



IOM International Organization for Migration
OIM Organisation Internationale pour les Migrations
OIM Organización Internacional para las Migraciones

EVALUATION REPORT

SUPPORT TO THE DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION OF FORMER COMBATANTS AND DETAINEES IN THE INDONESIAN PROVINCE OF ACEH

Funded by the European Commission Under
the Rapid Reaction Mechanism(RRM) budget line

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Acronyms

AMM	Aceh Monitoring Mission
BAPPENAS	Badan Perencanaan dan Pembangunan Nasional
BRA	Badan Reintegrasi Aceh
BRI	Bank Republic Indonesia
COHA	Cessation of Hostilities Agreement
COSA	Commission on Security Arrangements
DBMS	Database Management System
DDRR	Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reinsertion and Reintegration
DEPKUMHAM	Departemen Hukum dan Hak Asasi Manusia
DFID	Department for International Development
DINSOS	Dinas Sosial
DRR	Demobilization, Reinsertion and Reintegration
EC	European Commission
EPC	Emergency and Post-Conflict
FGD	Focus Group Discussions
FORBES	Forum Bersama Advisory Board
GAM	Gerakan Aceh Merdeka
Gol	Government of Indonesia
HPNA	Humanitarian Protection Needs Analysis
ICG	International Crisis Group
ICRS	Information, Counseling and Referral Service
KDP	Kecamatan Development Program
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MySQL	My Structured Query Language
PSA	Public Service Announcements
RRM	Rapid Reaction Mechanism
TNA	Tentara Nasional Aceh
TNI	Tentara Nasional Indonesia
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNIFEM	United Nations Development Fund for Women
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WAN	Wide Area Network
WB	World Bank

MAP OF ACEH, INDONESIA



Executive summary

This report is the product of an internal evaluation of the project implemented by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) ‘Support to the Demobilization and Reintegration of Former Combatants and Detainees in the Indonesian Province of Aceh’. Of an initial duration of six months, this IOM project began on August 15 2006 and was extended until June 14 2006. This project was funded by the European Commission under the Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM) budget line.

The project overall objective was to support the peace agreement in the province of Aceh in order to contribute to the long-term and sustainable demobilization, reinsertion and reintegration of demobilized combatants and amnestied prisoners.

The strategy of the project was to unfold in a phased process-oriented approach and was predicated by the decommissioning and demobilizing of former combatants and release of amnestied prisoners. The key component of the project was to address the immediate subsistence needs of up to 2,000 amnestied Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka – GAM) prisoners and up to 3,000 GAM demobilized combatants by providing them with transitional reintegration support packages to make available a safety-net in support of their reinsertion into society. In addition to this, the project’s strategy included a general health screening, an information campaign and the registration into a follow-up case management system. Project implementation was predicated by the establishment of 10 Information, Counseling and Referral Service (ICRS) offices at the district level. The ICRS concept developed by IOM has been successfully implemented in other countries in post-conflict situations.

The evaluation looked into the **relevance, performance, efficiency** and **outcome** of the project. Particular attention was paid to **lessons learned** and **recommendations** in order to capture innovative and replicable practices developed during project implementation. The evaluation is a result of extensive documentation review and field research which threw light on the functioning of the project.

The evaluation team found that the IOM project has had a positive impact on its beneficiaries and has achieved most of the intended objectives. However some gaps were identified. The following boxes show the main strengths and weaknesses of the project:

Strengths

- IOM developed at the conceptual stage a strong strategy predicated on its long standing experience in the field of Demobilization, Reinsertion and Reintegration which proved valid throughout project implementation
- IOM has shown good flexibility during project implementation, demonstrated a sound understanding of the dynamics of the peace process and secured privileged access to the main stakeholders involved in the peace implementation which guaranteed good delivery of activities

- IOM successfully set up a back bone structure of ICRS offices throughout Aceh acting as the central delivery mechanism for the immediate reinsertion phase and longer term reintegration phase
- IOM built in the project a strong medical component which acted as a confidence builder for the beneficiaries

Weaknesses

- For reasons outside of IOM's control, access to the former combatants caseload could not be secured and therefore a key target group of the project could not be assisted
- The information campaign component did not build in monitoring mechanisms making it very difficult to assess its impact on the general public of Aceh
- Outreach activities of ICRS offices, particularly vis-a-vis the communities, was not carefully thought through at the project design phase and delivered insufficient results
- The intended link between Dinas Sosial (DINSOS - Government of Indonesia Social Services) and ICRS offices did not materialize as originally foreseen which could hamper the sustainability of the structure created

The implementation of this project proved tremendously challenging because of the fluidity of the peace implementation in Aceh. One of the main difficulties encountered throughout project implementation is attributable to GAM's reluctance to turn over the names of 3,000 combatants to the government. Without this list of 3,000 names, IOM was not in the position to register the former combatants under the project since, as detailed in the project document (cf. Annex 1) and implied in the Memorandum of Understanding between GoI and GAM, reinsertion assistance to former combatants would require the identification and verification by GAM leadership of combatants eligible for project assistance. In addition, the Government of Indonesia's (GoI) decision to set up implementation mechanisms and financial schemes to facilitate the reintegration of former combatants and amnestied prisoner which were not originally foreseen at the time of project conception deeply modified the environment in which the project was being implemented. It shifted the policy and institutional framework within which the IOM project operated and resulted in the requirement for IOM to realign its activities.

Based on the findings of the evaluation, key recommendations and lessons learnt have been made. Whilst some are clearly specific to the project, others are more general and may apply to similar projects.

- Importance of the development of the medical component within the overarching programme strategy, tying the individual and community strands of assistance, is an innovation that has borne positive results.

- Importance at the peace negotiation stage to carefully plan the steps leading to demobilization and subsequent reintegration. This is a lesson that has to some degree been identified and learned within other contexts.
- Importance of careful and close coordination of efforts between the Government and the international community. The ability of all of the stakeholders and actors to support and encourage an evolving peace process requires that consensus of approach and articulating such an approach is required. Disparate competing activities combined with multiple uncoordinated communications within the government structures, results in wasted resources and ineffective interventions.
- Importance of better coordination between an implementing agency (IOM) and the peace monitors (AMM). Both agencies were supported by the European Commission (EC), and both had pivotal roles within the peace process. The paucity of understanding of one another's activities, resulted in missed opportunities for coordinated actions. An EC lead coordination mechanism could have enhanced the overall effect of their activities, strengthening the peace process.
- Importance of well researched needs of the target group at the project conception phase. In a rapidly evolving environment this is not always achievable, regardless of how necessary. Recognition of this could result in more flexible funding mechanisms to match the fluidity of any evolving post-conflict environment.
- Importance to anchor delivery mechanisms developed by the international community with existing governmental structures.

Introduction

1.1 Background

Contextual information about Aceh and the conflict

The Province of Aceh, which today has a population of 4.4 million, is located on the northern tip of the island of Sumatra. While an integral part of the Republic of Indonesia since its inception, Aceh has set itself apart from the rest of the country by its strict adherence to Islam, its history of being an independent sultanate until the Dutch invasion in 1873, and its strong regional and ethnic identity. Acehnese efforts to safeguard this identity conflicted with the Jakarta Government's policies from the beginning, with Jakarta/Aceh relations being fraught with tension throughout most of Indonesia's existence. The province is characterized by rich oil and gas resources, which has certainly played a role in the persistently unhappy center/periphery relations, which in turn were at the heart of the two major insurgencies in Aceh in 1953 and 1976.

The fall of Suharto allowed the Indonesian Government to explore alternatives to force to resolve the Aceh conflict. Nevertheless, as from 1998, the Aceh conflict escalated. The Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka; GAM) modified its strategy and transform itself into a genuinely popular movement. The absence of Indonesian military pressure during the 2000-2001 humanitarian pause and the 2002-2003 Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (COHA) enabled GAM to introduce a number of organizational changes, to recruit, train and rearm, all of which strengthened its military capacity. By May 2003, the insurgents had increased their active membership fivefold, expanding from their traditional stronghold areas into the rest of Aceh, and successfully controlling between 70 and 80 percent of the province, including local government, through their shadow civil service structure. GAM broadened its strategy— most importantly by internationalizing its quest, providing GAM with legitimacy and a platform from which to advocate for independence. GAM used the dialogue to gain world attention and support from the United States, the United Nations and the European Union. Alongside deep-seated suspicion of Indonesian's intentions and cease fire violations by both sides, this strategy of internationalization explains why GAM did not opt for a symbolic act of disarmament during the COHA phase and why it did not embrace regional autonomy tactically. This among other issues caused the peace process to collapse in May 2003. The military onslaught after the collapse of COHA significantly weakened GAM, with numbers dropping to half previous levels and fighters forced to retreat into the mountainous interior.

Throughout this period, the population of Aceh experienced the protracted destruction of the local economy. Thousands of Javanese trans-migrants deserted their coffee plantations in Central Aceh, while thousands of hectares of palm oil plantations in West Aceh, Aceh Singkil and South Aceh were abandoned.

15 August 2005: signature of the peace agreement:

It was during this period of instability that the province of Aceh was hit by the 26 December 2004 earthquake, which triggered the tsunami that wreaked unprecedented destruction. The tsunami and earthquake decimated a region already traumatized by the civil war. However this disaster created a climate in which to reinvigorate the peace process, which had been stalled since the breakdown of the COHA in 2003.

The involvement of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Vice-President Jusuf Kalla played a major role in softening the positions of the military hierarchy. With the exception of muted protests from the nationalists, dissent from prominent politicians and military figures in Jakarta and Banda Aceh has been relatively, if not absolutely, absent. This changed context allowed for the softening of positions on both sides in peace talks which opened in Helsinki.

After six months of peace talks, on 15 August 2005, the Government of Indonesia and GAM signed a historic peace treaty aimed at ending nearly 30 years of fighting that killed over 12,000 people. In the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) GAM agreed to renounce a demand for full independence and to disarm. In return, the Government offered amnesty to prisoner combatants, land, jobs and political representation as well as the withdrawal of more than half of its 53,000 troops and police. The Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) comprised of some 250 monitors from the European Union and five of Indonesia's South-East Asian neighbors were deployed to oversee the process and arbitrate disputes. The Memorandum of Understanding set out commitments and expectations aimed at building trust and confidence. The Government of Indonesia (GoI) recognized that the timeline to deliver a peace dividend was short and approached the donor community for immediate support. The GoI identified three priority areas in the 'Proposal for Supporting Priority programmes following the RI-GAM peace Agreement' within the context of a long-term strategy to encourage security and national reconciliation with the aim of building a positive environment for the resumption of economic activities and lasting peace:

- Communication/socialization of the MoU;
- Capacity building of Police and Local Government Apparatus;
- Reintegration of GAM combatants and prisoners into communities.

Yet, while the agreement was more holistic, and the political will from both sides was seemingly stronger, many challenges remained. The MoU outlined just the bare bones of a settlement. Many issues remained unresolved, which created problems while implementing the MoU. The peace agreement required GAM to demobilize "all of its 3,000 military troops". Because it did not specify how reintegration assistance would be provided, the Government, donors and international organizations have tried to work out a mechanism that meets the needs of all parties, namely security for GAM, transparency for the Indonesian army (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, TNI) and accountability for the donors. This is what the IOM project described below aimed to deliver.

DDRR Interaction with Peace Processes.

IOM's global experience with post-conflict demobilisation initiatives, has furnished it with a deep and holistic understanding of the social, economic and political factors prevalent with societies recovering from armed conflict. One of the most relevant factors specific to this action, are the effects and interdependence inherent between a peace-process and a Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reinsertion and Reintegration process (DDRR).

Within Aceh the implementation of the MoU, and the wider development of the peace-process, was based upon the core understanding that the GAM would evolve from an armed insurgency in opposition to the state, to become a legitimate political entity engaged within a democratic process. The transformation was agreed to within the MoU, but would begin with the implementation of the MoU. A core component of this transformation was to be the handing-in and destruction of the GAM arsenal, and the demobilisation of its combatants.

The implementation of a DDRR process within an evolving peace-process requires that the core intent of the DDRR process is achieved, without negatively impacting upon the evolution and implementation of the peace-process. Just as the handing-in of weapons requires political consent, the release of combatants also requires political consent, from the insurgents. The forced removal of weapons would have an equally negative impact as the forced removal of combatants from command structures, both activities could be viewed as inherently counterproductive to the evolution of the peace process.

The overriding methodology of any DDRR process requires that the command structures of the organization to be demobilized identifies their combatants to receive assistance, and subsequently any such assistance is delivered in a manner that does not require those individuals to remain reliant upon the command structures. This delicate balance, and the maintenance of consent, must be achieved by the implementation of the DDRR process.

In the specific framework of this project, and in line with its expertise acquired in similar operations worldwide, IOM's role was focused on the Demobilization, Reinsertion and Reintegration process (DRR), whereas Disarmament was under the responsibility of AMM. The involvement of IOM is therefore referred to as DRR in this report.

1.2 Evaluation scope and methodology

In accordance with the specifications of the contract, this final evaluation was conducted by IOM in collaboration with the EC. Lina Frodin, expert from the EC, took part in the field visit which took place from 3 to 7 July 2006 but the overall responsibility of the evaluation, including writing of the report stayed with IOM.

The evaluation was conducted through two main activities:

- The development of indicators to be used as a basis for both qualitative and quantitative analysis , as well as providing support for later monitoring and
- Field visit.

As described in the Terms of Reference, the evaluation looked into the **relevance** of the project (to which extent the objectives of the project remained valid and pertinent as originally planned); the **performance** (progress being made by the project according to performance indicators and in relation to the overall objective and project purposes); the **efficiency** (how well resources – funds, expertise, time etc. - have been used to undertake activities and have been converted to results) and finally the **outcome** of the project (achieved short-term and medium-term effects). Particular attention was paid to **lessons learned** and **recommendations** in order to capture innovative and replicable practices developed during project implementation.

In view of assessing the project using the above mentioned criteria, the evaluation consisted of field visits in several districts of the Province of Aceh as well as in Banda Aceh, the project management site. Due to the short duration of the evaluation, the evaluation team used a mixed methodology mainly focused on qualitative methods:

- Documentation review
- Field visits
- Semi-structured interviews with project management team and main stakeholders
- Focus group discussions

Documentation review:

Whilst the majority of the information was collected during the field trip, the evaluation team carried out detailed documentation review prior to visiting Aceh, which concentrated on local and international news reports, reports from the International Crisis Group (ICG), studies conducted by the World Bank (WB), Department for International Development (DFID) etc., previous reintegration projects in post-conflict situations and previous IOM projects, as well as various other documents widely available over the internet, in books etc. The review enabled the evaluators to gain insights into the conflict itself and the nature of the challenges met by IOM.

In addition, documentation reviewed included reports produced by the project implementation team as well as an analysis of the database set up in the framework of the project which provided access to quantitative data.

Field visit

IOM organized the field visit, providing logistical support and setting up meetings with the main stakeholders. The list of people to be interviewed was pre-defined by the evaluating team.

Given their central role in the implementation of the project, one of the main objectives of the field visit was dedicated to the evaluation of the establishment and functioning of the Information, Counseling and Referral Service (ICRS) offices. In this context, the ICRS offices of Langsa, Lhokseumawe, Sigli and Banda Aceh were visited. The evaluation team spent a relatively important amount of time interviewing ICRS staff and going through procedures in place at each office to measure their coherence and effectiveness.

Focus groups and beneficiary interviews

Organization of focus group discussions (FGD) with beneficiaries was another central aspect of the evaluation. As further explained in the report, the project only assisted one component of the originally foreseen caseload: amnestied prisoners, but not demobilized combatants. For the purpose of this evaluation, only amnestied prisoners were included in the FGD.

The focus groups were semi-structured and based around themes previously identified by the evaluation team.

The focus groups enabled an assessment of the impact of the project on the life of beneficiaries; particularly how the assistance provided impacted their initial reinsertion.

FGD also provided first hand information on the perception of and adherence to the peace process and analysis of the factors hinging its implementation. Finally, specific questions were asked regarding beneficiary aspirations for their longer term reintegration and their awareness of opportunities provided by IOM and other organizations.

The FGD presented the additional value of meeting with beneficiaries directly in their community and to assess the linkage between the assistance provided at the individual level and the assistance provided to the communities receiving amnestied prisoners in the framework of another project funded by the EC (“Livelihood Support in Conflict affected Communities in Aceh” funded under the Aid to Uprooted People budget line).

Interviews with implementing partners, donor and other stakeholders

In-depth interviews were held with the DRR team in Banda Aceh, Head of Dinsos¹ at provincial and district levels, Head of a Puskesmas² and beneficiaries. The intention was to gain insights into the practicalities of project implementation. Whilst these interviews provided details of the coordination mechanisms and management of the project, they also offered useful opportunities to discuss the general outcome of the project and its importance in the context of post-conflict Aceh.

Input from the GoI side was provided through the interviews with the Head of Dinsos at provincial and district levels.

¹ Department of Social Affairs

² Local clinic

2.0 Project description

A critical component of the peace process was the successful reinsertion of 2,000 amnestied prisoners and 3,000 former combatants into society. The project, with an implementation period of six months, was conceived to support this critical stage of the peace process. The project overall objective was ‘to support the peace agreement through confidence building measures that will contribute to long-term and sustainable demobilization, reinsertion and reintegration of demobilized combatants and amnestied prisoners’.

The strategy of the project was to unfold in a phased process-oriented approach and was predicated by the decommissioning and demobilizing of former combatants and release of amnestied prisoners. The key component of the project was to address the immediate subsistence needs of up to 2,000 amnestied GAM prisoners and up to 3,000 GAM demobilized/decommissioned combatants by providing them with transitional reintegration support packages to make available a safety-net in support of their reinsertion into society. In addition to this, the project’s strategy included a general health screening and the registration into a follow-up case management system.

Project implementation was predicated by the establishment of 10 Information, Counseling and Referral Service (ICRS) offices at the district level. The ICRS concept developed by IOM has been successfully implemented in other countries in post-conflict situations. The network of 10 ICRS offices was to act as focal point for former combatants and community members that would gather and maintain information and coordinate the progress of reintegration.

2.1 Specific objectives of the project

- 1) To provide a transitional reintegration package, including secure transportation assistance where necessary, for up to 2,000 amnestied prisoners and 3,000 former combatants;
- 2) To design and implement a multi-faceted socialization and communication campaign to disseminate information and educate both target beneficiaries and the general population about the peace building process
- 3) To conduct General Health Assessments for up to 2,000 amnestied prisoners and 3,000 former combatants and establish related medical referral networks
- 4) To establish an Information, Counseling and Referral Service (ICRS) network to facilitate the reinsertion of demobilized/decommissioned former combatants and recently released amnestied prisoners
- 5) To initiate the establishment of a case management database that will help map and prioritize in a systematic manner the delivery of reintegration assistance and contribute to developing individualized reintegration plan

2.2 Expected results

1. Up to 2,000 amnestied prisoners and 3,000 former combatants will receive a demobilization transitional reintegration package to provide for a six month transitional safety-net
2. Up to 2,000 amnestied prisoners and 3,000 former combatants will be given a General Health Assessment and will be provided with follow-up health care management advice. Where necessary, an individualized referral recovery plan will be outlined
3. A comprehensive socialization and communication campaign developed targeting information to a minimum of 30,000 Acehnese conducted
4. Information will be gathered through the demobilization registration process and a case- management database will be initiated for administration by the ICRS offices
5. 11 Information, Counseling and referral Support (ICRS) offices will be set-up, staffed and made operational. In so doing, the distribution of the transitional reintegration package will be fully operationalized and a foundation will be established for the mid-long term grant disbursement mechanism (to occur in second phase)
6. The foundation ICRS network and other related support structures placed and second phase of the project initiated (at end of six months)

The entire first six month phase of this intervention was designed to provide a foundation for the implementation of a long-term reintegration and community development strategy that would support and contribute to a sustainable and lasting peace.

2.3 Total budget:

Of an overall amount of Euro 4.545.504, the EC contributed Euro 4.000.000 to this action. (cf. Annex 2). This six month project was funded under the Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM) budget line of the European Commission designed to allow the Community to respond urgently to the needs of countries threatened with or undergoing severe political instability or suffering from the effects of a technological or natural disaster. Its purpose is to support measures aimed at safeguarding or re-establishing the conditions under which the partner countries of the EC can pursue their long term development goals. The main added value of the RRM is its ability to provide support to the political strategy of the Commission faced with a crisis in a third country.

2.4 Subsequent changes to the project

Due to difficulties in accessing the former combatant's caseload (as detailed subsequently in the report), IOM requested a four month extension to the project. Modifications were brought to the budget to accommodate the project extension, remaining within the same budget limit. An addendum to the contract was signed on February 10 2006. Of an initial

duration of 6 months, the project therefore had overall 10 month duration. (Start date 15 August 2005, end date June 14 2006).

While the RRM is a very flexible instrument, the Council Regulation establishing it imposes a number of legal constraints, notably:

- the maximum duration of any RRM project is six months;
- the RRM cannot finance humanitarian assistance;
- the RRM can only finance an operation where other EC instruments cannot respond within the timeframe necessary.

The granting of a four month project extension was therefore only possible on an exceptional basis.

3.0 Relevance of the project

3.1 Relevance of the project strategy

Though of overall good quality, the project document and the overall strategy adopted present a number of strengths but also weaknesses.

3.1.1 Strengths of the project strategy:

The identified objectives were well targeted and remained valid and relevant throughout project implementation. At the conceptual phase, IOM managed to capture the essential steps and set of activities that needed to take place in order to implement the project effectively. This is certainly due to IOM's long experience of implementing similar actions in other parts of the world. The recommended steps in support of the implementation of the peace process were mainly predicated on the lessons learned from previous operations.

Despite the fact that the project was recommending actions which have proven successful in other parts of the world, IOM was also careful to adapt its methodology to the specific context of Aceh. This was possible due to the good understanding IOM had acquired of the conflict in Aceh through an established presence in the Province before the 2004 Tsunami. In 2004, IOM undertook a survey, Humanitarian Protection Needs Analysis (HPNA), in order to screen and capture the humanitarian situation in Aceh after the declaration of martial law. This HPNA survey enabled IOM to create a fairly good picture of the specific situation in villages to which prisoners and demobilized combatants would return. In addition, just before the prisoners' release, IOM conducted a Needs and Aspiration Assessment of GAM Political Prisoners in partnership with the Human Rights Department of the Ministry of Justice (Departemen Hukum dan Hak Asasi Manusia, DEPKUMHAM) from 9 to 14 August 2005. Four hundred and twenty-

eight randomly selected GAM political prisoners (from a population of 1,642) in 47 prisons in four provinces were interviewed. Prisoners were queried about their perceptions about their return, reinsertion into normal life, opinions about the peace process and subsistence and vocational needs. The dataset ranged from low-level operatives to senior GAM leadership aged 16 to 65. Valuable information was also gleaned from a World Bank rapid conflict assessment conducted from late July to mid-August which identified scenarios that could occur in the months after the signing of the agreement, and suggested tools and mechanisms which could be used to support the peace process. This important baseline data enabled IOM to develop a well-informed strategy and particularly to define adequately the type of assistance needed upon release from prison of amnestied prisoners and demobilization of former combatants.

As a result, IOM was able to conceive at the project development stage a fairly detailed strategy, identifying actions necessary at the different stages of the project implementation. Of particular importance was the relevant conception of the content of the reinsertion package to be provided to amnestied prisoners and demobilized combatants as well as the inclusion of a specific general health assessment which proved later its validity and importance to ensure the adherence to the project of the beneficiaries.

The strategic importance of the initial reinsertion phase for the smooth implementation of the peace process and the necessary link with longer term reintegration is one of the strengths justifying the relevance of the project strategy and was comprehensively described in the project document. The necessary continuity between initial reinsertion and longer term reintegration has been rightly anticipated and catered for by IOM through the inclusion of a backbone structure, the ICRS offices that should continue operating after the end of the action. The 11 ICRS offices were conceived as the physical structure where the beneficiaries will converge to view and obtain information on issues pertaining to the peace and reconstruction process. Given the importance of restoring the link between amnestied prisoners and demobilized combatants with the communities of return, the offices were described as a place where the community could come together and discuss reconciliation issues and act as grass-roots network that would bridge information gaps and harness community members with a strategy to organize and mobilize themselves to meet their needs. However, that strategic objective was not always effectively achieved and this will be further discussed under the ‘Performance’ analysis.

3.1.2 Weaknesses of the project strategy:

The project strategy presented a number of weaknesses. Some confusing terminology is used throughout the project document; reference is made to ‘transitional reintegration package’, which was later transformed during project implementation into a ‘reinsertion package’ to better reflect the difference between the two critical stages of the DDDR process: initial reinsertion assistance followed by a longer term reintegration set of activities. The project document failed to clearly describe what belonged to the initial

reinsertion phase (covered by this action) and what will be achieved in a second stage (after the end of the action with financial support from other donors). At the evaluation stage, the confusing language used in the project document created problems to clearly identify what this project was supposed to achieve.

In addition, some of the assumptions made at the project conceptual phase did not materialize. As stated within the project document ‘the decommissioning/demobilization process will be initiated at the point of certification at the AMM mobile team processing sites, where former combatants will be certified and divested of arms and other combat paraphernalia.’ This assumption represents an understanding of the current DDRR paradigm, in so far as the point of disarmament also represents the point at which individual combatants enter the reinsertion and reintegration process. Such an assumption is valid based on past experiences of DDRR processes and programming. Within the context of Aceh, this process was not adhered to for reasons outside of IOM’s control, as the political process took precedence and the individual combatants were not identified, or registered into the project, at the point of disarmament. As further explained in this report, the effect of this divergence was that the project could not assist the former combatant caseload defined within the project document.

An additional weakness is the imprecise, perhaps inaccurate, definition of the project beneficiaries. It is stated in the project document that in addition to the 3,000 demobilized combatants and 2,000 amnestied prisoners, “their families, dependents and host communities” would be targeted by the action. The project document stated that “an estimated 35,000 direct and indirect beneficiaries” would benefit from the project. This is not substantiated in the strategy described as no specific activities were geared towards providing support to the host communities in the framework of this action.

Finally, the project strategy did not include a clear gender dimension. Even though it was rightly anticipated at the time of project design that the overwhelming majority of the amnestied prisoners and demobilized combatants were male, IOM should have, from the very outset, better factored in its delivery mechanism a specific gender programming. This is especially true for the beneficiaries at large as described above.

3.2 Project evolution, fluidity and flexibility

The strategy was well detailed in the project document but soon appeared the need to adapt it to the fluid environment of peace implementation in Aceh. IOM demonstrated a strong ability to adapt the project’s strategy to the evolving situation on the ground. From the outset, the Government of Indonesia (GoI) made very clear to the international community that the process needed to retain a strong ‘GoI face’ and that all assistance provided to the caseload needed to be seen as emanating from the GoI itself. This created problems vis-à-vis GAM, which was still very defiant of the intentions of the Government. Two major external factors pertaining to the dynamics of the political process negatively influenced the implementation of the project. The below sections

analyze the impacts on the project strategy and evaluates whether IOM's reaction was appropriate:

3.2.1 The under declaration of the number of GAM combatants during the Helsinki peace talks

One of the main difficulties encountered throughout project implementation is attributable to GAM's reluctance to turn over the names of 3,000 combatants to the government. Without this list of 3,000 names, IOM was not in the position to register the former combatants under the project since, as detailed in the project document and implied in the Memorandum of Understanding between GoI and GAM, reinsertion assistance to former combatants would require the identification and verification by GAM leadership of combatants eligible for project assistance. Any attempt to identify combatants excluding the GAM command structure, would have produced negative implications for the wider peace-process. The process of transformation of GAM from an armed insurgency organization to a legitimate political entity is a process that can only proceed at the pace set by GAM.

Despite its declaration, GAM's position has not only been a security issue, a concern that those persons would be targeted first if the agreement collapsed. GAM leadership argued that all of the combatants to be demobilized had escaped capture during the intensive military operations under martial law, beginning in May 2003. According to the analysis and reports of well informed observers of the peace process, such as International Crisis Group and interview with the Project staff, in fact, another compelling reason has been that the figure of 3,000 combatants stated in the Helsinki accords vastly underestimated the true numbers involved. It did not factor those involved in logistic support and 'civilian' roles such as 'GAM police' and administrators, nor did it take into account widows and other dependents of deceased GAM fighters or the many GAM members who surrendered or were captured during the military emergency of 2003-2005. Choosing 3,000 recipients was a genuine conundrum for GAM leadership. In addition to the 3,000 combatants mentioned in the agreement, GAM felt obliged to assist the many orphans and widows whose fathers and husbands perished in fighting for the movement. GAM planned to deduct money for them from the funds allocated to combatants. It became evident that GAM placed itself in a difficult position by making such low estimates during the peace discussions in Helsinki.

Another explanation as it emanated from reports from well informed observers of the peace process and captured in reports from the International Crisis Group, is that retaining control over the disbursement of funds was part of GAM's attempts at preserving its chain of command. GAM reportedly felt that if the Government or IOM distributed the funds directly to individual combatants without going through the organization's hierarchy, it would weaken its chain of command. This would in turn hamper GAM's efforts to recreate itself as a political movement.

In response to these developments pertaining to the political process, IOM was proactive in trying to identify solutions to secure access to the 3,000 combatant caseload. Working

within the parameters identified, and accepting the necessity to achieve the consent of the GAM hierarchy, IOM actively engaged the GAM leadership. This engagement was based upon the requirement to achieve consent for the identification of the combatants, and all interactions were focused upon disseminating information on the project benefits and seeking to define an agreeable plan for registration of the combatants.

In order to clarify the caseload, IOM also undertook a round of meetings throughout 2005 and the beginning of 2006. The project management team sought out and engaged with a number of GAM leaders, predominantly those engaged within the political transformation process. These meetings took the form of formal presentations at the IOM offices, presentations to groups of leading GAM personalities at the GAM offices and very informal gatherings. The purpose remained consistent, to ensure that all levels of GAM had a full and accurate understanding of the project benefits and IOM and GAM formulated a logistics plan for the registration of the combatants. Throughout these discussions two issues remained paramount for GAM: their concern that the identities of combatants should not be divulged to the GoI, and their insistence that the figure of 3,000 combatants was far too low. In reaction to these concerns IOM guaranteed a high degree of confidentiality concerning the identity of the project beneficiaries. Such guarantees were technically possible due to the development of the database, and the stringent data security protocols established. The guarantees were less sustainable politically. In relation to the GAM insistence that there were a much larger number of combatants than the politically stated 3,000, IOM agreed to discuss with donors and partners the issue of the low estimation, with the intent of gaining further funding in order that the total number of beneficiaries could be enlarged. To this end the GAM leadership sent a letter to the IOM programme, confirming that they intended to register their combatants for assistance with IOM, which also asked that the total number be increased (cf. Annex 4). This letter was received by IOM on 29 December 2005, and was widely distributed in efforts to achieve consensus on the issue of increasing the 3,000 limitation.

Reception of the letter was viewed by IOM as having established the first of its objectives, the consent of the GAM leadership had been achieved. Interaction with GAM over the following months focused upon establishing a logistics plan for the initial registration of 3,000 combatants. By the week commencing Monday 30th January, this plan was in place and had the agreement of the GAM political leadership, with registration to begin on Monday 06th February lasting for two weeks. The GAM interlocutors now insisted upon a final meeting, on Friday 03rd February, this time with 50 GAM - Tentara Nasional Aceh (TNA) combatant commanders. This meeting was held in Banda Aceh, the location disclosed to IOM hours before it began. The IOM project staff formally presented to the 50 commanders the benefits of the programme and the agreed upon logistic plan for registration. It should be noted that the GAM political leadership were present at the meeting, and this represented the first occasion that IOM had presented to the TNA military commanders.

A rapidly scheduled meeting was called by GAM over the weekend, involving representative of the GAM Sweden leadership, the Aceh political leadership and the TNA military commanders. IOM was informed at this meeting that the registration would have

to be delayed. Subsequent conversations with GAM revealed that the planned registration had highlighted contentious issues within GAM, concerning the disposition of ‘authority’.

Based on documentation review, interviews with officials and discussions with project staff, it seems that IOM was instrumental in assisting GoI and GAM to reach an agreement on the caseload and therefore contributing to the peace process continuity. It seems therefore that IOM’s reaction was adequate and demonstrated a sound understanding of the dynamics of the peace process. Because IOM managed to secure a broad access to the main stakeholders of the peace process with both the governmental and GAM, IOM was in a position to positively influence political discussions and, on several occasions, as evidenced above, a successful conclusion was close to be found thanks to these continued efforts. In view of fulfilling its obligations of accountability and transparency vis-à-vis the donor, and despite pressures from GAM and others, IOM rightly refused to provide reinsertion assistance to former combatants until GoI and GAM could reach agreement on the eligibility of beneficiaries. By doing so, IOM secured the integrity of the peace process implementation by not interfering negatively with it. It seems therefore that the inability to gain access to the 3,000 former combatant caseload cannot be attributed to any omission on the part of the organization.

3.2.2 Setting up of “competing” financial schemes in support of the implementation of the peace process by the GoI

Subsequent to the activities outlined above, the GoI’s decision to set up implementation mechanisms and financial schemes which were not originally foreseen at the time of project conception deeply modified the environment in which the project was being implemented. Parallel, reintegration schemes were created by the GoI, at a time when the implementation mechanism set up by the international community (in this case mainly IOM) were well advanced.

3.2.2.1 Disbursement of an initial reintegration package of IDR 1 million for former combatants by the Governor’s office

The Government announced an initial reintegration packages of IDR.1 million (about USD 100) a month for six months per returned combatant. Because of the unwillingness of the GAM to present a list of 3,000 combatants, the Government and GAM reached agreement at a 1 October 2006 meeting of the Commission on Security Arrangements (COSA). Instead of individual disbursements, they agreed that a sum would be paid to each of the GAM regional commanders based on the calculations of the numbers of fighters to be demobilized in his area. The commanders were responsible for distributing the money. Using this method, the Government made two rounds of payments to GAM, in October and November 2005. This GoI initiative contributed to alleviating the pressure which was mounting to quickly disperse reintegration funds to former combatants, which bought some time for the political process. Nevertheless, it had the negative consequence

of giving less traction to IOM's efforts to convince GAM to hand over the list of 3,000 combatants.

In addition, the EC supported by AMM saw a risk for double payment should IOM be in the position to disburse the reinsertion allowance foreseen in the framework of the project. A meeting took place at a high level in Jakarta between AMM, the EC and IOM. Despite the fact that all parties agreed that it was unlikely that, because of the disbursement method followed by the Government, all of the demobilized combatants would have received the foreseen allowance, it was agreed that IOM would not disburse any funds without the prior written consent of the EC (please see in Annex 6 the letter from IOM to the EC Ambassador dated 31 March 2006).

To avoid duplication and to address the issue of the higher number of combatants, IOM offered to provide assistance for another 3,000 former combatants and therefore contribute toward alleviating the problem of the under declaration of the true number of GAM former combatants. Although this idea initially had some traction with GAM, it has been through a number of revisions and did not materialize.

3.2.2.2 Creation of BRA and setting up of state run large scale financial schemes in support of the peace process

On 11 February 2006, the governor of Aceh created a body known as the Aceh Reintegration Agency (Badan Reintegrasi Aceh, BRA). It received a very large allocation from the State budget (overall USD 80 million spread as follows: IDR. 200 billion (about USD 20 million) allocated by the national planning agency, BAPPENAS, for fiscal year 2005 and IDR. 600 billion (about USD 60 million) for fiscal year 2006). BRA was mandated to organize the disbursement of financial support to three categories related to the implementation of the peace process: 3,000 combatants (as defined in the MoU), 1,985 political prisoners and 'affected civilians'. Reportedly, spurred as much by a desire to spend the balance before April (end of validity of the allocation from the 2005 fiscal year) as by the need to develop workable programs, the new agency hastily organized a scheme whereby two groups would receive immediate access to cash: former combatants and conflict victims, including members of anti-GAM fronts. For the ex-combatants, USD 2.5 million was budgeted for 'empowerment projects'. The envisaged disbursement mechanism proved to be unrealistic and did not satisfy the necessary transparency and accountability criteria required for such an operation. The GoI insisted in the end that a list of former combatants be produced by GAM to access this money. To-date, this disbursement has been stalled as BRA ran into the same difficulty as IOM: the refusal of GAM to hand over the list of demobilized combatants.

Overall, since its inception, BRA went through many changes and readjustments of its foreseen disbursement mechanisms and internal structures. The resignation of the Head of BRA and the political withdrawal of GAM from BRA are testimonies to some of the internal problems of this organization. The international community, among which the European Commission, has recognized the persistent weaknesses of BRA and since then started capacity building actions to support BRA.

The development of GoI plans for the delivery of the Bappenas Reintegration budget through BRA shifted the policy and institutional framework within which the IOM project operated. The establishment of BRA as the designated GoI body to oversee reintegration activities in Aceh resulted in the requirement for IOM to realign its activities. Through IOM's continued interaction with GAM leadership, there remained throughout the project duration a commitment on the side of the GAM leadership to direct the combatants to the ICRS offices to receive assistance when the process would allow it.

However, it became clear over time that IOM reinsertion assistance for former combatants was no longer necessary. Following a meeting of the Forum Bersama Advisory Board (FORBES) in Aceh on 16 May 2006, the issues surrounding the beneficiaries to be assisted within the IOM project, were finally clarified by the newly appointed Head of BRA. BRA requested that the IOM assistance to demobilized combatants be integrated within the BRA assistance, in a manner that foresaw IOM providing non-cash assistance to the ex-combatant caseload. These developments within the GoI mechanisms and strategy for delivering assistance to ex-combatants therefore rendered the reinsertion assistance component for former combatants within the IOM project redundant. In a letter dated 22 May 2006, IOM informed the EC that the funds allocated to the project for this activity would not be utilized.

Based on discussions with officials, documentation review and interview of project staff, it seems that throughout this process IOM was proactive in trying to identify solutions to enable the registration of the demobilized combatants within the project and proceed with the payment of the reinsertion allowance. IOM maintained very close contacts with all parties involved, at the government level in Jakarta, with BRA, the Office of the Governor, AMM and GAM. Despite all its efforts, access to the caseload could not be secured, with the consequence that the funds made available by the EC could not be used. This is particularly unfortunate considering that BRA has, to-date, not yet disbursed the reinsertion funds to the former combatants. The process remains stalled because of the continued unwillingness of GAM to provide a list of former combatants.

The difficulties encountered throughout this process points to the weaknesses in the peace accord between GAM and GoI which did not specify the procedure through which demobilization should take place. On 27th December 2005 GAM unilaterally announced that its troops were demobilized, apparently fulfilling its obligations under the peace agreement but without actually releasing any names.

As pointed out in this chapter, two main findings emerge from the evaluation of the project:

- The importance of planning and agreeing at peace negotiation stage on all details of the demobilization process cannot be overestimated in light of the difficulties faced in Aceh. This is a lesson that has to some degree been identified and learned within other context.
- The importance of careful and close coordination of efforts between the Government and the international community. The ability of all of the stakeholders and actors to support and encourage an evolving peace process requires that consensus of approach and articulating such an approach is required. Disparate competing activities combined with multiple uncoordinated communications with the government structures, results in wasted resources and ineffective interventions.

4.0 Project performance

This section analyzes in turn the performance of IOM in implementing the main objectives of the project, as well as its overall management.

4.1 ICRS offices set up, functioning and delivery

The project document describes five main areas of responsibility for the ICRS offices:

- Registration of former combatants
- Disseminating information and proactive community liaison
- Coordinating counseling and referral services
- Managing case files for target beneficiaries residing in that district
- Managing and coordinating the distribution of the reintegration assistance

The ICRS concept has been applied and tested by IOM in previous DRR operations in other countries. ICRS offices were conceived as the focal point for managing the implementation of the various components of the project as well as serving as community outreach points, making the link between the Individual and Community components of the DRR strategy (refer to the preceding chapter). As described in the project document, "they are the physical structures where beneficiaries converge to view and obtain information on issues pertaining to the peace process" and they "will provide continuity to longer term interventions which will evolve from the initial implementation phase". They were therefore one of the key components of this project. To what extent these expected results have materialized during project implementation is analyzed in this chapter.

4.1.1 Office set up process and locations

Of the 11 ICRS offices foreseen in the project document, 10 have been established within the timeframe of this project, with the final office being established shortly after the closure of this action. The administrative and managerial centre for these offices was located in Banda Aceh.

The locations of the ICRS offices were selected in accordance with the main areas of return of the demobilized combatants and released prisoners. They were established in Langsa, Lhokseumawe, Bireuen, Pidie, Aceh Besar, Meulaboh, Tapaktuan, Takengon, Kutacane and Calang. The map below shows the catchment areas of each of these offices.



Despite disparities in the number of districts covered by each office, taking into consideration the relatively even number of beneficiaries handled by each ICRS offices, population distribution and beneficiaries concentration, their location seems to be appropriate. This is of crucial importance as they are the physical structure where beneficiaries should converge and they should be therefore easily reachable.

Opening the ICRS offices was a relatively slow process at the initial stages of project implementation. The establishment of the ICRS offices should however not be viewed solely as logistics undertaking. The capacities of the offices rely exclusively upon the

capacities of the staff to operate and deliver the assistance; this required a great deal of time in training and building of individual and team capacities. If the four month extension had not been granted by the EC, the ICRS structure would have been incomplete and lacked the capacity to fulfill tasks and ensure the sustainability of the project. Not all offices would have been set up and staffed and essential training would have been incomplete.

Furthermore, only 10 out of 11 offices have been opened, within the project timeframe, with the final office being opened shortly after the completion of this action. According to the Project Manager, logistical difficulties aside, in particular, it proved very difficult to identify suitable premises in Calang which was severely affected by the Tsunami, the establishment of the final office was delayed in order to retain spare capacity to be deployed once the 3,000 ex-combatant caseload were identified. The distribution of the offices was based upon the locations of the 2,000 ex-prisoners, if the locations of the 3,000 ex-combatants proved to be markedly different the location of the final ICRS office would require a different solution. With the closure of the project and the non-identification of the ex-combatant caseload, the office was established in its original location. In Takengon the conflict dynamics, markedly different from the rest of the province, required the identification of alternative solutions.

In order to comply with GoI's expectations that DRR activities should retain a strong 'governmental face', IOM negotiated that the ICRS offices could be established within DINSOS premises. The intention was twofold: ensuring the Government's ownership on the reinsertion process, as well as ensuring the sustainability of the structure established. It was hoped that by locating IOM staff within DINSOS offices, cross-fertilization would take place among ICRS and DINSOS staff, ensuring DINSOS adherence and ownership of the reinsertion, and later reintegration, process. In addition to reinforcing DINSOS physical infrastructure and equipment, capacity building of DINSOS staff was an additional expected result. A Memorandum of Understanding was signed between IOM and DINSOS specifying the respective obligations of both parties.

Despite the validity of the project strategy, the implementation of the agreement proved difficult for several reasons. The first obstacle pertained to the allocation of suitable premises to IOM. Given the scarce resources of DINSOS at district level, in the majority of cases, premises proved to be too small and inadequate to accommodate the ICRS staff and to properly receive beneficiaries. Of particular concern was the lack of space given to the medical team based in each ICRS offices. Necessary privacy was in most cases not guaranteed to adequately receive and treat patients. Faced with this important constraint which hampered the effective operation of the ICRS offices, a decision was made by the Project Manager to move most ICRS offices out of the DINSOS premises and to set up parallel offices. Even though this decision was fully justified, this resulted in a shift from the original project strategy which is likely to have some consequences on the sustainability of the offices once financial support from donors' ends.

The second obstacle has been the lack of clear direction from the central DINSOS office at the province level to the DINSOS offices at district level. Interviews conducted during

the field visits revealed that district DINSOS staff had an imperfect, or weak, understanding of the nature of the partnership between IOM and DINSOS and the role of ICRS offices. The project management team tried to address this by organizing a bilateral workshop with DINSOS in Banda Aceh, gathering all heads of DINSOS at district level on February 08th 2006. The workshop disseminated information on the MoU signed between IOM and DINSOS and tackled some of the operational difficulties encountered in the office locations. Despite these efforts, important difficulties remained. It arose from the interviews with DINSOS staff conducted in one location during the evaluation that understanding and knowledge of ICRS offices mandate was weak. It evidenced a very poor transmission of information within DINSOS structures. These can be explained by the way in which Indonesian administrations function and the way in which instructions and information is insufficiently transmitted to field branches. This is further enhanced by poor capacity, both in terms of staffing and infrastructure. This is particularly worrying in view of the fact that DINSOS has received from the Government and BRA an important role for the disbursement of allowances to eligible beneficiaries

The third obstacle mentioned by the Head of DINSOS at province level, was related to jealousies which emerged between DINSOS and ICRS staff due to significant differentials in terms of equipment (cars, computers etc.) and seniority. In the specific Indonesian context, the head of DINSOS at district level sometimes found it difficult to work with ICRS coordinators who were younger than themselves. Also, contextual specific concerns voiced by district coordinators, related to their concerns around allowing DINSOS staff too much interaction with dispersal of cash assistance. Some ICRS staff felt that distance from the DINSOS staff would be a method of ensuring the incorruptibility of the assistance.

With some exceptions, such as in Langsa, the expected relationship between ICRS and district DINSOS offices did not come to fruition despite the strong relationship maintained throughout project implementation between the project management team and the Head of DINSOS in Banda Aceh and the efforts of ICRS offices to maintain a constant flow of information on their activities with their local DINSOS counterparts.

Despite the difficulties encountered with DINSOS, IOM's strategy to anchor delivery mechanisms developed by the international community with existing governmental structures remains valid and crucial to ensure sustainability. One of the recommendations which emerges from the evaluation is the need to include in the project strategy a strong capacity building component of the partner governmental institution in order to alleviate difficulties such as the ones which have been encountered in the framework of this project.

4.1.2 ICRS functioning

This section will examine the appropriateness of the premises, equipment and staffing level of the ICRS structure.

The evaluation team visited four offices in Langsa, Lhokseumawe, Sigli and Banda Aceh. Two out of four of these ICRS offices were located in DINSOS premises (Langsa and Sigli). In Langsa, premises were adequate, but were not so in Sigli. As a result, and in line with the comments above, the project manager informed the evaluation team that decision had already been made to move the office to another location. At the time of the evaluation mission, the office was in the process of relocation.

With the exception of Sigli, the ICRS offices were well set up, offering adequate space to receive beneficiaries. In each case, the medical team had a separate room, fully equipped with medical furniture, allowing the adequate reception and treatment of patients. Equipment was in place and fully functioning. Internet connections with the DRR central office in Banda Aceh had been recently upgraded which ensured an efficient functioning of the beneficiary database.

The ICRS staff interviewed confirmed that the equipment level was appropriate and that their working conditions were in line with the requirements of their duties. The only problem raised in all offices was insufficient means of transportation at their disposal to undertake efficient outreach, one of the central functions of ICRS offices. In addition to receiving beneficiaries, pro-active outreach in communities to contact beneficiaries and very importantly provide medical services appeared paramount for the ICRS offices to fulfill their task. Each ICRS office has only one car which is inadequate to allow efficient outreach. Thus, ICRS medical teams and outreach assistants needed to share the same car, which hampered their mobility and ability to deliver services as expected.

The staffing level in ICRS offices were in line with the contractual obligations. All planned positions were filled: each office had one office coordinator, two outreach assistants, one doctor, one nurse and one database assistant. In addition, each ICRS office had a security guard, which is of particular importance due to the sensitivity of the action. IOM succeeded in identifying well qualified staff for each of the identified positions. The table below indicates the staffing level of each ICRS office. Note however that not all of the below positions were funded under the EC project, but as well by additional funding raised by IOM to cover the subsequent reintegration phase following the initial reinsertion component covered by the EC funding³. This table is nevertheless interesting as it demonstrates the overall ICRS structure to which the EC funding contributed.

³ Funding was provided by the Japanese Government, the World Bank and the Government of Canada (for the latter two donors, this concerns only medical staff),

Current ICRS Staffing Structure

No	Office	Staff					Number of Clients
		Reintegration	Medical	Community	Support	Total	
1	DRR Headquarter	4	11	5	12	32	0
2	Langsa	4	2	1	1	8	397
3	Lhokseumawe	4	2	2	3	11	353
4	Bireuen	3	2	2	4	11	351
5	Pidie	4	2	2	1	9	223
6	Aceh Besar	4	2	0	4	10	213
7	Calang	1	0	0	0	1	to be opened soon
8	Meulaboh	4	2	1	4	11	156
9	Tapaktuan	3	2	2	4	11	237
10	Takengon	3	2	2	6	13	65
11	Kutacane	3	2	1	4	10	42
Total staff		37	29	18	43	127	2037

The ICRS staff interviewed reported that they were generally satisfied with the training they had received and felt that they were given the appropriate tools to successfully conduct their activities. Of particular interest was that staff had very clear ideas regarding additional training they would like to receive, thus demonstrating their understanding of their roles and responsibilities as well as of the tools they needed to improve delivery.

Administrative and managerial support received from the central DRRR office in Banda Aceh was adequate according to the ICRS staff interviewed. Control mechanisms were in place. Generally, the ICRS staff were satisfied with the flow of information coming from the central DRR office in Banda Aceh, particularly regarding contextual information on the overall advancement of the peace process and information on the evolution of the planning and activities of BRA. This is of particular importance given that, for amnestied prisoners, former combatants but also for the wider community, the ICRS offices represented the only source of information available. This is crucial given the inability of BRA to communicate clearly on the activities and reintegration schemes available. The

communication structure and ICRS offices themselves thus contributed toward alleviating the impatience created by the late delivery of financial support promised by the GoI.

Overall, it appears from the field visit and interviews with ICRS staff that the set up and functioning of the ICRS offices were in line with expected targets. The objective to establish a strong backbone to deliver reintegration services to beneficiaries for the medium to longer terms was achieved.

4.1.3 Performance of ICRS in delivering expected services

Because the ICRS offices were the implementation arm of the project, their performance was crucial to ensuring the overall success of the project. The evaluation team paid particular attention to the visibility of the offices towards the beneficiaries and the communities, reviewed their outreach strategy as well as their ability to manage individual beneficiary cases.

The numbers of visitors in ICRS offices is an indicator of their visibility and outreach capacity. Each office set up a registry book. On average, 10 persons per day visited ICRS offices, either to access information on the overall reintegration process, to access medical services or to follow up on their individual reintegration assistance. Although interviewed beneficiaries declared their overall satisfaction with the services received from the ICRS offices, focus group discussions revealed that some had an unclear idea of the type of services they could expect to receive from ICRS offices, particularly regarding access to medical services. This suggests the need for a clearer communication strategy on the mandate of the offices.

The majority of visitors were amnestied prisoners and their family members, and, to a lesser extent, demobilized combatants and members of conflict affected communities. This reflects the fact that the project could only gain access to the caseload of released prisoners. However, it is also an indication that the ambition of the project to establish ICRS offices as the place where "people in the community can come together and act as grass-root networks that bridge information gaps and harness community members with a strategy to organize and mobilize themselves to meet their needs" has not been fully met. Looking at the project document, the way the ICRS offices were supposed to fulfill this role was not fully thought through at the project conceptual phase. The role foreseen for the ICRS offices has not materialized in terms of creating a link with the communities where demobilized combatants and amnestied prisoners returned. This could be partially attributed to the fact that the way the ICRS offices would be operating was insufficiently described and developed at the project concept phase. Their mission and mandate was appropriately described, but their concrete modes of operation were not elaborated. This left a vacuum which had repercussions during project implementation.

A related difficulty has been the lack of a clear strategy to publicize the existence of the ICRS offices. It was originally intended that visibility of ICRS offices was falling under

DINSOS' responsibility, providing ICRS offices were located in DINSOS premises. But after the relocation of ICRS offices in separate premises, no streamlined visibility strategy was thought through. Each ICRS office seems to have developed its own practices, not having received clear instructions nor unified information tools. In most cases, strategies have been set up on an ad-hoc basis, which failed to deliver convincing results. Nevertheless, as pointed out by the Project Manager, there was a compelling rationale to let ICRS offices evaluate the degree of visibility they wished to give to their office given the pressing security issues and specific conflict dynamics in which they operate. To illustrate this difficult environment, it should be noted that on several occasions, ICRS offices were visited by members of the police force trying to gain access to information contained in the beneficiary database.

Finally, the management of individual cases seems to be fully in line with the expected results, during the initial reinsertion stage. The database is in place and fully functioning in each office. Outreach assistants in charge of individual case management displayed a strong understanding of their duties and procedures to be followed to complete their tasks. Despite mobility issues outlined above, outreach to beneficiaries within their communities is taking place and organized in a systematic manner. ICRS offices are therefore fulfilling their role in this respect.

Overall, the project has been successful in setting up a strong functioning network of offices. Important difficulties were nevertheless encountered: initial delays in the establishment of some ICRS offices, weak link with DINSOS and visibility issues. Despite these problems, the overall performance of the ICRS offices is satisfactory in as much as beneficiaries are being adequately and timely assisted. This crucial aspect of the project has been overall successfully implemented.

It emerges from this evaluation that IOM ICRS concept applied to Aceh has proven its validity as a critical component to assist in the smooth transition between the demobilization phase and the start of the reintegration phase and as a powerful tool for an effective socio-economic reintegration process. Well trained local staff as well as good information flow between the central DRR team and the ICRS offices is key to ensure the overall coherence of the backbone structure created. The importance of better anchoring the ICRS structure within its environment, particularly vis-à-vis the communities, through more streamlined visibility measures is one of the recommendations of this report.

4.2 Information and socialization campaign

In support of the implementation of the peace process, actions were requested to socialize the content of the MoU to the wider population of Aceh. This was one of the three priority areas identified by the GoI in its 'Proposal to for Supporting Priority Programmes following the RI-GAM Peace Agreement'. The main objective as defined in the project document was to provide explanations on how the concluded agreement "differed from the failed 2002 agreement" and to educate the various target groups "about the details of the agreement and its implications". The activity was to be implemented in close liaison

with the AMM, Kecamatan Development Program (KDP) and local culture/media experts in view of launching a culturally sensitive multi-faceted communication campaign.

Several target groups were identified:

- GAM amnestied prisoners
- GAM former combatants
- Host communities
- The general public

The expected results were the following;

- Production and distribution of 5,000 basic information brochures
- Production and distribution of 5,000 copies of the MoU
- Production and distribution of 30,000 posters and information pamphlets through ICRS offices, public offices, schools and religious centres
- Production of five 15 to 30 second Public Service Announcements (PSA) to be broadcast on local radio and TV (to broadcast at least 25 times, of which at least 50% during prime time)
- E-Forum, SMS services and mail box for public participation
- Setting up of an hotline to answer questions from the general public
- Partnership with religious authorities
- Organization of performing arts
- Development of information material for school students
- Community and public fora discussions in partnership with KDP
- Provision of conflict resolution training to KDP facilitators

This component of the project was very ambitious given the long list of activities to be implemented in a relatively short time frame (initially six months). The planned strategy and related activities were generally consistent with the needs and Aceh-specific context. Nevertheless, the activities were not adequately budgeted, which led to some necessary readjustments. Furthermore not enough attention was paid to the production of information material in the Acehnese language, which diminished the impact of the information campaign. Finally, the planned strategy failed to include the evaluation mechanisms necessary to measure the appropriateness and impact of the information material and activities. This would certainly have facilitated the readjustment of the strategy throughout project implementation and enabled a more accurate measurement of the impact. At the evaluation stage, these missing monitoring and evaluation tools made it very difficult to measure the performance of this component of the project.

4.2.1 Adjustments brought to the information campaigns

This component of the project witnessed a series of adjustments made throughout project implementation. Most of these proved to be positive and helped to alleviate some of the weaknesses of the project conceptual phase. These adjustments were rendered even more

necessary because, shortly after the signing of the peace agreement, the Government and GAM agreed to establish a joint team for information and socialization of the peace process in Aceh. The mandate of this '*Team Sosialisasi*' was to provide relevant information and respond to questions on the peace progress to/from a wide audience, including former GAM, local police and military as well as the general public. A further objective was to answer questions about unclear points in the Helsinki MoU. The international community organized itself to support the GoI initiative. IOM, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the World Bank, AMM, United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and United States Agency for International Development (USAID), formed a working group to assist "*Team Sosialisasi*" to disseminate all types of information related to the peace process. This working group has been meeting on a weekly basis since the beginning of September 2005 and agreed upon division of tasks in support of the socialization of the peace process.

The establishment of this working group forced IOM to revise and redirect some of its planned activities to avoid duplication and reinforce the action of the '*Team Sosialisasi*' as a whole. The flexibility demonstrated by the Project Manager on this component of the project was therefore fully justified. Furthermore '*Team Sosialisasi*' has been cited by most parties interviewed during the evaluation as a model, and, unfortunately, the only time during this period, where the international community, GAM and the Government worked closely together.

Based on coordination between the different 'socialization' actors discussed above, IOM implemented new activities, while other activities originally foreseen in the project document were no longer considered relevant or needed adjustment.

4.2.2 Activities undertaken and impact

- Instead of 5,000 copies, IOM printed 200,000 copies of the MoU in both English and Bahasa Indonesia which were distributed province-wide through a variety of different methods. The AMM, which had office presence in eleven districts has distributed the booklets through its field monitors. The World Bank's Kecamatan Development Project, UNDP and United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), three close partners of IOM, cumulatively distributed further copies through their network of contacts to the sub-district and village level. The Government's Information Department provided copies to their district-level socialization teams, and GAM's information committee disseminated another 10,000 into areas that would otherwise be inaccessible to conventional distribution strategies. GAM returned to IOM to seek a further 5,000 copies, which have been provided. Copies of the MoU have also been provided to amnestied political prisoners and through the ICRS offices. As indicated by the number of printed copies, the MoU proved very popular and constituted one the strengths of the information campaign. It is a shame nevertheless that the MoU was only printed in Bahasa Indonesia and in English. The outreach of this key document could have been higher if it had also been printed in Acehnese.

- IOM developed four Radio Public Service Announcements (PSA) in Bahasa Indonesia and Acehnese, distributed through 26 radio stations where they were aired on a rotating basis five times per day for a one-month period in January and February. The content of the PSA was approved by both GAM and GoI. The PSA carried three types of messages: the MoU from the perspective of Acehnese women; the points in the MoU and the MoU from the perspective of youth. Given that the PSA was largely coordinated and produced in Acehnese, this assured its appropriateness. However, no instruments were established to measure the impact of the PSA.
- IOM supported the GAM socialization committee in providing running cost support and equipment to facilitate GAM participation in the socialization process. With this support they were able to establish an office in the offices of InfoKom, the Government's regional Media and Public Information Department, as well as secure transportation and accommodation. This activity was not originally foreseen but was overall key to securing the participation of GAM in the information campaign.
- IOM regularly advertised the activities of the Government of Indonesia with regard to the implementation of the MoU. This was done through the influential local newspaper "Serambi" on a regular basis. The newspaper's advertisement was planned to be included every Saturday, however 'Team Sosialisasi' did not have the capacity to use this advertising opportunity on a weekly basis.
- UNDP requested IOM to distribute 5,000 radios to amnestied prisoners and demobilized combatants through the ICRS offices. Two thousand were distributed to amnestied prisoners, with the remaining 3,000 to be distributed to ex-combatants at a later stage when they will register at the ICRS offices. This activity was not paid directly by the EC project, but contributed to facilitate the access of the target group to information disseminated through the radio in the framework of the information campaign. This was a particularly welcomed activity given the low level of readership and limited access to TV in Aceh.
- As planned at the project conception phase, IOM used story tellers, a very popular but dying tradition in Aceh, as a way to disseminate information at the village level. A famous young story teller, who is working to maintain this tradition was identified. He carried out his performances with the help of an artist community, in 40 villages in five districts. These activities were an excellent vehicle for the socialization process of MoU and encouraged people to support peace, reconciliation and recovery in post conflict Aceh. In each district they visited, the storyteller incorporated some local issues related to district-specific problems. In addition, a film on this activity is currently being produced for broadcast on national Indonesian channels.
- As planned at the project conception phase, conflict resolution training was conducted. It was thought that tensions and derisive actions may arise, particularly at the grass-roots community level, when discussing the peace building process and the activity proved to be particularly useful. It was recognized as being important that those conducting open fora or information

campaigns were prepared to redress stress and aggressive behaviour that they may encounter. Between 7 and 10 March, IOM conducted a conflict resolution training facilitated by Ichsan Malik for KDP facilitators and the ICRS staff.

Despite important deviations from the originally anticipated activities, the overall coherence and performance of the information and socialization component of the project is satisfactory. IOM could rely on its strong Media and Information Unit operating from Banda Aceh. That this component was implemented in full partnership with the major players of the international community as well as with GAM and the GoI is particularly noteworthy.

The extent to which the information campaign impacted each of the target groups is however difficult to measure. Amnestied prisoners interviewed during the focus discussions displayed a certain understanding of the provisions in the MoU. It can be understood that demobilized combatants, the other group closely associated with the peace process, would have a comparable level of comprehension. How much this applies to the Acehnese general public is unknown. Various interlocutors met during the course of the evaluation lamented that the scope of the socialization activities undertaken in the framework of the Helsinki peace process was less comprehensive than during the COHA. This is largely due to the fact that financial means made available were less. Interviews made within remote communities showed that beyond the well-informed population of Banda Aceh, members of the public had no precise understanding of the content of the MoU. This perception needs to be further substantiated, but the lack of adequate evaluation mechanisms makes this impossible.

IOM's ability to refocus the planned information activities to fully integrate it within the strong and innovative delivery mechanism '*Team Sosialisasi*' was one of the strengths of the project management. It is nevertheless recommended that any information campaign has a monitoring mechanism in order to measure impact and redirect activities as needed. This should be adequately budgeted for.

4.3 Orderly disbursement of reinsertion packages

Recognizing that demobilized combatants and amnestied prisoners may have little or no financial or material resources available with which to start their new civilian lives, IOM conceived a 'transitional reintegration package', with distribution managed by IOM. In addition, IOM would provide transportation assistance for individuals to their places of origin. This is the first activity which was implemented immediately after project inception. For the reasons already developed in this report, only the released prisoners case load could be assisted under this activity. As recognized by the beneficiaries themselves as well as by the main stakeholders, it seems to be one of the best managed activities of the project.

4.3.1 Organization and performance of the disbursement process

Over a three day period (28 to 31 August 2005), the registration of beneficiaries took place. Some 941 amnestied beneficiaries (including 13 minors and 20 females) in 10 locations in Aceh, and 460 beneficiaries (including one minor, but no females) in four locations in Java were met immediately upon release from prison. All 1,401 political prisoners released voluntarily participated in the IOM-managed reinsertion process which provided for the prisoner and his/her family's immediate and short-term needs. As described in the project document, assistance included provision of a medical examination, the first of three cash payments (IDR 2.000.000), a basket of items including food, clothing and hygiene tools, an ID card to claim future benefits, and transportation back to the district of the prisoner's choice.

Amnestied prisoners released from Java were flown to Jakarta where they connected to flights departing to either Medan or Banda Aceh. From there, they were transported and escorted by bus to their home districts. Amnestied prisoners located in Aceh were transported by bus to their villages.

In addition, a number of political prisoners eligible for reinsertion assistance were released on Indonesian Independence Day, two weeks prior to the general amnesty. IOM, together with the GoI, identified those people eligible, and prepared a plan offering them assistance, which was covered under the budget for the reinsertion of 2,000 amnestied prisoners. This list with a total of 298 names was received by IOM on 15 October 2005, with a further 170 names later added by GoI, creating a total of 468 additional amnestied/remitted prisoners. Assistance to remitted political prisoners was provided to all through the IOM ICRS offices during the week 12 to 16 December 2005 and from February until June 2006. The involvement of the DINSOS personnel varied between office locations, with some having no involvement, with other seconding staff to assist. The two factors predominantly defining the differences in involvement were the perceived security threats that the DINSOS staff associated with being seen to assist GAM personnel, and the comfort levels of ICRC staff of DINSOS personnel being involved in a cash dispersal.

Special case:

- Early January 2006, IOM received a request from GAM to register 150 released political prisoners additional to the list agreed by GoI. They were processed and provided with assistance on 18 and 19 January 2006.
- In mid-April, IOM received news that 12 political prisoners (amnestied but remaining in prison due to involvement in other (criminal) cases) would be released from Tanjung Kusta Penitentiary on 19 April 2006 in Medan. They were processed and provided with assistance on the same day.
- in mid-May, IOM received news that five GAM prisoners who were released from prison in Thailand would be returning to Indonesia via Medan. A team from Banda Aceh met them in Medan, processed them and provide them with assistance on 18 May 2006.

In total, the caseload of amnestied prisoners assisted by IOM totaled 2,037 beneficiaries, including 16 minors and 28 females. Close coordination was maintained throughout the process with UNICEF to cater for the specific needs of minors.

Overall, this activity was implemented by IOM with professionalism. The widely disbursed locations of released prisoners sometimes created difficulties in referring them to the right ICRS office for subsequent payments. Nevertheless, all witnesses to this process emphasized the orderly and swift manner in which the operation was conducted. IOM proved able to provide adequate logistical support, to mobilize staff and set up a major operation in several locations concurrently at very short notice. It is certainly one of the major accomplishments of this project.

Subsequent disbursement of the remaining two tranches of the cash allowance was made from the relevant ICRS offices. Amnestied prisoners were informed through the press of the dates on which they needed to present themselves at their ICRS office, which took place the first week of December 2005 and the third week of January 2006, respectively. Initially it was foreseen that the instalments would be transferred to individual bank accounts at the district Bank Republic Indonesia (BRI) branch, upon reporting to the ICRS office. However most target beneficiaries did not have bank accounts and were still reluctant to handover identification, where they still possessed any identification. The management team decided to proceed with cash payments instead. Upon presentation at the ICRS offices, where their identification was verified utilizing the database, amnestied prisoners were issued a voucher for the relevant tranche payment to be cashed at the local BRI bank, where an ICRS officer was present to facilitate, witness and verify the payment.

Overall, successive tranche payments were implemented with the same level of professionalism experienced during the initial release. Rare attempts of fraud were detected by the ICRS staff thanks to the identification mechanism and registration in the database. That successive payments required amnestied prisoners to come to the ICRS offices was a positive strategy as it enabled the beneficiaries to become familiar with the ICRS locations and obtain more information on subsequent reintegration services they could receive. The intention was to secure the continuity between the initial reinsertion phase and the longer term reintegration. However, focus group discussions revealed that not all amnestied prisoners who went through the process had a clear understanding of the role of ICRS offices. This suggests that ICRS staff may not have provided sufficient information to all beneficiaries. The large number of people processed in a very short amount of time certainly accounts for this situation. It is nevertheless a missed opportunity which subsequently generated much work for the outreach ICRS staff to explain available ICRS services.

The ICRS delivery mechanism has therefore proven its efficiency and capability of delivering reinsertion services/payments to beneficiaries in a transparent and accountable manner. It is very encouraging that BRA approached IOM to use this established infrastructure, located in governmental premises, to disburse the allowances coming from the state budget for amnestied prisoners.

4.3.2 Composition, appropriateness and impact of the transitional reintegration package


As pointed out earlier in the report, IOM carefully conceived the content of the transitional reintegration package based on the information collected through the Need and Aspiration Assessment of GAM Political Prisoners conducted between 9 and 14 August 2005 in 47 prisons, as well as the review of the findings of the World Bank report conflict assessment survey. It was determined that it would consist of a material goods valued at USD 1,000 and a cash stipendium of USD 500 to be paid in three installments. At the time of conception, it was believed that this amount of money would be enough to cover living expenditures for six months.

Material goods distributed to individuals consisted of the following items:

2 pairs of trousers	1 pair of shoes
2 shirts	1 batik
2 pairs of underwear	2 towels
2 pairs of socks	1 hat
1 handkerchief	1 small travel bag
1 head covering (only for women)	sanitary items (only for women)
Toiletry Kit (soap, shampoo, toothbrush, toothpaste, comb, shaving kit)	
Small food items	
Newspaper	

When asked during focus group discussions, all the released prisoners interviewed declared that they were very satisfied with the content of the reintegration package. Items distributed were judged appropriate and in need upon their release from prison. Regarding the amount of money, no one complained that it was too little. Nevertheless, the assumption that it would be sufficient to cover living expenses over a six-month period proved to be incorrect. In conjunction with Harvard Medical School, IOM conducted a very interesting cash-use survey in order to measure the usage and impact of the reinsertion package. One thousand seven hundred and ten beneficiaries were surveyed by questionnaire. The main findings are the following:

Was the cash provided helpful in helping you return to your community?



An overwhelming majority responded favorably to this question.

The second question was related to the use of the cash they received.

Expenditure Category	Number of Respondents	% of Sample*
Housing (Rental or Repair)	219	12.8%
Farming	299	17.5%
Business Investment	472	27.6%
Paying Back Loans or Debts	881	51.5%
Transportation (purchase or repair of vehicle or motorbike)	119	7%
Food	758	44.3%
Medical Care (self)	386	22.6%
Medical Care (family)	160	9.4%
Gifts or Loans to Family or Friends	210	12.3%
Education (school fees, school supplies) for self or others	242	14.2%
Religious Expenditures	113	6.6%
Community Projects, Ceremonies	87	5.1%
Other	120	7.0%

* Note that the percentages do not add up to 100% because respondents were free to choose more than one category.

More than half the sample used at least a little of their money for paying back loans or debts, 44.3% used their money for food, and significant amounts of money were also spent on housing and medical care, suggesting that the transitional cash allowance was very helpful for amnestied prisoners to smooth the reinsertion process into their communities. Significant amounts of money were also spent on farming, business investment, and education, suggesting that the money was used for more than just transitional reinsertion assistance, but also applied toward building sustainable futures. This is a particularly interesting finding as it demonstrates that it went beyond what was

originally foreseen at the project conception phase. This was confirmed during the focus group discussions conducted during the evaluation as a number of beneficiaries mentioned that they had used the money to restart their former livelihood or to start a new one. In one case, a beneficiary declared that the amount of money had been pooled common with other assisted amnestied prisoners to jump start a joint business. The initial reinsertion has therefore spilled over into longer term reintegration.

Such a positive outcome was unfortunately not possible for an important number of amnestied prisoners who had to re-pay debts upon release from prison. More than half the sample used at least a little of their money for paying back loans or debts. This is testimony that they had to borrow money in order to improve their living conditions while in prison, support their families or to cover expenditures accrued during their trial.

The table below places the relevant categories against the anticipated uses of the transitional reinsertion allowance, as conceptualized during the project conception phase. The amount used for food and household effects, correlates most closely with the original projections. **Almost three times the amount was spent on health than was predicted, and almost five times the amount was spent by beneficiaries on education than was predicted.**

ITEM	% Anticipated	% Actual
Food	50	44.3
Shelter	24	12.8
Health	11	32
Education	3	14.2
Household Effects	12	3.5

Overall, beneficiaries interviewed during focus group discussions declared being reasonably hopeful about their future, slowly resuming a normal life and going back to or initiating family ties. When asked about their confidence level about the peace process, answers were generally hopeful. They all declared that they wanted to return to a normal life and said that the assistance provided by IOM to do so was very useful. That the caseload of demobilized combatants could not be assisted is unfortunate as their inclusion in this process would have contributed to creating a favourable environment for longer term peace in Aceh.

Careful design of the content of the transitional reintegration package through the conduction of preliminary research on the needs of beneficiaries as well as monitoring of cash stipendium usage after disbursement are two good practices developed by IOM in the framework of this project. It is recommended that the results of the cash-use survey be taken into account while planning the successive longer term reintegration phase in order to adjust intended services.

4.4 Conduction of General Health Assessment

Recognising that most former combatants and amnestied prisoners did not routinely seek health care assistance and noting the tendency toward the malnourishment of former combatants and amnestied prisoners as well as the psychological impact of years of stress and trauma associated with the on-going conflict, IOM included in the project strategy a General Health Assessment. IOM rightly recognized that, if left undetected, health and mental problems would inhibit the ability of beneficiaries to resume civilian life. In a context of extreme defiance of demobilized combatants and amnestied prisoners vis-à-vis the governmental health services and isolation from national social security, this component of the project proved very important and useful.

4.4.1 Description of procedures implemented and overall performance

In order to conduct the general health and mental health assessments at the initial point of release, 14 medical teams were deployed to cover the 1,401 amnestied prisoners in 14 prison locations (four in Java and 10 in Aceh province). Each medical team consisted of one medical team leader, two medical doctors, three nurses and one mental health specialist or a General Practitioner with some mental health background. In total, 98 medical staff were involved throughout the process, assisted by support staff. The medical screening included actual physical examination, counselling sessions on sexually transmitted diseases including HIV/AIDS, testing on tuberculosis and malaria, laboratory screening for malaria and syphilis (voluntary, with informed consent), and mental and psychosocial assessments using the Hamilton Scale for anxiety and depression, inclusive of a self-evaluation test. Additionally, IOM staff provided medical treatment for simple, treatable medical conditions on site, as well as multivitamins, and de-worming (for intestinal parasitism) medications. Upon completion of medical documentation, a health referral process was initiated where referral letters were handed out to amnestied prisoners as appropriate.

As for the disbursement of the reinsertion package, IOM's ability to set up and deploy medical teams at short notice deserves to be underlined. All prisoners went through the medical screening process. IOM's medical team had to operate under significant time pressure as most amnestied prisoners were impatient to leave the prisons.

However the anticipated time spent with individual beneficiaries did not materialize. The project document included the provision of a two hour health education session on HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and Sexually Transmitted Diseases which did not take place. Given the conditions of the release, it was unrealistic to assume that so much time could be spent with individual amnestied prisoners. This project objective was only partially met through the distribution of information leaflets on HIV/AIDS. Despite the use of the Hamilton Scale, it is also doubtful that mental health conditions could be appropriately assessed on this occasion.

Subsequent medical screenings were made available during the second and third disbursements of the cash allowance in ICRS offices. It should be noted that not all

registered amnestied prisoners agreed to undergo the voluntary General Health Assessment at the ICRS; thus the number of beneficiaries of this component is slightly lower than those who received the reintegration assistance from IOM. Ninety-two percent of the 2,037 demobilized amnestied prisoners underwent the health assessment package. This figure rather contradicts the impression given during the focus group discussions that not all beneficiaries were aware of the medical services available in ICRS offices.

In addition to general health assessments and referral services made available on the above mentioned occasions, and in line with its contractual obligations, IOM permanently established within each ICRS Office a medical unit staffed with one medical doctor and one nurse. In addition to their initial General Health Assessment during the registration process, a total of 1,186 amnestied prisoners returned for follow-up medical and further treatment during the second and third payment of their re-insertion package. In this follow-up assessment, the medical records of the beneficiaries were up-dated and their medical conditions addressed.

All individual medical information gathered during throughout project implementation has been kept within a separate section of the database, only accessible to the medical staff to secure the necessary confidentiality of medical information. The following information emerged from the medical data collected:

The overall physical and mental health status of the 1,879 amnestied prisoners was fairly good. Forty-two percent (785) presented normal physical examinations and 58% (1,094) had medical conditions and were provided with medical treatment. Of the 1,094 amnestied prisoners who had medical conditions, 24% (258) of the amnestied prisoners needed referrals to an existing health facility for further medical evaluation and/or treatment. Of the 258 amnestied prisoners referred for further medical evaluation and/or treatment, six were referred for mental health problems and 252 patients were referred for either medical or surgical treatment. The gender distribution of demobilized amnestied prisoners examined shows that 98.5% of those who availed of the services were male and 1.5% were female.

Statistics from the medical database confirm the need for such medical support in DDRR projects, as also underlined in the following section’.

4.4.2 General assessment of IOM medical procedures

The data accumulated during the medical examination allowed IOM to acquire an accurate picture of the medical conditions of amnestied prisoners and to therefore set up appropriate remedial actions. This data is particularly useful to plan and anticipate medical conditions likely to be found in similar processes to be undertaken in other countries.

Of particular importance was the medical referral service which has proved to be pivotal to re-engage amnestied prisoners with government health services. It contributed to

restore the link on both sides and alleviate the problem of mistrust identified at the beginning of project implementation. A correlated activity which has been praised both by beneficiaries as well as by the medical staff working in local puskesmas and district hospitals interviewed during the evaluation has been the support provided to restore the normal medical referral process within government health services. IOM facilitated the registration of amnestied prisoners with the national health insurance, allowing them to restore their rights and access to medical services. In addition, IOM played an important role in referring patients to the local puskesmas instead of directly to district hospital, therefore contributing to restore the integrity of the referral mechanism established by the Ministry of Health. Through its privileged links with the health authorities at the national, provincial, district and local levels built into the framework of its overall recovery activities in Aceh following the tsunami, IOM adequately informed relevant health interlocutors about its activities which was greatly appreciated, as evidenced during the interviews conducted during the evaluation. IOM also cooperated closely with AMM in this specific field.

- Based on these positive results, IOM subsequently developed relevant actions and included a specific medical component in its overarching strategy, making the link between the assistance provided to individuals as defined in the MoU, but as well to the wider conflict-affected communities. IOM, through its interaction with beneficiaries and their community, and in addition to its findings from the health assessment, generated many lessons learned and experiences that were utilized in developing projects that addressed the health needs of the targeted beneficiaries and their community.

The provision of health services acted as a confidence builder with the beneficiaries and GAM in general, which requested that IOM provides medical services to demobilized combatants identified by them. The medical component therefore gave traction to IOM's attempts to secure access to the former combatant caseload. It is one of the strengths of the project strategy and one of the good practices developed in the framework of this project.

4.5 Establishment of a case-management database

The fifth and last activity of the project was the establishment of a case-management database which would constitute the repository of the data captured during the registration of amnestied prisoners. The objective was to eventually integrate registration data with other data collected to generate socio-economic and demographic profile reports that would serve to identify and match the needs of amnestied prisoners and demobilized combatants with training, employment and other existing income generating opportunities. This database was therefore conceived as the foundation and main working tool for the subsequent reintegration phase, hence its crucial importance. Despite a slow start and a shift in the technical platform used in October 2005, IOM's delivery has been in line with the expected results.

A Microsoft Access database was established early in the project. The initial information captured was essentially bio-data related. An international staff member with expertise in information technology and specifically databases joined the program in a consultative capacity in October 2005. As a result and following some further analysis of requirements, a new database was established using the Database Management System (DBMS) product, My Structured Query Language (MySQL). A web-based front-end to the new database was developed to facilitate use via a wide area network for program operatives in the field. Functionality of the database was extended to encompass caseloading of beneficiaries which included capturing the following:

- Details of job vacancies and training opportunities identified as suitable for beneficiaries.
- Referral and placement outcomes in respect of employment and training.
- Case notes covering all interaction with beneficiaries and service providers.
- Substantive details of service providers including enterprise profiles.
- Details of projects established for single or groups of beneficiaries.
- Recording of all payments made to or on behalf of beneficiaries.
- Substantial medical database of beneficiaries to support field medical staff.

The database structure was fully appropriate and in line with anticipated outputs. It remains a powerful tool to track and facilitate the reintegration process of beneficiaries.

To enable each ICRS office to be connected to the database, a wide area data communications network (WAN) was established through a national service provider. This provided satellite links from each of the district offices serving the program back to the central server based at the IOM office in Banda Aceh. This server was built and is maintained by program staff.

After the initial launch of the network, problems were experienced with the speed of data transmission, and a number of actions were undertaken to remedy this. These included upgrading the network bandwidth from 64Kbps to 128Kbps and some application tuning.

Access to the database is limited to only two persons in each ICRS office, the ICRS coordinator and the database assistant. It is protected by a password. This security measure is fully justified given the sensitivity of the data captured. As mentioned, individual police officers have been to some of the ICRS offices and requested access to the database. These attempts were successfully rejected but it serves to demonstrate the sensitivity of the data captured and the importance of sound security measures.

During field visits to four ICRS offices, the evaluation team systematically checked the functioning of the database and the ability of the database assistants to operate it. With the exception of the ICRS office in Sigli, the speed of the connection was good, enabling efficient use of the database. Database assistants displayed a high level of competence and a good command of the different functionalities of the database. The fact that the database assistants job profile is not only to operate the database, but also to provide

reintegration counseling to beneficiaries was particularly appreciated by the evaluation team. Two of the four database assistants interviewed expressed their desire to receive further training in small business creation to strengthen their counseling skills. The evaluators encourage the project management team to undertake further training measures in this respect.

Of particular interest is as well IOM's recent initiative to link the different components of the DRR program within one database. The component of the overarching IOM DRR program⁴ - aimed at assisting villages to which amnestied prisoners and demobilized combatants return with immediate peace dividends - has been recently developed. Information on targeted villages and a range of monitoring information with regard to the villages and the specific proposals and projects undertaken can now be gathered. This is a particularly welcome initiative as it will enable IOM to collect extremely valuable data and to adequately inform donors.

The DRR database is also to be incorporated within a wider Management Information System serving the needs of all IOM programs being delivered with Aceh and Nias. This database is setting a standard for future operations and the move away from the use of standalone databases and spreadsheets to one in which an integrated view of operations can be taken at all levels of management within IOM Indonesia's purview.

Despite this overall positive picture, the medical component of the database is still lagging behind. Medical teams in ICRS offices cannot enter the data on line and it needs to take place remotely from Banda Aceh. This has created delays in the analysis of the medical data. Given their crucial importance, it is recommended that IOM address this problem swiftly.

4.6 Overall management of the project

This section analyzes the different aspects of project management to evaluate its overall performance: interaction with partners and donor, management of the ICRS offices including flow of information within the implementation team and quality of the reporting.

As evidenced on several occasions in this report, IOM has from the very inception of the project maintained a participative and inclusive approach towards the project with regards to implementing partners, donor and other interested parties. During the initial project design, the EC was closely involved in the drafting of the project document. Faced with the difficulty to access the caseload of demobilized combatants, IOM fully engaged itself in continuous discussions with the main parties engaged, particularly the Government at the central and local level, GAM as well as the international community involved in the implementation of the peace process. Thanks to its well established presence in the country and existing privileged relationship with the Government, the

⁴ Projects funded by USAID, UNDP and the EC under the Uprooted People budget line 'Livelihood support in Conflict Affected Communities in Aceh'

civil society as well as GAM, IOM had direct access to the highest level of decision makers on each side. IOM was careful in ensuring all parties involved were informed of its intentions and initiatives to unblock the access to the list of the 3,000 combatants. As already noted, a successful outcome was nearly achieved on several occasions thanks to these continued efforts. Throughout this process, IOM imposed itself as one of the main actors of the DRR and displayed a good understanding of the complex power balances at stake on the GoI and GAM's side.

As evidenced during the evaluation, it seems nevertheless that IOM's pro-active attitude has not been clearly perceived by the donor. At a certain juncture a sort of misunderstanding developed on both the EC and IOM's side. This could be partially attributed to the fact that IOM and AMM did not interact as they should have throughout the project duration. Even though both organizations worked together at the local level on concrete issues related to medical referral for example, no real cooperation occurred at the more political level. This is certainly a missed opportunity as both entities were funded by the EC and had similar objectives.

In view of the fact that all anticipated objectives have been met in the framework of this project (with the notable exception of the reinsertion assistance to demobilized combatants, a problem which was however independent of the IOM management capacity), it can be ascertained that the overall management of the project was good. Policy guidance was certainly one of the strong points of the project management team, enabling the action to be focussed on the peace process developments and constantly remain in line with the dynamic environment in which it operated. The project was therefore never implemented and managed in isolation from its immediate context. However, IOM recognized that the complex political context was shifting attention away from the need to establish and consolidate the ICRS structure. Very early on in the implementation of the project, IOM Indonesia received support from the Emergency and Post-Conflict (EPC) unit based at IOM Headquarters in Geneva to correct that imbalance. IOM therefore mobilized its institutional know-how to pass on the accumulated knowledge and lessons learned from previous similar operations. The training and recruitment of ICRS staff was undertaken by well experienced staff which secured the appropriate establishment of the project backbone structure. Several missions from EPC staff took place throughout the project duration to secure the overall performance of the action. In addition, the project management team was reinforced when the overarching DRR programme gained in importance and in complexity to secure the overall cohesion and coordination between its different components. This enabled an adequate transition between the initial reinsertion phase covered by the EC project and the medium to longer term reintegration funded by the Japanese Government.

Control mechanisms set up in the framework of the project were adequate and avoided potential problems of fraud. The evaluation team recognized the overall quality of the staff recruited by IOM to implement this project. It is recommended however that more continuous efforts be undertaken to upgrade the skills of staff working in ICRS offices in order to bring their skills to the level required to conduct efficient reintegration activities. During the evaluation, the need for focused training on how to set up small businesses –

the most requested form of reintegration support from beneficiaries – was mentioned several times and should be urgently organized in the framework of the follow-up phase aiming at the longer term reintegration funded by the Government of Japan. The flow of information, within and outside the project was overall satisfactory, with the exception of the interaction with AMM mentioned earlier.

Reporting was overall of a good quality, but IOM displayed difficulties in meeting deadlines as report submission was often delayed. This reflects the difficulty by the project management team in dealing with a wealth of concurrent priorities and it represents one of the weaknesses of the overall management of the project. Following the granting of a four-month extension, the EC requested the submission of monthly reports which were provided by IOM.

5.0 Project outcome and sustainability

Unfortunately, limited time, budget and access to beneficiaries have prevented the evaluation team from conducting a detailed analysis of the impact and sustainability of activities. Furthermore, the context in which this project was implemented is still unfolding. BRA is in the process of devising mechanisms and strategies to disburse reintegration assistance to demobilized combatants as defined in the MoU. At the time of writing of this report, payment has still not materialized, beside the initial disbursement carried out at the end of 2005. Reports from the WB, AMM or ICG have evidenced that only very small amounts actually reached former combatants. This is particularly detrimental so many months after the signature of the peace accord. Trust in the ability of the GoI to disburse the very important funds geared towards the facilitation of the implementation of the peace process is diminishing and impatience is mounting according to GAM and government officials. It is particularly regrettable that IOM reinsertion support for this group could not materialize despite the fact that the mechanism and funding were in place to conduct this activity immediately after the signature of the peace agreement.

Latest developments and discussions with GAM leadership and BRA indicate that IOM, through the ICRS offices, may be asked to assist 3,000 former combatants after all which would be a major breakthrough and would secure the fulfilment of the terms of the MoU. Furthermore, BRA has requested IOM to process the disbursement of the reintegration funds made available from the state budget for amnestied prisoners. These latest developments which intervened outside of the project duration are a testimony to IOM's continuous engagement with the main stakeholders to reach solutions to the problems encountered during the project lifetime, as well of the validity of the ICRS structure.

Based on previous IOM experiences, successful reintegration is key as it has a positive impact both on demobilized combatants. It works both as an incentive to fully embrace civil life and as a psychological support to start afresh their livelihoods and existence. This is impacting communities in turn, where successful reintegration leads to further acceptance of demobilized, whereas failures might strongly affect confidence regarding

reconciliation. In the case of this DRR and as witnessed by the evaluation team during field visits in villages, it is noticeable that the return of demobilized combatants and amnestied prisoners occurred relatively easily and that anticipated difficulties did not materialize in most cases.

The fact that the initial reinsertion cash allowance disbursed in the framework of the project was already used by a relatively important number of amnestied prisoners to restart their livelihoods can be considered as a testimony to the positive impact of the project.

As already emphasized in the report, the impact of the information campaign is more difficult to ascertain, given the absence of monitoring tools established. Nevertheless, amnestied prisoners interviewed in focus group discussions displayed in their vast majority overall a high confidence level in the peace process, even though fragile. Incidents between GAM and TNI occurred while the evaluation mission was being conducted and responses from interviewed beneficiaries reflected their strong reaction to such events. Some declared that they were ready to restart the fight if necessary. Nevertheless the majority of Acehnese welcome the peace agreement and want to end years of conflict, making this a very conducive environment for durable peace. Demobilized combatants and amnestied prisoners display a strong desire to reintegrate within the society and to close the chapter of their lives as insurgents.

As already pointed out in the section 'Strengths of the Project Strategy', sustainability was one of the strengths of this action based on appropriate methodological design. The project was conceived as a first phase geared towards longer term reintegration. Of particular importance is the setting up of the ICRS offices as the backbone structure of this longer term undertaking. Sustainability and future activities were therefore carefully built into the project strategy. Under IOM auspices, and thanks to the financial support of the Japanese Government, ICRS offices will continue to operate for another year to complete the reintegration process of amnestied prisoners. It is nevertheless urgent that IOM secure the full partnership of DINSOS to ensure that beyond this period ICRS functions, if not existence, will remain to continue to deliver support to beneficiaries. This is one of the major challenges which lie ahead for IOM.

Overall, the project outcomes are positive, all activities – with the major exception of the assistance to demobilized combatants - have been implemented successfully as originally anticipated. Contractual obligations have therefore been met.

6.0 Lessons learned and recommendations for application to future DDRR processes

As pointed out throughout the report, IOM has encountered some difficulties but as well developed some good practices which are of relevance for application to future DDRR processes. Based on the lessons learnt in the framework of this specific project as well as on IOM long standing experience in conducting similar operations in other countries, key recommendations can be drawn:

- Importance of the medical component. The development of the medical component within the overarching programme strategy, tying the individual and community strands of assistance, is an innovation that has borne positive results. Particularly within the Aceh context, where the ex-combatants remained politically inaccessible, the medical assistance met their immediate needs. This met two purposes, focusing the future beneficiaries upon the ICRS delivery mechanism, and meeting the wider programme objective of immediate post-conflict stabilisation. It is therefore recommended that future DDRR processes include a strong medical component. Results of the mental health assessment conducted within this project and the subsequent IOM study ‘Psychosocial Needs Assessment of Communities affected by the Conflict in the districts of Pidie, Bireun and Aceh Utara⁵’, point out to the need to not only provide general health services but as well a strong mental health services to alleviate years of trauma during the conflict. Should mental health interventions not be undertaken, the effects of trauma will make it far more difficult for other reintegration interventions undertaken for former combatants and amnestied prisoners. Conversely, interventions aimed at the traumatic experiences and resulting symptoms may have a ‘multiplier’ effect, not only dealing directly with experiences of depression or anxiety but also contributing to the ability of persons to make maximum use of the reintegration interventions made available
- Importance at the peace negotiation stage to carefully plan the steps leading to demobilization and subsequent reintegration. This is a lesson that has to some degree been identified and learned within other contexts. The specifics of the DDRR process must be addressed and agreed during the peace negotiations. A DDRR process is the physical manifestation of the political commitments at the core of peace processes. Each of the phases involved within the DDRR process directly affects the political process, as much detail should be included in political agreements as possible.
- Importance of careful and close coordination of efforts between the Government and the international community. The ability of all of the stakeholders and actors to support and encourage an evolving peace process requires that consensus of approach and articulating such an approach is required. Disparate competing

⁵ This research funded by the Government of Canada was conducted outside of this project but the importance of conducting such a research emerged during the implementation of the EC project.

activities combined with multiple uncoordinated communications within the government structures, results in wasted resources and ineffective interventions.

- Importance of better coordination between an implementing agency (IOM) and the peace monitors (AMM). Both agencies were supported by the EC, and both had pivotal roles within the peace process. The paucity of understanding of one another's activities, resulted in missed opportunities for coordinated actions. An EC lead coordination mechanism could have enhanced the overall effect of their activities, strengthening the peace process.
- Importance of well researched needs of the target group at the project conception phase. In a rapidly evolving environment this is not always achievable, regardless of how necessary. Recognition of this could result in more flexible funding mechanisms to match the fluidity of any evolving post-conflict environment.
- Importance to anchor delivery mechanisms developed by the international community with existing governmental structures. To achieve sustainable results, a strong capacity building component should be built into the project strategy to secure the full cooperation and ability of the partner governmental structures and avoid problems such as the ones encountered in the framework of this project.
- Importance of close cooperation between former belligerents as well as the international community for the conduction of information campaigns socializing the peace process. Information campaigns are key components of any peace implementation. The implementation mechanism developed in Aceh through the creation of '*Team Sosialisasi*' bringing together GAM, the Government has proven to be a powerful model to bring consensus on the messages to be conveyed to the general public. The fact that it was strongly supported by the international community at large, among which IOM, reinforced its impact. This is one of the good practices developed in the framework of the peace process in Aceh that could be replicated in other countries.

ANNEX I. PROJECT DOCUMENT

I. THE ACTION

1. Description

1.1 Title: "Programme of measures to support the demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants and detainees in the Indonesian province of Aceh"

1.2 Location(s)

Aceh, Java, Indonesia

1.3 Amount requested from European Commission

Total eligible cost of the action	Amount requested from European Commission
Eur 4,545,504	Eur 4,000,000

1.4 Summary

In support of recent peace agreement between the Indonesian government and the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka GAM), IOM will undertake an immediate assistance programme to facilitate the reinsertion (in the near term) and reintegration (in the long term) of demobilized combatants and recently released amnesty prisoners. IOM will also establish an information counselling and referral service and reintegration fund to promote longer-term sustainable reintegration activities and community stabilization.

Developed in concurrence with the Helsinki Peace Talks, this long-term stability and reintegration programme will facilitate timely, accurate and unbiased provision of support to rebuild community confidence and socio-economic recovery of former and disarmed combatants, their family members, conflict-affected civilians and their host families.

1.5 Objectives

Overall Objective

The overall objective of this project is to support the peace agreement in Aceh through confidence building measures that will contribute to long-term and sustainable demobilization, reinsertion and reintegration of demilitarized former combatants and recently amnestied prisoners.

Specific Objectives

- 1) To provide a transitional reintegration package, including secure transportation assistance where necessary, for up to 2,000 amnestied prisoners and 3,000 former combatants;
- 2) To design and implement a multi-faceted socialization and communication campaign to disseminate information and educate both target beneficiaries and the general population about the peace building process.

- 3) To conduct General Health Assessments for up to 2,000 amnestied prisoners and 3,000 former combatants and establish related medical referral networks.
- 4) To establish an Information, Counselling and Referral Service (ICRS) network to facilitate the reinsertion of demobilized/decommissioned former combatants and recently released amnestied prisoners
- 5) To initiate the establishment of a case management database that will help map and prioritize in a systematic manner the delivery of reintegration assistance and contribute to developing individualized reintegration plans.

1.6 Justification

Background

After six months of peace talks, the Government of Indonesia (GoI) and GAM signed a historic peace treaty aimed at ending nearly 30 years of fighting in the oil- and gas-rich province that has killed over 12,000 people. In the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) GAM agrees to renounce a demand for full independence and will disarm. In return, the government has offered amnesty to prisoner combatants, land, jobs and political representation; and, it will withdraw more than half of its 53,000 troops and police. About 250 monitors from the European Union and five of Indonesia's south-east Asian neighbours will comprise the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) to oversee the process and arbitrate disputes.

Since the conflict began in 1976, over 12,000 people have been killed during the prolonged violence and many more have been displaced within Aceh, as well as across neighbouring provinces. Throughout this period the Aceh population of 4.2 million people experienced the protracted destruction of their local economy as thousands of Javanese trans-migrants deserted their coffee plantations in Central Aceh, while thousands of hectares of palm oil plantations in West Aceh, Aceh Singkil and South Aceh were abandoned.

Prior to the recent agreement, the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement of 9 December 2002 (COHA) attempted to achieve similar goals. However, soon after its inception COHA broke down leading to the resumption of Martial Law. The effects resulting from Martial Law and renewed conflict have tremendously exacerbated ongoing efforts of the Indonesian and Aceh Governments to pursue stability, peace, democracy and a strategic means to break the vicious circle of poverty.

It was during this period of instability that Indonesia, more acutely the province of Aceh, was hit by the 26 December 2004 earthquake, which triggered the tsunami that wreaked unprecedented destruction to the island and other parts of South and South-east Asia. Countless aftershocks and another severe earthquake on 28 March 2005 have continued to frustrate the decentralization efforts and efforts to address the socio-economic challenges brought about by the civil war.

While the majority of the international community's recent actions have so far supported the immediate recovery and stabilisation of society following the natural disasters that recently afflicted the Province, fewer actions were launched to address its peace stability and demobilisation needs in this wider and longer context. Still, the effort to achieve a peaceful solution to the conflict has progressed against these challenges to achieve the MoU signed on 15 August 2005.

Project Strategy

The International Organization for Migration (IOM) has been designated by the Government of Indonesia (GoI) to act as the focal point for the design and implementation of a short term

reinsertion, and reintegration programme and to seek to assist with community stabilization efforts for the longer-term peace and reconciliation process.

A critical component of the overall peace process is the successful reinsertion of amnestied prisoners and former combatants into society in a manner that is mutually beneficial to the overall development of the province, starting at the community level. There needs to be a clear demonstration of commitment among all parties that demobilization and disarmament of combatants is as much a symbolic step towards reintegration into mainstream society as it is a practical display of commitment to peace. In support of this, a reinsertion strategy package will be designed as part of the national reconciliation effort to facilitate the adjustment of former combatants to civilian life, and civilians to the reintegration of former combatants to mainstream society.

The strategy will unfold in a phased process-oriented approach and will be predicated by the decommissioning and demobilization of former combatants and release of amnestied prisoners. In order to address their immediate subsistence needs, up to 2,000 amnestied GAM combatant prisoners and up to 3,000 GAM demobilized/decommissioned combatants will be provided with transitional reintegration support package to provide an immediate safety-net in support of their reinsertion into society. These groups will also be given access to general health screening and will be systematically registered into a follow-up case management system that will be underpinned by the establishment of 10 Information, Counselling and Referral Service (ICRS) offices at the district level, which will facilitate and guide overall programme implementation.

Through their community outreach capacity and case-management function, the ICRS offices will work to progressively extend the initial six month reinsertion assistance provisions into an integrated long-term reintegration strategy, that will include among other components a 'Community Reintegration Fund' established in the form of a community managed savings and loan cooperative system and other community development activities

The ICRS offices will act as focal contact point for former combatants and community members that will serve to gather and maintain information and coordinate the progress of reintegration. Through the ICRS office, individualized long term reintegration plans will be developed that will seek to match housing needs, training, employment support and other such issues with existing and evolving opportunities through coordinating a referral mechanism. IOM will work in close cooperation with the National and Provincial Authorities, as well as with international and national non-governmental organizations, to gather information on public and private sector development that can be advanced through the programme for the mutual benefit of the community and direct beneficiary.

An integral component of this longer-term objective, an eventual Reintegration Fund (not part of this project) will create a community-managed savings and loan cooperative system in close cooperation with local partners in Aceh and provide appropriate capacity building activities and start-up capital to assist cooperatives' members. The local communities will take active part in identifying vocational and technical training that best support their micro-entrepreneurial endeavours. As such, issues stemming from the absence of sources of incomes such as food security, nutrition, education, health, etc will be addressed. Moreover, the establishment of the financial cooperative will facilitate the sustained access of the target communities to credit that will allow them to pursue income-generating activities after the programmes completion.

While the time frame for the entire programme is expected to extend for several years, this initial project will address the critical first six months phase of this strategy – *the reinsertion phase*. The longer term success of this programme is predicated on the success of this critical

stage and urgent action to establish a foundation for support is needed. The project outlined herewith will guide the initial interventions required to establish the foundation network of support. The funding requested will assist with the immediate start-up phase of mobilizing staff, socializing them to understand and relay information about the peace building process, and will provide medical, economic, social and financial incentives to assist beneficiaries with their transition back to society. It will also support the establishment of ICRS field offices throughout the province and building linkages with the World Bank's Kecamatan Development Programme (KDP)¹ network on the district and local levels.

The project is urgently needed, particularly as the success of reintegration programming for the first released prisoners and ex-combatants will influence the decision of remaining combatants to disarm and disband themselves. The pace of the process in Aceh is accelerated, thus speed of implementation is an important consideration if the contribution to stabilisation is to be maximised.

Target Group

IOM with its extensive experience in peace-building and displaced population assistance is developing a long-term strategy to offer reintegration and livelihood support, as well as community infrastructure rehabilitation, to both former combatants and their families, populations displaced by the armed conflict and the natural disasters, as well as their host families and community at large.

At the request of the Government of Indonesia and the AMM, IOM will provide immediate reinsertion support that will provide a transitional safety-net for demobilized combatants and prisoners given amnesty. Such support will be geared toward establishing a longer-term community stabilization programme. IOM will target such assistance to an estimated 35,000 direct and indirect beneficiaries comprising:

- ✦ Up to 3,000 former combatants²;
- ✦ Up to 2,000 amnestied prisoners³;
- ✦ Their families, dependents and host communities

Gender and age considerations will be mainstreamed into all reinsertion programme initiatives as will special consideration to vulnerable cases such as war-disabled, women soldiers, underage soldiers, multi-traumatized populations, orphans and widows.

¹ A glossary of terms and abbreviations is included at the end of this document

² Figure agreed between GAM leadership to the Government of Indonesia during peace negotiations.

³ The final figure of prisoners to be released under the amnesty scheme is still under discussion, but Ministry of Justice estimates, cross-checked against other reliable sources put it at 2,000.

1.7 Detailed description of activities

The Reinsertion Process – Phase 1 (6 Months)

The process of reinsertion will unfold in two primary streams of activity: 1) the amnesty of prisoners being held in prisons throughout Java and Aceh; and, 2) the demobilization/decommissioning of combatants located in Aceh province.

The list of amnestied prisoners will be established on the basis of a Presidential decree and will be provided by the Ministry of Justice. The Head of the Aceh Monitoring Mission has the authority to rule on disputed amnesty cases.

The list of former combatants will be established by the Aceh Monitoring Mission, on the basis of information supplied by the GAM leadership and other such criteria as may be agreed between the parties to the MoU.

Amnestied Prisoners:

- 1) Released prisoners from among some 30 prisons located throughout Java will be aggregated into 4 primary processing sites in Java: Yogyakarta, Surabaya, Bandung and Semarang.
- 2) On the basis of the legal documentation certifying their release under the terms of the Amnesty provided by GoI, former combatants will be registered into the programme and given a Babu Bantuan Reintegrasi Transitu⁴ (Transitional Reintegration Assistance Booklet) booklet, which will serve as a reinsertion certificate to access future programme benefits, and will be provided an social integration orientation including written information on the reinsertion process; they will also be scheduled for a general health assessment (see GHA component below), and transported to their communities of choice.
- 3) Former prisoners will pass through a voluntary general health assessment to determine their state of general health, with a particular emphasis on screening for mental health, malaria, syphilis, tuberculosis and other similarly transferable diseases.
- 4) Upon completion of medical screening amnestied prisoners will be given a thorough an orientation briefing on the MoU, reinsertion issues (problems and complications that may arise and related access to support) and they will be apprised of their benefits, rights and representation and the long-range strategy for their successful reinsertion into society and expected contributions to community development.
- 5) Those registered will be provided with the initial installment of their reinsertion package to facilitate their initial smooth transition to civilian life. The package is primarily intended to serve as a transitional safety-net covering an initial 6 month period, but will be designed to integrate into a longer-term strategy for sustainable reintegration.
- 6) Bearing in mind security concerns raised by GAM prisoners, secure transportation will be provided for amnestied prisoners as follows:
 - Prisoners in Java: amnestied prisoners located in Java will be flown to Jakarta where they will connect to flights departing to either Medan or Bandar Aceh, whichever is in closest proximity to their home district. From there, they will be transported by bus to their home districts.

⁴ The booklet will provide a means of photo identification and will serve as the primary means of identity verification for accessing transitional reintegration support. A duplicate record and photo will be kept on file at the ICRC office for cross-checking.

- Prisoners in Aceh: amnestied prisoners located in Aceh will be transported by bus to their home district.

**Note: Security during transport was identified as a pressing concern of GAM prisoners; secure escort will therefore be arranged to their home districts.*

Decommissioning/Demobilization process:

- 1) The decommissioning/demobilization process will be initiated at the point of certification at the AMM mobile team processing sites, where former combatants will be certified and divest of arms and other combat paraphernalia.
- 2) Following certification and disarmament, former combatants will be given a Babu Bantuan Reintegrasi Transitu⁵ (Transitional Reintegration Assistance Booklet) booklet, which will serve as a reinsertion certificate to access future programme benefits, and will be provided with written information on the reinsertion process; they will also be scheduled for a medical examination.
- 3) Once certified, former combatants will be advised to report to district Department of Social Welfare (Depsos) offices where they will be fully registered into the programme by the Depsos, IOM, GAM registration team.⁶
- 4) Former combatants will pass through a voluntary general health assessment to determine their state of general health, with a particular emphasis on screening for mental health, malaria, syphilis, tuberculosis and other similarly transferable diseases.
- 5) Upon completion of medical screening those registered will be given a thorough briefing on the MoU, reinsertion issues (problems and complications that may arise and related access to support) and will be apprised of the long-range strategy for their successful reintegration into society and expected contributions to community development.
- 6) Finally, those registered will be provided with the first installment of their reinsertion package to facilitate their initial smooth transition to civilian life. The package is primarily intended to cover an initial 6 month period, but will be designed to integrate into a longer-term strategy for sustainable reintegration.

Through this project, IOM will undertake the following specific activities to facilitate the overall demobilization process.

1. Organize and implement an orderly disbursement of transitional reintegration assistance packages and facilitate return travel for demobilized combatants, where necessary.

The initial months following the signing of the peace agreement are critical to its overall success. Though an agreement has been reached, tensions remain and the transition to peace must be carefully nurtured. One of the fundamental elements and biggest challenges agreed to in the signed MoU between the GoI and GAM was the amnesty of prisoners and the disarmament of GAM fighters. While essential to achieving peace, it presents a host of challenges related to reinserting former combatants into society. An important element to this

⁵ The booklet will provide a means of photo identification and will serve as the primary means of identity verification for accessing transitional reintegration support. A duplicate record and photo will be kept on file at the ICRS office for cross-checking.

⁶ AMM certification of demobilization/decommissioning is prerequisite for registration into the programme. The Minister of Justice and Minister of People's Welfare have agreed to GAM participating in the registration process and representation at the ICRS offices.

'socialization' process and national reconciliation efforts will thus be the implementation of measures to smooth reintegration of former prisoners and combatants.

Recognizing that former combatants may have little or no financial or material resources at hand with which to start their new civilian life, IOM will coordinate the distribution of a transitional reintegration package for former combatants that will address basic subsistence requirements for a period of six months. The package will add a measure of stability to a period of change and transition and will enable the conditions for medium to longer term reintegration programming oriented toward sustainable livelihoods, broader market access and private investment.

Transitional Reintegration package

The transitional reintegration package will constitute a "personal effects" and "settling-in allowance" to provide beneficiaries with the financial means to support their adjustment to civilian life and will be managed and administered by IOM in coordination with programme partners. Following a review of findings of recent World Bank conflict assessment surveys and in deliberations with stakeholders and partners, it was determined that the transitional reintegration package would consist of a material goods valued at USD 100 and a cash stipend of USD 500, which would be paid out in 3 installments.

The goods equivalent for this cash stipend is based on the following UN and World Food Programme basic subsistence estimates for a family of 5 over 6 months:

Item	USD	%
Food	250	50
Shelter	120	24
Health	55	11
Education	15	3
Household effects (tools, cooking utensils, etc)	60	12

The stipend works out at a daily allowance of \$2.78, and is set at a rate somewhat below the UN recommended post-tsunami day labour rate (35,000 Rupiah, or approximately \$3.50)

Material goods will consist of the following items:

2 pairs of Trousers	1 pair of shoes
2 shirts	1 Batik
2 pairs of underwear	2 Towels
2 pairs of socks	1 Hat
1 handkerchief	1 small travel bag
Head covering (females)	Sanitary items (females)

Toiletry Kit (soap, shampoo, toothbrush, toothpaste, comb, shaving kit)
 Small food items (2 pieces)
 Newspaper

This package is based on the needs of political prisoners. The package of material goods for former combatants may be adjusted in the light of experience, depending on the precise needs discovered, but the overall value of the package will remain unchanged.

It is understood that the provision of transitional reintegration packages to former combatants will need to be carefully explained to host communities. This will be mitigated by the

ongoing communication and socialization campaign and Police Sensitization Training⁷, which will incorporate in its message details about the reinsertion process and the need for this transitional safety-net.

Coordination of the distribution of the package will take place at the ICRS district offices, which has a primary role in implementing the socialization and communication campaign; and thus is in a position to encourage broad understanding and transparency in the reinsertion process. It will also be explained in the socialization and communication campaign that this is but one component of a larger strategy for sustainable peace and community development, which will also eventually incorporate a reintegration fund for the benefit of former combatants and host communities as a whole. In so doing it will be demonstrated that the overall aim of the process is to strengthen and stimulate socio-economic progress and development for all.

Distribution process

First Installment -

Distribution of the first installment will take place at two primary points of contact for the respective target groups – amnestied prisoners in Java and decommissioned combatants.

Amnestied prisoners in Java will be transported from some 30 prisons to four primary locations processing points – Yogyakarta, Surabaya, Bandung and Semarang. At these processing points, amnestied prisoners will be met by designated MoJ and IOM personnel and provided an orientation briefing on the terms and prospects of the peace agreement, the provisions of the socialization campaign and particulars regarding their reinsertion into society. Access to a general health assessment coordinated by IOM and DEPKUMHAM medical professionals will also be provided (see GHA component).

During this period they will be issued a reinsertion certificate and will receive their first installment of their transitional reintegration package, which will amount to the complete set of material goods and the initial cash installment of a rupiah equivalent of USD 200 (in the form of a non-transferable bank cheque). And, arrangements will be made for their transport to Aceh, either overland from Medan or by air depending on their final destination. Once at the district of their final destination, they will be integrated into the ICRS case management system for ongoing follow-up.

Former combatants in Aceh will be given a similar orientation briefing following decommission/demobilization at the mobile AMM processing sites, which will guide them to the district ICRS office where they will be registered into the case management system and provided with their set of material goods and initial cash installment of a rupiah equivalent of USD 200 (in the form of a non-transferable bank cheque).

** For both groups it is a precondition of the provision of their transitional reintegration package that they have in their possession their reinsertion certificate.*

Subsequent installments -

The initial cash installment will cover a period of 90 days. Subsequent installments will be transferred to individual bank accounts at the district BRI (Bank Republic Indonesia) branch,

⁷ IOM “Strengthening the Indonesia National Police Through Institution-Building” project. This is funded by the Netherlands government and will not be funded under the present project.

upon reporting to the ICRS office. The second and third installments will be in the amount of USD 150 and will cover periods of 45 days.

2. Conduct General Health Assessments (GHA) of demobilized former combatants and amnestied prisoners

Anecdotal evidence and visual analysis suggests prisoners and former combatants do not suffer from major diseases. However, it is recognized that most former combatants have not routinely sought health care assistance and that there is a tendency toward malnourishment. Further, years of stress and trauma associated with the ongoing conflict may have had a psychological impact on former combatants, which, if left undetected, could inhibit their ability to resume to civilian life.

Therefore, in collaboration with the Ministry of Health (MOH), through its National Programmes and provincial/district health offices and partner agencies, IOM will establish a GHA framework and conduct general health assessments for former combatants and amnestied prisoners. The GHA will be conducted following the principles of the Alma-Ata declaration⁸, recognizing that health is a fundamental human right and that provision of adequate healthcare is a primary responsibility of governments. And, it is acknowledged that adequate and reliable information on the psychosocial/mental health conditions of the former combatants, their basic health care needs, and establishing a counselling referral system to facilitate their follow-up access to health care services are keys to sustainable economic and social development.

In addition to addressing the immediate goal of providing former combatants with access to a health assessment, the establishment of a GHA framework will also contribute to strengthening the logistical and management capacity of the Provincial/District Health Authorities to implement and manage such large scale GHAs and address the basic symptomatic treatment of medical fever, headache, diarrhoea, gastritis in addition to the treatment of Acute Respiratory Tract Infection, Malaria, Syphilis and Helminthiasis and other similar medical conditions.

The GHA will entail the following elements:

1. General Health Screening
2. Mental health assessment and establishment of an appropriate mental health referral mechanism;
3. Provision of a 2 hour health education session on HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Sexually Transmitted Diseases;
4. Development of a confidential database on the health conditions of each former combatants for use in refining future health related reintegration and livelihood initiatives.

The GHA activity will be implemented in three phases, i.e., Preparation, Health Assessment and Final Reporting. During this phase, IOM will hire the Project Officer and Project Assistant who will work with the IOM Medical Section to prepare the staffing, procurement and development of the project implementation plan. Coordination and collaboration will be established within this period as well as the formation and training of the medical team for each transitional reintegration processing site.

⁸ Declaration from the International Conference on Primary Health Care, Alma Ata on September 12, 1978.

Preparation: Under the technical guidance of IOM medical staff, a quick needs assessment will be conducted and a Memorandum of Understanding will be developed between IOM and the Ministry of Health and its Provincial/District Health Offices to agree upon mutual roles and responsibilities. An implementation plan will be developed, medical supplies and equipment procured and appropriately qualified staff placed into joint IOM/Provincial Health Office medical teams that will be attached to registration/processing sites. There will be 9 health care professionals fielded, one each to the ICRS offices outside Banda Aceh.

Health Assessment: Day 1 – initial registration and taking of anthropometric measurements, vital signs examination, visual acuity check, laboratory examination, physical examination and mental health screening (if needed). [Physical/Laboratory Examination: Urinalysis for Protein, Glucose and Hematuria; Malaria Screening ; Testing for Syphilis ; and AFB Sputum Smears of 3 consecutive days if needed.]

Day 2 – 4 - On the second to the fourth day, the Medical Team will review and complete the medical documentation of each patient; prescribe the medications/management of the patient; and provide the treatment within the established treatment parameters⁹ defined for the GHA.

As part of the TB screening activities, patients suspected of tuberculosis will be referred to a local TB clinic as necessary.

The Project Coordinators in each registration/processing site will submit a statistical report of the individuals' medical conditions and the original completed medical forms will be given to each patient.

* Basic Health care counselling and health education sessions will be scheduled concurrently with ongoing will physical/laboratory assessments during days 2-4. These sessions will address basic health care, Tuberculosis and Sexually Transmitted Diseases.

Final Reporting: The health assessment report will remain confidential (on a need to know basis) and will be given to each patient. IOM will maintain copies of the health assessment report for the purposes of data entry and analysis only. During intervening periods between the conducting of health assessments, data will be collated, analysed and compiled into an indicative database for eventual maintenance by the Ministry of Health and its Provincial/District Health Offices.

3. Undertake a broad socialization and communication campaign to disseminate information and educate both the programme target beneficiaries and the general population about the peace process.

There is still very little awareness on the MOUs contents, especially at the district and sub-district level, where its impacts will be greatest and will have immediate ramifications for both demobilized GAM combatants and their future host communities. Among the most urgent tasks is to find appropriate channels for the widest possible dissemination of information, in both Indonesian and Acehnese. Explanations are needed on how the recently concluded agreement differs from the failed 2002 agreement and various target groups need to

⁹ The project can only provide treatment for Syphilis, Malaria, and Helminthiasis. Treatment of symptoms such as Fever, Headache, Diarrhoea and Gastritis will also be made available. Initial emergency medical care and immediate referral will be provided in the discharge centers under the supervision of the provincial hospital and supported by the GHA Project.

be educated about the details of the agreement and its implications. Demobilized GAM combatants, amnestied prisoners, local authorities, security personnel and the general population need to be made aware of what the agreement means to them and what their role is in ensuring that peace and stability can be upheld. They also need to be informed of the reinsertion process and its various components.

IOM will liaise closely with the AMM, KDP and local culture/media experts to deliver information to various stakeholders that will serve as an empowering tool to facilitate a collective contribution to the reinsertion/socialization effort and manage expectations. This will entail the launching of a multi-faceted communication campaign that is culturally grounded, designed to reach GAM amnestied prisoners, former combatants, host communities, governmental and security personnel, and the general public. The information will aim to provide practical information on, legal, social and economic difficulties that may arise for amnestied prisoners and former combatants, as well as community awareness information on the peace process and how communities will benefit from the stabilization and reconstruction programmes.

These campaigns will be initiated in advance of the amnesty and demobilization/decommissioning process and will extend throughout the duration of this project, with appropriately modified and evolving messages and themes. They will play a valuable role in the decommissioning/demobilization effort through promoting broad understanding of the socialization process, making both communities and former combatants aware of the principles and needs being addressed through related support initiatives.

The information campaign will employ the following methods of information dissemination:

- Production of 80,000 'Basic facts' brochures/pamphlets/posters: Brochures, pamphlets and posters will be produced with simple, basic facts on the MOU and the realities of its implications. The information materials will widely distributed through a range of local networks, including the national and local authorities, World Bank's KDP network and partner NGOs.
- Media Public Service Announcements (PSA): IOM will produce 5 local language Radio and television PSAs that will explain the peace agreement and all its direct implications. These 15-30 second spot PSAs will be aired on radio stations in high rotation, primetime campaigns. It is anticipated that the PSAs will be aired via 24 radio spots and 3 television spots
- Hotline: A hotline will be established for former GAM combatants and the general public. The hotline staffed by trained personnel at the ICRS offices will provide an effective vehicle for public outreach in the dissemination of accurate and timely information. The hotline will serve a valuable dual purpose in information gathering on the concerns, fears, needs and expectations of both the primary target groups and their communities. Such information will be collected and collated into a database that will provide a breakdown of calls on a regional basis and a categorization of the nature of information or assistance requested by incoming callers. This database will provide a valuable resource tool for refining ongoing programme implementation.
- E-Forum, SMS Services and Mail Box for Public participation: Taking advantage of cost-effective telecommunication technology, information about the MoU and ongoing peace settlement efforts will be widely broadcast through mass SMS service messages, e-forum and related messaging services. The services which can be managed through a central networking system will distribute information aimed at promoting transparency to the general public and can also solicit feedback, which can be aggregated into a information management system that can be incorporated into information database.

- Partnership with religious authorities: Recognizing the critical role of religious authorities and the integral role houses of worship play in daily life, religious leaders and representatives representing 21 sub-districts will be invited to participate in a 'training of trainers' on the socialization process. In turn, religious leaders and representatives will be able to serve as resource persons on the socialization process at religious gatherings and houses of worship. In so doing, they will play a valuable role in promoting community cohesiveness and understanding throughout the socialization effort.
- Performing arts: Aceh has a rich history of performing arts, story-telling and poetry. The practitioners are well respected by the communities and will be a natural 'draw' in camps and villages throughout the province. Such artists and groups will be engaged and encouraged to incorporate socialization themes into their performance art. They will be guided on the process to insure accuracy and clarity. Given their extensive outreach and popular form of communication they will serve as an integral component to the overall information dissemination process. Related to this approach will be the holding of symbolic events signalling the "new beginning" that will include ritual blessing ceremonies, beating drums and the like to usher in the peace building effort. It is anticipated that at least 15 such events will be staged.
- Elementary and Secondary Education: The long period of unrest was a lifelong experience for the youth of Aceh and, thus they play a critical role in shaping and influencing enduring peace and stability. IOM will therefore engage education experts to develop age appropriate information material in support of the socialization process. Such information will be widely disseminated throughout at least 40 district and sub-district schools and other centers of elementary and secondary education.
- Community and Public fora discussions: Partnering with the KDP community development network at least 21 public fora discussions will be held at the grass-roots community level. This will encourage direct community involvement and engagement and will catalyse ongoing community level exchange on the peace building process.

Conflict Resolution Training

Clarity of information will be essential in the socialization and communication campaign. Still, there may be tensions and derisive actions that arise, particularly at the grass-roots community level, when discussing the peace building process. It is therefore important that those conducting open forums or information campaigns are prepared to redress stress and aggressive behaviour that they may encounter. Orientation training on conflict resolution will therefore be given to KDP information facilitator partners to prepare them for unforeseen challenges. A booklet will also be provided which gives advice on handling stressful situations and aggressive behaviour in a mollifying manner.

In the near term, training would target two KDP facilitators from each district, for the 10 districts receiving the bulk of the returning detainees and former GAM combatants. This would be expanded to cover all 21 districts as time and resources permit. The training will target those among the KDP network who have training experience and will be presented in a "training of trainer" format, to maximize its benefit.

Police Sensitization

In complement to these campaigns and in advance of the release of amnestied prisoners IOM, in collaboration with the Human Rights Department of the Ministry of Justice (DEPKUMHAM), will be conducting police sensitization training, through its ongoing "Strengthening the Indonesia National Police Through Institution-Building" project, which is financed by the Netherlands government. The training on "managing change" will be aimed

at reducing lingering animosity and mutual apprehension to insure police behaviour toward their former combatants doesn't undermine the peace agreement. Neglecting such considerations in Aceh could potentially lead to the deterioration of security and stability, which could act as a catalyst for a return to hostilities.

The training will target up to 8,000 police personnel responsible for community policing throughout Aceh. Twenty-one training teams will be deployed to Aceh and will begin training on 23 August. They will be trained extensively on the principles of the MoU, line by line, and the role and responsibility of Aceh police to enforce these principles and uphold and maintain human rights standards. They will be addressed on police behaviour, exercising mutual respect and upholding dignity.

Each officer will be given a copy of the MoU and apprised of their responsibility to observe and maintain human rights principles when encountering former combatants and to serve as positive catalyst in facilitating the overall socialization process.

This training will not be financed by the current project.

4. Establish 11 Information, Counselling and Referral Service (ICRS) offices.

In order to provide a foundation for the long term reintegration process, 11 ICRS offices will be established to serve as focal points for managing the implementation of the various components of this project and to serve as community outreach points – one overall administration office and 10 district offices. The structure for the network of Information Counselling and Referral Services Offices (ICRS) will be established as physical structures where the potential beneficiaries will converge to view and obtain information on issues pertaining to the peace and reconstruction process. The offices will be progressively established with priority given to Aceh Utara, Pide, Bueren, Sigli, which according to BAPPENAS is where the largest concentrations of GAM former combatants reside. ICRS office openings will also be prioritized in districts where AMM processing will take place.

They will provide a venue where people in the community can come together and discuss community and reconciliation issues and act as grass-roots networks that bridge information gaps and harness community members with a strategy to organize and mobilize themselves to meet their needs. These offices will be assisted by a network of local Community Facilitators from the Kacametan Development Project (KDP) and DENSO district administration. These offices will play a critical role in facilitating project specific activities described in this document and will provide continuity to longer-term interventions which will evolve from this initial 6 month implementation phase. The ICRS offices will be responsible for the following:

- Registration of former combatants
- Disseminating information and proactive community liaison
- Coordinating counseling and referral services
- Managing case files for target beneficiaries residing in that district
- Managing and coordinating the distribution of the reintegration assistance

The ICRS offices will be staffed by trained staff attached with Depsos, appropriately qualified residences of the community, former members of GAM and IOM.

5. To begin establishment of case-management database programme to support ongoing socialization and reintegration efforts for demobilized combatants and host communities.

IOM will coordinate with the GOI, AMM, Depsos and GAM to organize official registration of all the demobilized combatants. The registration procedure will include the completion of a basic questionnaire, receipt of settling-in allowance, issuance of a Babu Bantuan Reintegrasi Transitu (Transitional Reintegration Assistance Booklet) to former combatants and information about the ICRS office.

This information will be consolidated into a reintegration case-management database that will contain all pertinent data gathered during the registration process. Eventually, it will be integrated with other data collected to generate socio-economic and demographic profile reports that will serve to identify and match the needs of the former combatants with training, employment and other income generating opportunities that exist, so that an individualized reintegration plan can be developed.

It is foreseen that the database will be able to generate reports showing age, level of education, reintegration vulnerabilities, prior occupations, etc. These in turn will be used to map and prioritize in a systematic manner the delivery of reintegration assistance, including the need for further education, training, or the (re)establishment of opportunities in income-generating initiatives that will lead to sustainable reintegration beyond the reinsertion phase that will contribute to overall community development.

1.8 Methodology

Methodology

As part of an overall programme conception, IOM has consolidated data collected on conflict-affected areas during the past few years, prisoner questionnaires, and those living in tsunami affected areas. The data has been organized into three clusters of information about potential beneficiaries and host communities: (i) their *characteristics*, e.g., gender, age, health and education status, marital status and size of family, etc.; (ii) their *needs*, e.g., assets, or lack thereof, such as shelter, employment, land, finances, health and education access; and, (iii) their *concerns* e.g., where they want to go or return to, how they perceive their return; their sentiments about the peace process; what they see for their future, etc.

Most recent information has been gathered from a survey conducted among a representative population of GAM prisoners that will be given amnesty under the MoU. In early August, the GOI provided IOM with information on their locations in prisons in some 20 locations throughout Aceh and in Java, and from this IOM undertook a detailed survey of the detainees. They were queried about perception about their return, reinsertion into normal life, opinions on the peace process and subsistence and vocational needs. The dataset ranged from low-level operatives to senior GAM leadership ages 16 to 65. Preliminary findings suggest that all those to be released wish to return to Aceh, as close to their families as possible. They are optimistic about the future, although they list security and safety as a primary concern and fear being re-arrested. Most said they have no access to cash either to provide for their families or to build capital for livelihoods. Prisoners returning to tsunami affected areas also asked for housing assistance.

Valuable information was also gleaned from a World Bank rapid conflict assessment that was conducted from late-July to mid-August. The assessment identified scenarios that could occur in the months after the signing of the agreement, and suggest tools and mechanisms that the World Bank, and other donors and development actors, could use to support the peace process. Results suggest that those who support the agreement, are more concerned with reconciliation before justice, and urge that programmes support the reintegration and

reconstruction of Aceh, not just former GAM. Findings of this survey are similar to the Humanitarian Protection Needs Analysis (HPNA) undertaken by IOM in 2004 as the first such attempt to arrive at a comprehensive picture of the humanitarian situation in Aceh after the declaration of Martial Law.

It emanated from the need to establish reliable benchmarks for the determination of the plight of Returnees/ex-IDPs and their local communities from the perspective of the target clients themselves. The Government of Indonesia formally endorsed the report and then Vice-Governor Azwar Abubakar declared that the HPNA would serve as the roadmap to plot humanitarian assistance in the province.

This programme was under the early phases of implementation when the tsunami struck. Recent government statistics on the earthquakes and tsunami report upwards of 120,000 deaths, 38,000 missing still and more than 550,000 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) located in various camps and settlement sites. Enormous loss of life, massive destruction of homes, properties and infrastructure, thousands injured and rendered homeless and living in temporary often very crowded accommodations or with host families, with limited access to adequate basic services worsened the already existing economic scarcity and infrastructure destruction following years of civil war.

In view of longer-term planning, IOM conducted a Needs and Aspirations Survey¹⁰ of IDP population in 71 disaster affected sub-districts throughout NAD to better determine IDPs forward needs and expectations with a specific focus on settlement and livelihood. The two key findings were:

- ✦ A majority of the respondents stressed that community integrity and cohesiveness are important culturally, socially and economically; IOM thus promotes maintaining the integrity of communities in new settlement communities through coordinated and consultative arrangements, and;
- ✦ A wide margin the respondents strongly desire “proper housing”, which IOM Shelter Strategy responds to directly.

In addition to the Needs and Aspirations Assessment, IOM coordinated a sweeping six-week-long survey of tsunami-related Damage Assessments in 154 sub-districts (77% of Aceh’s sub-districts) located in 17 affected coastal districts around Aceh at the request of the National Planning Board (BAPPENAS).

Together, these surveys and assessments provide excellent baseline data for what is needed by the host communities regarding livelihood and capital demands.

Information from these surveys have helped shape a reinsertion/reintegration strategy, project activities and institutional arrangements for implementation that include: reinsertion packages, establishing an Information, Counselling and Referral Service (ICRS) network, general health screening, socialization efforts, development of a case management database, among others. Within this framework, special attention will be given to children and female combatants and efforts will be made to coordinate with agencies such as Unicef and Unifem to insure support is best suited to meet their needs.

Most importantly, the surveys revealed that there is a general overall acceptance of the MoU and its conditions among the Aceh population, including the amnesty of combatant prisoners,

¹⁰ http://www.iom.int/tsunami/documents/indonesia_needs_assessment.pdf

provided that local communities also derive benefit from reinsertion, socialization efforts. Such considerations are consistent with IOM's extensive experience in demobilization and reintegration programming and will guide programme implementation.

IOM experience suggests that offering reintegration assistance to demilitarized combatants within the context of overall community needs accelerates the process of security and national reconciliation, thereby building a positive environment for the resumption of economic activities and lasting peace. Often blamed for the excess of the fighting, demilitarized combatants can become marginalized. If left unassisted, they can be easily manipulated by subversive elements that may wish for a return to conflict. In support of reconciliation and a return to normal civilian life, demilitarized combatants and recently released amnestied prisoners need to be presented with options and alternatives that are perceived as being more positively viable than a resumption conflict.

Neglecting such considerations in Aceh could potentially lead to the deterioration of security and stability, which could act as a catalyst for a return to hostilities. This would only serve to negate all reconstruction efforts which have been implemented so far, through unprecedented international investments.

In short, the establishment of transparent programmes engaging former GAM member and the communities at large will contribute significantly to stabilising large numbers of civilian population in previously contested areas. Such interventions will offer war-devastated communities and resettling former combatants and their families the possibility to reconcile and work towards the revitalization of the community through the establishment of mutual co-operation and socio-economic investment in the future that will target common community and national reconstruction goals, rather than re-engaging in armed conflict.

2.0 Procedures for internal evaluation

IOM will apply standard internal auditing and evaluation procedures established for IOM project implementation activities worldwide. This includes the generation of monthly financial reports as well as day to day monitoring of project activities by the assigned project manager, under the overall oversight of the IOM Jakarta Chief of Mission.

2.1 Involvement and activity of other organisations (partners or others) in the action

- Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) – AMM has been assigned the responsibility for the demobilization and decommissioning of GAM and the monitoring of the reintegration of both the demobilized combatants and amnesty prisoners.
- DEPKUMHAM, Ministry of Justice – The MoJ has overall responsibility for the amnesty of GAM prisoners
- Ministry of Health – Responsible for National Health issues
- Kacamatan Development Project (KDP) – the KDP has the mandate for coordinating community development and has 21 district offices in Aceh. They also have unmatched staffing resources making them uniquely positioned to advance a large scale socialization and communication campaign. There are currently 21 KDP information facilitators scattered throughout 12 districts that each cover 3 sub-districts.
- Depsos as the social services structure in Aceh

2.2 Duration

The duration of this initial action will be six months.

3. Expected results

- Up to 2,000 amnestied prisoners and 3,000 former combatants will receive a demobilization transitional reintegration package to provide for a 6 month transitional safety-net.
- Up to 2,000 amnestied prisoners and 3,000 former combatants will be given a general health assessment and will be provided with follow-up health care management advice. Where necessary, an individualized referral recovery plan will be outlined.
- A comprehensive socialization and communication campaign developed targeting information to a minimum of 30,000 Acehnese conducted.
- Information will be gathered through the demobilization registration process and a case-management database will be initiated for administration by the ICRS offices.
- 11 Information, Counselling and Referral Support (ICRS) offices will be set-up, staffed and made operational. In so doing, the distribution of the transitional reintegration package will be fully operationalized and a foundation will be established for a mid-long term grant disbursement mechanism (distribution to occur in second phase)
- The foundation ICRS network and other related support structures placed and second phase of the project initiated (at end of 6 months).

Publications and other outputs

- 1) 5,000 basic information brochures will be produced and distributed to amnestied prisoners and former combatants.
- 2) At least 5,000 MoUs will be produced, printed and distributed to amnestied prisoners and former combatants
- 3) 30,000 posters and related information pamphlets on the socialization process and related programming will be produced and printed for distribution through the ICRS, public offices, schools, religious centers and other community gatherings
- 4) Five 15-30 second public service announcements will be developed and disseminated on local radio and television media. Each announcement will be placed at least 25 times of which at least 50% during prime time.
- 5) SMS text messaging presenting facts about the peace process will be produced and periodically transmitted throughout the project duration
- 6) A monthly newsletter will be created to advise on project implementation progress and distributed to all stakeholders.
- 7) A final project implementation report

2.3 Multiplier effects

The entire first 6 month phase of this intervention is designed to provide a foundation for the implementation of a long-term reintegration and community development strategy that will support and contribute to a sustainable and lasting peace. The implementation of the activities described herein establishes the network infrastructure to support this plan through instituting a transparent and accessible administrative structure. Through the ICRS network a national

reconciliation plan will be nurtured that will foster community outreach initiatives aimed at instilling a habit of community support and cooperation. In conjunction with consistent and ongoing socialization and communication activities, the groundwork will be put in place for concerted community engagement and ownership in advancing both the peace process and socio-economic development. This will establish the supportive environment necessary for long-term strategies that will include the cornerstone Reintegration Fund.

The reintegration fund will create a community-managed savings and loan cooperative system in close cooperation with local partners in NAD and provide appropriate capacity building activities and start-up capital to assist cooperatives' members. Local communities will, in turn, be able to take active part in identifying vocational and technical training that best support their micro-entrepreneurial endeavours. As such, issues stemming from the absence of sources of incomes such as food security, nutrition, education, health, etc will be addressed.

Moreover, the establishment of the financial cooperative will facilitate the sustained access of the target communities to credit that will allow them to pursue income-generating activities after the programmes completion. The conduct of a series of competency and needs based capacity building activities, which will be undertaken based on ongoing review and feedback gathered through the ICRS offices in phase 1, will further ensure sustainability of benefits at the household level. The approaches that will be utilized by the project such as community participation with support from relevant local government agencies at all phases of implementation will foster social cohesion and rebuild trust in the ability of the government to support community endeavours.

Examples of typical interventions that will be supported in the future will include:

- ✦ Housing, using the IOM Shelter Strategy endorsed by the Indonesian Government;
- ✦ Restoration of sustainable income-generating opportunities, including self-employment and agriculture;
- ✦ On-the-job training and apprenticeships;
- ✦ Livelihood & enterprise development;
- ✦ Micro credits;
- ✦ Vocational training and further studies
- ✦ Cooperative savings and loan

3. Glossary

GAM - Gerakan Aceh Merdeka

GoI – Government of Indonesia

GHA – General Health Assessment

ICRS – Information Counseling and Referral Service

AMM – Aceh Monitoring Mission

COHA - Cessation of Hostilities Agreement of 9 December 2002 (COHA)

KDP - Kacamatan Development Project

Babu Bantuan Reintegrasi Transitu - (Transitional Reintegration Assistance Booklet)

Depsos – department of social welfare, Ministry of People's Welfare

DEPKUMHAM – Human Rights Department, Ministry of Justice

PSA – Public Service Announcement

BAPPENAS – National Planning Board, Ministry of National Planning

MoH – Ministry of Health

ANNEX II. BUDGET

Annex III - Budget - Addendum 1

PEACE-BUILDING AND RECOVERY PROGRAMME FOR DEMILITARIZED
COMBATANTS, THEIR DEPENDENTS AND THE CONFLICT-AFFECTED
COMMUNITIES

LINE ITEMS	Unit Cost:eur	QTY	Duration (Months)	Total amount
1.0 STAFF AND OFFICE COST				
Staff Costs				
Chief of Mission (5%, P5)	13.232,00	0,0500	10,000	6.616
Head of Office in Aceh (25%, P4)				
PBR-NAD Aceh Programme Coordinator P4 (75%)	13.600,00	0,7500	10,000	102.000
ICRS Officer P3	10.303,00	1,0000	9,706	100.001
National Program Officers	1.819,40	5,0000	10,000	90.970
Medical Officer (50%) P3	10.302,77	0,5000	2,500	12.878
Medical Doctor G8	1.300,00	1,0000	10,000	13.000
Community Outreach & Information Officer P2	9.730,48	1,0000	2,500	24.328
Logistic Officer (25%) P2	9.730,48	0,2500	2,500	6.082
Logistic Assistant G5	951,05	1,0000	10,000	9.511
Admin & Finance Officer (40%) P2	9.730,00	0,4000	10,000	38.920
Administrative Assistant G5	951,05	1,0000	2,500	2.378
Finance Assistant G8	1.200,00	1,0000	10,000	12.000
Field Security Officer (25%) P2	9.730,48	0,2569	10,000	24.998
IT Officer (25%) P2	9.730,48	0,2569	10,000	24.998
Procurement, Banda Aceh 10% P2	9.730,00	0,1000	10,000	9.730
Sub-Total Staff Costs				478.406
Office Costs				
Rest & Recreation (4 project officers)	750,00	2,500	8,00	15.000
In-Country Travel	250,00	14,000	10,00	35.000
Stationary, office supplies and printing	248,00	4,032	10,00	9.999
4x4 vehicles (rental costs)	1.566,70	3,000	10,00	47.001
Vehicle Fuel and Basic Maintenance	150,00	3,000	10,00	4.500
Mobile Phones	116,00	1,000	one off	116
Office costs Banda ACEh (rent, communication, vehicles) - 30%	2.500,00	1,000	10,00	25.000
Sub-total Office Costs				136.616
Sub-Total Staff & Office Cost				615.023
2.0 OPERATIONAL COSTS				
Information Counseling and Referral Service Network Physical Establishment				
Community Outreach				
Team Leaders	572,84	11	10,00	63.000
Data entry	190,91	11	10,00	21.000
Outreach Assistants	500,00	11	10,00	55.000
ICRS Center Rent and Maintenance Including Utilities	496,20	11	10,00	54.582
ICRS Center Guards	248,10	22	10,00	54.582
ICRS Center Generators & fuel	3.721,50	11	one off	40.937
Security Compliance per ICRS Office	1.818,20	11	one off	20.000
ICRS Office internet Installation	2.067,50	11	one off	22.743
ICRS Office Equipment	3.636,40	11	one off	40.000
ICRS Office HF Communication Equipment	4.959,00	11	one off	54.549
ICRS Office 4x4 Vehicles (10 offices n/l governors office)	1.502,11	10	5,40	84.354
ICRS Vehicle Fuel and Basic Maintenance	148,86	10	10,00	14.886
ICRS Motorbikes				
ICRS Motorbike Fuel and Basic Maintenance				
ICRS Office Computers and Stabilizers	1.323,20	33	one off	43.666
ICRS Office Maintenance of IT systems & supplies	248,11	10	10,00	24.811
ICRS Office Communications Charges	248,11	11	10,00	27.292
Mobile Telephones	185,40	22	one off	3.639
ICRS Office Air Conditioners	330,00	20	one off	6.600
Prisoner Assessments				33.420
Direct Assistance				
Equipment and Vsal installation (incl. server)				65.000
Software development				20.000
Data entry clerks				35.500
Travel costs for prisoners from Java	260,80	469		122.315
Information Dissemination & Promotion/Publicity/Publication				
MoU Developed, Printed and distributed				30.000
Information Fact Sheets/Brochures developed and distributed				5.000
Radio and TV shows produced and disseminated (at least 25 times)				50.000
Newspapers ads				10.000
Development of comprehensive PSA campaign				25.000
Community Socialization				50.000
Reintegration				
Reintegration Allowance (cash and in-kind)				
Initial orientation packages (x5000)	165,40	5000		827.000
resettlement allowances (x5000)	330,80	5000		1.654.000
Medical Assistance				
Medical Staff)	785,65	5	10,00	42.425
Medical Equipment and documentation			lump sum	24.812
Other				
Programme Evaluation				7.000
Sub-Total Operational Costs				3.633.112
TOTAL (S&O + OPERATIONAL COSTS)				4.248.135
Overhead 7%				297.369
GRAND TOTAL				4.545.504

ANNEX III. LOGICAL FRAMEWORK

Logical Framework

‘Support to the Demobilization and Reintegration of Former Combatants and Detainees in the Indonesian Province of Aceh’

	Intervention Logic	Indicators of achievement	Sources and means of verification	Assumptions
Overall objectives	Support the peace agreement in Aceh through confidence building measures that will contribute to long-term and sustainable demobilisation, reinsertion and reintegration of demobilized former combatants and recently amnestied prisoners.	Level of reinsertion of demobilized former combatants and amnestied prisoners within the Acehnese society	WB Report GAM Reintegration Needs Assessment IOM ‘Cash-Use survey’	The MoU is implemented as agreed in Helsinki: prisoners are released by the GoI and GAM provides list of demobilized combatants for registration under the project
Specific objectives	<p>1. To provide a transitional reintegration package, including secure transportation assistance where necessary, for up to 2,000 amnestied prisoners and 3,000 former combatants.</p> <p>2. To design and implement a multi-faceted socialization and communication campaign to disseminate information and educate both target beneficiaries and the general population about the peace building process.</p> <p>3. To conduct General Health Assessment for up to 2,000 amnestied prisoners and 3,000 former combatants and establish related medical referral networks.</p> <p>4. To establish Information, Counseling and Referral Service (ICRS) network to facilitate the reinsertion of demobilized former combatants and recently released amnestied prisoners.</p>	<p>1. Adequacy of transitional assistance provided with reinsertion needs of prisoners upon release and combatants upon demobilization</p> <p>2. Level of awareness and understanding of Acehnese people about the peace process</p> <p>3. Adequacy of procedures established by ICRS medical teams to receive, treat and refer amnestied prisoners and former combatants</p> <p>4. Adequacy of ICRS locations and office set up to respond efficiently to the reinsertion needs of demobilized combatants and released amnestied prisoners.</p>	<p>1. IOM ‘Cash-Use survey’</p> <p>2. Newspapers articles, radio broadcasts and public opinion surveys capturing level of understanding and of awareness</p> <p>3. Medical component of the ICRS database</p> <p>4. Interviews with demobilized combatants and released amnestied prisoners</p>	GAM structure, GoI, the Governor’s Office continue to demonstrate a collaborative attitude towards IOM and adhesion to the objectives of the project

	5. To initiate the establishment of a case management database that will help map and prioritize in a systematic manner the delivery of reintegration assistance and contribute to developing individualized reintegration plans.	5. Adequacy of the database structure for accurately and systematically mapping the delivery of reintegration assistance	5.1 Physical establishment of the database in all ICRS offices and in Banda Aceh, project management site	
Expected results	<p>1. Up to 2,000 amnestied prisoners and 3,000 former combatants received a demobilization transitional reintegration package providing for a 6 month transitional safety-net.</p> <p>2. Up to 2,000 amnestied prisoners and 3,000 former combatants were given a general health assessment and provided with follow-up health care management advice. Where necessary, an individualized referral recovery plan was outlined.</p> <p>3. A comprehensive socialization and communication campaign developed and conducted targeting information to a minimum of 30,000 Acehnese.</p> <p>4. Information gathered through the demobilisation registration process and a case management database initiated for administration by the ICRS offices.</p> <p>5. 11 Information, Counseling and Referral Support (ICRS) offices set-up, staffed and made operational. In</p>	<p>1. 1.1 Number of amnestied prisoners and demobilized combatants who received a transitional reintegration package 1.2 Number of amnestied prisoners who received secure transportation assistance</p> <p>3.1 Number of General Health Assessments conducted 3.2 Number of medical referrals</p> <p>3.1 Number of basic information brochures produced 3.2 Number of MoUs produced and distributed 3.3 Number of PSAs developed and aired on local radio and TV</p> <p>4.1 Number of data entries in the database 1.2 Nature and accuracy of data entered</p> <p>4.1 Number of ICRS Offices established and staffed 4.2 Number of demobilized combatants</p>	<p>ICRS Database Financial records</p> <p>Medical component of the ICRS database</p> <p>Financial records Copies of newspapers Recording of radio broadcasts</p> <p>Queries run to extract, measure and evaluate content of the database</p> <p>Financial records Pay roll of ICRS staff</p>	The security situation remains stable in the Aceh Province allowing planned activities to take place and staff to travel. A single or series of security incidents could reduce project activity due to possible reduced mobility of staff as advised by the United Nations.

	<p>so doing, the distribution of the transitional reintegration package is fully operationalized and foundation for a mid-long term grant disbursement mechanism established</p> <p>6. The ICRS network and other related support structures are in place and the second phase of the project initiated.</p>	<p>and released prisoners who visited ICRS Offices</p> <p>6. Number of demobilized combatants and amnestied prisoners who received transitional reintegration packages who continue to be assisted by IOM for their medium to longer term reintegration</p>	<p>6. ICRS database</p>	
Activities	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Organize and implement an orderly disbursement of transitional reintegration assistance packages and facilitate return travel for demobilized combatants, where necessary 2. Conduct General Health Assessments of demobilized former combatants and amnestied prisoners 3. Undertake a broad socialization and communication campaign to disseminate information and educate both the programme target beneficiaries and the general population about the peace process 4. Establish 11 Information, Counseling and Referral Services (ICRS) offices 5. Begin establishment of case-management database programme to support ongoing socialization and reintegration efforts for demobilized combatants and host communities 	<p>Means</p> <p>Personnel:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 9.5 International staff • 59 National staff • 5 Medical staff <p>Equipment:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 13 Vehicles • 23 Mobile phones • 33 Computers and stabilizers <p>Operational facilities:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 10 ICRS Offices • 11 ICRS Office Equipment • 11 Office HF Communication Equipment 	<p>Budget</p> <p>Grand total: Euro 4,545,504 Staff and Office Costs: Euro 815,023 Operational Costs: Euro 3,633,112 Overheads: Euro 297,369</p>	

ANNEX IV. GAM LETTER TO IOM



ACHEH/SUMATRA NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT

To: IOM Post-conflict DDR Programme Manager.

From: Coordinator, Central Council MoU Socialization

29 December 2005

On behalf of the GAM leadership, and following on the demobilisation of the GAM-TNA, we are officially informing you, as the IOM Programme Manager for Post-conflict, that we intend to direct, initially, our ex-combatants and ex-prisoners to register for assistance with your DDR programme; delivered through the PIKR offices.

This decision is taken in recognition of the needs of our ex-combatants, and acknowledging the activities of IOM, in assisting the Achenese people building a better future, and your support to the peace process within Aceh.

We would at this stage wish to make you aware that we foresee a need, in the future, to address the needs of conflict affected peoples, beyond the ex-combatants and ex-prisoners. We look forward to discussing this with you in the near future, and hope that you will be in a position to meet these needs.

Tgk. Muhammad

Coordinator, Central Council MoU Socialization



ACHEH/SUMATRA NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT

Kepada Yth,
Program Manager IOM Post-conflict DDR

Dari: Kordinator MPS MoU

29 Desember 2005

Atas nama pimpinan GAM, dan mengikuti proses demobilisasi mantan TNA GAM, kami secara resmi menginformasikan kepada anda, sebagai Program Manager IOM untuk Post conflict bahwa kami merencanakan untuk tahap awal ini mengirimkan sejumlah mantan TNA and mantan tahanan GAM untuk didaftar bagi mendapatkan pelayanan dan bantuan dari program. Hal ini akan di laksanakan melalui kantor-kantor PIKR.

Keputusan ini diambil sebagai pengakuan terhadap pentingnya membantu para mantan prajurit GAM, dan mengakui aktivitas IOM bagi membantu masyarakat Aceh untuk membangun masa depan yang lebih baik, dan juga bagi membantu proses perdamaian di Aceh.

Bersama ini juga kami memberitahukan bahwa pentingnya bagi di masa depan untuk mebantukan kebutuhan masyarakat korban konflik, selain hanya dari mantan TNA dan mantan tahanan GAM. Kami ingin dalam waktu segera mendiskusikan masalah ini, dan kami mengharapakan IOM bisa bekerja untuk membantu kebutuhan para korban lainnya.

Majelis Pusat Sosialisasi MoU

Tgk. Muhammad

Kordinator

ANNEX V. EC LETTER TO IOM

RECEIVED 27 MAR 2006

EUROPEAN UNION
Delegation of the
European Commission in Indonesia



UNI EROPA
Delegasi Komisi Eropa
di Indonesia

Head of Delegation

Kepala Delegasi

Jakarta, 24 March 2006

Ref:1304-06/ERGG-11.06.05/SMes

Mr. Stephen J Cook
Chief of Mission, IOM
Surya Building 12th A Floor
Jl. MH Thamrin Kav. 9
Jakarta 10350.

Dear Mr. Cook,

Subject: RRM6-2005/05-0027.00 "Support for the demobilization and reintegration of former combatants and detainees in the Indonesian Province of Aceh"

With reference to recent developments on reintegration in Aceh, in particular the establishment of the Badan Reintegrasi Aceh (BRA), and the indication given by the Gol on 24/04/2006 in a meeting in Bappenas that it is in a position to pay individual reintegration cash assistance to 3000 ex-TNA from the state budget 2005-2006, the Commission is obliged to clarify its position with regard to the use of RRM funds for this same purpose under the above grant contract.

In the likelihood that the Gol confirms that it will proceed with the payment to the ex-TNA from the state budget, payment of RRM funds for this same purpose to ex-TNA would constitute a "double payment" which is not possible under EC's operating rules and regulations. Pending full clarification on this point by the Gol, we would request you not to release any funds for the purposes of cash payment under the above grant contract to ex-TNA without express and prior approval in writing from the Commission.

Yours sincerely,



Jean Bretéché
Ambassador

C.c.: Claes Andersson, L. Gillois RELEX A

ANNEX VI. IOM LETTER TO EC



IOM International Organization for Migration
OIM Organisation Internationale pour les Migrations
OIM Organización Internacional para las Migraciones

Jakarta, 31 March 2006

Subject: RRM6-2005/05-0027.00 “support for the demobilization and reintegration of former combatants and detainees in the Indonesian province of Aceh”

Dear Ambassador,

I would like to hereby acknowledge reception of your letter and confirm that IOM will not release any funds for the purpose of cash payment under the above grant contract to ex-TNA without express and prior approval in writing from the European Commission.

IOM is currently actively coordinating and cooperating with the newly established Aceh Reintegration-Peace Agency (BRA) in view of identifying potential solutions. We will keep you abreast of the progress of our discussions and will submit for your consideration proposals as to the way to use the EC funding in the strict framework of our grant agreement.

I would like to thank you for your continuous support to IOM's activities.

Yours sincerely,


Steve Cook
Chief of Mission
IOM Jakarta



Mr. Jean Bret  ch  
Ambassador
Delegation of the European Commission in Indonesia, Brunei Darusalam and East Timor
Wisma Dharmala Sakti
16th floor
Jl. Jend. Sudirman 32
Jakarta 10220

Cc Claes Andersson and Laurence Gillois
Relex A

ANNEX VII. SOURCES

Annex 7. Sources

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Post Conflict Reintegration Programme Update	IOM	July 2006
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