



International Organization for Migration (IOM)

The UN Migration Agency

A THEMATIC EVALUATION OF THE IOM'S MIGRATION CRISIS OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK (MCOF)

Annexes

OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL

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ANNEX 1: Evaluation Terms of Reference

EVALUATION OF THE IOM MIGRATION CRISIS OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK (MCOF) Terms of Reference

1. Background

Crises are a growing challenge for States and the international community and the human mobility dimension of humanitarian crises has been becoming increasingly relevant. Crises can produce complex and often large-scale migration flows and mobility patterns, and these migration dimensions were frequently overlooked in crisis response.

The IOM Migration Crisis Operational Framework (MCOF) was developed in 2012 at the request of IOM Member States, pursuant to their growing interest in the migration consequences of crisis situations. During the 101st Session of the IOM Council, held on 27-30 November 2012, they adopted Resolution No. 1243, endorsing the MCOF.

The framework is based on the understanding that States bear the primary responsibility to protect and assist crisis-affected persons residing on their territory in a manner consistent with international humanitarian and human rights law. IOM supports States, upon their request and with their consent, to fulfil their responsibilities.

IOM's MCOF is based on the "migration crisis" concept, a term that summarizes the complex and often large-scale migration flows and mobility patterns caused by a crisis. A migration crisis is understood to involve significant vulnerabilities for individuals and affected communities and generates acute and longer-term migration management challenges. A migration crisis may be sudden or slow in onset, can have natural or man-made causes, and can take place internally and/or across borders.

IOM is also bound and committed to existing legal and institutional frameworks contributing to the effective delivery of assistance and protection to affected populations during crises, and ultimately to the respect and promotion of human rights and humanitarian principles. The international humanitarian system has produced well-developed mechanisms to provide a coordinated international response to crisis situations. The MCOF has been structured to closely link with and complement the mandates of other agencies and existing humanitarian, development and peacebuilding systems, strictly ensuring that it does not replace or duplicate existing mechanisms and acts in full coordination. The MCOF was designed to enable the Organization to provide a holistic response to the complex nature of crisis-generated population flows; it therefore looks, as a whole, at all phases of a crisis (before, during, after), and considers the specific needs and vulnerabilities of crisis-affected migrants who fall outside of existing protection frameworks. IOM's MCOF is intended to *complement* existing international systems and is meant to improve IOM's performance *within* these systems. It fits with the Cluster Approach of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee and the international refugee protection regime.

The Operational Framework is a flexible tool that has been designed to:

- a) Improve and systematize IOM's response to migration crises by bringing together its different sectors of assistance within a pragmatic and evolving approach, while upholding human rights and humanitarian principles and promoting longer-term development goals;
- b) Help crisis-affected populations, including displaced persons and international migrants stranded in crisis situations in their destination/transit countries, to better access their fundamental rights to protection and assistance through IOM support to States;
- c) Respond to the often-unaddressed migration dimensions of a crisis, by complementing existing humanitarian systems as well as other systems addressing peace and security, and development issues;
- d) Build on IOM's partnerships with States, international organizations and other relevant actors in the fields of humanitarian response, migration, peace and security, and development.

The MCOF is organized around two pillars. Pillar one consists of the three phases of a crisis: before, during and after. Pillar two consists of 15 sectors of assistance: Camp Management and Displacement Tracking, Shelter and Non-Food Items, Transport Assistance for Affected Populations, Health Support, Psychosocial Support, (Re)integration Assistance, Community Stabilization and Transition, Disaster Risk Reduction and Resilience Building, Land and Property Support, Counter-trafficking and Protection of Vulnerable Migrants, Technical Assistance for Humanitarian Border Management, Emergency Consular Assistance, Diaspora and Human Resource Mobilization, Migration Policy and Legislation Support, and Humanitarian Communications. Together these two pillars allow for a flexible, comprehensive and context-specific response to a variety of crises, providing people with adequate assistance and protection and ultimately upholding their human rights and dignity.

The framework considers IOM migration management tools that supplement the humanitarian, transition and recovery response for migrants caught in a crisis, such as technical assistance for border management; consular services; response and referral for persons with special protection needs; and the organization of safe evacuations for migrants to return. It also helps to inform longer-term development activities.

In December 2015, IOM Council adopted Resolution No. 1310 welcoming the IOM Migration Governance Framework (MiGOF) as "the essential elements for facilitating orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility of people through planned and well-managed migration policies" and encouraging Member States to use MiGOF "to enhance their own governance of migration and mobility, with support from IOM". The MCOF is extensively mentioned in the Annex of the document referring to the basis of the MiGOF. In particular, Objective 2 of the MiGOF is a clear, albeit implicit, representation of the MCOF.

In 2016, IOM launched an internal MCOF-based strategic planning methodology to develop more strategic responses to migration crises. A 'Facilitator Manual' and associated toolkit integrates recent IOM policies and operational frameworks and guidance, such as the 'Principles for Humanitarian Action', 'Mainstreaming Protection' and the 'Progressive Resolution of Displacement Situations Framework', and enables the development of strategic planning products for IOM missions and their counterparts in affected countries.

Trainings and roll-out sessions have also been organized to help understand and utilize the MCOF.

2. Objective of the evaluation

The evaluation of the MCOF has been included in the Biennial Evaluation Plan 2017-2018 of the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) in agreement with the Department of Operations and Emergencies (DOE) given the importance of the MCOF for responding to crises and for managing IOM's responses in such contexts. The evaluation will mainly consist in an institutional and strategic analysis of the relevance and application of the MCOF. Its main objective will be:

To evaluate IOM's overall performance in the application of the MCOF in line with its objectives, examining also the development of IOM's technical expertise for its management; to evaluate its relevance to IOM's mandate and operational responses, as well as to new developments in the humanitarian and developments fields; and to analyze the internal synergies and institutional steps taken for an effective and sustained use of MCOF as a key decision-making and management tool for IOM's comprehensive responses to crises.

More specifically, the evaluation will examine:

- If, when and why MCOF has played a critical role to ensure that IOM could deliver its interventions during crises with a comprehensive approach and considering longer-term goals;
- The best practices and constraints in applying MCOF, including an analysis of the compliance with Resolution No. 1243 asking IOM to keep its Member States duly informed;
- The strategic importance of MCOF for coordination and collaboration with other partners and donors for accountability to affected populations.
- IOM's internal institutional set-up of MCOF in terms of definition of roles, training, roll-out, and development and issuance of additional guidance.

The evaluation will also provide recommendations on the strategic approach of MCOF, on reporting and operational procedures, as well as on challenges and success criteria for its use.

3. Scope of the evaluation

The evaluation will analyze the relevance, performance and achievements of the MCOF taking into account its objectives, the phases of a crisis and the 15 sectors of assistance presented in the background section, as well as its complementarity with other IOM's migration management tools and international frameworks, response systems, and modalities of coordination such as the IASC Transformative Agenda and cluster approach.

The evaluation will also undertake an analysis of case studies, to be selected in cooperation with the DOE and illustrating the different scenarios in which MCOF has been instrumental for organizing IOM's response. Given the large scope of the framework, the number of case studies will remain limited.

The evaluation will answer the following questions:

Relevance:

- Is the MCOF strategically relevant to meet the requirements of IOM's migration crisis response in line with its objectives and the IOM's mandate?
- Do specific IOM policies, strategies, standard procedures, programmes, and fundraising efforts promote the MCOF as a reference tool for crises management and post-crisis transition and recovery?

- Are the strategies for promoting and/or using MCOF with external partners, such as UN agencies, NGOs, donors and national governments properly consider IOM administrative and financial capacities, as well as other technical requirements?
- Does the MCOF properly cover cross-cutting issues such as gender and human rights as well as cultural aspects?

Effectiveness:

- Are the MCOF management and related monitoring mechanisms effective to report on its specific and overall performance and impact, and to generate recommendations for future strategic moves, including for resource mobilization?
- What are the institutional set-up and roles of the IOM's Country Offices, Regional Offices, and Headquarters in promoting and using the MCOF?
- How do we use MCOF to systematically frame our migration crises response across the organization?
- Is the MCOF an effective tool for framing and facilitating the collaboration with governments, donors, UN agencies, and civil society partners?
- How globally effective has IOM been in reaching the objectives of the MCOF? Has the coverage of and assistance to displaced populations and migrants in crises been comprehensive and adequately addressed using MCOF?
- In terms of connectedness, how does MCOF assure that activities are implemented in a way that takes medium, longer-term and interconnected approaches into account?
- How effective is the training and roll-out of MCOF inside and outside of IOM, including with implementing partners, governments and within the UN humanitarian coordination response?

Efficiency:

- Has IOM properly analysed financial requirements and organisational architecture for an effective implementation of MCOF?
- Are internal collaboration and resources sufficient to support MCOF's implementation as a relevant tool for the management of migration crises and mobility of populations?

Outcome and impact

- What is the outcome and/or strategic impact of the MCOF on IOM as the leading agency on displacement and migration crises, and as catalyst for resource mobilization for IOM operations?
- How has Member States, donors and partners' perception about the usefulness of MCOF as a reference framework evolved since its approval in 2012?
- What is the outcome and/or impact of MCOF for positioning IOM in preparedness, transition and post-crises initiatives?

4. Methodology and timeframe

Being a process and strategic evaluation, the methodology will maintain a balance between a global analysis and a more specific assessment of selected cases, which can properly illustrate the use of MCOF in different regions and for different types of intervention.

The selection of case studies will be determined at the start of the evaluation exercise with DOE, based on IOM geographical regions, the phases of the crises covered by MCOF, the types of emergency and of IOM's responses, as well as the formalization of MCOF for instance through institutional training and production of MCOF-based strategic plans.

The methodology will also consist of documentation reviews, desk research on case studies selected and interviews. DOE will be tasked to provide the necessary documentation specifically related to the management of MCOF as well as any documentation that can be considered relevant to the evaluation exercise, such as evaluations, donors' agreements or memorandum of understanding.

Interviews/surveys will be conducted with key IOM staff who have: a) managed and implemented MCOF or organized IOM's responses, b) been tasked to provide technical support and/or training, and c) participated in discussions related to the institutionalization and expansion of the use of the MCOF. Interviews/surveys are not limited to DOE and will cover other departments such as the Department of Migration Management. Interviews with IOM Senior Staff at Headquarters, in Regional Offices and with staff in Field Offices will also be organized. The list of staff for interviews and/or surveys will be established in close coordination with the DOE.

Interviews and/or surveys with external partners and with Member States will be discussed with DOE considering also the conduct of such external interviews in the framework of the case studies.

The evaluation is expected to start beginning of June 2018 and a draft report should be made available end of September 2018, depending on the decision to conduct a survey or on the number of case studies and related field visits. The OIG and DOE will also discuss options for sharing the evaluation report with IOM Member States in line with Resolution No. 1243 and reporting requirements.

OIG will be responsible for the overall implementation of the evaluation exercise and the budget will be covered by the OIG.

ANNEX 2: List of Documents Reviewed

Global Report

Internal

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- . *Plan estratégico nacional México 2017-2019: Marco Operacional en situaciones de crisis migratoria*. Santa Domingo: IOM, 2017.
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 - . "Migration Governance Framework: The essential elements for facilitating orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility of people through planned and well-managed migration policies." *SCPF 17th Session, S/17/4*, (25 September 2015).
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ANNEX 3: List of Interviewees

Name (First, Last)	Role / Position / Organization
HQ	
Mohammed Abdiker	Director, Department of Operations and Emergencies (DOE)
Renate Held	Director of Department of Migration Management (DMM)
Jill Helke	Director of International Cooperation and Partnerships (ICP)
Gregoire Goodstein	Head, Donor Relations Division (DRD), ICP
Anh Nguyen	Head, Migrant Protection and Assistance Division (MPAD), DMM
Leonard Doyle	Head, Media and Communications Division (MCD), ICP
Jacqueline Weekers	Head, Migration Health Division (MHD), DMM
Christine Adam	Head, Office of the Legal Counsel, Legal Affairs (LEG), ODG
Dina Ionesco	Head, Migration, Environment and Climate Change Division (MECC), DMM
Tristan Burnett	Head, Preparedness and Response Division (PRD), DOE
Louis Hoffmann	Head, Transition and Recovery Division (TRD), DOE
Angela Staiger	Senior Humanitarian Advisor, DOE
Rizki Mohammed	Senior Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) Coordination Manager, DOE
Patrice Quesada	Senior Regional Emergency and Post Crisis Specialist, IOM Regional Office (RO) Brussels
Lorenzo Guadagno	Consultant, TRD, DOE
Kerry Maze	Senior Migration Crisis Analyst, DOE
John McCue	Senior Operations Coordinator, DOE
Hayley West	Emergency Operations Health Officer, MHD, DMM
Ginette Kidd	Policy Officer (Durable Solutions), DOE
Chiara Milano	Programme Officer, PRD, DOE
Chissey Mueller	Specialist, Trafficking in Humanitarian Settings, MPAD, DMM
Libya	
Othman Belbeisi	Chief of Mission
Antonio Salanga	Senior Programme Development and Donor Relations Officer
Martina Salvatore	Emergency & Liaison Officer
Patrick Charignon	Transition & Recovery Specialist, Community Stabilization
Christine Petre	Public Information Consultant
Tassilo Teppert	DTM Project Coordinator
Ceren Goynuklu	Counter-trafficking National Programme Officer
Arif Hussain	Health Project Manager
Ewa Naqvi	Emergency Project Manager
Karolina Edsbacker	Protection Project Manager
Salem Ramadan	CEO, STACO
Ashraf Hassan	Voluntary Humanitarian Return Officer
Maysa Khalil	Search and Rescue Operations Officer
George-Paul Albu	IBM and Migration Working Group Focal Point
Nasr Dekakni	Protection Officer
Insaf Mounadi	Protection Consultant
Lily van Egeraat	Project Support Officer - Community Stabilization
Amina el Houderi	Senior Protection Assistant
South Sudan	
Former Staff	
David Derthick	Former Chief of Mission (until July 2016)

Name (First, Last)	Role / Position / Organization
Claire Lyster	N/A
Iain McLellan	IOM Office to the United Nations, New York
Jenny Pro	N/A
Katy Snowball	Programme Support Unit, IOM Iraq – Baghdad
Juba	
Sarah Jackson	Program Officer, USAID/OFDA
Emmanuel Taban	Program Management Specialist, USAID/OFDA
Sophia Mukasa Monico	Country Director, UNAIDS
Shadi Fathizadeh	Deputy Head, Humanitarian and Livelihoods Team, DFID South Sudan
Bart Witteveen	Technical Assistant, European Commission, Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO)
Victor Sinyangwe	NFI & GIK Coordinator, World Vision South Sudan
John Ndiku	Humanitarian Affairs Officer, Humanitarian Financing Unit, UN OCHA South Sudan
Ekwase Msoni	Humanitarian Affairs Officer, M&E, UN OCHA South Sudan
Maria Lopez Echevarria	Recovery, Return, and Reintegration Officer, UNMISS
Mara Lopes	Emergency Response Officer, FAO South Sudan
Abdal Monium Osman	FAO South Sudan
Driuni Jakani	Executive Director, LACHA
Judy Wakahiu	Project Manager, Democratic Governance and Stabilization Unit, UNDP
Maria Corinna Miguel Quicho	Assistant Representative (Protection), UNMISS
Akoc Manheim	Directorate of Nationality, Passports and Immigration (DNPI)
Ambassador Akwoch Daniel	Former Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Current Minister of
Honorable Dr. Manase L. Waya	Chairperson, Relief and Rehabilitation Committee (RRC)
Peter Dut	Executive Director, RRC
Santino Bon	Deputy Chair Person, RRC
Antonio Trentadue	DTM Officer, IOM South Sudan
Robert Mominee	CCCM, IOM South Sudan
Richard Okello	CCCM Trainer, IOM South Sudan
Angela Osti	S-NFI, IOM South Sudan
Naveed Anjum	S-NFI, IOM South Sudan
Luce Baudoin	WASH Officer, IOM South Sudan
Andrea Paiato	MHPSS Project Manager
Sukuvinre Kaur	Core Pipeline, IOM South Sudan
Teshome Adebabai	MHU, IOM South Sudan
Salma Tahir-Woods	MHU/GF, IOM South Sudan
Ontibile Dingert	Project Officer (M&E), PSU, IOM South Sudan
Zerihun Zewdie	Programme Officer, DTM, IOM South Sudan
Yadel Sirak	Programme Officer, Transition and Recovery, IOM South Sudan
Isaac Munyae	Programme Coordinator, IBM, IOM South Sudan
Wau	
Abraham Anyieth	Head of Sub-Office, IOM South Sudan
Saul Akandwanaho	Migration Health Physician, IOM South Sudan
Jesus Baena	WASH Officer EPnR, IOM South Sudan

Name (First, Last)	Role / Position / Organization
Kaoi Nakasa	TRD/DTM Programme Officer, IOM South Sudan
John Muchiri	Hygiene Promotion & Public Health Coordinator, IOM South Sudan
Ronald Gara	Logistics and Procurement Officer, IOM South Sudan
Fatur Surur	Operations Assistant, S-NFI, IOM South Sudan
Elaine Duaman	MHPSS Specialist, IOM South Sudan
Afsar Khan	Operations Officer Shelter/NFI, IOM South Sudan
Joyo Harriet	Program Manager, AFOD
Paulino Bald	Camp Officer, AFOD
Muhammad Salahuddin	Deputy Team Leader, RRR Officer, Relief, Reintegration and Protection Section (RRP), UNMISS
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ANNEX 4: Case Study #1 – Libya



Applying the Migration Crisis Operational Framework (MCOF) to Conflict-Induced Crises with Mobility Dimensions: The Case of Libya

Evaluation Rationale & Objectives

The case study of Libya is part of the MCOF thematic evaluation carried out by the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) to:

- Evaluate IOM's overall performance in the application of the MCOF in line with its objectives, examining also the development of IOM's technical expertise for its management;
 - Evaluate its relevance to IOM's mandate and operational responses, as well as to new developments in the humanitarian and developments fields; and
- Analyze the internal synergies and institutional steps taken for an effective and sustained use of MCOF as a key decision-making and management tool for IOM's comprehensive responses to crises.

In collaboration with the Department of Operations and Emergencies (DOE) based at the IOM Headquarters (HQ) in Geneva, OIG identified Libya as a relevant case of how the global MCOF¹ was applied to the prevailing crisis in the country and its mobility dimensions through the Libya MCOF (2017/2019)² that was developed for the Country Office (CO).

Before continuing with the case study, it is important to note that unless it is specified “the global MCOF”, any other mentions about the MCOF in the discussion that follows pertain to the MCOF for Libya.

Evaluation Methodology & Timeframe

For this case study, the following methodology was used to collect the data necessary for evaluating the above-mentioned points:

- A documentation review, covering the Libya MCOF (2017/2019), the CO's Plans of Action, and external documentation such as the Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP).
- Semi-structured interviews conducted in Tunis (Tunisia) and Tripoli (Libya), and remotely over Skype and e-mail (see Annex 3 for a list of interviewees).

In Tunis, a meeting was organized with one IOM staff. Following, in Tripoli, meetings were organized with several IOM staff (n=16) and one implementing partner. A field visit to the Tarik al-Matar detention center was also conducted on July 23rd, 2018, to observe the coordination and communication between IOM and external partners in carrying out the joint activities (fumigation and distribution of NFIs).

¹ IOM, “Migration Crisis Operational Framework,” *Council 101st session*, (15 November 2012).

² IOM, *IOM Libya Migration Crisis Operational Framework (MCOF) 2017-2019*, (Tunis: IOM, 2017).

Overview of the Crisis in Libya

Libya has been a country of destination and a country of transit for regular and irregular migrants from the Saharan and Sahel regions. The revolution in 2011 and the overthrow of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi led to high levels of forced migration: out of a population of 6.5 million, 550,000 were displaced within the country, while approximately 660,000 Libyans sought shelter in neighboring countries, alongside some 790,000 migrants that were working in Libya prior to the conflict.³ The crisis was compounded by armed confrontations between 2014 and 2016, and resurgent bouts of instability and violence since 2017, which have led to continued internal displacement and other complex migratory flows (e.g. labor migrants, migrants seeking onward travel to Europe, migrants who are long-term residents of the country, and returning IDPs).⁴

IOM Libya MCOF 2017/2019

To support the Libyan authorities and its population address the prevailing crisis in the country and its mobility dimensions, the IOM Office in Libya developed for the first time a country MCOF for the period 2017/2019 aimed at strengthening the Libyan authorities' holistic response to the complex migration crisis in the country, including:

- Protecting the fundamental rights of migrants and IDPs and meeting their basic needs;
- Supporting investment in stability and resilience; and
- Promoting national ownership among key stakeholders.

The Libya MCOF, which is based on IOM's global MCOF, has adopted an integrated and multisectoral approach to ensure a full-cycle response to the different phases of the Libyan crisis (emergency, transition and recovery, and development), which are fluid and overlapping, as well as to its mobility dimensions. The Libya MCOF is also informed by IOM's Principles for Humanitarian Action (PHA)⁵ and IOM's Progressive Resolution of Displacement Situations (PRDS) Framework⁶.

Operational Environment

The MCOF in Libya was developed to act as an analytical tool to assess IOM's engagement in Libya and to complement and reinforce existing national and international systems in the country, including IOM's presence on the Inter-Agency Coordination Groups, the UN Humanitarian Country Team (UN HCT), the Migration Working Group (MWG), and its role as co-chair of the Mixed Migration Working Group (MMWG), in partnership with UNHCR.

Key Findings

- The Libya MCOF is relevant to IOM's mandate and the CO's operational response in the country by reflecting key internal strategies and frameworks, as well as external ones, particularly the HRPs and the Humanitarian Need Overview (HNOs).
- Externally, the MCOF for Libya has proven useful for fundraising efforts and explaining IOM's strategic plan for the country and why it engages activities in the various sectors of assistance.
- The MCOF has, but only in part, helped the CO achieve the four objectives outlined in the global MCOF, particularly objectives one, three and four.

³ Ibid., 20.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ IOM Council, "IOM's Humanitarian Policy - Principles of Humanitarian Action," *Part II.8, 106th Session, C/106/CRP/20*, (12 October 2015).

⁶ IOM, *Progressive Resolution of Displacement Situations Framework*, (Geneva: IOM, 2016).

- While the first MCOF strategic planning workshop that was conducted for Libya was too short, the second one was longer and therefore more effective in helping to draft the Libya MCOF.⁷
- Internal collaboration channels and resources for applying the MCOF to IOM's activities in Libya are somewhat sufficient with additional efforts required to minimize the tendency to work in silos among units (especially at the HQ and Regional Office (RO) level), increase human resources, and establish a monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system for monitoring performance of activities against the MCOF strategic objectives.

Lessons Learned

1. No MCOF strategic planning workshop should be shorter than two days if it is to be effective in developing a country MCOF.
2. IOM staff familiar with the Libya MCOF view it as being only for emergency responses and not covering other activities, such as preparedness, transition and recovery, and migration management, given its title.
3. It is important to avoid continuously changing the number and staff engaged in developing a country MCOF to ensure the final document is consistent and context-appropriate.
4. Even if the country MCOF covers a period of three years, the response needs to be adapted given the continuous changes in the crisis and its mobility dimensions.
5. There is no reflection in the MCOF for Libya on how the CO can work better internally and cooperate more with other COs in the region, the RO and HQ to effectively and efficiently apply the MCOF to the crisis in the country.
6. Dependency on donor funding can limit the extent to which IOM is able to engage in work across the various areas captured in the Libya MCOF.
7. Need to begin speaking to external partners, accept that IOM does not work alone and to define where IOM fits in, given the different leads for the 15 sectors of assistance captured in the MCOF wheel.

Recommendations

1. Regularly update the MCOF to reflect as much as possible the prevailing situation in the country (i.e. have it as a living document).
2. Translate the MCOF for Libya into Arabic so that it can be shared with external partners, government counterparts and other key stakeholders in print and via trainings.
3. Organize a workshop with all project managers to explore ways of better integrating cross-cutting issues in project proposals.
4. Ensure that all units work together on developing a coordination plan to be used for implementing activities.
5. Ensure that all parts of the internal structure of the CO are fully functional, particularly the M&E function.
6. Develop a results matrix based on the Libya MCOF for the CO with indicators that units can report against for assessing their performance and results, and for improving the capacity of the Office.
7. Integrate the MCOF in trainings such as that on MICIC to increase awareness about the Libya MCOF and understanding how it applies in practice, as well as its links to other IOM initiatives.

⁷ The MCOF strategic planning workshops are generally guided by the MCOF Strategic Planning Toolbox that was developed to support IOM staff at the country level develop strategic plans in-line with the global MCOF and the PHA, the Protection Mainstreaming Guidelines and the PRDS. See IOM, *IOM Migration Crisis Operational Framework: Introduction to Strategic Planning*, (Geneva: IOM, 2016).

8. Develop a one-pager or an infographic on the MCOF to send out periodically to staff to remind them of it, covering things like an explanation of what it is and how it could be applied in practice.
9. Develop a fundraising strategy to complement the country MCOF and an implementation plan to move from the strategic/theoretical level to the practical/ground level.
10. Designate an MCOF focal point at the CO level that can coordinate with counterparts from the RO and HQ in applying the MCOF to activities in Libya.
11. Make the online global MCOF introductory course (four hours) mandatory for all staff at the CO.
12. Make it mandatory that all future project proposals include a brief paragraph on how the project is aligned to the country MCOF and which strategic objectives the project will contribute towards.

Relevance

a) Strategic Level

In Libya, the MCOF was informed by existing relevant national, regional and international frameworks, especially the Libya HRPs, the HNOs, the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, the Libya National Plan and the IOM Libya Plan of Action (2016-2017).⁸ For example, a review of the HRPs for 2015-2016, 2017 and 2018 (which were informed by the by HNOs for these same periods), reveals that all plans include a chapter on refugees and migrants centered around three objectives:

1. enabling access to multi-sectoral services (e.g. health assistance, emergency food, shelter-non-food items (S-NFI), protection, water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH), multi-purpose cash assistance and voluntary humanitarian return);
2. monitoring, promoting, and protecting the basic rights of migrants and refugees; and
3. raising awareness and building the capacities of national stakeholders.

These three objectives and activities are reflected, in turn, in the strategic objectives (SOs) of the Libya MCOF:

- SO2: Increased access to emergency assistance and essential services for the most vulnerable populations and communities;
- SO3: Improved access to protection services for the most vulnerable populations affected by the migration crisis, particularly women and children; and
- SO7: Improved capacity of the Libyan authorities to implement rights-based, comprehensive migration policies and assistance.⁹

Furthermore, consultations and exchange of views were coordinated with external partners on the MCOF. Yet, some of the staff interviewed that participated in the development of the MCOF

⁸ OCHA, *2015-2016 Libya Humanitarian Needs Overview*, (OCHA, September 2015); OCHA, *2017 Libya Humanitarian Needs Overview*, (OCHA, November 2016); OCHA, *2018 Libya Humanitarian Needs Overview*, (OCHA, December 2017); OCHA, *Humanitarian Response Plan Libya: October 2015-December 2016*, (OCHA, November 2015); OCHA, *Humanitarian Response Plan Libya: January-December 2017*, (OCHA, November 2016); OCHA, *Humanitarian Response Plan Libya: January-December 2018*, (OCHA, January 2018); UN Economic and Social Council, "Further Promotion and Encouragement of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Including the Question of the Programme and Methods of Work of the Commission Human Rights, Mass Exoduses and Displaced Persons. Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Francis M. Deng, submitted pursuant to Commission resolution 1997/39 Addendum Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement," *Commission on Human Rights fifty-fourth session Item 9 (d) of the provisional agenda*, E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2, (11 February 1998); IOM, *Libya Plan of Action August 2016-December 2017*, (Tunis: IOM, 2016).

⁹ IOM, *Libya MCOF*, 32-33.

mentioned having encountered several challenges at that time, including: a) time constraints and therefore not having sufficient time to assess where the CO was and to identify lessons learned; b) knowledge gaps between local partners and UN organizations; c) rapid expansion of the IOM Office after 2014 that required building a structure without knowing how much money would be received; and d) many new staff with less knowledge. Some of the staff that participated in the MCOF strategic planning workshops also mentioned that due to high turnover, there were too many different people from HQ and the RO involved in developing the document, thereby complicating the process.

The Libya MCOF, in turn, informed IOM's comprehensive action plan (Libya Plan of Action – January 2017-December 2019). The Plan, which presents the CO's financial requirements and programs for the next three years, has a reference to MCOF and the core activities correspond to those in the MCOF. The IOM Office is now planning for the remaining year by taking stock of the remaining projects to be completed, the funding available and how much additional funding is needed. "We started with this before the MCOF strategy, but now the MCOF is the tool that we have, and we plan to update both; the other tool is a list to be shared with the donor."¹⁰

The document was also mentioned as having been shared with donors for fundraising purposes and explaining IOM's strategic plan for the country and why it engages activities in the various sectors of assistance,

"As IOM we are trying to be definitely accountable to the Organization, to the UN system and to donors. We are trying to be predictable. If you try to have a leading role in terms of migration you also have to be predictable, those around need to know clearly what you can do, what you want to do, and what you partner with others on, so they take you as a reference in your activities (migration)..."¹¹

These factors demonstrate that the MCOF for Libya is strategically relevant in terms of meeting the requirements of IOM's response to the crisis in the country.

While the RO helped initiate the MCOF in Libya, providing important support in developing the strategic plan, it was reportedly very little involved in supporting its application. Of the 10 programme staff asked whether the RO has been involved in applying the MCOF to the crisis responses in Libya, half responded yes with the other half stating either no or that they do not know.

Operational Level

Operationally, further efforts are required to ensure that the Libya MCOF remains relevant. Of the 17 staff interviewed, six mentioned being very familiar with the MCOF, with the remainder reporting being only somewhat (n=8) or not so/not at all familiar with it (n=3),

"This is the first time in a long time that I open the document and see that we did some kind of thinking. Many times, we are running around to respond to situations and drafting concept notes; rarely feel we have a strategy. Feel many new colleagues don't even know what MCOF is, they think that our Mission is messy, yet we have a strategy and we should go back and reflect on this."¹²

Moreover, only three staff interviewed mentioned having applied the country MCOF in their work, which was done primarily for assessing the possible areas of intervention, developing project

¹⁰ Interview response of an IOM Libya staff member, July 2018.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Interview response of an IOM Libya staff member, August 2018.

proposals (but not explicitly mentioning the MCOF in the proposals), and for comprehensively implementing activities, such as under the European Union Trust Fund (EUTF). Nevertheless, the MCOF was mentioned by several staff (n=8) as being especially useful for baseline/background information on the context, having a comprehensive overview of IOM's engagement in the country and for developing project proposals.

When asked more generally whether the MCOF has been applied in implementing preparedness, response, transition and recovery, and migration management activities in response to the crisis in Libya, 11 of the 17 staff interviewed said yes with the remainder stating no (n=1) or that they do not know (n=5). However, even in this case, staff mentioned that more efforts need to be done and that it is more so that activities are in line with the MCOF than the MCOF actually being applied, which tie back to the reported lack of familiarity about the country MCOF among staff.

Some of the key explanatory factors for not using the Libya MCOF include the MCOF not being mandatory such as in project proposals, the different units working in silos, the lack of communication about and training on the MCOF, insufficient human resources and the fact that the document itself is user-unfriendly (too long). Another issue raised regarding to challenges of using the MCOF is the dependency on donors and their priorities in terms of the sectors and types of activities to be implemented.

Of the 10 programme staff asked whether MCOF for Libya has supported IOM in taking a comprehensive response to the crisis in the country, all said yes, except one. "We had a workshop in beginning when we brainstormed around the different pillars and talked about the Libyan context... We can have activities at different phases of a crisis (before, during or after). Everyone got a good view of how this affects operations and how to keep in mind for day to day operations."¹³ For example, when the staff are engaged in evacuating migrants stranded in detention centers, all components are present and engaged (such as S-NFI, health, psychosocial support, etc.). Yet, this comprehensive response has not been there from the outset of the strategy. Because the IOM Office was working remotely from 2014 until May 2017, the national staff and third-party contractors on the ground during this time focused largely on emergency related activities (Pillar 1). It is only in the last six months that there is a stronger international staff presence and that the CO has begun to engage more in transition and recovery efforts and capacity building with the national authorities.

Content-wise, while the MCOF considers context specific factors, as per the MCOF Strategic Planning Methodology (2016), the document has not been updated since its development in 2016. This reduces its relevance given the change in context, particularly outside of Tripoli such as in the southern parts of the country. A number of staff interviewed (n=7) mentioned that the document needs to be updated to account for the changes in context and that this should happen more regularly to ensure that it remains relevant if it is to be used for planning purposes,

"It should be looked into at the end of each year because the programs we implement always have an impact/a change. Every day, we gain more trust of government and partners and counterparts, more and more, which should be accounted for. Situation of Libya today is also different from what it was in 2016 when the MCOF document was developed."¹⁴

On a more positive note, the MCOF for Libya reportedly helps address cross-cutting issues, namely gender and human rights of migrants by helping understand and identify the ways that these could be

¹³ Interview response of an IOM Libya staff member, July 2018.

¹⁴ Ibid.

integrated in comprehensive responses to the crisis.¹⁵ “MCOF helped create a discussion around these issues that otherwise may not have been the case and by raising awareness it helps keep these issues in mind when developing programmes or projects.”¹⁶ But, more reflection is required when it comes to effectively integrating cross-cutting issues in project proposals.

Effectiveness

Overall, data collected demonstrates that the country MCOF has helped the IOM Office achieve the four objectives that are outlined in the global MCOF, particularly objectives one, three and four. For a breakdown of the results by objective, see Table 1.1 below.

Table 1.1. The State of the Global MCOF Objectives in Libya			
In Libya, the country MCOF has helped the IOM Office:	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>Don't Know</u>
a) Bring together the different sectors of assistance before, during and/or after a migration crisis, while upholding human rights and humanitarian principles and promoting longer-term development goals.	9	1	1
b) Support crisis-affected populations better access their fundamental rights to protection and assistance via the support it provides to the government.	9	0	2
c) Complement existing humanitarian systems and other systems addressing peace and security, and development issues.	6	1	4
d) Build partnerships with key stakeholders, especially government counterparts and international, national and local (non-governmental) organizations, in the fields of humanitarian response, migration, peace and security, and development.	9	0	2

When it comes to *improving and systematizing IOM's response to migration crises by bringing together the different sectors of assistance before, during, and/or after a migration crisis, while upholding human rights and humanitarian principles and promoting long term development goals*, almost all staff that responded to this question (82%) mentioned that the MCOF has helped IOM achieve this objective in Libya. “At the time we prepared the document, we were operating at different levels with different fields of coordination; we brought everything together in a coordinated matter; was an eye-opener for the role of protection across all activities...having a holistic approach.”¹⁷

Nevertheless, more integrated planning by the different units for responses is required, for instance, by developing a coordination plan, as quite a few coordination challenges still exist. Moreover, for comprehensive efforts to work, the internal structure of the CO needs to be fully functional. For instance, assessments are carried out to identify beneficiaries, their needs, goods and services to be provided, and ways to communicate with stakeholders, which are followed by the actual provision of goods and services. However, there is no M&E person(s) to monitor and assess such efforts, making it difficult to put in place an effective, efficient and comprehensive response. “If one part of the chain is broken, the system won't function.”¹⁸ Moreover, for effectively taking a comprehensive approach that upholds human rights and humanitarian principles and promotes long-term development goals, greater collaboration with local NGOs, as implementing partners, can facilitate access to challenging

¹⁵ Of the 10 programme staff that were asked this question, seven responded yes, one no, and two that they did not know.

¹⁶ Interview response of an IOM Libya staff member, July 2018.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid.

areas, as well as ensure that activities reflect and correspond to the prevailing context and needs of the affected populations.

Looking at whether the MCOF has helped IOM *help crisis-affected populations, including IDPs and international migrants stranded in the crisis situation in Libya (their destination/transit country), to better access their fundamental rights to protection and assistance through the support it provides to the State*, most staff (82%) that responded to this question said yes. However, it is only recently that capacity building efforts have started to focus on addressing the root cause of the problem: people entering without a visa continue to be considered illegal under Libyan law¹⁹ and thus placed in detention centers. Additionally, there is no counter-trafficking or anti-smuggling laws in place for criminalizing activities of traffickers and smugglers. Current capacity building efforts and support provided to the government thus focus on counter-trafficking and integrated border management (IBM) to help affected populations better access their fundamental rights to protection and assistance. But, the Libya MCOF has not been directly presented to the government in providing such support; thus, it has only informed the thinking behind the capacity-building and technical support efforts. According to one staff member,

“Difficult to say whether because of MCOF or because of standard IOM principles that MCOF captures that IOM has been able to achieve this objective. Don’t see added value of MCOF in improving access to human rights and protection; I see it as part of our humanitarian principles that we have to take into consideration in our activities. Before and after MCOF, don’t see how this changed operations in IOM.”²⁰

When it comes to *responding to the often unaddressed migration dimensions of a crisis, by complementing existing humanitarian systems, as well as other systems addressing peace and security, and development issues*, just over half of the staff (55%) that responded to this question said yes. At the CO level, the country MCOF has reportedly been a tool for the IOM Office to contribute to other systems. Specifically, by presenting it in different venues such as with resident coordinators, it has helped explain why IOM is a member or engaged in certain activities. At the field level, some strides have been made, for instance, many trainings have been done with local NGOs who are the only ones working on peace issues in the country. However, almost a similar number of staff (45%) stated that they do not know or that the MCOF for Libya did not help IOM complement existing humanitarian and other systems that address peace and security, and development issues in the country,

“Not sure how much can say thanks to the MCOF. MCOF did help put things into a larger context, like made operational people more aware of the need to be aware of the context, security and political situation, so yeah to a certain extent. Not sure how many people would go back to the document to look at what we said on x and y...”²¹

“Would not say that it is thanks to the MCOF that IOM complements existing humanitarian systems and other systems addressing peace and security and development issues in response to the crisis. We have a coordination mandate, the MMWG, and different sectors and the

¹⁹ “Libya’s legal framework concerning irregular entry and exit, irregular migration, and detention pre-dates the 2011 civil war. Relevant provisions are contained in two laws: Law No. 6 (1987) Regulating Entry, Residence and Exit of Foreign Nationals to/from Libya as amended by Law No. 2 (2004) and Law No. 19 (2010) on Combating Irregular Migration. These laws do not explicitly provide for administrative detention. Rather, under both laws, violations of migration provisions are criminalised and sanctioned with fines and imprisonment.” Global Detention Project | Mapping immigration detention around the world, “Libya,” available at: <https://www.globaldetentionproject.org/countries/africa/libya>.

²⁰ Interview response of an IOM Libya staff member, July 2018.

²¹ Ibid.

cluster system. MCOF is mentioning it, but I don't think coordination forums established are because of it, they were there before."²²

Finally, for *building on IOM's partnerships with States, international organizations and other relevant actors in the fields of humanitarian response, migration, peace and security, and development*, almost all of the staff that responded to this question (82%) answered yes, with the remaining staff stating that they don't know. However, similar to the views regarding the previous three objectives, staff do not know if it is because of the Libya MCOF or due to the growth in the CO, staff, coverage, etc. that IOM's network and relations with the government counterparts and NGOs are stronger and that the number of partnerships and Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) with other UN agencies have grown. For instance, members of the MWG, which IOM Libya co-chairs, consists of the government, regional and international organizations, specialized bodies, and NGO and CSOs. However, it is not because of the country MCOF that the MWG was established and that the partnerships built through this inter-institutional mechanism have developed,

"IOM has traditionally been an organization implementing itself and not through implementing partners, which is both positive and negative. We are now going more towards having more partnerships as implementing partners. I think this is touched upon in the MCOF working with other actors on the ground but can be strengthened more in Libya. We have no formal agreements with international NGOs and partners."²³

Barriers to Using the Libya MCOF 2017/2019

When looking at the extent to which the MCOF has been used, six of the 10 staff that responded to this question mentioned that barriers exist when it comes to using this tool, with most of them being external (a total of 11 barriers mentioned) and thus outside the control of IOM. For example, violence and instability make it difficult to reach affected populations in certain areas, and the existing national laws on migrants and irregular migration, along with the lack of counter-trafficking and anti-smuggling legislation makes it challenging to find alternative solutions for migrants detained. Internally, the few barriers reported (a total of three barriers mentioned) were financial ones (i.e. it is difficult to take a comprehensive approach without sufficient resources), the rapid growth of the IOM Office and its relocation back in Libya (i.e. it takes time for the internal structure to be established and thus to follow-up properly on initiatives like the country MCOF).

M&E and the MCOF for Libya

When it comes to assessing performance and improving the capacity of the IOM Office in Libya, M&E activities implemented by the different units do not account for the country MCOF when analyzing and reporting on their respective performance and results. The first notable reason for this is the absence of a results framework for the MCOF with indicators and targets that can be used by staff to measure progress towards the identified strategic objectives. Second, at the time of the field visit for this evaluation exercise there was also no full-time M&E person(s) to provide this kind of support. Indirectly, however, two staff mentioned that the M&E of projects does account for the Libya MCOF when analyzing and reporting on performance and results because the projects are aligned with the MCOF strategic objectives.

The MCOF for Libya is also mentioned by several staff (n=7) as having indirectly contributed to achieving the outputs and outcomes of the activities that are being implemented in response to the

²² Interview response of an IOM Libya staff member, August 2018.

²³ Ibid.

crisis Libya. For example, since the MCOF informs the development of certain projects, the results framework used for these projects to track progress and achieve the stated outputs and outcomes is also informed by MCOF. MCOF has also helped achieve the outputs and outcomes of activities by:

- helping identify who and where are the most vulnerable cases and what activities should be implemented;
- taking a comprehensive approach to humanitarian response, early recovery and transition; and
- promoting national ownership efforts.

These three pillars have also been noted by eight of the 10 staff that responded to this question as helping ensure that medium, long-term and interconnected approaches are taken when implementing activities. Moreover, given that the last Plan of Action for the Office was informed by the Libya MCOF this further helped ensure that activities are implemented in a way that accounts for medium, long-term and interconnected approaches. For example, in health, simultaneous efforts are undertaken to engage the Ministry of Health on strengthening policies and systems (medium and long-term), the Ministry of Justice on developing a counter-trafficking law (medium term) and the Ministry of Labor on labor migration (medium and long-term). In the long-term, these efforts will benefit not only migrants, IDPs, and returnees, but also the host communities, and will help transition from a humanitarian to a development focus in the assistance provided. However, as the situation in Libya remains volatile, the success of these activities is uncertain.

Trainings on the Global and Country MCOFs

In 2014, two capacity-building workshops were organized in Zarzis, Tunisia (15-28 September) with 48 Libyan and Tunisian emergency workers engaged in the response to the Libyan crisis (all civil society organizations). The workshops, which aimed to empower participating organizations and to create a pool of trained emergency workers also covered an interactive session introducing, among others, the global MCOF. Participants were given the opportunity to engage with the material (the MCOF wheel), through discussions and group exercises to boost their confidence, teamwork, and maximize their learning process. Of the 16 staff that were asked whether the CO conducted any trainings on the Libya MCOF for external partners, four recalled these workshops that covered the global MCOF, with the rest of the staff stating that they did not know (n=4) or that no trainings have been done (n=8). However, none of the staff were able to speak to the effectiveness of the workshops. According to the IOM news article published about the workshops at the time, “participants felt the workshops and issues discussed were important and relevant to the prevailing situation in Libya.”²⁴

Since then, however, no other trainings have been conducted for external partners on the MCOF and how it can be applied to preparedness, response, transition and recovery, and migration management activities before, during and after a crisis with mobility dimensions. One of the reported challenges for doing a training with external partners on the Libya MCOF is that the MCOF is not available in Arabic. Another training challenge is that there are no guidelines from HQ in terms of developing one unified plan on MiGOF and the country MCOF, especially since the pre- and post-phases are more governance oriented. Having such a plan was mentioned as being helpful for developing and conducting training, awareness-raising and capacity-building with key stakeholders, particularly the government counterparts.

²⁴ IOM, “Empowering Libyan Civil Society Organizations to Address the Needs of Migrants and Displaced Persons in Ongoing Crisis: IOM carried out two training workshops for emergency workers engaged in the response to the Libya crisis,” *Flash Report*, No. 63, (October 2014).

As regards trainings on the MCOF for IOM staff (either global or country level), apart from the two strategic planning workshops that were organized in 2016 as part of developing the Libya MCOF, no other trainings were reportedly conducted since then. The first workshop was for one day and was conducted in Zarzis, Tunisia. However, as another workshop was taking place at the same time and in which the staff that were supposed to attend the MCOF workshop were also participating in, this undermined the effectiveness of this brief MCOF training. The second MCOF workshop, on the other hand, was organized in Tunis for a period of three days, which was reported as having been more effective for developing the Libya MCOF. Surprisingly, none of the staff interviewed were aware of the free online global MCOF introductory course available through I-Learn.

Efficiency

When looking at how resources have been converted into outputs, the IOM Office in Libya appears to have indirectly analyzed the financial and administrative requirements for effectively applying the MCOF in implementing response efforts, and to a certain extent preparedness and transition and recovery activities in the crisis in Libya. This has been achieved via the HRP and the Plan of Action, both of which include a budget that indicate financial and human resources required for implementing the activities under the different components that reflect the Libya MCOF. Some of the noted challenges, however, to using resources in a timely and efficient manner has been the lengthy human resources procedures.

Internally, existing internal collaboration channels and resources for supporting the application of the country MCOF in managing a crisis with mobility dimensions are viewed to be somewhat sufficient. Specifically, nine out of 16 staff that responded to this question said yes, with the remainder stating they did not know/skipped or that this was not the case. The most frequent mentions regarding internal collaboration channels was strong communication and information sharing, followed by strong collaboration with HQ and RO, weekly meetings for PMs and the Senior Management coordination group, and greater cross-sectoral work and financial resources.

In contrast, the most frequently mentioned reasons by the staff interviewed as to why the internal collaboration channels and resources are not sufficient were the tendency among the units to work in silos (especially at the HQ and RO level), insufficient human resources, a lack of interest to use the Libya MCOF, which is also not an agenda item at meetings, and no M&E system for monitoring performance of activities against the MCOF strategic objectives.

Outcome & Impact

Although the MCOF for Libya is still ongoing, its existence for almost two years has nevertheless made it possible to explore some of its outcome(s) and impact(s). When asked what the outcome and/or strategic impact of the Libya MCOF was for IOM as the leading agency on displacement and crises with mobility dimensions, the MCOF was mentioned as having contributed towards this, however, that it is not because of the MCOF that IOM's position in this regard has been reinforced. "What helped us more is that we now have the MWG chaired by Ministry of Foreign Affairs and co-chaired by IOM and the MMWG, co-chaired by IOM and the UNHCR."²⁵ According to one staff member, it is because of the MMWG that IOM was able to advocate to keep the chapter on refugees and migrants in the HRP.

However, prior to the MCOF for Libya, the CO did not have many funds and there was no complementarity between the different sectors. "Now there are sufficient sectors that are relevant to each need...and that has offered us a wider and better response plan to tackling problems for the

²⁵ Interview response of an IOM Libya staff member, July 2018.

whole displaced population...Now, since MCOF, we have grown up and built more capacity in projects and in our approach to donors we explain the complementarity between activities.”²⁶ Moreover, while the Libyan government does not have any specific laws on counter-trafficking, this may change in the future. Through its capacity building efforts, the IOM is working with the Ministry of Justice to develop a counter-trafficking law. This may have a positive impact on the work of IOM by criminalizing the activities of traffickers and helping to find alternative solutions for migrants in detention centers. This will further support the application of the Libya MCOF 2017-2019 on the ground by facilitating the implementation of relevant projects aimed at improving, among other things, the “capacity of Libyan authorities to implement rights-based, comprehensive migration policies and assistance.”²⁷

In terms of positioning IOM in preparedness, transition and post-crisis initiatives, the staff interviewed reported several outcomes of the MCOF for Libya:

- Complementary programming, with humanitarian response activities such as capacity building in the health sector being something that will continue to serve Libyans and non-Libyans after the crisis.
- Promoting internal collaboration across units and external cooperation with the local authorities.

Looking ahead, the MCOF for Libya is viewed as having the potential to give the IOM Office legitimacy, especially in non-humanitarian areas of intervention like peacebuilding through social cohesion and development efforts such as income generating activities. However, for this to happen, the MCOF needs to be highlighted, disseminated and used to explain and justify its activities to Members States and donors (internationally) and external partners, government counterparts and other key stakeholders (nationally/locally). Moreover, given the focus on the before, during and after phases of a crisis, the MCOF also has the potential to help the CO tap into other opportunities, especially in the before and after phases where IOM is less known.

The IOM Office in Libya needs to reflect and decide upon the direction it would like to take:

1. Update the current country MCOF (keep it as an internal tool); or,
2. Develop an IOM country strategy based on the MiGOF and the Libya MCOF (and the UNDAF?) that also relates to other related IOM global and regional frameworks and strategies such as MICIC.

Questions for Reflection:


- How should the IOM Office in Libya proceed with creating an internal M&E framework for assessing performance against the strategic objectives of its MCOF?
- If the Libya MCOF is supposed to help the government, how do we keep track of progress and evaluate its performance?
- What do we expect after we train the government counterparts, external partners and other key stakeholders on the Libya MCOF?
- What are the complementarities and/or contradictions between the global MCOF and other IOM strategies, policies and frameworks?
- What are the links between the Libya MCOF and other country plans, strategies and frameworks like the UN Strategic Framework (2019-2020)?

²⁶ Interview response of an IOM Libya staff member, August 2018.

²⁷ IOM, *Libya MCOF*, 33.

- As IOM does not work alone in implementing the activities that fall across multiple sectors of assistance included in the wheel, how should evaluation of these efforts be done? Does IOM only report against the activities it has implemented, or should it assess the entire sector under which the activities fall?

ANNEX 5: Case Study #2 – South Sudan



Applying the Migration Crisis Operational Framework (MCOF) to Conflict-Induced Crises with Mobility Dimensions: The Case of South Sudan

Evaluation Rationale & Objectives

The case study of South Sudan is part of the MCOF thematic evaluation carried out by the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) to:

- Evaluate IOM's overall performance in the application of the MCOF in line with its objectives, examining also the development of IOM's technical expertise for its management;
- Evaluate its relevance to IOM's mandate and operational responses, as well as to new developments in the humanitarian and developments fields; and
- Analyze the internal synergies and institutional steps taken for an effective and sustained use of MCOF as a key decision-making and management tool for IOM's comprehensive responses to crises.


In collaboration with the Department of Operations and Emergencies based at the IOM Headquarters (HQ) in Geneva, OIG identified South Sudan as a relevant case of how the global MCOF²⁸ was applied to the prevailing crisis in the country and its mobility dimensions through the South Sudan MCOFs (2016/2017 and 2018/2019)²⁹ that were developed for the Country Office (CO).

Before continuing with the case study, it is important to note that unless it is specified "the global MCOF", any other mentions about the MCOF in the discussion that follows pertain to either the first or the second MCOF for South Sudan.

Evaluation Methodology & Timeframe

For this case study, the following methodologies were used to collect the data necessary for evaluating the above-mentioned points:

- A documentation review, covering the two South Sudan MCOFs (2016/2017 and 2018/2019), the Consolidated Appeal (2018)³⁰, and related external documentation such as the Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP, 2018)³¹.



²⁸ IOM, "Migration Crisis Operational Framework," *Council 101st session*, (15 November 2012).

²⁹ IOM, *MCOF South Sudan 2016-2017*, (Juba: IOM, 2015); IOM, *MCOF South Sudan 2018-2019*, (Juba: IOM, 2017).

³⁰ IOM, *IOM South Sudan Consolidated Appeal 2018*, (Juba: IOM, 2017).

³¹ OCHA, *South Sudan Humanitarian Response Plan January to December 2018*, (Juba: OCHA, 2017).

- Semi-structured interviews conducted in Juba, Wau and remotely over Skype (see Annex 3 for a list of interviewees).
- Surveys conducted via e-mail.
- Focus group discussions (FGDs) conducted in Juba and Wau.

In Juba, the visit took place from 17-20 and 26-29 September 2018, during which interviews and focus group discussions were organized with IOM staff, donors, implementing partners and government counterparts. Prior to the visit, some IOM staff in Juba had replied electronically to the interview questionnaire. In addition, Skype interviews were organized with several former IOM South Sudan staff (see Table 1.1 for an overview of the data collection tool(s) used by the type of participant).

Table 1.1. Overview of the Data Collected in Juba				
	<u>Interviews</u>	<u>Focus Group Discussions</u>	<u>Electronic Surveys</u>	<u>Sub-total Participants</u>
IOM Staff	2	2	5	21
IOM Former staff	5			5
Donors	2	2		6
Implementing Partners	5	2		9
Government entities	2	1		5
Total Participants				46 ³²

In Wau, the field visit took place from 21-26 September 2018, during which meetings were also organized with IOM staff, implementing partners and government counterparts, as well as beneficiaries (see Table 2.1 for an overview of the data collection tool(s) by the type of participant).

Table 2.1. Overview of the Data Collected in Wau				
	<u>Interviews</u>	<u>Focus Group Discussions</u>	<u>Electronic Surveys</u>	<u>Sub-total Participants</u>
IOM Staff	2	1		9
Implementing Partners	1	1		3
Government Counterparts	1	1		13
Beneficiaries	0	7		61
Total Participants				86 ³³

The focus of the following case study will be on the second MCOF (2018/2019) developed for South Sudan, with the first one being discussed, as appropriate, for instance, with regards to the lessons learned and best practices identified from conducting two strategic planning workshop exercises³⁴ and

³² The first focus group discussion with IOM staff had a total of 11 participants and the second one a total of three participants. Each focus group discussion with the donors and implementing partners had a total of two participants. The focus group discussion with the government counterpart had a total of three participants.

³³ The focus group discussion with IOM staff had a total of seven participants, with the implementing partner a total of two participants, and that with the government counterpart a total of 12 participants. With the beneficiaries, seven focus group discussions were organized, two at Nazareth Collective Center (the first one had a total of nine participants and the second one a total of six participants), one at Hai Masna Collective Center (a total of seven participants), one with Jebel Kher community members (a total of eight participants), and three at the PoC site (the first and second had each had a total of ten participants and the third one had a total of 11 participants).

³⁴ The MCOF strategic planning workshops are generally guided by the MCOF Strategic Planning Toolbox that was developed to support IOM staff at the country level develop strategic plans in-line with the global MCOF and the IOM Principles for Humanitarian Action (PHA), Protection Mainstreaming Guidelines and Progressive Resolution of Displacement Situations

developing two MCOF documents for the CO. Therefore, unless it is specified “first MCOF”, any other mentions about the MCOF in the discussion that follows pertain to the second MCOF for South Sudan.

Overview of the Crisis in South Sudan

In 2011, the Republic of South Sudan seceded from Sudan. Two years later, a political disagreement between the President, Salva Kiir, and the former Vice President, Riek Machar, gave way to a civil war between the forces loyal to the former, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), and those supportive of the latter, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement in Opposition (SPLM-IO). As of September 2018, over four million people have been uprooted, including more than 1.9 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) and over 2.4 million that fled the country as refugees. One important migratory strategy employed by those fleeing violence was to go to Protection of Civil (PoC) sites under the protection of the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). As of August 2018, a total of number of 198,444 civilians were seeking safety in six PoC sites across the country³⁵.

IOM South Sudan MCOF 2018/2019

In South Sudan, the MCOF is based on IOM’s continued engagement with the national and local government, national and international partners, and direct engagement with local communities. It acknowledges the progressive nature of crisis-resolution and the need for a sequenced approach to restore dignity and reduce risk and vulnerability of the crisis-affected populations. Accordingly, through the MCOF, IOM South Sudan has adopted an integrated, multi-sectoral approach under three pillars of intervention that emphasize complementary and mutually reinforcing actions at individual, household, community and systems level. The pillars are understood as promoting a coherent and effective transition between interventions in all phases of a crisis by identifying a set of priorities for planning humanitarian activities and migration management services (2018 Consolidated Appeal). The 2018-2019 MCOF aims to:

- Contribute to saving lives, providing dignified living conditions, and reducing vulnerability through addressing humanitarian needs of crisis-affected populations, IDPs, migrants and host-communities (Pillar 1);
- Enhance community stability and sustainable returns through strengthened coping mechanisms and social cohesion among displaced populations and host communities (Pillar 2); and
- Build national ownership and strengthen national rights-based systems through enhancing knowledge, skills and capacity (Pillar 3).

The MCOF for South Sudan is aligned to the Migration Governance Framework (MiGOF) Principles and Objectives (Objective 2)³⁶, and is informed by relevant IOM guidance, especially the PRDS Framework

Framework (PRDS). See IOM, *IOM Migration Crisis Operational Framework: Introduction to Strategic Planning*, (Geneva: IOM, 2016).

³⁵ 114,652 in Bentiu, 24,415 in Malakal, 39,198 in Juba UN House, 2,300 in Bor, 147 in UNMISS base, and 17,732 in the area adjacent to UNMISS in Wau (UNMISS, “UNMISS “Protection of Civilians” (PoC) Sites.” *PoC Update*, (06 August 2018).

³⁶ IOM Council, “Migration Governance Framework: The essential elements for facilitating orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility of people through planned and well-managed migration policies,” *106th Session*, C/106/40, (4 November 2015).

(2016)³⁷, the Framework for Addressing Internal Displacement (2017)³⁸, Protection Mainstreaming Guidance (2016)³⁹, the PHA (2015)⁴⁰ and the IOM Data Protection Principles (2009)⁴¹.

Operational Environment

The MCOF for South Sudan is defined as an operational framework that aims to systematize IOM's engagement in response to the crisis in the country and its mobility dimensions by outlining humanitarian, transition and recovery, and development approaches to address the complex, multi-sectoral needs of the affected populations. The MCOF has also been defined as a set of key priorities for planning humanitarian activities and migration management services to respond to the crisis more effectively⁴². Given the diverse views among IOM staff in South Sudan about what the MCOF is/is not (i.e. MCOF is sometimes viewed as a strategic framework and at other times as a programmatic and analytical tool), it is important that a workshop is organized to establish a shared understanding among them in this regard.

Key Findings

- The first and second MCOF for South Sudan were developed after the start of the crisis and the establishment of the humanitarian architecture. Therefore, the two documents have simply reflected rather than helped inform the CO's planning and implementation of activities.
- Externally, however, the MCOF for South Sudan have proven useful for fundraising and explaining and justifying IOM's engagement in the country. Accordingly, the MCOF is more of a strategic than an operational tool.
- The MCOF is relevant to IOM's mandate and operational responses by reflecting key internal strategies and frameworks, as well as external ones including the cluster system and strategies, the Grand Bargain and the New Way of Working (NWOW).
- The MCOF has helped the IOM Office in South Sudan achieve the four objectives that are outlined in the IOM council resolution on the MCOF that was adopted in 2012 by Member States, particularly objectives one, three and four.
- The two MCOF strategic planning workshops organized have helped break down existing silos between units in the South Sudan Office and to identify possible areas of collaboration.
- Internal collaboration channels and resources for applying the MCOF to IOM's activities in South Sudan are largely sufficient, although certain areas could be strengthened, for instance, the support that HQ and the Regional Office (RO) provide in developing and applying the MCOF.

Lessons Learned

1. An IOM Office that has not previously done an MCOF should allocate a week to correctly develop one and to do so as a team, which will help ensure full ownership over the end product and in turn its utilization.
2. The MCOF is an evolving process. Having the first MCOF down is necessary for developing the second one, with the latter being more focused in terms of strategic objectives, activities, and so forth.

³⁷ IOM, "Progressive Resolution of Displacement Situations Framework," (Geneva: IOM, 2016).

³⁸ IOM SCPE, "IOM Framework for Addressing Internal Displacement," *SCPF 10th Session, S/20/4*, (6 June 2017).

³⁹ IOM DOE, "Guidance Note on how to mainstream protection across IOM crisis response (or the Migration Crisis Operational Framework sectors of assistance)," IN/232, (20 January 2016).

⁴⁰ IOM Council, "IOM's Humanitarian Policy - Principles of Humanitarian Action," *Part II.8, 106th Session, C/106/CRP/20*, (12 October 2015).

⁴¹ IOM LEG, "IOM Data Protection Principles," IN/00138, (1 May 2009).

⁴² IOM, *Consolidated Appeal 2018*.

3. The MCOF wheel is a strong visual that people really pay attention to.
4. If the MCOF is to serve as a strategy, the CO needs to ensure that it is a strategy for operations in crisis. If the CO is already in the middle of a crisis and then develops an MCOF, the document needs to be regularly updated to remain relevant and effective in informing activities.
5. Considering the MCOF at the programme and project development stages can help ensure that it is reflected in strategies and activities, and not vice versa.

Best Practices

1. Conducting consultations with IOM staff and crisis-affected populations can help ensure that priorities and proposed interventions are aligned with beneficiary needs, the identified strengths and opportunities, and reflect the local contexts.
2. Ensuring that the entire MCOF development process is inclusive (internally and externally), boosts inclusiveness, ownership and buy-in.
3. Adapting the MCOF, including the wheel, to the context operating in, helps ensure that the document is relevant and context-appropriate.

Recommendations

1. Consult with external partners and government counterparts when developing the next MCOF.
2. Rename the MCOF (e.g. “the migration crisis core operational background”) and use it to establish the baseline for what the CO is supposed to be measuring its performance and results against.
3. Use lessons learned and best practices from previous MCOF(s) to inform the development of the next one, if the document is to be a productive and useful tool.
4. RO or HQ should follow-up on the utility of MCOF through a formal review to show the value of it using qualitative and quantitative data.
5. The MCOF wheel should be reviewed and Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene (WASH) be added as a sector.
6. Staff should be trained on the outcomes for different areas of the MCOF and how to monitor them in order to feed into the monitoring and evaluation (M&E) framework.
7. Ensure that project proposals reflect the MCOF.
8. Conduct a mid-term review to assess if the CO is on track or not in order to strengthen the relevance and use of the country MCOF.
9. Keep the MCOF as a living document that can be reviewed and updated regularly given the constantly changing context.
10. Strengthen the link between the humanitarian and development fields to reflect the continuum between these, as well as any overlapping areas that can inform possible joint planning and programming.
11. Preparedness phase should be strengthened and further elaborated upon.
12. All relevant staff should be invited to participate in the MCOF strategic planning workshop.

13. Once completed, the MCOF should be widely shared with donors, external partners and government counterparts.

14. A workshop should be organized with field staff to review and discuss the MCOF so that they understand the connection between their work and this strategic framework.

Relevance

a) Strategic level

In South Sudan, the two MCOFs have been informed by a number of existing relevant national, regional and international systems, frameworks and strategies. For example, the second MCOF (2018/2019) is aligned to the following:

- **Nationally:** The MCOF is framed around national strategies, including the Government's National Development Strategy and the National Dialogue, and is informed by the humanitarian architecture in the country, including the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) cluster system and cluster strategies, the South Sudan HRP (2017)⁴³ and the Humanitarian Needs Overview (HNO, 2018)⁴⁴. The MCOF also supports the South Sudan Regional Refugee Response Plan (RRRP, 2017)⁴⁵ that articulates regional protection and humanitarian needs for South Sudanese refugees.⁴⁶
- **Regionally:** The MCOF is aligned with the IOM East and Horn of African Regional Strategy, as the IOM's Regional Strategic Objectives aim to advance the socioeconomic well-being of migrants and society, and to effectively address the mobility dimensions of crises.⁴⁷
- **Internationally:** The MCOF acknowledges the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants adopted on 19 September 2016, the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM) and the Global Compact for Refugees (GCR), which is consistent with target 10.7 of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. It also integrates intentions under the Grand Bargain on Humanitarian Financing and the Agenda for Humanity (2016).⁴⁸

The MCOF 2018/2019, in turn, guided the 2018 Consolidated Appeal, which is a consolidation of IOM's financial requirements based on identified needs and the organization's estimated capacity to implement the planned programmes. While the Appeal is in line with the IASC cluster system and the HRP (2018), the MCOF helped include complementary responses beyond the immediate lifesaving assistance covered in the latter. This acknowledges that conflict transformation and resolution are only possible with assistance underpinned by a focus on resilience and local ownership (MCOF Pillars 2 and 3). It is because of these reasons that some of the IOM staff reported using solely the Consolidated Appeal (and not the MCOF) in their activities. "The Consolidated Appeal is what we already coordinated with other UN agencies, the government, etc. MCOF is duplicating the appeal and making it IOM specific."⁴⁹ Other staff view the Appeal is the operationalization of the MCOF.

Looking at the rationale behind the development of the MCOF, data reveals that accessing donor funding played an important part. "Donors were coming in with resilience funding (3-5 years), so needed multi-year strategy to get this funding. To get multi-year funding did this MCOF."⁵⁰ However,

⁴³ OCHA, *South Sudan Humanitarian Response Plan January to December 2017*, (Juba: OCHA, 2016).

⁴⁴ OCHA, *South Sudan Humanitarian Needs Overview 2018*, (Juba: OCHA, 2017).

⁴⁵ UNHCR, *South Sudan Regional Refugee Response Plan January – December 2017*, (Juba: UNHCR, 2016).

⁴⁶ IOM, *South Sudan MCOF 2018-2019*.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 4.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Interview response of an IOM staff member, August 2018.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

both MCOFs developed for South Sudan were have been for two-year periods. For IOM staff, this is still too short-term, thereby not addressing the donor requirement to have a multi-year strategy to access resilience funding. Moreover, the links between the humanitarian and development fields need to be strengthened. One suggestion provided by an IOM staff to do this is to have both a MCOF and a MiGOF.

When the MCOF in South Sudan was launched, it was reportedly distributed to donors and has been used for fundraising purposes and to explain IOM's strategic plan for the country and why it engages in the activities it does in the various sectors of assistance. However, greater efforts are needed to increase the use of the MCOF among donors. In particular, of the four donors interviewed, only one reported being familiar with the MCOF (they received a hard copy of the document but have yet to read through the entire document). "When we looked at the proposal document, we had the impression that IOM is doing everything, but when we saw the MCOF we felt reassured that this is not the case and that IOM's actions are informed by a strategic plan."⁵¹ Yet, given the intentions behind the MCOF (an internal IOM tool), external partners were not consulted neither for the first nor the second MCOF. "To my knowledge no, there were no external partners ever involved in it... MCOF is an internal IOM document meant for national and regional documents to inform wider government efforts, donors, etc."⁵²

Overall, the above findings reveal that the MCOF in South Sudan is only somewhat strategically relevant in terms of meeting the requirements of IOM's response to the crisis in the country. The main reason for this is the well-established humanitarian architecture that preceded the MCOF that IOM is also part of, which generally guides the planning and implementation of its activities.

While the RO supported the development of the two MCOFs for South Sudan, the process was largely led by IOM South Sudan. According to one IOM staff, "We have a strong PSU team and we are such a big mission that we operate independently of the RO."⁵³ When asked whether the RO has been involved in applying the MCOF, only five of the 21 IOM staff that responded to this question answered yes, with the remaining stating no (n=14) or that they don't know (n=2). "The RO provides a lot of operational support, helps give us direction."⁵⁴ For instance, all the concept notes and project proposals were mentioned by one IOM staff as being reviewed by the RO for ensuring their alignment with the MCOF.

Compared to the first MCOF, the CO took a participatory approach for developing the second one. "IOM held community consultations with male and female groups in Bentiu, Malakal, and Wau PoC sites, and workshops with IOM staff in Bentiu, Malakal, Wau, Juba, and Kigali."⁵⁵ This approach allowed IOM to align its priorities and to propose interventions aligned to the needs of beneficiaries, the identified strengths and opportunities, and the local context. Other changes that occurred between the first and the second MCOF is that for the second one more time was allocated for discussing resilience and transition, which were only briefly touched upon in the first MCOF.

Looking at the key stakeholders, only one out of the 17 stakeholders interviewed mentioned being familiar with the second MCOF. Consequently, when the stakeholders were asked about whether they consider the MCOF as being a relevant tool for preparedness, response, and transition and recovery efforts in the crisis in the country, the majority skipped the question due to a lack of sufficient

⁵¹ Interview response of an IOM donor, September 2018.

⁵² Interview response of an IOM staff member, September 2018.

⁵³ Interview response of an IOM South Sudan staff member, September 2018.

⁵⁴ Interview response of an IOM staff member, September 2018.

⁵⁵ IOM, *South Sudan MCOF 2018-2019*, 5.

knowledge about the MCOF to respond. Nevertheless, seven of the stakeholders that did respond to this question (despite their limited knowledge of the MCOF) considered the MCOF as a potentially relevant tool, as illustrated by the following quotes,

- “The wide array of activities made us feel IOM is doing many things, then we checked the MCOF to see what IOM’s value added is. IOM staff mentioned the MCOF and that the proposal fit within this strategy, so it’s not IOM being completely random.”⁵⁶
- “The three pillars of the MCOF is what the humanitarian community is trying to do in South Sudan.”⁵⁷
- “It’s good, there is a specific pillar on national ownership which is ultimately the goal of everyone. We are here to hand over in a responsible manner to the government. We are here to support and build capacity. Increasingly, there is the dependency syndrome in the country so Pillar 3 is important, as is raising awareness with government counterparts and in the different sectors.”⁵⁸
- “From just the three pillars, we can help address a lot of challenges that we have in this context. What we need to do is to follow and implement guidelines and recommendations and interpret them in real actions – looks like a good framework.”⁵⁹

b) Operational level

Operationally, further efforts are required, especially at the sub-office level to ensure that the MCOF remains relevant. In Juba, all current and former staff interviewed (n=26) reported being familiar with the MCOF, albeit to different degrees. Specifically, 11 staff reported being extremely/very familiar with the MCOF and three somewhat familiar, with the remainder (n=12) not having identified a specific degree of familiarity with the document. In contrast, at the sub-office level, only four of the nine staff interviewed mentioned being familiar with the MCOF, with the remaining staff reporting not knowing the MCOF, apart from its name, which they have heard about in passing from other colleagues. These findings highlight two things. First, the need to periodically organize trainings on the MCOF for staff so that they have a similar level of understanding. Second, the need to conduct more awareness-raising and information sharing with staff at the sub-office level so that they can situate their respective activities within the MCOF. Doing so can help support the achievement of the MCOF strategic objectives, as staff on the ground are best placed to identify potential opportunities and to propose solutions to any prevailing challenges.

When asked more generally whether the South Sudan MCOF has been applied in implementing preparedness, transition and recovery and/or migration management activities, 23 of the 24 staff in Juba that responded to this question said yes. However, how this was done was more from the perspective of providing a strategic framework than anything else given that the CO was already responding to the crisis in the country through the humanitarian architecture in place,

“By the time we started developing MCOF, we were already two years into crisis. MCOF provided us with a strategic direction. It forced us to reflect what it is we want to do next because when in emergency we tend to focus on the day to day activities. It helped with planning longer-term. It helped us to identify cross-cutting themes that the different units are

⁵⁶ Interview response of an IOM donor, September 2018.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ C

⁵⁹ Ibid.

working on and seeing where there is complementarity. [However,] MCOF was not mentioned directly in proposals but was attached and I would take it to meetings with donors.”⁶⁰

In Wau, three of the nine staff mentioned that the MCOF for South Sudan has been applied in implementing preparedness, transition and recovery and/or migration management activities, but in an indirect way. “I think programming is done in consultation with the Juba office. So, strategy and everything comes from Juba....so, I see these activities as being influenced by the MCOF document, based on my memory of what’s written in it.”⁶¹ The remaining six staff mentioned that MCOF has not been applied. “MCOF was created after planning and strategies have already been formulated; we already had ideas where and with whom we will work like the clusters, which are part of humanitarian architecture. MCOF didn’t inform our direction of operations. The humanitarian architecture informed what MCOF would be.”⁶²

Therefore, some of the key reasons for not using the MCOF include the cluster system and the cluster strategies, which preceded the first MCOF, the fact that MCOF is never mentioned at cluster meetings to inform activities, activities are donor driven, and there being a strong humanitarian but weak preparedness and development focus in the document itself. Other issues raised by staff with regards to using the country MCOF include difficulties applying the wheel, a lack of a common understanding as to whether the MCOF is a strategy or an operational tool, the continuously changing context, and the lack of institutional capacity to track performance against the targets and results achieved.

Crisis response approach

Looking at whether the MCOF has supported IOM in taking a comprehensive approach to its response to the crisis in South Sudan, only nine of the 24 programme staff in Juba that addressed this question said yes with the remaining saying no. One of the explanations provided is that the CO did not have a problem taking a comprehensive approach in the first place. “We built, we ran sites, we coordinated prior to the MCOF.”⁶³ Similarly, another programme staff mentioned that,

“The cluster system imposes a strategy on us, we were already doing all of this, which is why not using MCOF, other systems are more coordination intensive. Before MCOF for South Sudan, we were already working in different clusters and groups in line with the HRP. What we are doing, we put MCOF together, which reminded us what IOM’s role is within the country and who the target populations are.”⁶⁴

At the sub-office level, similar responses were received. Specifically, eight out of the nine programme staff interviewed mentioned that IOM takes a comprehensive approach, but not because of the MCOF; rather, because of the existing humanitarian architecture and cluster system and cluster strategies in place. The other programme staff mentioned that MCOF has helped the sub-office focus activities within the framework, thereby avoiding having a very broad response. “Consultations were done here for the MCOF so our activities, plans, etc. fall within the MCOF.”⁶⁵ Overall, these accounts highlight that the MCOF has not proven to be a useful tool for informing IOM’s comprehensive approach to its engagement in South Sudan.

⁶⁰ Interview response of an IOM staff member, September 2018.

⁶¹ Focus group discussion with IOM South Sudan staff members in Wau, September 2018.

⁶² Interview response of an IOM staff member, September 2018.

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Focus group discussion with IOM South Sudan staff members in Juba, September 2018.

⁶⁵ Interview response of an IOM South Sudan staff member, September 2018.

From the perspective of stakeholders (donors, external partners and government counterparts), all those interviewed, except for two government entities, reported IOM as taking a holistic/comprehensive approach to its response to the crisis in South Sudan. According to one local implementing partner, “IOM coordinates with the people and makes sure partners come together to implement common activities. IOM is always available, has resources and has logistics. Its response is comprehensive enough in all sectors.”⁶⁶

Beneficiary-wise, most of those interviewed at the POC site, collective centers, host community and the mental health and psychosocial support (MHPSS) center in Wau were of the view that IOM takes a comprehensive/holistic approach in providing services and support (for more details of the breakdown of responses see table 3.1 below).

Table 3.1. Beneficiaries’ View of IOM’s Approach to the Provision of Services & Support (10 = Comprehensive, 1 = Disjointed)											
Location	10	9.5	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Host Community (Jebel Kher, Wau)	4						2				
Collective Center (Nazareth, Wau)	4	1	1	4	1	1	1	1		1	1
Collective Center (Hai Masna, Wau)											
PoC Site (Wau)	15	1	2			1	10				2
Social Workers (Wau)	7	3	2								
<i>Note: Comprehensive approach (rating 8 to 10), somewhat comprehensive approach (rating 7 to 5), disjointed approach (rating 4 to 1). The IDPs at the Collective Center in Hai Masna had very little interactions with and knowledge of the services and support provided by IOM and could therefore not respond to this question.</i>											

Context and cross-cutting issues in the South Sudan MCOF 2018/2019

Content-wise, 23 out of the 24 programme staff in Juba mentioned that the application of the South Sudan MCOF accounts for context-specific factors, as per the MCOF Strategic Planning Methodology (2016). When the MCOF was developed, contextual and cultural factors were reportedly discussed. The MCOF wheel was adapted to reflect the operational context (WASH was added as another cluster in the wheel, replacing Technical Assistance for Humanitarian Border Management). According to one staff member, “Biggest migration crisis response and MCOF does not reflect what we are doing. By being forced to stick to a format was not to our advantage. The wheel is a visual and people really look at it.”⁶⁷ The first MCOF for South Sudan appears to have been adapted more to the operational context, however, out of considerations to try to have MCOFs at different COs standardized, the second MCOF was modified to reflect as much as possible the original MCOF wheel. In Wau, two of the nine programme staff interviewed mentioned that the MCOF for South Sudan does account for context specific factors. However, it was also mentioned that in the activities being implemented, while the context is accounted for, it is not because of the MCOF, but rather because it is already part of the response. The remaining seven programme staff in Wau, given that they reported not using and/or being familiar with the country MCOF, did not respond to this question.

As regards cross-cutting issues, 24 of the 26 IOM staff interviewed in Juba mentioned that the South Sudan MCOF does help address cross-cutting issues, especially accountability to affected populations (AAP), gender, protection, and conflict sensitivity, and, to a lesser extent, the environment. At the sub-office level, only two of the nine programme staff in Wau that responded to this question mentioned

⁶⁶ Interview response of an IOM staff member, September 2018.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

yes. The remaining seven staff, mentioned that cross-cutting issues are addressed, but on an ad-hoc basis and often because of donor requests, not because of IOM.

Effectiveness

Apart from the second MCOF objective outlined in the global MCOF, close to half of the IOM staff that responded to the question about the other three objectives confirmed that the country MCOF has helped IOM achieve these in South Sudan (see table 4.1 for an overview of the results for the global MCOF objectives in the country). However, a closer look at the explanations provided reveals that the humanitarian architecture in South Sudan, particularly the cluster system and cluster strategies is what helped IOM achieve these objectives. The first part of this section on effectiveness engages in a detailed discussion of these findings.

Table 4.1. The State of the Global MCOF Objectives in South Sudan

In South Sudan/Wau, the country MCOF has helped the IOM Office:	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>Don't Know</u>	<u>Not applicable / Missing</u> ⁶⁸
a) Bring together the different sectors of assistance before, during and/or after a migration crisis, while upholding human rights and humanitarian principles and promoting longer-term development goals.	15	4	5	11
b) Support crisis-affected populations better access their fundamental rights to protection and assistance.	10	6	8	11
c) Complement existing humanitarian systems and other systems addressing peace and security, and development issues.	15	6	3	11
d) Build partnerships with key stakeholders, especially government counterparts and international, national and local (non-governmental) organizations, in the fields of humanitarian response, migration, peace and security, and development.	14	5	5	11

When it comes to *improving and systematizing IOM's response to migration crises by bringing together the different sectors of assistance before, during, and/or after a migration crisis, while upholding human rights and humanitarian principles and promoting longer-term development goals*, 15 of the 24 staff (63%) that responded to this question mentioned that the MCOF has helped IOM achieve this objective in South Sudan. "The MCOF is a key resource enabling different thematic units – including those involved in different stages of crises (prior, during, subsequent) – to recognize and capitalize upon complementarity, facilitating joined-up programming, as well as a consolidated approach to fundraising and programme implementation."⁶⁹ Accordingly, MCOF has reportedly helped reduce the silos that people tend to work in. Nevertheless, efforts are still needed to narrow the existing gap between the document and its actual implementation. For instance, some staff mentioned there always being some friction between emergency crisis response and long-term development efforts, which may be addressed through the MCOF by elaborating further the areas for joined-up programming such as in WASH and health. When it comes to working with external partners, the MCOF was mentioned as not having directly helped. The principal reason provided for this is the existence of the cluster system which preceded the first MCOF. "In the Inter-Cluster Working Group

⁶⁸ Seven participants in one focus group discussion were not familiar enough with the MCOF to respond to this question. Another four participants in another focus group discussion did not hand in their responses to this exercise.

⁶⁹ Survey response of an IOM South Sudan staff member, August 2018.

we have all cluster leads (including UNMISS representation), so whenever there are clashes and new IDPs we meet together to come up with a plan who will do what next.”⁷⁰

Looking at whether the MCOF has supported IOM in *helping crisis-affected populations, including IDPs and international migrants stranded in the crisis situation in South Sudan, to better access their fundamental rights to protection and assistance through the support it provides to the State*, this objective had to be adapted given the context in South Sudan. Specifically, since the government is a party to the conflict and IOM has had minimal engagements with it thus far, the part underlined was removed from all interview questions and FGDs. The results reveal that only ten of the 24 IOM staff (42%) that responded to this question were of the view that the country MCOF has helped IOM achieve this objective in South Sudan. For instance, this objective was achieved “through engagement, advocacy, and capacity building in coordination with the humanitarian community.”⁷¹ MCOF also reportedly is a good reminder of IOM’s responsibilities to affected populations and the humanitarian principles of “do not harm” when providing immediate assistance. The remaining staff mentioned that the MCOF did not help achieve this objective (n=6) or that they did not know (n=8). These results are in large part explained by the operational context and the prevailing challenges of working with the government towards improving the access of IDPs and international migrants to their rights to protection and assistance.

When it comes helping *respond to the often-unaddressed migration dimensions of a crisis, by complementing existing humanitarian systems, as well as other systems addressing peace and security, and development issues*, 15 of the 24 staff (63%) that responded to this question mentioned that the South Sudan MCOF has helped IOM Office achieve this objective. However, like the comments about the cluster system, staff mentioned that humanitarian strategies and peace and security systems already existed prior to the first MCOF for South Sudan. Thus, it is important to ensure that the MCOF complements and does not duplicate these existing strategies and systems. Furthermore, given the context in the country, the focus has been mostly on humanitarian response, rather than peace, security and development issues. According to one IOM staff, “The disconnect is quite vivid – humanitarian support we are giving now is to save lives but not thinking about development.”⁷² This disconnect is also in part reflected in the MCOF, which has been raised as focusing primarily on humanitarian response, with the other sections such as those covering transition and recovery and integrated border management being much smaller. It is therefore recommended that the linkages between the before, during and after stages be strengthened and that the before and after stages be further elaborated, as appropriate, given the evolving context.

Finally, in terms of *building on IOM’s partnerships with States, international organizations and other relevant actors in the fields of humanitarian response, migration, peace and security, and development*, 14 of the 24 staff (58%) that responded to this question affirmed that the South Sudan MCOF has helped the IOM Office achieve this objective. Specifically, while the MCOF did not really help build partnerships with the government of South Sudan, it did with international, national and local organizations in the fields of humanitarian response, migration, peace and security, and development. “MCOF helps us internally frame how we need to approach partners, but they don’t know it’s MCOF.”⁷³ The remaining staff that mentioned no (n=5) or that they do not know (n=5) whether the MCOF has helped IOM achieve this objective pointed out that,

⁷⁰ Interview response of an IOM South Sudan staff member in Wau, September 2018.

⁷¹ Interview response of an IOM South Sudan staff member, August 2018.

⁷² Focus group discussion with IOM South Sudan staff members in Juba, September 2018.

⁷³ Interview response of an IOM South Sudan staff member, September 2018.

“MCOF is a reflection of the cluster objectives and strategy, existing donor requirements, and internal objectives. As such, MCOF doesn’t guide programming or response. It is a copy/paste of existing systems. If IOM is large, as in South Sudan, and cluster co-lead and pipeline manager, MCOF is not needed.”⁷⁴

Accordingly, the relationships that IOM has with these different stakeholders were already solid by the time the first MCOF was developed. Thus, MCOF primarily explains, rather than informs how IOM is operating in South Sudan.

Utility of the South Sudan MCOF (2018/2019)

When IOM staff in Juba were asked how they have used the second MCOF, several broad patterns emerged. The following are the main purposes that staff have reportedly used the MCOF for, in the order of importance:

1. Explanation and justification of work with external partners and other key stakeholders;
2. Donors relations and fundraising;
3. Internal collaboration and coordination;
4. Strategic planning; and
5. Mainstreaming and analyzing cross-cutting issues.

Staff also mentioned having indirectly used the MCOF, for instance to inform project proposals and the CO’s M&E framework, as well as to inform operational planning and response. At the sub-office level, given the limited knowledge and application of the MCOF to activities there, only one of the nine staff that participated in this exercise mentioned having used the MCOF, which was for background information and guidance.

Barriers to Using the South Sudan MCOF (2018/2019)

When looking at the extent to which the MCOF has been used, fourteen of the 25 staff that responded to this question, including one from the sub-office in Wau, reported the existence of both external and internal barriers to using MCOF. Internally, the barriers reported included a weak “after” phase, limited time to do capacity building activities with national NGOs, and that it was developed after the key programmatic decisions were already made. Externally, the barriers encountered to applying the MCOF include issues of access, changes in the dimensions of the conflict and peace process, the government not being part of the cluster system, and a lack of ownership on the part of national actors.

M&E and the South Sudan MCOF (2018/2019)

When it comes to assessing performance and improving the capacity of the CO, M&E activities implemented by the different units at the IOM Office in Juba do consider, albeit only to a certain extent, the MCOF when analyzing and reporting on their respective performance and results. Specifically, 16 of the 26 staff that responded to this question mentioned that M&E activities (indirectly) account for the MCOF when analyzing and reporting on performance and results. “MCOF helps to analyze cross-cutting issues and identify linkages between different thematic areas in implementation and performance.”⁷⁵ Another eight staff, including one staff from the sub-office in Wau, however, mentioned that M&E activities do not account for the MCOF when analyzing and reporting on performance and results, with the remaining staff not knowing whether this is

⁷⁴ Focus group discussion with IOM South Sudan staff members in Juba, September 2018.

⁷⁵ Survey response of an IOM South Sudan staff member, August 2018.

happening. These results are, however, expected to improve with the recently developed comprehensive results-based M&E framework for the CO, which is informed by the South Sudan MCOF (2018-2019). “MCOF was part of the process to formalize M&E in the mission and gave us more structure; the results framework is a next phase we would get better at (move away from merely counting people).”⁷⁶ Once the framework is implemented, units within the Office, through their respective M&E activities, will feed into it throughout the year. Then, at the end of the year, the framework will be used for the annual report that reports against the framework, indicators established, and the Consolidated Appeal.

When looking at whether the MCOF has contributed towards achieving the outputs, outcomes, and impacts of the activities implemented in response to the mobility dimensions of the crisis in South Sudan, 14 out of 21 staff (67%) that responded to this question mentioned that MCOF did not contribute to achieving outputs, outcomes and impacts for two key reasons. First, all the information captured in the document reflects what the IOM South Sudan was already doing, therefore the MCOF did not contribute towards achieving the expected outputs, outcomes and impacts. Second, the CO already has a Consolidated Appeal, which is viewed by some staff as the operational framework of IOM in South Sudan. In contrast, only five of the 21 staff (23%) that responded to this question mentioned that MCOF has contributed towards achieving the outputs, outcomes and impacts of the activities implemented in response to the mobility dimensions of the crisis in the country. Specifically, the MCOF in South Sudan has helped define IOM’s approach and frame and facilitate the implementation of projects, including the M&E efforts. Indirectly, MCOF has reportedly contributed towards achieving outputs, outcomes and impacts of activities by reflecting the cluster system of which the IOM is part of.

In implementing activities, the MCOF aims to promote medium, long-term and interconnected approaches. According most of the staff that spoke about this issue (19 out of 26 staff), MCOF has helped ensure that activities implemented do account for these approaches. For instance, MCOF has helped staff think for the long-term by highlighting the linkages between humanitarian and transition and recovery work, and thus the importance of keeping a long-term perspective even during emergency response. “Strengthened linkages between humanitarian and resilience work enable the design and delivery of integrated and multi-sectoral programming that best serves to ensure impact and sustainability.”⁷⁷ Nevertheless, a few staff (n=6) were of the view that the current MCOF is too short-term focused, making it difficult to strategize medium and long-term programming. Moreover, although some units reported taking an interconnected approach to their activities, this was not because of MCOF.

Trainings on the Global and Country MCOFs

Unlike Libya where two capacity-building workshops with civil society organizations engaged in the response to the crisis covered the global MCOF, in South Sudan, IOM has yet to conduct any trainings with external partners or any other key stakeholders on how the global or the country MCOFs can be applied to preparedness, response, transition and recovery, and migration management activities before, during, and after a crisis with mobility dimensions. One of the reasons provided as to why this is not being done is the cluster system,

“In South Sudan, we integrated a lot of operations in the cluster system, so key areas where we used partners like for shelter and Camp Coordination and Camp Management (CCCM), the

⁷⁶ Interview response of an IOM staff member, September 2018.

⁷⁷ Survey response of an IOM South Sudan staff member, August 2018.

underlying strategy for working with these partners has been the cluster strategy and HRP rather than the MCOF. MCOF is a reflection of what we are doing in the cluster system, but it is the cluster system that has a strategy of how we should operate.”⁷⁸

As for IOM staff, apart from the two strategic planning workshops, no other training has been conducted at IOM South Sudan. The first strategic planning workshop was organized in 2015 (Kampala, Uganda) which resulted in the first MCOF. The second workshop took place in May 2017 (Kigali, Rwanda) which resulted in the second MCOF. Given that only a selected number of staff were able to participate in these workshops, most staff, both at the CO and Sub-Office level, had not received any training on the global MCOF and/or its application to South Sudan. Furthermore, most of the staff that participated in this evaluation exercise were not aware of the free online global MCOF introductory course available through I-Learn.

Stakeholders and the South Sudan MCOF 2018/2019

Although only one of the four donors interviewed reported being familiar with the second South Sudan MCOF, all four donors mentioned having been consulted (between moderately to extensively) on IOM’s approach and activities in response to the crisis in South Sudan. Accordingly, when asked about their level of satisfaction, all four donors mentioned being satisfied (the other options being very satisfied, unsatisfied or very unsatisfied). However, one area that could be improved upon is how the CO communicates with donors about the latest situation in areas they are funding and how IOM is responding, for instance, in PoCs. “We want real live information and we are not getting this from IOM. IOM could do this weekly, for example, and share it with all donors such as at the weekly humanitarian donor meetings.”⁷⁹

According to relevant IOM staff, the MCOF has only slightly/moderately proven to be an effective tool for framing and facilitating collaboration with the government for preparing, responding to, and transitioning and recovering from the prevailing displacement and migration crisis in South Sudan. This finding is also reflected in the feedback received from the four government entities interviewed for this exercise. First, when it comes to preparedness, three of the four government entities interviewed mentioned having received support in the form of capacity building (training on human trafficking and human smuggling, MHPSS, and how to identify and use survey data collected to support returnees) and border management system and data support. This support was mentioned as having been effective. For example, with regards to MHPSS capacity building support,

“At first, the social workers were not qualified in their profession, which changed when we started the programme. Social workers come from various backgrounds; some have secondary and some university education, but none have specific studies in social work. Because of the programme, the social workers are able to do case management, write reports, and manage cases of rape.”⁸⁰

Second, in terms of response, only two of the four government entities interviewed reported having received (indirect) support. The support received in this regard is with respect to the conduct of MHPSS counselling (e.g. inside and outside of the PoC site in Wau) and identifying areas of conflict and sending staff to respond to prevailing problems – both of which were reported as having been effective. Third, when it comes to transitioning and recovering from the current displacement and migration crisis, two of the four government entities reported having received support. First, IOM

⁷⁸ Interview response of an IOM staff member, September 2018.

⁷⁹ Interview response of an IOM donor, September 2018.

⁸⁰ Interview response of a South Sudanese government counterpart, September 2018.

helped create an environment for social workers to train themselves and to do counselling. Second, IOM signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC) related to anticipated repatriation and other activities associated with repatriation, including recovery and development activities, more specifically the reconstruction aspect and livelihoods. While the former was reported as being effective, the latter was not, as it has yet to be operationalized.

Efficiency

In terms of how resources have been converted into outputs, data reveals that the IOM Office in South Sudan has directly and indirectly analyzed the financial and administrative requirements for effectively applying the MCOF in implementing its response efforts and, to a certain extent, preparedness, transition and recovery activities. In the first MCOF (2016/2017), a budget was reportedly developed. “We wanted to know how much money we would need to meet different goals.”⁸¹ For the second MCOF, however, this was indirectly done via the Consolidated Appeal, which includes a budget that indicates the financial and human resources required for implementing the activities under the different sectors that are reflected in the MCOF⁸². Nevertheless, even if perhaps not directly related to the MCOF, staff reported that the CO’s Resource Management team “monitors revenues and expenditures on a monthly basis and routinely reminds Programme Managers of low or high burn rate, and for them to adjust accordingly.”⁸³

Internally, existing internal collaboration channels and resources for supporting the application of MCOF in managing the current crisis and its mobility dimensions are viewed as being sufficient. Specifically, 25 of the 27 staff that responded to this question said that these channels and resources are sufficient. The most frequently mentioned forms of internal collaboration channels include coordination and collaboration among units at the CO through regular staff meetings, existing structures and internal capacities, and RO support. For instance,

“MCOF works if there is constant coordination and understanding within the mission. In South Sudan we were not siloed at all, there was a meeting every single week where everybody knew what was going on. MCOF was super good, we were able to take it a step further so that you knew what the status quo was within all units.”⁸⁴

However, 21 out of the 27 staff that responded to this question also found that certain internal collaboration channels and resources could be strengthened for applying MCOF in managing a crisis with mobility dimensions in the country. The most frequently mentioned issues in this regard are resources (i.e. more financial and human resources are required if IOM South Sudan is to look across all sectors and phases of a crisis, especially the transition and recovery phase) and collaboration and coordination, especially with HQ and the RO for preparing and applying the MCOF.

Outcome & Impact

Although the second MCOF for South Sudan is still ongoing, the existence of an MCOF in the CO since 2016 renders it possible to explore some of its outcome(s) and impact(s). When asked what the outcome of the MCOF is for IOM as the leading agency on displacement and crises with mobility dimensions, the MCOF was mentioned as having contributed towards this, but that it is not the sole

⁸¹ Interview response of an IOM staff member, August 2018.

⁸² These sectors are: CCCM, Shelter-Non-Food Items (S-NFI), WASH, Health & MHPSS, DTM, Logistics, Rapid Response Fund (RRF), transition and recovery, and migration management.

⁸³ Interview response of an IOM South Sudan staff member, August 2018.

⁸⁴ Interview response of an IOM staff member, September 2018.

factor. In terms of contribution, it was reported that the MCOF “helps the Mission structure its argument/explanation/representation when talking to partners, donors and the host government on what IOM does, and where and what it intends to do in the next 3, 6 or 12 months.”⁸⁵ However, the extent of this contribution was mentioned as ultimately depending on the staff. “It’s a good tool for planning, but to make it happen and to have a vision, to have planning, is contingent on the quality of the staff and their commitment to work as a Mission and through programs. Variability in staff is huge.”⁸⁶

When it comes to positioning IOM in preparedness, transition and post-crisis initiatives, staff interviewed reported several outcomes of the MCOF:

- explain and justify activities to donors and external partners;
- structure internal planning and response;
- increase internal cohesion and collaboration; and
- replicate and expand programming.

These outcomes have, in turn, reportedly helped position the Organization strongly in delivering activities within a number of sectors – both humanitarian and resilience based – in the country.

Looking ahead, IOM staff raised concerns about the usefulness of the MCOF, particularly for COs in a crisis context. “MCOF would be more useful for missions not in crisis mode by helping the mission be aware of its potential. Also helps frame for staff what they could do.”⁸⁷ In South Sudan, because the MCOF was created after the crisis had started and the humanitarian architecture was already established, the document did not inform planning and response strategies; instead, it was a reflection of how IOM was already operating. “MCOF resembles a lot the cluster system already in place; IASC and SPHERE and cluster guidelines – what makes our MCOF special?”⁸⁸ When it comes to coordination and collaboration with external partner in an effort to take a comprehensive approach and to avoid duplicating efforts, MCOF was again viewed as embodying how things were already operating at the Mission. “So many coordination systems in place before MCOF. MCOF reflected situation on ground. MCOF did not spearhead or help that coordination.”⁸⁹

Accordingly, the IOM Office in South Sudan needs to reflect and decide upon the direction it would like to take:

- 1) Update the current MCOF in 2019 to be used internally as a reference/background document of how IOM engages in South Sudan, and externally for fundraising and communicating about IOM’s engagement in the country; or
- 2) Develop an IOM country strategy based on the MiGOF and the MCOF, establishing a stronger link between preparedness, response, transition and recovery, and migration management, which then also relates to other related IOM global and regional frameworks and strategies such as MICIC.

⁸⁵ Interview response of an IOM South Sudan staff member, August 2018.

⁸⁶ Interview response of an IOM staff member, September 2018.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ Focus group discussion with IOM South Sudan staff members in Wau, September 2018.

⁸⁹ Interview response of an IOM staff member, September 2018.