

IOM

Peace and Stability Quick Impact Fund Phase II

End of programme evaluation report

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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ADRA	Adventist Development and Relief Agency
CAHW	Community Animal Health Worker
CBO	Community Based Organization
CCOSS	Care For Children and Old in South Sudan
CMS	Change Maker Sudan
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CPD	Center for Peace and Development, University of Juba
DDR	Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration
EU	European Union
FCA	Finn Church Aid
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
GAA	German Agro Action / Welthungerhilfe
GBV	Gender-Based Violence
GOSS	Government of South Sudan
GPAA	Greater Pibor Administrative Area
HTPVK	Holy Trinity Peace Village Kuron
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IcSP	Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace
IcS	Instrument for Stability
INCODE	Initiative for Community Development
IP	Implementing Partner
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IRW	Islamic Relief Worldwide
KII	Key Individual Interview
NCE	No-cost Extension
NGO	None-governmental organisation
NNGO	National None-governmental organisation
PMT	Programme Management Team
PRC	Peace and Reconciliation Commissions
PSQIF I	Peace and Stability Quick Impact Fund Phase I
PSQIF II	Peace and Stability Quick Impact Fund Phase II
PSU	Programme Support Unit South Sudan
RMU	Resource Management Unit
SMARD	Solidarity Ministries Africa
SPLA	Sudan People's Liberation Army
SPLM-iO	Sudan People's Liberation Movement in Opposition
TOCH	The Organization for Children's Harmony
UNMISS	United Nations Mission in South Sudan
VSF	Vétérinaires Sans Frontières / Veterinaries without Borders (VSF-Suisse)
WFP	World Food Programme
WMC	Water Management Committee

Summary

This evaluation discusses the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability of the European Union funded Peace and Stability Quick Impact Fund Phase II programme which was implemented by the Transition and Recovery Department of the International Organization for Migration South Sudan over a 15 months period in 2015 and 2016. The evaluation found that the programme's community-based peacebuilding and conflict mitigation strategies were critical in supporting national and international non-governmental organizations and community-based organizations to implement stabilization projects in remote and conflict-prone locations in South Sudan. The programme identified relevant key drivers of conflict, successfully supported the implementation of projects that address these key conflict drivers in an effective and efficient manner, and overall had a positive impact, albeit at the local level, on the vast majority of beneficiaries. In spite of the deteriorating political, security and economic environment, peacebuilding programmes remain relevant to achieving community resilience and contributing to recovery and reconciliation in South Sudan.

Introduction

Identifying, mitigating and addressing the root causes of forced migration is a core component of resolving displacement, promoting peace, ensuring a sustainable recovery and building resilience. The Transition and Recovery Division (TRD) of the International Organization for Migration (IOM) is responsible for overseeing programming to assist in reducing and preventing the impacts of, and recovering from, the longer-term consequences of crises, in particular its effect on human mobility and displacement and in ensuring conditions are conducive to meeting the complex needs of a sustainable return and reintegration. The country level responsible unit in IOM South Sudan is the Transition and Recovery Department (TRD).

IOM established the South Sudan mission after the country gained independence in 2011. With an operational presence in southern Sudan since 2005, IOM has gained extensive experience in post-conflict transition and recovery programming within the area. The IOM South Sudan TRD programming utilizes community-based peacebuilding and conflict mitigation strategies to foster communication and accountability within and between all sectors of society. TRD initiatives are designed to promote dialogue and boost local economies by facilitating trade and income generation, constructing or rehabilitating key infrastructure, promoting livelihoods and small business start-ups, and raising awareness on the benefits of peace. IOM actively encourages the participation of beneficiaries, stressing the importance of peace for development and the necessity of assuming responsibility for the sustainability of projects, within a framework of cooperation with government institutions to build community resilience and ownership. TRD activities ensure the continuity of humanitarian interventions while aiming for an effective and sustainable transition to recovery and development.

Peace and Stability Quick Impact Fund

From January 2012 to August 2014 IOM South Sudan's TRD Unit, in partnership with the European Union (EU) and through the Instrument for Stability (IfS)/Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP), implemented the "Peace and Stability Quick Impact Fund (PSQIF I) for the South-North Border Areas of South Sudan". Under this umbrella programme, IOM disbursed funds to Community Based Organizations, (CBOs) and national and international Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) to implement quick impact grants with the aims to: (1) deliver direct peace dividends to local communities and promote community peace dialogues; and (2) prevent the escalation of existing conflicts through promoting the enforcement of international human rights standards, supporting peace dialogues and facilitating peace and reconciliation community initiatives.

To capitalize on the positive changes on communities resulting from the PSQIF, the EU and IOM partnered again to implement a second phase. Implementation of the PSQIF II commenced in May 2015 and ended in December 2016. PSQIF II supported seven national and four international NGOs in implementing peace-building projects. Similar to the first phase, PSQIF II prioritized areas affected by continuous crisis, namely Warrab, Unity, Upper Nile, Western Bahr el Ghazal, and Jonglei. In October 2015, the EU requested IOM to consider a project in Eastern Equatoria. Subsequently, IOM was authorized by the EU to extend the coverage of the PSQIF II programme to Eastern Equatoria. (Annex I: PSQIF II Map)

Approach and methodology

The purpose of this summative evaluation of the PSQIF II Phase was to determine the extent to which the PSQIF II programme was implemented according to plan, determine the contributions made towards reducing tensions and strengthening positive relations between communities and identifying any lasting effects towards long-term stability in project locations.

The evaluation criteria selected to assess the impact of the activities of the PSQIF II programme were:

- *Relevance* is concerned with assessing whether the programme is in line with local needs and priorities;
- *Effectiveness* measures the extent to which an activity achieves its objectives;
- *Efficiency* is the the extent to which the costs of a development intervention can be justified by its results. Further, taking into account delivery of inputs, contribution of project beneficiaries to the project, expenditures and the overall cost-efficiency of the project.
- *Impact* is concerned with the totality of the effects of a development intervention, positive and negative, intended and unintended.
- *Sustainability* assesses if the programme was tailored to increasing ownership and accountability of beneficiaries and stakeholders. Further, the continuation or longevity of benefits from the intervention after the completion of the intervention.

Combined, these criteria lead to the understanding of the overall impact on the changes in beneficiaries’ lives brought about by the intervention, i.e. “the systematic analysis of the lasting or significant changes – positive or negative, intended or not – in people’s lives brought about by an action or a series of actions” (Roche, Chris: *Impact Assessment for Development Agencies: Learning to value Change*, 1999).

This evaluation simultaneously looks at the programme level as well project levels through the above criteria. (Annex II: PSQIF II Evaluation Approach)

This report is a result of field visits conducted by a two-member evaluation team of the IOM South Sudan Project Support Unit (PSU) to the project sites of ten Implementing Partners (IPs) in December 2016, and February and March 2017. The evaluation team employed qualitative methods targeting project beneficiaries, IPs’ staff involved in the projects, other stakeholders, including government representatives, and IOM staff involved in the programme’s implementation. Tools deployed were key informant interviews (KII) with IOM staff, IPs’ staff and stakeholders. Beneficiaries were approached with focus groups discussions (FGDs), and a small number were also interviewed. The evaluation also relied on first-hand direct observations at the project locations and document review.

The respondents

The evaluation team carried out a total of 29 semi-structured interviews and 23 FGDs (Annex III: PSQIF II Interview Participants), as below:

Type	Male	Female	Total Respondents
Individual interviews with IPs	26	2	28
FGDs	197	68	260
Individual interviews with stakeholders	4	0	4
Interviews with IOM staff	6	1	7
Total No. of Interviews	233	71	299

Table 1: Number of interviews and respondents disaggregated according to gender

Limitations

Any evaluation is shaped by constraints and limitations. Challenges this evaluation faced include:

Time constraints: Due to time and personnel constraints, a sample survey of the impact of the interventions on the lives of the beneficiaries was not possible. The evaluation here relies on observations.

Security: Only ten of the eleven IPs project sites were visited. The project of the Care for Children and Old Age South Sudan (CCOSS) NGO, located in Jonglei, could not be visited by the evaluation team due to insecurity in that area at the time of evaluation. Another security issue the evaluation team observed due to the current political and security context of South Sudan, is that some officials at the locations visited sent out 'spies' that followed the team while they were moving around including to project sites and may have mingled into the FGD groups. This had an impact on people's ability to speak freely and may have influenced their responses especially as when asked about inter- and intra-communal conflicts.

Personal limitations: With regards to the interviewers, one of the major difficulties is the risk of distortion of information and data gathered due to personal biases. These biases can emanate from the inability to understand the respondents' intentions or communication with them, or a wrong approach to the respondents. The evaluation team also relied on local translators which may have contributed to further complications.

The remainder of this document is set out in the following sections in line with the criteria of the PSQIF Phase II evaluation: relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability; Recommendations arising from analysis of the key findings, for future programming; and Conclusion.

PSQIF II project background

Overall objective

The overall objective of the PSQIF II programme was to promote community stabilization and peace initiatives among communities along the Sudan – South Sudan border (Northern Bahr el Ghazal, Warrab, Unity and Upper Nile), Jonglei and the Wunlit Triangle (Warrab, Unity and Lakes) through community stabilization interventions.

Specific objective

The specific objective was to respond to community needs by delivering quick impact peacebuilding projects in partnership with national, state and local actors, NGOs and CBOs.

Expected results

Result 1: The PSQIF II Grants enable peace promotion/community stabilization initiatives in conflict-prone communities in the Sudan-South Sudan border areas, the Wunlit Triangle and/or Jonglei.

Result 2: The civil society and public administration's capacity to manage peacebuilding projects is strengthened.

Result 3: Civil society actors, as well as humanitarian and development actors, are enabled to implement stability/humanitarian/development activities in areas affected by the conflict through support to re-establish a common operational base.

Projects

Projects were managed by the Programme Management Team (PMT) in Juba. Projects were selected according to the proposals' focus on addressing some of the key drivers of conflict, in accordance with results of the community consultations, assessments and analysis. Conclusions drawn from these

identified the following as key drivers of conflict: 1) Prevalence of arms possessed by young men; 2) Failure to establish rule of law; 3) Cattle raiding; 4) Criminality; 5) Competition for grassland and water; and 6) Inefficient dialogue between the parties. In Jonglei the limited capacity of the new Greater Pibor Administrative Area (GPAA) was also identified as a key factor driving conflict.

NGOs and CBOs were encouraged to apply for projects under various thematic windows, including but not limited to:

- Media, community outreach and awareness campaigns (including synergies with the IcSP partner Search for Common Ground);
- Promotion of constructive peaceful dialogues and negotiations;
- Equitable distribution of small scale livelihoods projects and resource projects, small scale community inter-communal conflict mitigation and small scale reconciliation infrastructure projects.

The project design was guided by a pre-defined structure specifically designed to focus on reducing conflict through media outreach, small scale conflict reduction in communities, or administration, or security, infrastructure, developing peace markets and trade, alongside supporting the local traditional authorities through conflict resolution and peace dialogues. All selected projects were designed to serve as mechanisms to stimulate inclusive, comprehensive dialogue so conflict could be addressed and resolved peacefully.

The grant awardees/IPs were initially identified either through calls for proposals, or through direct awards to qualified partners with demonstrated capacity to deliver the intended results. A transparent and non-discriminatory process to select projects was led by a PSQIF II Advisory Board set up under the programme.

The grant mechanism was designed to be flexible in order to address stabilization needs in an environment prone to frequent and unpredictable changes. This flexibility allowed for the selection of the most effective interventions in line with the overarching goal of the EU's peacebuilding and stabilization efforts, and the overall objectives of PSQIF II, while taking into account the evolution of the fluid political and security environment in which it operated.

Key Findings

Relevance

An intervention's relevance is measured by the extent to which an intervention addresses the needs as identified by the targeted beneficiaries. The evaluation looked into: to what extent the needs of beneficiaries and stakeholders were analyzed throughout the response and if the programme and projects adapted to changing dynamics; how the programming was informed by the context, including gender, conflict analysis, do no harm, and the local environments; how relevant the programme and projects were regarding the beneficiary requirements, local contexts and needs of women and men in target communities; to what extent the objectives of the programme and projects were valid; and if the approach and technical solutions were appropriate for the context.

The PSQIF II programme identified national non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and international NGOs by establishing a criteria system by which submitted proposals were evaluated. The 5-member PSQIF II Advisory Board, including lecturers at the University of Juba and members of the state governments' Peace and Reconciliation Commissions (PRCs), was formed to contribute to conflict analysis, facilitate an understanding of government policies and efforts in the area of peacebuilding, participate in the project selection process, and provide continuous guidance on conflict resolution during the projects' implementation phases. The PMT in Juba identified potential stakeholders for the PSQIF II Advisory Board and commenced work with them in February 2015. Those contacted included the South Sudan Committee for National Healing, Peace and Reconciliation (CNHPR), the Peace and Reconciliation Commissions (PRC), the Center for Peace and Development of the University of Juba and the National NGO Forum. These institutions were targeted mainly due to their respective roles in promoting and advocating for peace and reconciliation in South Sudan. The PSQIF II Programme Manager together with the PSQIF II Conflict Sensitivity Programme Specialist met with the various institutions separately to explain the project objective, expected outcomes and the role of the proposed Advisory Board. In this meeting, it was agreed that the Board would serve as a 'technical body' to review and evaluate projects which qualified for PSQIF II grants. The meeting also agreed on the criteria for selecting projects which included meeting the overall objective of PSQIF II and expected outcomes (i.e. reducing inter-communal violence, promoting peacebuilding and intercommunal reconciliation processes). The evaluation found that with this set up, the PSQIF II programme achieved a great deal of relevance by in-cooperating local expert knowledge in the areas of peacebuilding and reconciliation. The establishment of the committee was an important step in ensuring community involvement and local ownership, to confirm that the projects address real needs; and warrant sustainability beyond the project timeframe. The initial discussions between the PMT and the PSQIF II Advisory Board contributed substantially to the selection of appropriate and relevant project proposals. At the project implementation level, six out of the eleven IP projects set up local PSQIF II Steering Committees to monitor and support the implementation of the projects. The committees were comprised of local leaders and Chiefs, women and youth representatives, local NGO partners and IOM project staff.

All IPs conducted conflict analysis and needs assessments with the target communities. The IPs involved partners including state governments, community leaders and traditional chiefs, women and youth leaders and other stakeholders, in conflict analysis before the commencement of their projects. However, document review revealed a great difference in the quality of the consultations and the depth of the analysis conducted by the individual IPs. Two of the IPs did not equitably involve women in the community consultations. One IP, implementing a project along the Sudan-South Sudan border, pointed out that the migrants from Sudan, by custom, do not accept the involvement of women in public discussions. The

second IP stated that the key participants of conflicts were male youth, and involving women in the mediation was not accepted by the traditions in the area of implementation.

During the evaluation, the single most cited driver of inter- and intra-community conflicts identified in the community consultations was the lack of drinking water for both humans and their livestock. The second most often identified cause of conflict was stated as the movement of cattle, particularly causing conflicts between farming and pastoral communities. The third most common cause of conflict as named in FGDs with beneficiaries was the lack of livelihoods opportunities and unemployment, particularly amongst the youth. Other causes of conflict established in FGDs were lack of interaction between the different communities, lack of education of the population and cultural practices such as elopement.

Beneficiaries and IPs alike, found peace dialogues and conferences and similar peacebuilding events relevant in their contexts as well as supportive of longstanding traditions of negotiations in inter- and intra-communal conflicts. Further relevant components of the PSQIF II programme funded projects as stated by the beneficiaries were livelihoods training and trainings in animal health. Some components of the projects were only of minor importance to the communities. In FGDs beneficiaries stated that the introduction of vegetable farming, training in cattle auctioning, and road rehabilitation were of less significance to their lives and/or that they did not see any direct benefits from these activities to their lives.

A few components of the projects were thought pertinent during community consultations but were not taken up by the projects. These include the construction of prisons, police posts, an office for cattle auctioneers and the provision of finance management trainings to the project beneficiaries. IPs and IOM staff referred to the success of prison construction under the PSQIF I programme, and confirmed that these constructions are still in use. However, after consultations with the EU, no prisons or police offices were constructed with funding from the PSQIF II programme.

Moreover, in the FGDs conducted by the evaluation team, respondents named water boreholes/water points, health facilities and schools as most appropriate projects they would expect from NGOs, CBOs and donors.

In addition, IOM conducted extensive infrastructure needs assessments in GPAA at the beginning of the PSQIF II program. This was meant to build on the momentum of the achievements of the previous PSQIF I programme which contributed to the establishment of GPAA after activities assisted the facilitation of a peace agreement between the Government of South Sudan (GoSS) and the GPAA-based Cobra Faction in May 2014. The main interest and target during the PSQIF II programme was to deliver peace dividends to the people of GPAA through various interventions including infrastructure projects. Based on assessment findings, the peace dividends were delivered in Pibor County by constructing a footbridge connecting Pibor town with the main market; and building of six classrooms, four new classrooms at Pibor Primary School for Girls and two new classrooms at Pibor Primary School for Boys, also in Pibor town. These activities were directly implemented by IOM PSQIF II programme staff.

As a result of decades of civil war/war for independence as well as geographical isolation, the vast majority of NGOs and CBOs in South Sudan are weak in capacity and lack well qualified and skilled staff. To address this, the PSQIF II programme provided IPs with capacity building focusing on organizational administration, finance and programming. Every IP was provided with a one-day in-house financial reporting training by the IOM Resource Management Unit (RMU). All IPs stated that the RMU training was useful and helped them understand IOM financial rules and regulations as well as financial reporting requirements. In addition, the PSQIF II programme funded two trainings on conflict sensitive approaches to conflict conducted by an external provider, and one finance management training, also provided by an external provider. The trainings on conflict sensitivity took three days each and the duration of the finance

management training was one week. All IPs, except for one international IP, confirmed that the PSQIF II programme contributed to the strengthening of their capacity in the field of conflict mitigation and resolution, as well as finance management.

NGOs and CBOs operating in remote areas in South Sudan face substantial challenges due to lack of infrastructure, including accommodation and office buildings, lack of reliable communication means, and lack of electricity, fuel etc. Consequently, the PSQIF II programme's aim to support the operations of NGOs and CBOs in hard to reach areas affected by instability through the establishment of a common operational base was relevant. The PSQIF II programme not only constructed the humanitarian hub in Pibor town through direct implementation, but also installed solar power for two IPs; supported the installation of internet for one IP; supported staff and office costs for one IP; and provided logistical support whenever required. All IPs, except Finn Church Aid (FCA), confirmed that this support through the PSQIF II programme substantially contributed to their ability to operate in their respective project locations.

In addition to this, IOM, particularly its sub-office located in Wau, Western Bahr el Ghazal, provided ad hoc support to the IPs in project development, project implementation, resource management, and operational and financial reporting throughout the projects' implementation cycles. All IPs, except for one international IP, stated that this not only improved their capacity to manage and effectively implement the projects under the PSQIF II programme, but also significantly contributed to the success of their respective project.

At the lowest level of governance, the Payam, there was close collaboration with traditional Chiefs. Traditional Chiefs participated in the community consultations as well as peace conferences and dialogues. All Chiefs the evaluation team met approved of the efforts and methods of the PSQIF II programme to stabilize communities and bring peace. Traditional Chiefs seem to be more accepted by communities as regards to local conflict mediation. While the buy-in from traditional Chiefs was important, the relevance of support from the PSQIF II programme may not be concurrent. As one Chief stated, traditional Chiefs are already organized to address community issues and mediate conflicts. To quote, "It made no big difference to my capacity, I have been doing this (i.e. Chief role and conflict mediation) for 10 years and will continue." (*John Jur, Chief of the Bongo, Tonj town, Warrab*).

The PSQIF II programme supported eleven IPs to implement projects providing technical solutions as identified in the needs assessments and community consultations. As mentioned above, particularly the drilling and/or rehabilitation of boreholes addresses a key driver of conflict which is the lack of water and conflicts that arise from this. Nonetheless, some recommendations resulting from community consultations were not in-cooperated in the projects. The PSQIF II programme enabled the implementation of peacebuilding projects in 25 counties across Jonglei, Warrab, Northern Bahr el Ghazal, Unity and Eastern Equatoria. The evaluation found the objectives of the PSQIF II programme and all eleven projects relevant to the context and specific local environments. All project locations selected were remote areas prone to inter- and/or intra- communal conflicts and chronically underserved, if at all. Ten of the eleven IPs stated that their work would not have been possible without the support provided by the EU through PSQIF II programme.

Effectiveness

The effectiveness of an intervention is measured by the extent to which it has achieved its objectives. The evaluation looked into: to what extent the programme's and projects' objectives were achieved; what the major factors influencing the achievement / non-achievement of the objectives were; what the main obstacles encountered during programme and project implementation were; and what immediate benefits the target groups gained from the programme and project outputs.

The PSQIF II programme effectively addressed one of the major drivers of conflict, lack of water, by funding the drilling and/or rehabilitation of boreholes and water points. All beneficiaries of projects that drilled/rehabilitated boreholes unanimously agreed that this most effectively addressed their greatest need. In addition, water was found to be a key factor in support of peace dialogues. "Shared access to resources bring people together in a positive way, shared interest has to be shown to them so they get along." (*Commissioner of the PRC Luka Luach Nhial, Waradoth*). Beneficiaries as well as IPs agreed that the sharing of water constitutes a tangible result of peace dialogues for all parties as exemplified by the VSF project along the Sudan-South Sudan border.

However, depending on the technology used, the degree of usefulness of water points and boreholes varied. In one case, the construction of a natural dam, resulted in the sharing of water by humans and animals which puts humans at risk of disease. A better technological solution could have been found under expert advice of the PSQIF II Programme Engineer.

The livelihoods trainings provided showed mixed results as regards to effectiveness. All groups of beneficiaries, except those that received training as cattle auctioneers, expressed gratitude to the IPs for the trainings provided. The vast majority of the beneficiaries stated liking the trainings because they gave them the opportunity to improve their skills, meet and interact with people with whom they would otherwise not have had the opportunity to meet. However, beneficiaries reported difficulties with setting themselves up due to lack of required supplies on the market such as livestock vaccination as well as start-up kits being too small to sustain them for a sufficient length of time until they could independently sustain their new livelihoods.

Peace dialogues and events integrated members of local Peace Committees as well as local authorities. This effectively provided local people with the capacity to resolve local conflicts. Members of peace committees established by the PSQIF II programme as well as participants of peace dialogues/conferences and similar peace events emphasized that these activities and interactions lead to personal relations that contributed to the reduction of conflicts between the groups. An immediate benefit of the peace dialogues and conferences were successful social agreements on resource sharing and negotiations for the return of stolen cattle and the payment of blood money for several individuals that had been killed in recent conflicts. Other factors positively contributing to the decrease of inter- and intra-communal conflict referred to particularly in interviews with IPs and local Chiefs, include local governments' efforts, for example along the South-Sudan–Sudan border. Here the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was one factor to which the reduction of conflict was attributed to. In contrast, in some programme areas local government support was lacking or even counteracting peacebuilding efforts, for example projects implementing peace conferences and similar events were undermined by authorities not allowing the movement of conference participants. Generally, it could not be ascertained if the peace dialogues funded by the PSQIF II programme were the key factors leading to less inter- and intra-communal conflict as too many other important factors also played a role. Another issue with the peace dialogues, as raised by one IP, is that most peace conferences and similar activities focus on relatively urban areas for example in Aweil town or other state capitals, rather than taking place in the cattle camps

where the conflicts actually arise. Only two IPs, Initiative for Community Development (INCODE) and the Islamic Relief Worldwide (IRW), each held a conflict mitigation training in a cattle camp.

Project activities that were less successful or failed include the training of a group of 20 men in cattle auctioning. The training beneficiaries stated that the course did not constitute a proper livestock training and that they had requested other types of training, including finance management from the IP Solidarity Ministries Africa (SMARD). The livestock crushers constructed by Veterinaries without Borders (VSF-Suisse) were also not as successful as they are traditionally not used, consequently they were abandoned by the communities. VSF-Suisse achieved extraordinary high numbers in livestock vaccination. However, the evaluation found that the VSF-Suisse team, experienced in veterinary medicine, found it difficult to implement the peacebuilding component of the project.

Another project activity that did not yield the expected outcome was the introduction of vegetable gardening. The IP Islamic Relief Worldwide (IRW) distributed seeds and taught women groups how to plant communal gardens. However, beneficiaries reported that from the seedlings planted only about 50% yielded crop. The beneficiaries named issues with cattle trampling over the communal garden as well as insufficient water as the garden was to be kept during the dry season, contrary the typical planting period.

Two of the eleven IPs received direct supervision from IOM PSQIF II programme staff in construction and direct supervision of infrastructure project implementation. These were the HTPVK and INTERSOS. In both cases the PSQIF II programme substantially improved the capacity of the IP to operate under difficult conditions in remote locations. The HTPVK, through the support of the PSQIF II programme, is now accessible from Kapoeta, approximately 250km south-east, throughout the year which strengthens its ability to function and consequently implement its peace-building and stabilization work focusing on the inter-communal conflict between the Toposa and the Jie. The only other actor in the entire area is the Carter Center which focuses on the eradication of the Guinea worm.

The PSQIF II programme handed over the humanitarian hub in Pibor town which was built under the PSQIF I programme to INTERSOS. Under the PSQIF II programme INTERSOS was provided with facility management trainings, solar panels were installed, and a latrine and a generator house were constructed. INTERSOS continues to run the hub successfully and has recovered from the fighting that erupted in Pibor town in February 2017 leading to the looting of the humanitarian hub. The hub is one of three in Pibor but has standards well above the other two humanitarian hubs as regards water borehole, electricity, conference facility and internet. However, as the humanitarian footprint in the GAA increases, other humanitarian actors are constructing hubs, but accommodation and office spaces are still far from being able to meet the demand.

Overall the PSQIF II programme meet its objective of enabling peace promotion/community stabilization initiatives. Effectiveness was achieved through a project proposal selection process that ensured that viable projects were chosen and the provision of trainings and continued technical guidance to the NGOs had a positive effect on their capacity to manage medium sized grants and effectively implement peacebuilding projects. Obstacles encountered where the remoteness of the project locations, lack of communication means and the wider political destabilization of the country during the course of programme implementation.

Efficiency

Efficiency measures the extent to which the costs of an intervention can be justified by its results. The evaluation looked into: how effective the overall management of the project was; what factors contributed to or impeded effective programme management; if adequate human and financial resources were available and if this was the most effective use of resources; if activities were carried out in a timely manner; if the programme management systems and processes functioned well; what systems worked well i.e. staffing resources and structures, logistics, finance, and management support; and what were the contributions of targeted beneficiaries and IPs.

Overall the management of the PSQIF II programme was designed to be slim and flexible with the PMT based in Juba and most programme staff readily available to the IPs in the IOM Wau sub-office. When asked about the support provided, interactions and responsiveness from IOM, all IPs responded that they found IOM staff helpful, flexible and accessible on issues pertaining to their respective projects. This was particularly so at the IOM Wau sub-office. Respondents reported that IOM Wau sub-office staff were always available and provided them with good technical and administrative advice and hands-on support regarding, for example, procurement and logistics. IOM staff provided good feedback by, for example, sharing reports and information. IPs named IOM security regulations as pertaining to IOM staff as hindering sufficient and prompt field visits of IOM staff to their project sites. Generally, the evaluation found that the Juba-based PMT paid relatively few visits to the sub-office and project sites.

This evaluation did not look into alternative means of effecting similar outputs or compare this peacebuilding programme to other peacebuilding programmes in comparable contexts to establish cost-efficiency. Briefly, the most common hypothesis is that decentralized and slim management structures lead to cost-efficiency. The PSQIF II programme did have a light foot-print and, as with other IOM programmes and projects, low overhead costs. But it could not be ascertained if a centralized system of delivery would have had similar or divergent results. It was however found that the light foot-print did not always result in sufficient technical oversight of IPs.

The evaluation found the PSQIF II Advisory Board, established to select proposals that would successfully implement projects to achieve the wider aims of the PSQIF II programme and provide guidance throughout the programme cycle on issues of conflict resolution in the context of South Sudan, was only functional in the initial phase of the programme. The Advisory Board met four times from April to October 2015, mainly to review and approve project proposals. It could not be ascertained if the breakdown of the Advisory Board during the course of project implementation had any negative impacts on the programme's and projects' efficient management. However, the first selection process was reportedly slow. The evaluation also found a gap between the national and local level. The local PSQIF II Advisory Committees were involved in project launching ceremonies and peace dialogue events, led and carried out by the IP to ensure local ownership. As described by one IP in an interview, the engagement with communities and local authorities showed that some committees were more actively involved than others – communities with active local leaders, authorities and community leaders showed higher levels of participation and engagement than those with less active leaders. While differences in engagement did not result in significant obstacles to project implementation, IPs expressed that they would have liked to have a discussion forum with other IPs to share experiences. Only two, out of five planned, PSQIF II Steering Committee meetings at local level were held as a result of inaccessible roads during the rains and lack of funding allocated to the transportation of committee members.

The evaluation found that the PSQIF II programme faced a series of challenges which had negative effects on its efficiency. External circumstances impeding the programme's and projects' efficiency include the isolation of the project sites with nearly all supplies being sourced from Juba, or from Uganda and Kenya. Other challenges included the limited number of available contractors at remote project locations; the temporarily, unavailability of fuel at some project locations; inaccessibility of roads, particularly during the rainy season, and lack of communication network coverage at most project sites. Additionally, the July 2016 crises lead to the relocation of IOM international staff out of South Sudan as well as some IPs staff relocating themselves to safer areas in the country, consequently, the suspension of all ongoing project activities for approximately four weeks.

All NGOs named inflation as a major factor negatively affecting efficiency. Cost-efficiency was most of all affected by inflation as the political, security and economic situation in South Sudan deteriorated. Inflation was a major factor diminishing the budgets of all IPs, in January 2015 the SSP:USD rate was 3.1:1, by December 2016 the rate was 73:1. Inflation in some cases lead to the cutting of selected project outputs by IPs from the original project proposals as grant amounts could no longer cover all project costs.

All IPs cited delays in payments by IOM as the greatest obstacle to project implementation. Delays in fund disbursement by IOM was named as the sole highest risk IPs were exposed to.

Several IPs requested IOM for a no-cost extension (NCE) at the end of their projects. Five IPs obtained a NCE because they were not able to implement on time either due to delays in fund distribution by IOM, rains, or localized crisis that erupted in their areas of implementation. In the case of the HTPVK, issues with the sub-contractors hired for works lead to the issuance of an NCE. It is noteworthy that the contractor was not selected through a competitive bid, but through the HTPVK proposition to the EU.

To support a sufficient number of IPs, the maximum grant amount was set at USD150, 000 per IP. Project budgets were judged as realistic for the activities to be implemented. However, some IPs did not have the capacity or the experience to implement grants of this size. Consequently, several IPs had to return funds upon completion of their projects.

Several IPs stated that their infrastructure projects commenced too late, which lead to implementation delays. This was due to late signing of the IP-IOM agreements leading to late implementation start-up and funds disbursement, and lead-on complications as the project cycle was not attuned to the weather cycle. The schedules for peace dialogues were also not in line with the seasons as the dialogues required transport participants.

IPs named insecurity as another key factor impeding project efficiency as they could not always access project sites or facilitate the movement of training and peace dialogue participants. Insecurity also prevented the PSQIF II programme team from efficiently monitoring project sites.

Several IPs attempted increasing the efficiency of their projects through the use of available local resources and the mobilization of community labour. The HTPVK is a case in point. The community-based labour component of this project included: building drainage systems, piling stones, and the building of culvert gabions. This part of the project was envisaged to not only address the issue of drought in the area but was also to bring various communities together for a common cause and ensure ownership of the project. Communities were to receive food for work to alleviate the suffering of the drought affected population. However, the evaluation team found that there had been a miscommunication between the HTPVK and the communities, leading to many communities collecting stones and placing them along the road. Only one community, which had been mobilized correctly was compensated for its work accordingly. A result of this misunderstanding between the project and the communities was that erroneously mobilized communities looted the food rub hall of the HTPVK. Further, the communities reported anger and mistrust toward implementing partners (IOM, HTPVK, Adventists Development and Relief Agency

(ADRA), WFP and contractors). Another IP that deployed community labour was the CCOSS in its market clean-up activities.

The evaluation found that inefficiencies were compounded by institutional structures of both IOM and the IPs, and, at times, erroneous project management decisions. Lack of sufficient PSQIF II programme PMT responses to above mentioned issues lead to delays and other complications. Overall, project resources, in terms of human resources and finance, may have been more efficiently used. The evaluation concludes that efficiency in project implementation was only partially achieved.

Impact

Impact measures the totality of the effects of an intervention, positive and negative, intended and unintended. The evaluation looked into: what changes to the beneficiaries' lives resulted from the programme interventions; if these changes have been positive or negative, planned or unplanned; how many people approximately have been affected/reached through the programme and projects; and what factors and processes explain the changes generated as a result of the programme support.

The evaluation found that the single greatest impact of the PSQIF II programme on the beneficiaries' lives is the provision of safe water. Other components of the PSQIF II programme funded projects, had a relatively small impact on beneficiaries' lives as compared to the drilling/rehabilitation of boreholes and water points. Before the PSQIF II programme funded drilling/rehabilitation of boreholes and water points the beneficiaries reported using hand-dug wells with low yields and often not potable water causing illness. Several communities reported migrating to other locations due to lack of water. A total of 20 boreholes and water points were drilled and 20 rehabilitated and 1 dam constructed under the PSQIF II programme. It is difficult to establish the number of users for each borehole/water point as the population density varies across the project sites, populations practice transhumance and travellers pass by. Further, the newly drilled or rehabilitated water boreholes lead to people coming to settle in the areas. Based on a conservative estimate of one borehole providing water to about 800 to 1,000 people, the water points and boreholes now provide water to approximately 32,000 to 40,000 beneficiaries. This figure is based on the information of communities during FGDs about the sizes of their homesteads and the sizes of their neighbouring communities as well as document review.

During the evaluation, the IOM team visited 7 of the boreholes and water points drilled/rehabilitated and conducted FGDs with the communities living near the boreholes and members of the Water Management Committees (WMC) established through the support of the PSQIF II programme or having received refresher trainings through the programme's funds. In most, particularly remote, locations the PSQIF II programme funded sub-grantee/IP was the only provider of borehole(s)/water points. The IOM team observed community members using the boreholes to collect water for their families, as well as livestock being brought to the water points. The IOM team also observed that communities for whom the PSQIF II programme had provided water points and boreholes were also willing to share this water for example with travellers passing through the area.

Communities stated that prior to the construction of the boreholes, the women in the communities had to walk for hours to fetch water for their families. Consequently, children were left alone at home risking injuries due to lack of supervision; in some areas women were subject to harassment while fetching water a far distance from their homesteads. Benefits of the boreholes as cited by the communities include that

the women no longer need to walk for hours to fetch water and can spend more time on other activities. They can now better watch over their children and accidents amongst children while their mothers are away fetching water reduced. An additional benefit of the availability of borehole water as reported by communities is that they can now use water for hygienic purposes such as bathing and washing clothes. Other uses of the water were stated as brick making and the growing of vegetable gardens. Other aspects appreciated were that community members can now keep their cattle closer to their homes as water is available which makes the cattle less susceptible to raiding. Due to the newly rehabilitated/drilled boreholes communities reported not needing to move their cattle anymore, which is one cause of conflict when cattle trample over other communities' gardens. Some communities reported having moved back to the area after the PSQIF II programme supported project drilled/rehabilitated the borehole or water point. All communities reported no issues with the sharing of water sources. They also stated that generally there was a decrease in fighting and conflict over water sources.

Several communities raised issues of the potential increase of conflict due, particularly over newly drilled/rehabilitated boreholes and water points, to perceptions of skewed support. For example, if some communities were provided with water while neighbouring communities were not receiving any such assistance, communities feared that this could lead to conflict over the resource. Communities also expressed fear that the unguided usage of the water points and/or boreholes would cause rifts and arguments within the community, particularly if the water levels dropped as a result of over usage. Communities also reported an increase of the population in the area due to the availability of water and stated that the boreholes are becoming insufficient as a consequence.

As mentioned above under Effectiveness, the impact of interventions that provided livelihoods trainings was mixed. In total 55 young men and 26 young women were trained in food processing, 20 men were trained in cattle auctioneering, and 50 fishermen/women were trained. In total 75 men and eight women were trained as Community Animal Health Workers (CAHW). Thirty women were trained in keeping poultry auxiliaries. The evaluation found that trainings had greatest impact on the beneficiaries' lives when they built on already existing skills and livelihoods practices. For example the fishermen and fisherwomen trained appreciated the trainings because they enabled them to use better and more modern fishing techniques as compared to the traditional ones they had been using prior to the PSQIF II programme supported trainings. Trainings that built on already existing practices have the advantage that a quick and rapid intervention such as a refresher and skills update yields an improvement in skills, while a training that introduces completely new skills may take longer to actually have an effect on the beneficiaries' livelihoods. Further, cultural attitudes and practices may also slow down the engagement in new livelihoods or hinder taking them up altogether. Another decisive factor was the provision of start-up kits. Livelihoods projects that provided sufficient start-up kits for beneficiaries were somewhat successful when beneficiaries utilized these well, more successful were participants who also had some savings of their own to invest. In the case of livelihoods trainings provided by the FCA, it is noteworthy that more women than men set-up small scale businesses after completing the livelihoods training in food processing. The evaluation team met with women who continue to run small tea houses successfully. Women who had participated in the training but not set up a small scale business nevertheless stated that they benefited because they could use the skills in their family homes. Male participants stated that their start-up kits quickly depleted, and they had to give up the newly acquired occupation.

Livelihoods training focusing on animal health also had a major impact on the beneficiaries as well as livestock health in the respective area. The selected beneficiaries had received previous trainings in animal health, hence the short intervention built on already existing knowledge and skills. Beneficiaries also stated that the trainings contributed substantially to the animal health in their areas as they share their skills and assist local livestock keepers. However, most women who participated in the auxiliary training

reported that chicken are very expensive and that they cannot afford to keep chicken. Those women who did manage to keep chicken reported that the sale of chicken supported them to provide for their children.

As mentioned above under Effectiveness, the evaluation met with a women's group that had received training in gardening and received seeds, however their garden was in disuse. Besides the issue of cattle trampling over the garden and the lack of water cited by the women's group, the failure of this activity may be due to the fact that the growing of vegetables may not have high cultural value attached to it and would require a change of diet. The evaluation team, however did not visit any other such project activity therefore a generalization cannot be made. Nevertheless, while travelling in the area the team observed several World Vision projects implementing vegetable gardens through cash for work. When enquiring with a World Vision project team the team informed that the vegetable gardens are usually abandoned as soon as the cash for work programme ends, which would confirm the hypothesis that the consumption of vegetables is not part of the established diet in the area.

Peace dialogues and conferences were popular project components amongst beneficiaries, particularly favoured by members of Peace Committees either established by the IPs prior to receiving PSQIF II programme sub-grants or established by the IPs upon receiving PSQIF II funding. The IPs and local Chiefs unanimously considered peace dialogues and conferences to be a suitable response to local conflict. A total of 30 peacebuilding dialogues/inter-communal meetings/peace events (including peace caravans, rallies etc.) and inter- and intra-age set conferences were conducted by seven IPs to address conflict in and between communities during the programme period. One IP established a new Peace Committee and trained its members, while several of the IPs conducted refresher trainings for already existing local Peace Committees and leadership trainings for local Chiefs and women and youth representatives. Most participants of these conferences and dialogues as well as trainings reported perceiving the peace dialogues and conferences, and trainings as contributing to the reduction of conflict by providing fora for discussing and resolving conflicts. The evaluation nonetheless concludes that peace dialogues, although popular and a longstanding practise in South Sudan, seem to have impact only at the micro-level and only where local government was supportive and involved and hence interested in a positive outcome. Peace dialogues build on traditional mechanisms of negotiation when cattle raids and child abductions occur. However, given the intensity of conflict in South Sudan the evaluation assumes that these mechanisms have little impact on the current conflicts that are interlinked with wider conflicts at state and national level. A local Chief tellingly stated that the influence of traditional Chiefs is diminishing while youth are being armed by local politicians. As one IP put it: *"The traditional system is being undermined by too much violence and people bypassing the system by bribing SPLA and government."* The wider national level crisis was also named as majorly contributing to conflicts that low level initiatives such as peace dialogues cannot counteract. Another factor with negative impact on peacebuilding efforts raised by local Chiefs was the creation of 28 (and later further fragmentation) states from previously 10. According some local Chiefs this has led to competition and conflict amongst local Chiefs at the Payam level as well as local authorities at the state level over areas under their control. Where local government was mentioned as supportive to the peace initiatives, the PSQIF II programme's supported peace dialogues seem to have led, albeit temporarily and locally, to the stabilization of the area. Consequently, at the programmatic level the PSQIF II programme's impact as an enabler of peace promotion/community stabilization in conflict-prone communities was only temporary. Programme implementation areas in Jonglei and GAA have recurrently fallen back into conflict during and after completion of the PSQIF II funded projects.

One aim of the PSQIF II programme was to invite public administrators to participate in the training activities in an effort to promote government and civil society cooperation. However, as a result of the ensuing political crisis in South Sudan since December 2013, cooperation between United Nations agencies and programmes, international NGOs and South Sudan's civil society organizations, including

NGOs and CBOs, on the one hand and government entities on the other hand, became marred with difficulties. How this deterioration affected the PSQIF II programme is exemplified by the sub-grantee Free Voice staff being persecuted by the authorities in the context of a wider clampdown on the independent media and the organization having to abort its project. As a result of the current context in South Sudan, the impact of the programme on the civil administration's capacity is minimal.

Nonetheless, the evaluation found that capacity building targeting the IPs, has had a lasting impact on the IPs' staff. The trainings provided to the IP staff through the support of the project, according to all IPs, except one, improved motivation and ownership, enhanced staff skill sets and helped staff conceive of their place within the organization and greater structure of development aid systems. Nine of the eleven IPs stated that they continue to use the knowledge acquired in these trainings in their finance management and also believe that it has helped/will help them to attract new donors. IPs were also appreciative of the conflict sensitivity trainings which they find useful to their programme development.

The humanitarian hub in Pibor is still run successfully by INETERSOS and is fully occupied by humanitarian agencies operating in the GAA. As per the perceptions of the beneficiaries of the FCA who were trained in the facility, humanitarian actors found using the hub and the IPs (INTERSOS and FCA), wider improved relations in the community can be observed as result of NGOs based in the hub working in Pibor town and surrounding areas.

Sustainability

Sustainability measures the continuation or longevity of benefits from the intervention after the end of assistance. The evaluation looked into: to what extent were the results identified in the programme tending toward sustainability; and if the organisations that implemented the projects and the communities where the interventions took place will have the ability to maintain actions when external support ends.

At the programme level, the PSQIF II programme was to achieve sustainability through capacity building targeting IPs and civil administration and the PSQIF II Advisory Board selecting project proposals with viable exit strategies.

Sustainability strategies of projects funded by the PSQIF II programme include the establishment and training of local Peace Committees, establishment and training of WMCs, the deployment of community based labour technologies, the introduction of renewable energy sources, and takeover of equipment for maintenance works from the PSQIF II programme.

The PSQIF II programme successfully targeted IPs with trainings as described under Relevance. As a result of these trainings the CBOs and NGOs supported in remote and underserved areas continue to be leading actors in peace promotion well after the end of the PSQIF II programme. Some IPs have integrated the templates into their reporting and monitoring tools and continue to use them for other donors. Nine of the eleven IPs stated that they continue to use the knowledge acquired in these trainings and are hopeful that this will help them to attract new donors. However, given the current political situation, donor funding for peacebuilding, reconciliation and development is decreasing, making it difficult for NGOs to find funding. Nevertheless, the evaluation also found most projects were sustainable because the implementing NGOs and CBOs are rooted in the communities and with a genuine personal link continue to exert their efforts in spite of the many challenges.

As mentioned under Impact, capacity building activities targeting civil administration was not possible as the political situation in South Sudan deteriorated. Other observations made during evaluation visits and in discussion with members of the civil administration are that there has been a high turnover of staff in

the civil administration due to political instability. State Government personnel changes lead to a lack of institutional memory, deepened by non-existent record keeping. Consequently the evaluation team found only one stakeholder in a government position who continues to be involved with one of the PSQIF II funded projects. The interviewee understood sustainability as the continuation of funds for projects from external donors. On the other hand, at the local Payam level, Chiefs confirmed their capacity and willingness to continue in their traditional functions as negotiators and mediators between conflicting parties, despite the trend of loss of authority in the face of escalating violence that can no longer be contained by traditional mechanisms.

Most boreholes that were visited by the evaluation team were found functioning and well maintained by the communities. The boreholes and water points constitute the most sustainable output of all projects because of the great importance of safe water to the communities. Communities reported that they will continue to put their efforts into maintaining the water points / boreholes as their communities depend on them. When major breakdown occurs, communities collect money or barter livestock for the repair of the boreholes. At the project level, the most important mechanisms of sustainability of water points / boreholes is the WMCs. The evaluation found most WMCs functioning, with women's participation and forms of periodically elected governance, and rules to the usage which, in most cases, also ensures equitable access and monitoring of usage. Most IPs had also provided the WMC with tools for the repair of the boreholes. Some WMCs however reported not having the key of the borehole or lacking sufficient tools for repair despite receiving trainings from the PSQIF II programme funded project. Only one IP did not have the establishment and/or training of WMCs as a component of its borehole drilling project. Consequently, the beneficiaries of this project reported depending on the IP for the repair of the boreholes in case of breakdown. In one case the IP had envisaged the handover of boreholes it had drilled to the County Water Department as the mechanism for borehole repair. The community reported to the evaluation team that the County Water Department did not have the sufficient tools to repair the water borehole due to lack of availability of qualitatively good tools on the market and partially also due to apathy amongst the staff of the County Water Department.

Livelihoods trainings as described above under Effectiveness and Impact, only partially constitute sustainable interventions as only some contributed to livelihoods activities that continue to support the beneficiaries. However, even the recipients of successful livelihoods trainings, for example the fishermen and fisherwomen expressed that the trainings were not entirely sustainable. The training introduced new better techniques, but also made them dependent on new tools (hooks) they do not have. While the CAHW continue to work in the community, the availability of veterinary medicine remains an issue. Only few women trained in poultry auxiliary were able to keep such because they lack the financial means to invest into the livelihood. The women who had received training in gardening and seeds, reported having lost their implements and tools which may be due to lack of developing a sense of ownership.

Another sustainability strategy designed in the projects was the establishment and/or training of local Peace Committees. These Peace Committees were observed as functioning despite the end of the respective projects. This may be due to the fact that such Peace Committees are commonly found in South Sudan and a known means of conflict mediation. However, as mentioned under Effectiveness and Impact, these mechanisms are losing influence given the wider and larger conflicts that have engulfed the country since the commencement and end of the PSQIF II programme. Further, local power structures including some Chiefs and local authorities feel that the local status quo may be threatened by peace conferences and other efforts for peacebuilding. Largely, the sustainability of this result is undermined by the state and national governments' inability or unwillingness to limit small arms. Only peace dialogues/

conferences with genuine government support and follow up in the areas of rule of law can lead to change.

Recommendations

Key Finding Relevance

- Overall, the programme was relevant as it supported NGOs to build their capacities as well as conduct peacebuilding work in conflict prone and remote and hard-to-reach areas; IPs appropriately conducted conflict analysis prior to the projects' commencement and programme; and project designs incorporated community needs and critical key drivers of conflict.
 - The PSQIF II Advisory Board and, at the local level, the PSQIF II Steering Committees, did not sufficiently guide the programme as well as IPs in analysis of the conflict contexts and the identification of potential for peacebuilding. Consequently, the programme and conflict did not appropriately re-evaluate the conflict contexts as circumstances changed and did not make any changes or adaptations to ensure continued appropriateness.
 - The vast majority of IPs identified relevant needs and involvement of both women and men in community consultations and project implementation. However, the capacity of IP staff in conflict analysis and gender mainstreaming was not always high.
 - Donor, IPs and the PSQIF II programme team did not always accept communities' self-identified needs.

Recommendations

- To ensure the continuous analysis of the conflict contexts and identify areas with potential where the programme and the projects can strengthen peace throughout the programme duration, there is a need to have a strong and operational Programme Advisory Board as well as well functioning local Steering Committees. Board team development is necessary to ensure the board functions as an entity. The below recommendation also apply for the Advisory Board as well as the local Programme Steering Committees.
 - Board development should take place throughout the programme. This can include regular board evaluations as well as individual board member evaluation; an annual or bi-annual board review should include the board's activities, governance system, including strategy and operational performance; Board members should be evaluated as to whether they continue to demonstrate commitment to their role and commitment to attend panel meetings.
 - The programme budget should tailor for minor costs to keep the Advisory Board / local Steering Committees operational, for example reimburse the transportation costs, cover venue hiring for meetings etc.
 - Greater follow up of PMT with the Advisory Board and Sub-Office with the local Steering Committees as well as active involvement of the Programme Manager in the management of the board / sub-office with the local Steering Committees.
- To ensure that local pre-existing cultural divisions or culturally defined patterns of domination are not replicated in the projects, high quality conflict analysis as well as gender mainstreaming throughout the cycles of all projects is necessary. The programme should provide, particularly IPs' specialized staff such as Community Mobilizers and Peace and Reconciliation Advisors, with trainings regarding this at the beginning of their individual projects rather than, or in addition to,

trainings provided to all IPs at one point in time as their respective projects are then at different project cycle stages.

- IOM Programme staff should assist IPs throughout the project implementation cycle with conflict analysis and project risks should be identified and monitored throughout the project implementation to address any unintended consequences as they emerge.
- Project selection process should include a scoring system that gives weight to community identified projects even if donor and PMT may rate the identified projects lower.

Key Findings Effectiveness

- In the face of great challenges, including the remoteness of project locations, inflation and obstruction by state authorities, the programme achieved effectiveness through the selection of viable projects that effectively reached relevant beneficiaries, the use of effective technological and methodological solutions by most of the projects; and the provision of trainings and continued technical guidance to the NGOs.
 - Some projects did not provide the most effective technological solution.
 - Livelihoods trainings were not all effective due the shortness of the trainings, lack of acceptance, insufficient start-up support for and follow up with the beneficiaries.
 - NGOs and CBOs were taken on board over the entire duration of the programme, not all NGOs and CBOs were able to participate in all three trainings provided by external providers, and in some cases any of the three.
 - Some categories of staff essential to the implementation of projects, for example technical staff such as Machine Operators or Community Mobilizers, could also have benefited from targeted trainings.
 - Not all relevant groups, involved in conflict, such as youth in the cattle camps, were reached through the peacebuilding dialogues/conferences.

Recommendations

- To ensure that the best technological solutions are found, the right groups are targeted, capacity building to IPs is effective, and that livelihoods trainings etc. have greater effect, greater field presence of the PMT in support of the sub-office is required.
 - Throughout the projects' cycles, IOM staff, including technical staff such as the Programme Engineer, should ensure that adequate time is spent in the field, working directly with IPs and providing technical oversight directly at the project sites.
 - Conduct an organizational analysis of each IP and develop and implement tailor-made capacity building plans.
 - Ensure a comprehensive needs assessment involving a technical person, for example with agricultural background in the case of projects implementing agricultural activities, to safeguard the success of livelihoods trainings. Provide support in the technical assessment of requested livelihoods trainings.
 - Ensure that technically competent individuals conduct livelihoods trainings.
 - Monitor skills retention amongst beneficiaries.
- Create a greater link between the Advisory Board and the local Steering Committee and enable a discussion forum at both levels to enable sharing of experiences.

Key Findings Efficiency

- The PSQIF II programme achieved efficiency through a decentralized, slim and flexible staffing structure and management system. Nonetheless, the efficiency of the programme as well as

projects was negatively impacted by: institutional structures of both IOM and the IPs; at times, erroneous project management decisions; lack of adequate supervision through the Programme Engineer; inflation; insecurity; project cycles not in line with the weather cycle; and the eruption of nationwide crisis. Overall, project resources, in terms of human resources and finance, may have been more efficiently used.

Recommendations

- Assess the financial capacity of IPs and adjust project sizes and budgets accordingly. This will enable the programme to support more IPs and ensure greater coverage.
- For IPs to implement projects efficiently project proposals should be selected according to proven technical experience of the NGO/CBO. Further, a diversification of IPs can have an added advantage of widening the range of capacities instead of lumping portfolios with NGOs and CBOs having to implement project components that they are not experienced in nor have the appropriate staff.
- Consider additional Programme Engineer to ensure all IPs have sufficient technical oversight.
- All sub-contracting should take place through a competitive bidding process for contracting resulting in selection of a capable and committed contractor.
- Greater devolution of decision making powers from the PMT in Juba to the sub-offices to ensure better follow up with finance, procurement etc.
- Ensure quicker fund disbursement through partial funding of an IOM Finance Assistant in Juba.
- Consider targeted incorporation of labour-based technologies and deployment of a Programme Engineer with expertise in this.
- Consider more shadowing, understanding and recognition of the capacity of the IP's staff. Where there is identified lack of financial capacity, adequate induction and refresher training and oversight should be provided at the beginning of and throughout the project as required.
- Better monitoring of projects even in inaccessible locations as well as setting more realistic target beneficiaries numbers for the projects, by focusing on radius population rather than entire population of a region.
- Better adaptation of project cycles to the weather cycle at their specific project locations.

Key Findings Impact

- Overall the Programme's and projects' impact was overwhelmingly positive: IPs received valuable capacity building and communities appreciate the outputs of the projects, particularly the provision of safe water. However, potential unintended consequences of the projects such as conflict over water resources have to be addressed. Unintended consequences arising from inadequate consultations with communities as found in some cases, such as the HTPVK and SMARD, during the project design phase will subsequently limit the impact the project can have in the communities. Further, the lack of government involvement in the programme, particularly at the state level, diminished some peacebuilding efforts. A key driver of conflict, the absence of rule of law and weak law enforcement was neglected.

Recommendations

- Better address issues over the use of water sources provided by the programme through greater focus on this aspect of the programme/projects.
- Link community-based processes to peacebuilding to local and state government: In spite of the challenging relationship between agencies of the United Nations and the Government of South

Sudan, a peacebuilding programme should reserve a certain number of projects to focus on the strengthening of the rule of law (for example through community-based policing, traditional justice and reconciliation) and state authorities. The buy-in of state authorities could be achieved through for example infrastructure projects for state authorities and training including in areas of rule of law and peace and reconciliation.

- Possibly add professional conflict mediation facilitator to the PMT particularly when focusing on linkage between community processes and state level.

Key Findings Sustainability

- Overall, sustainability of the programme and project interventions was achieved through the overall community-based approach of the programme by partnering with NGOs and CBOs; integrating exit strategies involving the communities into project design; the use of renewable energy technologies and capacity building aimed at the NGOs and CBOs as well as the civil administration. However, sustainability was not adequately implemented throughout all projects. This was partially due to lack of the development of ownership in some communities; lack of acceptance of new livelihoods; limited focus of the programme on the civil administration; and the short project durations.

Recommendations

- To achieve greater sustainability of programme and project more complex and deeper discussions of how a peacebuilding programme can achieve the overall goal of peacebuilding may be required. Ensure that needs assessments and project implementation reflect community priorities.
- Greater thoroughness in comprehensive assessments to better understand beneficiary needs and design projects to have greater involvement of the beneficiaries to create ownership.
- While it is a challenge to work with NGOs and CBOs because of their low capacity, continue to strengthen NGOs and CBOs because they reach farthest and deepest into the communities.

Conclusion

The PSQIF II programme was part of the wider effort of IOM South Sudan to contribute to resolving displacement, promoting peace, and ensuring sustainable recovery and building the resilience of communities. Overall, the PSQIF II programme was appropriately designed to achieve this through its community-based peacebuilding approaches and conflict mitigation strategies.

The objective of the PSQIF II programme was to respond to community needs by delivering quick impact peacebuilding projects in partnership with national, state and local actors, NGOs and CBOs and communities. In spite of an increasingly adverse political, security and economic environment in South Sudan during the implementation period of the PSQIF II programme, the programme achieved its overall objectives of enabling peace promotion and community stabilization initiatives in conflict-prone communities in the Sudan-South Sudan border areas, the Wunlit Triangle and/or Jonglei; building the capacity of NGOs and COBs to manage peacebuilding projects and enabling a humanitarian presence in remote and conflict-prone areas.

The PSQIF II programme was an instrument that successfully channelled funds down to NGOs and CBOs in remote and conflict-prone areas and provided them with substantial support and capacities to tackle key drivers of conflict. The programme enabled NGOs and CBOs to reach into communities that otherwise had little or no support in the area of stabilization. By partnering with NGOs and CBOs, the PSQIF II programme achieved a wide geographic coverage at a relatively low cost.

Overwhelmingly, the PSQIF II programme, through the project selection criteria and process, ensured that the participatory approaches were inclusive and gave marginalized groups such as women and youth voices in the decision-making processes. Community consultations informed needs assessments and consequently the vast majority of projects implemented were of relevance to the beneficiaries in their local contexts. However, in some cases, the donor, programme and IPs did not accept the results of community consultations and their decisions on their needs. It is possible that the acceptance and funding of needs identified in the community consultations' could have led to more relevant projects. Greater relevance could also have been achieved through greater monitoring that also informs adaption of the projects to the changing contexts. Also, a quicker selection process, adaptation to weather cycles and in some cases better technological solutions could have led to greater effectiveness of the PSQIF II programme supported projects.

At a technical level, IOM ensured that a transparent finance system of checks and balances was in place, the IPs' projects were monitored and IPs were guided and supported whenever required. Cost-efficiency was achieved through a decentralized method of implementation through a slim and mobile IOM PSQIF II programme team. The IOM sub-office Wau was flexible and accessible to IPs. However, the PMT in Juba was remote and insufficiently visited the sub-office as well as project sites and the IOM financial system proved slow in disbursing funds to the NGOs and CBOs which in most cases only had the PSQIF II programme as a source of funding. A greater PSQIF II programme staff presence at the project sites, devolution of decision-making powers to the Wau sub-office and greater technical guidance and supervision at the project sites would have benefited most projects. Further, more focused, tailored and project cycle appropriate trainings would have led to a greater impact on the NGOs/CBOs staff capacities.

Overall, the PSQIF II programme had a positive impact on the beneficiary populations. The vast majority of beneficiaries appreciated the project's outputs, particularly and foremost all the provision of safe water sources for themselves as well as their livestock. NGOs and CBOs benefited from the capacity building provided through the PSQIF II programme. The programmes and projects' sustainability was achieved

through the involvement of the beneficiaries in maintaining project outputs, beneficiaries' continued activities for example in local Peace Committees and a sense of loyalty of NGOs and CBOs to the communities in which they are rooted. However it remains unclear how the majority of NGOs and CBOs will continue to finance their activities in an environment where less funds are available for recovery and development efforts.

During the programmes implementation period the relationship between UN agencies and humanitarian actors on the one hand and the government on the other deteriorated. In South Sudan involvement of state authorities can lead to mistrust of some ethnic groups towards a programme as well as risks lack of community participation as state authorities could capture peacebuilding processes and use them to their ends while also instilling fear in communities. In contrast to the PSQIF I programme, the PSQIF II programme responded to these risks by reducing state involvement. Nevertheless, a peacebuilding programme cannot succeed, even at the micro-level, if local state authorities are resistant. A peacebuilding programme should at the least aim at achieving the absence of resistance, yet better the buy-in of local and state level government. For a peacebuilding programme in South Sudan to have an impact beyond the micro-level and for a longer time span, it must, on the one hand find a means to engage local authorities that are either disinterested or counteract the peacebuilding efforts, and on the other hand ensure the independence of community-based activities.

At a higher state and national level, the achievements of the PSQIF II programme seem to fade as the crisis engulfed the country and to date is spiralling. Nevertheless, the PSQIF II programme's community-based approaches to peacebuilding remain vital and viable. The PSQIF II programme's grass root level approach remains a vital means of supporting conflict affected communities in South Sudan build resilience amidst great adversity.

At a policy level, a greater support of peacebuilding programmes through the UN agencies and programmes as well as humanitarian community, for example by including these in higher level objectives is required. Peacebuilding programmes remain relevant in the South Sudan context as they aim at building resilience and creating pockets of stability as soon as security allows. Peacebuilding programmes have a critical contribution to make in enabling communities to address issues in their daily lives and actively involve them in recovery efforts, and act as a counter weight, no matter how light, to negative forces.

Annexes