government employees. This ability to establish and maintain good relations with individuals from different working environments, as noted during our field trips, was undoubtedly essential to the overall effectiveness of the program.

With regards to reintegration packages, RAVEL staff in CoOs also showed a large amount of adaptability. IOM staff based in Addis Ababa adapted administrative procedures, such as purchase requests, to local procedures. When disbursements for training or sellers of materials proved difficult, staff were available to travel and solve problems. As project staff were responsible for helping returnees to create business plans, it was necessary that they be adaptable to each individual circumstance and able to navigate national procedures for each plan to facilitate use of funds.

The IOM Ethiopia staff was very accessible to the migrants in general. It was observed during our field visit that there was an open-door policy with migrants who wanted to meet with project staff.

### **STRONG REFERRAL NETWORK**

This rise in demand to participate in the program was mainly due to the strong referral network set up in Cairo, which accounts for the effectiveness of the program ex-Egypt. As mentioned, RAVEL was the first AVRR program in Egypt, and consequently, the referral network had to be adapted from previous non-AVRR projects, and individuals made aware of RAVEL. In addition to this, IOM workers formed new links with community leaders, embassy workers, and relevant government employees and this despite a relatively high turnover amongst government officials mainly in Egypt, but also in Libya, due to their respective domestic situations. Returnee numbers demonstrate the success of this referral network, as 511 individuals had been returned and/or reintegrated from Cairo as of May 2013, up from a revised target of 490 returnees ex-Egypt (initially 350).



## *RELATIONSHIP WITH GOVERNMENT IN LIBYA*

RAVEL workers in Libya enjoyed a productive working relationship with DCIM, thanks to the trust that was built through collaboration during and immediately following the civil war. This good relationship was evidenced by the fact that the Libyan government seamlessly referred detained migrants to IOM, and issued exit visas to IOM free of charge for migrants returning within the program, and sometimes even agreed to RAVEL workers conducting interviews with detained migrants in the IOM office rather than detention facilities. Thus, the mass evacuation assistance, by proving the good cooperation of IOM with authorities, paved the way for a strengthened referral of migrants. It also showed that gaining the trust of the partner government is the first step to set up a consolidated joint AVRR mechanism. .

### Weaknesses

#### *GENERAL*

Various IOM staff members made mention of difficulties with data-keeping on returnees. Data related to individuals and their reintegration process were not effectively communicated between local IOM offices, IOM Cairo and IOM Tripoli. This was in part linked to shortfalls within the MiMOSA system,<sup>3</sup> which required Internet connection beyond the capacity of some local offices, and demanded specific skills without provision for appropriate prior training of employees. Because of this, MiMOSA appeared to many to be time-consuming and inefficient.

IOM staff used an Excel file as an alternative to MiMOSA for storing migrants' data. The main problem linked to this was that the file could not be synchronized and updated from separate offices, thus reducing the effectiveness of the program in terms of data-gathering.

#### *CAPACITY-BUILDING*

Migrants willing to return home sometimes encountered difficulties due to some lack of information about migrant issues amongst lower-level workers in the Egyptian administration in charge of issuing exit visas. Problems included a lack of understanding of

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<sup>3</sup> Migrant Management & Operational Systems Application (MiMOSA) is an IOM system that aims at gathering data on migrants to facilitate project implementation and monitoring  
(<http://www.mimosa.iom.int/confluence/display/MAU1/MiMOSA+Official+Website>)

the difference between migrants and refugees, and indifference to migrants' plight. Awareness-raising activities in the RAVEL program were confined in both project design and implementation to higher-level officials of the Egyptian government. This lack of capacity-building for lower-level government employees reduced the efficiency of the program.

There was some lack of understanding of the RAVEL mechanisms among community leaders who formed part of the referral network. For instance, one community worker was unclear as to whether IOM reimbursed vaccination or helped with health costs. Moreover, some community leaders said that the criteria used to select migrants for return assistance were not always clear. Both of these issues show that later developments of the program – the addition of a budget line dedicated to additional health costs, the instauration of criteria for assistance – were not communicated back to the referral network. This led to situations in which community leaders were incurring the risk of diminished credibility amongst migrant communities as the information they gave could prove to be inaccurate, which in turn could cause problems for future cases and future IOM programs within the same communities.

However, as pointed out by IOM staff, there are limits to the amount of information that can be communicated back to the referral network, as it is fundamental for IOM to retain ownership of the eligibility criteria and avoid creating expectation due to the spread of incorrect rumors. This is partly so that IOM can adapt the project to changing situations and increasing demand, but also to make the screening process more efficient.

#### *PRE-DEPARTURE*

- **CoO conditions database**

IOM employees working directly with migrants within RAVEL reported insufficient information about conditions in CoOs, which made them less able to advise potential returnees on what could be expected upon their return, and more specifically regarding viable economic activities and available health facilities. This problem was especially acute concerning South Sudan.

- **Visibility**

We noted problems regarding the visibility material, which was generally produced too late to be fully useful. Not all of the embassy workers we interviewed had seen RAVEL brochures or posters before our fieldwork in late May 2013. Moreover, brochures produced

for RAVEL ex-Libya turned out to be superfluous during the implementation of the program, since referrals from detention facilities were sufficient to make up the whole Libyan caseload, thus making any additional referrals redundant.

IOM staff in Ethiopia, Sudan and South Sudan reported that some returnees were unclear about the reintegration process and expected the reintegration grant to be disbursed in cash immediately upon arrival. Although communication procedures were in place, they did not always have the desired effect of clearly conveying program procedures to migrants, especially regarding grant disbursement. However, IOM staff in the transit countries went to great lengths to ensure that migrants fully understood the terms of the reintegration package, including producing of videos in Amharic and Juba Arabic in case some migrants might have been illiterate. Moreover, all migrants signed a consent form repeating the term of the program which were also orally translated to them where necessary.

### **REINTEGRATION**

This section addresses challenges which affected the reintegration process under RAVEL.

- **Understaffing and staff training**

Some IOM offices in CoOs experienced understaffing. Some countries, like Togo and Benin, had no national IOM office but one IOM worker each, supported by the regional IOM office or IOM offices in neighboring countries. Communication between this local IOM presence and the sending offices in Egypt and Libya was thus made difficult at times, especially as other programs compete for individual workers' time. Moreover, this made monitoring reintegration very difficult in these countries.

Although the focal point for RAVEL in South Sudan was trained by IOM Addis staff, there was a lack of preparation for some staff in South Sudan, where one respondent to the questionnaire stated that they were not adequately prepared to receive returnees. This problem was no doubt magnified by the unexpectedly high caseload that followed from the independence of South Sudan. Community workers in Cairo reported cases in which returnees were not met upon arrival or encountered difficulties while trying to contact the office in order to access reintegration assistance, although these could not be verified independently.

- **Service fee**

The service fee system, whereby a standard fee was allocated to a receiving IOM office for each returnee who receives reintegration assistance, provided little incentive for monitoring, since it is claimed by the receiving IOM mission at the beginning of a migrant's reintegration project. The fee is meant to cover all of the cost of staff involved, establishment of a reintegration plan and related counseling, as well as the cost of monitoring the case on site, including transportation and DSA for the staff involved. This fee was also insufficient to cover both reintegration support and monitoring in offices that received few returnees as they did not benefit from the cumulated sums received by bigger offices.

- **Returnee networks**

Returnees in CoOs mentioned that they were wary of publicity concerning programs to assist them and that the program mostly acquired credibility in their eyes through word-of-mouth reports from fellow migrants in their own communities.

Many migrants, if not all, expressed the desire to have increased interaction with fellow returnees in order to align business plans, with the possibility of creating small group business enterprises and to learn from the experiences of others. Feedback given by returnees concerning the two business trainings provided by IOM and FeMSEDA demonstrated that one of the most important qualities of these trainings was the opportunity to network and liaise with other returnees.

- **Monetary reintegration assistance**

Every returnee interviewed, in addition to all staff surveyed, commented that the reintegration assistance was insufficient. The amount of the reintegration assistance is considered too low and ill-adapted to the cost of living in individual countries.

The problem is particularly acute in South Sudan, where cost of living is very high. Due to rising living costs in Ethiopia, including rental costs for businesses and housing, migrants stressed that they were limited in their business potential. Migrants with coherent business strategies were unable to realize much of their plans because of the upfront costs associated with starting their businesses. Some returnees managed to start a business but its sustainability may be called in to question unless they receive more funds. The money

was most useful as capital for start-up costs, but businesses would have had to experience almost immediate success to enable their continued sustainability past the project funds.

It should be noted that IOM has addressed this issue and planned for higher financial assistance in subsequent AVRR projects, such as the EU-funded “Protection”, started in December 2012. Reintegration allowance has been increased to 800 EUR per person.

It was also difficult for returnees from remote areas to access reintegration assistance as this required costly and time-consuming trips to the site of the local IOM office. This could account for some returnees failing to claim reintegration assistance upon their return. This problem was pointed out specifically with reference to South Sudan and Senegal.

Finally, a small group of migrants whose health needs went beyond those addressed by IOM through the provision of health travel assistance decided to use their reintegration assistance to provide for those needs. Until 2013, RAVEL had assisted in the return and reintegration of 45 Ethiopian nationals. Five returnees, or 11 per cent, used their reintegration grant for medical expenses. Three of those five had required dental treatment, and the purchasing of materials (i.e. toothpaste) in order to maintain their dental health. On average, their costs amounted to 395 euros – over 80 per cent of their reintegration assistance.

In Sudan, it was noted by IOM in meetings with the Secretariat of the Sudanese Working Abroad (SSWA) that many returnees were facing homelessness and would have preferred to use the grant in order to find housing. This would address a major need, but detracts from the benefits of reintegration assistance in finding gainful employment. For vulnerable cases, RAVEL indeed allowed migrants to use the reintegration to cover household expenses. Moreover, migrants stressed the need for market-oriented skills, such as Information Technology (IT) training.

- **Speed of reintegration assistance**

Lastly, all returnees’ in-kind reintegration requests were processed by IOM country offices and subject to approval by IOM Cairo. Though this assures project accountability and

coherence, it nevertheless detracted from field office autonomy and decreased time efficiency.



Milk shop opened by one returnee in Mekele

In response to the above-identified weaknesses, the following section provides corresponding recommendations where relevant.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

The following recommendations are ordered in such a way as to correspond to the weaknesses identified above. They thus follow the same categories (General, capacity-building, pre-departure and reintegration). In the few cases where we identified a weakness while recognizing that there is no adequate solution to it, we have not listed a corresponding recommendation hereafter. A table at the end of this document further sums up and emphasizes the relation between weakness and recommendation.

### General

- Offer individual training on MiMOSA for all IOM staff working on migrant monitoring instead of the PowerPoint slides provided so far. In the longer term, adapt MiMOSA to the field by taking into account slower and sporadic internet connections, integrating region-specific needs. Data keeping should be accessible offline and synchronized all at once when an internet connection is available. A definitive solution will require some financial investment but is necessary for more efficient data keeping in the long run.

### Capacity-building.

- Increase awareness-raising for lower-level government officials rather than higher-level officials only.
- Provide more information to community leaders, more specifically updates on selection criteria for assistance.

### Pre-departure

#### **CoO conditions database**

- Create a platform for country profile information on migrants' CoOs, available to IOM case workers, through partnerships with NGOs, local IOM offices, or educational institutions. Country profiles would include crucial information for returning migrants, such as cost-of-life indicators, viable business possibilities, security situation, and public infrastructure.

### **Visibility**

- Produce visibility material at the initial stages of an AVRR project. Adapt the production of visibility material to the situation in the CoT. As long as detention cases are abundant and easily accessible, as in Libya, there is no need for further publicity.

- Create a database of returnees who voluntarily agree to act as referral contacts for migrants in CoTs who are unsure about the reliability of the program.
- More information should be shared with returnees regarding the reintegration process in particular; this includes providing information on reintegration allowance to returnees in local currency (based on exchange estimates).

#### Reintegration

##### **Understaffing**

- More staff is needed in IOM offices in CoOs, especially in South Sudan. Use service fee to create one more post to assist with reintegration monitoring.

##### **Staff training**

- Offer systematic training to IOM office staff in CoOs. In addition to training by staff in IOM offices that perform well (especially Ethiopia), encourage visits by staff from receiving offices to sending offices. This would enhance personal relationships between IOM offices that are key for regional AVRR, thus strengthening communication between them and providing incentives for better service in receiving offices.
- Improved communication within and among IOM Cairo and IOM country offices and sub-offices.

##### **Service fee**

- Divide service fee into two parts, one allocated upon reintegration, and one after the monitoring is complete. Increase service fees for the first few cases in any given receiving office, so that the fee is higher for the first few returnees and then reduced to a standard fee for all. This would enable offices with few returnees to still support and monitor those returnees' reintegration appropriately. It would also address both understaffing and monitoring problems, as higher fees would allow offices to hire additional workers, and split fees would create an added incentive for monitoring.

##### **Returnee networks**

- Organize meetings between returnees with similar skills or business plans in an attempt to create networks of migrants with compatible interests. Additionally, any gatherings where returnees can network in general are encouraged, informed by those held in Niger, Mali and Ghana.

### **Monetary reintegration assistance**

- Adapt reintegration assistance to CoO to account for cost-of-living differences between countries. Additionally, consider handing out money in cash on a case-by-case basis, depending on specific problems to be addressed, especially health issues, or for returnees who reside far from the receiving IOM office. Where allowed by context, delegate disbursement of funds to partner NGOs in remote areas.
- Encourage returnees to explore micro-credit financing and facilitate application procedures through partnerships with relevant bodies.
- Prioritize shelter/rent for those who are vulnerable to being homeless. Whenever the conditions so allow, work with local authorities and relevant government departments in order to address the issue; conduct further research into the feasibility of adding housing as one type of assistance.
- During pre-departure health assessment, IOM doctors may assess, on a case-by-case basis, whether a one-off, in-kind assistance grant may be given to cover a medical expense in addition to the normal reintegration grant.

## CONCLUSION: RELEVANCE, EFFECTIVENESS AND SUSTAINABILITY

### Specific Objectives

1. To strengthen the capacity of key Government entities and civil society organizations to facilitate AVRR, in line with internationally recognized norms
2. To enhance inter-regional cooperation and encourage coherent program delivery in origin, transit and destination countries
3. To build the capacity of Government and civil society to assist returnees' sustainable reinsertion and reintegration in major countries of origin (Sudan, South Sudan, Ethiopia, Niger, Mali and Ghana)
4. To assist 715 stranded migrants, by facilitating AVRR ex-Libya and Egypt, in close cooperation with national authorities, civil society and UN agencies
5. To assist 841 migrants in evacuation ex-Libya

## Relevance

The Development Assistance Committee within the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD-DAC) defines relevance as follows:

The extent to which the objectives of a development intervention are consistent with beneficiaries' requirements, country needs global priorities and partners' and donors' policies. Retrospectively, the question of relevance often becomes a question as to whether the objectives of an intervention or its design are still appropriate given changed circumstances.<sup>4</sup>

The specific objective (1), which in part identified and set up a referral mechanism in Cairo, was key to the high numbers of migrants returned ex-Egypt demonstrates its relevance. In Libya, pre-existing referral mechanisms were severely disrupted by the civil war in 2011, making their consolidation impossible. However, a new relationship was set up with the new government, which proved pivotal in continuing the AVRR process there. Awareness-raising among Egyptian officials was also an important factor as it facilitated the collaboration with IOM, but the high turnover in government partners meant that personal relationships were ultimately more relevant to collaboration than formal training. Similarly, even in cases where awareness-raising activities were partial or even absent, referral partners still performed well on the basis of personal relationships with IOM staff. This shows that while the service-mapping exercise was very important in Egypt, awareness-raising sessions were not essential to the success of the program.

Specific objective (2) is relevant to future projects that will benefit from experience gained during RAVEL. RAVEL itself successfully built on experience from past programs and performed more effectively as a result. The study tour for government officials is a strong incentive for cooperation with IOM, but also is the only component of the program that puts sending and receiving countries in touch with each other on migration issues, which is especially relevant to sustainability. However, given recent instability in the region and the turnover in government positions, there is doubt as to whether this activity is to be prioritized over others.

Specific objective (3) is relevant in its attempt to facilitate reintegration beyond individual grants, by building a long-term system, through the training of governments, civil society and returnees and the provision of reintegration services such as the ICRS. Effective reintegration depends to a high degree on the network created between different actors (IGOs, NGOs, CBOs, etc.) in a CoO. A successful network may streamline processes, create a

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<sup>4</sup> Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results Based Management, p.32, 2002/ 2010, OECD-DAC.

dialogue between actors on similar issues, and avoid duplication of efforts. These networks may also allow returnees to have greater access to services that complement their IOM assistance and contribute to their reintegration. Training programs for returnees are relevant for their economic reinsertion since they develop specific skills or trades to be used in obtaining employment in addition to basic business skills that returnees can apply to the administration of their enterprises.

The relevance of the AVRR under specific objective (4) is demonstrated by the high demand that it met from migrants in Egypt and Libya. The return component of the program is especially relevant as the continued presence of many migrants in the CoTs was due to their inability to make their way home on their own. The precarious situation of African migrants in Egypt, where they are often victims of racism, discrimination, and where their irregular status makes them unable to access many state resources, and in Libya, where the civil war made them targets of violence, means that the best solution for CoTs and for migrants themselves was their voluntary return.

The relevance of the reintegration component is subject to debate, depending on the answer to the following question were: the shortfalls in the results of reintegration mentioned above caused by problems in implementation, or inherent issues within reintegration as a goal? Within RAVEL program the relevance of reintegration seemed to us to be clear despite weaknesses in implementation (cf. supra). The main point of relevance of reintegration in AVRR is that it allows migrants to return home without stigma, which removes a serious deterrent for return. This point was reiterated by psychosocial workers, and members of migrants communities, as well as IOM staff. Additionally, in some cases, reintegration might act as an incentive for return, since it provides funds to start a business or undertake training.

Specific objective (5) was a very relevant response to the Libyan emergency in 2011. Libya had been for decades a main destination and transit country for African migrants who were endangered both because of the general situation in the country and as specific targets of violence due to suspicion linked to the Gaddafi regime (cf. annex). The safest solution for these migrants was evacuation, and the response provided, which allowed also for return to their CoO, and some form of collective reintegration, was especially pertinent to the situation.

## Effectiveness

The OECD-DAC defines effectiveness as follows:

The extent to which the development intervention's objectives were achieved or are expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance.<sup>5</sup>

RAVEL was very effective in terms of specific objective (1). A strong referral mechanism was set up in Egypt, and strong working relationships were established with the Egyptians government as well as the new government in Libya, which became the main referral partner there. These relationships are the main reason for the quantitative success of the program, whereby 761 migrants were assisted as of May 2013.

No comment as to the effectiveness of specific objective (2) can be made given that two of the three main activities planned had not been implemented at the time of fieldwork: neither the study tour nor the AVRR manual have been completed. The Egypt-specific SOPs have been finalized and they are meant for internal use, targeting primarily at IOM staff but they are not being widely used to date.

Some activities were limited under specific objective (3). It was decided that two eight-day (instead of eight one-day) trainings promoting returnees' economic reinsertion would be conducted in Ethiopia in order to gather as many returnees as possible. The feedback available from the first business development service training in February 2013 (provided to 22 returnees) by IOM Ethiopia and FeMSEDA demonstrated that participants benefitted from the trainings and would recommend their continuity. A second training was held in April 2013 and involved 30 participants.


Activity (iii) of specific objective 3 included four workshops to establish reinsertion and reintegration networks in Ethiopia. A May 2012 report highlighted the intention to create such a network including 20 partner organizations including NGOs and CBOs. However, at time of fieldwork, there was only one workshops of this kind planned for the future. It should be noted that a government referral network was put in place which involved the micro and small enterprise (MSE) development office and the technical vocational education and training (TVET) institutes, as well as with Agar Ethiopia, which assists VoTs. Since this government network was already in place, IOM Ethiopia referred returnees to these services.

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<sup>5</sup> Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results Based Management, p. 20, 2002/ 2010, OECD-DAC.

Two workshops were planned between IOM Khartoum and the SSWA in April 2013 in order to institute Information, Counseling and Referral Services (ICRS), but since no information on this subject was provided from Sudan, it is impossible to comment on their effectiveness.

The program was most effective under specific objective (4). The target under this objective was to return and re-integrate 750 migrants ex-Egypt and Libya. The cumulated number of migrants returned from both CoTs was 761 as of May 2013, which is in excess of the target, despite various causes of instability in the region representing a major challenge for the program implementation. The effectiveness of AVRR ex-Egypt was especially remarkable. From a projected 350 returnees, the target was increased to 490, and the actual number reached was 511 as of May 2013. In Libya the initial target was 365, but this was subsequently reduced to 250 in light of the civil war and one-year interruption to the program that followed. 238 migrants were returned ex-Libya between January and May 2013. The Libyan numbers remain high in the context of the political developments there.




In terms of reintegration, effectiveness is more nuanced because of the number of cases in which reintegration assistance was never claimed, particularly in countries facing emergencies, such as South Sudan (i.e. mass return of South Sudanese nationals).

The program is generally effective in promoting reintegration and in deterring onward migration considering that many returnees, once returned and offered assistance, are daunted by the prospects of future migration and wish to stay in country. In interviews with RAVEL returnees in Ethiopia, six of eight interviewed indicated that they would not be interested in further attempts at migration. In this regard, reintegration assistance was successful in providing incentives for returnees to live in their country of origin by allowing them to start businesses and wish to remain to see their businesses grow.

One migrant had wanted to continue onward to Europe but was advised by a fellow Ethiopian living in Cairo that she should not take the risk and was instead informed about the RAVEL project. Another migrant stated that she had made unsuccessful attempts to continue to another country from Egypt but decided to return home because of the insecurity. Their cases demonstrate the effectiveness of the program in providing alternatives to onward migration since the interviewees may have attempted onward migration to Europe irregularly were it not for the immediate and assured option that they could return home to escape the insecurity in the country.

Activities under specific objective (5) saw 841 migrants evacuated from Libya. The number envisaged at first was 400 migrants, but this was increased to 841 after costs were adjusted. The evacuees benefitted from collective reintegration, which was a good solution considering that no financial reintegration assistance was provided by IOM.



## Sustainability

The OECD-DAC defines sustainability as follows:

The continuation of benefits from a development intervention after major development assistance has been completed. The probability of continued long-term benefits. The resilience to risk of the net benefit flows over time.<sup>6</sup>

The relationships started under specific objective (1) are likely to persist and be useful in future programs, thus making the achievements under this specific objective sustainable. Despite a lack of understanding of program details among some stakeholders, IOM has shown itself to be a reliable partner to all of embassies, community leaders, and CoT governments, and all of these stakeholders seemed ready to collaborate further with IOM on other programs. In the Libyan context, IOM has built significant trust with the government, inter alia by dealing directly with the official authorities instead of militias in charge of detention centers, and the government seems aware of its interest in working in collaboration with IOM, which further ensures the sustainability of these relationships.

An important way in which to consider sustainability for RAVEL is by asking whether the program has permanently altered attitudes towards migrants. The answer to this in our case is not clear-cut. In the case of higher-level officials in Egypt, willingness to collaborate with IOM on these issues could be an indicator of progress in this regard, but the lack of training at lower levels of government mean that there remains a certain reluctance to address migrants' needs and rights.

The sustainability of results under specific objective (4) is best assessed on a longer term than is possible here. Issues to do with the sum allocated for reintegration assistance are a strong factor in the sustainability of migrants' return as their business projects might suffer from lack of funds and compel renewed migration. Furthermore, AVRR is not designed to address the root causes of migration, which are first and foremost economic, and thus is not a sustainable solution to irregular migration. Although migrants know the risks of irregular migration, the wide gap in development between countries continue to means that the imagined benefits of migration could still act as an incentive to leave again. These trends are not observable on a short-term basis within this evaluation, but these issues remain central to programs dealing with irregular migration.

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<sup>6</sup> Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results Based Management, p. 36, 2002/ 2010, OECD-DAC.

One way in which these results could be sustainable would be for authorities in CoTs to learn from their experience with IOM to conduct their own voluntary return initiatives. In the case of Egypt, such sustainability is not conceivable as the government does not have the necessary resources to implement such initiatives, without external help, and migration management has not been systematically addressed in the post-revolution phase. However, this possibility is less remote in Libya, and it remains to be seen whether the government could perform returns on its own after the end of RAVEL (and RAVL).

If sustainability of return is defined as migrants becoming fully self-sufficient without assistance and deterred from further attempts at migration, the program may not be effective for all returnees. Sustainability of return is especially jeopardized for those migrants who used their reintegration assistance for health expenses since they will not be able to use their reintegration assistance for the purposes of skills training or business start-up. Instead, they are likely returned to the similar situation to that which pushed them to migrate originally – that is, in the case of many economic migrants, lack of employment or capital for business ventures.

For those returnees who were able to start a business, their reintegration may depend entirely on the success of that business. Though IOM cannot guarantee this success, the fact that the reintegration amount is not sufficient for many returnees to reach the potential of their business plans limits the possibility of their success. Although the grant may cover some of the initial start-up costs for a business, migrants otherwise needed to have already had savings to contribute, as well as assured accommodation. For those migrants originally targeted by the program as vulnerable, they may have not had the chance to bring any earnings back from the country in which they had worked. In this case, the assistance was very limited in helping them to reintegrate, especially if they did not already have a social network to assist them in other regards.

The sustainability of returns for evacuees under specific objective (5) was never a main aim of this action, which was conducted in the context of an emergency. However, IOM and other partners provided training in co-operative organization and awareness-raising on the dangers of irregular migration, which constituted an attempt to create some longer-term solution for these returnees. Given the limited means available, the economic conditions in Ghana, Niger, and Mali, and especially the political situation in Niger and Mali,

we cannot comment on whether evacuees returned to these countries found long-term prospects to incentivize staying there.

### Conclusions

This evaluation concluded that the program highly relevant to the situation in which it was implemented, and that all of its 5 specific objectives contributed to that relevance. The program was also mostly found to be very effective, as beneficiaries used the services formulated in the project output, leading to the benefits formulated in the project outcomes. This was largely due to strong referral networks in transit countries. However, the effectiveness of reintegration is more nuanced because of a number of cases in which reintegration assistance was never claimed, especially in countries facing emergency situations. The sustainability of the outcomes of RAVEL was found to be strong in a narrow understanding, but an entirely government run AVRR program does not yet seem to achievable in countries with limited resources and pressing priorities.

	<b>Strengths</b>	<b>Weaknesses</b>	<b>Recommendations</b>
<b>Overall</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Need for AVRR in Egypt and Libya, in light of the request for assistance coming from migrant communities</li> <li>• Flexibility: at adapting program considering volatile political environment, cultural difficulties and increase in AVRR demand</li> <li>• Staff adaptability</li> <li>• Establishment of a strong referral network</li> <li>• Good relationship with Libyan government</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• MiMOSA inadequate in this context</li> <li>• Alternative to MiMOSA solution (excel sheet) not efficient enough</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Training on MiMOSA</li> <li>• Improve data management</li> </ul>
<b>Capacity-Building</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Meetings with community leaders and representatives led to the creation of a solid referral network</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Lack of awareness of migrant issues among low-level government officials (Egypt)</li> <li>• Lack of information (especially about selection criteria) among community leaders (Egypt)</li> <li>• Lack of returnee networking opportunities</li> <li>• Lack of decision-making ability for country offices</li> <li>• Ineffective communication between some IOM country offices and sub-offices</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Strengthen awareness-raising for low-rank government officials</li> <li>• Update community-leaders on selection criteria for AVRR</li> <li>• Returnee network creation</li> <li>• As much as possible, grant country offices greater decision-making autonomy in order to increase effectiveness by limiting overhead; increase training and ask for monthly reports rather than individual plans</li> <li>• Improved and regular communication between and within missions</li> </ul>

<p style="text-align: center;"><b>Pre-departure</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Individual Counseling and possibility to inquire with country offices prior to return on availability of specific services</li> <li>• Strengthened counseling for Ethiopians/Southern Sudanese migrants through the creation of videos in local languages and use of tablet in detention facilities</li> <li>• Further Health assistance for very vulnerable migrants and compulsory vaccination for Southern Sudanese reimbursed</li> <li>• Referral to other projects/external partners in case of need (e.g. psychosocial support)</li> <li>• Assistance with immigration offices and embassies in obtaining documents/visas</li> <li>• Assistance at the airport with departure/arrival</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Lack of available information on conditions in CoO to advise migrants before departure</li> <li>• Visibility material not widely circulated from the beginning</li> <li>• Visibility material superfluous in Libyan context</li> <li>• Vulnerable migrants were unsure of whether they could trust the program and needed to refer to their own personal contacts for reassurance before approaching IOM</li> <li>• Lack of information for some migrants on reintegration process, nature of assistance and country context</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Create a platform for country profile information on migrants' CoO</li> <li>• Visibility material available early on in the program</li> <li>• Adapt visibility material to the context</li> <li>• Create voluntary returnee contact database</li> <li>• Use interpreters to convey information on reintegration assistance for those who may not be literate. Provide information on reintegration grant in local currency and purchasing power locally</li> <li>• Provide contextual information on country of origin to prepare returnees for reinsertion</li> </ul>
<p style="text-align: center;"><b>Reintegration</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Reintegration plans tailor-made to address individual needs and ideas</li> <li>• Follow up via phone and/or monitoring for the majority of returnees</li> <li>• Vulnerable cases were assisted with cash disbursements when needed</li> <li>• Referral to reintegration/protection networks whenever available in the country of return.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Not enough available human resources in certain countries</li> <li>• Service fee insufficient for reintegration support and monitoring</li> <li>• In-kind reintegration assistance insufficient to cover all needs, including immediate housing and health needs</li> <li>• Remote access to reintegration assistance</li> <li>• Lack of rehabilitation support for some very vulnerable returnees before being able to reintegrate</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• More staff needed, especially in South Sudan. Use service fee to create additional position</li> <li>• Systematic training of staff in CoOs</li> <li>• Divide service fee in two parts; one for the reintegration and one for the monitoring</li> <li>• Increase service fee for the first few cases in a given office as to ensure that the offices expenses for reintegration support are covered</li> <li>• Increase and adapt reintegration assistance in accordance to each country of origin profile</li> <li>• Hand-out money in cash on a case by case basis (not just vulnerable migrants) where logistical or geographical obstacles to the normal process arise</li> <li>• Continue delegating disbursement of funds and monitoring to partner NGOs if context allows</li> <li>• Provide improved information to migrants re: country context, and reintegration allowance in local currency</li> </ul>

			<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Encourage micro-credit financing</li><li>• Work with governments in CoOs to ensure access to services (e.g. departments of housing), wherever feasible</li><li>• Provide for individual emergency grants to top the normal reintegration assistance with additional support for those identified pre-departure as having immediate health needs that might hinder their successful reintegration</li></ul>
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**Terms of Reference**  
**External Evaluation Mission**

**Regional Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration Program for Stranded Migrants in  
Egypt and Libya (RAVEL)**

Egypt and Libya have been identified as an important crossroad for East African migrants heading toward Europe or Israel.

Although Egypt is considered mainly a transit point by many travelling the Eastern African Route at the outset, it may also become a *de facto* country of destination. According to the World Bank 2010 report, Egypt hosts around 245.000 refugees and migrants, a 45% increase from 2000 figures.

In this context, RAVEL overall objective is to support the national and civil society effort to stem illegal migration along the Eastern Migration Route and assist vulnerable migrants – including through a comprehensive assisted voluntary return and reintegration (AVRR) program ex-Libya and Egypt.

The RAVEL program offers the possibility for 715 migrants stranded in Egypt and Libya to return to their country of origin in a humane and dignified way. In this respect, IOM offers migrants - after an accurate screening process and in collaboration with relevant embassies - the possibility to return voluntarily on a commercial flight. Logistic and bureaucratic pre-departure assistance is provided, as well as post-departure reintegration assistance (such as small business start-up support, education and vocational training, etc.)

In addition to the provision of AVRR services, RAVEL also aims at strengthening the capacity of key Government entities and civil society organizations to facilitate AVRR, in line with internationally recognized norms; enhancing inter-regional cooperation and encourage coherent program delivery in origin, transit and destination countries; building the capacity of Government and civil society to assist returnees' sustainable reinsertion and reintegration in major countries of origin (Sudan, South Sudan, Ethiopia, Niger, Mali and Ghana) and to assist 841 migrants from Niger, Mali and Ghana in evacuation ex-Libya.

## Objectives of the Evaluation

This evaluation is the result of cooperation between the IOM office in Egypt and the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies (IHEID) in Geneva.

The intended audience of the evaluation includes the European Commission, donors' governments, national counterparts, other IOM missions and the Office of the Inspector General.

The overall objective of the evaluation is to assess relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability of the voluntary return and reintegration assistance provided to stranded migrants under the project.

The following specific objectives were identified in accordance with IOM evaluation guidelines:

1. Pre-departure (Egypt): to analyze the relevance and effectiveness of each step of the AVRR process:

- Referral system: Does the referral system reach all potential beneficiaries? Is the referral system the most objective system? Was the information campaign effective?
- Candidate screening: are the questions relevant and do they allow a selection of the most vulnerable candidates? Is the reintegration assistance process in the country of origin well explained?
- Medical clearance: are the criteria for medical fitness to travel adequate?
- Logistics: is the operational procedure (interview - travel arrangements - departure) timely and efficient? Is the quality of the travel assistance sufficient?

2. Post-Departure (Sudan and Ethiopia): to analyze the quality and impact of the reintegration process in the country of origin:

- Travel assistance: was the travel assistance provided post-departure (airport assistance upon arrival and, where applicable, accompanied travel) sufficient and efficient?

- Communication: did the migrant understand the information given pre-departure?
- Reception at IOM office: is the returning migrant well received by the IOM office?
- Reintegration plan: does the IOM staff provide guidance on the chosen reintegration activity of the returning migrant?
- Disbursement procedures: are the procedures efficient and adapted to the local financial infrastructure? Impact: Does the assistance facilitate the reintegration of the returnee? Does it have an impact on his/her living condition? Is it sustainable? Is there a risk of failed integration leading to renewed emigration?
- Network of NGOs: Does the local network of NGOs facilitate the reintegration of the returnee?

### **Methodology**

Five students have been selected and are required to have competency in English and French (written/oral), and at least one should be an Arabic speaker. They should be flexible and adapt themselves easily in a different cultural setting. The team will be based in Geneva and hold regular meetings in order to produce the final report. Three evaluators will be travelling to the IOM office in Egypt and two to the IOM office in Ethiopia.

IOM Cairo will share the background documents with the selected students as preparation for their field missions. Data collection methodology will be developed accordingly and will include:

- a) Review of existing reports and documents
- b) Questionnaires/surveys among stakeholders
- c) On-site observation
- d) Interviews with key informants
- e) Focus group discussions
- f) Phone interviews.

A work plan, including methodology, questionnaires and list of stakeholders to be interviewed, will be shared with IOM Cairo in order to allow a timely and relevant planning of the evaluation activities on the field. IOM Cairo will support the evaluators throughout the evaluation period.

#### **Timeline and Deliverables**

- February 1- 7: Selection of participating students
- February 8 - March 5: Analysis of background documents
- 15 March – presentation of a work plan (including evaluation techniques)
- 20 April – 15 May Missions to Egypt and Ethiopia
- June 1: Presentation of the evaluation draft
- June 15: Presentation of the final report
- July: Presentation of the results of the evaluation at the IHEID

The expected outcome of this external evaluation will be a final report addressing the specific objectives with a set of recommendations. A draft report will be submitted to IOM Cairo for comments 2 weeks before the final deadline of June 15<sup>th</sup>, 2013.

#### **Budget**

8,000 €

IOM will fund airfare, visas and daily substance allowance (DSA), inclusive of accommodation and meals. IOM does not cover insurance for malicious acts.

#### **Supporting documentation**

- Project documents (Narrative, log frame and work plan)
- Budget
- Interim reports (EC)
- Updated statistics
- Questionnaire results

**ANNEX II: LIST OF PEOPLE INTERVIEWED**

<b>Institutions</b>	<b>Individuals</b>	<b>Interview Date</b>
<b>IOM Geneva</b>	Christophe Franzetti (Head, Office of the Inspector General)	15 April 2013
<b>IOM Cairo</b>	Michele Bombassei (Head of Operations for Middle East and North Africa Project Manager)	14 May 2013
	Emanuela Muscara (Project Support Officer)	15 May 2013
	Adam Ragy (Project Assistant)	13 May 2013
	Ahmed Saeed (Community Liaison Officer )	15 May 2013
	Dr Anuar Muhammad	15 May 2013

<b>AMERA (Cairo)</b>	2 staff members	13 May 2013
<b>Embassy of the Republic of South Sudan in Cairo</b>	Staff	13 May 2013
<b>Focus Group with community leaders and workers (Cairo)</b>		14 May 2013
<b>Embassy of the Republic of Senegal in Cairo</b>	Staff	14 May 2013
<b>Embassy of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia</b>	2 staff member	15 May 2013
<b>IOM Libya</b>	Ashraf Hassan (Reintegration Consultant)	19 May 2013
<b>Mugamma</b>	Staff	9 June 2013
<b>IOM Ethiopia</b>	Eskedar Tenaye Program Assistant	6 May 2013
	Abraham Tamrat Senior Program Assistant	10 May 2013
<b>Returnees</b>	4 Returnees interviewed in the IOM office in Addis Ababa	7 May 2013
<b>Returnees</b>	Interview with 2 returnees in their place of business/training	7 May 2013
<b>Returnees</b>	Interview with 2 returnees in their place of business/training in Mekele	8 May 2013
<b>Agar Ethiopia</b>	Staff	10 May 2013

## ANNEX III: LIST OF STANDARD QUESTIONNAIRES FOR CoDs

### Questionnaire for IOM staff in Cairo

Introduction	
• Could you please introduce yourself?	
• What is your role in the project?	

Result I - A Framework for AVRR is established and consolidated in Libya and Egypt, through capacity building activities targeting national authorities and civil society	
<b><u>Conduct a service mapping exercise in Egypt</u></b>	
• How did you identify partners (government departments and civil society actors?)	
<b><u>Organise an inter-Ministerial workshop in Egypt</u></b>	
• Did you succeed in organizing the inter-ministerial workshop in Egypt? If not, why?	
<b><u>Conduct 10 awareness raising sessions</u></b>	
• How do you think that you succeeded in mobilizing partners and raising awareness?	

Result II – Cooperation between Origin, transit and destination countries is enhanced and coherent programme delivery in the field of AVRR is encouraged	
<b><u>Organising a study tour to selected European countries for Egyptian Mol officials</u></b>	
• Can you explain what caused a delay in the implementation of this activity?	
• Why was the CCCPA needed to identify the officials for participation in this study-tour?	
• How did you select Italy as the destination for the study tour?	
<b><u>Develop, translate, print and distribute SOPs for AVRR ex-Egypt; Develop, translate, print and distribute a region-specific AVRR manual</u></b>	
• Have the SOPs produced for Egypt been useful?	
• When will the AVRR manual be produced and distributed?	
• What caused the delay in this activity?	

<b>Result IV – 750 vulnerable migrants are provided with return and reintegration assistance, ex-Libya and Egypt</b>	
<b><u>Develop, translate, print and distribute IEC material in Libya and Egypt</u></b>	
• How did you distribute the leaflets?	
• Who made the video and where was it shown?	
<b><u>Identify and provide 750 stranded migrants with pre-departure, transit, post arrival and reintegration support ex-Libya and Egypt</u></b>	
• How many migrants have you returned (and reintegrated) so far?	
• How did these migrants get in touch with IOM staff?	
• Did you think that partners were doing enough in terms of referral?	
• What criteria did you use to select migrants most in need of AVRR?	
• What is the Doctor meant to assess? During the medical examination, what medical criteria do you use?	
• What is your estimate of how much time it takes for migrants to return? Do you think that is a reasonable amount of time?	
• How much assistance do you provide in terms of travel arrangement? Do you provide translation services? Do you feel the assistance provided is sufficient?	
<b>Case of the unaccompanied minor</b>	
• In the case of the unaccompanied minor returned to her country of origin, how would you assess your collaboration with the government and other UN agencies?	
• How do think the experience gained in the case of the unaccompanied minor will benefit future AVRR projects?	
• Did you organize a round table with all partners involved in this case? If so, how would you assess this activity?	
• What criteria did you use for the assessment of the reintegration plan in the case of this unaccompanied minor?	

<b>Result V - Identify and provide 400 stranded migrants with pre-departure, transit, post arrival assistance support ex-Libya</b>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What was the impact of the evacuation of stranded migrants in Libya on the programme in Egypt?</li> </ul>	

<b>General</b>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• How would you assess your collaboration and communication with other IOM offices and missions within Egypt and outside Egypt?</li> </ul>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• How would you assess your collaboration and communication with the Egyptian government?</li> </ul>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• In retrospect do you feel that your job description as laid out in the ToRs for your position corresponded to the work needed in practice? Please explain.</li> </ul>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• In your opinion what has worked and what has not worked in this project?</li> </ul>	

## Questionnaire for Mugamma Officers

Introduction	
1. Could you please introduce yourself?	
2. What is your role in the project?	

a.

b. General Questions	
3. Did anyone from your department/ ministry attend awareness-raising sessions about AVRR conducted by IOM? a. If so, did you find them useful? b. If not, why not?	
4. How would you assess your relationship with the RAVEL IOM staff?	
5. How long does it take to produce exit document for migrants willing to return to their countries of origin with IOM? Do you feel that that adequately responds to IOM demands?	
6. According to you what is good/bad about the RAVEL project?	

## Questionnaire for Embassies

Introduction	
1. Could you please introduce yourself?	
2. What is your role in the project?	

a.

b. General Questions	
3. Did anyone from your embassy attend awareness raising sessions about AVRR conducted by IOM? a. If so, did you find them useful? b. If not, why not?	
4. How did you identify migrants for referral to IOM under the RAVEL programme?	
5. How many migrants has your embassy referred to IOM for Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration (AVRR)?	
6. Did you find the information and education campaign (IEC) material provided by IOM useful and sufficient?	
7. Are you in touch with the Egyptian government officials on issues linked to AVRR?	
8. According to you, what is good/bad about this process?	

## Questionnaire for Community Social Workers

Introduction	
1. Could you please introduce yourself?	
2. How did you come to work with IOM? What is your role in the project?	

a.

b. General Questions	
3. Did any of you attend awareness raising sessions about AVRR (Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration) conducted by IOM?	
4. If so, how would assess these sessions?	
5. Did you find the IEC material provided by IOM useful and sufficient?	
6. How would you assess your collaboration and communication with IOM staff?	
7. Do you think that you will be able to continue with referrals once the project is over?	

a.

b. Questions with regards to migrants and AVRR	
8. What are the main reasons driving migrants to request AVRR?	
9. How do you identify migrants for referral to IOM under the AVRR programme?	
10. How many migrants have you referred to IOM for AVRR?	
11. How long does it take for a migrant to get a date of return once he/she is referred to IOM? Do you think this is fast enough?	
12. Do you think the assistance migrants receive is sufficient?	

13. According to you what is good/bad about the RAVEL programme?	
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## Questionnaire for IOM staff in Tripoli

Introduction	
1. Could you please introduce yourself?	
2. What is your role in the project?	

a.

b. Result I - A Framework for AVRR is established and consolidated in Libya and Egypt, through capacity building activities targeting national authorities and civil society	
c. <u>Organise two training courses targeting national authorities and civil society organizations in Libya</u>	
3. Could you please explain how the situation in Libya caused a delay in the implementation of this activity?	
4. Where you able to implement this activity since the last Interim Report (Oct. 2012)?	
5. If not, how did this affect the cases of those returnees who have been assisted so far?	
6. Were you able to rely on a pre-existing referral network set up as part of a previous programme?	

a.

b. Result II – Cooperation between Origin, transit and destination countries is enhanced and coherent programme delivery in the field of AVRR is encouraged	
c. <u>Develop, translate, print and distribute a region-specific AVRR manual</u>	
7. Did you use any previous manual or SOPs to implement the AVRR project in Libya?	

a.

b. Result IV – 750 vulnerable migrants are provided with return and reintegration assistance, ex-Libya and Egypt	
c. <u>Develop, translate, print and distribute IEC material in Libya and Egypt</u>	
8. Have you now produced, printed and distributed IEC material in Libya?	
9. If so, please answer the following questions: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. How did you decide on the number of IEC material to produce in each language?</li> <li>b. How did you distribute the leaflets?</li> </ul>	

c. Who made the video? d. Where did you show the video?	
<b>e. Identify and provide 750 stranded migrants with pre-departure, transit, post arrival and reintegration support ex-Libya and Egypt</b>	
10. How many migrants have you returned (and reintegrated) so far?	
11. How did migrants willing to benefit from AVRR get in touch with IOM staff?	
12. Do you think that partners have been doing enough in terms of referral?	
13. What criteria did you use to select migrants most in need of AVRR?	
14. What is the Doctor meant to assess? What medical criteria did you use to select migrants for AVRR?	
15. What is your estimate of how much time it takes for migrants to be returned? Do you think that that is a reasonable amount of time?	
16. How much assistance do you provide in terms of travel arrangements? Do you have translator? Do you feel the assistance provided is sufficient?	
17. If you were dealing directly with the return process, what specific problems did you encounter and how did you overcome them?	

a.

b.

<b>c. Result V - Identify and provide 400 stranded migrants with pre-departure, transit, post arrival assistance support ex-Libya</b>	
18. Could you please explain the difference between the assistance provided under this activity from that provided under expected result IV?	
19. How did you identify migrants for evacuation?	
20. Why were all migrants evacuated were from Ghana, Niger, and Mali?	
21. How do you explain the fact that you were able to assist 841 migrants instead of the expected 400?	
22. What was the impact of this activity on the RAVEL programme in Libya?	
<b>General</b>	
23. How would you assess your collaboration and communication with other IOM offices and missions within	

Libya and outside Libya?	
24. How would you assess your collaboration and communication with the Libyan government?	
25. In retrospect do you feel that your job description as laid out in the ToRs for your position corresponded to the work needed in practice? Please explain	
26. In your opinion what has worked and what has not worked in this project?	

### Questionnaire for DCIM representative

Introduction	
1. Could you please introduce yourself?	
2. What is your role in the RAVEL programme?	

a.

b. General Questions	
3. How many migrants have you so far referred to IOM as part of the RAVEL programme?	
4. What kind of training have you received as part of the RAVEL process?	
5. Could you describe your experience of the referral process?	
6. According to you what is good/bad about the RAVEL project?	

Questionnaire for Migrants

1. What were your reasons for volunteering for AVRR?
2. How were you referred to the programme?
3. Did you come across any IEC material (videos, pamphlets etc.)?
  - a. Did you understand it?
  - b. Did you find it useful?
4. What assistance was provided to you before returning to your country of origin?
5. How do you feel you have been treated during the process (from first point of contact until now)?
6. How helpful was the IOM staff upon arrival?
7. Was the reintegration process/procedure clear to you?
8. Did you experience any problems with the delivery of the reintegration assistance?
9. Do you consider the assistance provided by IOM to be useful for your reintegration?
10. Did you rely on the IOM office for your reintegration when you first returned?
  - a. In what ways? How often?
11. What are your reintegration plans?
  - a. How do you intend to reintegrate?
  - b. Do you plan on benefitting from IOM assistance in the reintegration? (reintegration project)
12. What types of reintegration assistance did you receive? (Business/training/housing/cash assistance)
  - a. How satisfied are you with the assistance that you received?
13. In your opinion, what is good/bad about the integration process?
  - a. What improvements would you suggest to the whole process?
14. What were the major difficulties regarding reintegration in your community upon return?
  - a. How did IOM assist you in overcoming these difficulties?
15. Are you satisfied with your current situation?
16. Where do you see yourself living in the future?
  - a. If you wish to stay, did IOM assistance help you in reaching that decision?
  - b. If you wish to leave again, why and where?
17. What are your future plans?

## Question to others (NOT IOM workers) Ethiopia

### Government officials

#### **Expected Result 2:**

- Did you find the study tour useful?
  - Do you think it led to increased cooperation? Programme delivery? Can you give concrete examples?
- Did you have any input in the development of the SOPs and AVRR manual for the region?
  - Do you use the SOPs and AVRR manual and do you find them appropriate?
- How would you evaluate this activity?

#### **Expected Result 3:**

- Did you participate in any workshops held to establish reinsertion and reintegration networks in Ethiopia?
  - What activities were conducted during the workshops?
  - What feedback, if any, do you have?
  - What did you learn?
  - Do you feel like you gained competence in terms of AVRR?

#### **Expected Result 4:**

- What, if any, kind of collaboration do you have with IOM?
  - What are the strengths/weaknesses of your collaboration?
- What role do you play in assisting AVRR or in assisting migrants?
- What gaps would you identify in your activities or in IOMs?
- Do you have any programs in place to incentivize returned migrants to stay in-country?

### Civil society and embassies

#### **Expected Result 3:**

- Did you receive any training course on AVRR from IOM?
  - How did you benefit from it?
- Do you feel that it enabled you to assist migrants in their reintegration?
  - What other feedback do you have?
- Do you think the IOM training made you change your priorities?
- Do you feel like you gained competency in assisting returnees?
- Does your organization get any material support for your participation in the AVRR framework?
- Are you in touch with government on these issues?
  - Did you receive separate training or joint training with the government?

**Expected Result 4:**

- What, if any, kind of collaboration do you have with IOM?
  - What are the strengths/weaknesses of your collaboration?
- What role do you play in assisting AVRR or in assisting migrants?
- What gaps would you identify in your activities or in IOMs?
- Do you have any programs in place to incentivize returned migrants to stay in-country?

## Questionnaire for IOM Staff in Ethiopia

### Introduction

- Can you introduce yourself? What is your role in the project?

### Expected Result 2

- How did you select participants for the study tour in a EUMS?
- What do you think the study tour achieved?
- Do you think that this led to significant cooperation between origin, transit and destination countries?
- How would you evaluate the coordination with the IOM Tripoli/Cairo offices?
- Do you think this led to coherent programme delivery? Please explain.
- Was the AVRR manual useful?
- If relevant, ask about reasons for failure to meet specified target.

### Expected Result 3

- How many workshops were held to establish reinsertion and reintegration networks in Ethiopia?
  - What activities were conducted during the workshops?
  - What was the feedback from participants?
  - How would you assess the impact of the workshops?
- How many training programmes promoting returnees' economic reinsertion were conducted?
  - What were the principal training programmes?
  - How would you evaluate the effectiveness of the training programmes?
  - What, if any you feedback did you receive from programme participants?
- How many beneficiaries received in-kind reintegration assistance?

### Expected Result 4

- How many migrants have returned (and been reintegrated) so far?
  - How many came from Libya?
  - How many came from Egypt?
- Can you briefly describe the reintegration process?
- Do you supervise the reintegration process of migrants on a regular basis?
  - Can you briefly describe the supervision process?
- How do you measure the success of the reintegration programme or of an individual's reintegration?
  - How would you then assess the programme's success thus far?
- Do you collaborate with NGOs, government officials and/or International Organizations within your reintegration program?
  - How would you evaluate the success of collaborating with these other actors?

**Expected Result 5**

- What was the impact of the evacuation of stranded migrants in Libya on the programme in Ethiopia?

**General**

- What do you feel has worked and what has not worked in this project?

## Question to others (NOT IOM workers) Sudan

### Government officials

#### **Expected Result 2:**

- Did you find the study tour useful?
  - Do you think it led to increased cooperation? Programme delivery? Can you give concrete examples?
- Did you have any input in the development of the SOPs and AVRR manual for the region?
  - Do you use the SOPs and AVRR manual and do you find them appropriate?
- How would you evaluate this activity?

#### **Expected Result 3**

- Were you involved in the site visits?
  - What was the intended purpose and how effective do you think the visits were?
- Were you involved in the workshops held in order to instigate ICRS establishment?
  - What activities were conducted during the workshops?
  - What was your feedback?
  - How would you assess the impact of the workshops?

#### **Expected Result 4:**

- What, if any, kind of collaboration do you have with IOM?
  - What are the strengths/weaknesses of your collaboration?
- What role do you play in assisting AVRR or in assisting migrants?
- What gaps would you identify in your activities or in IOMs?
- Do you have any programs in place to incentivize returned migrants to stay in-country?

### Civil society and embassies

#### **Expected Result 1:**

- Did you receive any training course on AVRR from IOM and how did you benefit from it?
- Did you feel that it enabled you to answer migrants' queries effectively?
- Do you think the IOM training made you change your priorities?
- Does your organization get any material support for your participation in the AVRR framework?
- Are you in touch with government on these issues?
  - Did you receive separate training or joint with the government?
- How would you assess this activity?

#### **Expected Result 3:**

- Did you receive any training course on AVRR from IOM and how did you benefit from it?
- Do you feel that it enabled you to assist migrants in their reintegration?
  - What other feedback do you have?
- Do you think the IOM training made you change your priorities?
  - Do you feel like you gained competency in assisting returnees?

- Does your organization get any material support for your participation in the AVRR framework?
- Are you in touch with government on these issues?
  - Did you receive separate training or joint training with the government?

**Expected Result 4:**

- What, if any, kind of collaboration do you have with IOM?
  - What are the strengths/weaknesses of your collaboration?
- What role do you play in assisting AVRR or in assisting migrants?
- What gaps would you identify in your activities or in IOMs?
- Do you have any programs in place to incentivize returned migrants to stay in-country?

## Questionnaire for IOM Staff in Sudan

### Introduction

- Can you introduce yourself? What is your role in the project?

### Expected Result 2

- How did you select participants for the study tour in a EUMS?
- What do you think the study tour achieved?
- Do you think that this led to significant cooperation between origin, transit and destination countries?
- How would you evaluate the coordination with the IOM Tripoli/Cairo offices?
- Do you think this led to coherent programme delivery? Please explain
- Was the AVRR manual useful?
- If relevant, ask about reasons for failure to meet specified target?

### Expected Result 3

- How many site visits did you conduct and where?
  - What was the intended purpose and how effective do you think the visits were?
- How many workshops were held in order to instigate ICRS establishment?
  - What activities were conducted during the workshops?
  - What was the feedback from participants?
  - How would you assess the impact of the workshops?
- How many beneficiaries received in-kind reintegration assistance?

### Expected Result 4

- How many migrants have returned (and been reintegrated) so far?
  - How many came from Libya?
  - How many came from Egypt?
- Can you briefly describe the reintegration process?
- Do you supervise the reintegration process of migrants on a regular basis?
  - Can you briefly describe the supervision process?
- How do you measure the success of the reintegration programme or of an individual's reintegration?
  - How would you then assess the programme's success thus far?
- Do you collaborate with NGOs, government officials and/or International Organizations within your reintegration program?
  - How would you evaluate the success of collaborating with these other actors?

**Expected Result 5**

- What was the impact of the evacuation of stranded migrants in Libya on the programme in Sudan?

**General**

- What do you feel has worked and what has not worked in this project?