



Independent Evaluation of IOM's  
Project "Horn/Gulf of Aden/Yemen:  
Improving Protection of Migrants –  
Phase III"

Final Evaluation Report

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## **Executive summary**

### **BACKGROUND**

The International Organization for Migration (IOM) has sought to promote humane management of mixed migration flows in the Horn of Africa through its project “Horn/Gulf of Aden/Yemen: Improving Protection of Migrants – Phase III”, implemented from October 2012 to September 2013. Phase III built upon the initiatives undertaken in phases I and II. With a budget of one million dollars, the project, which was managed by IOM Kenya, included measures aimed at providing services to migrants, improving regional coordination and cooperation among stakeholders, as well as awareness raising and capacity building. In addition, particular activities were emphasised in each project country to adapt the project to the country’s particular needs. Hence in Ethiopia, the project included a mapping exercise on labour migration, as well as efforts to inform potential migrants about the realities of the journey. In Djibouti, Somaliland and Puntland, the focus was on direct emergency assistance, awareness raising to migrants, and Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration services. Finally in Yemen, the project provided emergency and longer-term assistance to migrants.

The project sought to achieve three key outcomes:

1. Regional coordination, cooperation and capacity in mixed migration management is improved.
2. Protection concerns of migratory populations are mitigated and addressed.
3. Frameworks for regularized labour migration out of the Horn of Africa to Gulf States are improved.

### **EVALUATION PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY**

As Phase III drew to a close, and in keeping with IOM’s commitment to improve results based management, this external evaluation was commissioned in order to review the effectiveness of the project, assess prospects for sustainability, identify and document lessons learned and best practices, and inform the development of follow up projects and programmes.

The evaluation was undertaken according to OECD-DAC and UNEG principles and guidelines, with an evidence-based and utilization focused approach. The consultant is independent, thus the conclusions reached are those of the evaluator.

Data collection methods included a review of project documents as well as key informant interviews and focus group discussions, coupled with field observations. The analysis was based on the logical framework of the project as well as on content analysis of responses to interviews and of project documentation. The project’s effectiveness was analysed primarily through a most-significant change approach, assessing the informants’ perceptions of the project’s effects. Contextual analysis of other actors involved in similar activities permitted the conduct of a contribution analysis, wherever the complexity of the context made direct causality difficult to attribute.

## FINDINGS

### *Relevance*

The evaluation finds that the project, while somewhat overly ambitious, responds to concrete needs in the region, and is well aligned with IOM's mission and expertise. Efforts have clearly been made to involve stakeholders, although moves to ensure alignment with national priorities in each country and thus bolster ownership were relatively weak.

(Findings 1 and 2)

**FINDING 1:** The project and its intended results are highly relevant for the existing context in which it is being carried out, are in line with IOM's objectives and expertise, and are relevant to the needs of stakeholders. Consultation with stakeholders during the design phase was good in certain regards, though with some important weaknesses.

**FINDING 2:** Overall, the project's theory of change is well suited to the context in which it is implemented. Further, almost all of the project's objectives, outcomes and outputs are logically linked and have a reasonable potential to bring about many of the desired changes, although cannot be expected to fully address the root causes of irregular migration.

### *Effectiveness*

The project has had positive effects for two of its main objectives, namely with regards to enhancing cooperation and coordination and, to a greater extent, in providing emergency assistance and information to migrants. The third objective, improving frameworks for regularizing migration flows, has had much more mixed results. An important weakness throughout has been the absence of sufficiently robust monitoring and documentation frameworks, as a result of which the extent of project effects cannot be adequately assessed. While the project's staff is overall capable and effective, management structures and project-cycle challenges have somewhat reduced the project's effectiveness.

(Findings 3 to 6)

**FINDING 3:** The project has had some limited initial success as regards improving regional coordination, cooperation, and capacity in mixed migration management, though with some significant challenges as regards Action Plans.

**FINDING 4:** The project has enjoyed good success in carrying out most of its activities related to mitigating and addressing the protection concerns of migratory populations, yet weaknesses in terms of monitoring limit the ability to judge the true effects of some of those activities.

**FINDING 5:** The project has had reported though unverified success with very important caveats as regards project activities related to improving frameworks regularizing mixed migration in the region.

FINDING 6: A major strength of the project is its excellent and dedicated staff; challenges include poor monitoring and evaluation, some coordination and management issues, the fact that it strongly resembles a program but is largely run on a project basis, and some issues arising from the initiative's life cycle.

#### *Process and efficiency*

Overall, the project has been efficiently implemented and managed, although weaknesses were observed particularly in terms of timeliness of project activities as well as performance and results monitoring.

(Findings 7 and 8)

FINDING 7: The project was relatively efficient at working toward outputs given the challenging contexts and complexity of the issues, though with some significant concerns related to burn rates overall and to human resources in some offices.

FINDING 8: Overall project management was good though with some weaknesses that occasionally affected activities; project design was largely good, with some weaknesses noted; and while promising initial steps have been taken related to program performance and results monitoring, much work remains to be done.

#### *Sustainability*

FINDING 9: Reasonable sustainability strategies were planned – such as capacity building and working toward regularized mixed migration – though weaknesses related to these activities as well as challenges in terms of ownership and institutionalization undermine long-term project sustainability.

#### **LESSONS LEARNED**

The project's theory of change is strong; yet its weaknesses in terms of the goals that migrant outreach can expect to achieve point toward the lesson that it is important to challenge and rigorously examine intuitively appealing linkages in project logic.

Successfully influencing the priorities of key stakeholders, such as putting mixed migration on national and regional agendas, can only be achieved through early and continued dialogue and awareness raising. This in turn creates an enabling context for project sustainability.

Appropriate project monitoring frameworks and practices are necessary for continuous feedback and identifying opportunities for improvement during, rather than after, project implementation. This has become the norm in international cooperation activities, and improves project evaluability.

Long-term, integrated planning can and should occur when there is a reasonable expectation that future funding will be possible, with short-term projects fitted in to that larger plan. This can

improve project continuity and increase effects, and can also be highlighted to funders as a positive attribute that means their money will achieve more.

Inefficient and weak coordination mechanisms can directly affect a project's results, and need to be addressed through an open, collaborative process of discussion that ultimately puts in place mechanisms and procedures to ensure smoother functioning.

## **RECOMMENDATIONS**

**RECOMMENDATION 1:** IOM should build on recent positive moves regarding developing monitoring tools to ensure that project results are monitored and that results feed back into and inform project implementation and planning. (Related to findings 3, 4, 6 and 8)

**RECOMMENDATION 2:** IOM should in particular monitor its outreach activities, to judge what effects if any they are having and to adjust the activities as necessary. (Related to findings 4 and 2)

**RECOMMENDATION 3:** IOM should work to reinvigorate the labour migration portion of the project and its associated activities; as part of this effort, it should engage with destination countries in a coherent and systematic manner. (Related to findings 5 and 8)

**RECOMMENDATION 4:** IOM should continue to work to build ownership among key stakeholders, especially government actors. (Related to findings 1, 3 and 9)

**RECOMMENDATION 5:** IOM should continue to build and enhance its capacity building activities for both individuals and organizations, and should monitor and follow-up on these activities to ensure their effectiveness. (Related to findings 1, 3, 6 and 9)

**RECOMMENDATION 6:** IOM should conduct a capacity needs assessment to determine whether project staff have the requisite technical and project management capacities, and provide additional support as needed to ensure that these needs are met. (Related to Finding 7)

**RECOMMENDATION 7:** IOM should continue to seek out the right balance between the autonomy of the country offices and oversight by the managing office. (Related to findings 6 and 8)

**RECOMMENDATION 8:** IOM should decide whether this is a program or a project and adjust its planning and implementation accordingly. (Related to findings 6 and 1)

## **A c r o n y m s**

AVRR	Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration
CO	Country Office
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organization
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
ILO	International Labour Organization
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MRC	Migration Response Center
OECD-DAC	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development - Development Assistance Committee
ONARS	Office National d'Assistance aux Réfugiés et aux Sinistrés
RMMS	Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat
UNEG	United National Evaluation Group
IT	Information Technology
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund



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## 1. Introduction

This Final Evaluation Report presents the findings of the independent evaluation of the International Organization for Migration's (IOM) "Horn/Gulf of Aden/Yemen: Improving Protection of Migrants – Phase III" project, implemented from October 2012 to September 2013.<sup>1</sup> The report is organized into five sections as follows:

- Section 1: Introduction
- Section 2: Context and Purpose of the Evaluation
- Section 3: Findings
- Section 4: Conclusions/Lessons Learned
- Section 5: Recommendations

The report also contains annexes that supplement the information contained in the main body of the report. The annexes are organized as follows:

- Annex 1: Terms of Reference
- Annex 2: Evaluation Matrix
- Annex 3: Capacity building and Monitoring and Evaluation
- Annex 4: List of Respondents
- Annex 5: List of documents consulted

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<sup>1</sup> Some of the project activities took place after this end date, with the prior agreement of the donor.

## 2. Context and Purpose of the Evaluation

### 2.1 Context

The International Organization for Migration (IOM) is the leading international organization addressing issues of migration. It acts with its partners in the international community to assist in meeting the operational challenges of migration management, advance understanding of migration issues, encourage social and economic development through migration, and uphold the human dignity and well-being of migrants.

One of the key regions in which IOM works is the Horn of Africa, an area where often volatile and insecure conditions motivate large numbers of people – including refugees, asylum seekers, smuggled and trafficked persons, as well as migrant workers – to move within and across borders. More particularly, a large number of migrants head to staging areas in Somaliland, Puntland and Djibouti with the goal of crossing the Gulf of Aden to reach Yemen and beyond. The migrants, most of whom come from Ethiopia and Somalia, face extreme hardship in making this trip: exposure to often harsh climatic conditions, physical and sexual abuse from smugglers and authorities, as well as regular incidents at sea that cause loss of life. The migrants are especially vulnerable because they have limited financial resources and often lack legal documentation, as well as because there is a general absence of legal protection for migrants and dangerous security conditions in many of these countries.

IOM has sought to promote humane management of mixed migration flows in the Horn of Africa through its project “Horn/Gulf of Aden/Yemen: Improving Protection of Migrants – Phase III”, implemented from October 2012 to September 2013. Phase III built upon the initiatives undertaken in phases I and II, and involved measures that responded to the very different contexts in each country as well as the particular needs of migrants. Thus in Ethiopia, the project particularly focused upon awareness raising among migrants about the realities of the journey, enhancing cooperation and coordination amongst various key stakeholders including government and other International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs), capacity development, and a pilot mapping exercise on labour migration. In Djibouti, Somaliland and Puntland, the focus was on direct emergency assistance and awareness raising to migrants, improving cooperation and coordination as well as capacity development, and Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration of migrants. And in Yemen, the focus was on emergency and longer-term assistance to migrants as well as Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration. The project, which was managed by IOM Kenya, also included measures aimed at improving regional coordination and cooperation.

Mixed Migration includes irregular migrants (which includes migrant workers as well as migrants who leave for other reasons such as reuniting with their family), refugees and asylum seekers (forced migrants), victims of trafficking (involuntary migrants), stateless persons, and unaccompanied minors and separated children as well as other vulnerable people on the move.

Source: *Responses to Mixed Migration in the Horn of Africa & Yemen: policies and assistance responses in a fast-changing context*, August 2013, pg. 9.

The project sought to achieve three key outcomes:

4. Regional coordination, cooperation and capacity in mixed migration management is

improved.

5. Protection concerns of migratory populations are mitigated and addressed.
6. Frameworks for regularized labour migration out of the Horn of Africa to Gulf States are improved.

The total budget for the project was USD\$ 1 million, distributed as follows:

Item	Amount (in USD)
Staff costs	297,960
Office costs	120,421
Operational costs	534,000
Outcome 1: Regional coordination, cooperation, and capacity	84,000
Outcome 2: Protection	381,000
Outcome 3: Labour migration frameworks	44,000
Monitoring and evaluation	25,000
IOM Overhead	47,619
TOTAL	1,000,000

## 2.2 Evaluation objectives

This independent evaluation of the project “Horn/Gulf of Aden/Yemen: Improving Protection of Migrants – Phase III” is in line with IOM’s commitment to improve results based-management. The main purpose of this evaluation is to review the effectiveness of the project, assess prospects for sustainability, identify and document lessons learned and best practices, and inform the development of follow up projects and programmes.

More specifically, the stated objectives of the evaluation are to:

- Assess the relevance of the project’s intended results.
- Assess the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of project implementation.
- Assess the effectiveness of the project in reaching its stated objectives.
- Assess prospects for sustainability.
- Assess the appropriateness of the project design and management arrangements for achieving its stated objectives
- Identify lessons learned and best practices.
- Assess existing proposed follow up programmes and make recommendations for improvements.

## 2.3 Evaluation framework and methodology

The assignment was carried out in conformity with international evaluation standards including OECD-DAC and UNEG principles and guidelines. The evaluation was evidence-based and utilization focused, subject to the limitations of the resources available. Stakeholder participation was sought and incorporated into the evaluator's understanding of the information collected, analysis performed, findings presented, recommendations made, and results disseminated. The consultant is independent, thus the conclusions reached are those of the evaluator.

An evaluation framework identifies the main questions of the study and provides the plan for how these questions can be answered. It defines the key terms and provides the sources of data, data collection instruments, and approach to analysis. This section provides in prose the broad aspects of the methodology placed in the form of an evaluation matrix in Annex 2.

An evaluation matrix is a way of organizing the evaluation questions around the major issues of concern to the evaluation. Further, as relevant, the matrix sub-divides the elements of the main questions into sub-questions that explicitly address the relevant issues under investigation. As such, the answers to these sub-questions combine to answer the overall questions, and are the primary focus of the data collection. The matrix also provides a structure to ensure that multiple data sources are used to answer each question, and a mix of stakeholder views is sought during the process to ensure balance and accuracy to the greatest extent possible.

This evaluation framework is structured around the key evaluation criteria of relevance, effectiveness, process and efficiency, and sustainability.

### 2.3.1 Data Collection methods

The consultant obtained data from a desk review of documents, as well as semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders, focus group discussions and field observations. These elements will be described in more detail below. All methods of data collection were undertaken with a utilization-focused approach emphasising lessons learned and good practices with an aim of informing future programming. The components of this process are as follows:

#### 2.3.1.1 Document Review

An initial review of available documents was undertaken during the inception phase of this evaluation, serving to provide key background information to inform the other methods to be used, as well as identifying gaps in knowledge and data sources. Another round of document review was undertaken as part of the report preparation phase of the evaluation, primarily focusing on documents received since the inception phase.<sup>2</sup> The documents reviewed were provided by IOM, and included among others (see Annex 5 for a full list):

- Project document
- Project budget
- Interim reports and final reports

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<sup>2</sup> For a complete list of documents reviewed during the course of the evaluation, see Annex 5.

- Monitoring reports
- IOM strategy papers
- Quarterly reports

### **2.3.1.2 Semi-structured interviews**

For the development of an understanding of the project's logic and functioning, as well as the extent to which it achieved expected results and challenges faced, semi-structured interviews were conducted with those involved in the development, management and implementation of the project. Identification of key stakeholders was carried out with the assistance of IOM. The full list of interviewees can be consulted in Annex 4. Categories of respondents included:

- IOM Kenya staff; IOM Ethiopia staff; IOM Djibouti staff; IOM Yemen staff; IOM Somalia staff (including staff based in Puntland and Somaliland)
- Government officials (Federal Police Commission, Ethiopia, Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, Ethiopia, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ethiopia, Immigration Police, Djibouti, Ministry of the Interior, Djibouti, and the Office National d'Assistance aux Réfugiés et aux Sinistrés (ONARS), Djibouti)
- Members of coordination bodies

These semi-structured interviews were organised around the main themes of the evaluation matrix (see Annex 2). For each informant, questions were asked according to their potential and actual familiarity with the different components of the project, based upon the questions and sub-questions in the evaluation matrix. As such, the exact structure and content of the interview was tailored according to the flow of the interview, the knowledge of the interviewee and the information received.

### **2.3.1.3 Field observations**

The question of field observations/discussions with beneficiaries was addressed at the initial meeting in Nairobi. There were two main concerns related to trying to include beneficiaries: that the very tight schedule in each country and the time required to visit with beneficiaries meant that it was not clear that it would be possible to schedule field observations/beneficiary discussions; and more importantly from a methodological point of view, that the lack of data collection visits to Yemen and Somalia would preclude contact with beneficiaries in those countries – thus any contact with beneficiaries in the countries actually visited would lack a basis for cross-country comparison, and would therefore be little more than anecdotal.

It was agreed to try to conduct an informal focus group of returned migrants during the consultant's visit to Ethiopia, with the information gathered to be used for primarily illustrative purposes so as to inform the consultant's understanding of the challenges faced by the IOM in its programming due to the methodological issues noted above. This informal focus group did prove possible to organize, and involved approximately eight Ethiopian men at the transit centre in Addis Ababa who were returning to their home region. A second informal focus group also took place in Djibouti, which consisted of approximately 25 Ethiopian men who were waiting to be returned to their home region.

### 2.3.2 Data Analysis

Data collected during the document review and the interviews as well as through general observations was subjected to qualitative analyses. Data was triangulated across respondents and between data sources in order to ensure its empirical validity.

The analysis was based on the logical framework of the project as well as on content analysis of responses to interviews and of project documentation. This allowed the consultant to assess the project's relevance, efficiency and sustainability. The project's effectiveness was analysed primarily through a most-significant change approach, assessing the informants' perceptions of the project's effects. As well, contextual analysis of other actors involved in similar activities permitted the conduct of a contribution analysis, wherever the complexity of the context made direct causality difficult to attribute.

It should be noted that due to the short implementation period of the project and the complexity of the issues being addressed, evaluation findings are primarily at the level of outputs. Thus while the consultant made every effort to assess progress towards outcomes, assessing project impacts proved in many ways premature at this stage.

### 2.4 Risks, limitations and mitigation strategies

The methodology was designed to produce a quality evaluation in accordance with OECD-DAC and UNEG evaluation standards, within the constraints presented by the available budget and time. Any methodological choice implies limitations, and the tight timeline for this assignment as well as the lack of field visits to some of the implementation sites also presented limitations and risks. The exhibit below summarises the main constraints and presents the mitigation strategies adopted.

#### Exhibit 2.4 – Limitations and Mitigation Strategy

Limitation / Risk	Mitigation Strategy
The very tight timeline in the field gave rise to concerns about the ability to engage with all the relevant actors. In particular, there was not time for field visits to Puntland and Somaliland, while the security situation in Yemen made it impossible to carry out fieldwork there.	Active support from the Kenya office and from the country offices in identifying, scheduling and facilitating relevant interviews aimed to mitigate this to the extent possible. For the countries where field visits were not possible, distance interviews by telephone and Skype were carried out.
Baselines were not available for many of the elements to be evaluated, and thus it was difficult to definitively determine progress made on these elements.	Attempts were made to determine baselines wherever possible, through documents as well as through interviews. This included attempting to reconstruct baseline data <i>ex post</i> , primarily through interviews.
There were concerns that it might not be practical to engage with beneficiaries, from a methodological point of view (inability to compare across countries) and from a timing point of view.	As noted earlier, it proved possible to organize two informal focus groups of returning migrants during the consultant's visits to Ethiopia and to Djibouti (for primarily illustrative purposes).

### 3. Findings

This section presents the findings emerging from the data collection and analysis process. It is organised according to the main evaluation criteria of relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, sustainability based on the definitions of these terms by the OECD/DAC, and follows the lines of inquiry summarised in the evaluation matrix.

#### 3.1 Relevance

The concept of relevance is defined by the OECD/DAC as the extent to which the objectives of a development intervention are consistent with beneficiaries' requirements, country needs, global priorities and partners' and donors' policies. In this section, we particularly focus upon the relevance of the project's intended results relative to the context in which it was implemented and the needs of stakeholders, including governments. We also examine the theory of change that connects the project's activities with the outcomes sought.

**FINDING 1:** The project and its intended results are highly relevant for the existing context in which it is being carried out, are in line with IOM's objectives and expertise, and are relevant to the needs of stakeholders. Consultation with stakeholders during the design phase was good in certain regards, though with some important weaknesses.

##### 3.1.1 Relevance to Context

The present context for mixed migration in the Horn of Africa region is critical. Over 100,000 migrants arrived in Yemen in 2011 and in 2012, a number that does not include those who left their home countries but failed to reach Yemen.<sup>3</sup> While the rate of migration appears to have slowed slightly in 2013 compared to the previous year, the numbers still remain very high – for example, an estimated 3,129 Ethiopians made their way to Yemen in August 2013.<sup>4</sup> Furthermore, while the number of Somalis making the trip has decreased – with the improving socio-political situation in Somalia a key reason for this – the number of Ethiopians has risen significantly.

Importantly, migrants continue to experience severe human rights abuses along the route, and the levels of abuse and violence appear to be increasing. This includes abandonment by smugglers, lack of food and water or medical support, confinement, beatings, sexual attacks, torture, extortion and robbery. While the number of deaths at sea has decreased, kidnappings for ransom seem to be on the rise. Indeed, some have linked the decrease in deaths at sea to the increasing value of the lives of the migrants for ransoming purposes.<sup>5</sup>

Until recently, a key challenge in coping with this situation was the relative lack of good data, analysis and reporting regarding regional mixed migration. It was to address these issues as well as

<sup>3</sup> *Responses to Mixed Migration in the Horn of Africa and Yemen*, Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat, August 2013, pg. 14.

<sup>4</sup> See the *Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat Monthly Summaries*, available at: [www.regionalmms.org](http://www.regionalmms.org)

<sup>5</sup> Chris Horwood, 2009, quoted in *Responses to Mixed Migration in the Horn of Africa and Yemen*, pg. 14. The observation about increasing levels of violence was also made informally by several key respondents.

to improve support and coordination that the Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat (RMMS) was set up in 2011 by IOM and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) among other agencies.<sup>6</sup> Research by RMMS has underlined several key contextual issues: Most if not all countries in the region are to one degree or another overwhelmed by the nature and scale of the mixed migration challenge, a situation that is exacerbated by their relatively limited capacities. At the same time, migration policies and frameworks are “incoherent and incomplete”, lacking a clear vision on migration and suffering due to poor mainstreaming of migration into other policy areas. Given the regional nature of the issue, regional cooperation is clearly critical; yet at this time, such cooperation and coordination remains relatively incipient.

Taken together, this context of high migrant numbers and high rates of abuse and suffering coupled with the relatively weak capacities of regional actors underlines the strong relevance of the project given its focus on addressing the needs of the migrants by trying to address their protection concerns, improving frameworks for regularized labour migration, as well as improving regional coordination, cooperation and capacity. This point of view was echoed by multiple key informants including governmental stakeholders, who described the project’s intended results and activities as relevant to the particularities of the context.

### **3.1.2 Alignment with IOM’s Objectives and Expertise**

The primary objective of IOM as an organization is to “facilitate the orderly and humane management of international migration”.<sup>7</sup> This overarching goal involves multiple activities, which include: providing services to persons requiring international migration assistance; enhancing the management of migration; helping to build national and regional capacities and cooperation on migration matters; to assist in addressing the root causes of irregular migration; to promote dialogue on migration; to facilitate the voluntary return and reintegration of migrants; and to support states in the area of labour migration.<sup>8</sup> The organization has moreover developed considerable expertise in line with this objective and these activities over the course of its 60 years of work in the field of migration.

The three main objectives of the project – see section 2.1 – as well as its specific activities are very clearly aligned with IOM’s organizational objective and activities described above. Those project activities include providing direct services to migrants such as voluntary return and reintegration, building capacities, improving coordination and cooperation, and supporting states in the area of labour migration. Overall then, the project is very relevant to IOM’s strategies, priorities and expertise.

### **3.1.3 Alignment with stakeholder needs and priorities**

The key stakeholders for this project include migrant groups and vulnerable individuals, regional governments and local authorities, NGOs and relevant civil society organizations, as well as migrant host communities in Somaliland, Puntland, Djibouti, Ethiopia and Yemen. The alignment of the project with the needs of governments is particularly important, since they are the key partners with which IOM works to implement the project activities. As was noted in Section 3.1.1.2 and as emerged in multiple key informant interviews, the capacities of the regional governments are low

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<sup>6</sup> IOM continues to sit on the steering committee for the RMSS.

<sup>7</sup> *IOM Kenya Strategic Plan 2012-2014.*

<sup>8</sup> *IOM Kenya Strategic Plan 2012-2014.*

relative to the scale of the challenges, especially in terms of their ability to provide services directly to migrants. IOM's activities focused on supporting their governmental partners in providing such services – for example at the Migration Response Centres (MRCs) and with Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration (AVRR) of migrants – are thus highly relevant to the regional governments.

Regarding the relevance of the project to the priorities of the governments, key informant interviews confirmed that addressing the situation of the migrants is among the priorities for all regional governments. Recent actions by certain governments confirm this observation – for example, the Yemeni government raided a smuggler's compound in April-May 2013 and freed approximately 2000 migrants that were being held there<sup>9</sup>; and the Ethiopian Foreign Ministry recently banned its citizens from travelling abroad for work so as to “safeguard the well-being of citizens”, who it said were suffering physical and psychological trauma as well as death because of illegal human trafficking.<sup>10</sup>

In making this observation, it bears noting that IOM played an important role in contributing to putting the issue of mixed migration onto the agenda of regional governments. Thus the relevance of the project to governmental priorities is to some degree a result of efforts by IOM to influence those priorities. A caveat to this analysis is that improving regional coordination and cooperation on mixed migration, a key objective of the project, remains relatively peripheral to governmental priorities. More particularly, governmental efforts in this regard sometimes seem half-hearted, an impression that also emerged in interviews with key government informants. While this aspect of the project is therefore not very relevant to governmental priorities at present, IOM is working to shift those priorities, which would have the effect of making it relevant. This in turn has important implications for national ownership however, since ownership is frequently strongest when it emerges as a priority out of a nationally driven process.

The alignment of the project with the needs and priorities of migrant groups and vulnerable individuals is made clear in Section 3.1.1.1, while its relevance to those of NGOs and civil society organizations – and particularly to the organizations with which IOM coordinates closely regarding the migrants, UNHCR and UNICEF – was emphasized by multiple key informants. The relevance to migrant host communities also emerged quite strongly in key informant interviews. According to one person, “the local people are friendly in general to the migrants; [that is] they are good initially, but they have very limited resources – for example in terms of hospitals – and they have lost their patience as the numbers have increased.”

### **3.1.4 Consultation of stakeholders in project design**

The process for project design began at the regional office – from where the project was ultimately managed – and involved input from the funder (the Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration, US Department of State) as well as the IOM country offices. The input from the funder played an important role in the project proposal being adapted to incorporate more measures aimed at addressing the root causes of the challenges related to mixed migration, most visibly in the development of objective three (aimed at improving frameworks for labour migration in the region).

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<sup>9</sup> Interview with key respondent.

<sup>10</sup> BBC news report, “Ethiopia bans citizens from travelling abroad for work”, 24 October 2013, available at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-24663049>.

From the point of view of country offices, key respondents reported having a sense of being well consulted in the project design phase, and of their needs being taken into account. Yet several respondents from at least one CO characterized the consultation process as rather perfunctory, since the CO was given very little time to comment on what was already a practically finished proposal and was moreover told that there was an expectation that very little would change.

There does not seem to have been a formal consultation process related to the project design with the government partners, but rather an attempt to represent their needs based on understandings of these by IOM. Formal, direct consultation with governments would very likely be challenging to coordinate and time-intensive; yet it is nonetheless important to recognize that the lack of such consultation has implications in terms of national ownership, and risks reinforcing a notion that government is very much a junior partner on the project. Reduced national ownership in turn has negative implications for long-term project sustainability, an issue that will be further examined later in this report.

### 3.1.5 Theory of change

**FINDING 2:** Overall, the project's theory of change is well suited to the context in which it is implemented. Further, almost all of the project's objectives, outcomes and outputs are logically linked and have a reasonable potential to bring about many of the desired changes, although cannot be expected to fully address the root causes of irregular migration.

Today we understand the need for a theory of change as a necessary condition for managing toward development results. A theory of change can be defined, quite simply, as a theory of how and why an initiative works.<sup>11</sup> Conceptually related to logic models, theories of change map the causal chain of a development intervention, from inputs to outcomes to impacts. The theory of change goes further than the logic model, in that it explicitly tests the underlying assumptions to answer the crucial question of "why" a development programme should have a particular impact.

Building on this work, a theory of change approach can thus be defined as a systematic and integrative set of assumptions and hypotheses that link the activities, outcomes, and impacts of a project or program. This definition suggests that, when designing a project or program, it is important to determine, early on, the intended outcomes (long term, medium and immediate), the activities it expects to implement to achieve those outcomes, and the managerial and contextual assumptions that may have an effect on the implementation of activities, as well as their potential to bring about desired outcomes. Like all good approaches or methods for understanding social phenomena, the theory of change needs to be adapted to the specific context within which it is asked to explain cause and effect relationships.

The project's overarching objective is to promote humane management of mixed migration flows in the Horn of Africa, by pursuing three distinct but complementary outcomes:

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<sup>11</sup> Carol Weiss, *New Approaches to Evaluating Comprehensive Community Initiatives*, 1995.

1. Regional coordination, cooperation, and capacity in mixed migration management is improved.
2. Protection concerns of migratory populations are mitigated and addressed.
3. Frameworks for regularized labour migration out of the Horn of Africa to Gulf States are improved.

Stated simply, the project's underlying theory of change understands the vulnerability of migrants in the Horn of Africa as being causally related to the lack of a clear and coordinated cross-border regulatory framework for labour migration, which incentivises irregular/undocumented migration. This situation in turn is understood to stem from insufficient capacity within the national governments involved regarding migration management more broadly speaking, and mixed migration more specifically, which prevents the development of an effective regulatory framework and of the provision of adequate protection of migrants' rights. Further, the project assumes that labour migration will continue to occur given the socio-economic context in the region, with demand for labour continuing to grow in Saudi Arabia and in other states in the Arabian Peninsula, while employment opportunities will remain scarce in sending countries from Ethiopia to Eritrea and Somalia. Hence, the project aims to promote the development of safe, legal channels of labour migration within sending, transit and destination states.

The assumptions and intervention logic of the project have been overall validated by the evaluation. Indeed, key informants in all countries confirm that the existing pattern of migration favours irregular migration in the absence of a clearly established framework, stemming from a common lack of awareness of migrant rights coupled with legitimate security concerns, which creates a response to migration that frequently involves suffering and abuse, thus increasing the vulnerability of such migrants in the region. The project's emphasis on capacity building in the form of promoting the creation and functioning of cross-border migration committees and of a regulatory framework for labour migration thus appears to the evaluator to be an appropriate response to the context in which it is implemented.

Similarly, the project recognises that vulnerable migrants are exposed to dangers emanating from the harsh conditions along migration routes with little water or protection from the elements, as well as precarious conditions in boats and abuses from human smugglers and the risk of trafficking. The project's objective of providing protection services to migrants, and enhancing the national governments' capacity to provide such services, is also appropriate to its context.

At the same time, the project sees irregular migration as stemming in part from the lack of information/awareness on the part of migrants of, on the one hand, existing legal channels of labour migration, and on the other of the dangers of clandestine migration. The project thus seeks to contribute to deterring irregular migration by providing potential migrants with that information. Yet it is not at all clear that lack of information/awareness is part of the reason that migrants choose to go. Indeed, it seems entirely possible that even with perfect information about channels for legal migration and the dangers of clandestine migration, people would still choose to leave, such is the

strength of the factors – dire economic circumstances in particular – that push them to go.<sup>12</sup> As such, this element represents the weakest link in the project’s theory of change.

The exhibit below presents a schematic of the evaluator’s understanding of the project’s theory of change.

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<sup>12</sup> This points to the need for follow-up measures to determine the effects of this output and thus ascertain its usefulness, an issue that is addressed later in this report.

**Exhibit 3.1.5 – Project Theory of Change**

<b>Outcomes</b>	<b>Outputs</b>	<b>Assumptions</b>	<b>Actions</b>	<b>Rationale</b>
1. Regional coordination and cooperation and migration management improved	1.1 Cross-border migration committees comprised of officials from Ministries of Interior, and national police, immigration, and coast guard officials, are established.	Migration route passes through many countries, thus needs coordinated approach and the continuous engagement of high-level government officials	Coordination and encouragement of meetings and interactions	Increased interactions and meetings should lead to increased cooperation, which in turn should lead to increased capacity of national governments to deal with migration on their own (ie, without IOM intervention)
	1.2 Members of cross-border migration committees have improved skills and knowledge on mixed migration, protection needs, identification and referral processes, provision of services including AVRR services, and cross-border cooperation.	Government officials lack capacity to effectively manage migration	Capacity building of individual members of cross-border migration committees	Members of cross-border migration committees need to have a strong understanding of the issues involved in order to be effectively engaged in the coordination of migration, as well as appropriate skills to help address the issue
	1.3 Local, national, and regional networks of mixed migration actors are established and engage in action-oriented dialogue.	Governments lack institutional capacity to effectively manage migration	Capacity building of institutions involved in migration management, including through the establishment of functioning cross-border migration committees	Institutional capacity and stability are needed to foster greater cooperation between key stakeholders, and thus to combine their capacities to respond to migration
2. Protection concerns of migratory populations are mitigated and addressed.	2.1 Migrant populations and potential migrant populations have improved understanding of regular migration channels and the risks of irregular migration.	Migrants engage in irregular migration because they are unaware of regular migration channels and of the risks of irregular migration, hence, they are exposed to dangerous and abusive conditions of migration	Provide information to migrants and potential migrants	Informed migrants and potential migrants are less likely to migrate irregularly and are thus at less risk of encountering the dangers of irregular migration
	2.2 Government regulations governing the operation of MRCs are established.	Governments lack awareness of migrant rights and strategies to manage mixed migration	Building institutional capacity for the operation of MRCs	A clear framework for the operation of MRCs increases government understanding of mixed migration and helps to reduce risk of abuses of migrant rights by the authorities. It also facilitates the provision of assistance to migrants

Outcomes	Outputs	Assumptions	Actions	Rationale
	2.3 MRCs have improved administrative and technical capacities.	MRCs lack sufficient capacities to provide appropriate assistance to migrants	Building institutional capacity of MRCs	Well functioning MRCs can provide appropriate assistance to migrants, whether regular or irregular
	2.4 Data collection, analysis, and dissemination systems are strengthened.	There is insufficient information regarding migration flows to enable appropriate management.	Building institutional capacity for monitoring of migration flows	Appropriate information on migration flows will enable appropriate policy design and service provision
	2.5 Identification protocol and referral systems are established and functioning.	There is insufficient information regarding migration flows to enable appropriate management.	Building institutional capacity for monitoring of migration flows	Appropriate information on migration flows will enable appropriate policy design and service provision
	2.6 Vulnerable migrants have access to appropriate services.	Vulnerable migrants require services that are not sufficiently available (in accessibility and/or quality) to ensure their well-being	Building capacity for service provision to vulnerable migrants (availability of MRCs and qualified personnel)	Appropriate (accessible and good quality) services will protect vulnerable migrants and facilitate their safe voluntary return
3. Frameworks for regularized labour migration out of the Horn of Africa to Gulf States are improved.	3.1 Assessment report describing current channels for regular migration from countries of origin, recommendations for improvements to the legal and regulatory frameworks governing labour migration, and assessments of potential for establishment of new channels, is available.	Irregular migration occurs in part because appropriate channels for regular labour migration in the region are very weak	Recommendations for revision of frameworks for migration to regularize flows	Regulated and legal channels for labour migration will reduce the flows of irregular migration and thus reduce the vulnerability of migrants
	3.2 Processes for self-regulation (e.g., code of conduct) of private employment agencies are in place.	Irregular migrants are subject to abuse and trafficking from employment agencies	Assistance for the development of self-regulation framework for employment agencies	Informed and regulated employment agencies will provide a safer framework for migration
	3.3 Services for facilitation of labour migration are established and/or improved.	Irregular migration is in part the result of a lack of available services for regular labour migration	Institutional capacity building for the provision of services to facilitate labour migration	Regulated and legal channels for labour migration will reduce the flows of irregular migration and thus reduce the vulnerability of migrants

## 3.2 Effectiveness

Effectiveness can be defined as “the extent to which the development intervention’s objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance”, or as the answer to the question “is the activity achieving satisfactory results in relation to stated objectives?”. In other words, effectiveness is seen as a measure that assesses the extent to which the objectives of a project were met, from the output to the outcome level, and the extent to which these results contribute to achieving the longer-term, broader objectives of the project. Implicit within the criterion of effectiveness is timeliness.

Before we can assess the extent to which the project was successful at achieving its outputs and the extent to which these contributed to achieving the larger project objective of promoting humane management of mixed migration flows in the Horn of Africa, it is important to consider what best practices are in humane management of mixed migration flows and whether the project outputs, outcomes and objectives are in line with these.

IOM has played a lead role in defining such best practices, as have other organizations also focused upon this issue area such as the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC). While there is some variation in the particularities of the approaches taken to mixed migration – frequently influenced by the mandate and concerns of the organization and the circumstances in which it operates – the broad outline of best practices is clear. This involves focusing on what IOM calls “...the whole ‘migration lifecycle’...by addressing mixed migration flows before or as they develop, while in motion and in emergency situations, post-arrival and in the longer term.”<sup>13</sup> Such a focus implies working both in the short-term by offering services to migrants and trying to improve their situation, as well as in the long-term by trying to improve the circumstances of mixed migration. This latter component logically would include legal measures, greater cooperation between responsible authorities, and sensitization/awareness as well as capacity building for key actors.

These broad strokes are clearly present in the project’s outcomes, while the strength of the linkages between those outcomes and the project outputs was analyzed in Section 3.1.2 (where it was shown that they are logically linked). The key question then becomes, to what extent did it achieve its outputs and thus outcomes? In answering this question, the report will focus upon each outcome and the outputs associated with it separately.

### 3.2.1 Outcome One – Improving Regional Coordination, Cooperation and Capacity

**FINDING 3:** The project has had some limited initial success as regards improving regional coordination, cooperation, and capacity in mixed migration management, though with some significant challenges as regards Action Plans.

The first expected outcome sought to improve regional coordination, cooperation, and capacity in mixed migration management by focusing on establishing cross-border migration committees,

<sup>13</sup> 2008 IOM Discussion Note, *Challenges of Irregular Migration: Addressing Mixed Migration Flows*, pg. 5.

improving the capacities of committee members, putting in place Actions Plans, and fostering local, national and regional networks of mixed migration actors. The underlying logic is to improve the cooperative engagement of key actors on mixed migration (especially governments) both within and across borders in the region, as well as to increase their capacities to constructively work on the issue.

The extent of the project's overall contribution to improving regional coordination, cooperation and capacity in mixed migration management emerges in analysis of each output below. Yet the question of the extent of contribution should also be contextualized with the recognition that progress on the outcome depends upon such measures as careful and sustained nurturing of relationships as well as the creation and invigoration of frameworks and other coordination mechanisms, all things that take place over years. Extent of progress on each output is thus not a perfect measure of extent of progress on the longer-term outcome.

### **3.2.1.1 Cross-Border Migration Committees**

Cross-border migration committees were to be established at the Loyado, Galafi and Guelile crossing points into Djibouti from Somalia and Ethiopia. The committees would be comprised of relevant officials from both sides of the border, including from the Ministry of Interior, the Police and the Ministry of Immigration. The idea was to increase cooperation between these officials at the border, and according to one interviewee, to have that local cooperation filter up to higher levels of government.

Committees have indeed been established at all three locations, but they have only partly achieved the goals that were set for them. More particularly, while the committees have been established in each country and have met several times, they have not formally met and coordinated with their counterparts in the adjoining country. One key informant surmised that this was because of low government buy-in to such meetings that resulted in hesitancy and delays, as well as general bureaucratic slowness. Another key informant had a more positive reading, saying that the government is interested but that it will simply take time for all the elements to fall into place. In Djibouti, a key informant said that the cooperation aimed at by the committees is already taking place, though informally.

What emerges then is a picture of an output that has not been achieved, yet where key first steps have been taken that could, if they continue to be built upon, constitute the basis for greater cross-border cooperation and coordination in the future.

### **3.2.1.2 Capacity building**

In addition to establishing the cross-border migration committees, the project aimed to increase the capacities of committee members in the areas of mixed migration, especially in terms of the protection needs of migratory populations, services available to migrants as well as referral processes to connect migrants to these services, and means of cross-border cooperation. Key respondents in all three countries reported that capacity building activities such as training sessions were carried out. They also noted that these training sessions were useful, but that as is always the case, more training would be worthwhile.

Yet simply carrying out training sessions does not necessarily translate into effective capacity building. This is because effective capacity building requires the relevant individuals to be given the necessary training, and for those individuals to then change the way that they work as well as translate their new knowledge back into their organization such that it affects the ways in which the organization carries out its work in the long-term. Measuring these things requires active tracking of participants following the training activity, to determine whether the training “stuck”, whether and to what degree it influenced their ways of doing things, and to what extent the changes have been incorporated into the larger organizational way of working.<sup>14</sup> There is not evidence of such follow-up being carried out for the project.<sup>15</sup> Thus while the fact that the planned training was carried out is extremely positive, we cannot be certain of its true effectiveness.

### **3.2.1.3 Action Plans**

Another component of the project was to assess and improve Action Plans at the local, national and regional levels, and to improve linkages between the different levels. Such Actions Plans would in theory provide clear guidelines for continuing to improve the response to mixed migration in the region, based on governments acknowledging that mixed migration is an important issue and determining an appropriate response.

According to respondents, formal Action Plans exist at the national level in the various countries, with that of Ethiopia being particularly detailed and moreover having links between the national and local levels (though this progress cannot solely be attributed to the project under evaluation). Yet there is a sense among multiple respondents that the Actions Plans are often not being formally followed and that this initiative was perhaps overly optimistic. Part of the challenge arises from the fact that drafting an effective Action Plan requires ongoing collaboration between all the relevant actors to gain input and to ensure agreement and buy-in moving forward. This in turn implies a slow, steady process of cumulative work over the course of developing the plan. Efforts in this regard were limited, and so Actions Plans, while available, remain relatively under-realized in practice.

### **3.2.1.4 Networks of mixed migration actors established & engage in dialogue**

The project’s efforts to establish networks of mixed migration actors and to encourage them to engage in dialogue have primarily focused on mixed migration task forces at the national level. These task forces pre-dated the project under evaluation, with the task force for Somalia being the first one to come into existence several years ago and in turn giving birth to the task forces in Hargeisa and Bosaso. The idea behind such task forces is to improve cooperation and coordination between agencies working on mixed migration, so as to avoid duplication of efforts and to capitalize on their respective areas of expertise by promoting knowledge sharing.

Mixed migration task forces are meeting regularly – every month or two – in Djibouti, Somaliland, Puntland, Yemen and Ethiopia, with Yemen’s standing out as especially active. In Ethiopia, the task force is in fact a high level structure that is chaired by the Deputy Prime Minister, which according to one respondent underlines the importance attached to the initiative by the government and

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<sup>14</sup> For more information on capacity building, see Annex 3.

<sup>15</sup> One interviewee noted that follow-up would be done on the capacity building for the cross-border committees as part of Phase IV of the project.

positively affects how other actors judge it. A particular success for the project was the establishment of a task force for Kenya. Overall, respondents within IOM as well as within government said that the task forces are helping to facilitate cooperation and coordination at the national level, and the project's contribution to facilitating them represents a clear area of success.

The project's efforts to establish networks of mixed migration actors and engage in dialogue at the regional level primarily consist of the annual meeting of the Regional Committee on Mixed Migration. This meeting brings together key national-level actors from IOM as well as from each country's governments for several days to discuss and learn about particular topics of relevance to the issue of mixed migration and more generally to strengthen relationships so as to facilitate more coordinated action on mixed migration. The 2013 meeting was to have taken place in September, but was pushed back to late October with the agreement of the funder. This later timeline was due to the fact that planning took longer than anticipated, largely because the efforts to include the government of Kenya for the first time and to have them host the meeting in Nairobi were more time consuming than anticipated. Delaying to October was deemed a reasonable price for getting Kenya involved and thus having all the key regional countries represented at the meeting. The meeting was ultimately held on October 30<sup>th</sup> and 31<sup>st</sup>, 2013.

Overall, respondents from each country found the regional meetings to be very useful. Several also speculated that more frequent contact – ideally in person, though also through more frequent communication especially regarding progress made on commitments from the regional meeting – would increase their effectiveness. Yet these observations should be qualified with recognition that some follow-up dialogues between government actors and IOM were carried out, with Somaliland and Puntland particularly standing out in terms of holding regular meetings and follow-up.

Cooperation and coordination at the local level tends to be largely informal, though respondents – including IOM and government representatives – reported that it is working well on an as-needed basis.

### 3.2.2 Outcome Two – Mitigating and Addressing Migrants' Protection Concerns

**FINDING 4:** The project has enjoyed good success in carrying out most of its activities related to mitigating and addressing the protection concerns of migratory populations, yet weaknesses in terms of monitoring limit the ability to judge the true effects of some of those activities.

The project's second expected outcome sought to address the protection concerns of migrant populations by focusing on awareness raising activities, capacity strengthening at Migration Response Centres (MRCs), improved data collection, and especially by providing services directly to migrants. Overall, it seems clear based on the analysis of the outputs below that the project made a contribution to mitigating and addressing the protection concerns of migratory populations, though definitively assessing the extent of the contribution would depend on appropriate follow up measures as well as baselines for comparison.

### 3.2.2.1 Outreach to migrant populations and potential migrant populations

The project sought to improve understanding of regular migration channels as well as the dangers of irregular migration through various outreach measures. These measures include: distributing education materials, posting warning posters, broadcasting radio programs, carrying out community dialogue workshops, putting on educational plays and concerts, having returnee migrants give talks and working with local leaders. The outreach measures have been carried out in all countries with considerable energy and with considerable effort to tailor them to the context, and indeed have been carried out in previous phases of the project as well. At the level of implementing the activities, therefore, the output has been a success.

Yet multiple respondents in several countries expressed a sense of frustration that the measures are not having the effects sought, and questioned whether something else should be done. To some degree this concern can be linked to the still very high numbers of migrants, which respondents intuitively link to outreach measures and use as a basis for judging those measures' relative failures. Knowing the complex constellation of very strong push and pull factors that cause migrants to leave, it seems unreasonable to label the outreach activities a failure simply because migrant numbers remain high. At the same time, there is a more significant issue pointed to by these concerns: that follow-up monitoring can make it possible to judge the effects of outreach activities, and can be used as a basis for refining and designing more effective outreach activities.

#### The Effectiveness of Outreach Measures

"The people arrive and they don't know what awaits them; they're from small villages where there is only one radio. There's something that isn't getting through, something missing... we need to think more creatively about how to reach people better, to better educate them through outreach."

*A key informant*

Key informants confirmed that monitoring of the effectiveness of outreach is not being done; instead, the only measure focused upon is the number of outreach activities carried out. One respondent noted that they used to try to measure effects by handing out surveys after outreach events, but that questionnaires were not returned and that "it was a total failure". To some degree this situation is being addressed by the new data gathering measures being put in place at the Migration Response Centres, where migrants are asked how they heard about the MRC. There is thus the possibility that they could say whether they had heard about it by posters or some other outreach measure, which could in turn provide a basis for refining activities. Yet this is only reaching a small proportion of the target population, and does not represent a full examination of the effectiveness of particular outreach activities. Nor is it clear how this information will feed into future refinements of outreach activities.

Overall then, while many varied outreach activities have been carried out, the true effectiveness of these activities remains unclear. We cannot therefore definitively say whether migrant populations and potential migrant populations have improved awareness.

### 3.2.2.2 Government regulations concerning the operation of MRCs

Putting in place government regulations concerning the operation of Migration Response Centres (MRCs) was envisioned as a way to promote greater government ownership, to increase capacity

and to clarify roles and responsibilities, ultimately helping to improve the operation of the MRCs. But interviewees in the various countries said that efforts to put in place such regulations have not been successful, largely due to their being stalled at the government level. IOM informants speculated that these measures are not prioritized by the governments and indeed that there is reluctance on the part of governments to take it on, though the exact reasons for this reluctance are not clear. Another contributing factor noted by one interviewee is staff turnover in the relevant ministries, which blocks efforts to move forward on regulations. A different key informant also noted that in one location – Puntland – a tug of war between various ministries over ownership/control of the MRC and reporting lines has negatively affected this output.

### **3.2.2.3 MRCs have improved administrative and technical capacities**

The aim of this output was to improve the capacities of MRC staff to register migrants, to report findings, to analyse data, and to contribute to coordinating the response to mixed migration. The training focused on administrative issues (particularly human resources questions), on Information Technology and database management, and on human rights and child protection. MRC and IOM staff interviewed, as well as several government representatives, reported that the relevant people received the training, and also said that it was of good quality. Several cited the delivery of the trainings as a key success of the project.

However, a weakness in regards to the training was that no formal follow-up was done in terms of assessing its effectiveness at improving capacities and changing actual ways of working. There is initial evidence that MRC employees are gathering and reporting data better as a result of the rollout of a new data management system and training related to the rollout (see Section 3.2.2.4; data reports using the new system have been received by the Regional Office from three MRCs, and comprise new data fields); yet this does not constitute a formal follow-up of training effectiveness and of improved capacities. According to one key informant, the training activities were carried out quite late in the project cycle, which meant that follow-up activities were not possible during Phase III. While it is therefore possible that such activities will be carried out in Phase IV of the project, they did not form part of the project under evaluation.

### **3.2.2.4 Data collection, analysis, and dissemination systems are strengthened**

Data collection on migrants is a key activity carried out at the MRCs, providing crucial information that can help to increase understanding of the evolving situation related to mixed migration, and that can in turn help to inform future programming related to mixed migration. The project under evaluation sought to improve the data collection systems to allow for more sophisticated analysis and for better understandings to develop. Thus an IT specialist travelled to the MRCs in the summer of 2013 to carry out an initial assessment. Based on this, it was determined that the system needed to be made more user friendly, that staff needed training, and that more information could usefully be gathered from migrants. The new system was subsequently redesigned and rolled out to three MRCs in September 2013 (in Hargeisa, Bosaso and Obock, the latter two of which had been using paper-based data gathering up until then), with one day training sessions offered and a second day in which the IT specialist was available to answer questions and help with trouble-shooting.

The system represents a significant qualitative improvement over the old system, in terms of user friendliness and also in terms of the quality of the information gathered. Each of the MRCs has also

submitted first reports to the RO, showing that they know how to use the new system. In the future, efforts will likely be made to continue to enhance the system in terms of information gathered, as well as developing the ability for each MRC's system to be integrated together with the others so as to facilitate more sophisticated combined analysis. There is also the possibility of rollout to the MRC in Yemen. Overall then, it is clear that data collection, analysis and dissemination systems have been improved by the project.

### **3.2.2.5 Identification and protocol systems are established**

One aspect of the project focused on helping to develop and disseminate better procedures for identifying migrants in Obock, Hargeisa and Bosaso, as well as for linking vulnerable migrants to protection services. An external consultant was thus engaged to develop a set of Standard Operating Procedures as a practical tool for MRC and IOM staff. The resulting document is very comprehensive and user-friendly and of high quality, outlining how to identify particular types of migrants, what principles should guide interactions with migrants, appropriate guidelines for registering migrants, and finally detailing the various referral systems. The document has been translated into French for use in Djibouti, and there have been three training sessions on how to use it.

Due to lack of follow-up monitoring, it is not yet clear how effective the training was and to what degree usage of the document has been integrated into the daily procedures of the MRC or IOM staff. Yet according to key informants, feedback on the document has been extremely positive.

### **3.2.2.6 Vulnerable migrants have access to appropriate services**

As part of the project under evaluation, IOM has prioritized offering direct services to vulnerable migrants. Such services range from health services offered through the MRCs to information sharing with migrants and potential migrants to supporting migrants who want to return home through the Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration (AVRR) program.

The project clearly operates within significant financial strictures that limit its ability to reach all vulnerable migrants. Yet given those financial limitations, the numbers that it does reach are significant – to focus on just one metric, 765 stranded Ethiopians were voluntarily repatriated between early June and the end of July 2013 through the IOM Yemen Assisted Voluntary Return program.<sup>16</sup> More generally, examination of the various project reporting documents underline that large numbers of vulnerable migrants are able to access appropriate services.

At the same time, this output is concerned with much more than simply numbers. The “appropriateness of the services” being offered depends upon the needs and priorities of the migrants. Here again, it seems clear that the basket of services offered by IOM, from emergency health aid, food and water, to help returning home, represent the most appropriate services that it is within the organization's power to offer, subject to the various limitations within which it must operate.

The final element within the output is accessibility to those services. Several key informants commented on the siting of the MRC in Bosaso, which is in a government facility; given that nearly

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<sup>16</sup> *Mixed Migration Coordination Bulletin*, Volume 10, July 2013.

all migrants from other countries are travelling without official papers and thus are illegally in Puntland, it seems clear that many but the most desperate would hesitate to access the MRC and thus IOM's services. Yet another key informant confirmed that plans are under way to move the MRC to a different site in the port area, where it would not be in a government building and where it would be closer to where the migrants leave from. Accessibility would thus be improved.

Notwithstanding the present siting of the MRC at Bosaso, accessibility to IOM's services by vulnerable migrants is good. This is not to say that it is perfect – yet it must be recognized that the migrants frequently cross borders or access the coast at isolated points and thus that there is no perfect location for making services 100% accessible. Moreover, the security situation in many of the countries also hinders IOM's ability to ensure complete accessibility, particularly in Southern Yemen and in South-Central Somalia.

Subject to these various qualifiers, the project has been quite effective at ensuring that vulnerable migrants have access to appropriate services, and indeed this represents an area of notable success for the project.

### 3.2.3 Outcome Three – Improving Frameworks for Regularized Regional Labour Migration

**FINDING 5:** The project has had reported though unverified success with very important caveats as regards project activities related to improving frameworks regularizing mixed migration in the region.

Migrant workers represent a significant proportion of mixed migration flows. Such migrants are seeking economic opportunities to both improve their own lives and to be able to send remittances home. IOM believes that the factors pushing these migrants toward the Gulf States are at present inevitable and unavoidable, and thus that one of the best ways to stem irregular migration out of the Horn of Africa “...is to build systems for regular labour migration between appropriate countries.”<sup>17</sup> To begin this process, the project aimed to carry out a pilot project in Ethiopia that would involve an assessment report describing channels for regular migration, make recommendations for improvements to the legal and regulatory frameworks governing labour migration, and assess the potential for the establishment of new channels. That report would in turn form the basis for putting in place processes for self-regulation of private employment agencies as well as for establishing/improving services for facilitation of labour migration. According to one key informant, it was anticipated that some of these elements would continue to be developed and built upon in subsequent phases of the project under evaluation.

Planning for this outcome got underway at the end of 2012/beginning of 2013. The IOM office in Nairobi identified an international consultant with the relevant experience, and Terms of Reference, workplan and budget were developed in January for what was anticipated to be a two-month consultancy. But it was decided that the consultancy should be managed from the Ethiopia office, and moreover that an Ethiopian national should undertake the consultancy especially because they would have the local language skills and thus be better equipped to carry out the research. Planning proceeded very slowly, in particular as it proved very time-consuming to identify an appropriate

<sup>17</sup> PRM Project Proposal Phase III Final, pg. 6.

candidate. By March-April, it was decided that a second consultant was required, a specialist in labour migration from the Philippines who would be able to draw upon that country's related experience in labour migration. The same key informant said that pressure to include the Filipino expert also came from the Ethiopian government.

All of these developments slowed down the project such that the study was not carried out until very late in the project cycle. Two key informants said that the report has been completed and that it is presently being reviewed by the Ethiopian government. They also said that a draft of the report was the focus of a very positive and productive two-day meeting involving IOM representatives, the International Labour Organization (ILO), private employment agencies as well as government ministries including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Labour. It was anticipated that the report and its findings would form the basis for bilateral and multilateral dialogues related to future policy options and capacity building measures. Overall, there is a sense of momentum and excitement.

Based upon the account of the two key informants, the report appears to meet the expectations set for it, and that it has been the subject of appropriate consultation and commentary that would improve its content as well as contribute to increased ownership by key actors. Yet the consultant has not been shown a copy of this report, nor have IOM staff managing the overall project from Nairobi, this despite the fact that the report was to be published and disseminated within the project period. Given all the delays and changes and in light of the poor communication that has dogged this output – as well as the repercussions for related outputs, detailed below – this gives rise to significant concerns. Judgment regarding the extent to which this output has been met must therefore be withheld at the present time.

As a result of the slowdown in producing the report, the other two outputs that were supposed to build upon it – putting in place processes for self-regulation of private employment agencies as well as establishing/improving services for facilitation of labour migration – reportedly remain at the very early planning stages. This might have been judged as relatively reasonable progress, especially given that, as was noted earlier, both the funder and IOM recognized that these components would continue to be developed and built upon in subsequent phases of the project. Yet because of the issues in producing the report, and just as importantly because of quite serious communication breakdowns between IOM in Nairobi and Addis Ababa regarding progress on it, the labour initiative was dropped from Phase IV. It seems then that in the absence of finding an alternative-funding source, these two latter outputs and indeed the labour initiative as a whole strongly risk stalling completely. For this reason, the project is deemed to not have been effective as regards the latter labour migration outputs.

#### 3.2.4 Major factors influencing project results

**FINDING 6:** A major strength of the project is its excellent and dedicated staff; challenges include poor monitoring and evaluation, some coordination and management issues, the fact that it strongly resembles a program but is largely run on a project basis, and some issues arising from the initiative's life cycle.

Over the course of this evaluation's interviews and site visits, it became very clear that the staff working on this project have dedicated significant energy and have displayed very strong commitment to ensuring the project achieves its outputs. They often work in very difficult circumstances, in sometimes isolated and hard-to-reach contexts with poor infrastructure and in some instances security challenges. They must also cope with movements of migrants that are sometimes unpredictable and are often secretive and informal, as well as with migrants that are very resource-poor. And they have to coordinate with partners whose capacities are quite low and who are also relatively resource-poor. In general, the staff is a great strength of this project, a fact that deserves to be recognized.

There are several issues and challenges that are threaded throughout the project results described in sections 3.2.1, 3.2.2 and 3.2.3 above, and that affect them. One is the very weak monitoring and evaluation and the frequent lack of baselines with which to compare, which affects the project's ability to definitively measure the results of project activities and thus to refine, adjust and improve those activities.

In observing the effects of weak project monitoring and evaluation, it is important to recognize that while this evaluation is focused upon the project that ran from October 2012 to September 2013, that project represents Phase III of a multi-year initiative that is now (at time of writing) into Phase IV. What seems clear then is that while the project's funding is (largely) annual and IOM's structure is of a projectized organization, the project is in practice a program that is funded on a project basis. This is significant, especially because many of the outcomes, and indeed the outputs that are supposed to produce those outcomes, in fact require more than one year to achieve. The point here is that judged on the basis of the Phase III project, multiple outputs and outcomes have not clearly been achieved and risk being reversible; but if Phase III is seen as the third year of a multi-year initiative, progress made during the year can be seen as part of a cumulative process and thus represented as more of a success.

Another issue that affects project results is the sometimes-unwieldy management structure and the communication/coordination issues that to some degree can be traced to that (see Section 3.3.2 for more on this). More particularly, the project is managed out of Nairobi though implemented in Ethiopia, Puntland, Somaliland, Djibouti and Yemen, with the Somalia office based in Nairobi and with Puntland and Somaliland reporting both to the Somalia office and to the project manager in Nairobi. Furthermore, chiefs of mission and country offices have significant autonomy, yet the project manager in Nairobi is ultimately responsible for results achieved. This situation leads to delays and inefficiencies in implementing certain project activities, which in turn has ripple effects on other project activities. Such delays and inefficiencies also affect morale and accountability as well as reducing the effectiveness of project monitoring by undermining feedback loops and potential problem solving. All of this directly affects project performance.

A final factor flows from the life cycle of this initiative, seen as the third year of a multi-year program. The emergency response aspects of the regional mixed migration challenge, most of which have been in place for years now, are being supplemented with new efforts to address the root causes of regional mixed migration. An example of this is outcome 3, which was introduced with exactly this goal in mind as a result of consultation and creative thinking between IOM and the funder. Such efforts require a different set of skills and approaches, based on relationship building

and cumulative, multi-year efforts; they also require a different timeline to achieve results. In looking at Phase III then, we can see an initiative that is transitioning from emergency response with some efforts at addressing root causes to emergency response with a more robust set of efforts at addressing root causes. Results and extent to which results have been achieved should be seen within this light.

### 3.3 Process and efficiency

The notion of efficiency focuses on whether the programme used its resources in the most economical manner to achieve its objectives. Put another way, it seeks to determine whether similar results could have been obtained with fewer resources, and whether appropriate resources were allocated to achieve the expected results. By also considering process in our analysis, we can give consideration to how the project was designed and implemented.

#### 3.3.1 Allocation and use of resources

**FINDING 7:** The project was relatively efficient at working toward outputs given the challenging contexts and complexity of the issues, though with some significant concerns related to burn rates overall and to human resources in some offices.

The documentation provided did not make clear the criteria for resource allocation. Informal communication with the project manager confirmed that there were three criteria used: donor priority, general consistency with the previous year's allocations, and dialogue and discussion with country Chiefs of Mission and resource management officers. This gives an idea of the logic and justifications driving resource allocation to particular activities or particular regions, but does not make possible a detailed analysis that would critically examine each allocation. In the absence of sufficient detail for such an analysis, we are able to focus upon the appropriateness of resource allocation and of budgetary resources relative to the nature and scale of the project's activities and outputs. In general, the budgetary resources appear to have been tight but appropriate for achieving the project outputs and outcomes, while the allocation of budgetary resources appears to be adequate and appropriate. The documents also show a close alignment between planned and actual expenses.

More particularly, for a project that has a significant number of resource intensive activities and outputs, it seems reasonable that slightly more than half of the overall budget (US\$534,000) was allocated to operational costs. In terms of the internal distribution of the operational budget between countries, it bears noting that several key informants felt that certain offices got more or less than they might have required. The documentation provided does not describe the rationale for how operational money was allocated between offices, thus making it difficult to pass judgment on this issue. Yet it was not clear that the distribution had a noticeable negative effect on activities and outputs. Similarly, the staff costs both overall (at US\$297,960) and in terms of distribution by country seem very reasonable in light of the geographical reach of the project and the multiple activities that are carried out in each country. Office costs at US\$120,421 are reasonable for a project of this nature.

There are some concerns about burn rates on this project, meaning the rate at which the project budget was spent. Key informant interviews confirmed that burn rates were very low during the first parts of the project – just below 20% of the project budget at the five month point – and that spending picked up around the eight month point to finally finish very near to 100%.<sup>18</sup> This

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<sup>18</sup> Final end of project figures for the project were not available at the time this evaluation was carried out, though preliminary figures were seen by the evaluator.

represents a bad budgetary practice, and moreover could help to explain why certain outputs and outcomes had results that were relatively compromised (outcome three in particular, for which work was heavily weighted to the second part of the project). We will return to this issue in the next finding.

Turning to human resources, while in general appropriate resources were dedicated to the project, there are some concerns in terms of abilities of some staff and possibly staff numbers. More specifically, in at least one of the offices visited certain staff seemed to have more tasks than they could handle while the other staff seemed unable to provide appropriate support. Recognizing that the consultant was not able to visit all the country offices and thus is not able to offer a global opinion in this regard, it nonetheless was clear that the skillsets and training levels of some support-level staff relative to mixed migration and in terms of office work in general are insufficient and could be affecting project implementation. One factor that could partly be contributing to this was an observation made by two interviewees, that staff turnover rates for these positions have sometimes been higher than normal. This implies that more trained and knowledgeable staff are leaving and being replaced by new employees who have to go through an inevitable learning curve and have not benefited from earlier one-off training sessions.

### 3.3.2 Project management, design and monitoring

**FINDING 8:** Overall project management was good though with some weaknesses that occasionally affected activities; project design was largely good, with some weaknesses noted; and while promising initial steps have been taken related to program performance and results monitoring, much work remains to be done.

Project management was relatively good given the sometimes-unwieldy management structure, referred to in Section 3.2.4. It was noted in that section that there are sometimes communication and coordination issues that arise between the various offices working on the project. That being said, the project manager has put in place mechanisms to try to improve internal communications and information sharing as well as to ensure that the project is progressing appropriately, including tri-weekly telephone conversations with each office and monthly coordination bulletins that share project updates as well as information on donors and planning issues. Such measures have improved coordination though have not eliminated the challenges.

In the previous finding, it was noted that the project burn rates were problematic and likely affected program activities to some degree. Concerns in this regard were communicated multiple times over the course of the project to the chiefs of mission by the project manager, though the problem persisted. This underlines the challenges of having a project manager who is at distance from the implementing countries and who has relatively little authority over them, as well as more generally the challenges of a multi-country regional project. Such challenges will almost certainly continue.

Regarding project design, as was noted in the finding on the Theory of Change, the assumptions, linkages and intervention logic of the project are generally good. This is true for all three outcomes, other than the project's assumption that irregular migration stems in part from lack of information/awareness about legal channels for migration and about the dangers of clandestine migration. As was noted in Finding 2, it is not clear that improved information will reduce migrant

flows as long as the real push factors (economic issues and insecurity in particular) are still in place and at the same level. Multiple key interviewees indirectly confirmed this point, claiming that even if potential migrants were aware that they are almost certain to fail and that they strongly risk being abused or suffering along the way, they would still overestimate their chances of being one of the lucky ones that would succeed and would thus choose to go. From a project design perspective then, this output is not clearly coherent with the outcome sought.

Another issue in terms of project design is the degree to which destination countries were included, Saudi Arabia in particular (as the major destination country). It would be relevant to engage with the destination countries on matters of regional coordination, cooperation and capacity building (outcome 1) since to be cohesive and coherent such efforts should focus on including key actors at every step of the migrants' route, from departure to transit to destination countries. The importance of doing so is underlined by recent moves by Saudi Arabia to round up and expel migrants, many of whom are from the Horn of Africa.<sup>19</sup> The moves show that Saudi Arabia is an integral part of the problem and similarly that it must be part of the solution.

The project document in fact says that "...IOM works with both migrant and host communities, and transit and destination countries/regions in order to offer a broad response to mixed migration flows from the Horn of Africa to Yemen." But the only concrete mention in that document of efforts to engage Saudi Arabia and other destination countries is in relation to outcome 3, which emphasises working toward putting in place systems for regular labour migration between Ethiopia and the destination countries. The project manager confirmed that the plan was to focus initially on Ethiopia, and based on findings there to later expand to Saudi Arabia for the negotiation of a bi-lateral labour agreement. Yet details on this plan, including how to engage and a timeline for doing so, are not made clear in the project document. This is a weakness of the project design.

Project monitoring and evaluation was planned for and built into the project design. It was envisioned as a relatively simple and straightforward process that would focus on measuring progress on outcomes and outputs using the results matrix in the project document. That document also detailed indicators for the outcomes and outputs, though it noted that many if not most lacked baseline data with which to measure progress. According to several interviewees, very little if anything was done in terms of monitoring and evaluation during the first six months of the project.

Around the seven-month point, an IOM monitoring and evaluation specialist developed an M&E toolkit that includes: a performance management framework; a migration management practitioner perceptions survey (which would measure opinions on their organization's migration management work, as well as – importantly – changes in these); a tool for measuring progress on each indicator for outcome one; migrant exit surveys to measure progress on outcome two; pre and post awareness campaign assessment questionnaires and focus group discussion checklist. The quality of the toolkit is good given its aim of carrying out basic project monitoring.

The M&E specialist then carried out monitoring field trips to Ethiopia, Djibouti, Puntland and Somaliland (between May and July, 2013) and also gave training sessions in each country on how to

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<sup>19</sup> BBC News report, "Saudi Police in Riyadh Clash With Migrant Workers", 10 November 2013, available at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-24888304>.

carry out monitoring. The reports do a very good job of summarizing progress and the key issues, and also make useful and pointed recommendations on how to improve project results. Yet it remains unclear to what degree or even if country offices continued to use the monitoring tools or whether there is a good understanding of why results-based management is important and how it can help to improve programming. Moreover while other project reporting tools were used – for example, the tri-weekly phone conversations referred to above – these tended to remain at the level of pure activity monitoring rather than results-based management.<sup>20</sup>

Overall then, initial steps related to project monitoring and evaluation were taken, though these remained very nascent and seem to have had little momentum.

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<sup>20</sup> For more information on using monitoring and evaluation for capacity building, please see Annex 3.

### 3.4 Sustainability

The sustainability of a project is defined as the continuation of benefits from an intervention after major development assistance has been completed, the probability of continued long-term benefits. Put more simply, it seeks to determine whether the benefits of an activity are likely to continue after donor funding has been withdrawn.

**FINDING 9:** Reasonable sustainability strategies were planned – such as capacity building and working toward regularized mixed migration – though weaknesses related to these activities as well as challenges in terms of ownership and institutionalization undermine long-term project sustainability.

The project has several components that can be linked to sustainability. Capacity building measures for key stakeholders is one such strategy, since the increased capacities would allow them to undertake improved work on behalf of migrants beyond the end of the project. Similarly, efforts to increase ownership and buy-in by key stakeholders could contribute to sustainability since they would increasingly prioritize the issue on their own and thus use their own resources to seek to address it. Still another strategy that can contribute to sustainability is better knowledge management and stronger monitoring, both of which can strengthen planning and continually improve the nature and quality of the response if they are properly institutionalized.

More fundamentally, long-term efforts to regularize mixed migration can be seen as a sustainability strategy since if it works, it would mean that there are formal legal frameworks within which mixed migrants would presumably receive more humane treatment. To some degree, efforts to engender greater cooperation and coordination could also contribute to sustainability by ideally creating an impetus behind the issue area such that partners would hold other partners to account and synergistically work on advancing more humane mixed migration management in the region.

Yet the actual sustainability of many of these strategies is in fact relatively weak, as was detailed in the effectiveness section. Thus multiple capacity building measures have been undertaken, but weak follow up and monitoring as well as poor institutionalization of the capacities undermine their ability to have impacts in the long-term. Challenges in terms of increasing the ownership and buy-in by key partners are also of concern. That is, key stakeholders and governments in particular have certainly placed a greater priority on the issue area relative to how it was seen five years ago, when according to one interviewee, denial that the situation constituted a crisis was the norm amongst some governments – witness the recent fact-finding trip to Harad, Yemen to observe stranded migrants by Ethiopian government representatives, a trip that was partly facilitated by IOM and that underlined the Ethiopian government's increased awareness of and interest in the problem as well as in cooperating with the Yemeni authorities to address it. Yet according to several interviewees, they continue in practice to see the provision of many of the services to migrants, particularly through the MRCs, as an IOM responsibility rather than as a joint responsibility that they will take over in the near future. Said one interviewee, "...it's seen as IOM's baby, and they [the government] are quite clear in saying that it would grind to a halt without IOM support. They say that they simply don't have the resources."

While the resource issue is very likely true, the spirit of the comment underlines weak ownership and low commitment levels by the government stakeholders, both of which undermine sustainability. Furthermore, the comment points toward an ongoing role for IOM, which in turn gives rise to questions about IOM's efforts to ensure more long-term funding for its work in the region either from the existing donor or other donors. What activities are being taken to secure such funding – rather than annual funding which is reviewed every year – is not clear at the present time.

Overall then, the project had some good sustainability measures, but these measures are subject to a variety of challenges that seriously undermine their ability to ensure sustainability. That being said, they are also measures that can be built upon and that could, in the future, help to promote sustainability.

## 4. Conclusions/Lessons Learned

This evaluation brings out some important conclusions specific to the project and which to some extent are generalizable as lessons learned/good practices.

In terms of relevance, the project takes into account the local context as well as the priorities and areas of expertise of key stakeholders, which is an excellent practice. One important lesson is that for projects that are working to influence the priorities of key stakeholders – in this case, IOM has played a role in influencing governments to put mixed migration on their agenda and rank it among their priorities – efforts and activities aimed at engendering ownership and buy-in are absolutely crucial to overall project success both early on and throughout. As part of this process, it is important to align with and to show alignment with existing stakeholder priorities (since buy-in is tied to national counterparts recognizing their own priorities in the project).

The project's theory of change is also quite strong; yet its weaknesses in terms of the goals that migrant outreach can expect to contribute to points toward the lesson that it is important to challenge and rigorously examine intuitively appealing linkages in project logic and to avoid logical fallacies in such linkages.

Regarding effectiveness, the project has enjoyed some initial success that can be built upon for longer-term outputs, and has excelled in providing direct services to migrants. Lessons learned include the importance of project monitoring and of using monitoring to inform and improve planning. While undertaking it can seem onerous on top of the variety of pressing demands that already face staff, it is worth underlining its potential, if properly carried out and used, to greatly improve the effects of activities such that "time lost" on monitoring in fact translates into much stronger results. An added bonus is that funders want to work with organizations that can demonstrate documented results, which is not really possible in the absence of appropriate monitoring.

Another lesson concerns the challenges arising from short-term projects that have characteristics of longer-term programs. More particularly, while the international funding environment tends to favour short-term project funding, it is also increasingly demanding longer-term, integrated solutions to the issues with which organizations are grappling. The lesson is that long-term, integrated planning can occur when there is a reasonable expectation that future funding will be possible, with short-term projects fitted in to that larger plan. This can improve project continuity and increase its effects, and can also be highlighted to funders as a positive attribute that means their money will achieve more.

In terms of process and efficiency, the project had relatively good results though with some concerns as regards implementation rates, internal communication and coordination as well as program performance and results monitoring. The lesson regarding the need for program performance and results monitoring has already been touched upon above. A lesson arising from the project's challenges in terms of internal communications and coordination is an obvious one, but is nonetheless worth highlighting: inefficient and weak coordination mechanisms can directly affect a project's results, and need to be addressed through an open, collaborative process of discussion that ultimately puts in place mechanisms and procedures to ensure smoother functioning.

Finally, the evaluation found that the project had reasonable sustainability strategies but that these suffered due to factors that included weak follow up and monitoring, as well as low levels of ownership and buy-in amongst key stakeholders. The lessons from this, regarding the need for project monitoring and continuous efforts related to increasing ownership and buy-in, were highlighted earlier.

## 5. Recommendations

The following recommendations flow from the findings in the report, and are linked to specific findings after each recommendation:

- 1. IOM should build on recent positive moves regarding developing monitoring tools to ensure that project results are monitored and that results feed back into and inform project implementation and planning.**

During the project, IOM developed strong monitoring tools and moreover carried out training for several country offices on how to implement such monitoring. The fact that these things were done is a very positive step. Yet on the basis of the evaluation, we find very little evidence that these tools are being consistently and correctly used, and thus that ongoing monitoring is being carried out.

We recommend that a mechanism be put in place to provide ongoing support and advice for project personnel, to make sure that data is collected and analyzed properly and feeds back into project implementation in a timely manner such that problems and challenges are caught early and appropriate corrective action can be taken. The importance of ongoing monitoring should also be made clear to project staff, and should be reinforced as a priority activity. We furthermore recommend that baseline data be collected immediately, since it is in comparison with this that progress can be judged. Such data can also usefully be drawn upon by future project evaluations. Of course baselines should normally be collected before implementation begins; but even late baselines, from for example November 2013, would offer a basis for judging change at the end of the next project cycle.

(This recommendation relates to findings 3, 4, 6 and 8)

- 2. IOM should in particular monitor its outreach activities, to judge what effects if any they are having and to adjust the activities as necessary.**

IOM has been carrying out outreach activities to migrants and to potential migrants for several years now, using a rich and varied set of methods. Yet lack of consistent, rigorous monitoring and follow-up means that it is unclear what effects these activities are having. The organization should put in place a mechanism to judge the effects of outreach activities, should collate the data on particular activities and between countries, and should use it to assess how the activities can be improved, what new activities might be merited and which activities should be dropped.

(This recommendation relates to Finding 4 and to some degree to Finding 2)

- 3. IOM should work to reinvigorate the labour migration portion of the project and its associated activities; as part of this effort, it should engage with destination countries in a coherent and systematic manner.**

The project outcome aimed at working to put in place measures related to labour migration (outcome 3) was a key activity that seeks to address the root of the problem of irregular migration rather than just treating the symptoms. As was noted in Finding 5, the activity was not very effectively carried out due to a variety of factors, and was subsequently dropped from Phase IV of the project. In light of the (reported) efforts and progress made on this outcome, and given its focus on root causes (which would contribute significantly to addressing the other expected outcomes of the project), IOM should develop and implement an effective strategy to build on the reported momentum and enthusiasm that have so far been generated on this area of activity. It should do so in consultation and collaboration with other key actors in the region, particularly ILO.

As part of this strategy, IOM should outline and begin to implement a plan for engaging with destination countries in general and Saudi Arabia in particular. As outlined in Finding 8, inclusion of destination countries is key to having a broad and all-encompassing effort to improve labour migration issues. Ultimately, these countries should also be incorporated into the project's efforts to improve regional coordination and cooperation (e.g. the annual meeting of the Regional Committee on Mixed Migration).

(This recommendation relates to Finding 5 and to Finding 8)

**4. IOM should continue to work to build ownership among key stakeholders, especially government actors.**

Key stakeholder ownership is needed to ensure the engagement and commitment of relevant actors, and thus effective implementation in the short term. In the longer term, it is necessary for addressing larger objectives, ensuring legitimacy/relevance and, ultimately, sustainability.

IOM has started to build ownership through awareness raising activities, combined with capacity building. This is a good practice that should continue and that should be strengthened, ensuring that the right individuals are being trained and retained, that new capacities are being used and multiplied within the relevant institutions, and that their effectiveness is being monitored to ensure maximal effects.

(This recommendation relates to findings 1, 3 and 9)

**5. IOM should continue to build and enhance its capacity building activities for both individuals and organizations, and should monitor and follow-up on these activities to ensure their effectiveness.**

Capacity building is a key part of IOM's efforts to build ownership and to maximize effects. Yet effective capacity building is about much more than simply providing tools and carrying out training activities. It also involves identifying the correct individuals whose capacities should be enhanced, making sure that the capacity building measures stick and affect the individual in the desired way, as

well as ensuring that their new abilities feed back into their organization and that the organization is concretely affected in the desired way. This requires monitoring and follow-up in the short and long-term and making the appropriate adjustments as needed.<sup>21</sup>

With this in mind, IOM should build on its existing capacity building measures, and should particularly focus on how it can enhance the measures it undertakes so as to maximize their effects on individuals and organizations.

(This recommendation relates to findings 1, 3, 6 and 9)

**6. IOM should conduct a capacity needs assessment to determine whether project staff have the requisite technical and project management capacities, and provide additional support as needed to ensure that these needs are met.**

Given the financial constraints under which this project operates, it is extremely important for its effectiveness and efficiency that project staff in all countries be of the highest technical and managerial calibre possible in order to ensure that resources are used at maximum efficiency and that opportunities are not lost. In light of the weaknesses identified in Finding 7 with regards to over-extended and under-skilled staff, it is the evaluator's opinion that additional support should be provided in the form of training, coaching or other skill enhancing activities to support those members of staff who need it. This should also allow for a redistribution of tasks to ensure that members of staff are not overextended and can devote appropriate time to all project tasks.

(This recommendation relates to Finding 7)

**7. IOM should continue to seek out the right balance between the autonomy of the country offices and oversight by the managing office.**

This report has highlighted certain inefficiencies and challenges arising from sometimes-problematic internal communication and coordination. To a large extent, these issues arise due to the management structure of a regional project implemented in multiple countries, with authority and to some degree responsibility existing at the centre as well as in-country. To succeed, such a project needs to ensure that there is sufficient autonomy for the implementing offices to be proactive and reactive, but also for the regional coordinator to have good information about what is happening and why as well as the ability to wield some level of control so as to ensure overall project coherence and advancement. The point here is that it is necessary to strike a balance, a process that requires flexibility, adjustment, mutual learning, communication and trust. IOM should pursue this balance by building on communication initiatives such as the tri-weekly phone conversations and the monthly bulletins, and by being proactive early on when the balance is in danger of being lost.

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<sup>21</sup> See Annex 3 for more information on carrying out capacity building and monitoring and evaluation as an aspect of capacity building.

(This recommendation relates to findings 6 and 8)

**8. IOM should decide whether this is a program or a project and adjust its planning and implementation accordingly.**

The project under evaluation is funded on a project basis and its planning and design looks like that of a project. In practice however, it in many ways resembles the third phase of a program (with the fourth phase now underway). The problem with this is that programs have different, often more flexible and longer-term, timelines, different exigencies and opportunities in terms of planning and in terms of activities, and even different organizational characteristics (in terms of such things as the qualities that they seek out and reward in their staff, their priorities and their institutional structure). Indeed, many of the challenges and weak results of the project can be traced to this inconsistency; for example, the fact that implementation for many activities began late in the project cycle or that longer-term activities registered relatively little progress would in many ways be interpreted differently within the context of a program.

IOM should resolve this inconsistency by deciding that it is a project and running it like a project or deciding that it is a program and running it like a program, even if funding is on an annual basis. In the former scenario, planning, implementation, and, importantly, expectations could be adjusted accordingly based on the actual timeline. In the latter scenario, strong long-term and short-term planning could frame annual activities, governments could be included in the planning and design process (offering the advantage of increasing government ownership and thus engagement, as well as enhancing sustainability), better monitoring and reporting could inform adjustments to activities and thus increase their effectiveness, and the organization could more effectively shape itself to deliver stronger short and long-term results. While recognizing that the latter scenario would be a difficult one to implement and could take time, the rewards that could flow from it in terms of project results are significant and would thus justify the challenges in overcoming those difficulties.

(This recommendation relates primarily to Finding 6, as well as to Finding 1)

## Annex 1. Terms of Reference

### Evaluation of the IOM project “Horn/Gulf of Aden/Yemen: Improving Protection of Migrants – Phase III”

#### Evaluation context

The International Organization for Migration (IOM) is committed to the principle that humane and orderly migration benefits migrants and society. As the leading international organization for migration, IOM acts with its partners in the international community to: assist in meeting the growing operational challenges of migration management; advance understanding of migration issues; encourage social and economic development through migration, and; uphold the human dignity and well-being of migrants.

Due to a variety of factors the Horn of Africa remains an area where volatile, insecure conditions continue to motivate large numbers of people to move within and across borders. These irregular migration flows include refugees, asylum seekers, smuggled and trafficked persons, and economic migrants. The push and pull factors mobilizing these population movements are varied, with some migrants fleeing from the Horn of Africa due to political unrest, persecution, and conflict, while others are leaving situations of extreme resource scarcity, drought, crop failure, food insecurity, and severe poverty.

IOM has been working with government and partners in Kenya, Somalia, Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Yemen to promote the human management of these migration flows through the project “Horn/Gulf of Aden/Yemen: Improving Protection of Migrants – Phase III.” This project was implemented from October 2012 to September 2013 and aimed to:

1. Improve regional coordination, cooperation, and capacity in mixed migration management;
2. Mitigate and address protection concerns of migratory populations; and
3. Improve frameworks for regularized labour migration out of the Horn of Africa to Gulf States.

#### Evaluation purpose

IOM conducts project and programme evaluations as part of its commitment to improved results based management. Evaluation results are used to improve decision-making and evaluate performance, and to improve project and programme design and implementation. The purpose of this evaluation is to review the effectiveness of the project, assess prospects for sustainability, identify and document lessons learned and best practices, and inform the development of follow up projects and programmes.

#### Evaluation scope

This evaluation will focus solely on the project entitled “Horn/Gulf of Aden/Yemen: Improving Protection of Migrants – Phase III.” This project was implemented in Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia (Somaliland and Puntland), and Yemen from October 2012 to September 2013.

#### Evaluation criteria

The objectives of the evaluation are to:

1. Assess the relevance of the project’s intended results.
2. Assess the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of project implementation.
3. Assess the effectiveness of the project in reaching its stated objectives.

4. Assess prospects for sustainability.
5. Assess the appropriateness of the project design and management arrangements for achieving its stated objectives
6. Identify lessons learned and best practices.
7. Assess existing proposed follow up programmes and make recommendations for improvements.

### **Evaluation questions**

A complete list of evaluation questions and sub-questions will be jointly developed together with the evaluation consultant. The below questions are indicative of the types of questions to be addressed in the evaluation:

#### **Relevance**

1. How appropriate are the project's intended results for the context within which it operates?
2. What is the theory of change underlying the project?
3. To what extent were the needs of stakeholders and the regional governments taken into account in project design?

#### **Effectiveness**

4. To what extent did the project promote humane management of mixed migration flows in the Horn of Africa?
5. To what extent did the project's activities lead to improved regional coordination, cooperation, and capacity in mixed migration management?
6. To what extent did the project's activities mitigate and address protection concerns of migratory populations in the region?
7. To what extent did the project's activities improve frameworks for regularized labour migration out of the Horn of Africa to Gulf States?
8. Were project activities implemented as planned and on schedule?
9. What is the quality of the project outputs and/or the project activities?

#### **Process and efficiency**

10. How cost-effective is the project?
11. How efficient is the overall management of the project?
12. How appropriate is project design to achieve its objectives in the context in which it operates?
13. What external factors affected the implementation of the project and how were they managed?
14. How effectively were the programme performance and results monitored?

#### **Sustainability**

15. Were suitable strategies for sustainability developed and implemented?
16. To what extent are the project results likely to be sustained in the long-term?

### **Evaluation deliverables**

The consultant will produce the following:

1. A revised terms of reference for the evaluation, if required.
2. A draft evaluation inception report, inclusive of evaluation matrix (questions and sub questions, indicators and data sources), proposed methodology, and proposed work plan.
3. A final inception report, incorporating IOM's comments and agreed upon work plan.
4. A powerpoint presentation debrief at the end of on-site data collection.
5. A draft evaluation report.

6. A final evaluation report.

### Evaluation methodology

Review of existing reports and documents; in-depth interviews with key informants such as front line law enforcement officials, government officials, and members of local, national, and regional coordination bodies; and questionnaires and focus group discussions with migrants.

For the document review, the following documents will be provided upon signature of contract:

- Project document
- Project budget
- Interim reports and final reports
- Monitoring reports
- IOM strategy papers

Assistance will be provided in the identification of key stakeholders, and in organizing the schedule of interviews, focus groups, and site visits.

### Evaluation workplan

The detailed evaluation workplan will be agreed upon between the project manager in IOM Kenya and the consultant. The evaluation will take place over a five-week period, including two weeks travel and in country time in Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Yemen. A general workplan is presented below.

Activity	Days	Location	1	2	3	4	5
Initial document review and revision of ToRs	3	Home-based	X				
Draft inception brief (2 to 5 pages)	1	Home-based	X				
Travel	1		X				
Management interviews and meetings	2	Kenya		X			
Final inception brief	1	Kenya		X			
Travel, in country interviews, and data collection	14	Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Yemen		X	X		
Travel	1				X		
Draft evaluation report	5	Home-based				X	
Final evaluation report	2	Home-based					X

### Schedule of events, deliverables, and payments

Payments will be made in two installments according to the following schedule:

Description	Installment	Approximate dates	Payment
Signature of contract and revised ToR		01 October	
Travel and field work		09 to 24 October	
Draft inception report	1 <sup>st</sup> installment	10 October	
Final inception report		23 October	

Powerpoint debrief		23 October	50%
Draft evaluation report		06 November	
IOM review of draft report and submission of consolidated feedback		07 – 10 November	
Final evaluation report	2 <sup>nd</sup> and final installment	13 November	50%

## Required Competencies

### Behavioural

- takes responsibility and manages constructive criticism;
- works effectively with all clients and stakeholders;
- promotes continuous learning; communicates clearly;
- takes initiative and drives high levels of performance management;
- plans work, anticipates risks and sets goals within area of responsibility;
- displays mastery of subject matter;
- contributes to a collegial team environment;
- creates a respectful office environment free of harassment and retaliation and promotes the prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse (PSEA);
- incorporates gender-related needs, perspectives, and concerns, and promotes equal gender participation
- displays awareness of relevant technological solutions;
- works with internal and external stakeholders to meet resource needs of IOM.

### Technical

- delivers on set objectives on hardship situations;
- effectively coordinates actions with other implementing partners;
- works effectively with local authorities, stakeholders, beneficiaries and the broader community to advance country office or regional objectives.

## Required Qualifications and Experience

- completed advanced university degree from an accredited academic institution preferably in Management, Business Administration or related field;
- five years of professional experience (or seven years for candidates holding a first level university degree) in project monitoring and evaluation);
- previous experiences with IOM and with UN specialized agencies an advantage;
- experience in liaising with national and international organizations.

### Languages

Fluency in English is required. Working knowledge of French, Arabic, and/or local languages an advantage.

### **Mode of Application:**

Submit cover letter and CV including daytime telephone and e-mail address to:- International Organization for Migration (IOM), Human Resources Department, P.O. Box 55040 – 00200, Nairobi, Kenya or send via e-mail to [hrnairobi@iom.int](mailto:hrnairobi@iom.int)

**CLOSING DATE: 9<sup>TH</sup> September, 2013**

Only shortlisted applicants will be contacted

## Annex 2. Evaluation Matrix

Issue	Main Questions	Sub Questions	Sources of Data	Methods of Data Analysis	Comments
<b>Relevance</b>	How appropriate are the project's intended results for the context within which it operates?	<p>Is there a demonstrated need for the project and its activities?</p> <p>Are the project objectives in line with IOM's strategy, priorities and expertise?</p>	<p>Global documents and expectations</p> <p>Regional documents</p> <p>Country documents</p> <p>IOM strategy papers</p>	Document review	
	What is the theory of change underlying the project?	<p>What are the hypotheses and assumptions within the theory of change and to what degree are these reasonable?</p> <p>To what extent are the causal links between outputs, outcomes and results and related assumptions clearly defined and realistic?</p>	<p>Project proposal and design documents</p> <p>Interviews with IOM, project partners</p> <p>Best practices in project design and relevant literatures</p>	<p>Document review</p> <p>Semi-structured interviews</p> <p>Evaluation literature</p>	
	To what extent were the needs of stakeholders and the regional governments taken into account in project design?	<p>To what extent were stakeholders consulted during the design phase of the project? How were they consulted, what input was taken into consideration, and to what extent?</p> <p>To what extent is the project aligned with the priorities of key stakeholders and of regional governments? To what extent is it aligned with their identified needs and operational capacities? Human and financial resources?</p>	<p>Project planning documents</p> <p>Interviews with key stakeholders</p> <p>Interviews with government representatives</p>	<p>Document review</p> <p>Semi-structured interviews</p> <p>Potentially focus groups</p>	

<b>Effectiveness</b>	To what extent did the project promote humane management of mixed migration flows in the Horn of Africa?	<p>What are the best practices in humane management of mixed migration flows?</p> <p>Do the project outputs, outcomes and objectives reflect the promotion of such best practices?</p> <p>How successful have the activities been with respect to outputs, outcomes and progress toward impact?</p> <p>Does evidence exist that the project has successful, proven outputs?</p> <p>That is has achieved sustainable outcomes and progress toward impact?</p>	<p>Project planning documents</p> <p>Monitoring and evaluation reports</p> <p>IOM interviews</p>	<p>Document review</p> <p>Semi-structured interviews</p>	
	To what extent did the project's activities lead to improved regional coordination, cooperation, and capacity in mixed migration management?	<p>Has there been improved regional coordination, cooperation, and capacity in mixed migration management? In what regard and to what degree?</p> <p>Are there any other factors, including other actors working toward similar goals, which could be responsible for results?</p> <p>Does the project build on and complement the work of existing actors working toward similar goals? (if any)</p>	<p>Project planning and reporting documents</p> <p>Documentation from partners</p> <p>Interviews with IOM and project partners</p>	<p>Document review</p> <p>Semi-structured interviews</p>	
	To what extent did the project's activities mitigate and address protection concerns of migratory populations in the region?		<p>Project planning and reporting documents</p> <p>Interviews with IOM and project partners</p>	<p>Document review</p> <p>Semi-structured interviews</p>	
	To what extent did the project's activities improve frameworks for regularized labour migration out of the Horn of Africa to Gulf States?	<p>What changes have been made to the frameworks for labour migration?</p> <p>What effect have these had on self-regulation of private agencies?</p> <p>On labour migration flows? (have they been used by migrants?)</p>	<p>Project documents</p> <p>Interviews with IOM and project partners</p>	<p>Document review</p> <p>Semi-structured interviews</p>	

	Were project activities implemented as planned and on schedule?	Which activities were on time and which encountered challenges? What specific challenges did particular activities encounter? To what degree did the challenges occur within phase III of the project vs. resulting from previous phases? To what degree could and/or did the challenges have been anticipated and planned for? To what degree were they external to the project or internal to it?	Monitoring and evaluation reports Interviews with IOM	Document review Semi-structured interviews	
	What is the quality of the project outputs and/or the project activities?	To what extent did each output achieve its indicator, and why? To what extent did each of them contribute to meeting the respective project objectives? (to what degree was this a result of project design vs. implementation) Did each output meet the needs of beneficiaries?	Project documents Monitoring and evaluation reports Interviews with IOM and project partners	Document review Semi-structured interviews	
<b>Process and Efficiency</b>	How cost-effective is the project?	To what extent were the appropriate resources (human/financial) allocated to the functioning of the project, given its wide range of beneficiaries and activities? To what degree were those resources appropriately allocated to particular parts of the projects?	Project documents Budget/finance documents Interviews with IOM and project partners Comparison with best practices	Document review Semi-structured interviews	
	How efficient is the overall management of the project?	To what extent was the project efficiently designed, planned, implemented, monitored and evaluated over the 2012-2013 period? What were the key strengths, areas for improvements and lessons learned? To what extent were project activities implemented within planned budgets?	Project documents Budget/finance documents Interviews with IOM Comparison with best practices	Document review Semi-structured interviews	
	How appropriate is project design to achieve its	Were the appropriate activities/outputs chosen in relation to project objectives?	Global documents Comparison with	Document review	

	objectives in the context in which it operates?		best practices Interviews with IOM	Semi-structured interviews	
	What external factors affected the implementation of the project and how were they managed?	Were potential impacts of external factors planned for and anticipated to the extent possible?	Project documents Global documents Interviews with IOM Interviews with project partners	Document review Semi-structured interviews	
	How effectively were the programme performance and results monitored?	Was there an appropriate monitoring and evaluation system in place, with proper indicators? Was formal reporting carried out regularly? To what degree did reports help improve the project during its lifetime, and how will it help in the planning and implementation of future initiatives of this sort?	Project documents Interviews with IOM	Document review Semi-structured interviews	
<b>Sustainability</b>	Were suitable strategies for sustainability developed and implemented?	Has ownership of the project been taken over by national partners? Have sources of financing been identified for the post-project period/for additional phase(s)? Have follow-ups on training been planned, to see whether trainees retain and are using what they were taught?	Project planning documents Monitoring and evaluation documents Interviews with IOM Interviews with project partners	Document review Semi-structured interviews	
	To what extent are the project results likely to be sustained in the long-term?	Which results will be sustainable and why/which results will not be sustainable and why? Are specific sustainability measures in place? If not, what will make it possible to sustain project activities in the long-term?	Project documents IOM strategy papers Interviews with IOM Interviews with project partners	Document review Semi-structured interviews	



### Annex 3. Capacity building and Monitoring and Evaluation

This Annex is meant to inform general understanding of capacity building and monitoring and evaluation of capacity building. It also includes a section that specifically looks at tracer studies.

#### What is capacity building?

Capacity building is often understood as a purposeful, external intervention or support with the intention of strengthening capacity over time by facilitating or catalyzing change.<sup>22</sup> The focus of M&E is therefore not only capacity development (changes in capacity at individual, organisation or societal level) but also the extent to which this is supported or hindered by external interventions.

Capacity development is the process by which individuals, organizations, institutions and societies develop abilities to perform functions, solve problems and set and achieve objectives. It needs to be addressed at three inter-related levels: individual, institutional and societal. Specifically, capacity building encompasses a given country's human, scientific, technological, organizational, institutional and resource capabilities. It is further understood that this process involves three interrelated levels, specifically the individual, organisational and societal levels. In all cases, capacity development must be understood as a continuous, long term process.

- **Individual level:** this is the most commonly used approach. It generally takes the form of training courses, workshops, or seminars, through which participants acquire knowledge and/or tools that will allow them, at the personal or individual level, to perform their duties with a higher level of professionalism.
- **Organisational level:** this relates to the formal entities that comprise a group of people in pursuit of a common goal. This type of capacity building represents an organisational investment to promote the continuity of newly acquired capacities, with or without continuity in personnel. It usually requires efforts to provide the administrative or technical tools needed to facilitate organisational effectiveness and appropriate management of activities and budgets.
- **Societal level:** capacity development at the societal level is required to support the paradigm of a more interactive public administration that learns equally from its actions and from the feedback it receives from the population at large. In order for public administration to be seen as a responsive and accountable service provider, whose performance needs to be monitored, societal change is required.

At the organisational level, capacity building is carried out for a variety of different purposes. Broadly, these can be divided into two. Technical capacity building is aimed at addressing a specific issue concerning an organisation's activities. Technical capacity building would not normally be expected to involve an organisation in a fundamental process of change, and would be unlikely to touch on the culture, vision, values or other core elements of that organisation. Technical capacity

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<sup>22</sup> *Compendium of basic terminology in governance and public administration*, United Nations, Economic and Social Council (2006). Document E/C.16/2006/4. Available at: <http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un/unpan022332.pdf>

building is often carried out in the context of a specific project or programme with which an organisation is involved. It is the type of capacity building that is found in the project “Horn/Gulf of Aden/Yemen: Improving Protection of Migrants – Phase III”. General capacity building, on the other hand, is provided to help organisations develop their own capacity to better fulfil their core functions, and achieve their own mission.

### **M&E of capacity, or M&E of capacity building?**

It is important to note the difference between M&E of capacity and M&E of capacity building. The former is concerned with assessing the changing capacity of an organisation (or individual, or society) whilst the latter is concerned both with the quality and relevance of capacity building efforts, and the immediate changes occurring. In both cases, M&E might also be used to further look at wider changes resulting from any improved capacity.

### **M&E Tools for Capacity Building<sup>23</sup>**

- **Ripple model:** shows how capacity building contributes both to changes at the individual or organisational level and then wider changes in the lives of beneficiaries or in civil society, starting from the support provided, and attempting to trace the changes forward.
- **Organisational assessment tools:** are designed to assess capacity, and plan capacity development. Sometimes they are used to monitor and evaluate capacity development or capacity building. They are the only tool in widespread use designed specifically with capacity development in mind.
- **Planning tools:** The traditional method of developing a capacity building plan is to set objectives and indicators to show expected progress over a particular timeframe.
- **Outcome mapping:** requires a programme to identify individuals, groups and organisations with which a programme interacts directly to effect change, and where there are opportunities for influence. Outcome mapping involves the identification of a spread of possible outcomes (progress markers) ranging from those stakeholders expect to see, to those they would like or love to see. This avoids the need for precise predictions about the pace of change at the beginning of a project or programme.
- **Most significant change:** is most often mentioned as an alternative to results-based management techniques. Most significant change is a system designed to record and analyse change in projects or programmes where it is not possible to precisely predict changes beforehand, and is therefore difficult to set pre-defined indicators.
- **Tracer studies:** are concerned primarily with the changes at the level of the former beneficiaries’ lives. They seek to document changes but also to determine the extent to which the intervention contributed to the changes.

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<sup>23</sup> Praxis Paper 23: *Monitoring and Evaluating Capacity Building: Is it really that difficult?*, INTRAC 2010.

## Tracer Studies<sup>24</sup>

Tracer studies can provide valuable information on what has happened to a group of beneficiaries that have been exposed to an intervention (beneficiaries can be individuals or organisations). Implementing agencies usually have a fairly good idea of what the beneficiaries are doing for the duration of the project, and at the moment it ends. However, the real challenge is for interventions to produce lasting, long-term results. The ultimate measure of the success of an intervention is for the desired changes in the lives of beneficiaries to still be present, in some manner, after the project itself has been phased out. A tracer study is interested in finding out, for example, if the individuals who participated in the capacity building activities have been able to apply the skills/tools acquired in their home organisation.

A tracer study explores what changes occurred in the lives of former beneficiaries, and if and how the intervention contributed to these changes. A more comprehensive goal is for tracer studies to offer insight into which type of interventions, or which type of approaches within an intervention, may have had more impact. Knowing what seems to work better, and in what circumstances, is valuable in any future programme planning and decision making.

There are three primary goals for tracer studies:

1. Document changes in the lives of the former beneficiaries of the intervention.
2. Understand if and how an intervention contributed to these observed changes.
3. Learn how the intervention could have been designed differently in order to enhance impact and eventually use this knowledge to improve decision making and the design of future interventions.

Tracer studies usually take the form of periodic questionnaires and/or interviews administered to the direct beneficiaries of the intervention, to their colleagues (supervisors and/or supervisees), case studies, focus group discussions, and/or key informant questionnaires. In all cases, it is important to ensure, at the moment of the intervention, that contact details are obtained and updated on a regular basis. This allows the organisation to avoid the common pitfall of tracer studies, namely that the actual task of tracing the former beneficiaries may be complicated since information on their whereabouts may be dated or incomplete.

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<sup>24</sup> *IPEC Child Labour Impact Assessment Toolkit: Tracer Study Manual*, International Labour Office, International Programme on the Elimination of Child Labour (IPEC) – Geneva: ILO, 2011 – 3 v.

## Annex 4. List of Respondents

### Key Informant Interviews

<b>Kenya</b>	
Heather Komenda	Manager, Programmes Support Unit, IOM Kenya
Benson Mbogani	IT Database Assistant, IOM Kenya
Craig Murphy	Project Coordinator, Mixed Migration, IOM Kenya
Janet Ondieki	Mixed Migration Project Assistant, IOM Kenya
<b>Somalia (based in Kenya)</b>	
Feisal Muhamud	Operations Assistant, IOM Somalia
Barrack Okeyo	Internal Monitoring and Evaluation, IOM Somalia
Heidrun Salzer	Project Development, IOM Somalia
<b>Puntland and Somaliland</b>	
Ismael Ali	Mixed Migration Assistant, IOM Bosaso
Dayib Askar	Mixed Migration Assistant, IOM Hargeisa
Isaac Munyae	Project Officer, IOM Bosaso
<b>Yemen</b>	
Lilian Ambuso	Operations Officer, IOM Yemen (based in Harad)
Salma Dhaifallah	Case Worker, IOM Yemen (based in Sana'a)
Ahlam al-Masany	Project Assistant, IOM Yemen
<b>Ethiopia</b>	
Ato Yifredew Getnet Dessie	Director General of Consular Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ethiopia
Sharon Dimanche	Migration Management Project Manager, IOM Ethiopia
Ato Wondimu Chama Kaba	Crime Investigation Unit, Federal Police Commission, Ethiopia
Ato Daniel Lema Keterew	Foreign work Permit Team Leader, Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, Ethiopia
Sisay Mulatu	Project Assistant and capacity building/government liaison focal point, IOM Ethiopia
Tagel Solomon	Assisted Voluntary Return/Counter Trafficking/Irregular Migration Programs Coordinator, IOM Ethiopia
Mengistu Tadesse	Project Assistant and Awareness and Outreach Focal Point, IOM Ethiopia
Abrham Tamrat	Project Assistant, AVR/CT focal point, IOM Ethiopia
<b>Djibouti</b>	
Ahmed Mohammed Bourhan	Programming Assistant, responsible for MRC Obock, IOM Djibouti
Mr. Elmi	Director General of Eligibility, ONARS, Djibouti
Colonel Ibrahim Gona	Director, Immigration Police, Djibouti
Chris Horwood	Coordinator, Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat

Mr. Siraj	Secretary-General, Ministry of the Interior, Djibouti
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### Focus Groups

Location and Date	Participants <sup>25</sup>
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia – October 2013	8 migrant men
Djibouti City, Djibouti – October 2013	25 migrant men

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<sup>25</sup> The names of the participants are not included to ensure the confidentiality of these vulnerable individuals.

## Annex 5. List of documents consulted

### Reports and Assessment Reports

*A review workshop on recommendations from the 2012 Regional Committee of Mixed Migration Regional held in Imperial Hotel, 12th-13th June 2013.* Dayib, A. Askar (project assistant). IOM. 2013. 10 pages.

*Assessment report of the current administrative functions and capacities of the IOM supported migration response centres in Hargeisa, Somaliland; Bosaso, Puntland; And Obock, Djibouti.* Macdonald, N. (consultant). IOM. June, 2013. 28 pages.

*Bio data collection sheet. Returnees' Details.* IOM Ethiopia. March, 2012.

*Desperate choices. Conditions, risks & protection failures affecting Ethiopian migrants in Yemen.* Danish Refugee Council, RMMS. October, 2012. 60 pages.

*Ethiopia KAP baseline inception report and data collection tools.* Komenda, H. (IOM Nairobi PSU Manager). IOM. 2013. 14 pages.

*Internal IOM Note for the File – Mixed Migration Monitoring Trip & Site Visit. Bosaso and Hargeisa.* IOM. November, 2012. 6 pages.

*Internal IOM Note for the File – Mixed Migration Monitoring Trip & Site Visit. Djibouti.* IOM. January, 2013. 4 pages.

*Internal IOM Note for the File – Mixed Migration Monitoring Trip & Site Visit. Addis Ababa.* IOM. December, 2013. 4 pages.

*IOM Somalia Mission. Field monitoring report on the Implementation of IOM Projects in Puntland & Somaliland.* Okay, B. (M&E Assistant). IOM. September, 2013. 19 pages.

*Performance Management Framework with BOSASSO data. Interviews with Munyae, I., Ali, I.S. and Ismail, A.A.* Komenda, H. (IOM Nairobi PSU Manager). IOM July, 2013. 9 pages.

*Performance Management Framework with DJIBOUTI data.* Komenda, H. (IOM Nairobi PSU Manager). IOM. July, 2013. 11 pages.

*Performance Management Framework with HARGEISA data.* Askar, D. (Mixed Migration Project Assistant). IOM. July, 2013. 14 pages.

*Project Proposal. Horn/Gulf of Aden/Yemen: Improving Protection of Migrants – Phase III .* Komenda, H. (IOM Nairobi PSU Manager). IOM. June, 2012. 18 pages.

*Report of the rapid situational analysis on irregular migration and livelihoods alternatives/needs assessment conducted in four Woredas of Oromia zone administration, Amhara regional state.* IOM-SLO Addis Ababa Counter trafficking/irregular migration Unit (internal document). July, 2012.

*Report on Cross Border Migration Committee workshop in Lowyado, Somaliland on 14th - 15th August 2013.* Askar, D. (project assistant). IOM Hargeisa. 2013. 9 pages.

*Roadmap for the development of a labour migration management programme for the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia.* Achacoso, T. (consultant). IOM. September, 2013. 111 pages.

*Standard Operating Procedures for the Protection of Vulnerable Migrants in the Horn of Africa: A Tool for the Migration Response Centers.* Migration Response Centre. 2013. 19 pages.

*TDY Report*. Komenda, H. (IOM Nairobi PSU Manager). IOM. July, 2013. 2 pages.

*TDY Report*. Komenda, H. (IOM Nairobi PSU Manager). IOM. July, 2013. 3 pages.

*TDY report*. Komenda, H. (IOM Nairobi PSU Manager). IOM. May, 2013. 4 pages.

### **Brochures**

*Migration for the benefit of all. Mixed migration.* IOM Nairobi - Regional Office for the East and Horn of Africa. (After 2010).

*Migration sensibilization brochure. Horn/Gulf of Aden/Yemen: Improving Protection of Migrations.* Komenda, H. (IOM Nairobi PSU Manager). IOM. 2013. 36 pages.

### **Discussion Notes**

*International dialogue on migration 2008. Challenges of Irregular Migration: Addressing Mixed Migration Flows.* IOM. November, 2008. 9 pages.

*Irregular migration and mixed flows: IOM's approach.* IOM. December, 2009. 10 pages.

### **Evaluation documents**

*New Approaches to Evaluating Comprehensive Community Initiatives.* Weiss, C. 1995.

*Compendium of basic terminology in governance and public administration,* United Nations, Economic and Social Council (2006). Document E/C.16/2006/4. Available at: <http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un/unpan022332.pdf>

*Praxis Paper 23: Monitoring and Evaluating Capacity Building: Is it really that difficult?,* INTRAC 2010.

*IPEC Child Labour Impact Assessment Toolkit: Tracer Study Manual,* International Labour Office, International Programme on the Elimination of Child Labour (IPEC) – Geneva: ILO, 2011 – 3 v.

### **Excel files**

*Summary of Budget Consumption by Country Mission for CT.0650 as of 22 Aug 2013.* Murphy, C. August, 2013.

*Budget utilization. Horn/Gulf of Aden/Yemen: Improving Protection of Migrations Phase III.* Komenda, H. (IOM Nairobi PSU Manager). IOM. July, 2013.

*Budget utilization report. Djibouti.* Komenda, H. (IOM Nairobi PSU Manager) IOM July, 2013

*Budget utilization report. Horn/Gulf of Aden/Yemen: Improving Protection of Migrations Phase III.* Komenda, H. (IOM Nairobi PSU Manager). IOM. July, 2013.

*Staff numbers and names.* Komenda, H. (IOM Nairobi PSU Manager). IOM.

*Ethiopia migration trends.* Komenda, H. (IOM Nairobi PSU Manager). IOM. 2013.

*Ethiopia Migrant data form. Returnees' Details Inquiry Form. Destination Country/Area: Ethiopia.* Komenda, H. (IOM Nairobi PSU Manager). IOM. 2011.

*Ethiopia migrant contact form. Returnees' Details Inquiry Form. Destination Country/Area: Ethiopia.* Komenda, H. (IOM Nairobi PSU Manager). IOM. 2011.

*Budget utilization. ZPMR.* Komenda, H. IOM.

*Project Proposal. Horn/Gulf of Aden/Yemen: Improving Protection of Migrations Phase III.* Komenda, H. (IOM Nairobi PSU Manager). IOM.

*Final budget report - ZPMR\_Djibouti.* Murphy, C. September, 2013.

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*Final budget report – ZPMR Somalia.* Murphy, C. September, 2013.

*Final budget report - ZPMR\_Yemen.* Murphy, C. September, 2013.

### **Monthly and Quarterly Bulletins**

*1st quarterly report. Interim report to PRM Horn/Gulf of Aden/Yemen: Improving protection of migrants.* Komenda, H. (IOM Nairobi PSU Manager). IOM. October-December 2012. 7 pages.

*2nd quarterly report. Interim report to PRM Horn/Gulf of Aden/Yemen: Improving protection of migrants.* Komenda, H. (IOM Nairobi PSU Manager). IOM January-March 2013. 8 pages.

*3rd quarterly report. Interim report to PRM Horn/Gulf of Aden/Yemen: Improving protection of migrants.* Komenda, H. (IOM Nairobi PSU Manager). IOM. April-June 2013. 10 pages.

*IOM Mixed Migration Monthly Coordination Bulletin. Kenya, Somalia, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Yemen. Vol 1.* IOM. October, 2012. 2 pages.

*IOM Mixed Migration Monthly Coordination Bulletin. Kenya, Somalia, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Yemen. Vol 2.* IOM. November, 2012. 2 pages.

*IOM Mixed Migration Monthly Coordination Bulletin. Kenya, Somalia, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Yemen. Vol 3.* IOM. December, 2012. 2 pages.

*IOM Mixed Migration Monthly Coordination Bulletin. Kenya, Somalia, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Yemen. Vol 4.* IOM. January, 2013. 2 pages.

*IOM Mixed Migration Monthly Coordination Bulletin. Kenya, Somalia, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Yemen. Vol 5.* IOM. February, 2013. 2 pages.

*IOM Mixed Migration Monthly Coordination Bulletin. Kenya, Somalia, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Yemen. Vol 6.* IOM. March, 2013. 2 pages.

*IOM Mixed Migration Monthly Coordination Bulletin. Kenya, Somalia, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Yemen. Vol 7.* IOM. April, 2013. 2 pages.

*IOM Mixed Migration Monthly Coordination Bulletin. Kenya, Somalia, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Yemen. Vol 8.* IOM. May, 2013. 2 pages.

*IOM Mixed Migration Monthly Coordination Bulletin. Kenya, Somalia, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Yemen. Vol 9.* IOM. June, 2013. 2 pages.

*IOM Mixed Migration Monthly Coordination Bulletin. Kenya, Somalia, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Yemen. Vol 10.* IOM. July, 2013. 2 pages.

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### **Maps of migration routes**

*Mixed Migration Route Map: Africa and Horn of Africa.* Murphy, C. IOM. 2012.

*Mixed Migration Route Map: Horn of Africa.* Murphy, C. IOM. 2005.

### **Strategic frameworks**

*Ethiopia Assessment sample size and budget.* Komenda, H. (IOM Nairobi PSU Manager). IOM. 2013. 2 pages.

*IOM Africa. Strategy paper.* William Lacy Swing (General Director). IOM. 2011. 28 pages.

*IOM Africa. Strategy plan for the Horn of Africa.* Komenda, H. (IOM Nairobi PSU Manager). IOM. 2012. 54 pages.

*IOM Kenya. Strategic plan 2012-2014.* Komenda, H. (IOM Nairobi PSU Manager). IOM. 2012. 62 pages.

*IOM Regional strategy for Mixed Migration: 2013-2014. Horn of Africa and Yemen.* IOM. September, 2013. 8 pages.

### **Terms of reference**

*Termes de référence.* Centre d'Orientation et d'Aide aux Migrants (COAM), Obock, Djibouti. IOM. 2 pages.

*Terms of reference.* Migration Response Centre (MRC), Bosaso, Puntland. IOM. 2 pages.

### **Research series**

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