

Final Report for  
**Mid-term Evaluation of  
the Return of Qualified African Nationals  
Phase III**  
7 ACP RPR 287



**I T A D**

Submitted by  
ITAD Ltd

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# Mid-term External Evaluation of the Project for the Return and Reintegration of Qualified African Nationals, Phase III

## Mid-Term Evaluation Final Report

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## List of Acronyms

CBA	Cost Benefit Analysis
CEC	Commission of the European Communities
CoM	Chief of Mission
EC	European Commission
ECU	European Currency Unit
JOF	Job Offer Forms
GC	Government Counterpart
GOA	Government of Angola
GOG	Government of Ghana
GOM	Government of Mozambique
GOZ	Government of Zimbabwe
HQ	Headquarters
IBRD	World Bank
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
NAO	National Authorising Office
NIP	National Indicative Programme
OVI	Objectively Verifiable Indicator
PCM	Project Cycle Management
PM	Placement Mission
PSF	Private Sector Foundation
RM	Recruitment Mission
RIP	Regional Indicative Programme
RQAN	Return of Qualified African Nationals
SG	Support Group
SE	Self-Employment Component
TCA	Technical Cooperation Agreement
TOKTEN	Transfer of Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme

## Mid-term External Evaluation of the Project for the Return and Reintegration of Qualified African Nationals, Phase III

### Mid-Term Evaluation Final Report

#### Summary

The project for Return and Reintegration of Qualified African Nationals, Phase III, is a continuation of a project initiated in 1983. As stated in the financing proposal, the objectives of Phase III are:

- Overall Objective: Contribute to enhancing the role and utilisation of highly qualified, qualified and skilled African personnel in the development of participating countries
- Programme Goal: The selective return migration of highly qualified, qualified and skilled Africans in order to contribute to fostering the receiving country's human resources capacity
- Project Purpose:
- To assist highly qualified, qualified and skilled African nationals residing in industrialised countries in their return and reintegration process
  - To promote the return of highly qualified, qualified and skilled Africans residing in other African countries
  - To assist the returnees to become meaningfully and gainfully employed/self-employed
  - To assist and encourage African countries in the establishment and/or strengthening of an institutional framework to promote the voluntary return of their highly qualified, qualified and skilled nationals

The project is implemented by the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), based in Geneva. It aims to return 899 African nationals to the eleven target countries of Angola, Cap Verde, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea Bissau, Kenya, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and to others designated as non-target countries. Due to security problems, no project operations have taken place in Sierra Leone.

IOM has Placement Missions (PMs) in all target countries, and Recruitment Missions (RMs) in industrialised countries. Placement Missions work in consultation with government counterparts to identify priority sectors and job vacancies. Recruitment Missions in industrialised countries recruit suitably qualified and experienced African nationals, and provide them with financial assistance to return to Africa.

The mid-term evaluation of the Project for the Return and Reintegration of Qualified African Nationals, Phase III, took place in January and February 1997. The objective of the study is to provide for a detailed assessment of the project's relevance, efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability, and if necessary for a redesign or a reorientation of the project. The evaluation team comprised Dane Rogers

(teamleader) and Andrea Cravinho (Economist). Tom Farrington, Director ITAD, was the overall project coordinator.

### Preparation and Design

RQAN Phase III originated from the previous two phases. Its design was based on the findings of the evaluation of Phases I and II, and on the recommendations of a seminar held in Harare in 1992. The evaluation made a clear recommendation that a proper analysis of the problems to be addressed should be conducted in order to identify alternative strategies and assess the risks involved. Despite this recommendation the focus of the Harare seminar was on specifying corrective measures to address the shortcomings of Phase II's design.

Although the Financial Proposal was drafted at the end of 1992, it was not approved until February 1994. The implementation of Phase III commenced in January 1995. The long preparation period was due mainly to concerns among member states about the relevance and cost effectiveness of the programme, and to reluctance on the part of some participating countries to agree on the financing arrangements. This led to a protracted negotiation process between IOM, the Commission and prospective participating governments during which the total project cost was reduced from ECU 17.3m to ECU 13.4m. This lengthy process did little to prepare the way for smooth implementation of the programme, and may well have contributed to delays in start-up in some of the participating countries.

An unusual aspect of the design phase was that the Financing Proposal was prepared by IOM, who consulted directly with prospective participating governments. Their role as implementing agency of the previous two phases contributed to a design that was biased towards the modalities of the previous phases and was based on incomplete analysis of the specific contexts of each participating country. The evaluation team feels that the programme design would have benefitted from the involvement of independent planning expertise.

### Programme Relevance

In general all participating countries are experiencing severe deficiencies in human resource capacity in both public and private sectors. However, manpower planning is often an area in which information is not readily available, and so it is difficult to quantify these shortages. Where information does exist, it clearly indicates that the programme is relevant to the problems experienced, and to the development objectives of each country. Given the lack of development of country-specific objectives, it is difficult to provide a deeper assessment of the relevance of the programme to each country context.

The poor security situation in Sierra Leone and Angola, and also in Mozambique until the recently negotiated peace, has seriously affected programme implementation. The evaluation team therefore questions whether these three should have been included as target countries at the start of implementation, although it is recognised that the country situations in both Sierra Leone and Angola were considerably more positive at the time the Financing Proposal was first drafted.

The particularly poor economic conditions in Cap Verde, Guinea Bissau, Ethiopia and Zambia have contributed to the low return rates in these countries.

While there is clear potential for complementarity with other interventions, there is little evidence of any coordinated action with other programmes of the EU or other donors. Some IOM missions have attempted to establish closer links with other programmes, particularly TOKTEN<sup>1</sup>, but have been unable to do so due to the apparent reluctance of other programmes to work more closely together.

## Efficiency

IOM staff met by the evaluation team (in Geneva and in PMs) are without exception highly motivated and committed to programme implementation, and very hard-working. All activities for which IOM is responsible have been carried out, although with varying degrees of efficiency and effectiveness. Field staff are generally aware of the constraints affecting programme implementation, and have adopted a flexible, pragmatic approach to carrying out activities. However, this flexibility has not translated into modifications to the programme design to take account of country-specific conditions. This is of critical importance given questions about the soundness of the programme's design.

An important aspect in the design of Phase III, which differentiates it from Phases I and II, is the requirement that placements are demand driven. However, this concept has not been developed by IOM. Despite the requirements of the TCA and to the stated intentions of IOM, the return process remains largely driven by the supply of candidates. As a result there is a poor match between the candidate rosters and job rosters, meaning that much time is wasted in processing candidates for whom no realistic jobs exist, and in identifying jobs that are not filled.

IOM Geneva's role in supervision and backstopping has been largely taken up with the development of guidelines for programme implementation. While they have produced a formidable portfolio of operational guidelines which have contributed to better understanding of the purpose and modalities of the programme among mission staff, they also reflect an over-centralised approach to implementation which has discouraged PMs from developing country-specific approaches.

The case of the participating Lusophone countries requires particular attention. While it is recognised that the evaluation team visited the two most problematic countries (Angola and Mozambique), the team felt that Lusophone countries had not been sufficiently integrated into overall programme operations. IOM should therefore develop a modified approach that takes account of the particular issues constraining returns to Lusophone countries.

Comparisons of cost effectiveness among IOM missions indicate a high degree of variation in terms of staff costs. As a large international organisation with its own accounting procedures, it was to be expected that financial monitoring and control might prove difficult. However, the extent to which staff costs per returnee have

<sup>1</sup> Transfer of Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals, funded by UNDP

varied between missions reflects a lack of appropriate arrangements for financial monitoring. This has also resulted in inadequate systems for reporting expenditure against each of the eleven NIP and three RIP funds which finance the programme. Considerations of cost effectiveness have been complicated by the funding of a proportion of staff costs by IOM.

The performance of government counterparts and Support Groups has been mixed. Where counterparts have been appointed they have generally undertaken their core activities, but their role in formulating training programmes has been weak, and no evidence has been found of their involvement yet in the preparation of terms of reference for the institutionalisation of the programme. Although a number of Support Groups have fulfilled their mandate of identifying priority sectors and job vacancies, they have not proved an efficient means of making placements. Due to the NIP and RIP disbursement arrangements, the role of National Authorising Officers (NAOs) in programme monitoring has been weak.

The Commission's steering and monitoring role is limited to Unit DGVIII/G/4, and Country Desk Officers in Brussels tend not to be involved directly in programme steering or monitoring. Unfortunately, communication has not been effective between the various stakeholders in Brussels, and the programme has to a certain extent slipped through the 'supervision net'.

The evaluation team feels strongly that the unusual arrangements for disbursement (whereby funds are disbursed directly to Geneva without the requirement for approval of Delegations and NAOs) have been a significant contributory factor to weaknesses in planning and/or monitoring, with a consequent effect on implementation. The disbursement of funds direct to Geneva under a fixed schedule does not require the signature of payment orders by the Delegations or NAOs, nor the submission and approval of annual workplans and budgets, as is normally the case for EU-funded projects. This has weakened the role of the Delegations and NAOs, and has weakened pressure on IOM to undertake a critical review of progress on an annual basis. One particular consequence is that IOM does not provide information on expenditure against RQAN budget headings on a country by country basis. This means that Delegations and NAOs are unaware of how much of the NIP and RIP funds have been spent. This has also allowed anomalies to occur such as the disbursement of ECU 120,488 from Sierra Leone's NIP despite the fact that no IOM activities have been undertaken there, and the expenditure in Ghana of ECU 454,149 of NIP-sourced funds against a disbursement of only ECU 187,425. The evaluation team recognises that this does not reflect any malfeasance, but is a result of the unusual disbursement arrangements.

In general, monitoring systems provide IOM with some useful information on implementation progress. However, monthly reports are largely narrative and do not provide a summarised picture of progress, issues and problems against the main activities to be undertaken. There are too many indicators at the activity level, and insufficient or inappropriate indicators at the results level. IOM does not prepare budgets under the RQAN cost headings, with the result that there are no comparisons between physical and financial progress.

The Backstopping Expert has identified or addressed many of the issues raised in this report, and obviously has a sound grasp of implementation issues and problems. However, the backstopping reports address issues of efficiency without looking sufficiently at issues of effectiveness and do not sufficiently question the appropriateness of programme strategies. Findings are compiled into consolidated reports after each round of country visits, and country-specific reports or aide memoires are not produced.

### Effectiveness

Overall achievement of targets is low although the rate of placement increased during the latter half of 1996. Overall 23% of placements targets have been met, but achievement of intra-regional returns (3%), non-target returns (13%) and self-employed returns (2%) are particularly low.

Those candidates who have returned are of a consistently high calibre. It is very unfortunate therefore that given the scale of human resource needs in the participating countries, the matching process results in the ad hoc placement of candidates as and when a match can be made. Due to the lack of effective prioritisation by counterparts and Support Groups, returnees become 'islands of expertise' and the potential impact of the programme is dissipated.

By the end of 1995 Support Groups had been established in only 5 countries. For most of the target countries it must be concluded that support groups have not made a significant contribution to placement, beyond the identification of priority sectors and job types. Their composition is usually skewed too much towards the public sector with the result that a long list of priority sectors and job types can be generated quickly (often from outdated reports) without sufficient consideration of broader economic priorities, or of the practicality of trying to recruit candidates in often low-paying jobs.

By the end of 1995 counterparts had been appointed in only 6 countries. At present Cap Verde, Guinea Bissau and Uganda remain without a counterpart. To date, counterparts have been trained in Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Training has been mostly of an informal nature, focusing on familiarising counterparts with IOM procedures for recruitment, placement and reintegration follow-up.

In general there has been a lack of clear strategies to achieve institutionalisation and sustainability, and as a consequence the training and institution building component has not developed beyond 'familiarisation of the counterparts with IOM procedures for recruitment, placement and reintegration'. This lack of clear strategies is reflected by the fact that no critical review of procedures has taken place to date, despite suggestions from PM staff that they are probably too complex to be handed over to participating governments with any degree of confidence.

## Economic and Financial Analysis

Returnees were largely satisfied with the support package, notwithstanding comments that landlocked countries should receive a larger amount due to the higher shipping costs.

There is no economic data available from IOM to form the basis of an assessment of economic or financial feasibility of the self-employment component, although as there are only three self-employed returnees the expected benefits at this stage would be negligible.

The TCA and the Operational Plans have made no provision for the collection of data necessary for a Cost Benefit Analysis. It is unrealistic to expect the programme to have a measurable impact at the sectoral or national level as is implied by the existing logframe. A more realistic and measurable impact would be expected at the enterprise level, looking at the benefits generated by returnees within the institutions to which they have returned. This approach would require the redefinition of the overall objectives and project purpose, and associated indicators.

## Sustainability

Only a small proportion of the returnees interviewed indicated that they would be likely to re-emigrate. However, approximately a quarter of returnees feel that it is probable that they will change jobs, suggesting that the sustainability of their employments is not good. Evidence from discussions with returnees and employers suggests that the potential for impact through skills and knowledge transfer is considerable, but data collected by IOM is too subjective to provide reliable information.

Prospects for institutional sustainability are poor, and unlikely to improve unless recruitment and placement procedures are simplified and made more efficient, and clear strategies for handover and associated training are developed.

Although information on costs is fairly comprehensive, all information on the 'downstream' benefits produced by returnees is qualitative. However, despite the lack of data, there is strong anecdotal evidence to suggest that due to the generally high calibre of returnees their potential for impact is considerable.

## Recommendations

1. An evaluation workshop should be held to discuss the evaluation findings. Two alternative scenarios are presented for the workshop. Under scenario 1, implementation procedures would remain basically the same but would be elaborated at country level i) to take account of revised targets, and ii) to improve financial monitoring and reporting. Under scenario 2, the scope for the workshop would be much wider, and would focus on developing a revised logframe matrix and implementation schedule using the techniques of PCM. Given the short period of implementation remaining, it is the opinion of the evaluation team that scenario 1 is the most practicable solution.

### Programme Operations

2. Due to the non-realisation of assumptions about the security situation and economic conditions, Sierra Leone should no longer be part of the programme.
3. Angola and Mozambique should no longer be designated as target countries. Instead they should become non-target countries, with the requirement that candidates must be pre-matched in order to gain financial assistance (as is the current requirement).
4. A Portuguese-speaking staff member should be assigned to take on responsibility for the Lusophone countries for the remainder of the programme duration. This official should be based in Guinea Bissau or Cap Verde, and make regular visits to both countries and to Lisbon.
5. The indicative target for Uganda should be revised downwards in the light of the recommended skills gap assessment to be undertaken by the Private Sector Foundation. Disbursement of Uganda's NIP funds should be adjusted to take account of the reduced funding requirement.
6. The targets for intra-regional returns and returns to non-target countries should be revised downwards to conform with current trends. A proportion of funds from the West Africa RIP for both components could be re-allocated to finance above-target returns in Ghana. Disbursement of RIP funds should be adjusted to take account of the reduced funding requirement.
7. The self-employment component should be reassessed. There should be considerable scope to draw lessons from other DGVIII programmes. After the re-assessment, a decision should be taken whether to continue or to close down this component. If it is to continue, then the Commission and IOM should clarify whether the funds should be made available to returnees in the form of a grant or a loan. Furthermore, funds should be made available to candidates after return, when they have had the opportunity to assess local market conditions, and develop the necessary commercial contacts. The possibility of reducing the target number of 140 assisted returnees, but increasing the loan size should also be explored if ECU 4,500 is found to be insufficient.

### Programme Activities

#### Recruitment and Placement

8. IOM should re-orient its recruitment and placement procedures towards a more job-led strategy, based on the results of the recommended 'rapid assessment' of job opportunities.
9. IOM should experiment with the use of the internet as a means of recruitment.
10. Recruitment Missions should make informal contacts with recruitment consultancies and multi-nationals to familiarise themselves with current recruitment techniques.

### Reintegration

11. Returnees should be encouraged to establish their own associations. This should not involve any direct costs to the programme.



### **Institution-Building and Sustainability**

12. Each Placement Mission should review current arrangements for institution-building, and recommend modified arrangements for the remainder of the programme. In the light of any negative assessments by PMs, alternative arrangements should be discussed immediately with the NAO and Delegation.
13. The composition of the support group should be reviewed in the light of the findings of the rapid appraisal of priority sectors.
14. Where the prospects for an effective support group appear poor, Geneva HQ and the Delegation should be informed, and a decision agreed on alternative arrangements.

### **Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation**

#### **Planning and Decision-making**

15. All missions should be provided with an annual budget allocation, against which they should prepare a workplan and budget. This workplan and budget would then be the basis for preparation of activity schedules, and for reporting by each mission, as well as for six-monthly reports.
16. On the basis of approved workplans and budgets, decision-making should be fully decentralised from Geneva HQ to Placement Missions and Recruitment Missions.

#### **Monitoring**

17. Monthly reporting should follow activity schedules more closely.
18. IOM should review the modified database programme (RQAN 2.2) to determine whether it provides sufficient flexibility to fulfill the requirements of a modified approach to recruitment and placement, and recommendations for revised evaluation arrangements. Particular attention should be paid to ensuring compatibility with a spreadsheet or database package that will allow the data to be exported to other programmes and analysed efficiently.

#### **Evaluation**

19. To facilitate the terminal evaluation, IOM should design a simple system for gathering baseline data from employers. This could be in the form of a simple questionnaire appended to the job offer form, requiring the employer to specify what particular benefits they expect from the returnee, the status of relevant systems/operations prior to the returnee's entry into the organisation.

#### **Backstopping**

20. The backstopping expert should produce an aide memoire immediately after each country visit.
21. As soon as IOM introduce revised arrangements for budgeting and financial reporting, backstopping reports should include brief assessments of financial efficiency and effectiveness

## 0. Preamble

### 0.1 Return and Reintegration of Qualified African Nationals, Phase III

The project for Return and Reintegration of Qualified African Nationals, Phase III, is a continuation of a project initiated in 1983. As stated in the financing proposal, the objectives of Phase III are:

- Overall Objective: Contribute to enhancing the role and utilisation of highly qualified, qualified and skilled African personnel in the development of participating countries
- Programme Goal: The selective return migration of highly qualified, qualified and skilled Africans in order to contribute to fostering the receiving country's human resources capacity
- Project Purpose:
- To assist highly qualified, qualified and skilled African nationals residing in industrialised countries in their return and reintegration process
  - To promote the return of highly qualified, qualified and skilled Africans residing in other African countries
  - To assist the returnees to become meaningfully and gainfully employed/self-employed
  - To assist and encourage African countries in the establishment and/or strengthening of an institutional framework to promote the voluntary return of their highly qualified, qualified and skilled nationals

The project is implemented by the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), based in Geneva. It aims to return 899 African nationals to the eleven target countries of Angola, Cap Verde, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea Bissau, Kenya, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and to others designated as non-target countries. Due to security problems, no project operations have taken place in Sierra Leone.

IOM has Placement Missions (PMs) in all target countries, and Recruitment Missions (RMs) in industrialised countries. Placement Missions work in consultation with government counterparts to identify priority sectors and job vacancies. Recruitment Missions in industrialised countries recruit suitably qualified and experienced African nationals, and provide them with financial assistance to return to Africa.

The project has a total commitment of ECU 13,430,000 which includes ECU 730,000 allocated for the funding of returns during the 'briefing period' which occurred between phases II and III. Phase III therefore has an effective commitment of ECU 12,700,000.

### 0.2 Mid-Term Evaluation

The mid-term evaluation of the Project for the Return and Reintegration of Qualified African Nationals, Phase III, took place in January and February 1997. The objective of the study is to provide for a detailed assessment of the project's relevance, efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability, and if necessary for a redesign or a

reorientation of the project. The terms of reference for the evaluation are included in Appendix 2.

The evaluation team comprised Dane Rogers (teamleader) and Andrea Cravinho (Economist). Tom Farrington, Director ITAD, was the overall project coordinator.

The methodology used in the evaluation study was as follows:

- I. File study and discussions with with Commission staff in Brussels, and IOM staff in Geneva.
- II. File study and indepth interviews in ACP countries with the following stakeholders:
  - EU Delegates and relevant EU Project Officers
  - National Authorising Officers (or relevant representatives)
  - Counterparts (designated and/or operational)
  - Selected Support Group Members
  - IOM staff
- III. Focus group discussions were held with returnees.
- IV. A survey was conducted of all returnees met during country visits.
- IV. Semi-structured interviews were held with a limited number of employers in order to assess the extent of transfer of know-how.

An inception report was submitted to the Commission following the initial visits to Brussels and Geneva, which included provided, among other things, a summary of initial findings and a brief outline of the issues which were to be covered during the evaluation.

A list of persons met and organisations visited is set out in Appendix 2.

## 1. Background

### 1.1 Historical Overview of Phases I, II and III

A historical overview of Phases I, II and III is summarised in table 1-1.

In 1983, the Commission provided ECU 3.75m for a pilot phase of the programme Reintegration of Qualified African Nationals. This first phase covered Kenya, Somalia and Zimbabwe, and it was evaluated during a seminar in Nairobi in December 1987. On the basis of the seminar's findings, a second phase was approved by the Commission with funding of ECU 7.3m. The number of target countries was extended to six, covering Ghana, Kenya, Somalia, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

Table 1-2 summarises the objectives, target group and target countries of RQAN during phases 1, 2 and 3.

The main differences between phases II and III can be summarised as:

- A revised specification of the target group to include highly qualified, qualified and skilled African nationals, and to ensure that candidates have gained a minimum of 2 years relevant professional experience
- The strengthening of programme assistance to enhance the social and cultural reintegration of the returnees, especially those who have been expatriated over a long period
- The introduction of a self-employment component to assist a proportion of returnees in establishing their own businesses
- A new requirement to establish or strengthen an institutional framework through the identification of government counterparts and the establishment of support groups, to ensure a better link between placement activities and the manpower priorities of beneficiary countries, as well as to improve the sustainability of the programme
- The strengthening of monitoring and evaluation arrangements, including the conduct of regular surveys among a sample of returnees to assess the career development and reintegration process, and the provision of backstopping monitoring by an external expert

**Table 1-1: Timeline of Major Events in the Preparation and Implementation of RQAN Phase III**

<u>Year</u>	<u>Month</u>	<u>Events</u>	<u>No. Returnees<sup>2</sup></u>
1983	January	<i>Phase I start-up</i>	
1986	December	<i>End of Phase I; Nairobi seminar to discuss achievements of Phase I</i>	
1987	October	<i>Phase II start-up</i>	
1991	Aug-Nov	<i>Evaluation of Phases I and II</i>	
1992	Feb	<i>End of Phase II; Harare Seminar to discuss achievements of Phases I and II, and future prospects for Phase III</i>	
1992	June	<i>Financing Proposal drawn up (by IOM) on basis of evaluation findings and the Harare seminar; includes logframe v.1</i>	
1994	February	<i>EDF committee of member states advise approval of Financing Proposal for Phase III; CEC approves Financing Proposal</i>	
1994	August	<i>Financing Agreement signed between CEC and 11 target countries; bridging funds disbursed to IOM</i>	
	November	<i>Technical Cooperation Agreement (contract) signed with IOM</i>	
1995	January	<i>Project implementation commences with phased start-up in target countries</i>	1
	February		
	March		2
	April	<i>Submission of 'Operational Plan' for implementation of Phase III; includes logframe v.2</i>	1
	May		5
	June		3
	July	<i>1st progress report submitted by IOM</i>	5
	August		8
	September		8
	October	<i>Revised rolling plan for Jan-Jun 1996 prepared with assistance from Dr Amershi; annual targets modified downwards</i>	3
	November		7
	December	<i>Back-stopping mission to Geneva</i>	15
1996	January	<i>Backstopping mission to Zambia, Zimbabwe, Mozambique</i>	11
	February		10
	March	<i>Backstopping mission to Lisbon</i>	12
	April	<i>Backstopping mission to Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia</i>	11
	May		14
	June	<i>Annual report for 1995 received from IOM</i>	11
	July	<i>Consolidated mission report received from Backstopping expert</i>	21
	August	<i>Desk Officer visits IOM Geneva to follow up findings of backstopping report; IOM agree to implement recommendations</i>	12
	September		6
	October		8
	November		21
	December		10

<sup>2</sup> Phase III only, not including Bridging Fund placements

Table 1-2: Summary of Objectives, Target Group and Target Countries, for RQAN Phases I, II and III

	Objectives	Target Group	Target countries
Phase I	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. To enhance the role and utilisation of qualified national personnel</li> <li>2. To assist developing countries in encouraging voluntary return migration</li> <li>3. To mitigate the adverse effects of the brain-drain from African countries</li> </ol>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Highly qualified/skilled African nationals residing in industrialised countries, who have graduated from universities or technical, management or administration schools and who have professional experience</li> <li>• In exceptional circumstances (maximum 10% of cases) African nationals residing in other African countries provided that they cannot occupy an employment commensurate with their qualifications in their country of residence</li> </ul>	Kenya Somalia Zimbabwe
Phase II	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. To enhance the role and utilisation of qualified national personnel</li> <li>2. To assist developing countries in encouraging voluntary return migration</li> <li>3. To mitigate the adverse effects of the brain-drain from African countries</li> </ol>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Highly qualified/skilled African nationals residing in industrialised countries, who have graduated from universities or technical, management or administration schools and who have professional experience</li> <li>• In exceptional circumstances (maximum 10% of cases) African nationals residing in other African countries provided that they cannot occupy an employment commensurate with their qualifications in their country of residence</li> </ul>	Ghana Kenya Somalia Uganda Zambia Zimbabwe
Phase III <sup>3</sup>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. To assist highly qualified, qualified and skilled African nationals residing in industrialised or other African countries in their return and reintegration process</li> <li>2. To assist returnees to become meaningfully and gainfully employed/self-employed</li> <li>3. To enhance the social and cultural reintegration of the returnees</li> <li>4. To assist and encourage African countries in the establishment/ strengthening of an institutional framework to promote the voluntary return of their highly qualified, qualified and skilled nationals</li> </ol>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Highly qualified, qualified and skilled<sup>4</sup> African nationals residing in industrialised countries who have gained at least 2 years of relevant experience abroad in professions related to their education and to key economic sectors to be strengthened in the receiving countries, after completion of their studies<sup>5</sup></li> <li>• Highly qualified, qualified and skilled African nationals residing in other African countries who have gained at least 2 years of relevant experience abroad in professions related to their education and to key economic sectors to be strengthened in the receiving countries, after completion of their studies, provided that they cannot be employed in a job which is commensurate with their qualifications in their country of residence</li> <li>• Highly qualified, qualified and skilled African nationals who can become self-employed in their home country. The candidates must have gained at least 5 years of relevant experience in professions related to their education</li> </ul>	Angola Cape Verde Ethiopia Ghana Guinea Bissau Kenya Mozambique Sierra Leone Uganda Zambia Zimbabwe

<sup>3</sup> Specific objectives<sup>4</sup> The relevant levels of qualifications and occupations are defined in accordance with the 'International Standard Classification of Occupations - ISCO', ILO, 1990<sup>5</sup> The condition of having gained professional experience after completion of studies only applies for highly qualified and qualified African nationals

## 2. Preparation and Design

### 2.1 The Design Process

The design of Phase III was based on the findings of an evaluation of Phases I and II, and on the recommendations of a seminar held in Harare in February 1992.

The evaluation of Phases I and II was undertaken on behalf of the Commission of the European Communities between August and November 1991. The evaluation<sup>6</sup> concluded that the programme was successful in terms of:

- the numbers of qualified and skilled persons returned
- being a unique and innovative project
- its relative cost effectiveness

However, despite these positive conclusions, a number of criticisms were identified:

- 60% of Phase II placements were 'scholarship candidates' returning after completion of studies abroad, and were therefore likely to have returned anyway without RQAN support
- The majority of the 'scholarship candidates' did not meet the target group criteria as they were on student visas and thus unable to gain work experience abroad
- 58% of Phase I placements and 74% of Phase II placements were in the public sector, reflecting IOM's narrow focus on public sector contacts
- Methods of publicising the programme reached only a small proportion of potential returnees
- IOM's 'job brokering' role (matching candidates to jobs) was largely driven by the supply of candidates applying for assistance, rather than driven by the demand for qualified or skilled nationals. Thus it did not take sufficient account of either employer or national manpower needs
- Due to the supply driven approach, the matching process was slow, often causing financial problems to candidates awaiting return
- IOM's recruitment missions in the industrialised countries had no formal lines of communication to regional and country offices, causing problems in the coordination of recruitment and placement activities
- Monitoring and evaluation arrangements were ineffective for measuring the 'downstream' effects and impact of the programme

The Harare seminar was held *'to discuss the results of the programme and to further explore ways and means to address the issue of high level manpower shortages in sub-Saharan Africa'*<sup>7</sup>. The objectives of the seminar were:

1. To discuss findings, conclusions and recommendations of the evaluation on the results and impact of the Reintegration of Qualified African Nationals - Phases I and II;
2. To discuss modalities of extension of the Programme to other interested African countries;

<sup>6</sup> Evaluation Report - Reintegration of Qualified African Nationals, Final Report, April 1992

<sup>7</sup> 2nd Evaluation Seminar on the Programme for the Reintegration of Qualified African Nationals, Harare, 25-27 February 1992

3. To discuss and explore revisions and adjustments to the project's implementation to further increase its efficiency and facilitate its smooth operation; and
4. To explore additional funding possibilities.

The stakeholders involved in the Harare seminar were representatives of African governments participating in Phases I and II (from both target and non-target countries); representatives of the Commission; and staff of the International Organisation for Migration. There were no returnees present, nor were there any representatives of similar repatriation programmes such as TOKTEN.

The evaluation of Phases I and II had concluded that the Programme was '*embedded in an environment whose major determinants are beyond its control. The long term success of the project...is therefore crucially dependent upon clarification of the assumptions and risks involved...*'<sup>8</sup> The evaluation report made a clear recommendation that a proper analysis of the problem should be conducted '*in order to identify appropriate and manageable solutions and viable alternatives and, most importantly to identify the risks involved*'. Despite the report's recommendations (which had been made available to the seminar participants in draft form), the seminar did not seek to further identify and analyse the assumptions underlying programme objectives. Instead the focus was on specifying corrective measures to address the shortcomings of Phase II's design.

A statement of the problems to be addressed by Phase III does not appear until the Financing Proposal (first drafted in 1992 and approved in 1994). The problem statement reads in full:

"The problems to be addressed are: the shortages of qualified human resources in Sub-Saharan African countries, particularly in sectors that are essential for their development; the 'brain-drain', and the difficulties faced by qualified Africans residing abroad to return to their country of origin (financial constraints; lack of knowledge about real employment opportunities).

To this end, the recommendations put forth during the Harare evaluation seminar as well as those of the external evaluation have been taken into account, and relevant corrective measures have been taken in the design of Phase III. In particular, the definition of the programme's target groups has been specified, and it now determines that relevant qualifications and professional experience are a pre-requisite for the selection of candidates. Selection criteria have been strengthened accordingly, and guidelines for the recruitment in industrialised countries have been revised to provide the necessary link with the receiving countries' priorities in the field of manpower development. The training and set up of support groups comprised of appropriate government counterparts and representatives of the private sector, provision for the facilitation of self-employed activities, including advisory services and project viability assessments have also been included in the new project to sustain the institution building component of the programme."<sup>9</sup>

Although the Financial Proposal was drafted at the end of 1992, it was not approved until February 1994. The reasons for such a long delay are not very clear, but seem to stem from two causes:

<sup>8</sup> Evaluation Report - Reintegration of Qualified African Nationals, Final Report, April 1992

<sup>9</sup> Return and Reintegration of Qualified African Nationals - Phase III, Financing Proposal VIII/1040/92-N



1. Concerns on the part of EU member states about the relevance and cost-effectiveness of the programme<sup>10</sup>.
2. Reluctance on the part of some participating countries to agree to the financing arrangements, especially those concerning disbursement.

The first Financing Proposal was submitted by IOM to the Commission in June 1992, with a total budget of MECU 17.36 to cover 15 target countries. Following a prolonged period of negotiations, the final version was submitted by IOM in October 1994, with a total budget of MECU 13.43 to cover 11 target countries. Table 2-1 summarises the main changes between the first and the last drafts of the financing proposal. In absolute terms the major reductions were to *Direct Costs for Recruitment & Placement* (-36%), *Institution Building & Counterpart Training* (-43%), and *Indirect & Administration Costs* (-29%), as compared to an overall reduction in the budget of 23%. However, the number of target countries was reduced from 15 to 11, so that only *Direct Costs for Recruitment & Placement* (-13%), *Institution Building & Counterpart Training* (-23%) were significantly reduced on a per country basis.

Table 2-1: Summary of Revisions in Cost Estimates for RQAN III

Budget Item	June 1992 ECU	Oct 1994 ECU	% Change in Budget:	
			Total	Per target country
I. Direct Costs				
1. Direct Support to Returnees	10,745,500	8,899,000	-17%	+13%
2. Direct Costs for Recruitment & Placement	3,692,060	2,362,121	-36%	-13%
3. Institution Building & Counterpart Training	240,570	136,276	-43%	-23%
Sub-total	14,678,130	11,397,397	-22%	+6%
II. Indirect & Administration Costs				
1. African countries	1,509,840	1,053,741	-30%	-5%
2. Industrialised countries	164,300	139,200	-15%	+16%
Sub-total	1,674,140	1,192,941	-29%	-3%
III. Evaluation, Monitoring & Auditing	180,390	180,390	0%	+36%
Contingency	826,633	659,273	-20%	+9%
Total	17,359,293	13,430,000	-23%	+5%

Source: IOM Geneva

With regard to the second issue, the consultants were not able to gather any direct documentary evidence of the specific concerns of African governments about the funding and disbursement arrangements. However, a number of National Authorising Officers (NAOs) expressed their dissatisfaction with the funding

<sup>10</sup> "...the extension of the project to a third phase has been discussed for some time within the Commission, with the Delegations in the participating countries,, and with IOM. These discussions concentrated on two sets of issues: firstly, it was questioned whether the socio-economic environment in many African countries are sufficiently favourable to a durable reintegration of qualified Africans, and thus whether it is appropriate to finance their return; and secondly, how to improve the project's modalities in order to improve its qualitative output, as recommended by the external evaluation." Minutes of the 292nd Session of the EDF Committee, Brussels, 25th January 1994

arrangement whereby NIP funds were disbursed directly from Brussels to IOM, Geneva, without the requirement for approval by the NAO. It also seems that in general participating African governments were looking for greater direct involvement in programme implementation than had been the case in Phases I and II.

One unusual aspect about this programme's design phase is that the Financing Proposal was drafted by IOM. Furthermore, it seems that IOM was in direct contact with prospective participating African governments during the period of programme preparation to discuss their possible involvement. It is the evaluation team's opinion that IOM's central role in the programme's design resulted in a number of problems which have affected implementation:

- IOM were not sufficiently experienced in planning techniques such as the logical framework approach, critical path analysis and resource scheduling to ensure a well-planned programme
- IOM maintained a strong design bias towards the modalities of Phases I and II, so that Phase III was designed to address the shortcomings of Phase II's design, rather than in response to a rigorous problem analysis
- by their involvement in direct negotiations with prospective participating governments, IOM's future relationship with the NAO and other government stakeholders may have been prejudiced where disagreements arose over the unusual disbursement arrangements

## 2.2 Coherence and Realism of Project Design

As part of the Financing Proposal, a logical framework matrix was drawn up. A slightly revised version was included in IOM's Operational Plan, produced in mid-1995. Copies of both of these logframes can be found in Appendices 3 and 4.

The consultants have assessed both the logframe contained in the Financing Proposal, and that contained in the Operational Plan. They have been evaluated in terms of the following criteria:

1. Intervention logic:
  - are the objectives clearly stated?
  - are they 'realistic', 'specific' and 'measurable'?<sup>11</sup>
  - are the means-ends relationships sufficiently clear?
2. Objectively verifiable indicators:
  - are indicators specific to the objectives, sensitive to change in the duration of the programme?
  - do they specify quantity, quality and time?

<sup>11</sup> 'Realistic' - can the objective be achieved within the duration and resources of the project?  
'Specific' - can achievement of the objective be attributed specifically to the project? 'Measurable' - can achievement of the objective be effectively measured and at acceptable cost?

### 3. Sources of verification:

- are sources of verification adequate and cost effective to collect the specified information?

### 4. Assumptions:

- are assumptions relevant and realistic?
- are they sufficiently well-specified to facilitate monitoring of their effect on project implementation?

#### 2.2.1 Intervention Logic

**Overall objective** - Based on discussions with stakeholders during country visits, it is unclear what 'enhancing the role and utilisation of...African personnel' means. Some participating governments in post-conflict countries saw the programme as having a role in the national reconciliation process, but no stakeholder was able to articulate a more specific interpretation of this objective.

It is not realistic to expect the return of 40-60 nationals in various economic sectors to have a measurable impact on the development of participating countries. Even if it were possible, so many other factors influence a country's development, that it would be impossible to establish causality by separating out the specific impact of the programme.

**Programme Goal** - It is unclear what 'to contribute to fostering the receiving country's human resources capacity' actually means. As with the Overall Objective, stakeholders were unable to provide any clarification on its meaning, other than that each country needs all the qualified and skilled manpower it can find. This objective is not clearly stated and seems unrealistic given the numbers of returnees involved.

**Project Purpose and Results** - According to the conventions of Project Cycle Management (PCM), results describe the goods and services provided by the project, while the project purpose describes the utilisation of these goods and services by the intended users. However, in the Financing Proposal logframe the phrasing of the project purpose ('to assist...' or 'to promote...') refers more to the services provided by the programme than to the utilisation of these services by returnees, their employers or participating governments.

In fact, there is little difference between the purpose and the results. Lack of clarity of the programme goal, and poor definition of the project purpose has led to an over-concentration on the numbers and mechanics of the return process, and neglect of the potential and actual 'downstream' effects of skills and knowledge transfer in the workplace. Perhaps one reason for this is the inclusion of the additional level of 'Programme Goal', leading to confusion between this and the project purpose.

**Activities** - Activities are summarised in the logframe, and specified in more detail in Annex VI of the Financing Proposal. In line with the comments above, there is insufficient specification of activities related to institutionalisation of the programme. Furthermore, the sequence of activities related to recruitment and

placement implies a supply-driven rather than demand-driven approach to placements, reflecting Phase III's similarities with Phase II.

### 2.2.2 Objectively Verifiable Indicators

No indicators are specified for the Overall Objective in the Financing Proposal logframe, reflecting the lack of definition of this objective. In IOM's Operational Plan, the indicators are more appropriate (notwithstanding comments above about confusion between the levels of the logframe) but imply a trend towards higher qualifications which reflects a narrow focus on only one category of the specified target group.

The Financing Proposal OVI for the Programme Goal would be satisfied by the simple fact of all placements being made within identified priority sectors. This is more a compliance criterion than an indicator of project performance. The Operational Plan provides an additional indicator of career development which would provide useful information about the contribution made by returnees, but is unlikely to be sensitive to change in the short to medium term.

Of the 5 indicators specified for the Project Purpose (or Programme Specific Objectives), 3 are highly subjective relying on a self-assessment of returnee impact. Data on these indicators will not contribute to an objective measurement of programme effects and impact. The remaining 2 indicators (concerning the durability of placements) are relevant indicators of sustainability, but not of effects or impact.

### 2.2.3 Sources of Verification

The various sources of verification listed in the logframe are:

- regular assessment of the priority sectors for employment of returnees
- six-monthly reviews
- external mid-term evaluation
- external terminal evaluation
- IOM computer database
- population and sample surveys of assisted returnees (by IOM)
- monitoring of the reintegration process of the returnees (by IOM)
- technical/managerial backstopping monitoring (external expert)

All of these (except the external evaluations) have been used to monitor programme progress, indicating that the methods used are within the capability of IOM. Expenditure to date on monitoring and evaluation has been 46% of budget, so it seems that the methods used are cost-efficient. However, questions arise about the cost-effectiveness of the surveys and of the IOM computer database - the former because of questions about the objectivity of the data collected (see comments above about indicators for the Project Purpose); the latter because of concerns about the flexibility of the database programme (see section 4.2.7 below).

### 2.2.4 Assumptions

Assumptions should be assessed in terms of the degree to which they are likely to affect project implementation, and the probability of their being realised.

Assumptions which are expected to have a significant influence on project implementation, but are considered unlikely to be realised are often described as 'killer assumptions'. Table 2-2 lists the assumptions and provides comments on their relevance and suitability for monitoring.

Table 2-2: Comments on Assumptions Specified in Financing Proposal Logframe Matrix

Assumption	Comment
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Governments of recipient countries make efforts to implement appropriate personnel policies, and to render labour market regulation more efficient</li> </ul>	Unrealistic to expect government to make policy changes in response to the anticipated return of between 40 and 100 individuals
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Governments make efforts to establish manpower plans to identify priority sectors for employment of returnees, and support IOM in identifying concrete job vacancies</li> </ul>	Unrealistic to expect governments to establish sectoral manpower plans in response to the anticipated return of between 40 and 100 individuals. A more appropriate assumption would have been that sufficient manpower information exists to facilitate a meaningful identification of priority sectors.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Support obtained from receiving countries to facilitate the transfer of human resources</li> </ul>	Relevant assumption which can be influenced by programme's efforts to gain specific country agreements.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The security situation in countries of return allows for project implementation</li> </ul>	Potential killer assumption which should have formed the basis for decision on start-up of programme on a country-by-country basis.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Working conditions are considered reasonable</li> </ul>	As above. Requires further specification (eg. salary levels, quality and availability of housing and schooling) in order to facilitate monitoring.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Support groups meet regularly</li> </ul>	Not a relevant assumption during project implementation as this is part of the intervention logic.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Government counterparts participate actively in project implementation</li> </ul>	As above.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Active implication of government counterparts in project implementation</li> </ul>	As above.

Given the clear recommendations contained in the evaluation of Phases I and II, the consultants feel that assumptions have been insufficiently specified, and have not been built into the monitoring arrangements of the programme.

A suggested revised logframe matrix is presented in Appendix 4. It must be stressed that this draft version 3 is intended only as a discussion document. Its basic premise is that the service provided by the programme is the return of skills and experience to participating countries. Its Project Purpose therefore focuses on the 'downstream effects' of returnees, and reflects the consultants' views on what is realistic, specific and measurable within the period of implementation remaining. However, this logframe has been formulated without stakeholder participation. To involve stakeholders in each target country in a reformulation of programme objectives is not feasible in the time remaining, and it is not recommended that such an exercise be undertaken.

### 3. Relevance of the Project

#### 3.1 Objectives

Relevance assesses the problems to be solved and the project's objectives against their physical and policy environment. Due to the absence of a rigorous problem analysis during project preparation, and lack of clarity in definition of objectives, the assessment of RQAN's relevance is limited to whether shortages of highly qualified, qualified and skilled manpower exist in the participating countries, and whether the return of this target group is relevant to the social, economic and political features of each country.

In general all participating countries can be said to experience severe deficiencies in human resource capacity in both public and private sectors. However, manpower planning is often an area in which information is not readily available, and so it is difficult to quantify these shortages.

With regard to the social, economic and political environment, examining the realisation of assumptions provides a good indication of the relevance of the programme. This can be found in table 5-7, section 5.1.7. The main points to emerge are:

- The poor security situation in Sierra Leone has prevented the programme from starting up
- The poor security situation in Angola has seriously affected programme implementation and is largely responsible for the return of only 3 candidates to date. Programme operations should not have commenced until a political settlement had been reached between the Government and UNITA
- The post-conflict situation in Mozambique has adversely affected programme implementation, and programme operations were probably started too soon
- Despite insurgency problems in Uganda, the security situation does not appear to have discouraged ex-patriated Ugandans from returning. The government is committed to the reconstruction and reconciliation process, and has put in place legislation to encourage immigration and investment by Ugandans abroad. Public sector salaries are low, but the economic growth rate is high, and investment and employment opportunities exist in the small but growing private sector
- The post conflict situation in Ethiopia has adversely affected programme implementation. On the UNDP Human Development Index, Ethiopia is the fourth poorest country in the world. Salaries are low, adequate housing is scarce and the costs of living are high
- The poor economic situation in Zambia has adversely affected programme implementation, with only a small number of ex-patriated Zambians demonstrating a desire to return. Public sector salaries are extremely low, and the cost of living is high by comparison. Private sector salaries are also low in comparison to the costs of housing and schooling
- Despite recent falls in Ghana's economic growth rate, the economic and political conditions remain highly conducive to the return of nationals. Although no figures were available at the time of the evaluation, the high rate of return under the programme is evidence of the generally favourable conditions

### 3.2 Changes in Commitments

All target countries expressed their desire to participate in Phase III. Their views of the role of RQAN in their particular countries are summarised in table 3-1 below.

Table 3-1: Extracts from Country Statements to Harare Seminar

Country	Statements
Angola	"One third of [the] population...had migrated abroad due to the civil war and its destabilising effects. Now that the peace process had begun in Angola, the Government has recognised the need to attract back its nationals."
Cap Verde	"The lack of qualified manpower is due to the emigration of qualified nationals, forced to leave mainly because of social and economic factors."
Ethiopia	"After many years of civil strife and conflict...Ethiopia must now focus its attention on the assistance and resettlement of the thousands of Ethiopians displaced by the war."
Ghana	"The Government would now like to foster an increase in placements in the private sector...and also expressed its interest in increasing the recruitment of highly qualified and professionally experienced managers for placements in key positions in the public sector and state enterprises, as well as the private sector."
Guinea Bissau	"The Delegate...noted that the return of nationals will be of utmost importance to his country, especially in the policy management and economic sectors...Great importance is placed on the return of small entrepreneurs and the self-employed."
Kenya	"Kenya continues to experience shortages of qualified manpower, especially of engineers, doctors, town planners, academics, as well as technicians and craftsmen. Kenya...believes that incentives must be established to entice professionals...to settle in non-urban and rural areas."
Mozambique	Did not attend seminar
Sierra Leone	"The Delegate noted that the primary problem facing Sierra Leone [was] the exodus of highly qualified professionals, especially University Professors in the fields of science and medicine, which was triggered by a difficult economic environment."
Uganda	"Twenty years of war coupled with political and economic mismanagement have made Uganda one of the countries most severely affected by the outflow of skilled manpower...The Government of Uganda wishes to extend the programme...to qualified nationals living within the region and to include a component for the implementation of small enterprises."
Zambia	"Phase III should include a regional component and assistance to returning self-employed entrepreneurs. It is recognised that these newly developed components could facilitate the transfer of technology, encourage employment creation and income generation, and strengthen the informal sector's ability to serve as a national 'sponge' to absorb surplus manpower."
Zimbabwe	"The main areas of concern highlighted by the Government are health and higher education."

Target countries can be broadly separated into 3 groups:

- those committed to RQAN as a means of contributing to the process of national reconstruction and reconciliation following a period of conflict (Angola, Ethiopia, and Uganda)
- those wishing RQAN to address particular sectoral concerns (Kenya, Sierra Leone, Zambia and Zimbabwe)
- those with more general objectives for RQAN (Cap Verde, Ghana, Guinea Bissau)

In December 1996 IOM Brussels met with the Ambassadors of Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe, and with the Charges d'Affairs of Angola and Kenya who made the following comments:

- Uganda - the programme should give more emphasis to placements in the private sector in view of the economic reforms and privatisation process Uganda is undergoing
- Zimbabwe - the placement potential is in the private sector, mainly the small manufacturing sector
- Zambia - opportunities exist in agricultural development, particularly small enterprises, and the self-employment component should be targeted in this sector
- Angola - current conditions do not favour return. If it is decided to discontinue the programme in Angola, IOM could explore the possibility of using funds for demobilisation and reinsertion.
- Kenya - the programme should look at assisting the return of Kenyan students from the CIS

The evaluation team feels that any changes that might be indicated by the above comments are not a reflection of a fundamental change in commitment, but rather of the lack of definition of country-specific objectives which enables different stakeholders to interpret programme objectives in different ways.

### 3.3 Structural Adjustment Programmes

Although attempts have been made to link RQAN more closely with SAPs, this has generally not been possible at a practical level. Most priority sector sheets developed in target countries reflect priorities identified in SAP-related studies and documents. However, progress in implementation of the public sector reform components of SAPs has generally been poor. While a significant number of placements have been made in the public sector these cannot be described as a coordinated response to SAPs.

With regard to the recruitment of ex-patriates, it is only in Zimbabwe that the government has a concerted policy of recruitment. It appears that this is a planned response to the temporary absence of nationals on study leave overseas, and is therefore not in conflict with the programme.

### 3.4 Complementarity and Coordination

#### 3.4.1 Complementarity

Complementarity refers to integration between EU development cooperation policy and those pursued by the member states.

There is no evidence of any complementarity. Where programmes are being operated which offer opportunities for complementarity (eg. the World Bank funded Enterprise Development Programme and ODA's Merit Awards for doctors in Zambia), linkages have not been developed. Attempts by IOM to develop closer links with the TOKTEN programme which operates in a number of the target countries have not proved successful, usually due to an apparent lack of interest on the part of UNDP.



### 3.4.2 Coordination

Coordination refers to mutual consultation about development policies, and in particular to actions mutually agreed between the European Commission, member states and third countries.

There is some evidence of consultation (for example, between RQAN and the EU-funded Human Resource Development Programme in Uganda) but no evidence of mutually agreed actions.

## 4. Efficiency

Table 4-1 summarises total expenditure against the cost estimate and financing plan, and table 4-2 summarises total expenditure by source of funding.

### 4.1 Means and Costs

The purpose of an analysis of the means and costs is to determine the level of cost-effectiveness with which physical means and financial costs have been utilised during activities in order to achieve project results. For RQAN III this means the cost-effectiveness with which returnees have been recruited and placed, support groups have been established, and counterparts trained. To relate activities to expenditure under the cost codes of the programme budget, the 16 activities listed in Annex 1A-4 of the Technical Cooperation Agreement (TCA) can be summarised as follows:

- activities related to recruitment
- activities related to placement and reintegration
- activities related to institution building and counterpart training

Unfortunately, it is not possible to disaggregate expenditure data to these three types of activity as IOM does not maintain records of expenditure against RQAN budget headings by country. By necessity, the assessment is limited to:

- analysis of total staff costs by mission (not distinguishing between Direct Programme Activity Costs, and Institution Building and Counterpart Training)
- analysis of direct support to returnees by country of destination

Table 4-1: Summary of Expenditure Against Cost Estimate and Financing Plan  
(Jan 1995 - Nov 1996)

BUDGET ITEM	Source	Budget (ECU)	Expenditure (ECU)	% Exp.
<b>I. DIRECT COSTS</b>				
1. Direct Support to Returnees				
a) Direct support to returnees from industrialised countries to target countries	NIP	5,185,000	1,157,823	22%
b) Direct support to placed cases on an intra-regional basis	NIP	534,000	27,731	5%
c) Cost of cases exceeding the indicative number, plus cost of returnees to other countries	RIP	2,550,000	108,045	4%
d) Direct support to self-employed cases (additional direct support of ECU 4,500/case)	RIP	630,000	32,474	5%
Sub-total I.1		8,899,000	1,326,073	15%
2. Direct Programme Activity Costs for the Recruitment and Placement of Returnees				
a) Direct support costs for pre-departure assistance, programme information dissemination, identification, pre-selection, recruitment and counselling	RIP	692,740	385,758	56%
b) Direct support costs for job identification and placement	RIP	738,160	255,218	35%
c) Direct support costs for the project monitoring and follow-up of the reintegration process	RIP	738,163	342,429	46%
d) Direct support costs for activities related to self-employment	RIP	179,430	73,040	41%
e) Collection and dissemination of available manpower plans of development priorities in the field of socio-economic development	RIP	13,628	4,444	33%
Sub-total I.2		2,362,121	1,060,889	45%
3. Institution Building and Counterpart Training	RIP	136,276	44,434	33%
<b>TOTAL I.</b>		<b>11,397,397</b>	<b>2,431,396</b>	<b>21%</b>
<b>II. INDIRECT AND ADMINISTRATION COSTS</b>				
1. African ACP countries (general office, communication and transport)	RIP	1,053,741	404,185	38%
2. Industrialised Countries (general office, communication and transport)	RIP	139,200	181,660	131%
<b>TOTAL II.</b>		<b>1,192,941</b>	<b>585,845</b>	<b>49%</b>
<b>III. EVALUATION, MONITORING (TECHNICAL AND MANAGERIAL BACKSTOPPING) AND AUDITING</b>				
1. Evaluation				
a) Monitoring and surveys (including mid-term)	RIP	14,340	0	0%
b) Backstopping missions	RIP	64,800	50,647	78%
c) End of project seminar	RIP	81,000	0	0%
Sub-total II.1		160,140	50,647	32%
2. External Auditing	RIP	20,250	0	0%
<b>TOTAL III.</b>		<b>180,390</b>	<b>50,647</b>	<b>28%</b>
<b>TOTAL I+II+III</b>		<b>12,770,728</b>	<b>3,067,888</b>	<b>24%</b>
Contingencies (5%)	RIP	659,273	0	0%
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b>13,430,001</b>	<b>3,067,888</b>	<b>23%</b>
Less advance contribution to Bridging Fund (paid from Regional Cooperation funds)	RIP	-730,000	730,000	-100%
<b>GRAND TOTAL</b>		<b>12,700,001</b>	<b>3,797,888</b>	<b>30%</b>

Source: Technical Cooperation Agreement, Annex IA-3, 16.11.94; and RQAN III programme accounts

#### 4.1.1 Staff Costs by Mission

Staff costs disaggregated by Placement Mission, Recruitment Mission and Geneva HQ are presented in the following tables. A summary is presented in table 4-1.

Table 4-2: Summary of Staff Costs and Cost Ratios for Placement Missions, Recruitment Missions and Geneva HQ

Total Staff Costs for:	Mission Staff Costs (\$)			Total Returns			Staff Costs per Returnee (\$)		
	1995	1996	Total	1995	1996	Total	1995	1996	Total
Placement Missions*	204,273	334,456	538,729	52	117	169	3,928	2,859	3,188
Recruitment Missions	142,949	216,596	359,545	58	147	205	2,465	1,473	1,754
Geneva HQ	211,270	261,054	472,324	58	147	205	3,643	1,776	2,304
Total (All missions)	558,492	812,106	1,370,598	58	147	205	9,629	5,525	6,686

\* Total returns do not include intra-regional returns, for which it is assumed that Placement Missions incurred no costs  
Source: IOM, Geneva

The main points of interest are as follows:

- total staff costs increased by 45% in 1996 (from \$558,492 to \$812,106)
- staff costs per returnee decreased by 39% in 1996 (from \$10,036 to \$6,108)
- staff costs of Placement Missions accounted for 39% of total staff costs per returnee, increasing from 37% in 1995 to 41% in 1996
- staff costs of Recruitment Missions accounted for 26% of total staff costs per returnee, remaining constant during 1995 and 1996
- staff costs of Geneva HQ accounted for 34% of total staff costs per returnee, decreasing from 38% in 1995 to 32% in 1996

#### Placement Missions

A breakdown of PM staff costs is presented in table 4-3:

Table 4-3: Staff Costs and Cost Ratios by Placement Mission

Placement Mission	Mission Staff Costs (\$)			Total Returns			Staff Costs per Returnee (\$)		
	1995	1996*	Total	1995	1996	Total	1995	1996	Total
Angola	9,000	2,926	11,926	-	3	3	na	975	3,975
Cap Verde	-	-	-	-	7	7	na	-	-
Ethiopia	32,176	28,237	60,413	3	12	15	10,725	2,353	4,028
Ghana	65,567	98,339	163,906	21	29	50	3,122	3,391	3,278
Guinea Bissau	-	2,033	2,033	2	13	15	-	156	136
Kenya	1,746	13,702	15,448	7	16	23	249	856	672
Mozambique	-	41,238	41,238	1	5	6	-	8,248	6,873
Sierra Leone	-	-	-	-	-	-	na	na	na
Uganda	-	55,856	55,856	7	8	15	-	6,982	3,724
Zambia	88,240	73,927	162,167	3	12	15	29,413	6,161	10,811
Zimbabwe	7,544	18,198	25,742	8	12	20	943	1,517	1,287
Total Staff Costs for Placement	204,273	334,456	538,729	52	117	169	3,928	2,859	3,188

Source: IOM, Geneva

The main points are:

- The Ghana and Zambia missions have incurred significantly higher staff costs than other missions. While Ghana's high costs can be justified by their higher number of returns, this is not the case for Zambia, where \$88,240 was spent during 1995 during which only 3 placements were made.

- The Guinea Bissau, Kenya and Zimbabwe missions have incurred significantly lower costs.

Because a number of placement missions were not yet established in 1995, for the purposes of comparison it is probably more representative to look at staffing costs per returnee for 1996. These show that:

- Mozambique, Uganda and Zambia incurred above-average staffing costs
- Angola, Guinea Bissau, Kenya and Zimbabwe were significantly below average
- These differences cannot be explained by the differing rates of return - for example, during 1996 12 placements were made in Ethiopia at a staff cost of \$2,353 per returnee, while the same number were returned to Zambia at a staff cost of \$6,161.

During 1996 IOM paid from other sources a significant proportion of the RQAN staff costs incurred in Mozambique, Uganda and Zimbabwe. If these costs are added back in, then costs per returnee increase significantly in these countries. Therefore any improvements in overall cost effectiveness appears to have been due to supplementation of funding by IOM, rather than to any improvements in efficiency.

Table 4-4: Staff Costs and Cost Ratios by Placement Mission, including IOM Supplementary Funding

Placement Mission	IOM Suppl. Funding	Staff Costs per Returnee (\$)		
		1995	1996	Total
Mozambique	37,712	-	15,790	13,158
Uganda	42,912	-	12,346	6,585
Zimbabwe	48,295	943	5,541	3,702

Source: IOM, Geneva

### Recruitment Missions

A breakdown of RM staff costs is presented in table 4-5:

Table 4-5: Staff Costs and Cost Ratios by Recruitment Mission

Recruitment Missions	Mission Staff Costs (\$)			Total Returns			Staff Costs per Returnee (\$)		
	1995	1996*	Total	1995	1996	Total	1995	1996	Total
Australia	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	na	na
Belgium	19,294	25,301	44,595	-	-	-	na	na	na
Germany	-	39,600	39,600	-	1	1	na	39,600	39,600
Great Britain	59,872	61,951	121,823	32	41	73	1,871	1,511	1,669
Netherlands	952	538	1,490	-	-	-	na	na	na
Portugal	22,273	35,760	58,033	2	35	37	11,137	1,022	1,568
Saudi Arabia	-	590	590	-	-	-	na	na	na
Switzerland	na	na	na	-	4	3	na	na	na
USA	37,464	44,292	81,756	21	60	81	1,784	738	1,009
Intra-Regional	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
- Kenya	na	na	na	1	-	-	-	-	-
- South Africa	-	5,103	5,103	-	6	-	-	-	-
- Zaire	3,094	3,461	6,555	-	-	-	-	-	-
- Zimbabwe	na	na	na	1	1	-	-	-	-
Sub-total (Intra-regional)	3,094	8,564	11,658	2	7	9	1,547	1,223	1,295
Total Staff Costs for Recruitment**	142,949	216,596	359,545	58	147	205	2,465	1,473	1,754

\*\*\*Includes returns to non-target countries

Source: IOM, Geneva

The overall picture shows that while staffing costs for recruitment increased by 51% in 1996 (from \$142,949 in 1995, to \$216,596 in 1996), there was an accompanying increase of 153% in the number of returns during the corresponding period (from 58 to 147). Thus average recruitment costs per returnee fell by 40% (from \$2,465/returnee to \$1,473). However, when comparing the performance of different missions, a number of issues arise:

- Significant staffing costs have been incurred in Belgium (\$44,595) while no returnees have been recruited through the Brussels mission. While this mission obviously has a liaison role with the Commission in Brussels, it is unclear why such a high level of costs have been incurred.
- Significant costs have also been incurred in Germany (\$39,600) while only 1 returnee has been recruited through this mission.
- The Lisbon mission incurred \$22,273 in staff costs during 1995 but only recruited 2 returnees at a cost of \$11,137 per returnee. However, during 1996 with the increase in returnee numbers, this fell to \$1,022 per returnee.

It seems therefore that cost-effectiveness with respect to recruitment has only been achieved in Great Britain, USA, on an intra-regional basis, and in Portugal during 1996.

### Geneva HQ

Geneva HQ staff costs are presented in table 4-6:

Table 4-6: Staff Costs and Cost Ratios for Geneva HQ

Recruitment Mission	Mission Staff Costs (\$)			Total Returns			Staff Costs per Returnee (\$)		
	1995	1996*	Total	1995	1996	Total	1995	1996	Total
Switzerland(Geneva HQ)	211,270	261,054	472,324	58	147	205	3,643	1,776	2,304

Source: IOM, Geneva

The main points are:

- Staffing costs in Geneva rose by 24% in 1996 (from \$211,270 in 1995 to \$261,054 in 1996). Due to the increased rate of placements, average Geneva staff costs per returnee fell by 51% during the same period (from \$3,643 to \$1,776).
- However, this fall in costs does not appear to reflect an improvement in cost effectiveness, as during 1996 IOM contributed \$240,164 from non-RQAN sources. If these funds are included in the analysis, costs per returnee fell by only 6%.

Table 4-7: Staff Costs and Cost Ratios for Geneva HQ, including IOM Supplementary Funding

Mission	IOM Suppl. Funding	Staff Costs per Returnee (\$)		
		1995	1996	Total
Switzerland (Geneva HQ)	240,164	3,643	3,410	3,476

Source: IOM, Geneva

#### 4.1.2 Direct Support Costs

All direct support costs to returnees are funded from NIP contributions. Details of expenditure are presented in tables 4-7 and 4-8. Direct support consists of funds for:

- airfares - for the returnee and family
- integration assistance - in the form of a relocation grant
- equipment - to meet the professional requirements of the job
- shipping - for goods belonging to the returnee and family
- salary supplement - for a limited period to assist in reintegration
- training - where relevant, to meet the professional requirements of the job
- miscellaneous

Table 4-8: Total Expenditure on Direct Support Costs, by Country of Placement (\$)

Destination	Airfares	Integration Assistance	Equip.	Shipping	Salary Suppl.	Training	Misc.	Total
Angola	3,759	4,783	9,158	5,921	3,878	0	0	27,499
Cap Verde	4,536	15,297	19,066	7,350	11,472	0	0	57,721
Ethiopia	12,567	20,383	46,950	34,214	17,740	0	187	132,041
Ghana	75,472	80,913	111,626	150,794	29,210	0	6,134	454,149
Guinea Bissau	10,207	43,784	43,429	19,835	19,744	0	0	136,999
Kenya	24,963	19,600	52,140	83,976	35,520	0	102	216,301
Mozambique	13,907	9,439	11,892	11,238	5,961	0	50	52,537
Sierra Leone	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Uganda	11,350	25,801	14,754	65,719	11,926	0	40	129,590
Zambia	19,371	22,068	21,555	63,696	8,879	0	5,704	141,273
Zimbabwe	21,031	17,207	48,197	74,775	13,464	549	45	175,258
Sub-total	197,163	259,275	378,767	517,568	157,794	549	12,262	1,523,378
Non-target countries	48,029	71,421	93,776	94,360	13,879	0	138	321,603
Total (All countries)	245,192	330,696	472,543	611,928	171,673	549	12,400	1,844,981

Source: IOM, Geneva

Table 4-9: Average Expenditure on Direct Support Costs per Returnee, by Country of Placement (\$)

Destination	Airfares	Integration Assistance	Equip.	Shipping	Salary Suppl.	Training	Misc.	Total per Returnee
Angola	1,253	1,594	3,053	1,974	1,293	0	0	9,166
Cap Verde	648	2,185	2,724	1,050	1,639	0	0	8,246
Ethiopia	838	1,359	3,130	2,281	1,183	0	12	8,803
Ghana	1,509	1,618	2,233	3,016	584	0	123	9,083
Guinea Bissau	680	2,919	2,895	1,322	1,316	0	0	9,133
Kenya	1,085	852	2,267	3,651	1,544	0	4	9,404
Mozambique	2,318	1,573	1,982	1,881	994	0	8	8,756
Sierra Leone	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na
Uganda	757	1,720	984	4,381	795	0	3	8,639
Zambia	1,291	1,471	1,437	4,246	592	0	380	9,418
Zimbabwe	1,052	860	2,410	3,739	673	27	2	8,763
Sub-total	1,167	1,534	2,241	3,063	934	3	73	9,014
Non-target countries	1,334	1,984	2,605	2,621	386	0	4	8,933
Total (All countries)	1,196	1,613	2,305	2,985	837	3	60	9,000

Source: IOM, Geneva

The average amount for direct financial assistance to returnees is \$10,000 for returns from industrialised countries, and \$7,000 for intra-regional returns. Thus the maximum expenditure allowable to date is:

$$\begin{aligned}
 \$10,000 \times 169 \text{ industrialised country returns} &= \$1,690,000 \\
 \$7,000 \times 36 \text{ intra-regional returns} &= \$252,000 \\
 &= \$1,942,000
 \end{aligned}$$

In fact, a total of \$1,844,981 has been spent, representing a saving of 5% (\$97,019) against the budget. It has not been possible to disaggregate direct support costs by country and by industrialised/intra-regional return, thus for the purpose of country comparisons table 4-8 presents costs of industrialised and intra-regional returns combined.

Table 4-10: Utilisation of Direct Support Costs, by Country of Placement

Country	Average Cost (\$)	% Utilisation
Angola	9166	97%
Cap Verde	8246	87%
Ethiopia	8803	93%
Ghana	9083	96%
Guinea Bissau	9133	96%
Kenya	9404	99%
Mozambique	8756	92%
Sierra Leone	na	na
Uganda	8639	91%
Zambia	9418	99%
Zimbabwe	8763	93%
All target countries	9014	95%
Non-target countries	na	94%
Total (All countries)	na	95%

Source: IOM, Geneva


In line with figures for total expenditure, all countries average 95% expenditure of budget ceilings per returnee, with savings varying from 13% in Cap Verde to only 1% in Kenya and Zambia. Unsurprisingly, returnees to landlocked countries tended to incur higher shipping costs, while returnees to Lusophone countries incurred significantly lower costs reflecting the fact that virtually all Lusophone returnees returned from Portugal rather than further afield. However, no deeper conclusions can be drawn as the amount of goods shipped varied from returnee to returnee.

## 4.2 Organisation, Management and Monitoring

### 4.2.1 Organisational Structure

Duties and responsibilities of the main actors involved directly in programme implementation are described in the Operational Plan. In general, the roles and responsibilities of the various actors are well defined. Figure 4-1 summarises the current organisation structure of RQAN III and its relationship with the Commission and participating governments.

Figure 4-1: RQAN III Organisational Structure



#### 4.2.2 IOM

Without exception, the IOM staff met by the evaluation team (in Geneva and in Placement Missions) are highly motivated and committed to programme implementation, and very hard-working. All activities for which IOM is responsible have been carried out, although with varying degrees of efficiency and effectiveness. Field staff are generally aware of the constraints affecting programme implementation, and have adopted a flexible, pragmatic approach to the carrying out of activities.

However, this flexibility has not translated into modifications to the programme design to take account of country-specific conditions. This is of critical importance given questions about the soundness of the programme's design. For example, it is accepted among the field staff in a number of countries that under current arrangements and procedures, counterparts and support groups do not represent an effective strategy for institutionalisation of the programme, yet activities related to institution building have not been critically reviewed. The following tables list the activities to be undertaken by each main agent within IOM, and provides brief comments on the success with which they have been carried out. As the subsequent analysis demonstrates, IOM has made strenuous efforts to carry out all activities; what has been lacking is the strategic planning capability to assess the effectiveness of their efforts.



Placement Missions

Key: ✓ = carried out

~ = partially carried out

X = not carried out

Activity	Carried out?	Comment
1. Making contacts with governments of recipient African states, in order to identify priority employment sectors to be strengthened, including opportunities for self-employment in liberal professions.	✓	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Strong bias towards the public sector</li> <li>• Lack of prioritisation between priority sectors, and within identified job types</li> <li>• Self-employment opportunities not well identified</li> </ul>
2. Identifying concrete job vacancies in the participating ACP countries through contacts with business circles, private and state enterprises, and government administration.	✓	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Insufficient involvement of private sector due to over-reliance on support groups as mechanism</li> <li>• No systematic ranking of identified jobs</li> </ul>
6. Rendering services in performing 'job broker' activities between potential employers and African candidates.	✓	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Successfully carried out although very time-consuming</li> <li>• Some incidences of poor communication between placement and recruitment missions, leading to candidates or jobs dropping out of roster</li> </ul>
9. Obtaining support from the receiving governments to speed up the transfer of human resources.	✓	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• X out of 10 countries have memoranda of understanding concerning customs duties and immigration formalities</li> </ul>
10. Identifying training opportunities for returnees in cases where specific additional training is required for taking up certain jobs.	X	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Only \$549 has been spent on returnee training</li> <li>• PMs tend to wait for requests from returnees rather than assessing training needs</li> </ul>
11. Keeping regular contacts with the returnees after their return, and provide advisory services if required, in order to assist them in the reintegration process.	✓	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• High response rate to follow-up survey</li> <li>• PM staff have excellent relationship with returnees, and are considered to be very supportive by returnees</li> <li>• X% of returnees rated PM assistance as very satisfactory or satisfactory in addressing reintegration problems</li> </ul>
12. Consulting regularly with government authorities to further the institutionalisation and sustainability of the project.	~	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Discussions have been held with all counterparts (where appointed), but modalities of institutionalisation have not been developed</li> </ul>
13. Arranging specific training for the selected government counterparts, in order to involve them directly in the project implementation.	✓	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Informal training has been conducted to familiarise counterparts with IOM recruitment and placement procedures</li> <li>• All counterparts (where appointed) are involved directly in project implementation through chairing of support group meetings, and endorsement of matched candidates</li> <li>• Training 'component' does not have well-developed objectives</li> </ul>
14. Identifying appropriate institutions and persons to form support groups.	✓	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Over-representation of public sector</li> <li>• While organisational representation at meetings has been reasonable, often the individuals attending lack the authority or knowledge to undertake a steering role within the programme</li> </ul>
15. Assisting and providing facilities for support group meetings.	✓	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Some countries have taken over payment of costs for support group meetings (sitting allowances, refreshments, etc.)</li> </ul>
16. Recruiting a limited amount of temporary local personnel in each of the target countries for carrying out tasks required on the spot, coordinated by one of the four regional IOM offices.	✓	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• There is an IOM office in each target country (except Sierra Leone), but start-up dates vary between countries which has affected implementation</li> </ul>

Recruitment Missions

Activity	Carried out?	Comment
4. Making contacts through the organisation's existing network with universities, professional organisations etc., to identify suitably qualified candidates, in accordance with [the above mentioned] guidelines.	✓	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Carried out in accordance with guidelines</li> <li>• Recruitment approach is through promotion of the programme rather than identified job vacancies</li> <li>• Most candidates fall into highly qualified category</li> </ul>

## Recruitment Mission cont.d

5. Identifying and selecting candidates for self-employment based on the evaluation of their professional background, training, experience, entrepreneurial capacity in close cooperation with the competent national authorities in the receiving country.	~	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Only X candidates identified so far, of which 3 have returned</li> <li>Based on evaluation survey, not many returnees were aware of the self-employment loan, therefore publicity seems to be lacking</li> </ul>
6. Rendering services in performing 'job broker' activities between potential employers and African candidates.	✓	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Successfully carried out - returnees very appreciative of RM role in matching them to jobs</li> <li>Some incidences of poor communication between placement and recruitment missions, leading to candidates or jobs dropping out of roster</li> </ul>
7. Providing adequate incentives to retain highly qualified, qualified and skilled human resources.	✓	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Although \$10,000 does not represent a substantial incentive, only X% of returnees have changed jobs</li> </ul>
8. Purchasing of equipment and the handling of all documents related to the transfer of the selected candidates and equipment, organisation of movement and reception in the receiving country.	✓	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Equipment considered helpful by returnees, although in landlocked countries (Uganda, Zambia) high shipping costs mean that insufficient funds remain for purchase of equipment</li> <li>Many returnees experience problems with customs clearance on arrival. PMs assist as much as possible, but memoranda of understanding not always implemented fully</li> </ul>

## Geneva HQ

Activity	Carried out?	Comment
3. Designing guidelines for the recruitment of African nationals in industrialised countries in order to assess the qualities of the returnees such as management leadership, capacity to transfer knowledge and technology, etc., besides formal educational qualifications, in accordance with the defined target groups of the programme.	✓	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Geneva HQ has produced guidelines for all aspects of programme implementation (see table X)</li> <li>Guidelines generally considered useful by PMs and RMs</li> <li>Target group specification not sufficiently well-developed - lack of operational differentiation between highly qualified, qualified and skilled with consequent over-representation by highly qualified returnees</li> <li>Monitoring guidelines weakened by specification of too many indicators</li> </ul>

As tables 4-11 and 4-12 show, returnees are largely satisfied with the services provided by IOM, and during focus group discussions they commented that both RM and PM staff had generally been extremely helpful and supportive.

Table 4-11: Returnee Satisfaction with IOM Recruitment Services

How satisfied were you with programme procedures for:	Countries							Total
	Ang	Eth	Gha	Moz	Ug	Zam	Zim	
1. Screening and approving your application								
Very satisfied	0 0%	6 86%	4 33%	0 0%	4 36%	3 38%	7 64%	24 44%
Satisfied	3 100%	1 14%	6 50%	3 100%	6 55%	3 38%	3 27%	25 45%
Not satisfied	0 0%	0 0%	2 17%	0 0%	1 9%	2 25%	0 0%	5 9%
(blank)	0 0%	0 0%	0 0%	0 0%	0 0%	0 0%	1 9%	1 2%
Total	3 100%	7 100%	12 100%	3 100%	11 100%	8 100%	11 100%	55 100%
2. Matching you with a job								
Very satisfied	0 0%	5 71%	1 8%	1 33%	1 9%	1 13%	4 36%	13 24%
Satisfied	3 100%	0 0%	3 25%	0 0%	2 18%	3 38%	0 0%	11 20%
Not satisfied	0 0%	0 0%	1 8%	2 67%	4 36%	2 25%	0 0%	9 16%
Found own job	0 0%	1 14%	7 58%	0 0%	4 36%	2 25%	5 45%	19 35%
(blank)	0 0%	1 14%	0 0%	0 0%	0 0%	0 0%	2 18%	3 5%
Total	3 100%	7 100%	12 100%	3 100%	11 100%	8 100%	11 100%	55 100%
3. Preparing you and your family for departure								
Very satisfied	1 33%	6 86%	3 25%	1 33%	5 45%	1 13%	5 45%	22 40%
Satisfied	2 67%	1 14%	5 42%	1 33%	5 45%	5 63%	2 18%	21 38%
Not satisfied	0 0%	0 0%	4 33%	1 33%	0 0%	2 25%	2 18%	9 16%
(blank)	0 0%	0 0%	0 0%	0 0%	1 9%	0 0%	2 18%	3 5%
Total	3 100%	7 100%	12 100%	3 100%	11 100%	8 100%	11 100%	55 100%
4. Providing you with financial and material assistance								
Very satisfied	0 0%	3 43%	5 42%	0 0%	3 27%	0 0%	4 36%	15 27%
Satisfied	2 67%	3 43%	6 50%	1 33%	6 55%	4 50%	2 18%	24 44%
Not satisfied	0 0%	1 14%	1 8%	2 67%	2 18%	4 50%	3 27%	13 24%
(blank)	1 33%	0 0%	0 0%	0 0%	0 0%	0 0%	2 18%	3 5%
Total	3 100%	7 100%	12 100%	3 100%	11 100%	8 100%	11 100%	55 100%

Table 4-12: Returnee Satisfaction After Return


	Countries								Total
	Ang	Eth	Gha	Moz	Ug	Zam	Zim		
1. Since your return, how satisfied are you with your job (from a professional point of view)									
Very satisfied	0 0%	4 57%	2 17%	0 0%	3 27%	4 50%	5 45%	18 33%	
Satisfied	2 67%	3 43%	8 67%	2 67%	6 55%	1 13%	4 36%	26 47%	
Not Satisfied	1 33%	0 0%	2 17%	1 33%	2 18%	3 38%	1 9%	10 18%	
(blank)	0 0%	0 0%	0 0%	0 0%	0 0%	0 0%	1 9%	1 2%	
Total	3 100%	7 100%	12 100%	3 100%	11 100%	8 100%	11 100%	55 100%	
2. How has IOM assisted you in addressing reintegration problems you or your family may have experienced?									
Very well	1 33%	2 29%	0 0%	0 0%	1 9%	0 0%	2 18%	6 11%	
Satisfactorily	0 0%	4 57%	3 25%	1 33%	6 55%	3 38%	2 18%	19 35%	
Not at all	2 67%	0 0%	6 50%	1 33%	1 9%	5 63%	1 9%	16 29%	
(blank)	0 0%	1 14%	3 25%	1 33%	3 27%	0 0%	6 55%	14 25%	
Total	3 100%	7 100%	12 100%	3 100%	11 100%	8 100%	11 100%	55 100%	

Overall, IOM has carried out required activities, yet achievement of indicative targets remains low in all countries except Ghana and Zimbabwe. This has been for a number of reasons, including external factors (such as non-realisation of the assumption that economic conditions are conducive to return). However, the evaluation team feels that there has been insufficient critical review of the reasons underlying the low rates of return, and therefore activities have not been modified to take account of problems experienced. In other words, the programme has been implemented in a 'blue-print' rather than a 'process' manner.

### Promotion, Recruitment and Placement

Of central importance to the success of the programme are recruitment and placement activities. An important aspect in the design of Phase III, which differentiates it from Phases I and II, is the requirement that placements are demand driven. However, this concept has not been developed by IOM. The existing practice is simply to ensure that identified job vacancies are in identified priority sectors, and that a local scarcity of suitably qualified manpower exists. At the same time, recruitment missions identify potential candidates through a general promotion strategy whereby the programme is promoted but specific job vacancies are not. Thus placement activities and recruitment activities are carried out separately. The job brokering role is confined to matching the candidate roster to the job roster, resulting in the ad hoc placement of candidates as and when a match can be made. The matching process is summarised in Figure 4-2:

Figure 4-2: The Matching Process



This approach has a number of effects:

- The return process is largely driven by the supply of candidates than the demand for skills, contrary to the requirements of the TCA and to the stated intentions of IOM<sup>12</sup>
- There is a poor match between the candidate rosters and job rosters, meaning that much time is wasted in processing candidates for whom no realistic jobs exist, and in identifying jobs that are not filled

This point can be illustrated with data from the Ethiopia and London missions which provide an indication of the drop-out rates from the candidate and job rosters:

**Ethiopia** - of the 53 jobs identified, 14 (26%) have resulted in closed files, while of the remaining open vacancies a large proportion have remained unfilled for a year or more. Thus the 'hit rate' is probably not much more than 50%, implying a considerable waste of effort on the part of IOM staff. While this may in large part reflect the difficult conditions in Ethiopia, it also appears to confirm that the matching process is not working effectively.

Table 4-13: Summary of Job Roster Status

Status	Number	%
Candidate Returned	15	28%
Candidate Approved	6	11%
Candidate Matched	1	2%
Open	17	32%
Closed	14	26%
Total Jobs	53	100%

Source: IOM, Ethiopia

**London** - Of the 179 candidates entered onto the roster, 76 (42%) have returned. However, there are 51 Ghanaians on the roster who cannot be returned as no funds are available; and 33 candidates have been awaiting matching for an average of 12 months. Thus the 'hit rate' is currently only 52%.

<sup>12</sup> "The third phase of the programme places greater emphasis on demand orientation or making sure the programme aims at concentrating on the highest priority positions to fill, and matches these positions with the highest quality candidates. This involves 1) identifying priority sector jobs in participating African countries with the cooperation of government counterparts and support groups, and 2) recruiting highly qualified candidates to match these positions." Operational Plan. IOM, March 1995

Table 4-14: Summary of Status of Candidate Roster, and Average Period Since Approval

Status	No.	%	Avg. Months Since Approval
Pending	33	18%	12.0
Awaiting JOF	3	2%	15.3
JOF	14	8%	9.7
Returned	76	42%	4.9
Closed	2	1%	12.0
No funds	51	28%	12.7
Total	179	100%	9

Source: IOM, London

One aspect of placement which seems to be particularly inappropriate is the requirement for returns to match an 'optimal distribution' which stipulates target ratios for:

- priority sector distribution
- public/private/self-employed sector distribution
- matched/pre-matched distribution

Findings in target countries suggest strongly that an optimal distribution is inappropriate in that conditions are often difficult in target countries, and it is not possible to implement placement quotas by sector. The more realistic approach would be to identify job vacancies in all identified sectors and then to develop targets on the basis of these. Such an approach would also reflect a more demand-driven approach.

Notwithstanding these comments, systems for recruitment and placement have resulted in a high calibre of returnees. However, they are fairly complex and are considered by a number of PM staff to be inappropriate for handover to counterpart institutions.

Given the difficulties experienced by RMs in placing candidates, it would have been appropriate for them to visit the local offices of recruitment consultancy companies or multinational firms to see how recruitment and placement are done on a commercial basis. Such organisations take a more job-led promotion approach which could have provided IOM with some useful information to guide them in their own operations.

Using the internet as a means of recruitment has not yet been explored by Geneva HQ or RMs. IOM is in the process of establishing a website for launching during March this year, providing information about its operations. As yet there are no plans to use the website for RQAN purposes. However, as the costs of development of the website have already been borne by other sources, this represents a cost effective opportunity for RQAN to experiment with the use of the internet.

### Supervision and Backstopping

In the list of main activities, Geneva HQ has the lead role in developing guidelines for programme implementation. It also has overall responsibility for supervising and

monitoring implementation and specifying corrective measures as necessary. Internal monitoring is covered below in section 4.2.7.

The first set of operational guidelines were produced in July 1995, 7 months after the start of implementation. These outlined procedures for candidate selection, recruitment and placement, provision of direct support, sustainability and institution building, organisational structure, and monitoring and evaluation. These guidelines were updated during 1996 according to the following schedule:

1. Intra-Regional Component	Feb 1996
2. Application of the RQAN Significant Factor Criterion	Feb 1996
3. Returnee Follow-Up Monitoring and Evaluation	Mar 1996
4. RQAN Bridging Funds and Phase III Mid-term Surveys	Apr 1996
5. Instructions for Completion of Activity Indicators Workbook	May 1996
6. Gathering Pre-Departure Briefing Information	Jul 1996
7. Application of Activities Indicators in Mission-level Programme Management	Aug 1996
8. Priority Sector Review	Oct 1996
9. Placement Mission-Recruitment Mission Collaboration	Nov 1996
10. Self-Employment Component	Nov 1996
11. RQAN III Strategic Planning Workbook - Instructions for Completion	Nov 1996

Although most field staff consider that on balance the new guidelines have been helpful, their introduction has also proved burdensome. Often Geneva HQ has required missions to respond to new procedures with new information within a very short period, and complying with the requirements has taken up a considerable amount of PMs staff time. The evaluation team feels that the guidelines have not sufficiently reflected country differences, and are not oriented towards institutionalisation. The general impression in the field is that greater flexibility to develop country-specific approaches would enhance implementation. This would require that IOM's policy of decentralisation be speeded up for RQAN.

### Lusophone Countries

The case of the participating Lusophone countries requires particular attention. While it is recognised that the evaluation team visited the two most problematic countries (Angola and Mozambique), the team felt that Lusophone countries had not been sufficiently integrated into overall programme operations. The following issues should be noted:

- there are no staff members within IOM HQ who are able to converse in Portuguese
- guidelines have only recently been translated into Portuguese, and previously had been distributed to Lusophone countries in English (despite the inability of Lusophone country staff to speak English effectively)
- RQAN's recruitment strategy does not take account of the particular problems of Lusophone countries, viz:
  - the very tense political situation in Angola and to a lesser extent in Mozambique

- the unattractive economic conditions and rigid labour markets in Lusophone Africa
- the lack of Lusophone candidates fulfilling RQAN qualifications and criteria
- the relative mobility of Lusophone Africans abroad

Although the evaluation recommends that Angola and Mozambique should be redesignated as non-target countries, a total of 58 placements remain to be made to Cap Verde and Guinea Bissau. IOM should therefore address the issues listed above, and develop a modified approach that takes account of the particular issues constraining returns to Lusophone countries. This should result in the strengthening of training and support to field staff in Lisbon, Cap Verde and Guinea Bissau.

#### 4.2.3 Participating countries

The performance of government counterparts and support groups has been mixed. Where counterparts have been appointed they have generally undertaken their core activities, but their role in formulating training programmes has been weak, and no evidence has been found of their involvement yet in the preparation of terms of reference for the institutionalisation of the programme.

Although a number of Support Groups have fulfilled their mandate of identifying priority sectors and job vacancies, they have not proved an efficient means of making placements. Where priorities have been identified, the lists of sectors and job types generated are all extensive and do not reflect the scale of the programme - eg. the support group in Ethiopia identified 55 job types within 8 sectors, as against an indicative target of 45 returns. Furthermore, a high proportion of placements are either pre-matched or made by IOM through personal contacts - ie. not by the support group. Meeting minutes suggest that members are not active outside meetings, although when the opportunity presents itself, some do assist in programme promotion. Given the realities of job identification, the Support Group's role is somewhat redundant, and updating of priority sectors may be more efficiently achieved by IOM in consultation with the counterpart.

National Authorising Officers (NAOs) have no direct role in programme implementation. However, due to the NIP and RIP disbursement arrangements, the role of NAOs in programme monitoring has been weakened.

#### 4.2.4 Commission

The Commission agreed to contribute a total of ECU 13,430,000<sup>13</sup>, in accordance with the general and special conditions of the Financing Agreement. Disbursement has been carried out satisfactorily, notwithstanding comments on the appropriateness of the disbursement mechanism.

Programme steering and monitoring by the Commission is undertaken by DGVIII (Unit G4) in Brussels and by Delegations in target countries, with an input from the

<sup>13</sup> ECU 730,000 was deducted as an advance contribution towards the Bridging Fund. Total funding for Phase III is therefore ECU 12,700,000



Backstopping Expert who reports directly to Unit G4. Comments on backstopping activities are provided below in section 4.3.1. There was a period of 6 months, from November 1995 until March 1996, during which there was effectively no programme steering from Brussels. This was due to the absence on sick leave of the responsible officer, and the relocation of the programme to Unit DGVIII/G/4 in March 1996. Following the relocation, there was also the natural period of readjustment during which the newly assigned officer familiarised herself with the programme. Thus for an extended period, there was little involvement from Brussels.

Placement Missions are required to consult regularly with Delegations to keep them apprised of programme progress. In a number of countries, the Delegation regularly attends support group meetings.

Although the programme is 45% financed from NIP funds, Country Desk Officers in Brussels tend not to be involved directly in programme steering or monitoring. Some Desk Officers are kept informed of programme progress by the Delegations, but in general it appears that the Commission's steering and monitoring role is limited to Unit G4. Unfortunately, communication between the various stakeholders in Brussels has not been effective. When combined with the unusual disbursement arrangements, the programme has not been placed high on the agendas of either Country Desk Officers in Brussels or the Delegations, and can be said to have slipped through the 'supervision net' to a certain extent.

#### 4.2.5 Plan of Operations

The TCA required that a detailed plan of operations be prepared in consultation with the Commission. A summary of the plans produced by IOM is given below:

<u>Plan</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Period Covered</u>
Operational Plan	Mar 1995	Programme Duration
RQAN III Acceleration Plan	Dec 1995	December 1995
Revised Activity Planning Sheets for RQAN III	Dec 1995	Programme Duration
Rolling Plan	Jan 1996	Programme Duration
Operational Plan	July 1996	Jul - Dec 1996

The first Operational Plan was submitted in March 1995. This document comprised:

- a description of programme objectives and monitoring arrangements
- a revised logframe matrix
- organisational structure and responsibilities of each of the main actors involved
- a schedule for reporting, follow-up surveys and backstopping

The main document is only 3 pages long and cannot be considered as a 'detailed plan of operations'. It does not specify intended start-up dates in the 11 target countries, nor does it set targets on a country-by-country basis. Greater involvement by the Commission at this early stage might have ensured effective mechanisms for planning and monitoring.

The first Operational Plan was updated in December 1995, when IOM produced an acceleration plan for December 1995, and revised activity planning sheets for the

remaining programme duration. These revisions appear to have been in response to a visit to Geneva HQ by the Backstopping Expert in October 1995. The main modification was to intensify activities to publicise and promote the programme in order to identify more candidates, and thus to increase the rate of return.

In contrast to the initial plan, these revised plans are perhaps too detailed while at the same time remaining too general - too detailed in that procedures are incorporated into activities; and too general in that no country specific actions are elaborated, many of the activities are 'ongoing', and no quantitative or timebound targets are provided. However, responsibilities are clearly identified. An example is provided in figure 4-3.

Figure 4-3: Extract from Revised Activity Planning Sheets for RQAN III (Dec 1995)

Activity 4	Interim Results	Schedule (Quarters)				etc
		1234	1234	1234	1234	
4.0 Rendering service in performing "job broker" activities between potential employers and African candidates						
4.1 Match candidates with job vacancies	Cand/Job dossiers HQ databank Job offer form					
4.2 Receive matching dossiers and pass to employers	"					
4.3 Negotiate with employer/candidate regarding special requirements prior to candidate taking up post	"					
4.4 Identify Phase II pipeline cases with priority sectors where job offer exists and candidates are unable to return without IOM's assistance	"					
4.5 Notify placement missions of these Phase II pipeline cases to ascertain if job vacancy exists. If so, complete job offer formalities	RM faxes					

The next update to the operational plan was the rolling plan produced in February 1996. The main changes introduced were intensification of programme promotion, and relaxing of the work experience requirements for candidates from Lusophone countries and from Uganda to include 'during education' experience.

The most recent update was the operational plan for July to December 1996. The format and style of this document is different to the previous plans, and does not follow the logframe structure. In fact it appears to be more a plan for implementing the new guidelines, than an overall operational plan for the programme.

One particular criticism which applies to both the operational plan and to the related guidelines is that the scale of effort required is not proportionate to the results to be achieved, and does not take account of realities on the ground. For example, the operational activities specified to determine programme significance<sup>14</sup> are:

<sup>14</sup> See p2 of Operational Plan (July - December 1996)

1. Collect all available information on on-going and planned activities related to target countries' economic development, manpower and human resources development, labour market strategies, and structural adjustment of the economy.
2. Analyse these data with respect to their implications for RQAN's placement objectives. Incorporate knowledge gained of the current impacts of macroeconomic and labour policies and activities, and of indications towards future trends, into RQAN placement strategies.

These activities were to be carried out by PMs in all target countries during the period August - September 1996. The amount of time and effort required (especially at this stage 19 months into programme implementation) seems disproportionate compared to the number of returns for each country - ie. a complete labour market analysis should not be necessary for the placement of 40 or 50 returnees. Furthermore, in many countries the data simply does not exist, or is so out of date as to undermine the validity of the exercise. During the period in which the data was to be collected and analysed, the PMs (often with only 1 person working full-time on RQAN) would have been deflected from placement activities.

#### 4.2.6 Financial Management

There are 14 funding sources for the programme - 11 NIPs and 3 RIPs. The allocation of funds by source can be seen in table 4-1. NIP funds are only for expenditure on direct support to returnees to target countries, either from industrialised countries or on an intra-regional basis. All other expenditure is sourced from RIP funds. Table 4-15 summarises contributions, disbursement and expenditure by source of funds.

Table 4-15: Summary of Expenditure by Source of Funding (ECU)

	Contribution <sup>a</sup>	Disbursed <sup>a</sup>	Expenditure			Balance of Disbursed Funds
			to-date	as % of disbursement	as % of contribution	
<b>NIP Funds</b>						
Angola	502,500	158,288	21,980	14%	4%	136,307
Cap Verde	297,000	93,555	46,138	49%	16%	47,417
Ethiopia	382,500	120,488	105,543	88%	28%	14,945
Ghana	595,000	187,425	363,011	194%	61%	(175,586)
Guinea Bissau	400,000	126,000	109,506	87%	27%	16,494
Kenya	765,000	240,975	172,894	72%	23%	68,081
Mozambique	400,000	126,000	41,994	33%	10%	84,006
Sierra Leone	382,500	120,488	0	0%	0%	120,488
Uganda	1,000,000	315,000	102,039	32%	10%	212,961
Zambia	497,500	156,713	112,922	72%	23%	43,790
Zimbabwe	497,500	156,713	140,095	89%	28%	16,617
<b>Sub-total NIP</b>	<b>5,719,500</b>	<b>1,801,643</b>	<b>1,216,123</b>	<b>67%</b>	<b>21%</b>	<b>587,189</b>
<b>RIP Funds</b>						
West Africa	2,024,500	637,718		na	na	na
East Africa	2,582,500	813,488		na	na	na
Southern Africa	2,373,500	747,653		na	na	na
<b>Sub-total RIP</b>	<b>6,980,500</b>	<b>2,198,858</b>	<b>1,613,175</b>	<b>95%</b>	<b>30%</b>	<b>110,661</b>
<b>Total NIP + RIP</b>	<b>12,700,000</b>	<b>4,000,500</b>	<b>3,184,355</b>	<b>83%</b>	<b>26%</b>	<b>698,585</b>

Source: a - Unit DGVIII/G/4; b - IOM Geneva

The large number of funding sources makes the process of developing appropriate financial management and budgeting arrangements difficult. The situation is further complicated by the fact that as a large international organisation, IOM has its own budgetary and accounting procedures which do not readily match the requirements of the RQAN III budget. The current system can be summarised as follows:

- 1. Disbursement**
  - Funds from each of the NIPs and RIPs are disbursed from Brussels direct to IOM in Geneva according to the disbursement schedule contained in Article 35 of the TCA
  - IOM deposits all funds in a single account in Geneva
  - ECU are converted to US dollars
- 2. Budgeting**
  - Each mission (including the RQAN Unit in Geneva) submits an annual budget for staff costs and office costs only, by project (including RQAN)
  - Geneva HQ revises budgetary allotments by project
- 3. Financial Reporting**
  - Each mission (including the RQAN Unit in Geneva) submits a monthly summary of expenditure
  - On a six-monthly basis, Geneva HQ consolidates all RQAN expenditures using IOM accounting procedures, then allocates these expenditures to the RQAN budget headings. This information is presented for the whole programme and not by country

Thus, except for the purpose of six-monthly reporting, RQAN accounting procedures are the same as for all other IOM activities. The evaluation team feels that IOM financial management and budgeting systems for RQAN are inadequate for the following reasons:

- The schedule of disbursements is fixed and is not linked to project progress (via the usual practice of submission and approval of annual workplans and budgets). This has resulted in such anomalies as ECU 120,488 being disbursed from Sierra Leone's NIP funds, while no placements have been made; or Ghana, where ECU 187,425 has been disbursed while ECU 454,149 of NIP funds has been spent.
- Financial progress is not reported on a country-by-country basis, with the result that NAOs and the Commission are unable to monitor expenditure against NIP and RIP contributions and disbursements
- IOM does not prepare budgets under the RQAN cost headings, with the result that financial control systems do not facilitate assessment of cost-effectiveness, either by mission, country or activity. This seems likely to have contributed to the large variations in cost-effectiveness highlighted in section 4.1.1
- The lack of annual budgetary allocations means that recruitment and placement missions are unable to undertake meaningful planning based on availability of resources. This in turn weakens IOM's ability to develop effective monitoring systems.

#### 4.2.7 Internal Monitoring and Evaluation

Arrangements for internal M&E were set out in the TCA, and elaborated further in the Operational Plan. The specified mechanisms are:

- a databank to enable Geneva HQ to monitor the matching and reintegration process
- follow-up and mid-term surveys among a sample of returnees on their individual career development and reintegration process (data to be entered onto the databank)
- technical and managerial backstopping and monitoring (to be carried out jointly with the Backstopping Expert)

Reporting arrangements require that each mission submits a monthly report to Geneva HQ. Six-monthly reports are compiled and sent to the relevant representatives of participating governments, to Delegations, and to the Commission in Brussels.

##### Databank

The databank appears to have been designed more as a repository of information than as a monitoring and analysis tool. It contains much information which could be used for both monitoring and on-going evaluation. However, the programme does not facilitate data manipulation to the extent that even simple frequencies and cross-tabulations have to be manually constructed on a spreadsheet from long lists of information contained on print-outs from the database. Many mandays of work were required to generate the information required by the evaluation team - information which should have been readily available with minimal programming, and certainly no requirement for manual re-entry of data. IOM are currently in the process of installing an updated version of the databank in all missions.

Geneva HQ have developed an updated version of the databank programme which appears to suffer from the same problems with regard to data analysis and export. This version has been distributed to all missions, and there is a danger that much time and effort will be invested in training staff in how to use an inappropriate programme.

##### Follow-up monitoring

Follow-up monitoring is conducted on a six-monthly basis through a postal survey of all returnees. The questionnaire covers 2 areas - i) reintegration issues/problems; and ii) extent of skills and knowledge transfer. The questions asked are:

##### Reintegration

- A. How well do you feel you have professionally integrated since your return from abroad?
- B. How well can you apply the skills / knowledge gained abroad to your current work?
- C. In your current position, do you feel you have the opportunity to transfer skills / knowledge to others?

##### Skills and knowledge transfer

- D. In your current position, what impact do you feel you can have on your workplace or professional field?

- E. What professional achievements do you feel you have made since your return from abroad?
- F. What opportunity do you feel you have in this country to pursue development of your career?

For reintegration questions, returnees are asked to rate whether they have reintegrated *fully*, *partially* or *not at all*, and to provide some explanation for their response. For the skills transfer questions they are asked to rate their impact as *significant*, *some*, or *none*, and to provide some explanation for their response.

With regard to reintegration, the survey cannot be described as monitoring as it collects information only every six months. In practice, the need for IOM's assistance becomes apparent when the returnee informs the PM directly. A more effective means of monitoring problems might be through IOM attendance at returnee meetings - see section 5.1.6 for information on this point.

The questions on skills transfer require a highly subjective response, and are not practicably verifiable. In any case, no baseline data exists on systems or performance in the workplace against which to assess changes.

#### **Technical and Managerial Backstopping and Monitoring**

Until September 1995, missions reported against the following headings in their monthly reports:

1. Candidate roster
2. Job bank roster
3. Procedural matters/questions
4. Priority sectors
5. Government counterpart training
6. Support Groups
7. Policy questions/miscellaneous
8. Meetings with EU Delegation
9. Other contacts
10. Six monthly reports
11. Follow-up questionnaires
12. Other issues

In October the format of the monthly reports was changed to reflect more closely the activities listed in the logframe. However, a number of missions found this format difficult due to the level of detail required (each main activity was broken down into a number of sub-activities) and returned to using the first format. Thus, at present monthly reports are not standardised.

Guidelines for monitoring were substantially revised in a series of guidelines produced between March and November 1996. In May 1996 Geneva HQ distributed instructions for completion of an Activity Indicators Workbook, and in August these were followed up with guidelines on how to apply these indicators to programme

level management through the use of a ratings system<sup>15</sup>. The evaluation team feels that while these instructions and guidelines indicate a great deal of effort on the part of IOM to improve their systems, they are too detailed resulting in additional work for mission staff, and the ratings are too subjective to be of practical use. Mission staff did however express the view that despite these criticisms, the activity indicators had been useful in helping them to think through their roles and responsibilities.

In summary, the main criticisms of procedures for internal monitoring are:

- there are too many indicators at the activity level, and insufficient or inappropriate key indicators at the results level
- there is no comparison of physical and financial data, and considerations of efficiency and effectiveness are not sufficiently covered
- there is no baseline data on the level of operations in the workplace, or of the employers expectations/requirements immediately prior to the candidates return, and procedures for ongoing evaluation do not collect objectively verifiable data on skills and knowledge transfer
- monitoring systems do not reflect country differences, particularly with regard to the effect of assumptions and the appropriateness of institution-building activities
- monthly reports are largely narrative and do not provide a summarised picture of progress, issues and problems against the main activities to be undertaken

#### 4.3 External Monitoring and Evaluation

Arrangements for external M&E were set out in the TCA. The mechanisms were:

- technical and managerial backstopping and monitoring by an external expert (to be carried out jointly with IOM staff)
- a mid-term evaluation after 18 months of implementation
- a terminal evaluation 4-6 months before completion of the project
- an audit to be carried out by an external auditor appointed by the Commission

##### 4.3.1 Backstopping

The terms of reference of the Backstopping Expert envisaged that backstopping missions would be undertaken every 7-8 months, and that all countries would be visited unless prior approval were obtained from the Commission. To date the following visits have been undertaken:

- Geneva HQ: October 1995 (initial fact-finding mission)
- Geneva HQ: 12 - 14 December 1995
- Zambia, Zimbabwe, Mozambique: 21 January - 2 February 1996
- Lisbon: 27 - 29 March 1996
- Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia: 14 - 21 April 1996
- Geneva: 27 - 30 August 1996
- Lisbon, Cap Verde: September 1996

The TOR for the backstopping consultant state that:

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<sup>15</sup> Missions are required to subjectively rate their achievement of activity indicators as 1 = fully; 2 = nearly; 3 = partially; 4 = not at all

"The main objective of the backstopping is to contribute to keeping project's implementation on track, in particular as regards its strategic and qualitative aspects. In this framework the backstopper will carry out the following tasks:

- supervise the project's implementation by IOM in accordance with the operational plan, including the establishment and functioning of IOM's monitoring system for the project
- regularly assess the progress made in the project's implementation
- if necessary, advise IOM's project management and the Commission on required adjustments or re-orientations, either of the operational plan as such, or of its execution by certain parts of the implementation structure

The backstopping will also serve to formulate relevant questions for the project's mid term review."

Also stated in the backstopping TOR is the following:

"If the consultant considers that specific adjustments or re-orientations are necessary, either in the operational plan as such, or in the way it is executed in practice, concrete proposals for such re-adjustments or re-orientations may be included in the report, in order to advise the project management and the Commission on how to improve the project's implementation."

Thus the Backstoppers role can be interpreted as one of monitoring on behalf of the Commission, and also of provision of technical advice to both IOM and the Commission.

The Backstopper has identified or addressed many of the issues raised in this report, and obviously has a sound grasp of implementation issues and problems. However, the evaluation team feels that backstopping reports do not sufficiently question the appropriateness of programme strategies. Instead, they suggest the need to intensify activities strictly within the parameters of the programme design. It appears that to a certain extent the backstopper has followed a blueprint approach to implementation and monitoring (which may not be surprising given his involvement in the programme's preparation). Given the clear and early evidence that placement rates were low and institutional structures missing, a more active role could have been played by the backstopper in re-orienting the programme at an earlier stage.

No evidence was found of aide memoires produced by the Backstopping Consultant while in-country. Although the Backstopper has produced country-specific draft reports, the findings of each 'round' of visits are consolidated into one final report. Although this is in line with the TOR, it has nonetheless reduced the usefulness of the backstopping missions to the countries visited.

However, it is important to note that the Backstopping Consultant does not have any executing authority. He can make recommendations to both the Commission and IOM, but recommended actions can only be taken on the authority of the Commission.



### 4.3.2 Mid-Term Evaluation

The mid-term evaluation commenced 24 months after start of implementation, 6 months after its scheduled date.

## 5. Effectiveness

The results to be achieved by the programme are set out in the TCA. They are dealt with below under the two categories of Returns and Institution building.


### 5.1 Returns

An update of actual returnee placement is provided in tables 5-1 and 5-2. Planned and actual achievements can be summarised as follows:

Returns - Planned Results (not including those returned using Bridging Funds)	Actual	
	No.	%
1. 527 (highly) qualified/skilled African nationals residing in industrialised countries recruited and placed in the participating target countries	166	31%
2. 89 (highly) qualified/skilled Africans transferred on a regional basis	3	3%
3. 283 additional (highly) qualified/skilled Africans assisted to return to non-target countries	36	13%
4. 140 (highly) qualified/skilled Africans assisted as self-employed in the liberal professions	3	2%


Figure 5-1 shows cumulative placements for the programme as a whole and figure 5-2 presents this information by country.

Figure 5-1: Cumulative Placements (1995-96)



Source: IOM, Geneva

Figure 5-2: Cumulative Placements by Country



Source: IOM, Geneva

Table 5-1: Summary of Planned and Actual Placements by Country, as at 31 December 1996<sup>a</sup>

Country of Placement	Indicative Targets			Actual Placements						
	Industrialised	Intra-Regional	Total	Industrialised No.	%	Intra-Regional No.	%	Total No.	%	of which Self-empl.
<b>Target countries</b>										
Angola	45	20	65	3	7%	0	0%	3	5%	na na
Cape Verde	28	7	35	7	25%	0	0%	7	20%	na na
Ethiopia	45	0	45	15	33%	0	na	15	33%	1 7%
Ghana	48	0	48	50	104%	0	na	50	104%	0 0%
Guinea Bissau	35	10	45	15	43%	0	0%	15	33%	na na
Kenya	80	0	80	23	29%	0	na	23	29%	0 0%
Mozambique	40	10	50	6	15%	0	0%	6	12%	na na
Sierra Leone	45	0	45	0	0%	0	na	0	0%	na na
Uganda	83	32	115	12	14%	3	9%	15	13%	na na
Zambia	38	5	43	15	39%	0	0%	15	35%	1 7%
Zimbabwe	40	5	45	20	50%	0	0%	20	44%	1 5%
sub-total target	527	89	616	166	31%	3	3%	169	27%	3 2%
<b>Non-target</b>	283	0	283	36	13%	0	na	36	13%	na na
<b>Total</b>	810	89	899	202	25%	3	3%	205	23%	3 1%

a - Not including those returned using Bridging Funds

Source: IOM, Geneva

Table 5-2: Cumulative Placements by Country

Country	Mar-94	Jan-95	Feb-95	Mar-95	Apr-95	May-95	Jun-95	Jul-95	Aug-95	Sep-95	Oct-95	Nov-95	Dec-95	Jan-96	Feb-96	Mar-96	Apr-96	May-96	Jun-96	Jul-96	Aug-96	Sep-96	Oct-96	Nov-96	Dec-96
Angola																									
Cape Verde																	1	1	1	2	2	3	4	6	7
Ethiopia												1	3	3	4	4	6	8	8	11	12	13	14	14	15
Ghana	1	1	1	1	2	4	6	8	10	12	15	19	21	27	27	30	33	36	37	43	45	45	45	47	50
Guinea Bissau																									
Kenya						2	3	3	5	7	7	7	7	7	7	9	9	12	15	17	18	19	19	22	23
Mozambique								1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	3	4	4	4	4	6	6	6	6	6
Uganda				1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	7	8	9	9	10	10	10	12	12	13	14	14	15
Zambia						1	1	2	2	2	2	2	3	4	7	8	8	10	10	11	12	12	13	14	15
Zimbabwe				1	1	1	1	2	5	6	6	7	8	9	9	11	13	14	14	16	18	18	19	20	20
Non-Target Countries										1	4	4	4	6	8	9	10	11	12	18	21	24	25	28	34
<b>Total</b>	1	1	1	3	4	9	12	17	25	33	36	43	53	69	79	91	102	116	127	148	160	166	174	195	205
<b>Monthly Increment</b>		0	0	2	1	5	3	5	8	8	3	7	15	11	10	12	11	14	11	21	12	6	8	21	10

Source: IOM, Geneva

From the tables presented, the main points of interest are:

- The overall rate of placement is low (23%) and the programme is unlikely to achieve its targets under current arrangements
- Ghana has now achieved its target. Taking into account placements to be financed by the Bridging Fund, they have spent or committed all available NIP funds and can therefore not make any more placements unless additional resources are accessed
- Ethiopia, Guinea Bissau, Zambia and Zimbabwe have a reasonable chance of achieving their overall targets
- Angola, Cap Verde, Mozambique and Uganda have achieved particularly low placement rates and are unlikely to achieve targets

- The placement rate to non-target countries is particularly low (13%), and the target of 283 returns is unlikely to be achieved
- The rate for intra-regional placements is particularly low (3%), and the target of 89 returns is unlikely to be achieved
- The proportion of returnees who have accessed the self-employment loan is particularly low (2%), and the target of 140 self-employed returns is unlikely to be achieved

Additional points of interest include:

- Placement rates vary between countries - Ghana has achieved 104% of its targets, while Angola has achieved only 3%
- Date of first placement varies between countries - from April 1995 in Ghana and Zimbabwe to September 1996 in Angola
- Most anglophone countries made first placements between March and October 1995, while start-up in Lusophone countries was significantly later
- The overall rate of placement increased significantly between December 1995 and August 1996, during which 102 placements were made
- The overall rate of placement may have slipped back slightly, notwithstanding a high number of placements during November 1996

### 5.1.1 Target Group Analysis

This section looks more closely at the characteristics of the target group, analysing educational qualifications, experience, gender and age.

Table 5-3: Placements by Qualification

Type of Qualification	Total	
	No.	%
PhD	67	33%
MSc	24	12%
MD (Medicine)	23	11%
BSc	22	11%
MBA	19	9%
BA	16	8%
MA	13	6%
LLB (Law)	7	3%
ACCA (Accountancy)	6	3%
Diploma	6	3%
LLM (Law)	2	1%
Total	205	100%

Source: IOM, Geneva

Although the TCA specifies that the target group comprises highly qualified, qualified and skilled African nationals, it is apparent that virtually all returnees fall into the highly qualified category - 75% have post-graduate qualifications; 97% are graduates; and 3% have only Diplomas. There are no skilled returnees.

The average age and experience of returnees is summarised in table 5-4, which indicates little variation in average age. In general, the returnees have significant

overseas experience (averaging 12 years). Although the data suggests a difference in length of overseas experience between Lusophone and Anglophone countries, this may not be significant due to the small sample size in Angola and Mozambique. It must be concluded therefore that the experience criterion for the target group has been met and exceeded.


Table 5-4: Average Age and Experience by Country

Country	Data	Total
Angola	Sample size	3
	Average age	38
	Average years spent abroad	4
Ethiopia	Sample size	7
	Average age	41
	Average years spent abroad	12
Ghana	Sample size	12
	Average age	39
	Average years spent abroad	15
Mozambique	Sample size	3
	Average age	37
	Average years spent abroad	8
Uganda	Sample size	11
	Average age	37
	Average years spent abroad	14
Zambia	Sample size	8
	Average age	38
	Average years spent abroad	10
Zimbabwe	Sample size	11
	Average age	35
	Average years spent abroad	9
Total Sample size		55
Total Average age		38
Total Average years spent abroad		12

Source: Evaluation survey

Of the 205 returnees, 163 are men and 42 are women. While the programme was not specifically designed with gender considerations in mind, it appears that the absence of such considerations may have worked against women candidates with regard to matching and the preparation of job offer information. During focus group discussions some women returnees stated that IOM appeared not to have sufficiently discussed issues such as maternity leave and particular housing requirements with their prospective employers. In at least 1 case (in Uganda), this resulted in a prolonged period of hardship during which the 7-months pregnant candidate returned to the UK while awaiting an alternative job offer.

Figure 5-3: Returnees by Gender



Country visits indicated that the programme is very much capital city focused. A number of factors are likely to have contributed to this:

- a high proportion of public sector placements are in central government
- much of the private sector activity occurs within or around capital cities
- opportunities and facilities in provincial and rural areas are often particularly poor, and are not attractive to the highly qualified candidates returning through the programme

### 5.1.2 Sectoral Analysis

Figure 5-4 shows that the majority of placements have been in the public sector, although this varies between countries as illustrated by table 5-5. Main points of interest are:

- A high proportion of private sector placement has been achieved in Ghana (56%), Kenya (48%) and Uganda (53%)
- In Angola, Ethiopia, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique Zambia and non-target countries, the proportion of public sector placements exceeds 70%

Figure 5-4: Placements by Sector



Reasons for the low rate of placement in the private sector include:

- Non-realisation of the assumption that economic conditions would remain conducive to return. This means that in a number of countries (eg. Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Zambia) there are few opportunities in the private sector.
- Inappropriateness of the support group as a mechanism to involve the private sector in job identification. In countries where placement rates are low, there is little incentive for the private sector to invest much time and effort in support group activities given the minimal or zero return they get in terms of placements in the private sector.
- Using the programme-led rather than job-led approach to recruitment, which produces a candidate roster that does not closely match local private sector requirements.
- The often informal nature of private sector contacts which requires intensive effort on the part of PMs to identify and follow-up possible vacancies within a very short space of time.
- The reluctance of prospective employers to appoint a RQAN candidate without a face to face interview.

Table 5-5: Placements by Sector

Country	Sector						Total
	Public		Private		Self-employed		
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	
Angola	3	100%	0	0%	0	0%	3
Cape Verde	5	71%	2	29%	0	0%	7
Ethiopia	11	73%	4	27%	0	0%	15
Ghana	21	42%	28	56%	1	2%	50
Guinea Bissau	12	80%	3	20%	0	0%	15
Kenya	12	52%	11	48%	0	0%	23
Mozambique	5	83%	1	17%	0	0%	6
Sierra Leone	0	na	0	na	0	na	0
Uganda	7	47%	8	53%	0	0%	15
Zambia	13	87%	1	7%	1	7%	15
Zimbabwe	12	60%	7	35%	1	5%	20
Non-target	27	75%	9	25%	0	0%	36
Total	128	62%	74	36%	3	1%	205

An issue raised by IOM field staff is that private sector employers are usually not willing to wait while a candidate is recruited through RQAN in response to a job advertisement. However, this would seem to suggest that manpower is available through sources other than RQAN - either locally or through other overseas contacts. Based on discussions with a limited number of employers, if suitable manpower is not available locally it would seem likely that the employer would be willing to wait until RQAN found a suitable candidate, provided that i) the candidate is of a high calibre, and ii) the waiting period is not too long.

### 5.1.3 Demand Driven Placement

Placements can be described as demand-driven in as far as they meet programme requirements that placements be made in priority sectors and where there is a local shortage of equivalent manpower. However, the manpower requirements of all of the target countries are so substantial that placements of suitably qualified and experienced candidates in any sector could be described as being responsive to the demands of host countries. In fact, in some of the countries this is put forward by government counterparts as the main justification for the programme.

Given the extent of manpower shortages in each country, and the fact that the target number of returnees for each country is tiny by comparison, the evaluation team feels that it would be more useful to interpret responsiveness to demands for manpower in terms of the extent to which manpower needs have been prioritised, and these priority needs met. This idea is closely linked to the concept mentioned in section 2.2 that objectives should be realistic, specific and measurable. By identifying only realistic jobs within a limited number of sectors in each country, RQAN would have a realistic chance of achieving an impact that would be both attributable to the programme, and measurable for the purposes of evaluation.

In most countries the priority sectors identified are broad, and there has been no further prioritisation of these sectors, or of the job types within them. The application




of the 'optimal distribution' of returns has in some cases worked directly against this by requiring PMs to place returnees across sectors. In some cases this has led to the cessation of recruitment into some sectors despite the continuing need for qualified personnel (eg. the financial sector in Ghana), and a reorientation to sectors which have not shown much potential for recruitment. It is the evaluation team's opinion that this slows the rate of return and dissipates programme impact. Furthermore, it discourages counterparts and support groups from thinking in more strategic and practical terms, and considering how RQAN fits into the overall picture of human resource development, especially given its limited resources.

Zimbabwe has followed a more strategic approach, where the targeting of priority sectors in Zimbabwe has followed a sector-specific approach, focusing on the health sector. This approach has been the result of close and studied collaboration between IOM Harare, the GC, SG and the EU Delegation in Harare. IOM Harare has always adopted a flexible definition to the priority sectors, continuously adjusting the list as appropriate.

#### 5.1.4 Matching

An issue which was raised by the evaluation of Phases I and II was whether returnees would have returned anyway, even without RQAN assistance. One indicator as to whether this is occurring in Phase III might be whether returnees were 'matched' or 'pre-matched' to their jobs, the presumption being that if returnees were pre-matched by themselves, this indicates that they were planning to return anyway. As figure 5-5 shows, 59% of returnees were pre-matched. While it is recognised that the full range of services offered by RQAN can act as a considerable incentive for pre-matched candidates who might not otherwise have returned, procedures for determining that RQAN is a 'significant factor' in the returnees decision to return are inadequate - merely requiring an assurance from the returnee that he or she would not otherwise be able to return. If evaluation recommendations are adopted for a job-led recruitment approach, this will no longer be an issue.

Figure 5-5: Placements by Source of Matching



Source: IOM, Geneva

The evaluation team feels that if IOM were to follow a job-led promotion strategy, then the proportion of pre-matched placements would be considerably reduced.



### 5.1.5 Self-Employment

The self-employment component is described in section 1.4 of the TCA which states that its purpose is *"to meet the specific requirements of African nationals returning to become self-employed in the liberal professions...The provision of this extra assistance will facilitate placement of highly qualified personnel in semi-urban and eventually rural areas."* The component was to be piloted in Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique and Zambia, but from November 1996 coverage was extended to Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

The maximum amount available is ECU 4,500. This is in addition to the direct support of ECU 8,500 in the case of returns from industrialised countries, and ECU 6,000 in the case of intra-regional returns. The self-employment loan was intended to cover additional equipment costs, plus costs of technical support, office establishment, and specific training in areas such as market information and management skills. The terms of the loan are that it is interest free, and that no payments need be made during the first year after return.

To date there have been only 3 self-employed placements, in Ethiopia, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The evaluation team met all 3. The Ethiopian returnee (an Ophthalmologist) has entered into a joint venture with a business acquaintance in Addis Ababa, opening an eye hospital. Although the hospital is not yet operating, it is likely that this will be a successful venture due to the considerable financial backing made by the business partner, and the lack of similar facilities in the city. The Zambian returnee returned in early 1996 to establish a management consultancy company. He has undertaken a small number of assignments but has experienced serious cashflow problems, and is unable to make any repayments. Currently his business operations are limited to producing business cards.

The only conclusion can be that this component has been ineffective. There are a number of reasons for this.

- The initial design of the component appears to have been based on a discussion during the Harare seminar when participants felt that those working in the 'liberal profession' (doctors and lawyers) should have the opportunity to supplement their low public sector incomes. If this was the case, then the component was not based on any problem analysis, but merely on 'what seemed like a good idea at the time'.
- Detailed guidelines for the self-employment component were only produced in November 1996. Prior to this period, self-employment loans were available but there was no technical support available for business establishment or management either from IOM or an advisory organisation.
- The evaluation team feels that the procedures introduced in November 1996 are inappropriate in the following respects:
  - the requirement that a business plan be prepared by the prospective returnee while still overseas removes any opportunity for the returnee to undertake market or logistical research
  - assessment of the business plan is undertaken in-country by an appointed advisory organisation, so that possible modifications cannot be discussed face to face with the returnee. This has resulted in considerable delays for current

self-employment candidates while the business plan and suggested modifications are transmitted back and forth between RM and PM

- Publicity about the availability of self-employment loans has been poor, and a significant proportion of the returnees interviewed during the evaluation had been unaware of the availability of funds.
- The amount of funds available is adequate only for the establishment of new businesses which have extremely low capital costs. In the absence of rigorous assessments of the viability of enterprises supported, or of additional financial backing from other sources, the loan represents a substantial risk to the self-employed returnees.

The evaluation team would seriously question the advisability of extending the pilot from 4 to 6 countries on the basis of such poor performance, especially given the time required to establish a working relationship with appropriate technical advisory bodies.

Given the limited amount of funding and the comments above, the evaluation team feel that it would be more appropriate to offer the loan after the candidates return, when they have had the opportunity to assess local market conditions, and develop the necessary commercial contacts. This would also allow much closer contact between the candidate and the advisory body, thus improving the quality and flexibility of the business plan. As only 14% of all returnees will be able to access the funds, loans could perhaps be offered on a competitive basis to ensure that only the most viable enterprises are supported. Another approach might be to offer the loan only to those working in the public sector, to enable them to supplement their salaries and thus improving the sustainability of their placements.

#### 5.1.6 Reintegration

Table 5-6 summarises the main reintegration problems experienced by returnees.

Unsurprisingly salaries are considered a problem by a high proportion of returnees. Only in Zimbabwe is this not an acute problem. Housing is also a major issue, particularly in Ethiopia, Zambia and Zimbabwe. For those with school age children, inadequacy of schooling was a particular problem in Ghana, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

Table 5-6: Returnee Satisfaction After Return

Since your return, how satisfied are you with:	Countries							Total
	Ang	Eth	Gha	Moz	Ug	Zam	Zim	
1. Salary								
Very satisfied	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Satisfied	0	1	2	1	2	0	6	12
	0%	14%	17%	33%	18%	0%	55%	22%
Not satisfied	3	6	10	2	9	8	5	43
	100%	86%	83%	67%	82%	100%	45%	78%
(blank)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Total	3	7	12	3	11	8	11	55
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
2. Housing								
Very satisfied	0	1	0	0	0	0	2	3
	0%	14%	0%	0%	0%	0%	18%	5%
Satisfied	2	0	5	2	6	2	1	18
	67%	0%	42%	67%	55%	25%	9%	33%
Not satisfied	1	6	7	1	4	5	8	32
	33%	86%	58%	33%	36%	63%	73%	58%
(blank)	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	2
	0%	0%	0%	0%	9%	13%	0%	4%
Total	3	7	12	3	11	8	11	55
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
3. Schooling								
Very satisfied	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	9%	2%
Satisfied	1	1	5	1	3	1	1	13
	33%	14%	42%	33%	27%	13%	9%	24%
Not satisfied	1	1	6	1	2	5	4	20
	33%	14%	50%	33%	18%	63%	36%	36%
na	1	5	1	1	6	2	5	21
	33%	71%	8%	33%	55%	25%	45%	38%
Total	3	7	12	3	11	8	11	55
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: Evaluation survey

### 5.1.7 Assumptions

Comments on the appropriateness of assumptions have already been provided in section 2.2.4. A summary of the extent to which assumptions have been realised in the countries visited during the evaluation is provided in table 5-7.

From comments already made it is apparent that the assumption concerning manpower plans has been partially realised. Where manpower plans already existed, these have been used to identify priority sectors, but the list of sectors and job types has generally been too broad to offer anything but the broadest strategic framework for the programme. It was unrealistic to expect that governments would undertake additional manpower studies in response to RQAN, and in fact this has not been fulfilled, and where plans have not existed or are out of date IOM has undertaken sufficient work to ensure that priority sectors are identified.

Table 5-7: Summary of Realisation of Assumptions by in Countries Visited by Evaluation Team

Assumption	Angola	Ethiopia	Ghana	Mozambique	Uganda	Zambia	Zimbabwe
Governments of recipient countries make efforts to implement appropriate personnel policies, and to render labour market regulation more efficient	No personnel policies implemented in response to RQAN	No personnel policies implemented in response to RQAN	No personnel policies implemented in response to RQAN	No personnel policies implemented in response to RQAN	No personnel policies implemented in response to RQAN	No personnel policies implemented in response to RQAN	No personnel policies implemented in response to RQAN
Governments make efforts to establish manpower plans to identify priority sectors for employment of returnees, and support IOM in identifying concrete job vacancies	No manpower plans developed in response to RQAN; government has not supported identification of job vacancies	No manpower plans developed in response to RQAN; government has supported identification of job vacancies	No manpower plans developed in response to RQAN; government has supported identification of job vacancies	No manpower plans developed in response to RQAN; government has not supported identification of job vacancies	No manpower plans developed in response to RQAN; government has supported identification of job vacancies	No manpower plans developed in response to RQAN; government has supported identification of job vacancies	No manpower plans developed in response to RQAN, but own government initiatives parallel to RQAN and active support in identification of job vacancies
Support obtained from receiving countries to facilitate the transfer of human resources	No agreement. Returnees have experienced problems with customs clearance.	Agreement signed in February 1997, but does not extend duty free privileges to returnees. Many returnees have experienced problems with customs clearance.	Agreement signed prior to programme start-up, but lapsed in November 1996. Recent returnees experiencing problems with customs clearance.	Informal agreement with customs that the privileges extended to students are also available for RQAN returnees. However, some problems still experienced by returnees.	Agreement signed but some difficulties experienced by returnees in gaining customs clearance	Agreement signed but some difficulties experienced by returnees in gaining customs clearance	No agreement and returnees have experienced problems with customs clearance and shipping
The security situation in countries of return allows for project implementation	Has adversely affected the return process. RQAN unlikely to be successful until a Government of Reconciliation (GORN) is in place and political/economic stability is improved	Has not adversely affected return process	Has not adversely affected return process	Has adversely affected the return process as peace is a very recent phenomena. RQAN started too soon	Despite insurgency problems, no evidence that it has adversely affected implementation	Has not adversely affected return process	Has encouraged the return process
Working conditions are considered reasonable	Public sector salaries are extremely low. Working conditions are better in the private sector which is still stagnant.	Working conditions are generally poor, although among those interviewed, none suggested that they were likely to change jobs or to re-emigrate	Public sector salaries are low. Working conditions are better in the private sector.	Public sector salaries are extremely low. Working conditions are better in the private sector, embryonic but growing.	Public sector salaries are low. Working conditions are better in the private sector. Among those interviewed, 9% suggested that they were likely to re-emigrate, and 36% suggested they would probably change jobs	Working conditions very poor - salaries extremely low, housing a problem, limited private sector opportunities. Among those interviewed, none suggested that they were likely to re-emigrate, but 38% suggested they would probably change jobs	Public sector salaries are low. Working conditions are better in the private sector.
Support groups meet regularly	Has met 4 times since November 1995	Has met 8 times since July 1995	Has met regularly since Jan 1995	Only met in November and December 1996	Has met 4 times since October 1996	Has met 9 times since Jan 1995	Has met 5 times since July 1995
Government counterparts participate actively in project implementation	Weak participation from counterpart	Active participation from counterpart	Active participation from counterpart	Weak participation from counterpart	Original counterpart did not participate actively due to his involvement in electioneering. Currently no counterpart	Active participation from counterpart	Active participation from counterpart
Active implication of government counterparts in project implementation	As above	As above	As above	As above	As above	As above	As above

Main comments on the (non)realisation of other assumptions are:

- In Sierra Leone the poor security situation has meant that the programme has not been implemented at all
- In Angola and Mozambique the poor security situation has seriously affected programme implementation, and has contributed to the late start-up of RQAN operations
- In Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique and Zambia, poor working conditions have seriously affected the programme's ability to place candidates

## 5.2 Institution Building

### 5.2.1 Support Groups

The TCA states that "support groups [will be] created in main target countries". Figure 5-6 below summarises progress to date, indicating when support groups were formed and how many times they have met:

Figure 5-6: Start-up Dates and Frequency of Support Group Meetings by Country

Country	Jan-95	Feb-95	Mar-95	Apr-95	May-95	Jun-95	Jul-95	Aug-95	Sep-95	Oct-95	Nov-95	Dec-95	Jan-96	Feb-96	Mar-96	Apr-96	May-96	Jun-96	Jul-96	Aug-96	Sep-96	Oct-96	Nov-96	Dec-96	No. Meetings	
Angola																										4
Cape Verde																										Not yet formed
Ethiopia																										8
Ghana																										5
Guinea Bissau																										1
Kenya																										4
Mozambique																										2
Sierra Leone																										na
Uganda																										4
Zambia																										9
Zimbabwe																										6

As the figure shows, by the end of 1995 support groups had been established in only 50% of the effective target countries<sup>16</sup>. The frequency of meetings varies between countries from 4 within a 3 month period in Uganda to 4 over a 14 month period in Angola. At present, only Cap Verde remains without a support group.

IOM outlined the responsibilities of the support groups in the Operational Plan. These were:

1. To provide guidance to the implementor to locate the programme within the country's development priorities.
2. To indicate sectors of priority development as well as specific job types, including possibilities for self-employment in the liberal professions

While in some countries (eg. Ethiopia, Zambia, Zimbabwe) the support groups have fulfilled their mandate, they have not proven an effective means of undertaking a

<sup>16</sup> Not including Sierra Leone

rigorous prioritisation of sectors and job vacancies. The priority sectors identified usually cover all important sectors within the country, and the number of job types identified is disproportionate in comparison to the target number of returnees.

Few members undertake any programme-related activities between meetings, giving the impression that the only reason for attending meetings is to collect the sitting allowance, or because they have been instructed to do so by a superior. In the countries visited by the evaluation team there has been a high turnover of the membership - either the organisational membership has changed, or because individual organisations do not maintain good continuity of representation. For example, in Ethiopia a total of 28 organisations have been represented on the support group, but during 1996 only 13 were represented at more than 50% of the meetings.

For most of the target countries it must be concluded that support groups have not made a significant contribution to placement, beyond the identification of priority sectors and job types. Their composition is usually skewed too much towards the public sector with the result that a long list of priority sectors and job types can be generated quickly (often from outdated reports) without sufficient consideration of broader economic priorities, or of the practicality of trying to recruit candidates in often low-paying jobs. As time goes by and members see little progress in their particular sectors of interest, they lose what little motivation they already had.

A high proportion of placements rely on the hard work and network of contacts established by the PM staff. Once priority sectors are identified, they have tended to remain fairly constant, so updating has not required much work on the part of support group members. Their role therefore becomes somewhat redundant, thus undermining the purpose and effectiveness of meetings. If the support groups are to have a role, then their composition must more closely reflect the sectors in which placements are made. Only in this way can they see that their efforts are producing results, thus increasing their motivation.

### 5.2.2 Counterparts

The TCA states that "counterparts [will be] trained in main target countries recruitment, placement and follow-up activities". Figure 5-7 below summarises progress to date, indicating when counterparts were appointed and whether they have received any training:

Figure 5-7: Date of Appointment of Counterparts by Country

Country	Jan-95	Feb-95	Mar-95	Apr-95	May-95	Jun-95	Jul-95	Aug-95	Sep-95	Oct-95	Nov-95	Dec-95	Jan-96	Feb-96	Mar-96	Apr-96	May-96	Jun-96	Jul-96	Aug-96	Sep-96	Oct-96	Nov-96	Dec-96	Trained?
Angola																									No
Cape Verde																									Not yet appointed
Ethiopia																									Yes
Ghana																									Yes
Guinea Bissau																									Not yet appointed
Kenya																									Yes
Mozambique																									Yes
Sierra Leone																									na
Uganda																									Awaiting new c/part
Zambia																									Yes
Zimbabwe																									Yes

As the figure shows, by the end of 1995 counterparts had been appointed in only 60% of the effective target countries. At present Cap Verde, Guinea Bissau and Uganda remain without a counterpart - the latter due to the election of the previous counterpart to parliament which bars him from further involvement in the programme. To date counterparts have been trained in Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Zambia and Zimbabwe, although in Zambia the appointed trainee is currently on six months study leave overseas. Training has been mostly of an informal nature, focusing on familiarising counterparts with IOM procedures for recruitment, placement and reintegration follow-up.

The responsibilities for the counterpart are also outlined in the Operational Plan, and are the same as for the support groups, with the addition of "assisting in overcoming obstacles to programme implementation."

The counterpart strategy has had mixed success, and relies heavily on the commitment and capabilities of the nominated counterpart. For example, in Ghana the counterpart is committed and has been very active in programme implementation, while in Uganda the counterpart, while being supportive, has seriously held back the institutional activities due to his involvement in elections and the absence of any support staff to act as a focus for training. This reliance on personalities represents a large risk to institutionalisation and sustainability.

In general there has been a lack of clear strategies to achieve institutionalisation and sustainability, and as a consequence the training and institution building component has not developed beyond 'familiarisation of the counterparts with IOM procedures for recruitment, placement and reintegration'. Although IOM has developed contacts with the Ghana High Commission in London, there are no clear indications yet about the feasibility of transferring recruitment activities to embassies. For some countries this may be politically difficult - returnees in some countries commented that IOM play an important role as a neutral broker in the recruitment process, and they would have been less likely to return had they been forced to work through their embassies. Given that Ghana has now achieved its target, it should be the focus for developing ideas and strategies for institutionalisation.

Discussions with PM staff suggest that current procedures are probably too complex to be handed over to participating governments with any degree of confidence. If any handover is to take place, then procedures must be streamlined (in line with the recommendations on recruitment and placement). The handover process should start as soon as possible in order to provide indications of the likelihood of sustainability prior to programme completion. The issue of future funding will also need to be addressed, and commitments by participating governments or alternative donors will provide an important indication of the sustainability of the programme.

## 6. Economic and Financial Analysis

### 6.1 The Programme Budget

#### 6.1.1 Structure

An important issue identified in section 4.1.1 is the lack of financial control as evidenced by the high degree of variation in cost effectiveness between IOM missions. Logically the immediate cause of this problem is inadequacy of procedures for financial management, monitoring and reporting. However, it may also be the case that the budget structure does not facilitate effective financial management.

Under Project Cycle Management, a project budget is prepared on the basis of a resource schedule which is itself developed from the project logframe. Thus there is a clear linkage between the structure of the budget and the activities to be undertaken. While the structure of the RQAN III budget does match the planned activities listed in the logframe at the programme level, it does not adequately reflect the activities undertaken at mission level. In section 4.2.2 all activities are listed by responsibility. If the budget was disaggregated to PM, RM and HQ, then it is likely that it would be easier to use especially given the recommendations contained in this report concerning decentralisation.

#### 6.1.2 Sufficiency of Funds

Analysis of the sufficiency of funds is undertaken with reference to table 4-1. Brief analysis indicates that RQAN is well within budget except for the category of *Indirect and Administration Costs* in industrialised countries. This would indicate that in general funds are sufficient to undertake the planned activities, but closer analysis indicates a more complicated picture. The budget is analysed below for sufficiency of funds by cost heading. It must be noted that IOM makes additional contributions to the RQAN budget from its own funds. The analysis below does not include these contributions.

#### 1.1 Direct Support to Returnees

All cost sub-headings are directly linked to the number of returns. Therefore the only issue is whether targets were realistic. Given the low rates of return in all countries,



the conclusion can only be that under existing programme arrangements the targets were too high except in Ghana where the target was too low.

### I.2 Direct Programme Activity Costs for the Recruitment and Placement of Returnees

Items I.2 a) and b) relate to the costs of recruiting and placing returnees from industrialised countries and on an intra-regional basis. Comparison of physical and financial progress shows that while 27% of targeted returns have been achieved (169 out of 616), 45% of funds for related Direct Programme Activity Costs have been spent. It should not be expected that the ratio of *Direct Programme Activity Costs* to *Direct Support to Returnees* will remain constant as there will have been significant expenditure at the start of implementation to establish new systems and procedures. Nonetheless given that expenditure on the latter is running at 166% of the former, under current implementation arrangements funds do not appear to be sufficient.

Applying the same approach to items I.2 d) and I.1 d) (the self-employment component) indicates that while only 3% of targeted self-employed returns have been achieved, 41% of related *Direct Programme Activity Costs* have been spent. Given the comments made in 5.1.5, this discrepancy is not due to a lack of sufficiency of funds but rather to issues of relevance and effectiveness.

Under item I.2 c) 46% of funds have been spent on project monitoring and follow-up of the 27% of targeted returns which have so far been achieved. Thus there is a danger that under current implementation arrangements these funds will not prove sufficient.

Item I.2 e) refers to funds for the collection and dissemination of manpower plans. The majority of these funds would have been spent at the start of implementation when the initial research was undertaken to determine manpower priorities. A small proportion of funds would be required for updating these priorities on a periodic basis. As only 33% have been spent to date, it must be concluded that funds for this item are more than sufficient.

Arrangements for institution building and counterpart training (item I.2 e)) have been criticised as lacking a clear strategy. While expenditure of 33% of funds would suggest that funds are adequate, this low rate may be more a reflection of a low level of activity in this area.

### II Indirect and Administration Costs

The rates of expenditure in ACP countries and industrialised countries are in direct contrast. Item II.1 is well within budget at 38%, while item II.2 is running over budget at 181%. This implies that the funds for the latter are insufficient. However, during the financing proposal negotiation process (1992-94) funds for this item were actually increased by 16% on a per-country basis. The implication therefore is that either the amount budgeted for in 1992 significantly low, or poor financial management and control has resulted in inefficiency and over-expenditure. Given the

wide variations in staff costs between RMs, the evaluation team is of the opinion that the latter is the more likely explanation.

### III Evaluation. Monitoring and Auditing

Funds for items III.1 and 2 appear to be adequate. If the recommendation concerning the holding of a mid term evaluation workshop is accepted (which might logically fall under this cost heading), it is assumed that funds will be sourced from the contingency.

#### **6.2 Support Package**

A breakdown of the support packages provided to returnees has already been presented in section 4.1.2.

Many of the returnees had been in relatively well-paid jobs in industrialised countries, and in comparison to their salaries the package cannot be viewed as offering a substantial incentive to return. Furthermore, many have come back to jobs with salaries that do not even pay basic living costs, so in general financial incentives did not play a large part in the decision to return.

Returnees were largely satisfied with the support package, notwithstanding comments that landlocked countries should receive a larger amount due to the higher shipping costs.

#### **6.3 Self-Employment**

To date there are only 3 self-employed returnees. Therefore the expected benefits at this stage are negligible. In any case there is no economic data available from IOM to form the basis of an assessment of economic or financial feasibility. As already stated, the evaluation team feels that this component has been ineffective and should be re-oriented.

#### **6.4 Cost Benefit Analysis**

The TCA and the Operational Plans have made no provision for the collection of data necessary for a Cost Benefit Analysis. Although information on costs is fairly comprehensive, all information on the benefits produced by returnees is qualitative, and therefore inappropriate for a CBA. However, despite the lack of data, there is strong anecdotal evidence to suggest that due to the generally high calibre of returnees their potential for impact is considerable. A number of returnees were able to cite particular examples of new systems or techniques they had introduced, or achievements such as increases in turnover within their companies.

As suggested in section 2.2 and in the draft revised logframe, it is unrealistic to expect the programme to have a measurable impact at the sectoral level. A more realistic and measurable impact would be expected at the enterprise level - ie. looking at the benefits generated by returnees within the institutions to which they have returned.

The objectives and indicators contained in the current logframe do not reflect enterprise-level effects and impact. The suggested approach would therefore require the redefinition of the overall objectives and project purpose, and associated indicators. The logframe contained in Appendix 4 provides the following suggestion:

Overall Objective

To improve technical and managerial performance within assisted institutions of participating countries

Indicators

- Improved economic and financial performance of assisted private sector institutions
- Improved efficiency of assisted public sector institutions

Project Purpose

To improve local technical and managerial capacity within assisted institutions through the transfer of skills and know-how from returning highly qualified, qualified and skilled African nationals

Indicators

- New techniques/systems introduced
- Numbers of colleagues trained
- Qualitative assessment of returnees' contribution by colleagues/employer
- Additional jobs created by self-employed enterprises

At the level of the project purpose, the information required would be relatively straightforward to collect on a 'before and after' basis. As part of the job offer process, employers could be asked to detail what benefits they expect from employing a returnee, and to provide brief details of the level of operations in the areas where benefits are expected. This might have the added benefit of encouraging the employer to think more carefully about what the job entails, and therefore provide the returnee with more information.

The information could be used as a baseline. Prior to programme completion, a sample survey could be undertaken to assess the extent to which employers expectations have been met. The survey could also collect information on the number of new techniques or systems introduced, staff members trained, etc. and seek a qualitative assessment from employers and colleagues of the returnees' contribution. With regard to existing returnees, it would not be appropriate to try and construct a retrospective baseline, and modified arrangements for them would have to be developed for the final evaluation.

At the overall objectives level the emphasis should be on the direct economic benefits generated by the returnee (eg. changes in profitability; amount of turnover for which returnee is responsible; value of new clients brought in by returnee; etc.). For public sector placements, the emphasis should be on changes in efficiency which can then be costed (eg. reduced administration costs as a result of new systems introduced by returnee) or ascribed a value (eg. increase in number of students graduating; increase in number of patients treated). However, there are likely to be serious difficulties in establishing causality - whether the changes can be plausibly attributed to the returnee - raising questions about the cost-effectiveness of collecting such information. It is recommended therefore that the programme collects evaluation data only at the level of the project purpose.

## 7. Sustainability

Sustainability has a number of dimensions for RQAN. These are:

- the likelihood that returnees will remain in-country and within priority sectors
- the longer term impact that returnees might have within the workplace, and in the wider sectoral environment
- the prospects for institutionalisation of the programme in order that the return process is continued after programme completion

Downstream effects and prospects for institutionalisation have been discussed in sections 6.3 and 5.2 respectively.

Tables 7-1 and 7-2 below indicate that only a small proportion of returnees are so dissatisfied with the return that they are likely to re-emigrate (4%). The picture is a little less positive when looking at the jobs to which candidates have returned. To date, 15% of survey respondents have changed jobs and 28% think it probable that they will do so before the two year period of the integration agreement is over. Given the average period of time spent abroad this is perhaps part of the natural readjustment process, but is nonetheless worrying and should be carefully monitored.

Table 7-1: Likelihood to Re-emigrate by Country

How likely are you to re-emigrate?	Countries							Total
	Ang	Eth	Gha	Moz	Ug	Zam	Zim	
Probably	0 0%	0 0%	0 0%	1 33%	1 9%	0 0%	0 0%	2 4%
Possibly	1 33%	4 67%	3 25%	0 0%	3 27%	3 38%	5 45%	19 35%
Unlikely	2 67%	2 33%	9 75%	2 67%	7 64%	5 63%	6 55%	33 61%
Total	3	6	12	3	11	8	11	54

Table 7-2: Number of Returnees Who Have Changed Jobs

Are you still in the same job?	Countries							Total
	Ang	Eth	Gha	Moz	Ug	Zam	Zim	
Yes	2 67%	7 100%	11 92%	3 100%	9 82%	6 75%	9 82%	47 85%
No	1 33%	0 0%	1 8%	0 0%	2 18%	2 25%	2 18%	8 15%
Total	3	7	12	3	11	8	11	55

Table 7-3: Likelihood to Change Jobs by Country

How likely are you to change jobs?	Countries							Total
	Ang	Eth	Gha	Moz	Ug	Zam	Zim	
Probably	0 0%	0 0%	3 25%	1 33%	4 36%	3 38%	4 36%	15 28%
Possibly	3 100%	3 50%	6 50%	2 67%	4 36%	3 38%	3 27%	24 44%
Unlikely	0 0%	3 50%	3 25%	0 0%	3 27%	2 25%	4 36%	15 28%
Total	3	6	12	3	11	8	11	54

Despite these concerns, findings from the focus group discussions indicate that most returnees have made a firm decision to return and are determined to overcome integration problems, even if this does mean changing jobs. Table 7-4 shows that the major reasons for return are career development, family, nation building and social or cultural factors. It is interesting that only 5 respondents cited IOM financial assistance as a reason for their return, underlining the evaluators opinion that the support package makes a major contribution to speeding up and smoothing the return process, but that it does not represent a sufficient incentive to cause them to return.

Table 7-4: Reasons for Return

Career Development	23
Family	21
Make Contribution	19
Social/Cultural	18
IOM Assistance	5
Improved Home Environment	4
Quality of life	2
Rejoin family	2
Completion of studies	1
Contract termination	1
Job Offer	1
Racism	1
Visa Problems	1

Source: Evaluation survey

The evaluation team feels that the recommended returnees' associations can play an important role in both monitoring and dealing with reintegration problems, and thus ensuring greater sustainability.

## 8. Recommendations

The main recommendations of the evaluation are presented below. Table 8-1 prioritises them according to whether they should be implemented immediately, within the next three months, or should await consideration at the forthcoming evaluation workshop. Additional country-specific recommendations are presented in the Country Annexes, and are summarised in Appendix 8.

1. There are twenty-one recommendations presented in this report. Given the difficult implementation history of RQAN, and the fact that only eighteen months remains before the programme comes to an end, it is important to prioritise the recommended actions. To this end the first recommendation is that an evaluation workshop be held. The purpose of the workshop would be to disseminate the evaluation findings to all main stakeholders, and at least to begin the process of developing modified workplans and budgets for the remainder of the programme.

During the evaluation field visits, and during discussion of the draft report, some concern was expressed over the extent to which major changes could be

implemented over the next eighteen months. In response to this concern, two alternative scenarios are presented for the workshop, varying in terms of the scope of the workshop, and the number and range of participants. The major difference between the two are as follows:

- under scenario 1, implementation procedures would remain basically the same but would be elaborated at country level i) to take account of revised targets, and ii) to improve financial monitoring and reporting
- under scenario 2, the scope for the workshop would be much wider, and would focus on developing a revised logframe matrix and implementation schedule using the techniques of PCM. Additional changes envisaged would include revised arrangements for i) job-led recruitment and placement, ii) institution building, and iii) monitoring and evaluation

#### Scenario 1

<b>Workshop objectives</b>	By the end of the workshop, participants will have: A familiarised themselves with the findings of the mid term evaluation B prioritised the mid term evaluation recommendations C agreed arrangements to strengthen operations in Lisbon, Cap Verde and Guinea Bissau D agreed a revised programme workplan for the remainder of the programme
<b>Expected outcomes</b>	1. Revised country targets for international, intra-regional and non-target returns 2. Revised procedures for self-employment component 3. Revised country-specific workplans for remainder of programme duration 4. HQ, RM and PM budgets for remainder of programme duration 5. Revised physical and financial reporting procedures
<b>Participants</b>	EC (2), IOM HQ (2), PM Heads* (8), RM Heads (3 - UK, USA & Lisbon), Backstopping Consultant (1), Counterparts (8): <b>TOTAL = 24</b>
<b>Resource persons</b>	1) Moderator, 2) Evaluation Teamleader: <b>TOTAL = 2</b>
<b>Expected duration</b>	3 days

\*Assuming that Angola, Mozambique and Sierra Leone do not attend

Scenario 2

Workshop objectives	By the end of the workshop, participants will have: A familiarised themselves with the findings of the mid term evaluation B prioritised the mid term evaluation recommendations C agreed arrangements to strengthen operations in Lisbon, Cap Verde and Guinea Bissau D formulated a revised logframe, implementation schedule and budget <sup>17</sup>
Expected outcomes	1. Revised logframe and indicators 2. Revised country targets 3. Revised procedures for self-employment component 4. Revised country-specific workplans for remainder of programme duration 5. HQ, RM and PM budgets for remainder of programme duration 6. Revised arrangements for job-led recruitment and placement 7. Revised arrangements for institution building 8. Revised monitoring and evaluation arrangements 9. Revised physical and financial reporting procedures
Participants	EC (2), IOM HQ (2), PM Heads* (8), RM Heads (3 - UK, USA & Lisbon), Backstopping Consultant (1), Counterparts (8): TOTAL = 24
Resource persons	1) Moderator, 2) Evaluation Teamleader: TOTAL = 2
Expected duration	5 days

\* Ibid

Provisions for the workshop should include a Moderator, and the Evaluation Teamleader should be involved as a resource person. Sufficient time should be budgeted for to prepare the workshop in consultation with IOM and the Commission.

Given the short period of implementation remaining, it is the opinion of the evaluation team that scenario 1 is the most practicable solution.

## 8.1 Programme Operations

2. Due to the non-realisation of assumptions about the security situation and economic conditions, Sierra Leone should no longer be part of the programme.
3. Angola and Mozambique should no longer be designated as target countries. Instead they should become non-target countries, with the requirement that candidates must be pre-matched in order to gain financial assistance. Candidates currently on the roster should be assisted as far as possible during the closing-down period. For Mozambique this period will only last until March 30th, when IOM's licence to operate expires.
4. A Portuguese-speaking staff member should be assigned to take on responsibility for the Lusophone countries for the remainder of the programme duration. This staff member should be based in Guinea Bissau or Cap Verde, and make regular visits to both countries and to Lisbon. Particular areas of concern to be addressed are the identification of realistic job vacancies; the training of government counterparts; mitigating the tendency for re-emigration

<sup>17</sup> Detailed objectives would be formulated based on "Draft Terms of Reference: Moderation Logical Framework Planning Workshop", Evaluation Unit (DGVIII/A/2)

- (identified by the backstopping expert). The indicative target for Cap Verde should be reviewed in the light of a rapid appraisal of priority sectors (see recommendation 7 below).
5. The indicative target for Uganda should be revised downwards in the light of the recommended skills gap assessment to be undertaken by the Private Sector Foundation. Disbursement of Uganda's NIP funds should be adjusted to take account of the reduced funding requirement.
  6. The targets for intra-regional returns and returns to non-target countries should be revised downwards to conform with current trends. Given the time remaining (only 22 months until programme completion) it is not worthwhile investing a significant amount of time and effort in reorienting these components. A proportion of funds from the West Africa RIP for both components could be re-allocated to finance above-target returns in Ghana. Disbursement of RIP funds should be adjusted to take account of the reduced funding requirement.
  7. The self-employment component should be reassessed. Loans should be made available to candidates after return, when they have had the opportunity to assess local market conditions, and develop the necessary commercial contacts. This would also allow much closer contact between the candidate and the advisory body, thus improving the quality and flexibility of the business plan. As only 14% of all returnees will be able to access the funds, loans could perhaps be offered on a competitive basis to ensure that only the most viable enterprises are supported. Another approach might be to offer the loan only to those working in the public sector, to enable them to supplement their salaries and thus improving the sustainability of their placements. The possibility of reducing the target number of 140 assisted returnees, but increasing the loan size should also be explored.

## 8.2 Programme Activities

### 8.2.1 Recruitment and Placement

8. IOM should re-orient its recruitment and placement procedures towards a job-led strategy. The activities involved might include the following:
  - Placement Missions could undertake a rapid assessment within key priority sectors to identify sectors/sub-sectors which offer the best prospects for return. This will involve an assessment of the salaries and benefits available, as well as identifying where complementary sources of support exist (such as other donor-funded programmes) which might supplement low salaries. Much of this information will already have been collected by Placement Missions. On the basis of this rapid assessment, Placement Missions and counterparts should review the current list of priority sectors, and concentrate placement efforts in those areas offering the most realistic terms and conditions.
  - Within newly prioritised sectors, Placement Missions should identify potential employers as soon as possible and conduct workshops (involving a maximum of 25-30 representatives). The objectives of the workshop should be to inform identified employers of the services offered by the programme, to sensitize employers to its limitations (eg. time required to recruit and



return candidates; lack of resources to fly candidates over for interview), and to identify job vacancies.

- Following the workshops, Placement Missions should screen the identified vacancies and collect all necessary information on the 'approved' jobs. This information should be transmitted to Recruitment Missions as soon as it is available.
- Upon receipt of job information, Recruitment Missions should attempt to recruit and screen candidates for the identified vacancies. Recruitment channels should include the Internet, previously identified professional organisations and any other channels that have proved effective so far. Regular contacts should be maintained between Recruitment Missions and Placement Missions, with an emphasis on keeping both prospective employers information of progress, and ensuring that each is informed of candidates or jobs dropping off the roster as soon as possible.

Following a demand-driven approach would have a number of important advantages:

- Sensitizing government counterparts and counterpart structures to where realistic job vacancies exist, encouraging them to learn skills (such as labour market assessment) which would contribute to sustainability and viability of programme operations
  - removing the need for IOM to match candidates, thus speeding up processing
  - Providing employers with a choice of candidates, and potential candidates with a choice of jobs, thus substantially increasing the 'hit-rate' of candidate and job rosters
  - Enabling IOM to concentrate on screening candidates and jobs - something in which they have proven themselves to be effective
  - Removing the issue of pre-matching, as all placements would be in jobs identified by the programme
  - improving the balance of highly qualified, qualified and skilled returnees in response to real demand.
9. IOM is in the process of establishing a website for launching during March this year, providing information about its operations. As yet there are no plans to use the website for RQAN purposes. However, as the costs of development of the website have already been borne by other sources, this represents a cost effective opportunity for RQAN to experiment with the use of the internet as a means of recruitment.
10. Recruitment Missions should make informal contacts with recruitment consultancies and multi-nationals to familiarise themselves with current recruitment techniques. This should only be carried out very briefly, and on an exploratory basis, to determine if there are any opportunities for applying commercial techniques. Only if these opportunities appear substantial should any costs be incurred, or major procedural changes be introduced.

### 8.3 Reintegration

11. Returnees should be encouraged to establish their own associations. Possible functions of the associations could include:

- mutual counselling and assistance to facilitate the reintegration process
- involvement in self-monitoring of the reintegration process, and the 'downstream effects' of skills and knowledge transfer
- representation on the Support Group to provide feedback on returnees experiences, and to place demands on the group
- involvement in programme promotion and recruitment through returnee contacts both in-country and in their countries of emigration
- preparation of pre-departure materials to better inform candidates of the real conditions in their various sectors and job types

The decision to form an association, and to meet on a regular basis is for the returnees themselves. The formation of returnees associations should have no cost implications for the programme.

### 8.4 Institution-Building and Sustainability

12. Each Placement Mission should review current arrangements for institution-building, and recommend modified arrangements for the remainder of the programme. For countries where no counterpart has been appointed, this should be remedied immediately in close consultation with the NAO and Delegation. Where counterparts have been appointed, their capability and effectiveness should be assessed to determine the prospects for institutional sustainability. In the light of any negative assessments, alternative arrangements should be discussed immediately with the NAO and Delegation. A key criterion for selection of the counterpart should be existing or potential capacity to undertake recruitment and placement activities after the programme is completed.

13. The composition of the support group should be reviewed in the light of the findings of the rapid appraisal of priority sectors. It is suggested that:

- private sector representation should increase significantly
- a representative of the returnees should be involved
- where complementary donor-funded programmes are identified, representatives should be invited to participate
- the size of the group should be limited to 10-15 members to facilitate more effective meetings, and to encourage greater mutual accountability
- within each steering group, a core sub-group of members should be identified to assist IOM as much as possible in undertaking programme activities. This core group should be encouraged to work closely with the counterpart, and may form the basis of a sustainable institutional structure

14. Where the prospects for an effective support group appear poor, Geneva HQ and the Delegation should be informed, and a decision agreed on alternative arrangements.

## 8.5 Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation

### 8.5.1 Planning and Decision-making

15. Financial planning, monitoring and control would be much improved by the introduction of new budgeting and reporting procedures using the RQAN budget headings. All missions should be provided with an annual budget allocation, against which they should prepare a workplan and budget. This workplan and budget would then be the basis for reporting by each mission, and for six-monthly reports.
16. On the basis of approved workplans and budgets, decision-making should be fully decentralised from Geneva HQ to Placement Missions and Recruitment Missions. Geneva's role should be to monitor progress and to provide technical and backstopping support as required. Where new guidelines or procedures are required, these should be developed by Geneva HQ in close consultation with Recruitment Missions and Placement Missions.

### 8.5.2 Monitoring

17. Monthly reporting should follow activity schedules more closely. In figures 1-1 and 1-2 examples are given of formats for a six-month schedule and a monthly report for the activities listed in recommendation 7 above.
18. IOM should review the modified database programme (RQAN 2.2) to determine whether it provides sufficient flexibility to fulfill the requirements of a modified approach to recruitment and placement, and recommendations for revised evaluation arrangements. Particular attention should be paid to ensuring compatibility with a spreadsheet or database package that will allow the data to be exported to other programmes and analysed efficiently.

### 8.5.3 Evaluation

19. To facilitate the terminal evaluation, IOM should design a system for gathering baseline data from employers. This could be in the form of a simple questionnaire appended to the job offer form, requiring the employer to specify what particular benefits they expect from the returnee, the status of relevant systems/operations prior to the returnee's entry into the organisation. This could in fact form part of the screening process, encouraging employers to think carefully about what they want, and providing the candidate with more information about their intended role.

### 8.5.4 Backstopping

20. The backstopping expert should produce an aide memoire immediately after each country visit.
21. As soon as IOM introduce revised arrangements for budgeting and financial reporting, backstopping reports should include brief assessments of financial efficiency and effectiveness.

Figure 8-8: Example of Possible Activity Schedule




Figure 8-9: Example of Possible Monthly Report Following Activity Schedule Format

Activities	Expected Output	Progress	Issues/Problems/ Recommended Action
1. Undertake rapid appraisal of terms and conditions in priority sectors	Rapid appraisal completed by end week 1; counterpart endorses new priority sector list by end week 2		
2. Identify potential employers in priority sectors	50 employers identified by end week 3 (at least 50% from private sector); venue arranged and invitations sent by end week 4		
3. Conduct workshop to promote programme and identify 'realistic' job vacancies	etc.		
4. Collect necessary information and screen vacancies			
5. Compile job roster and provide to RMs			
6. Inform employers of progress and assist in selection process			

Table 8-1: Prioritisation of Recommendations

Recommended for Immediate Action	Recommended for Action within next 3 months	Recommended for Consideration at Workshop
<p>2. Due to the non-realisation of assumptions about the security situation and economic conditions, Sierra Leone should no longer be part of the programme.</p> <p>3. Angola and Mozambique should no longer be designated as target countries. Instead they should become non-target countries, with the requirement that candidates must be pre-matched in order to gain financial assistance (as is the current requirement).</p> <p>6. The targets for intra-regional returns and returns to non-target countries should be revised downwards to conform with current trends. A proportion of funds from the West Africa RIP for both components could be re-allocated to finance above-target returns in Ghana. Disbursement of RIP funds should be adjusted to take account of the reduced funding requirement.</p> <p>17. Monthly reporting should follow activity schedules more closely.</p> <p>18. IOM should review the modified database programme (RQAN 2.2) to determine whether it provides sufficient flexibility to fulfill the requirements of a modified approach to recruitment and placement, and recommendations for revised evaluation arrangements. Particular attention should be paid to ensuring compatibility with a spreadsheet or database package that will allow the data to be exported to other programmes and analysed efficiently.</p> <p>20. The backstopping expert should produce an aide memoire immediately after each country visit.</p>	<p>1. An evaluation workshop should be held to discuss the evaluation findings. Two alternative scenarios are presented for the workshop. Under scenario 1, implementation procedures would remain basically the same but would be elaborated at country level i) to take account of revised targets, and ii) to improve financial monitoring and reporting. Under scenario 2, the scope for the workshop would be much wider, and would focus on developing a revised logframe matrix and implementation schedule using the techniques of PCM.</p> <p>4. A Portuguese-speaking staff member should be assigned to take on responsibility for the Lusophone countries for the remainder of the programme duration. This official should be based in Guinea Bissau or Cap Verde, and make regular visits to both countries and to Lisbon.</p> <p>5. The indicative target for Uganda should be revised downwards in the light of the recommended skills gap assessment to be undertaken by the Private Sector Foundation. Disbursement of Uganda's NIP funds should be adjusted to take account of the reduced funding requirement.</p> <p>7. The self-employment component should be reassessed. There should be considerable scope to draw lessons from other DGVIII programmes. After the re-assessment, a decision should be taken whether to continue or to close down this component. If it is to continue, then the Commission and IOM should clarify whether the funds should be made available to returnees in the form of a grant or a loan. Furthermore, funds should be made available to candidates after return, when they have had the opportunity to assess local market conditions, and develop the necessary commercial contacts. The possibility of reducing the target number of 140 assisted returnees, but increasing the loan size should also be explored if ECU 4,500 is found to be insufficient.</p> <p>10. Recruitment Missions should make informal contacts with recruitment consultancies and multi-nationals to familiarise themselves with current recruitment techniques.</p> <p>11. Returnees should be encouraged to establish their own associations.</p> <p>12. Each Placement Mission should review current arrangements for institution-building, and recommend modified arrangements for the remainder of the programme. In the light of any negative assessments by PMs, alternative arrangements should be discussed immediately with the NAO and Delegation.</p> <p>13. The composition of the support group should be reviewed in the light of the findings of the rapid appraisal of priority sectors.</p> <p>14. Where the prospects for an effective support group appear poor, Geneva IIQ and the Delegation should be informed, and a decision agreed on alternative arrangements.</p>	<p>8. IOM should re-orient its recruitment and placement procedures towards a job-led strategy.</p> <p>9. IOM should experiment with the use of the internet as a means of recruitment.</p> <p>15. All missions should be provided with an annual budget allocation, against which they should prepare a workplan and budget. This workplan and budget would then be the basis for preparation of activity schedules, and for reporting by each mission, as well as for six-monthly reports.</p> <p>16. On the basis of approved workplans and budgets, decision-making should be fully decentralised from Geneva HQ to Placement Missions and Recruitment Missions.</p> <p>19. To facilitate the terminal evaluation, IOM should design a simple system for gathering baseline data from employers. This could be in the form of a simple questionnaire appended to the job offer form, requiring the employer to specify what particular benefits they expect from the returnee, the status of relevant systems/operations prior to the returnee's entry into the organisation.</p> <p>21. As soon as IOM introduce revised arrangements for budgeting and financial reporting, backstopping reports should include brief assessments of financial efficiency and effectiveness.</p>

**APPENDIX 1**  
Terms Of Reference For  
Mid Term Evaluation Of RQAN III

## A. Introduction

According to the Technical Cooperation Agreement concluded between the European Commission and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) in November 1994, Annex 1A, page 8, para. 4.3. c), reference is made to the need of carrying out a mid-term external evaluation after 18 months of project implementation. This evaluation will assess project results up to now. If necessary it will make recommendations to adjust policies, specific objectives, institutional arrangements, resource allocations, etc. On the basis of the evaluation results, the Commission will decide on possible adjustments for continuation of project implementation.

## B. Objectives of the study

In the financing agreement of the project adopted by the EDF Committee, it was decided to conduct a mid-term evaluation of it. (Refer to the evaluation of Phases I and II and to the subsequent seminar in Harare in 1992).

The main objectives are to provide for a detailed assessment of the project's relevance, efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability and if necessary for a redesign or a reorientation of the project.

## C. Background of the project.

The project is the continuation and extension of a project (Phases I and II), initiated in 1983 and implemented under Lomé II and Lomé III.

Following the conclusions and the recommendations of an external evaluation and the second evaluation Seminar in Harare in February 1992, the project for Phase III brought important innovations and modifications compared to the two precedent phases.

- a) The overall objective of the current project is to enhance the institutional capacity at ACP host country level, including the private sector, by the return and reintegration of highly qualified, qualified and skilled african personnel.
- b) The project purpose should be thoroughly assessed by the evaluation. From official documents, the project purpose is related to the enhancement of the role and utilisation of the returnees in key sectors of the economy, the improvement of local institutional capacities and the transfer of the know-how. In this context, the issue of job creation - although it is not a specific objective of the programme - should also be assessed.

Concluded for a four years period - 1995 to 1998 - this project envisages 11 target countries, as follows : Angola, Cap Verde, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea Bissau, Kenya, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

## c) Results and activities

Implemented by IOM, the main activities to be carried out by the organisation can be found in Annex 1A-4 of the terms of Reference of the Technical Cooperation Agreement.

The cumulative indicative minimum number of returnees to be assisted under the project is 999 of whom 699 to the 11 target countries and 300 in the so-called non



target countries. In the 11 target countries, it was foreseen to place 140 as self-employed on a pilot basis; 89 were supposed to be reintegrated from other ACP countries.

According to the plans of operation, 250 returnees were planned for placement up to the end of 1996. At the end of August 1996, 152 had been returned of which 30 females and 122 males. Of these, 131 have been placed in the target countries, 96 in the public sector, 31 in the private sector and 4 as independent.

Compared to the precedent Phases, the Phase III of the current project reinforced the selection criteria for African candidates willing to find jobs in Africa. It introduced the demand orientation (the demand of the labour market), the identification of the priority sectors of the receiving countries, the establishment of support groups of major local actors and the building up of the appropriate government counterpart structures and institutions. An other important modification was to favour also the returns to the private sector and not only to the public sector.

d) Means

The global cost estimate of the project amounts to ECU 13.430.000, out of which ECU 12.700.000 coming from 11 NIP and 4 RIP and ECU 730.000 coming from an advance contribution made under Lome III Regional Funds.

The resources are itemised as it follows :

- direct support costs to returnees (70%)
- management costs :
  - direct programme activity costs for the selection and placement of returnees (18,6%)
  - institution building and counterpart training (1%).
  - administration costs (9%)
- evaluation, monitoring (technical and managerial backstopping) and auditing (1,42%).

- e) The planned mid-term evaluation of the current Project should start if possible at the end of November 1996 and cover about 6 countries.

D. Issues to be studied (lay-out of the report)

DO Summary (10% of the report length)

D1. Background of the project

The evaluation should in particular provide information on the following aspects:

- quick historical overview of Phases I, II and III. Main changes of Phase III.
- the process of change (if any) in the priorities and commitments of the target countries and their impact on project implementation.
- the appropriateness of the project approach vis-a-vis specific cultural and regional differences of the recipient countries, as for example the regional particularities of the lusophone and the anglophone countries, of eastern and western African countries, etc.
- other interventions of the Governments, the Commission and/or other donors and their effect on the project, specially the ongoing recruitment of expatriate personnel in certain target countries and the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP).
- information about the social, economic and cultural reintegration of the returnees in the respective target countries : the role of the implementing agency in this process should be given particular importance.

## D2. Preparation and Design

The Consultant should provide a short overview of the project origin and design phases taking the Harare Seminar of February 1992 as a starting point, and then assess its internal coherence as reflected in the project's document and in the logical framework matrix.

## D3. Relevance of the Project

- a brief assessment of the project objectives against social, economic and political features of the countries should be provided.
- taking the Harare Seminar (February 1992) and the TCA Agreement (of 16.11.94), the evaluators should try to assess changes if any, in the commitments of the countries and the priorities of the governments signatory of the project. In case of major changes, the evaluators shall assess if these changes have undermined or enhanced the project's relevance and if the appropriate communication channels have been used.
- the consultants should check if any specific cultural and regional differences of context could be identified which influence project implementation.
- assess if specific interventions of the Governments, the Commission or other donors directly or indirectly affect project implementation. Special attention should be paid here to the SAPs and the ongoing recruitment of expatriates by certain Governments.
- coherence, complementarity, coordination with other Commission's programmes and with other donors' interventions.

- the evaluators should assess if any promotion of female candidates and returnees has taken place within the programme operation although it is not explicitly mentioned in the programme.

#### D4 Efficiency

Of particular importance for this mid-term evaluation are the following points:

- have the project means been used efficiently to transform project activities into results : costs in comparison to other initiatives, internal cost allocation, etc.
- is the organisational set-up of the project from the Headquarters (Commission, IOM, backstopping) and from the implementing agency to the field adequate ?
- are the structure(s) of the Counterpart institutions in place, appropriate and cooperative?
- is the monitoring and evaluation system of the implementing agency adequate?
- is the backstopping service provided appropriate and effective?
- is the program monitoring by IOM and the program steering by the Commission in general adequate?
- preliminary appreciation on any other least-costly way to achieve comparable results.

#### D5. Effectiveness

Taking into account the relatively short period of the (Phase III) programme implementation, the evaluators should specially examine the degree of achievement of results and project purpose:

- for the enhancement of the role and utilisation of the returnees in key sectors of the economy
- for the improvement of local institutional capacities and of the know-how transfer
- the job creation - although it is not a specific objective of the programme - should be another aspect to be assessed, including the streamline effect on the host institutions
- the evaluators will update the actual number of returnees placement and give a qualitative appreciation on their jobs
- were the jobs identified really responsive to the existing demands by the host countries?

- an assessment of the pilot project of establishing as self employed in the originally selected four countries (Kenya, Zambia, Ghana, Mozambique) should be made, as well as in any countries successively identified by the implementing agency.
- were the activities undertaken likely to encourage final reintegration?
- have the assumptions related to the Government plans for identifying priority in different sectors of the economy been effectively fulfilled?
- have any other assumption been fulfilled?

#### D6. Economic and Financial Analysis

- the consultants should examine in particular the financial aspects related to the adequacy and efficiency of the assistance package for the returnees.
- the consultant should also assess the economic and financial feasibility of the pilot project of self employment.
- the evaluators should provide the basic elements for a cost/benefit analysis of the programme to be further developed in the final evaluation.

#### D7. Sustainability/Replicability

Particular attention should be given also to :

- the sustainability of the employments supported by the programme (preliminary assessment)
- the adequacy of support provided by the implementing agency for building up local institutions and their participation
- the long-term effects that could be expected on the working environment of returnees (colleagues, offices capabilities, etc)
- other cultural issues.

#### E. Plan of Work

- Should be consulted as key resource persons or organisations : Mrs. Cabanne (VIII/G/4), Mr. Sebregondi (VIII/A/6) and other DGVIII officials having been involved in the management of the program; Dr. Amershi (the technical and managerial back-stopping expert); IOM; ACP Governments; EU Delegations.
- Suggestion for methods and approach
  - studying the files
  - in-depth interviews with the returnees, counterparts and other relevant actors

- using the internal survey of IOM in Geneva as starting point for a deeper probe
  - collection of qualitative and quantitative countrywise data (socio-economic indicators, labour markets, human resources, etc.)
- c) It is suggested that the consultants make a selection of the target countries to be visited in the 3 following regions : East, West and Southern Africa. The decision will be taken with the Commission services after the briefing meeting and first review of documents.

For example, by selecting both success and failing stories:

- 2 lusophone countries : Angola and Mozambique
- 1 in Southern Africa : Zambia and Zimbabwe
- 2 in East Africa : Uganda and Ethiopia
- 1 in West Africa : Ghana

d) Duration and timing of the evaluation:

Two consultants are necessary.

Both should stay:

- 2 days in Brussels for briefing and first decision on the country-sample to be visited and for a working session with the backstopping expert (beginning of January)
- 3 days in Geneva for interviews with IOM and documents/data base consultation and final decision on the sample (in close consultation with the Commission)
- 3 weeks in the field - each expert one week in one country - (20 Jan. to 16 Feb.)
- 2 days in Geneva for further check and completion of the obtained information.

For writing the draft report, the two experts should have 2 weeks each ( $\pm$  10 March)

The Commission should take 4 weeks to read and give comments to it.

The two evaluators should come 1 day in Brussels for the discussion of the draft report ( $\pm$  8 April).

They should then have 2 weeks in total to finalise the report ( $\pm$  25 April).

## F. Expertise Required

The two experts should have similar profiles (sociologist or social anthropologist) with complementary skills covering:

- the social, cultural aspects of the reintegration of the returnees in the respective countries

- human resources development projects (specially economic aspects, labour market, etc.)
- gender issues, migration and reintegration experience
- with ability to make statistics analysis, cost-benefit assessment and cost analysis
- knowledge of some of the 11 target countries and of the relevant languages.

#### G. Reporting

- inception report after the visit to Brussels and Geneva specifying sample of countries to be visited, approach for the mission and check list for interviews to be sent to the Commission before the field visits.
- draft report (by 10 March., 30 copies in english): one main report + country annexes (to be verified during the work if this is the appropriate solution).
- final report (by <sup>25th April</sup> ~~the end of March~~, 30 copies in english).

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## APPENDIX 2

### Itinerary

## Itinerary

Country	Dane Rogers	Andrea Cravinho
Brussels	7th - 8th January	7th - 8th January
Geneva	9th - 13th January	9th - 13th January
Ghana	19th - 26th January	19th - 26th January
Mozambique		26th - 31st January
Zambia	27th - 1st February	
Zimbabwe		1st - 7th February
Uganda	1st - 8th February	
Angola		7th - 11th February
Ethiopia	8th - 15th February	
Geneva	18th - 19th February	18th - 19th February
Brussels	25th April	25th April



**APPENDIX 3**  
List Of Persons Met

## List Of Persons Met

### Schedule of Meetings during Inception Period

#### DGVIII. EC headquarters in Brussels

Mrs. Cabane, EC Desk Officer  
Mr. Sebregondi, EC Administrator in Evaluation  
Mrs. Bakker, EC Desk Officer  
Mrs. Hales, EC Desk Officer for Sierra Leone  
Mr. Hild, EC Desk Officer for Guinea Conakry  
Mr. Ferreira, EC Desk Officer for Angola  
Mr. Luchner, EC Desk Officer for Zimbabwe  
Mr. Vandermeeren, EC Desk Officer for Kenya  
Mrs Soezen, EC Desk Officer for Malawi  
Dr. Amershi, RQAN III backstopper  
Mr. Andre, EC Desk Officer for Uganda  
Mr. Duarte de Carvalho, EC Desk Officer for SADCC  
Mr. Kelly, EC Desk Officer for Zambia  
Mr malin, EC Desk Officer for Mozambique

#### IOM headquarters in Geneva

Mr. El Nour, RQAN III Programme Coordinator  
Mr. Lupoli, IOM Head of Bureau: Africa and the Middle East  
Mrs. Sokiri, RQAN III Database, Reintegration & Monitoring  
Mrs. Moreno, RQAN III Processing & Matching  
Mrs. Vasselotti, Promotion & Self-Employment  
Mr. Dauba, IOM Analyst Programmer  
Mr. Ruiz-Rios, Head of IOM mission in Lisbon  
Mr. Purcell, IOM Director General

### List of Persons Met During ACP Visits

#### Ghana

Javier Puyol, Ambassador, EC Delegation  
Rune Skinnebach, EC Delegation  
Antonio Polosa, Head of Office, IOM  
Monique Gho, IOM Accra, Programme/ Operations Officer  
Juliet Kusi, IOM, Accra, Assistant Programme Officer  
Dr Francis Agble , Vice Chairman, Public Services Commission, Counterpart  
Mr Amegavie, Executive Secretary Ghana National Chamber of Commerce, Support Group Member  
Frank Ocran, Acting Chairman, State Enterprises Commission, Support Group Member  
George Owusu, Executive Director, Ghana Employers Association, Support Group Member  
Mr Apatu, Ministry of Finance, Support Group Member  
Ernest Kwamina Addison, Returnee  
Daniel Amon Kwashie, Returnee  
Sarah Fynn Ocran, Returnee  
Fred Asiedu-Frimpono, Returnee

Ignatius Kwame Asare, Returnee  
Kenneth Kyei Ban'ng, Returnee  
Emmanuel Yeboah Asamoah, Returnee  
Kwaku Anyemedu, Returnee  
Gloria Joyce Quansah, Returnee  
Evelin Youvett Quist-Addo, Returnee  
Regina Adutwum, Returnee  
Sylvia Anie, Returnee  
Ebenezer C Totimeh, World Bank Desk, Ministry of Finance

#### Zambia

Dr Taylor, Head of Mission, IOM  
Mr Banda, Deputy Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Labour, Counterpart  
Mrs B Nonde, Deputy Executive Director, Zambia Federation of Employers, Support Group member  
Gideon M Phiri, Chairman, Zambia Chambers of Commerce, Support Group member  
Simfukwe, National Authorising Office, Ministry of Finance, Support Group member  
Chanda, Dean, University of Zambia, Support Group member  
Mwanza, Public Services Management Division, Support Group member  
Hector HL Banda, Principal Lusaka Campuses, Zambia Institute of Management, Support Group member  
Maureen M Daura, Returnee  
Darlington Lupale Kapasu, Returnee  
Josiah Ngondo Dr, Returnee  
Victor Mudenda, Returnee  
Felix Ngosa, Returnee  
Lemba Davy Nyirenda, Returnee  
Georgina Mulundu, Returnee  
Christine Mwelwa Kaseba, Returnee  
Ellah Chembe, World Bank, Zambia, Resident Mission  
Mike Soko, Asst Resident Representative, UNDP

#### Uganda

Nicoletta Giordano, Head of Office, IOM  
Charles A Kwenin, Programme Officer, IOM  
John Crosthwaite, EC Delegation  
Georges-Marc Andre, EC Brussels  
Honourable Ruhemba Kweronda, MP, ex-Counterpart  
Jassie Rosie Kisakye, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare, Acting counterpart  
Fred Opio, Executive Director, Economic Policy Research Centre, Support Group member  
Grace Musoke, Project Coordinator, Private Sector Foundation  
Moses Bekabye, Programme Officer, Private Sector Foundation, Support Group member  
Balayo J Anthony, Programme Officer, Private Sector Foundation  
Mr Taliwako, National Authorising Officer  
Mr Mugabe, National Authorising Office, Support Group member  
Giorgio Horn, Head, Training Programme Implementation Unit

Nyiira Dr, Exec Secretary, Uganda National Council for Science and Technology, Support  
Group member  
Sebutinde Judge, Returnee  
Stephen Martin, Returnee  
Paul Kiwanuka Musoke, Returnee  
Kizito Serumaga, Returnee  
Herbert Kamuntu, Returnee  
Farida Ngeye Kyamanywa, Returnee  
Anne Babinag, Returnee  
Charles Francis, Returnee  
Herman Augashine Ssemuju, Returnee  
Yosa Wawa, Returnee  
Rujagaata Xavier, Returnee  
Betty Constance Pool, Returnee  
James S Saaka, Pan World Insurance Co Ltd, Employer  
Mathias Nalyanya, Acting Dean, Martyrs University, Employer  
Gaiv Tata, Senior Operations Officer, World Bank

#### Ethiopia

Meera Sethi Dr, Head of Office  
Claudia Wiedey-Nippold, Economic Adviser, Delegation of the European Commission to  
Ethiopia  
Legesse Mamo, Ministry of Economic Development & Cooperation, Counterpart  
Negatu Mereke, Ministry of Economic Development & Cooperation  
Mr Abebaw, National Authorising Office  
Dawit Johannes, Speaker of Parliament  
Brickti Kebede, Department of Trade and Industry, Support Group member  
Tsesai Berhane, Ministry of Works and Urban Development, Support Group member  
Christopher Lehembert, Deputy Residential Representative, UNDP  
Girmai Gebrew, Returnee  
Araya Asfaw, Returnee  
Yilma Seleshi, Returnee  
Haregewein Ashenafi, Returnee  
Tewodros Woldeamlak, Returnee  
Solomon Yirga, Returnee  
Yonas Admassu, Returnee  
Yidegiligne Haile Mariam, Returnee  
Hailu Ayele Dr, Academic Vice President, Addis Ababa University, Employer  
Abiye Yohannes, Managing Director, Universal Consultants, Employer  
Yohannes Beshah, Employer  
Mr Kidani, Bank of Ethiopia  
Mr Abip, Investment Office of Ethiopia  
Christian LeHembre, Deputy Resident Representative, UNDP  
Sudarshan Gooptu, Senior Resident Economist, World Bank

#### Angola

Mr. Mario Tavalaj, Chief of Mission, IOM Angola  
Mr. Inacio Muxiry, RQAN Co-ordinator, IOM Angola

Mr. Miguel Kiampuku, RQAN returnee  
Mr. Ismael Martins, RQAN returnee  
Mr. Joaquim Manguera, RQAN returnee  
Mr. Fernando Muqueque, Acting Director IAECAE, Government Counterpart  
Mrs. Apolinaria Gomes, Ministry of Fisheries, Support Group Member  
Mr. Almeida, Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Support Group Member  
Mr. Mendes Munguambe, Repatriation Programme Officer, UNHCR  
Mrs. Elizabeth Auget, Finance and Accounts Officer, IOM Angola  
Mr. Carlos Neto, Acting Director of the NAO, UTA/ACP-CE  
Mr. Paulo Sequeira, Economic Counsellor, Delegation of the EC  
Mr. Ortiz de Zuniga, Delegate, Delegation of the EC  
Mr. Gaspar Cardoso, Director of the NAO, UTA/ACP-CE

### Mozambique

Dr. Silva Neves, EU Delegate  
Mr. Muchanga, RQAN Programme Co-ordinator, IOM Maputo  
Mr. Caravela, Managing Director, SOCIMO (RQAN employer)  
Mr. Come, NAO Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
Mr. Francisco Noa, UEM lecturer (RQAN returnee)  
Mr. Haus, Instituto Nacional de Emprego e Formacao Profissional, Ministry of Labour (Government Counterpart)  
Mr. Jordao X. Junior, Financial Director, SOCIMO (RQAN returnee)  
Mr. Lipinski, UNV Programme Officer, UNDP  
Mr. Lofote, Director of the NAO, Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
Mr. Pire, Programme co-ordinator, EU Delegation  
Mr. Rousselot, Chief of Mission, IOM Maputo  
Mr. Santos Alfredo, LINK NGO Forum (SG)  
Mr. Viola, General Manager, Bank of Mozambique  
Mr. Viola, Human Resources, Head of Professional Training, Ministry of Public Works and Housing (SG)  
Mrs. Lange, Director, Faculty of Language/Literature, University Eduardo Mondlane UEM (RQAN employer)  
Mrs. Lusidia Felimone, UEM lecturer (RQAN returnee)

### Zimbabwe

Ms. Milella, RQAN Programme Coordinator, IOM Harare  
Mr. Weiss, Associate Expert, IOM Harare  
Mr. Chipanga, Senior Executive officer, Ministry for Health and Child Welfare (SG)  
Ms. M. Murandu, Director of Public Relations, University of Zimbabwe (SG)  
Ms. N. Mabhemba Baartman, Hotel Manager, private sector, Bulawayo (returnee)  
Mr. M. Klucklow, Clinical Psychologist, private sector, Bulawayo (returnee)  
Dr. W. Mubatanhema, Lecturer in Microbiology, University of Zimbabwe (returnee)  
Mr. Shenje, Lecturer of Computer Science, Ministry of Higher Education (returnee)  
Ms. Togarepi-Blanco, Human Resources Manager, BHP Minerals, private (returnee)  
Ambassador Laidler, Delegate to the EU  
Ms. Valette, Programme Coordinator, EU Delegation  
Mr. Mhlanga, NAO, Ministry of Finance  
Eng. F. Zingwiro, Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority

Mr. Changamire, Manager, Contact Employment & Training Services (SG)  
Mr. D. Cook, Resident Representative, IBRD  
Dr. J. A. Meyer, Dentist (returnee)  
Dr. E. Sibanda., Medical Practitioner/Lecturer, University of Zimbabwe (returnee)  
Dr. M. U. McCann, GP, private sector SE (returnee)  
Mr. P. Majongwe, Chief Executive, Human Resources Training & Consultancy (SG)  
Ms. Shipley, UNV Coordinator, UNDP  
Dr. Keane, Chief of Mission, IOM Harare  
Mr. Mutapuri, GC, Ministry of Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare  
Mr. F. Munyira, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare  
Dr. R. Doolabh, Radiologist, Bulawayo, Ministry of Health (returnee)  
Dr. W. Mandere, Surgeon, Ministry of Health (returnee)  
Mr. G. Chinembiri, Horticulturalist, private sector (returnee)  
Dr. A. Nhema, Lecturer of Political Science, University of Zimbabwe (returnee)  
Dr. P. L. N. Sikosana, Permanent Secretary, Ministry for Health & Child Welfare  
Dr.S. K. Chandiwana, Medical Research Council of Zimbabwe

**IOM Geneva**

Shirley Dunstall, Programme Coordinator, IOM London  
Michael Barton, Management Information Centre, IOM, Geneva  
Rodney Guerrier, Management Information Centre, IOM, Geneva

**APPENDIX 4**  
**Logical Framework Matrix for RQAN III**  
**as contained in Financing Proposal**

## LOGICAL FRAMEWORK

Project title: return and reintegration of qualified African nationals - Phase III<sup>1</sup>

	Logic of intervention	Objectively verifiable indicators	Source of verification	Assumptions
Overall Objective	Contribute to enhancing the role and utilisation of highly qualified, qualified and skilled African personnel in the development of participating countries		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>terminal external evaluation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Governments of recipient countries make efforts to implement appropriate personnel policies, and to render labour market regulation more efficient</li> </ul>
Programme Goal	The selective return migration of highly qualified, qualified and skilled Africans in order to contribute to fostering the receiving country's human resources capacity	The returnees have been absorbed in key sectors of the economy in accordance with the priority manpower needs of the country concerned	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>regular assessment of the priority sectors for employment of returnees</li> <li>six-monthly reviews</li> <li>external mid-term evaluation</li> <li>external terminal evaluation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Governments make efforts to establish manpower plans to identify priority sectors for employment of returnees, and support IOM in identifying concrete job vacancies</li> </ul>
Project Purpose	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>To assist highly qualified, qualified and skilled African nationals residing in industrialised countries in their return and reintegration process</li> <li>To promote the return of highly qualified, qualified and skilled Africans residing in other African countries</li> <li>To assist the returnees to become meaningfully and gainfully employed/self-employed</li> <li>To assist and encourage African countries in the establishment and/or strengthening of an institutional framework to promote the voluntary return of their highly qualified, qualified and skilled nationals</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>at least 80% of returnees still employed in accordance with available manpower development plans after 2 years of project activities</li> <li>70% of returnees assisted as self employed are still operating 2 years after their return</li> <li>at least 70% of the returnees consider their job commensurate with their training</li> <li>at least 70% of returnees consider that a transfer of knowledge/ experience to others takes place</li> <li>at least 80% of returnees consider that the return of qualified nationals contributes to the development of the receiving country</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>IOM computer database</li> <li>population and sample surveys of assisted returnees (by IOM)</li> <li>monitoring of the reintegration process of the returnees (by IOM)</li> <li>technical/managerial backstopping monitoring (external expert)</li> <li>mid-term evaluation after 18 months of project implementation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>support obtained from receiving countries to facilitate the transfer of human resources</li> <li>the security situation in countries of return allows for project implementation</li> <li>working conditions are considered reasonable</li> </ul>

<sup>1</sup> Source: Return and Reintegration of Qualified African Nationals - Phase III, Financing Proposal VIII/10/10/92-N



	Logic of intervention	Objectively verifiable Indicators	Source of verification	Assumptions
Results	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- 610 (highly) qualified/ skilled African nationals residing in industrialised countries recruited and placed in the participating target countries</li> <li>- 87 (highly) qualified/ skilled Africans transferred on a regional basis</li> <li>- 300 additional (highly) qualified/ skilled Africans assisted to return to non-target countries</li> <li>- 140 (highly) qualified/ skilled Africans assisted as self-employed in the liberal professions</li> <li>- Support groups created in main target countries</li> <li>- government counterparts trained in main target countries recruitment, placement and follow-up activities</li> </ul>	<p>Means: (MECU)</p> <p>Direct Support 10,40</p> <p>Administrative costs 1,20</p> <p>Evaluation, monitoring, auditing 0,18</p> <p>Contingencies 0,65</p> <p>Advance 12,43</p> <p>(0,73)</p> <hr/> <p>11,70</p>	<p>Same as above and:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- terminal external evaluation</li> <li>- terminal evaluation seminar for participating countries</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- support groups meet regularly</li> <li>- government counterparts participate actively in project implementation</li> </ul>
Activities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Identifying priority employment sectors and concrete job vacancies in recipient countries</li> <li>- Identifying/selecting candidates for self-employment</li> <li>- "job broker" services between employers and African candidates</li> <li>- providing adequate incentives for return and reintegration of (highly) qualified/ skilled Africans in their country of origin</li> <li>- identifying/providing specific training to returnees if required for certain jobs</li> <li>- providing follow-up advisory services to returnees on the spot</li> <li>- activities aimed at strengthening the project's institutionalisation and sustainability</li> </ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- regular managerial/technical backstopping monitoring</li> <li>- external mid-term evaluation</li> <li>- external terminal evaluation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- active implication of government counterparts in project implementation</li> </ul>

**APPENDIX 5**  
Draft New Version of  
Logical Framework Matrix for RQAN III

Project title: Return and Reintegration of Qualified African Nationals - Phase III  
 Logical Framework: Draft Version 3

Intervention Logic			Objectively Verifiable Indicators		Source of Verification	Assumptions
<b>Overall Objective</b>	To improve technical and managerial performance within assisted institutions of participating countries		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Improved economic and financial performance of assisted private sector institutions</li> <li>Improved efficiency of assisted public sector institutions</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Mid-term and end-of-project sample survey of assisted institutions</li> </ul>		
<b>Project Purpose</b>	To improve local technical and managerial capacity within assisted institutions through the transfer of skills and know-how from returning highly qualified, qualified and skilled African nationals		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>New techniques/systems introduced</li> <li>Numbers of colleagues trained</li> <li>Qualitative assessment of returnees' contribution by colleagues/employer</li> <li>Additional jobs created by self-employed enterprises</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Mid-term and end-of-project sample survey of assisted institutions</li> <li>Backstopping mission reports</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Local staff within assisted institutions receptive to new ideas</li> <li>Sufficient resources exist within assisted institutions to implement new techniques and systems</li> </ul>	
<b>Results</b>	1. Highly qualified, qualified and skilled African nationals recruited, placed and reintegrated in participating target and non-target countries, according to priorities identified by steering groups		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Number, type and terms and conditions of job vacancies identified</li> <li>Number of highly qualified, qualified and skilled African nationals returned to priority sectors</li> <li>Number of returnees self-employed</li> <li>Number of returnees still in post 2 years after return</li> <li>Number of returnees and families experiencing reintegration problems</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Job roster</li> <li>Candidate roster</li> <li>Monthly and six-monthly reports</li> <li>Minutes of returnees association meetings</li> <li>Follow-up survey of returnees' reintegration</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Qualifications/skills and experience of expatriated nationals match manpower requirements within identified priority sectors</li> </ul>	
	2. Institutional framework established/strengthened to facilitate the recruitment, placement and reintegration of highly qualified, qualified and skilled African nationals into priority sectors during and beyond the programme's duration		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Government counterpart appointed</li> <li>Steering groups formed with representatives from public and private sectors</li> <li>Returnees associations formed and represented in steering groups</li> <li>Priority sectors identified and endorsed by counterparts</li> <li>Steering groups take over responsibility for recruitment, placement and reintegration activities by end of programme</li> <li>Alternative source(s) of funding accessed by end of programme</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Monthly and six-monthly reports</li> <li>Minutes of steering group meetings</li> <li>Minutes of returnees association meetings</li> <li>Priority sector sheets</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Sufficient information on manpower requirements exists to facilitate meaningful identification of priority sectors</li> <li>Governments allocate staff and resources to continue recruitment, placement and reintegration activities after programme completion</li> </ul>	

Activities	Intervention Logic	Objectively Verifiable Indicators	Source of Verification	Assumptions
<p>1.1 Publicise and promote programme among potential candidates, employers and other stakeholders</p> <p>1.2 Identify and advertise job vacancies within the priority sectors of participating countries</p> <p>1.3 Screen applicants to ensure that they meet programme criteria for qualifications/skills and experience</p> <p>1.4 Facilitate contacts between candidates and potential employers</p> <p>1.5 Assist returnees and their families to return and reintegrate</p>	<p>2.1 Identify government counterparts</p> <p>2.2 Form steering groups</p> <p>2.3 Identify and update priority sectors</p> <p>2.4 Identify and screen job vacancies</p> <p>2.5 Train government counterparts and steering group members in recruitment, placement and reintegration activities</p> <p>2.6 Assist returnees' reintegration</p> <p>2.7 Identify alternative funding sources</p> <p>2.8 Coordinate actions with other repatriation programmes</p>	Means	Costs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Political and economic conditions conducive to return</li> <li>• Governments expedite transfer of returnees</li> </ul>
				<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Government committed to return of expatriated professionals</li> <li>• Other repatriation programmes cooperative</li> </ul>

**APPENDIX 6**  
Evaluation Survey Questionnaire

Date \_\_\_\_\_

## RETURNEES QUESTIONNAIRE FOR MID-TERM EVALUATION OF RQAN PHASE III

### A. Basic Information

1. First name(s)			
2. Family name			
3. Sex	Male/Female	Nationality	
4. Age	_____ years	Number dependents	
5. Marital status			
6. Professional qualifications			
7. Current job title			
8. Employer			

### B. Background To Return

9. What country did you emigrate to?	
10. How long were you abroad?	_____ years

11. What were your reasons for original emigration (list factors in order of importance)?

12. Please provide brief details of your study & employment history while abroad

13. How did you hear of the RQAN programme?

14. What made you decide to return (list factors in order of importance)?

15. How did you get matched with the job to which you returned?

1. By RQAN [ ]  
2. By self [ ]  
3. Other [ ]

16. What was the primary reason you accepted the job found by RQAN?

1. Only means to access support package [ ]  
2. Liked the job [ ]

17. Are you still in the job for which you received support from RQAN?

1. Yes [ ]  
2. No [ ]

If NO, briefly describe why you changed jobs?

### C. The Return Process

month / year

18. Date of submission of *pre-application form* to RQAN

\_\_\_\_ / \_\_\_\_

19. Date of approval as RQAN candidate (if known)

\_\_\_\_ / \_\_\_\_

20. Date of matching with job (if known)

\_\_\_\_ / \_\_\_\_

21. Date of return to home country

\_\_\_\_ / \_\_\_\_

22. Date of commencement of employment

\_\_\_\_ / \_\_\_\_

23. Would you have returned at this time anyway, even without RQAN support and assistance?
1. Yes [ ]  
2. No [ ]
24. During the application process, how satisfied were you with programme procedures for:
- a) screening and approving your application
1. Very satisfied [ ]  
2. Satisfied [ ]  
3. Not satisfied [ ]
- b) matching you with a job
1. Very satisfied [ ]  
2. Satisfied [ ]  
3. Not satisfied [ ]  
4. Found own job [ ]
- c) preparing you and your family for departure
1. Very satisfied [ ]  
2. Satisfied [ ]  
3. Not satisfied [ ]
- d) providing you with financial and material assistance
1. Very satisfied [ ]  
2. Satisfied [ ]  
3. Not satisfied [ ]
- C. The Reintegration Process**
25. When did you last have contact with the programme (not including being invited to this meeting)?
26. Since your return, how satisfied are you with the following:
- a) job (from a professional point of view)
1. Very satisfied [ ]  
2. Satisfied [ ]  
3. Not satisfied [ ]
- b) earnings (including salary top-up)
1. Very satisfied [ ]  
2. Satisfied [ ]  
3. Not satisfied [ ]
- c) housing
1. Very satisfied [ ]  
2. Satisfied [ ]  
3. Not satisfied [ ]
- d) schooling for family
1. Very satisfied [ ]  
2. Satisfied [ ]  
3. Not satisfied [ ]
27. How do you think your family feels about being back in your home country?
1. Very happy [ ]  
2. Happy [ ]  
3. Not happy [ ]



28. Is your standard of living better or worse compared to when you were abroad in your country of emigration?
1. Better off [ ]  
2. Worse off [ ]  
3. No change [ ]
29. Are you or your family experiencing any problems in reintegrating?
1. Yes [ ]  
2. No [ ]
30. How has IOM assisted you in addressing these problems?
1. Very well [ ]  
2. Satisfactorily [ ]  
3. Not at all [ ]
31. What is the likelihood that after the 2 year period specified in the integration agreement that you will:
- a) re-emigrate
1. Probable [ ]  
2. Possible [ ]  
3. Unlikely [ ]
- b) change jobs
1. Probable [ ]  
2. Possible [ ]  
3. Unlikely [ ]

If the answer to 31 a) or b) is *Probable*, please explain why this is the case:

**APPENDIX 7**  
Checklist of Issues for  
Focus Group Discussion  
with Returnees

## Checklist of Issues for Discussion with Returnees

1. When did you agree to join this project? How did you hear of RQAN?
2. Why did you leave <<your country>> originally? What factors persuaded you to remain overseas - in <<your country>>, and in your country of emigration?
3. How have these factors changed - in <<your country>>, and in your country of emigration?
4. Describe your situation in your country of emigration, prior to your return. Why had you not returned in the past?
5. What was it that persuaded you to return? What was IOM/RQAN's role in this decision. (*split matched and pre-matched for group discussion?*)
6. What contact had you maintained with <<your country>> while you were away? Did you make a number of trips home before reaching a decision? Were these useful/significant in making a decision?
7. What were your expectations of return? How did your expectations compare to the reality?
8. What support were you expecting from RQAN for your return and reintegration? Has the support you have received been satisfactory? How could it be improved?
9. If RQAN didn't exist, what other avenues were there available to assist you to return?
10. What contribution do you feel you have made in your job since your return? (*Split public/ private sector for group discussion? Try to find out about job creation and other 'downstream' effects.*)
11. What has your return meant for your family? Was the decision to return made within the family (how) and did any family event precipitate your move (describe)?
12. What are your experiences of the reintegration process - good and bad? How has your life changed since returning? (eg. fitting in better; standard of living better; family more settled) How could the programme have prepared you better during pre-departure?
13. What do you perceive to be the strengths of the project? What about the weaknesses?
14. What adjustment/improvements would you like to see?
15. How do you view your short, medium, and longer-term future?

**APPENDIX 8**  
Recommendations from  
Country Annexes

### Recommendations for Angola

1. Under the present circumstances, RQAN clearly has no relevance in Angola. Angola should therefore become a non-target country and the RQAN office in Luanda should be closed. The outstanding resources in the EC Angola NIP of ecu 479,500 (ecu 502,500 - 23,000) should be returned to the NIP resources. This implies that of the ecu 160,959 already disbursed 23,000 have been legitimately spent and the IOM should reimburse the unspent balance of ecu 137,959.
2. RIP resources could be used to strengthen remaining RQAN operations elsewhere.
3. IOM Lisbon and IOM HQ should consider the comments made by the returnees outlined in this report (see point 1.6.1)
4. The EC and IOM HQ should discuss the definition of clearer divisions of responsibility and executive decision-making power in order that greater country flexibility can be introduced. It is the concern of this evaluation that neither IOM HQ nor EC HQ chose to act upon the information provided by both IOM Luanda and the EC Delegation in Luanda. It is regretted that neither the implementing agency nor the donor were able to exercise sufficient authority to close down a clearly cost-ineffective and irrelevant project. This evaluation considers that the project design was evidently not specific in its designation of responsibilities.
5. IOM HQ should consider the importance of having staff with Portuguese language skills and cultural knowledge before embarking upon projects in Lusophone countries.

### Recommendations for Ethiopia

1. IOM Ethiopia faces difficulties in finding 'realistic' job offers which attract returnees. Currently there is too little coordination between recruitment and placement, and frequently candidates do not match jobs, or vice versa. However, discussions with private sector employers indicate that if a more effective matching process were adopted, there might be some potential for increasing placements in the private sector. It is apparent that the candidate roster does not meet the manpower needs of the private sector. Candidates are considered too highly qualified and are perceived as having too high expectations. IOM HQ should therefore develop strategies for separately targeting qualified and skilled nationals to ensure that candidates match more closely local manpower requirements, especially within the private sector.
2. IOM Ethiopia should develop a more effective approach to identifying 'realistic' job offers, especially in the private sector. Indications are that there are job vacancies offering a gross salary plus benefits of \$6,000. These vacancies should be more actively pursued, perhaps through a private sector seminar, to promote RQAN and identify manpower requirements among at least a sample of private companies. However, a major constraint is that employers require to interview the candidate before making an appointment. A number of candidates undertake independent visits prior to return. IOM should continue their current policy of encouraging candidates to visit potential employers at the same time. IOM should also explore the possibility of using unutilised

direct support costs to fund in-country interviews. To date, a saving of \$18,000 has been made as returnees have not received the full \$10,000 allocation.

3. Other potential areas for identifying vacancies are:
  - closer links with the Prime Minister's Office - to link up more closely with public sector reform
  - the University of Addis Ababa - to build on past success in placing returnees
  - liaising more closely with UNDP to identify vacancies on the new programmes commencing in mid-1997
4. Policy of 'optimal distribution' of placements should be dropped in favour of a more flexible approach which takes account of the difficult employment conditions in Ethiopia.
5. The implication of the above recommendations is that IOM recruitment missions should adopt a more pro-active recruitment policy of promoting jobs on a country-specific basis rather than the current programme-wide approach. By recruiting for identified job vacancies, IOM should ensure a closer match between candidate and job. This will reduce the current level of unproductive effort with respect to job searching, and reflect a more truly 'demand-driven' approach. A major avenue to explore is increased use of the internet. IOM should develop a RQAN website to carry country-specific details of the programme, conditions in-country, as well as details of job vacancies including terms and conditions. By researching what other country-specific websites exist, IOM could establish internet links with these to ensure maximum exposure of the programme.
6. Existing procedures for the self-employment component are not appropriate, as they require candidate to prepare business plan while still abroad. The self-employment loan should be made available after return to facilitate more realistic plans. Funds should be made available to public sector returnees as means of supplementing govt salary through private enterprise. However, funds are only available for 4 or 5 returnees, so the economic impact of the component will not be great.
7. There are no clear options for strengthening the Support Group. However, because of its weak role in job identification and placement, its composition and functions should be re-assessed.
8. With regard to the identification and updating of priority sectors, it may be more efficient for the counterpart to take over this function, working in consultation with IOM. To this end, it would seem sensible for the counterpart to link more closely with other departments within MEDAC, as this ministry coordinates all development programmes. A more appropriate strategy for linking up with Public Sector Reform would be closer bilateral contacts with the Prime Minister's Office, the Public Services Commission, and Personnel Departments in other ministries.
9. If the objective is for the return process to be continued after RQAN is completed, then alternative strategies for institutional sustainability must be developed. To this end, the focus should be on the counterpart. It is unlikely that the Ethiopian Government will be able to fund any returns, so alternative donor support will have to be found. However, given the current economic environment, additional funding is unlikely on the grounds of feasibility.
10. An alternative avenue is to focus on assisting individual institutions (eg. Addis Ababa University) in developing a recruitment network through the internet.

11. At present, IOM Placement Missions do not have a separate budget for training and institution building, even though there is an item for this in the overall programme budget. Procedures for financial planning and monitoring will have to be modified to enable IOM Ethiopia (and other missions) to develop and implement strategies for institution building.
12. Training objectives should be more clearly identified. The focus should be on the development of institutional capacity. This would require streamlined procedures, and more on-the-job training to familiarise the counterpart with the realities of recruitment and job searching - eg. manpower needs assessment, networking, internet. Training of embassy staff in recruitment would also be necessary.
13. Funds for training are limited, totally ECU 136,276 for all Recruitment and Placement Missions. As at November 1996, ECU 44,434 had been spent. The remaining funds should be allocated separately to each mission to enable them to develop specific training modules.

### Recommendations for Ghana

1. IOM Ghana should be provided with information by Geneva HQ as to exactly how much of the West Africa RIP funds are available for financing of above target returns to Ghana. Preliminary estimates indicate that at least ECU 45,000 should be available.
2. Discussions with the counterpart suggested that the Government of Ghana may be willing to fund the return of approximately 10 candidates per year, and this opportunity should be followed up vigorously by IOM Ghana. Alternative sources of funding should also be sought.
3. IOM Ghana should facilitate the establishment of a returnees association. This should be as much as possible organised and run by the returnees themselves. Nonetheless, on the basis of their willingness to assist in RQAN operations, possible areas of involvement could include:
  - preparation of pre-departure materials
  - assisting in reintegration of new arrivals
  - networking to identify job opportunities
  - self-monitoring of the reintegration process, and downstream effects and impact
4. Now that all targeted returns have been achieved, it is unclear what role the Support Group will continue to play. There is little point in them updating the priority sectors if no additional funds can be found. As the SGs role has not so far been developed beyond the identification of priority sectors and job vacancies, there are few prospects at present for institutionalisation.
5. Ghana will in practice become the pilot country for institutionalisation. Provided that funds for additional returns can be found, the focus should therefore be on returning suitably qualified and experienced Ghanaians within a much-strengthened strategic framework. Because it is likely that only limited funds will be available in the short term, this does not mean that complicated studies or initiatives should be undertaken. Rather it

means that a well-targeted approach should be adopted that is scaled to the funds and resources available. Thus if only 10 returns can be funded each year, then the sectors of sub sectors of return should be carefully chosen to maximise potential impact. Ten placements of a type similar to the mortgage banking specialist would be preferable to ten ad hoc placements within a wide range of sectors.

### Recommendations for Mozambique

1. Mozambique should either (6.2) become a non-target country or (6.3) be implemented by the Government Counterpart. This evaluation considers the former more appropriate.
2. Should Mozambique become a non-target country, the outstanding resources in the EC Mozambique NIP of Ecu 356,219 (Ecu 400,000 - 43,781) should be returned to the NIP resources. Any NIP disbursement to the IOM which exceeds Ecu 43,781 should presumably be reimbursed to the EC. RIP resources could be used to strengthen remaining RQAN operations elsewhere.
3. Should RQAN continue in Mozambique, the following issues should be addressed, and these are developed in point 2.1 and 5.4:
  - Importance of greater local IOM executive power, less reliance on IOM HQ;
  - Need for strategic planning to cover an isolated RQAN post-IOM departure;
  - Downward revision of target number;
  - Alteration of the intra-regional component;
  - Elimination of the Self-Employment component;
  - Importance of incorporating student programme experience into RQAN;
  - Targeting of priority sectors should be much more broader and flexible to the context;
  - Strengthening of information flows between IOM Maputo/Recruitment Missions and embassies/Recruitment Missions;
  - Building of relationship with the EC;
  - Interviews of candidates.
4. Should RQAN continue, both IOM Recruitment Missions and IOM Maputo should impress on candidates and returnees the role of the IOM outlined in the ToR in the reintegration process. Returnees should be encouraged to bring their particular problems to the attention of IOM Maputo. This has multiple functions: (a) psychological, as returnees will perceive that they are not alone; (b) informative, as IOM needs this information to communicate to the RMs (c) practical, where IOM assists in finding a solution; (d) promotional, important given that most candidates hear of RQAN through personal connections.
5. IOM should collect objective data on downstream effects of the returnees in order to facilitate the final evaluation (such as the letters already requested from employers). Information could be collected from returnees in education regarding number of students, new techniques, particular contributions to seminars, etc.. Returnees in the medical field could provide information on how rare their skills are, number of patients treated, etc.. Returnees in the private sector could provide information on their particular



responsibilities, any training they have provided to colleagues, new techniques introduced, etc..

6. It is recommended that IOM Lisbon be made aware of its reputation amongst the returnees and the specific reasons of complaint (appendix 3 for examples). It is recommended that the resource person used in the north of Portugal be used more fully in the IOM Lisbon office for RQAN, and that she be involved in communication between IOM Lisbon and the Placement Missions. These issues are clearly outlined in point 1.6.
7. Should RQAN continue, IOM HQ should issue very clear instructions on the follow-up of returnees. In other RQAN countries this evaluation has suggested that up to date information and recommendations could be gathered through an association of returnees. However, in the case of Mozambique, discussions with the returnees and RQAN co-ordinator suggest that there would not be an active interest on the part of the returnees in holding regular informal meetings. It is suggested that IOM Maputo continue in its efforts to maintain contact with the returnees on a one-to-one basis.
8. This evaluation considers that IOM HQ was correct in advising IOM Lisbon to drop the standards applied to Lusophone candidates (see 5.4.2). This should be discussed with the EC since it represents a deviation from the Technical Cooperation Agreement.
9. IOM HQ should consider the importance of having staff with Portuguese language skills and cultural knowledge before embarking upon projects in Lusophone countries.

### Recommendations for Uganda

1. IOM have recently been successful in co-opting the Private Sector Foundation onto the Support Group. PSF have indicated their willingness to play a much more active role in assisting the programme in identifying job vacancies, and in facilitating the matching process. This opportunity should be actively pursued. Discussions with the World Bank identified the potential of accessing funds from the Business Uganda Development Scheme (BUDS)<sup>1</sup> to undertake a skills gap assessment within PSF member organisations. This could be used as a basis for greatly increasing the number of identified job vacancies, and embedding the placement process in a more strategic framework. PSF could also play an important role in sensitising their members to the cost and resource implications of attracting Ugandan expertise into their companies, and therefore in identifying realistic job opportunities. Care will have to be taken to match the needs of RQAN and PSF as closely as possible, while ensuring that the assessment and sensitisation is carried out effectively and quickly. It may be necessary to follow a quick and dirty approach at first, and undertake a more rigorous assessment at a later stage.

On the basis of the assessment, the high target number of returnees should be revised, and the NIP allocation to Uganda adjusted accordingly. If, for any reason, the assessment is delayed beyond May or June 1997, then IOM Kampala should consult with the Delegation to determine an alternative basis for revision of the target number.

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<sup>1</sup> BUDS is a cost sharing grant scheme which reimburses 50% of pre-approved qualifying costs of private sector firms and institutions up to a ceiling of \$30,000.

2. In addition, PSF plays an important role in the Capacity Building Programme funded by World Bank, chairing a private sector committee (comprising government and private sector members) which meets to exchange information. PSF may therefore provide RQAN with opportunities to link more closely with government and private sector capacity building. IOM should therefore actively encourage greater PSF involvement, and hand over responsibilities to PSF as soon as possible. It should also seek to become more involved in the Capacity Building Programme through PSF's chairmanship of the private sector committee.

It should be noted that reliance on the World Bank-funded PSF may represent a risk to the programme. IOM Kampala and the Delegation should avoid the programme becoming perceived merely as a component of the much larger Capacity Building Programme under which PSF operates. This risk should be closely monitored.

3. During discussions with Phase III returnees, and a limited number of employers, there is evidence (albeit subjective) that RQAN returnees are of a consistently high calibre, and that their potential impact in terms of skills transfer is significant. There is currently a potential network of 16 Phase III returnees, plus a number of returnees still in-country from Phase II and the Bridging Fund period. The returnees consulted expressed their enthusiasm for the idea of establishing a returnees association which could undertake a number of functions:
  - mutual counselling and assistance to facilitate their own reintegration
  - self-monitoring of the process of skills and knowledge transfer, to assist RQAN in more effectively measuring programme effects and impact
  - networking within their respective sectors and organisations to identify job vacancies
  - assisting in the matching process to ensure that candidates' skills and experience meet the job requirements
  - possibly working towards the creation of a consultancy network drawing on their own members in order to broaden their impact

**IOM should therefore facilitate the formation of a returnees association, and hand over responsibilities to the returnees as soon as possible.**

4. Points 1 and 2 above would require a more targeted recruitment strategy than is currently undertaken by IOM. This approach should focus on marketing the available jobs rather than just the programme itself, and would reflect a truer demand-driven approach. Possible avenues to explore include:
  - establishing a website which would post job vacancies on the internet, thus speeding up the recruitment process
  - advertising specific job vacancies (including details of the remuneration package on offer) in professional journals and other relevant publications

**IOM should continue with their current approach of identifying job opportunities until PSF and the returnees identify sufficient job vacancies. Meanwhile the recruitment missions should explore the possibility of establishing a website immediately. As soon as sufficient job vacancies are identified, these should be actively marketed through the internet and other relevant channels.**

If some measure of success could be achieved through PSF or the returnees, then this may have two benefits:

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- demonstrating a feasible approach which may stimulate the wider Support Group to become more involved
  - releasing IOM Kampala from the task of identifying job vacancies, allowing them to concentrate more on supervising the placement process (something in which they have been successful so far), and facilitating the institution building process, initially with PSF and the returnees association, but later with the wider Support Group.

### Recommendations for Zambia

1. IOM Lusaka should refine its approach to the identification of priority sectors and job vacancies. A more effective targeting strategy is required which identifies 'realistic' job offers in a limited number of sectors where impact can be maximised. In general this means identifying vacancies which offer terms and conditions which are attractive to potential returnees.

However, the specific terms and conditions vary between job types - for example, the programme has had some success in attracting much needed doctors and lecturers. A number of returnees found that career development overseas was limited by discrimination, and that their return offered greater hopes of job satisfaction and career advancement. Therefore financial concerns are by no means the only professional factor influencing the decision to return. IOM should therefore continue to target such professions but with a more job-specific promotion strategy.

2. With regard to the private sector, there are a number of donor-funded entrepreneurship programmes which offer potential for complementary actions by IOM - for example, the Enterprise Development Programme funded by the World Bank, and the Trade and Enterprise Facility funded by the EU. By targeting specific areas and promoting these overseas, the programme may be better able to attract returnees. In order to facilitate this approach, IOM will have to streamline its application and approval procedures to speed up the process of return.

Suggested areas for initial investigation are the universities, MoH and the private sector; the latter in conjunction with other schemes to attract returnees. In order to create a better understanding of the aims of the programme, IOM should involve stakeholders in the development of a clear recruitment and placement strategy for the remainder of the programme duration. This should include the reformulation of the programme's higher objectives to ensure that they are realistic, specific and measurable, and that they are specific to Zambia.

3. The performance and effectiveness of the Support Group is closely associated with that of the Counterpart institution. While the chairman has been diligent in his attendance at meetings, it appears that the MLSS may not be the most appropriate 'institutional home' for the programme. MLSS is one of the weaker ministries, and the counterpart is an government payroll accountant by training and experience. Opportunities to develop a more pro-active approach therefore appear limited. It is recommended therefore that IOM explore the possibility of placing the programme within Cabinet Office. Dr Kanganja, Permanent secretary of the Public Services Management Division and a member of the

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Support Group, has expressed his support for the idea. Such a move would have the benefits of placing the programme within a more influential and dynamic ministry, and enable IOM to link more closely with Public Sector Reform plans should this be appropriate. However, a risk might be that the programme focus would remain on the public sector. IOM should therefore consider how to bolster private sector representation on the Support Group. If closer links are established with other donor-funded entrepreneurship programmes, representation from these programmes may be one means of improving private sector involvement. It would also have the added advantage of providing an additional attraction to existing private sector members.

4. Returnees are a greatly underutilised resource. Prior to this evaluation mission, they had met only once before, in December 1996. Without greater involvement with each other and with the programme, they will remain 'islands' of expertise. They could be used much more effectively in a number of ways, including the revitalisation of the Support Group. Although it is not a requirement of the programme's plan of operations, IOM have already begun to encourage returnees to form their own association, and for them to be represented on the Support Group. Based on the findings of a focus group discussion with 9 returnees, they appear enthusiastic about becoming more involved. Possible areas include:
  - involvement in self-monitoring of the 'downstream effects' of skills and knowledge transfer
  - representation on the Support Group to provide feedback on returnees experiences, and to place demands on the group
  - involvement in programme promotion and recruitment through networking both in Zambia and their countries of emigration
  - preparation of pre-departure materials to better inform candidates of the real conditions in their various sectors and job types
  - mutual counselling and assistance to facilitate the reintegration process
5. IOM should ensure that clear strategies for reorganisation of the Support Group, and greater involvement of the returnees are prepared as soon as possible. Realistically, the programme has perhaps 6 months to develop new strategies in order that sufficient time remains for them to be fully tested before the end of 1998.
6. Although there are no clear pointers as to how the training component can be strengthened, counterpart training will remain closely linked to procedures for recruitment, placement and follow-up activities. Arrangements should be reviewed in the light of strategies developed for improving the targeting of recruitment and placement activities, and the proposed reorganisation of the Support Group. In principle, training should encourage greater flexibility in approach in order that recruitment and placement opportunities can be more readily identified and acted on.

### **Recommendations for Zimbabwe**

1. This evaluation is concerned with the balance of decision-making weight between IOM HQ and the field. Greater executive power should be given to IOM Harare as supervised by the CoM, and there should be less reliance on IOM HQ. This evaluation seeks to

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encourage the formulation of country strategies as much as possible in order to ensure a more coherent and efficient implementation of RQAN.

2. The SE component needs to be developed (see point 2.1.2 for details). It is recommended that the IOM RQAN co-ordinator in Harare become familiar with the EC and UNDP micro-project programme in Zimbabwe in order to better implement the RQAN SE component, and explore the possible avenues for seeking the advice of experienced EC local staff. It is recommended that IOM Harare, in consultation with the GC and the SG, be given the choice to decide if the SE component as it is currently designed is relevant to Zimbabwe:
3. The targeting of priority sectors should continue to be dynamic in its approach and flexible to the country context.
4. The endorsement of the Job Offer Forms should follow the logic of the country concerned and its rules should not be set in stone.
5. It is recommended that the Recruitment Missions place special emphasis on informing Zimbabwean RQAN candidates that they should clear their particular situation with their embassy in the host country prior to departure regarding nationality laws. It is also recommended that the Placement Missions use the information gained from its involvement with the reintegration process to provide feed-back to the Recruitment Missions on the particular problems that RQAN candidates face with respect to immigration and nationality laws and the solutions they have found.
6. It is recommended that both Recruitment Missions and IOM Harare impress the potential candidates and returnees on the role of the IOM outlined in the ToR regarding the reintegration process. Returnees should be encouraged as much as possible to bring their particular problems to the attention of IOM Harare. This has multiple functions: (a) psychological, as returnees will not perceive that they are alone; (b) informative, as IOM needs this information to communicate to the Recruitment Missions; (c) practical, where IOM is able to assist in finding a solution; (d) promotional, important given that most RQAN candidates heard of RQAN through personnel connections.
7. The returnees suggested that IOM Harare encourage informal gatherings in both Harare and Bulawayo to which returnees and any other relevant RQAN could actors be invited (such as the spouses of returnees, as participation in RQAN affects the entire household). This would have the same multiple functions namely: (a) psychological, as returnees will not perceive that they are alone; (b) informative, as IOM needs information to communicate to the Recruitment Missions; (c) practical, where IOM is able to assist in finding a solution; (d) promotional, important given that most RQAN candidates heard of RQAN through personnel connections.
8. Concrete plans should be made on ensuring the funding element for RQAN sustainability. RQAN Zimbabwe should continue to widen its approach to involve other stakeholders in what has so far been a very successful exercise in institution-building.

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9. IOM Harare should collect objective data on the positive downstream effects of the returnees in order to facilitate the final evaluation of RQAN.

10. This evaluation highly recommends that the experience of the present RQAN co-ordinator be used in a more challenging environment within the RQAN programme, and this point is further developed in the main report, suggesting that this resource be used to supervise the placement of returnees in all the target and non-target Lusophone countries. It is also recommended that future substitutes to the current RQAN co-ordinator be responsible to the CoM of IOM Harare in first instance, and only secondly to IOM HQ.