



**Evaluation of IOM’s Institutional Approach to the Implementation
of the Humanitarian Development Peace Nexus**

IOM CENTRAL EVALUATION

DEPARTMENT OF STRATEGIC PLANNING AND ORGANIZATIONAL PERFORMANCE

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Acronyms

AAP	Accountability to Affected Populations
CCA	Common Country Analysis
CCCM	Camp Coordination and Camp Management
CO	IOM Country Office
CoM	IOM Chief of Mission
CSO	Civil Society Organization
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DDGO	Deputy Director General for Operations
DMM	Department of Migration Management
DOE	Department of Operations and Emergencies
DPDC	Department of Peace and Development Coordination
DPSMM	Department of Programme Support and Migration Management
DS	Durable Solutions
DTM	Displacement Tracking Matrix
EU	European Union
GCM	Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration
GIFMM	Grupo Interagencial sobre Flujos Migratorios Mixtos
HDPN	Humanitarian Development Peace Nexus
HRP	Humanitarian Response Plan
JSC	Joint Steering Committee to Advance Humanitarian and Development Collaboration
HQ	IOM Headquarters
IASC	Interagency Standing Committee
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
IOM	International Organization for Migration
JSC	Joint Steering Committee to Advance Humanitarian and Development Collaboration
L/NNGO	Local/National Non-governmental Organization
M&E	Monitoring and evaluation
MCOF	Migration Crisis Operational Framework
MHPSS	Mental Health and Psychosocial Support
MSD	Migration and Sustainable Development Unit

NGO	Non-governmental Organization
NWOW	New Way of Working
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OIG	Office of the Inspector General
RD	Regional Director
RO	IOM Regional Office
RPLO	Regional Policy and Liaison Officer
RTS	Regional Thematic Specialist
SDG	Sustainable Development Goals
ToC	Theory of Change
TRD	Transition and Recovery Division
UN	United Nations
UNCT	UN Country Team
UNDS	UN Development System
UNEG	UN Evaluation Group
UNSDCF	UN Sustainable Development Cooperation Frameworks
UNSDG	UN Sustainable Development Group

Acknowledgements

The evaluation was included in the biennial evaluation plan 2021-2022 of IOM's Central Evaluation, in consultation with the Department of Operations and Emergencies (DOE) and the Department of Migration Management (DMM) (currently restructured into the Departments of Programme Support and Migration Management – DPSMM and partly of Peace and Development Coordination - DPDC). It was completed remotely from November 2021 to June 2022.

The team of external senior consultants was recruited on behalf of the Owl RE, evaluation and research consultancy, Geneva Switzerland, comprised of Dr Glenn O'Neil (Team Leader), Patricia Goldschmid and Dr Sharon McClenaghan, given their significant experience and knowledge of the humanitarian development and peace nexus (HDPN) dimensions. IOM Central Evaluation highly appreciated their commitment to the conduct of the exercise and the quality of the report.

The consultants would also like to thank all IOM staff who participated in the exercise as well as the stakeholders from the organizations within the UN System in addition to governments, non-governmental organizations and other entities for their help, time and insights provided during this evaluation. The support of the four IOM Country Offices that participated in the evaluation (Colombia, Iraq, Somalia and Ukraine), was very much appreciated, in addition to the guidance provided by the IOM Central Evaluation and the Regional Monitoring & Evaluation Officers.

IOM Central Evaluation

Executive Summary

This report is a thematic and strategic evaluation of the International Organization for Migration's (IOM) institutional approach to the implementation of the Humanitarian Development Peace Nexus (HDPN). The aim is to assess IOM's integrated strategic approach, operationalization of and contribution to the HDPN; and to provide recommendations on how to strengthen IOM's work across the nexus to better address the needs and expectations of crisis affected populations.

The evaluation was conducted in close consultation with the Department of Operations and Emergencies (DOE), the Department of Peace and Development Coordination (DPDC) and the Department of Programme Support and Migration Management (DPSMM), with the participation of IOM Senior Advisor on HDPN. The evaluation was carried out by a team of three consultants of Owl RE, evaluation and research consultancy, Geneva, Switzerland. It was completed remotely from November 2021 to June 2022.

The evaluation aimed to provide a global assessment while focusing on three case study countries as an illustration of HDPN implementation: Colombia, Iraq, and Somalia. Ukraine was originally included but given the escalation of the conflict in early 2022, the focus was adjusted to use Ukraine only as an example where possible. The following research methods were used: a document review; an online survey of IOM field staff globally with 58 responses received; semi-structured interviews with IOM staff and key stakeholders (89 persons); an analysis of HDPN presence in 17 IOM country strategies, plans, roadmaps and country crisis response plans and appeals; a checklist of eight HDPN dimensions and factors analyzed against the three case study countries.

In February 2019, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) adopted its Recommendation on HDPN, in order to foster greater coherence among actors working to strengthen resilience in fragile contexts and address the root causes of humanitarian challenges. The HDPN Recommendations was developed in response to a call for strengthened policy and operational coherence across three interlinked pillars: humanitarian, development, and peace, reflecting commitments across key global frameworks including Agenda 2030 and the Sustaining Peace resolutions. IOM has adhered to the OECD/DAC recommendations and principles since 2020.

Findings

Relevance: IOM's adopted HDPN definitions and principles were found to be relevant to the mandate and work of the IOM, as IOM has been working on HDPN even before the formal creation of the nexus, given its multi-mandated role in the humanitarian, development and peace pillars. However, it was noted that HDPN had not yet been sufficiently integrated or mainstreamed within the IOM. IOM's comparative advantage in using projectization for a flexible and pragmatic approach of programmes implementation across the nexus was also seen as a constraint for a comprehensive institutionalization and operationalization of HDPN, also considering that IOM tended to work in silos across the pillars. IOM's HDPN approach was also assessed as strongly considering the goals and objectives of IOM's international frameworks and commitments. Mixed feedback was received as to the extent that the available tools and guidance were facilitating analyses in support of an HDPN approach.

Coherence: IOM was found to have a strong external coherence through its participation in global HDPN mechanisms and United Nations (UN) coordination and specific HDPN processes at the country-level. External coherence was also assured by the commitments of actors to the DAC nexus recommendation that provided a common framework. Internal coherence was assessed as weaker,

primarily linked to the lack of general synergies and interlinkages between IOM projects/programmes and across pillars that impacted on a more coherent HDPN approach.

Effectiveness: The level of operationalization of IOM's HDPN approach varied, with IOM stronger in external facing areas such as contributing to collective outcome processes and weaker in internal facing areas such as mutually reinforcing programming across the nexus. Although there was guidance available on the operationalization of HDPN, feedback indicated that more was needed, such as on high-level positioning and practical guidance for the field. Perceptions differed on the ability of IOM's HDPN institutional approach to uphold humanitarian principles reflecting a broader ongoing debate for multi-mandated organizations. IOM's communication tools and knowledge management products and systems were seen as partially effective in promoting the HDPN approach. IOM Country Offices (COs) varied in their engagement on HDPN with target population in line with Accountability to Affected Populations (AAP) commitments.

Efficiency: IOM COs and Regional Offices (ROs) fundraise for projects and programmes that integrate a HDPN approach. There are limited opportunities to apply for flexible and multi-year funding, but they are on the rise. No systems have been identified currently to support IOM field offices in fundraising activities related to HDPN. There had been limited efforts to enhance field staff expertise and development on HDPN, with one of the top requests from surveyed IOM staff was for more training on HDPN. IOM has made minimal corporate investment to date in HDPN which impacted on the promotion of HDPN and its principles, notably internally.

Impact: The impact of IOM's HDPN approach was found to be strongest at the global level on policy and inter-agency processes, such as their contribution to IASC, OECD/DAC and the High-Level Panel on Internal Displacement. At country level the impact was lower and more differentiated, most often found where IOM played a co-ordination role (such as within Durable Solutions, Camp Coordination and Camp Management, etc.). Within IOM, there was evidence that recent structural and strategic changes had given heightened visibility and priority to HDPN although, as a new set-up, this was not consistent and was primarily evident at HQ level. Amongst UN entities at the global level, IOM was seen as a positive reference for HDPN. Amongst donors, the overall perception of IOM's ability to operate across the HDPN spectrum varied.

Sustainability: Overall, the sustainability of HDPN operationalization was found to be weak, embedded in elements of individual projects but undermined by a number of factors including: projectization, current funding modes and donor priorities, lack of knowledge management systems, capacity of the local and national actors and insecure political and development contexts.

Conclusions

Since adhering to the OECD/DAC Nexus Recommendation in 2020, the IOM has made progress in its institutionalization and operationalization of HDPN as seen in its participation in the global nexus processes and the collective outcome processes at the country-level. IOM COs are increasingly adapting their programming to work across the nexus where the contexts allow it, with Ukraine being a prominent and acute example on constraints. Where the IOM faces obstacles in operationalizing HDPN, they are predominantly internal (aside from funding availability). It should also be noted that this evaluation's findings and consequent recommendations largely align with the propositions of previous IOM studies on HDPN.

Recommendations

(Please see full report for all proposed action points).

A. Guidance: Although IOM guidance exists on HDPN it remains largely unknown and/or not adapted for usage by the field. The concept of HDPN remains vague for many IOM staff and practical guidance and examples are needed. Further, senior field management (Chiefs of Mission (CoMs), deputies, and programme coordinators) have differing interpretations of HDPN. The IOM is encouraged to issue a high-level guidance note outlining IOM's institutional position on HDPN; revise existing operational guidance on HDPN; integrate practical guidance on HDPN in all relevant guides/handbooks; develop an operational guidance note on drivers of human mobility; and provide institutional backing to the roll-out and development of supportive materials to apply MCOF 2.0.

B. Programming: The HDPN approach can only be operationalized successfully if IOM addresses a number of key institutional obstacles; a significant one being the lack of joined-up or integrated programming. IOM has made increasing progress on designing and implementing projects that work across the nexus. However, the issue is not with these projects but more so with finding linkages within and between pillars. It is proposed that IOM should launch an organizational-wide initiative to adopt integrated programming with measurable indicators in the forthcoming Organizational Effectiveness Results framework; continue to support COs and ROs to design projects that work across the nexus and address multi-sectoral drivers of human mobility in planning and programming exercises; encourage a more systematic consultation of affected populations; and increase the use of partnerships that prioritize strengthening national and local capacities.

C. Assessment and analysis: IOM COs are valuable contributors to joint assessments although opportunities and motivation were limited. Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) was found to provide a solid contribution to analyses that was beginning to be used across the nexus. In addition to the forthcoming roll-out of MCOF 2.0, it is anticipated that the HDPN Drivers Study will also contribute a greater integration of gender-sensitive and root cause analyses. IOM is encouraged to prioritize the interoperability of data collected by IOM across different COs and ROs projects; adopt a more comprehensive review of data relevant to HDPN; further lead and/or participate in joint assessments; integrate gender-sensitive and root causes analyses and structural drivers of conflict; continue to strengthen DTM's contribution to HDPN and guidance on how to carry out coherent drivers' analysis and assessments.

D. Planning: The introduction of a common and mandatory planning across regions and countries was an opportunity to reinforce integrated programming and an HDPN approach, as increasingly reflected in IOM's appeals and actions plans. HDPN should not be systematically included but only where relevant. However, as seen in the recent examples of Afghanistan, Iraq, Mozambique, and Ukraine, urgent humanitarian needs are often linked to longer-term issues of resilience, recovery, and development where the IOM has programmatic strengths. In guidance produced for CO planning, IOM is encouraged to adopt an inclusive and multi-year planning process and continue to integrate a HDPN approach within appeals and action plans where relevant.

E. Resources: IOM's limited resources committed to HDPN was found to impact the ability of the organization to operationalize HDPN at the field level, taking into account the considerable nexus-related responsibilities at the global level. The evaluation notes however that a department (DPDC) dedicated to HDPN is now in place, which will certainly be an asset to further reinforce IOM operationalization of HDPN. A starting point could be to establish a temporary (e.g. 2 year) cross-organizational working group to champion the operationalization of HDPN and determine the

resources needed. It should also be underlined that the operationalization of HDPN is the responsibility of all IOM staff in fragile and conflict-affected contexts.

F. Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E), knowledge management and learning: IOM's M&E presence within COs was largely project-based and not always conducive to the collection and monitoring of country-level/collective outcomes and indicators. The ability to share and learn of how other comparable COs, projects or programmes were operationalizing HDPN was limited, reflecting weak institutional knowledge management systems within IOM. The IOM should consider creating more opportunities where projects and programmes can share their experiences on HDPN operationalization; promote the conduct of evaluations focusing also on HDPN approach in the IOM operations; increase M&E capacity within COs to support in the monitoring of country-level/collective outcomes; within the Organizational Effectiveness Results framework ensure that there is an indicator for COs on the key organizational aspects that support HDPN and expand training opportunities (e.g. e-learning module) on the operationalization of HDPN and make it available in different languages.

G. Leadership and coordination: CoMs, their deputies and programme coordinators were found to be central to encourage their teams to work together and across the nexus. Greater adaptive and flexible CO structures that break down the pillars and silos are needed. In fragile and conflict-affected countries, IOM are encouraged to recruit senior staff who possess the appropriate skills and experience to operationalise HDPN and COs should consider the best structures to avoid silos. In the re-organization of ROs, IOM should consider how the new structure (and roles) can optimally support the operationalization of the HDPN, for example by opening up the role of Regional Thematic Specialist (RTS) and Regional Policy and Liaison Officers (RPLO) beyond specific specializations. HDPN should be specifically mentioned in job descriptions of CoM, RTS, RPLO and Regional Directors.

H. Funding: Availability of flexible and multi-year funding for projects that integrated a nexus approach was limited for COs and ROs, although opportunities were growing as donors increasingly recognised the need to offer such funding. Support for obtaining funding for nexus-focused programming at the country-level was largely absent. Current CO structures and the projectized nature of the IOM also limited collaboration between IOM teams to raise funds. Donors in general had a fragmented understanding of IOM's current and potential ability to work across the nexus. IOM are encouraged to develop a specific fundraising strategy clarifying its HDPN approach; increase HQ support to identify nexus-specific funding and facilitate COs in accessing such funding; actively and regularly inform key donors about IOM's HDPN approaches and the best practice examples seen in integrating the nexus in IOM programming; and modify the financial tracking systems to provide a better tracking of HDPN related and multi-year funding.

1. Introduction

This evaluation report is a thematic and strategic evaluation of the International Organization for Migration's (IOM) institutional approach to the implementation of the Humanitarian Development Peace Nexus (HDPN). The evaluation was included in the biennial evaluation plan 2021-2022 of IOM's Central Evaluation and was conducted in close consultation with the Department of Operations and Emergencies (DOE), the Department of Peace and Development Coordination (DPDC) and the Department of Programme Support and Migration Management (DPSMM), with the participation of the Senior Advisor on HDPN who reports to the Deputy Director General for Operations (DDGO). IOM Central Evaluation is in the Department of Strategic Planning and Organizational Performance (DPP) at Headquarters. The evaluation was carried out by a team of three consultants of the Owl RE, evaluation and research consultancy, Geneva, Switzerland. It was completed remotely from November 2021 to June 2022.

2. Evaluation Background

2.1. Objectives and focus of the evaluation

The aim of this evaluation was to assess IOM's integrated strategic approach, operationalization of and contribution to the HDPN; and to provide recommendations on how to strengthen IOM's work across the HDPN to better address the needs and expectations of crisis affected populations. More specifically, the evaluation aimed to analyze the internal synergies and institutional steps taken by IOM for an effective and sustained adherence to the HDPN approaches, principles and recommendations agreed upon by the international community and the United Nations (UN).

This objective was supported by a series of 24 evaluation questions, as per the Terms of Reference (annex 1), developed in the evaluation matrix during the inception phase and organized based on the six OECD-DAC evaluation criteria.¹ The evaluation questions, indicators, data collection tools and sources are detailed in the evaluation matrix (annex 4).

2.2. Evaluation methodology

The evaluation findings are based on the triangulation of data, information and evidence collected through the following research methods:

- A document review of all relevant documentation. A list of the main documents reviewed can be found in Annex 2.
- An online survey of IOM staff globally with 58 responses received representing the main roles targeted with all regions represented.²
- Semi-structured interviews with IOM staff and key stakeholders: 89 persons in total. A list of persons interviewed can be found in Annex 3.
- An analysis was carried out of HDPN presence in 17 IOM country strategies, plans, roadmaps and country crisis response plans and appeals as found in the section Evidence-based Analysis.

¹ OECD-DAC six evaluation criteria – relevance, coherence, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability: <https://www.oecd.org/dac/evaluation/dacriteriaforevaluatingdevelopmentassistance.htm>

² Survey response demographics by role: 41% - Chiefs of Missions (CoMs) & deputies; 26% - technical/thematic specialists; 14% - monitoring and evaluation (M&E) staff; 14% - project staff.

- A checklist of eight HDPN dimensions and factors was created and analyzed against the three case study countries as found in the section Evidence-based Analysis.

The evaluation aimed to provide a global assessment while focusing on three case study countries as an illustration of HDPN implementation: Colombia, Iraq, and Somalia. Ukraine was originally included as a fourth country but given the escalation of the conflict in early 2022, the focus was adjusted to use Ukraine as an example where possible but not as a full case study country, as detailed in limitations below.

The following table details the number of persons interviewed by type of stakeholder group.

Table 1: Overview of persons interviewed

Stakeholder group	No.
IOM staff in four Country Offices (COs) – (5-Somalia, 3-Ukraine 4-Colombia, 11 – Iraq)	23
External Stakeholders in three countries (4 – Somalia, 8-Colombia, 7-Iraq)	19
IOM staff in other COs (Afghanistan, Cameroon, Pakistan, Tunisia)	5
IOM HQ staff	16
IOM Regional Offices (ROs) staff	14
Global stakeholders (UN agencies and OECD)	8
Donor governments (HQ) ³	4
Total	89*

*Including 19 staff interviewed in the inception phase.

Data analysis: A combination of qualitative (interviews and discussions) and quantitative data (survey responses and budget breakdowns) was collected. The qualitative data was analyzed thematically to understand trends linked to the different issues and areas covered by the surveys and interviews. A qualitative data analysis software, Deedose, was used to code the responses of the participants, which made it possible to explore the trends and tendencies linked to the issues covered by the evaluation questions. Charts were used to provide an overview of the results from the survey data collected.

Limitations: The evaluation’s inception report set out the three limitations with proposed mitigation strategies as detailed in the table below. A commentary is also provided on the limitation and its impact on the evaluation. In addition to the three limitations, a fourth limitation was faced by the evaluation; the necessity to re-consider Ukraine as a case study country given the conflict that started in the middle of the conducting of the evaluation after its inclusion as a case study.

Table 2: Limitations faced by the evaluation

Limitation identified	Mitigation strategy	Commentary
(a) The context of COVID-19: The timing of the evaluation during the COVID-19 pandemic response/recovery will likely impact on the	Early and close involvement with the IOM team to help coordinate meetings and ensure availability of key	With the exception of Ukraine (as explained below), the IOM staff and stakeholders were available and accessible for the evaluation. Within each of the three case study countries,

³ At the HQ level, staff of the governments of Belgium, Switzerland and Sweden were interviewed (with Ireland providing feedback via email). In the case study countries, staff of the US government were interviewed for Colombia and Iraq; staff of the governments of Australia and Switzerland were also interviewed for Iraq.

availability of IOM staff and project stakeholders and/or extend the time it will take to respond to the evaluation request and provide inputs.	stakeholders. Interviews took place remotely over a period of eight weeks.	a focal point was nominated in each of the countries that supported the evaluation team in the organization and conduct of interviews.
(b) Insufficient data: General problem of insufficient data, or insufficient representative data collected, owing to poor response rate from interviewees and surveys.	Triangulation with other data gathering tools from different sources will help address any data gaps.	The response rate for both the interviews and survey was satisfactory enabling the evaluation to collect a broad range of views and feedback.
(c) Broad scope of HDPN: HDPN as an approach is broad in its scope and the evaluation, with 45 consultancy days, will be challenged in its ability to cover all aspects of the full scope of HDPN within IOM.	The evaluation will focus on responding to the evaluation questions, prioritize issues that appear to be key in the process and state any limitations in its ability.	The evaluation team focused on responding to the evaluation questions as detailed in this report. Some aspects, such as IOM's global and regional roles in HDPN processes were not able to be explored in-depth; the priority was given to HDPN operationalization at the country-level.
(d) Conflict in Ukraine: the outbreak of conflict in early 2022 implied that it would be difficult to access IOM staff and stakeholders in the Ukraine.	In discussion with the IOM evaluation team, it was decided to keep the focus on Ukraine but reduce its role in the evaluation given anticipated unavailability of IOM staff and stakeholders.	The evaluation team were able to interview three IOM staff in Ukraine, in addition to several HQ and regional staff that were involved in the Ukraine response. It was not possible to interview any external stakeholders.

3. Background to HDPN

In February 2019, the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) adopted its Recommendation on HDPN, in order to foster greater coherence among actors working to strengthen resilience in fragile contexts and address the root causes of humanitarian challenges. The HDPN Recommendation was developed in response to a call for strengthened policy and operational coherence across three interlinked pillars: humanitarian, development, and peace, reflecting commitments across key global frameworks including Agenda 2030 and the Sustaining Peace resolutions.⁴ IOM has adhered to the recommendations and principles included in the OECD/DAC document since 2020.

Before that, IOM had already endorsed its commitment to a New Way of Working (NWOW) and on enhancing engagement between humanitarian and development actors (commitment 10 of the Grand Bargain) at the World Humanitarian Summit in September 2016. Together with other humanitarian, development and peace actors, IOM agreed on common goals towards Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) targets; multi-year programming with milestones in three to five years; and to build local capacities of communities, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and governments. IOM

⁴ OECD-DAC (February 2019), *DAC Recommendation on the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus*.

contributes to these outcomes through its broad mandate and role in humanitarian, development, and peace activities.

IOM's approach towards the HDPN focuses on implementing the DAC nexus Recommendation and its 11 Principles clustered as follows: comprehensive programming (common analysis, country cooperation and collective outcomes); coordination (communities at the center, complementary, and collaboration); cross cutting issues (including climate, gender, and diversity; cultural context; and conflict sensitivity); and closing financial gaps (coherence, cost-efficient, capitalize on comparative advantages).

IOM collaborates with other actors through its operations, whenever relevant, as well as with mechanisms such as the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), the UN Sustainable Development Group (UNSDG), the UN Development System (UNDS), the UN Joint Steering Committee to Advance Humanitarian and Development Collaboration (JSC), and the OECD/DAC-UN Nexus group. At the country-level, IOM collaborates with the UN Country Teams (UNCTs), the cluster system and in working with joint humanitarian appeals, as well as on Common Country Analysis (CCA) and UN Sustainable Development Cooperation Frameworks (UNSDCF).

IOM employs the Migration Crisis Operational Framework (MCOF) to promote coherence across different programming areas within the Organization. MCOF, created in 2012, was designed to bring together IOM's different sectors of assistance in upholding human rights and humanitarian principles and in promoting transition and longer-term development goals. The 2022 MCOF Addendum ("MCOF 2.0") reinforces IOM's HDPN approach.

IOM has a dedicated Transition and Recovery Division (TRD) within DPDC (previously part of DOE) that focuses on stabilization and resilience; durable solutions and recovery; transition and peacebuilding and reducing disaster risk⁵, combatting climate change and environmental degradation. DPDC also includes the Migration and Sustainable Development Unit (MSD), which is the institutional focal point for mainstreaming IOM's contribution to the achievement of the 2030 Agenda and leads the implementation of the IOM Institutional Strategy on Migration and Sustainable Development 2019–2023. HDPN has been given further visibility through this newly created department, but DOE remains involved in preparedness, anticipatory action and humanitarian response, and DPSMM to a lesser extent with the assistance to migrants through equity and social cohesion.

IOM has also appointed a senior advisor for HDPN, previously located in DOE but now reporting to the DDGO. An IOM Member State, Sweden, is funding this secondment to support the development of strategies and partnerships, with a focus on advancing the HDPN approach within IOM's work, coordination, and policies. Since 2021, the IOM has developed a Global Crisis Response Platform that centralizes and presents IOM's Crisis Response Plans and associated financial requirement.⁶

4. Findings

The findings are organized around six evaluation criteria and related evaluation questions.

⁵ IOM is also an executive partner of the Capacity for Disaster Reduction Initiative (CADRI), a global partnership that helps countries reduce disaster and climate risk: <https://www.cadri.net/>

⁶ <https://crisisresponse.iom.int/>

4.1. Relevance

IOM's adopted HDPN definitions and principles were found to be relevant to the mandate and work of the IOM, with most IOM staff commenting that IOM has been working on HDPN even before its formal creation, given its multi-mandated role in humanitarian, development and peace pillars. However, it was also thought that HDPN had not yet been sufficiently integrated or mainstreamed within the IOM. IOM's comparative advantage in using projectization for a flexible and pragmatic approach of programmes implementation across the nexus was also seen as a constraint for a comprehensive institutionalization and operationalization of HDPN, also considering that IOM tended to work in silos⁷ across the pillars. IOM's HDPN approach was also assessed as strongly considering the goals and objectives of IOM's international frameworks and commitments. Mixed feedback was received as to the extent that the available tools and guidance were supporting analyses in support of an HDPN approach.

What is the relevance of IOM's HDPN definitions and principles to the mandate and work of IOM?

Feedback from both IOM staff and external stakeholders confirmed that IOM's HDPN definitions and principles are relevant to the mandate and work of the IOM, with efforts made on all levels of the organization to link IOM mandate to the nexus pillars as confirmed by this external stakeholder:

"[HDPN] Extremely relevant to the IOM. It encompasses everything they do and creates a bridge between humanitarian and development and the new focus on peace building."


Most IOM staff feel that IOM has been working on HDPN even before its formal launch in 2016, given its multi-mandated role. However, many thought that HDPN had not been sufficiently integrated or mainstreamed within the IOM, as this IOM staff commented:

"HDPN is very relevant for the IOM, but it needs to be "sold" better internally and not just as another framework. It encompasses just about everything we do but there's a fatigue around terminology and programming."

Feedback from both interviews and the survey confirmed that IOM is using the HDPN approach where the context allows when developing and/or implementing projects. Forty per cent of IOM staff surveyed indicated that they use the HDPN approach either "Always" or "Often", another 42 per cent that they use it "Sometimes" and 9 per cent "Never" as shown in the chart below. Various barriers were identified to the use of HDPN approach that go beyond relevance to the context, including the existence of silos within IOM limiting cooperation, availability of funding and lack of knowledge, guidance, and practical experience on how to operationalize HDPN (see also below under the Effectiveness section).

⁷ "Silos" within IOM refers to the way IOM is structured both at HQs and field level with units and teams tending to be grouped together by their main focus in either humanitarian or development work.

Figure 1: frequency of HDPN approach when developing/implementing projects



Positive examples were noted with IOM COs taking steps towards a more institutionalized HDPN approach by consolidating the work of departments, projects, and approaches (further elaborated in Effectiveness section). For example, in Colombia the emergency response department incorporates emergency and stabilization to ensure a longer-term response and coordination between these areas.

Are there any constraints for IOM as a ‘multi-mandated’ organization concerning HDPN? What is IOM’s comparative advantage across the HDPN?

IOM is recognized by both IOM staff and external stakeholders as being a ‘multi-mandated’ organization well positioned to adopt a HDPN approach, its comparative advantage being its flexible and pragmatic approach that allows it to work across the nexus without being questioned. Positive examples were noticed in all case study countries where IOM worked successfully across the nexus as detailed in the Effectiveness section.

IOM’s projectization raised a mixed feeling, some stakeholders seeing it as a comparative advantage in that it allows for flexibility, in addition to matching quickly emerging needs across the nexus, and others underlining projectization as a constraint for the operationalization of HDPN as it requires very good internal coordination within IOM to work across the HDPN pillars.

Another constraint faced by IOM for HDPN operationalization is the tendency to work in silos, often dictated by the funding structure of ‘short-term’ projects privileged by IOM donors and by projectization preventing longer-term programming and cross-sectoral collaborations between departments. However, there are examples where IOM was able to work across the nexus pillars, notably in preparedness, anticipatory action, post conflict, transition, recovery and stabilization (see Effectiveness section below). Addressing this challenge for finding the necessary synergies to work across the nexus pillars is explained in the below statement of an IOM staff:

“In our CO we have the emergency department, transition department and development department. Now we need to institutionalize HDPN and have the different approaches streamlined.”

Is IOM’s HDPN approach properly considering the goals and objectives of the GCM, SDGs, UN development and IASC reforms?

IOMs HDPN approach was assessed as strongly considering the goals and objectives of international frameworks and commitments. IOM was cited by external stakeholders as working closely with governments and other actors (donors, UN agencies, NGOs, etc.) in all case study countries to encourage the consideration of goals and objectives of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM), SDGs, UN development and IASC reforms, where relevant. IOM was also

seen as being very visible at the global level in support of IASC reforms related to the nexus, as discussed further in the Impact section.

At the country-level, IOM’s strategies and plans were aligned with the international frameworks and plans, and they have worked further to align this with a HDPN approach, with successes but also obstacles as described throughout this report.


IOM’s HDPN approach encourages an engagement with the UN country structures and processes in the aim of common and coherent responses and outcomes as described in the Effectiveness section below. IOM COs have long been encouraged to participate in UN country structures and process that pre-dates the creation of HDPN.⁸ Although IOM’s participation was generally viewed as positive it did vary given the lack of guidance to IOM Chiefs of Mission (CoM) as noted by this external stakeholder, and which can be extrapolated to HDPN approaches:

“Other UN organizations have much stronger structures and guidance to really make their CoMs adhere to rules and to engage with the UN system at the country-level. IOM’s CoMs are much freer which has some advantages but leads to inconsistent presence, participation, and contributions from IOM to the country-level processes and structures.”

Do the available tools and guidance support IOM Country Offices in undertaking risk-informed and gender-sensitive analysis of root causes, cross-cutting issues, and structural drivers of conflict in the framework of HDPN?⁹

There was mixed feedback as to the extent that the available tools and guidance were supporting an analysis on these issues. Surveyed IOM staff varied in their assessment of the support of available tools as seen in the chart below, with less than half agreeing or not knowing of the support provided by these tools (with the exception for gender-sensitive analysis). This mixed feedback is possibly related to the limited availability of tools and guidance in these areas. IOM staff interviewed mentioned the MCOF framework as the most useful tool in addition to some programme/project specific tools. The 2021 HDPN Drivers Regional (Central America and the Caribbean) Study found that many tools lacked clear direction on how, when, and where to apply them.¹⁰

Figure 2: Support of available tools for analyses




⁸ For example, the CoM Handbook (2016) encourages CoM to participate in UN country-level processes.

⁹ This question also integrates the evaluation question “Do IOM HDPN related tools and guidance properly include analysis of cross-cutting issues?”

¹⁰ IOM (June 2021), *Addressing drivers of migration and displacement in Central America and the Caribbean across the Humanitarian, Development and Peace Nexus* (draft).

At the same time, most surveyed IOM staff reported that they were integrating ‘Do No Harm’ and gender and conflict sensitive approach and addressing root causes and structural drivers of migration in CO/RO planning (42 per cent-Always, 36 per cent-Often and respectively 40 per cent-Always, 33 per cent-Often). As indicated in the analysis of IOM’s country plans and strategies, gender analyses were particularly absent¹¹ (see Evidence-based Analysis section) and this absence was also reflected in IOM analysis and programming in general according to IOM staff interviewed. There was anticipation from IOM staff that the IOM HDPN Drivers Project, currently underway, would support COs in enhanced context and risk analysis.¹²

Figure 3: Use of analysis in programming



4.2. Coherence

IOM was found to have a strong external coherence through its participation in global HDPN mechanisms and UN coordination and specific HDPN processes at the country-level. External coherence was also assured by the commitments of actors to the DAC nexus recommendation that provided a common framework. Internal coherence was assessed as weaker, primarily linked to the lack of general synergies and interlinkages between IOM projects/programmes and across pillars that impacted on a coherent HDPN approach.

How does IOM ensure both internal and external coherence of its HDPN approach?

Internal coherence: Considered as the synergies and interlinkages on HDPN within the IOM, it was assessed as being weak in many respects. This was primarily due to the lack of general synergies and interlinkages between projects/programmes and across pillars that impacted on a comprehensive HDPN approach as these IOM staff indicated:

“We have a lot of artificial separations within IOM, for example, supporting victims of trafficking is very similar in programming for what is done for reintegration of migrants; but they are completely different departments and rarely talk – so how can we ensure a consistent approach, including for HDPN”.

“We have silos of excellence – very good robust humanitarian; also, recovery, and also migration management; but it’s very rare that we deploy all three in a comprehensive integrated way”.

¹¹ A gender analysis may have been carried out in preparation of a strategy but it was not visible in the final document.

¹² IOM (2020), *HDPN Driver Project*. MiRAC.

Tools, such as MCOF were cited as ensuring some coherence across COs and ROs but knowledge management, information, and exchange within IOM on HDPN was lacking as discussed in the Effectiveness section. Although guidance on HDPN was available, it was not known or sufficiently detailed to ensure internal coherence according to IOM staff (See Effectiveness section below for further details on HDPN guidance). CoMs, deputy CoMs and programme coordinators were seen as being key to ensuring internal coherence, in general and on HDPN, although this varied considerably from country to country according to IOM staff and external stakeholders, as discussed below.

External coherence: Considered as the consistency of IOM’s HDPN approach with other actors’ HDPN approaches, this was assessed as being stronger than internal coherence. Through its participation in global HDPN mechanisms (e.g., OECD, IASC) and through UN coordination and specific HDPN processes at the country-level, external coherence was strong according to IOM staff and external stakeholders. External coherence was also assured by the commitments of actors to the DAC nexus recommendation that provided a common framework.

In several countries IOM was considered an important leader in ensuring coherence on migration and HDPN. For example, in Colombia it leads the GIFMM (*Grupo Interagencial sobre Flujos Migratorios Mixtos*) network together with UNHCR with an online portal that allows actors to coordinate actions in the response to the influx of Venezuelan migrants. Similarly, IOM co-leads the Camp Coordination and Camp Management (CCCM) cluster in most contexts, which was seen as supporting cohesion on the nexus.

IOM was also seen as supporting external coherence at the country-level through its approach and support to other actors, as noted by this external stakeholder: *“Communication is easy with the IOM, from the technical staff to the CoM. They are very accessible and understand the dynamics of other agencies in the country.”*

Despite this positive assessment, IOM staff and external stakeholders commented that there was a need for further harmonization and coordination between actors on the nexus at the country-level. This was also a finding of the 2021 IASC Nexus mapping that found *“diverging views and interpretations”* on the nexus amongst actors at the country level.¹³ Actors, including IOM, were seen as very good at considering the nexus at a project level, but the challenge was how to achieve coherence with multiple actors working in a specific country or sub-region. Further, more efforts were seen as necessary from IOM and other actors to ensure coherence across the nexus in their programming, as this stakeholder explained:

“We can see up to 20 actors delivering on collective outcomes; and there is room for them to better track how they are assisting populations in need and make stronger links across the nexus; I’ve seen cases where the IOM will respond with a humanitarian response and then disconnect after six months without making the links to other actors for recovery and long-term development.”

4.3. Effectiveness

The level of operationalization of IOM’s HDPN approach varied across the eight dimensions defined (see below table), with IOM stronger in external facing areas such as contributing to collective outcome processes and weaker in internal facing areas such as mutually reinforcing programming

¹³ IASC (November 2021), *Mapping good practices in the implementation of Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus approaches, Country Briefs and Synthesis Report, 2021.*, p. 3.

across the nexus. Factors that facilitated or constrained IOM in operationalizing HDPN were identified. Although there was guidance available on the operationalization of HDPN, feedback indicated that more was needed, such as on high-level positioning and practical guidance for the field. Perceptions differed on the ability of IOM’s HDPN institutional approach to uphold humanitarian principles reflecting a broader ongoing debate for multi-mandated organizations. IOM’s communication tools and knowledge management products and systems were seen as partially effective in promoting the HDPN approach. IOM COs varied in their engagement with target population in line with Accountability to Affected Populations commitments.

To what extent has IOM operationalized its HDPN approach at the country-level?

The level of operationalization of IOM’s HDPN approach was assessed across eight dimensions as summarized below. A detailed analysis of each dimension is provided in the Evidence-based Analysis section.

Table 3: Assessment of HDPN operationalization – eight dimensions

Dimension	Summary assessment
Shared vision and collective outcomes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> IOM makes a positive contribution to collective outcome processes at the country-level such as supporting the creation of the UN Sustainable Development Cooperation Frameworks (UNSDCFs) and Humanitarian Response Plans (HRPs). The current UNSDCFs of the three case study countries all had migration issues integrated.
Assessment and analysis	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> IOM participates in CCAs although opportunities for other joint assessment are limited given the ongoing preference of IOM and other agencies for agency-own analyses. IOM’s DTM in the three case study countries was seen as a positive example of data that was used within IOM and shared with and used by other actors, although it was mainly used for humanitarian programming (and transition to a lesser extent). The lack of interoperability and sharing of data between IOM projects was noted by both IOM staff and external stakeholders.
Planning	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The COs of the three case study countries were undertaking multi-year planning/programming. Until 2020, IOM had no common and mandatory planning across regions and countries; implying flexibility but also that the processes for planning could vary, in terms of its inclusivity and integration of HDPN. An analysis of 17 IOM country strategies, plans roadmaps and country crisis response plans and appeals shows that HDPN was mentioned in most and were strong in describing their external collaboration but weak on internal collaboration and comprehensive programming. The 2022 Roadmap for Northern Mozambique, the April 2022 Ukraine Flash Appeal and the Iraq Crisis Response Plan 2022-2023 were good examples of making the links between the pillars.
Programming	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Positive examples were seen of IOM projects/programmes that were successfully making the links between the pillars, such as in the areas of preparedness, anticipatory action, post conflict, transition, recovery, and stabilization.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • These examples often include humanitarian response together with activities to contribute to peace, such as community stabilization, and eventually to longer-term development through employment, housing, and property rights. • IOM’s 2022 response in Ukraine illustrated how such links were being made, even in an acute conflict situation (see information in the box below). • Specific activities were also highlighted that effectively made the links between the pillars such as border management, health, cash-based programming and water, sanitation, and hygiene. Other activities such as diaspora engagement was seen as having potential but were continuing to be seen by IOM primarily through a development lens.¹⁴ • A major weakness of IOM programming consistently highlighted by both IOM staff and external stakeholders was the lack of mutually reinforcing programming across the nexus. • External stakeholders, including donors could cite positive examples of IOM projects spanning the nexus but at the same time noted limited cross-synergies between IOM projects.
Monitoring and evaluation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Only a minority of COs/ROs had M&E frameworks that included elements for reporting on HDPN in CO/RO strategic plans. • There was a lack of M&E frameworks being developed for strategic plans in general by COs/ROs (and thus presence of HDPN indicators). • The draft indicators framework to accompany the Strategic Results Framework does have two HDPN indicators, on CCAs and funding, but nothing on integrated programming nor on planning. Key areas of HDPN, such as “Putting people at the centre” and “Strengthen national and local capacities” are reflected across the indicators of the Framework. • Limited integration of assessing IOM’s HDPN approach within evaluations carried out at the country-level.
Leadership and coordination	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Establishing mechanisms to avoid silos and enable synergies was reported as being limited indicating that internal coordination was not yet optimal. • The role of CoMs, deputy-CoMs and programme coordinators were seen as central to encourage pillars, projects, and programmes to work together across the nexus and adopt a HDPN approach. • The role of CoM varied depending largely upon the individuals as there were no known requirements and/or guidance for them on HDPN. • Examples were seen where IOM had taken leadership roles that promoted a HDPN approach, for example as co-lead of the CCCM cluster or early recovery cluster. • The Regional Thematic Specialists (RTS) were seen as having an important role in promoting a HDPN approach, but this was limited given their ‘siloeing’ within a specialization.
Partnerships	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • IOM mainly has partnerships with governments and other UN agencies. • Through its development pillar IOM was strong in building national ownership with authorities, which was also seen in some recovery, transition and stabilization projects.

¹⁴ IOM has invested in diaspora engagement beyond development as seen with the Global Diaspora Summit 2022 (<https://www.iom.int/global-diaspora-summit-2022>) and the 2022 Framework for Diaspora Engagement in Humanitarian Assistance (<https://www.idiaspora.org/en/learn/resources/project-materials/draft-note-framework-diaspora-engagement-humanitarian-assistance>). However, these initiatives are yet to influence any broad changes to field programming integrating diaspora engagement beyond development.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • IOM favors direct implementation by its own staff for many projects, which limited the development of local capacity. • Partnerships with local/national NGOs (L/NNGOs) and civil society organizations (CSOs) tended to be as contracted service providers. Very few examples were seen where L/NNGOs or CSOs had an equal status partnership with IOM.
Funding and finance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The majority of surveyed IOM staff reported that their COs/ROs were designing funding proposals/appeals that reflect the full spectrum of the IOM programming. • However, the number of such proposals were limited due to 'siloeing' within the COs and lack of nexus funding available. • There were limited opportunities with many donors to apply for flexible and multi-year funding although they were increasing. • Designing joint proposals and appeals with other UN partners was less common although examples were seen where IOM had joined other UN partners in projects successfully.¹⁵ • There was still a tendency for IOM to work alone for various reasons, which limited the number of joint proposals.

Examples of IOM projects/programmes successfully making the links between the pillars

Colombia: The Venezuelan migrant and refugee response involves programmatic areas of the CO with capacity to respond to different needs for 1.8 million migrants and returnees entering or transiting through the country. For example, activities in health, support for the communities that host Venezuelans, and protection for the victims of trafficking. The GIFMM platform was developed as a coordination mechanism that links the humanitarian response with longer term development focus for the Venezuelan migrant response. It is co-chaired by IOM and UNHCR and groups together all UN agencies, civil society organizations and NGOs to align activities. Every year, joint needs assessment are undertaken by GIFMM partners to assess the needs and movements of refugees and migrants in Colombia, and to design a response not only to their immediate humanitarian needs but also for their socio-economic integration, regularization and access to employment.

Iraq: IOM co-chairs Iraq's Durable Solutions Network with UNDP, working with a range of humanitarian, stabilization and development actors, including the government of Iraq to facilitate safe returns and the reintegration for internally displaced populations (IDPs) in situations of protracted displacement, as well as supporting other durable solutions for people who are unable to return. Part of the work of IOM's Community Stabilization Unit includes the Mental Health and Psychosocial Support (MHPSS) programme which encompasses a range of activities aiming to improve the psychological and social well-being and strengthen the overall resilience of individuals affected by conflict and contributes to greater social cohesion. The MHPSS has been active in up to 10 governorates across the country and implemented in close collaboration with other social cohesion and protection activities.¹⁶ Durable Solutions is now included as a fifth pillar in the

¹⁵ Examples seen in Somalia and Iraq.

¹⁶ See: <https://iraq.un.org/en/173497-iom-iraq-mental-health-and-psychosocial-support-programme-activities-overview>

UNSDCF and IOM’s work in this area with partners is especially relevant now as the country moves towards transition.

Somalia: Saameynta (“impact” in Somali), launched in March 2022, is a four-year programme to achieve durable solutions for more than 75,000 IDPs and vulnerable host communities in Somalia. Saameynta aims to leverage planned urbanization and investment to provide affordable housing, employment opportunities and community assets such as infrastructure, irrigation facilities, markets, and other locally identified priorities; contributing to further stabilization of the communities and social cohesion. IOM is leading the project in partnership with the government of Somalia, UNDP and UN-HABITAT supported by the Integrated Office of the UN. The programme budget is some USD 18.0 million and is funded by the governments of the Netherlands and Switzerland.¹⁷

What factors have facilitated or constrained IOM in operationalizing HDPN?

Factors that facilitated or constrained IOM in operationalizing HDPN were mentioned by stakeholders and IOM staff (in the interviews and survey), with the most frequent factors listed in the table below.

Table 4: Facilitating and constraining factors (ranked)

Facilitating factors	Constraining factors
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • IOM’s multi-mandate implies that it can be present in each pillar of HDPN • The operational presence of IOM in many contexts globally • The nature of contexts where IOM is operational with each pillar of HDPN present • Speed, willingness and flexibility of IOM to adapt its field activities • Rapidity of IOM to respond to needs of affected populations 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Silos at HQ, ROs, COs that limit cooperation across pillars • Donor funding that is limited to a HDPN pillar (and not across the nexus); competition amongst IOM projects for funding • Lack of knowledge, guidance and practical experience of how to operationalize HDPN • Projectization nature of IOM’s activities that limit follow-up and sustainability measures • IOM’s multi-mandate implies that the variety of IOM projects not always working towards the same objectives

These factors are further discussed throughout this report.

What are the IOM policies, tools, guidance, systems and/or strategies in place to support the operationalization of HDPN?


Currently, there is guidance available on the operationalization of HDPN including, the 2020 Internal Guidance for DOE on HDPN, summary presentations, short videos and information sheets on HDPN and donors (e.g. European Union, USAID, World Bank) and HDPN and operations.¹⁸ Surveyed staff were asked which guidance they use when considering HDPN, with the highest being the IOM Project Handbook (76 per cent) followed by MCOF (55 per cent) and the Accountability to Affected Populations (AAP) Framework (48 per cent), as seen in the chart below. Of note, the Project Handbook

¹⁷ IOM (20 March 2022), *The Federal Government of Somalia and UN Partners launch Saameynta Project to Provide Lasting Solutions for People Displaced by Conflict and Climate Change*: <https://somalia.iom.int/news/federal-government-somalia-and-un-partners-launch-saameynta-project-provide-lasting-solutions-people-displaced-conflict-and-climate-change>

¹⁸ For example on WASH, Cash-Based Interventions, Health, AAP, shelter, CCCM, Shelter and Settlement, Participatory Practices.

(2017) pre-dates the conception of HDPN and therefore contains no specific guidance on HDPN (the Project Handbook does promote principles key to HDPN such as complementarity of IOM projects).

Figure 4: Use of tools/handbooks, strategies, frameworks when considering HDPN



Despite the available guidance, feedback from IOM staff indicated that they thought there was not sufficient guidance available to support the operationalization of HDPN. Some staff were also not aware of available guidance. The need for more guidance was one of the top requests of improvements indicated by surveyed field staff.

Based on insights provided by IOM staff, they were seeking two types of additional guidance:

- 1) **High-level guidance positioning HDPN within IOM’s strategic priorities and frameworks used.** It is understood that such a guidance note is planned to be issued by the Deputy Director General for Operations in 2022. This need has already been highlighted in the 2019 HDPN in Practice report.¹⁹
- 2) **Practical guidance on the operationalization of HDPN.** The existing guidance on HDPN and IOM was not widely known (17-21 per cent as seen in the chart above) and field staff were seeking more practical guidance on the “how to” of HDPN. This is not an issue unique to the IOM as the 2022 OECD interim review of DAC nexus recommendation noted: *“One of the most frequently heard comments from those consulted for this report is that the DAC Recommendation did not come with an instruction manual for proper implementation”*.²⁰ The 2022 Light Review of the Joint Steering Committee (JSC) to Advance Humanitarian and Development Collaboration also noted: *“There is a wealth of documentation about the nexus...However, the guidance that exists is sometimes not operational enough”*.²¹ It was also highlighted that there was no guidance on HDPN inclusion in project design and it was proposed by staff that the revised IOM Project Handbook

¹⁹ “As an overarching recommendation, and in recognition of varied levels of understanding of HDPN and the [new way of working] NWOW, there is an urgent need for the development and dissemination of institutional guidance outlining IOM’s institutional commitments, position, conceptual framing and comparative advantages”. IOM (March 2019), *The Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus in Practice, An IOM report based on five country case studies* (Ginette Kidd), p. 37.

²⁰ OECD (2022), *Interim Progress Review of the DAC Recommendation on the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus*. P. 24. <https://www.oecd.org/dac/the-humanitarian-development-peace-nexus-interim-progress-review-2f620ca5-en.htm>

²¹ Ruedas, M. & Almgren, O. (May 2022), *Light Review of the Joint Steering Committee (JSC) to Advance Humanitarian and Development Collaboration* (draft). P. 9.

(currently underway) should contain such guidance (rather than a separate document). Given the above high reference to MCOF, it was also seen as important tool for HDPN integration (which was confirmed in the revised version).²²

To what extent and how precisely does IOM’s HDPN approach uphold humanitarian principles, and integrate do no harm, and conflict sensitive approaches to avoid unintended negative consequences and maximize positive effects across programming in at risk, fragile and crisis settings?


Perceptions differed on the ability of IOM’s HDPN approach to uphold humanitarian principles reflecting a broader ongoing debate for multi-mandated organizations. The majority of surveyed IOM staff “Agreed” (56 per cent%) or “Partially agreed” (14 per cent%) that IOM’s HDPN approach upholds humanitarian principles, avoids unintended negative consequences and maximizes potential positive effects, although some one quarter (26 per cent%) responded “Don’t know”, as seen in the chart below.

The potential challenges for multi-mandated organizations in upholding humanitarian principles in their work across the humanitarian, development and peace pillars has long been recognized and pre-dates the creation of HDPN.²³ This was confirmed by IOM staff interviewed who stressed that any challenges were linked more so to IOM’s multi-mandated nature rather than its HDPN approach.

In Iraq, these potential challenges for IOM in upholding humanitarian principles were highlighted by IOM staff and stakeholders interviewed, notably in IOM’s activities in border and camp management and supporting the government of Iraq in repatriating Iraqi nationals from northeast Syria.²⁴

Stakeholders were mixed in their perceptions of IOM upholding humanitarian principles in these activities in Iraq. Some stakeholders saw IOM’s involvement as lacking a proper risk assessment as one stated: “IOM is less hampered by humanitarian principles than other humanitarian organizations”. Other stakeholders saw this as an example of IOM’s pragmatic approach, as this stakeholder stated: “IOM is very solutions driven, practical in their programming which is a rare quality for humanitarian organizations”.

Figure 5: IOM’s HDPN approach upholding humanitarian principles



²² Based on the 2022 revised MCOF framework (MCOF 2.0) reviewed by the evaluation team.

²³ Slim, H. & Bradley, M. (2013), *Principled Humanitarian Action & Ethical Tensions in Multi-Mandate Organizations*, World Vision: <https://www.alnap.org/system/files/content/resource/files/main/slim-and-bradley-multi-mandate-ethics-world-vision-may-2013.pdf>; Fanning, E., & Fullwood-Thomas, J. (2019), *The Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus: What does it mean for multi-mandated organizations?* Oxfam: <https://policy-practice.oxfam.org/resources/the-humanitarian-development-peace-nexus-what-does-it-mean-for-multi-mandated-o-620820/>


²⁴ IOM (10 April 2022), *Working to set an example on the global stage: Iraq, UN and international community discuss way forward on return of Iraqis from Syria’s Al-Hol*: <https://iraq.iom.int/news/working-set-example-global-stage-iraq-un-and-international-community-discuss-way-forward-return-iraqis-syrias-al-hol>

Are IOM's communication tools and knowledge management products effective in promoting the HDPN approach within IOM and externally (other UN bodies, states, beneficiaries)?

IOM's communication tools and knowledge management products were seen as partially effective in promoting the HDPN approach. While IOM surveyed staff agreed (23 per cent) or partially agreed (40 per cent) that IOM effectively promotes and communicates on the HDPN approach, one quarter partially disagreed (14 per cent) or disagreed (12 per cent). These findings were reflected in the interviews with IOM staff and external stakeholders in the three case study countries; while some thought that IOM was promoting effectively its HDPN approach, others thought that it was not well understood both internally and externally. Despite the available resources on IOM and HDPN as described above, these were mainly designed for IOM staff and unknown by external stakeholders. This situation was also compounded by the lack of knowledge management systems/mechanisms within IOM as discussed below. Where IOM was seen as effectively promoting its HDPN approach was through its practical work, such as in co-leading the CCCM shelter in Somalia and Iraq.

As described in the Impact section, the IOM was seen by donors and peer UN agencies as a positive contributor and promoter of HDPN at the global level.

Figure 6: Promotion and communication on HDPN approach



What systems are in place to learn lessons and highlight good practices in the implementation of the HDPN, and how are they promoted inside and outside the Organization?

There was a general agreement amongst IOM staff interviewed that there was a lack of systems in place to learn lessons and highlight good practices in the implementation of HDPN. The existing IOM and HDPN resources do feature lessons learnt and good practices, but they remained largely unknown by IOM staff (17-21 per cent of surveyed staff as seen in the chart above – figure 4). The IOM had also produced a series of case studies in 2019 on the operationalization of HDPN with an internal and external report but there was limited evidence that they were being used to inform IOM's field programming.²⁵ For some IOM staff, this reflected a weak focus on knowledge management globally for the Organization and the insufficient exchange across countries on best practices, which has been raised previously.²⁶ IOM Colombia was cited as a good example with their own internal knowledge management system to share available analyses, reports and evaluations between

²⁵ See: IOM (March 2019) (Ginette Kidd), *Op. Cit. (internal report)* and IOM (2019), *Operationalizing the Humanitarian–Development–Peace Nexus: Lessons learned from Colombia, Mali, Nigeria, Somalia and Turkey* (Liam Perret) (external report). The internal report contained a series of global and country-level recommendations on operationalization of HDPN. However, no formal follow-up or action plan in response to these recommendations was found by this evaluation.

²⁶ IOM (April 2021), *Addressing Drivers of Migration and Displacement across the Humanitarian, Development and Peace Nexus: IOM's Experience with Case Studies from Bangladesh and Ethiopia* (draft).

projects/programmes.²⁷ Surveyed staff provided feedback on knowledge management and HDPN as these quotes illustrate:

“I think IOM is probably doing already a lot of HDPN approaches/programming, but we may not be aware as we are too busy doing, instead of communicating. It would be useful to have some internal guidance on what good HDPN programming for the IOM is.”

“I knew that IOM tools exist on HDPN but hadn't heard of all the tools listed in the previous [survey] question. Making those more available or promoting them more would be useful.”

Are IOM Country Offices engaging with target population in line with Accountability to Affected Populations (AAP) commitments and in coordinating with other UN agencies?

In the three case study countries, the IOM COs varied in their engagement with target population in line with AAP commitments. Positive examples were provided where IOM had supported the integration of an AAP approach within its programmes/projects. For example, through its co-lead of the CCCM cluster in Somalia, the IOM supported a systematic complaints mechanism for internally displaced persons (IDPs); in all three countries, IOM's transitional and recovery projects integrated community consultations throughout the project cycle.

However, according to both IOM staff and external stakeholders, the integration of AAP was inconsistent across IOM programmes/projects. For example, although external stakeholders in both Iraq and Somalia could cite the above positive examples, they also saw a lack of an overall consistent application of AAP across all CO programmes/projects. This was thought due largely to the siloing and projectization of IOM's activities and not specifically related to IOM's HDPN approach.

4.4. Efficiency

IOM COs and ROs fundraise for projects and programmes that integrate a HDPN approach; there are limited opportunities to apply for flexible and multi-year funding, but they are on the rise. No systems have been identified currently to support IOM field offices in fundraising activities related to HDPN. There had been limited efforts to enhance field staff expertise and development on HDPN, with one of the top requests from surveyed IOM staff was for more training on HDPN. IOM has made minimal corporate investment to date in HDPN which impacted on the promotion of HDPN and its principles, notably internally.

How does the IOM fundraise for its HDPN approach? Are there systems in place to support field offices in fundraising activities related to HDPN? And if so, are they efficient and cost-effective?

The IOM does not have a particular focus on fundraising for its HDPN approach; more so the IOM fundraises for projects and programmes that integrate a HDPN approach, as highlighted by many IOM staff interviewed. As mentioned in the Effectiveness section, IOM COs/ROs commented that there were limited opportunities to apply for flexible and multi-year funding. A specific challenge mentioned by IOM staff was that project proposals that spanned across the nexus pillars could be difficult to secure funding for as donors had funding streams divided by pillars, as confirmed by the 2022 OECD interim review report.²⁸ An example seen in Colombia was where Venezuelan migrants were given a

²⁷ Another example was in the Iraq CO, where the internal communications unit produces a monthly newsletter and the donor relations unit prepares a weekly newsletter on best practices.

²⁸ OECD (2022), *Op. Cit.*

status by the government to remain for 10 years, which required a longer-term approach but available donor funding was limited to a short-term humanitarian response focus.

However, more flexible funding was becoming available as described in the highlight box below. In addition, the unearmarked voluntary contributions IOM received nearly tripled from 2017 to 2021 that provided more flexible funding although it was still only some 4% of voluntary contributions globally.²⁹ The 2022 OECD interim review report confirmed that progress had been made in developing financing instruments and mechanisms that are “nexus ready”.³⁰ IOM COs reported that some donors had been proactive in promoting HDPN alongside AAP and localization agendas. For example, the 2022 project Breaking the Climate-Conflict in Somalia, which spans the humanitarian and peace pillars, was based on an EU proposal towards IOM according to IOM staff involved.³¹

There were no systems identified in place to support IOM field offices in fundraising activities related to HDPN. More so, COs fundraised directly for projects with donors with varying levels of support from ROs according to IOM staff interviewed. IOM’s global financial tracking systems currently had limited abilities to analyze funding related to HDPN. COs reported integrating HDPN where relevant in proposals but faced challenges in fundraising. Some of these challenges were related to HDPN, such as funding availability for projects that span the HDPN pillars, but others were a reflection of broader challenges for fundraising for COs as this IOM CO staff explained:

“In our CO, we are very siloed and there is funding competition even between ourselves, different programmes for the same pots of money. This does not foster a good atmosphere within the CO and it is ingrained within the mission. It’s a contradiction against integrated programming that we are promoting.”

Examples of nexus funding

Somalia: For the Saameynta Programme (managed jointly with UNDP and UN-Habitat), the programme uses the UN Multi-Partner Trust Fund for Somalia to centralize fundraising. This is a mechanism used to manage funds from multiple donors and for multiple years; to date the governments of the Netherlands and Switzerland have committed some USD 18.0 million to this fund.

Iraq: Some donors provide funding through multiple instruments that create a holistic approach across the nexus. For example, the European Union (EU) provides development funding through the Directorate-General for International Partnerships (DG INTPA); humanitarian funding through the European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO); and “peacebuilding/nexus” funding through the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) under the umbrella of the EU Foreign Policy Instrument (FPI).

²⁹ Unearmarked voluntary contributions: 2017- USD \$14.88 Million; 2021 – \$38.79 Million. In 2021, the total voluntary contributions, unearmarked and earmarked, were \$997.96 Million; with unearmarked funding accounting for 3.8%. Source: IOM (2021), *2021 Annual Report on Unearmarked Funding*: <https://sway.office.com/vSn5fA5PC1MDUZo6?ref=Link>

³⁰ *Ibid.*

³¹ The project is for 18 months duration, 6 million EUROS, and funded through by the EU through its Global Europe - Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI), further information: <https://www.iom.int/news/new-iom-and-eu-project-targets-somali-communities-affected-conflict-and-climate-change>

Is IOM efficient in enhancing staff expertise and supporting staff development in the field for HDPN?

There had been limited efforts to enhance field staff expertise and development on HDPN. This was compounded by the lack of knowledge management on HDPN and the limited awareness of the HDPN resources available as described above.

IOM had participated in the development of the sector-wide Nexus Academy.³² Launched in 2022, the Nexus Academy centered on a training programme to facilitate learning and exchange on the nexus. However, given the demand for the Academy's training, it is envisaged that it would only be open to a very limited number of IOM staff (estimated at less than five per year). However, an online version is being produced by the Nexus Academy that should be ready for all staff by end of 2022.

One of the top requests from surveyed IOM staff was for more training on HDPN, as their comments reflected: *"Mandatory training, not conceptually, but through cases studies with CoMs and other key staff", "Simulations exercises and case analyses with real life scenarios"*.

The IOM has integrated HDPN within its forthcoming training "Leveraging Global Frameworks through policy and programming" whose basic level components will be mandatory for IOM staff when rolled out in 2022.³³

Are IOM's corporate investments in HDPN sufficient to meet its agreed upon principles?³⁴

IOM had minimal corporate investment to date in HDPN. Direct investment that could be identified was limited to the funding (by Sweden) of an HDPN senior advisor who reports to the Deputy Director General of Operations (supported by an intern). The only other known dedicated staff was a recently appointed nexus advisor to the Cameroon CO. The limited human resources did have an impact on the possibility for IOM to promote HDPN and its principles, notably internally as described above. The newly created HQ department, DPDC has grouped units key to HDPN and heightened its visibility internally; but it has not increased resources dedicated to HDPN, as far as this evaluation was aware.

Other UN agencies that have also committed to adhere to the DAC nexus recommendation, including UN-Habitat, UNDP and UNFPA were interviewed for this evaluation (nexus advisors). They also described their nexus set-ups as limited in terms of staff and emphasized the need to mainstream and integrate HDPN within existing organizational frameworks, policies, and programming. They also emphasized the necessity to adapt and align organizational structures and processes to the nexus. This confers with the 2022 OECD interim review report which described three ways organizations are accelerating broad institutional approaches to take forward the nexus: grand strategies, bottom-up approaches, and targeted measures.³⁵

³² Further information: <https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/humanitarian-development-collaboration/nexus-academy-explainer-learning-community-and-capacity-hdp-solutions>

³³ IOM (1 December 2021), *Leveraging global frameworks, Training Concept, Post pilot roll-out*.

³⁴ This question was originally phrased as "Are IOM's corporate investments in HDPN sufficient to meet its agreed upon principles, *and not at the detriment of its humanitarian imperative*". The last phrase on humanitarian imperative was removed by the evaluation team as it was not seen as being possible to answer, i.e. there could be many obstacles to meeting IOM's humanitarian imperative but it was not possible to assess if investment in HDPN was one of them.

³⁵ OECD (2022), *Op. Cit.*

4.5. Impact

The impact of IOM's HDPN approach was found to be strongest at the global level on policy and inter-agency processes, such as their contribution to IASC, OECD-DAC and the High-Level Panel on Internal Displacement. At country level the impact was less and more differentiated, most often found where IOM played a co-ordination role (such as within Durable Solutions CCCM, etc.). Within IOM, there was evidence that recent structural and strategic changes had given heightened visibility and priority to HDPN although this was not consistent and was primarily evident at HQ level. Amongst UN entities at the global level, IOM was seen as a positive reference for HDPN. Amongst donors, the overall perception of IOM's ability to operate across the HDPN spectrum varied.

What is the impact of IOM-HDPN work on key policy processes at global and regional levels, including for integrating migration and displacements into HDPN coordinated approaches?

IOM was found to be very active at the global level and perceived by the majority of external stakeholder (UN agencies and donors), as having a positive impact on policy and inter-agency processes, especially in relation to its position/role in IASC and OECD fora. IOM is the co-lead (with the Government of Belgium) on the OECD DAC-UN Nexus Coordination in Countries workstream³⁶ and has taken an active role in the IASC Results Group 4 on Humanitarian-Development Collaboration. IOM is also active in its support for the High-Level Panel on Internal Displacement, which will cover a number of topics related to operationalizing the nexus.³⁷

IOM was less visible to this evaluation at the regional level on policy issues. In the operational area more so than policy, IOM was active with the Regional Platform for Refugees and Migrants from Venezuela (R4V). IOM in 2021 played a (co)-leadership role in 55 coordination fora – at the regional, sub-regional, and national levels, carrying out a unique coordination role in the Refugee Migrant and Refugee Response Plan through GIFMM in Colombia and other countries.³⁸

IOM was also regarded as playing a key role at the national level by leading different frameworks for collaboration, integrating migration and displacements into HDPN coordinated approaches and in some cases, impacting upon national policy. For example, in Iraq, IOM is co-chair of the Durable Solutions Technical Working Group and provides the highest number of staff resources for Durable Solutions coordination. IOM was perceived as instrumental for the transition phase and described by one stakeholder “*as a pioneer and leader*”, credited with having championed new national legislation on IDPs. IOM also chairs the Returns Working Group at national level and Area Based Coordination Mechanisms at the local level. As described above, IOM also had a positive contribution to the development of the CCAs and the UNSDCFs in the three case study countries.

³⁶ “The coordination in countries workstream, co-led by Belgium and the IOM, aims to provide a shared space where stakeholders involved in the HDP nexus can exchange on instruments for joint context analysis and joined-up programming in line with the DAC Recommendation”. OECD (2022), *Op. Cit.*, p. 18.

³⁷ IOM (27 April 2020), *Adopting a comprehensive approach to internal displacement: Operationalizing the triple nexus*. Standing Committee on Programmes and Finance, Twenty-eighth Session, S/28/7.

³⁸ IOM (2020), *Global Report 2020 - Operations and Emergencies*, p. 17: <https://www.iom.int/resources/iom-global-report-2020-operations-and-emergencies>¹⁷: <https://www.iom.int/resources/iom-global-report-2020-operations-and-emergencies>

However, it was also highlighted by both external stakeholders and IOM staff that while IOM was in an important position to influence at the global and regional levels, this was not always translated into programming at the field level. This resulted in a disconnect between its policy and practical experiences on the ground as well as a missed opportunity to fully utilize the knowledge and experience gained from and for field programming, as illustrated by the following comments of external stakeholders:

“IOM has so many relevant experiences of what works and what doesn’t but is losing this opportunity on using this practical knowledge and wealth of experience.”

“The Global Compact for Migration is very nexus orientated and through IOM’s [global] strategy it is bringing the IOM to contribute more to coordination at the global level – but we need to see how this has been translated at the field level.”

What is the impact of IOM’s HDPN structural and strategic changes since the World Humanitarian Summit on IOM’s organizational culture and way of working at the country-level?

Since the commitments to a NWOW and the Grand Bargain at the *World Humanitarian Summit* in 2016, IOM’s organizational culture and ways of working have undergone a number of changes primarily at the level of HQ, which have given a heightened priority to HDPN. Significant work has been undertaken at the level of HQ relating to its corporate identity and recognition of the importance of operating with a nexus-informed approach to transcend the humanitarian-development-peace divide, as recognized in the IOM Strategic Vision 2019-2023 and the Strategic Results Framework (approved by IOM’s Director General in 2021).

The recent restructuring and formation of the new Department DPDC is evidence of the Organization positioning itself further as a HDPN actor. According to IOM staff, these changes have heightened the visibility of HDPN and the need for “a coherent mindset” in the HDPN approach.

At the country level, the pace of change was generally slower than at HQ with less consistent understanding of HDPN according to IOM staff interviewed and surveyed. While IOM was operationalizing the HDPN approach as evidenced in many different programme areas and national fora (see Effectiveness section), awareness and understanding was seen to differ between countries and regions. HDPN had different interpretations at the field level, considered as less relevant by some IOM staff or thought of as a HQ-focused policy activity. This was notable externally as this stakeholder commented: *“IOM staff tend to think that HDPN is only about durable solutions for IDPs – but it is much more than that.”*

It was also noted that while HQ has been restructured, regional re-structuring had not yet occurred. ROs remained largely organized by the previous HQ divisions, as all seen in the specializations of the RTS. This was seen as an obstacle to the pace of change on HDPN at the country level according to IOM staff interviewed.

What is the impact of IOM’s HDPN work as a reference for stakeholders?

The overall perception of IOM’s ability to operate across the HDPN spectrum varied amongst different country contexts and between different groups of stakeholders based at the global, HQ and field levels. Amongst many UN entities, IOM was regarded as strong at the global level and active in

leadership roles in inter-agency coordination mechanisms, especially in crisis contexts where the scope of IOM's work has expanded broadly in recent years.³⁹

According to external stakeholders, IOM was often perceived as having a lot to contribute to all three nexus pillars but was driven mainly by implementation - "doing things". It was seen as less experienced in analysis and conceptualization needed to inform strategic discussions and planning, also influenced by its siloed approach and projectization. However, there was evidence that IOM was becoming more strategic and evidence-based as seen with its progress in global strategic planning (e.g. 2021 Strategic Results Framework) and at the country-level (multi-year strategies and plans).

At the field level, views were varied with IOM regarded most often as strong in one or two of the pillars, or complimentary sectors, rather than having a coherent HDPN approach, (a view which was echoed by donors, usually responsible for funding one or two of the pillars):

- **In Iraq** the views were diverse, ranging from the perception of IOM as "a catch-all agency" to a humanitarian and transitional actor that does bridging work from humanitarianism to early development and stabilization; the government was seen as seeking IOM support for every aspect of work across the nexus, especially concerning returnees. As an IOM staff commented *"we are perceived quite positively because of the ability we have of crossing the humanitarian and development work, our proximity to communities and our ability to take risks. Principled pragmatism... not to be overly dogmatic, and that positions us well."*
- **In Colombia**, IOM was recognized as covering all three pillars with a strength in combining humanitarian and development. The peace aspect was also a key focus with the integration of Venezuelan migrants into communities, particularly in areas where armed groups are still active. IOM in Colombia is very integrated into UN processes through the GIFMM platform for the Venezuelan response, and through IOM's involvement in the UNSDCF where all three nexus pillars are coordinated.
- **In Somalia**, IOM was perceived as being a "good player" across the nexus pillars, with very strong programming in humanitarian, transition and stabilization areas and a consistent presence in the UN country-level processes and fora. However, IOM was seen as weaker in coordination between its projects/programmes, both between and within pillars and areas of work.

4.6. Sustainability

Overall, the sustainability of HDPN operationalization was found to be weak, embedded in elements of individual projects but undermined by a number of factors including: projectization, current funding modes and donor priorities, lack of knowledge management systems, capacity of the local and national actors and insecure political and development contexts.

³⁹ IOM (27 April 2020), *Op. Cit.*, p. 2.

How does IOM build sustainability within its HDPN approach?

Many of the same factors facilitating or constraining operationalization of IOM's HDPN approach also influenced its sustainability (see Effectiveness section for a full list of these factors). These included the projectized and "reactive" nature of operations and subsequent dependence upon short term funding, as opposed to longer term funding. Separate donor funding streams were also noted as contributing to the problems of developing a sustainable HDPN approach as well as other structural issues such as the differing priorities of COs, and the absence of an effective knowledge management system to enable learning from similar projects in-country or elsewhere. The tendency for IOM to favor direct implementation, notably for humanitarian and post-conflict activities, rather than working with local actors was also seen as being detrimental to sustainability (and not in line with the DAC nexus recommendation).

The importance of strategic prioritization was raised by several interviewees in relation to the need for longer term programming. Where projects or programmes were considered sustainable, such as migrant health, this was considered only as secondary and a "by-product". The lack of an articulated HDPN vision was also noted as described previously, even in situations where there was a perceived high dependence on IOM, such as Iraq, one of the Organization's biggest missions, in which it plays a number of important coordination roles (Durable Solutions, CCCM cluster, etc.). As one donor noted:

"I never ever thought of IOM's work in the context of HDPN. If they do have a strategic approach, then that has not been communicated to us as donors at the country-level."

Good examples of building sustainability within its HDPN approach were found where IOM invested in joint analyses, coordination and planning and/or working closely with local actors, for example:

- **Iraq:** Part of IOM's Community Stabilization Programming includes the empowerment of communities through social cohesion programmes, for example training youth groups and women leaders, focusing on youth with the aim of strengthening their capacity to participate in society, as the country rebuilds from the conflict.
- **Somalia:** In transition and recovery projects, community-based planning is used that brings together government and communities; ensuring that their priorities are reflected in the projects which facilitates sustainability.
- **Colombia:** there is an emphasis on establishing sustainability at the design stage of projects and programmes, such as in psychosocial support for return and relocation of families and individuals, which focuses on using local capacities to ensure some continuation.

To what extent does IOM invest in local actors/first responders for local, sustainable and resilient responses in support of HDPN local approaches?

IOM was found to favor direct implementation by its own staff for many projects, particularly in humanitarian and post-conflict activities, limiting the development of local capacities and lessening

the sustainability of its HDPN approach and potential contribution to SDG 17 on Partnerships.⁴⁰ As noted above in relation to partnerships, the majority of relationships with L/NGOs and CSOs were in their role as service providers with very few examples seen where local NGOs or CSOs had an equal status partnership with IOM. As one external stakeholder noted: *“L/NGOs feel crowded out and not included in UN partnerships.”* In this respect, the 2020 IOM guidance on strengthening engagement with local actors has not yet been fully adopted in the three case study countries.⁴¹

Examples were seen of investing in government capacity development in the three case study countries, but it was inconsistently applied across projects and programmes. Often an issue raised by IOM staff and external stakeholders was the capacity of governments to guarantee the continuation of services and activities following the end of an IOM (or other UN or INGO) project or programme, as this external stakeholder commented:

“In this country there are no specific nexus partnerships. Durable solutions coordination structures are where it takes place, but the government is not part of the coordination. It’s meant to be all about transitioning to government ownership, but they are not part of it.”

However, the capacity of the local and national actors in insecure political and conflict environments was also considered as risks to sustainability and not easily managed according to IOM staff.

Do IOM Country Offices consider that IOM’s HDPN approach can contribute to sustainability in peace building and development efforts avoiding protracted crises?

The majority of staff from COs believed that IOM’s HDPN approach had an important role to play in IOM’s work in peace building and recovery. But it required a careful phasing (e.g. the timing of engagement with the government), matching the current country context, capacity of the authorities, access to the concerned areas and considering any possible challenges for IOM in upholding humanitarian principles as described above.

IOM’s livelihood partnerships with the government, work in community stabilization programming, sustainable reintegration of IDPs and promotion of social cohesion were all noted as key areas supporting a longer-term approach to peace building and development efforts. It was also noted by IOM staff interviewed that the deciding factors for mitigating protracted crises may often lie outside the control of the organizations such as IOM.

The importance of understanding and assessing risk was also noted by a number of IOM staff in relation to ensuring a sustainable, appropriate and flexible HDPN approach, as this IOM staff explained:

“The approach depends on what it is we are supporting. Say it is about supporting IDPs to return home and we provide assistance. If we get it wrong the risks are high and people end up displaced again. We need mechanisms to ensure the right approach is used in the design of the programme, the involvement of local organizations and government and the ability to follow up over time. But sometimes we can get it wrong. These are complex contexts, and we cannot know every potential obstacle in advance.”

⁴⁰ See: UNDESA (2020), *The SDG Partnership Guidebook: A practical guide to building high impact multi-stakeholder partnerships for the Sustainable Development Goals*, Darian Stibbe and Dave Prescott, The Partnering Initiative and UNDESA: <https://sdgs.un.org/sites/default/files/2022-02/SDG%20Partnership%20Guidebook%201.11.pdf>

⁴¹ IOM (2020), *Strengthening engagement with local actors: A toolkit for IOM staff*.

The priorities and interests of donors in peace building was also noted as influencing IOM's response, specifically in relation to complex emergencies such as Colombia and the different understandings of IOM's role as a peace actor in different contexts. The role of strong partnerships was also noted as key in relation to the challenges of peacebuilding with partnership holding greater value than that of the funding, for example IOM's partnership with Nadia's Initiative for Women's Empowerment and Livelihood Programme in Iraq, which is part of a larger project on community stabilization.⁴²

It should also be considered that there is little consensus amongst actors as to what the peace pillar means in HDPN and in practice.⁴³ In this respect, IOM staff in all three case study countries were able to indicate concrete examples of how they saw their projects/programmes contributing to the peace pillar, such as in Iraq where the 2022-23 Crisis Response Plan features activities labelled "Peacebuilding and Peace preservation".⁴⁴

4. What factors can support sustainability of IOM's HDPN approach?

A number of factors were identified as supporting the sustainability of IOM's HDPN approach, including:

- **A shared vision/narrative and understanding of HDPN.** Informed by CO experience with supportive guidance for implementation at CO level, as this IOM staff commented "*Institutional commitment that translates into a coherent narrative to donors and others*".
- **Targeted flexible multi-year funding to support long term programming.** While the current funding model is mainly short-term project based, longer term funding is becoming increasingly available often through multiple instruments which can create a holistic programmatic approach across the nexus (see the above Examples of nexus funding).
- **Positioning the Organization as a more strategic actor at country level through closer policy dialogue and programming developed in alignment with national policies.** This can help move away from the perception that IOM is only an operational humanitarian agency and provide the basis for a sustainable approach. For example, a "seat at the table" in key national policy processes (e.g. migration, health, security) would help support sustainable programming.
- **Developing partnerships to promote sustainability and national ownership.** As stated above, IOM favored direct implementation, but examples were seen of it promoting sustainability and national ownership when it worked with local actors.
- **Shared risk analysis ensuring inclusion of local and national actors.** To provide a joint understanding, to inform systematic strategic and coordinated planning, and to support strong partnerships based on complementarity, with an approach that is culturally and contextually appropriate to support sustainability
- **M&E at the country level to monitor progress towards collective outcomes.** IOM M&E supporting clear milestones and measuring progress.

⁴² See: *Leveraging the Security Development Nexus in Iraq: Support for Community Stabilization in Conflict Affected Communities*, <https://reliefweb.int/report/iraq/iom-iraq-partners-nadia-s-initiative-women-s-empowerment-and-livelihood-programme><https://reliefweb.int/report/iraq/iom-iraq-partners-nadia-s-initiative-women-s-empowerment-and-livelihood-programme>.

⁴³ For a discussion on this point, see: IASC (2020), *Issue paper: Exploring peace within the Humanitarian-Development- Peace Nexus (HDPN)*: <https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/humanitarian-development-collaboration/issue-paper-exploring-peace-within-humanitarian-development-peace-nexus-hdpn>

⁴⁴ IOM, *Iraq Crisis Response Plan 2022-2023*.

- **CoM leadership, having requisite skills.** To support and ensure HDPN approach at the country level. There also needs to be accountability and incentives for CoM leadership that are currently absent for UN agencies as the 2022 JSC light review highlighted.⁴⁵
- **Guidance based on good practice examples.** As noted by one IOM staff *“we need really good case studies: how HDPN works and in which context and what approach made sense.”*

HDPN approach and the 2022 Ukraine conflict

Prior to the February 2022 conflict in Ukraine, the country was seen as being an exemplary context for operationalizing the HDPN approach for IOM and other actors; the country was moving towards stabilization and further development in many regions while balanced with the protracted conflict in the east of the country where ongoing humanitarian needs persisted. This was coupled with smaller scale disasters, such as flooding, that required preparedness and response from the government and humanitarian actors. IOM was supporting Ukraine in many of these aspects, including emergency, transition and recovery, migration protection and assistance (human trafficking), migration and border management, migration governance, health services and travel assistance.

With the Russian military offensive against Ukraine in February 2022, the IOM had to reorientate rapidly its activities to the massive humanitarian needs of Ukraine and neighboring countries. This was reflected in the March 2022 Flash Appeal for the first six months of the emergency response with a funding requirement of USD 350 million.⁴⁶

However, within this acute crisis IOM’s HDPN approach still remained relevant according to IOM staff in Ukraine, as one commented it was *“a humanitarian crisis that demands a development response”*. Rather than stopping the development-focused projects and programmes, many were repurposed to support the government and stakeholders for the evolving situation. This included border management and counter-trafficking efforts. While immediate needs were the priority, IOM programming was also focusing on the needs of Ukrainian refugees in neighboring countries, such as psychosocial support and access to education and employment. IOM staff in Ukraine and neighboring countries also spoke about the need for their humanitarian activities to be carried out with a view for long-term resilience and sustainability, such as health, water and sanitation and shelter. IOM also conducted assessments to rebuild some buildings, such as schools and health centers for facilitating the return of IDPs in some areas, in particular around Kyiv. It was also important to align with national HDPN strategies, for example in the work done with World Health Organization on recovery and transformation of health systems. This HDPN approach “in action” was reflected in full spectrum of IOM activities as detailed in the April 2022 Flash Appeal for Ukraine and neighboring countries, covering nine months with a funding requirement of USD \$514 Million.⁴⁷

⁴⁵ “...the difficulty involved in changing the way that agencies operate (business as usual), that it is often through a great deal of individual effort that progress is made [on HDPN] and this generally involved working against the existing incentive structure.” Ruedas, M. & Almgren, O. (May 2022), Op. Cit. p. 8.


⁴⁶ IOM (March 2022), *IOM Flash Appeal for Ukraine and Neighbouring Countries*: <https://www.iom.int/resources/iom-flash-appeal-ukraine-and-neighbouring-countries-march-august-2022>

⁴⁷ IOM (April 2022), *IOM Flash Appeal for Ukraine and Neighbouring Countries*: <https://www.iom.int/resources/iom-flash-appeal-ukraine-and-neighbouring-countries-april-2022>

5. HDPN Theory of Change

Based on the findings of this evaluation, a theory of change (ToC) was developed by the evaluation team that reflects the pathway for the operationalization of HDPN within IOM at the field level (see chart on the next page). The ToC reflects an ideal scenario with text in speech bubbles commenting on what this evaluation perceived as actually occurring.

Figure 7: Theory of change – HDPN operationalization – ideal scenario with comments



6. Conclusion and recommendations

Since adhering to the OECD/DAC nexus recommendation in 2020, the IOM has made progress in its institutionalization and operationalization of HDPN building on its work prior to the conceptualization of the nexus. Progress has primarily been seen in participating in the global nexus processes and the collective outcome processes at the country-level. IOM COs are increasingly adapting their programming to work across the nexus where the contexts allow it, with Ukraine being a prominent and acute example.

This evaluation found that where the IOM faces obstacles in operationalizing HDPN they are predominantly internal (aside from funding availability). These obstacles revolve around structural and organizational issues larger than HDPN, such as the lack of integrated programming, the decentralized nature of the Organization, field leadership and strategic priorities. Suggested solutions to these issues have already been proposed to the IOM in previous HDPN studies in 2019-21.⁴⁸ But as far as this evaluation is aware, they have not been fully acted upon. This evaluation's findings and consequent recommendations largely align with these previous propositions.

To accelerate further the operationalization of HDPN, the IOM needs to address these issues. As per the findings of the 2022 OECD interim review report, the acceleration on HDPN operationalization requires *“grand strategies, bottom-up approaches and targeted measures”* as reflected in the following conclusions and recommendations.

A. Guidance: Although IOM guidance exists on HDPN it remains largely unknown and/or not adapted for usage by the field. HDPN as a relatively new concept is not yet present in the guidance, which field staff actually use, such as the IOM Project Handbook (MCOF 2.0 is a good example where HDPN is integrated). This is key as the concept of HDPN remains vague for many IOM staff and practical guidance and examples are needed. Further, senior field management (CoMs, deputies, and programme coordinators) have differing interpretations of HDPN, and high-level guidance is also required for them. The need for coherent guidance was also noted by some donors who did not all have a clear view on IOM's HDPN approach.

Recommendations:

- Issue a high-level guidance note outlining IOM's institutional position on HDPN, its commitments, position, conceptual framing, comparative advantages, and priorities. This note should be directed to the senior field management of COs and ROs and issued by IOM leadership. A summary should be made available for external use, i.e. with donors, UN peers and partners.
- Revise existing operational guidance on HDPN (such as information sheets for operations) to make them more operationally relevant (less on “what” is the nexus and more on “how” to apply it).
- Integrate practical guidance on HDPN in all relevant guides/handbooks, notably the Project Handbook (currently under revision) and CoM Handbook (when revised). Ensure that guidance is

⁴⁸ Notably in three reports: (1) IOM (June 2021), *Addressing drivers of migration and displacement in Central America and the Caribbean across the Humanitarian, Development and Peace Nexus* (draft); (2) IOM (March 2019), *The Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus in Practice, An IOM report based on five country case studies* (Ginette Kidd); (3) IOM (April 2021), *Addressing Drivers of Migration and Displacement across the Humanitarian, Development and Peace Nexus: IOM's Experience with Case Studies from Bangladesh and Ethiopia* (draft).

available to project developers as to how to integrate a HDPN approach when relevant in new project proposals (ideally in the revised Project Handbook).

- Develop an operational guidance note in line with IOM's conceptual approach on drivers of human mobility to strengthen the understanding of how IOM works across thematic areas applying an HDPN approach, connected to the existing tools and materials across development and crisis contexts, such as MCOF and the Essentials of Migration Management.
- Provide institutional backing to the roll-out and development of supportive materials to apply MCOF 2.0 in various contexts and for strategic planning.

B. Programming: The HDPN approach can only be operationalized successfully if IOM addresses a number of key institutional obstacles; a significant one being the lack of joined-up or integrated programming. Given its significance, the IOM should adopt a *“grand strategy”* on integrated programming. IOM has made increasing progress on designing and implementing projects that work across the nexus, for example to combat interlinked conflict, climate change and migration issues. However, the issue is not with these projects but more so with finding linkages within and between pillars. IOM also needs to accelerate action on two key areas of the DAC nexus recommendation, notably *“Putting people at the centre”* through AAP and *“Strengthen national and local capacities”* through partnerships.

Recommendations:

- Launch an organizational-wide initiative to adopt integrated programming at all levels; this should be integrated within the organizational strategic priorities; COs and ROs should be held accountable through measurable indicators in the forthcoming Organizational Effectiveness Results framework that will accompany the Strategic Results Framework.
- Continue to support COs and ROs to design projects that work across the nexus, capitalizing on the full spectrum of IOM's activities.
- Strengthen the operational capacity of ROs and COs to comprehensively assess and address multi-sectoral drivers of human mobility in the context of humanitarian and development planning and programming exercises, including through enhanced context and risk analysis across the HDPN through concrete operational guidance.
- Encourage and monitor a more systematic consultation of affected populations in the design, implementation and evaluation of CO projects and programmes across the full spectrum of IOM's activities in fragile and conflict-affected contexts (and not only for humanitarian activities).
- Encourage and monitor the use of partnerships that prioritize strengthening national and local capacities amongst local actors (authorities, L/NGOs and CSOs) in fragile and conflict-affected contexts that moves beyond implementation partnerships and towards equal partnerships; consider introducing an indicator(s) for COs on national/local partnerships within the Strategic Results Framework.

C. Assessment and analysis: The COs reviewed as part of this evaluation were found to be valuable contributors to joint assessments with other actors such as for the CCAs, although opportunities and motivation for joint assessments was limited. DTM was also found to provide a solid contribution to analyses that was beginning to be used across the nexus. In addition to the forthcoming roll-out of MCOF 2.0, it is anticipated that the HDPN Drivers Study will also contribute a greater integration of gender-sensitive and root cause analyses in projects, programmes and strategies. Where COs were

less strong was in the ability to carry out joint analyses between IOM projects and share data which led to a lack of interoperability between project data.

Recommendations:

- Encourage the interoperability of data collected by IOM across different COs and ROs projects (while respecting data protection principles) that will support a greater shared understanding of migration issues and stronger evidence base.
- Encourage a more comprehensive review of data relevant to HDPN and explore all the various workstreams that could contribute data towards HDPN.
- Encourage COs to lead and/or participate in joint assessments with other UN agencies and other humanitarian actors for operational responses where feasible.
- Integrate gender-sensitive and root causes analyses and structural drivers of conflict when implementing the HDPN approach in projects/programmes.
- Continue to strengthen DTM's contribution to HDPN, such as further systematic integration of development and peace-relevant data such as seen with the new concept of Solutions and Mobility Index, such as the "Return index in Iraq."⁴⁹
- Strengthen guidance to ROs and COs on how to carry out coherent drivers' analysis and assessments across the HDPN and connect them with IOM's interventions at the community, local and national policy level through concrete operational support for integrated analysis and planning to address drivers of migration and displacement.

D. Planning: The planning processes were found to vary in terms of their inclusivity and the integration of HDPN. This was in part a result of the absence of a common and mandatory planning across regions and countries for IOM, now being developed since 2020 in line with modern management practices. This is also an opportunity to reinforce integrated programming and an HDPN approach, where relevant. A HDPN approach is increasingly present in IOM's appeals and actions plans, as seen with recent examples of Afghanistan, Iraq, Mozambique, and Ukraine, with a move also to multi-year planning. HDPN should not be systematically included but only where relevant. However, as seen in these recent examples, urgent humanitarian needs are often linked to longer-term issues of resilience, recovery, and development where the IOM also has programmatic strengths.

Recommendations:

- In guidance produced for CO planning, encourage an inclusive planning process with representation across the programmatic and support units.
- Continue to integrate a HDPN approach within appeals and action plans where relevant, reflecting the full spectrum of IOM's activities (including diaspora engagement).
- Encourage the move towards multi-year planning at the country level where feasible.

E. Resources: IOM had committed limited resources to its operationalization of HDPN approach. This was found to impact on the ability of the organization to operationalize HDPN at the field level, taking into account the considerable nexus-related responsibilities at the global level. The evaluation notes however that a department dedicated to HDPN is now in place, which will certainly be an asset to further reinforce IOM operationalization of HDPN. To be effective, this may require "*targeted*

⁴⁹ <https://iraqdtm.iom.int/returnindex#>

measures” such as the temporary deployment of nexus advisors in priority contexts (as currently the case with Cameroon CO). A starting point could also be to establish a temporary (e.g. 2 year) cross-organizational working group to champion the operationalization of HDPN and determine the resources needed. Further, the operationalization of HDPN is the responsibility of all IOM staff in fragile and conflict-affected contexts and this needs to be underlined.

- Consider establishing a temporary (e.g. 2 year) cross working group to champion the operationalization of HDPN and determine the resources needed. A first task could also be to review and respond to the recommendations of this report (and past reports listed in footnote 47).

F. M&E, knowledge management and learning: IOM’s M&E presence in the three case study countries was largely project-based and not always conducive to the COs for the collection and monitoring of country-level/collective outcomes and indicators. The ability to share and learn of how other comparable COs, projects or programmes were operationalizing HDPN was limited, reflecting weak institutional knowledge management systems within IOM (according to IOM staff). There were some exchanges but mainly at the country-level. Learning opportunities on HDPN were limited for IOM staff, with a request by IOM staff for training, both in English and other languages. There was also limited integration of assessing IOM’s HDPN approach within evaluations carried out at the country-level.

Recommendations:

- Create more “bottom-up” opportunities where projects and programmes can share their experiences on HDPN operationalization (for example through webinars, online discussions, or other interactive formats).
- Promote the conduct of evaluations focusing also on HDPN approach in the IOM operations.
- Increase M&E capacity within COs to support in the monitoring or country-level/collective outcomes.
- Within the Organizational Effectiveness Results framework that will accompany the Strategic Results Framework, ensure that there is an indicator for COs on the key organizational aspects that support HDPN, such as integrated planning and programming, developing synergies across the nexus pillars within the CO, etc.
- Expand training opportunities (e.g. e-learning module) on the operationalization of HDPN and make it available in different languages (e.g. Arabic, French and Spanish).

G. Leadership and coordination: CoMs, their deputies and programme coordinators were found to be central to encourage their teams to work together and across the nexus. However, this role of senior staff as nexus “champions” varied in the three case study countries (and in other contexts according to IOM staff). It is suggested that greater attention should be paid to the profile of senior staff for fragile and conflict-affected contexts. Greater adaptive and flexible CO structures that break down the pillars and silos are needed. An increased priority given to integrated programming as described above can further reinforce this. The ROs were largely absent in promoting a HDPN approach with some exceptions seen, largely based on individual initiatives. With the foreseen re-organization of ROs there is an opportunity to re-position the role of the ROs in the operationalization of HDPN, including within the positions of RTS, Regional Directors (RD) and Regional Policy and Liaison Officers (RPLO).

Recommendations:

- In fragile and conflict-affected countries, seek to recruit senior staff who possess the appropriate skills and experience to operationalize HDPN with multi-disciplinary backgrounds and convening skills and ability to strategically engage with diverse partners.
- COs should consider the best structures to avoid silos, encourage transparency between teams and enable synergies to capitalize on IOM's comparative advantage, considering mission outcomes, assessment and analysis capacity, technical units and project support.
- In the re-organization of ROs consider how the new structure (and roles) can optimally support the operationalization of the HDPN, including fundraising, for example by opening up the role of RTS and RPLO beyond specific specializations in order to support HDPN and other potentially global "change" initiatives (e.g. integration of climate change, adoption of AAP, etc.). HDPN should be specifically mentioned in job descriptions of RTS, RPLO and RD – in addition to COM.

H. Funding: Availability of flexible and multi-year funding for projects that integrated a nexus approach was limited for COs and ROs, although opportunities were growing as donors increasingly recognised the need to offer such funding. Support for obtaining funding for nexus-focused programming at the country-level was largely absent. Current CO structures and the projectized nature of the IOM also limited collaboration between IOM teams to raise funds. Donors in general had a fragmented understanding of IOM's current and potential ability to work across the nexus, often reflecting their own experiences and interactions with IOM. In that regard, IOM fundraising approach and strategy focusing on HDPN are weak, leading to questioning the capacity of IOM to operationalize the nexus and to a maintaining a siloed approach favoured by some donors. IOM's global financial tracking systems had limited abilities to analyze funding inflows related to HDPN, which would be useful to understand funding needs and trends.

Recommendations:

- Develop a specific fundraising strategy clarifying HDPN approach and providing tools to COs, ROs and donors for effective consultations and decision-making to fund it.
- Increase HQ support to identify nexus-specific funding and facilitate COs in accessing such funding.
- Actively and regularly inform key donors about IOM's HDPN approaches and the best practice examples seen in integrating the nexus in IOM programming.
- Modify the financial tracking systems to allow; a) tracking of multiyear funding commitments and b) funding related to HDPN through a better use of "HDPN" as a keyword when entering funding records into the system (i.e. develop guidance/criteria for use of the HDPN keyword).


7. Evidence-based analysis: Eight dimensions of HDPN operationalization

This analysis was based on the data and information collected through the staff survey and interviews, in addition to a checklist of factors of these dimensions used for the three case study countries (see below). An analysis of 17 IOM country strategies, plans, roadmaps, country crisis response plans and appeals was also carried out and is detailed below.

1. Shared vision and collective outcomes

This dimension was largely operationalized through participation of IOM in collective outcome processes at the country-level, including those of the governments and UN, such as processes supporting the creation of the UN Sustainable Development Cooperation Frameworks (UNSDCFs) and Humanitarian Response Plans (HRPs). On this dimension, the majority of surveyed IOM staff reported that their COs/ROs “Always” (44 per cent) or “Often” (27 per cent) contribute to UN collective outcomes at the country-level. This was reflected in the interviews at the country-level that confirmed that IOM was participating in collective outcome processes (when available) and the IOM contribution was seen as positive; the current UNSDCFs of the three case study countries all had migration issues integrated. The positive contribution of IOM was also supported by the growth and strengthening of joined-up country planning processes across the nexus, currently taking place in 25 countries and contexts.⁵⁰

Figure 8: Collective outcomes



2. Assessment and analysis

This dimension was operationalized by participation in joined-up assessments with other actors, conflict-sensitive assessments within IOM CO and interoperability of data between projects. As confirmed in both the staff survey and interviews, the IOM participated in CCAs; “Always” (48 per cent) or “Often” (20 per cent) according to surveyed staff. Examples of participating in multi-sectoral/joint assessments with UN or other partners were seen, such as joint IDP site assessments in Somalia, although in general they were limited, as seen in the graph below “Always” (13 per cent%) or “Often” (33 per cent). IOM staff and external stakeholders explained that opportunities to participate in joint assessments was limited given the ongoing preference (of IOM and other agencies) for agency-own analyses.


IOM’s DTM in the three case study countries was seen as a positive example of data that was used within IOM and shared with and used by other actors, although it was mainly used for humanitarian programming and transition projects to a lesser extent.⁵¹ IOM staff reported in all three countries that

⁵⁰ OECD (2022), *Interim Progress Review of the DAC Recommendation on the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus*.

⁵¹ A good example being IOM’s “return index” for Iraq: <https://iraqdtm.iom.int/returnindex#>

their projects often produced research and data which was not shared and used by other IOM projects, even within the same pillar, let alone with other pillars. This lack of interoperability and sharing of data within IOM was also noted by external stakeholders; several commented that in country-level processes, IOM could not always present a complete analysis of migration-related issues, but more so very specific data related to given projects or programmes.


Figure 9: Joint assessments



3. Planning

This dimension was operationalized through the application of country-level multi-year inclusive planning across the full spectrum of IOM’s activities, integrating conflict-sensitive, risk assessment and gender-sensitive analyses. The majority of surveyed IOM staff reported that their COs/ROs “Always” (48 per cent) or “Often” (24 per cent) carry out multi-year planning/programming. This was confirmed in the three case study countries where multi-year planning had been carried out with country strategies, varying from two to four years. As indicated by IOM staff interviewed, a challenge seen in planning was that until 2020, IOM had no common and mandatory planning across regions and countries. Positively this implied flexibility for COs/ROs in planning but also meant that the processes for planning could vary in terms of its inclusivity of IOM staff and partners, in addition to the integration of HDPN.

Figure 10: Planning



An analysis of 17 IOM country strategies, plans, roadmaps, as well as country crisis response plans and appeals supported this analysis as seen in the table below. The strategic planning documents reviewed were strong in describing their external collaboration, often within the UN system, and their emphasis on building local and national capacity (albeit not always through sustainable partnerships), fulfilling important aspects of the HDPN approach.

Most documents explicitly mentioned and implicitly implied HDPN throughout the texts. Context analysis varied with the most notable absence being gender-sensitive analysis. Documents were weakest on internal collaboration and comprehensive programming as further discussed below. Collaboration and complementarity among IOM pillars were present but mainly between humanitarian and peace (e.g. stabilization activities); there were fewer links between the development pillar and the humanitarian and peace pillars. Given their focus, the crisis response plans and appeals tended to make very few links to the development pillar (and links to the country strategy), with some exceptions such as the 2022 Roadmap for Northern Mozambique, the April 2022 Ukraine Flash Appeal and Iraq Crisis Response Plan 2022-2023. A limitation of the country strategies and action plans found was that their outcomes/objectives were mainly organized around the pillars decreasing possibilities for synergies.

	<i>HDPN explicitly mentioned</i>	<i>External collaboration</i>	<i>Internal collaboration</i>	<i>Contextual analysis</i>	<i>Comprehensive programming</i>	<i>Local & national capacity</i>
IOM country strategies, plans, roadmaps, country crisis response plans and appeals (17 documents)	71%	94%	62%	62%	62%	71%

Scale explained:

<i>Factor</i>	Explanation
<i>External collaboration</i>	Document supports IOM’s participation and collaboration with external actors (i.e. other UN agencies, INGOs, national authorities and CSOs) in support of collective outcomes
<i>Internal collaboration</i>	Document support collaboration and complementarity between IOM pillars and projects
<i>Contextual analysis</i>	Document shows evidence of a contextual analysis that is joint risk-informed, gender-sensitive and includes/references analysis of root causes
<i>Comprehensive programming</i>	Document supports people-centered approach, full spectrum of IOM programming reflected
<i>Local & national capacity</i>	Document supports development of local and national capacity through partnerships and coordination

4. Programming


Programming was operationalized by prioritizing/mainstreaming AAP and adopting mutually reinforcing programming across the nexus. As seen in the chart below, over half of surveyed IOM staff responded “Always” or “Often” for each of the programming aspects, with AAP receiving the highest results and creating foundations for development and peace the lowest results (possibly reflecting contexts where such foundations are not yet possible).

Positive examples were seen in all three case study countries of projects/programmes that were successfully making the links between the pillars, such as in the areas of post conflict, transition, recovery and stabilization. Specific activities were also highlighted that effectively made the link such

as border management, health, cash-based programming and water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH). Other areas such as diaspora engagement was seen as having potential but according to IOM staff was continuing to be seen by ROs/COs mainly through a development lens, whereas research has shown that diaspora effectively respond across the nexus in fragile and conflict contexts.⁵² IOM has started to invest in diaspora engagement beyond development as seen with the Global Diaspora Summit 2022 and the 2022 Framework for Diaspora Engagement in Humanitarian Assistance, as mentioned above.

A major weakness of IOM programming consistently highlighted in interviews with both IOM staff and external stakeholders was the lack of mutually reinforcing programming across the nexus. Although many positive examples were seen of projects spanning across pillars of the nexus, often these projects did not exchange or communicate with each other in a given country.⁵³ Further, often there were weak or no links reported between pillars, for example between a diaspora engagement (development) project and humanitarian response projects. This was mentioned by external stakeholders, including donors, who cited positive examples of IOM projects spanning the nexus but at the same time saw limited cross-synergies between projects (donor priorities and funding also reinforced these limited synergies as detailed below). As noted above, the more recent response plans, such as the 2022 Roadmap for Northern Mozambique, the April 2022 Ukraine Flash Appeal and the Iraq Crisis Response Plan 2022-2023 did show better links between the pillars.

Figure 11: Programming



5. Monitoring and evaluation (M&E)

This dimension was operationalized by contribution of CO/RO to monitor progress towards collective outcomes and inclusion of HDPN elements in M&E frameworks. In all three case study countries, there was M&E capacity within the COs although the M&E staff tended to be assigned to specific projects and programmes rather than supporting the COs in general. As seen in the chart below, surveyed staff reported that only a minority of COs/ROs (7 per cent-“Always”, 18 per cent-“Often” with a sizeable “Don’t know” – 20 per cent) had M&E frameworks that included elements for reporting on HDPN in CO/RO strategic plans. IOM staff explained that it was challenging to determine HDPN indicators


⁵² DEMAC (2022), *Diaspora humanitarian response and engagement - key highlights*:

https://demac.euwest01.umbraco.io/media/s5id00r5/demac_key-highlights-of-diaspora-humanitarianism_single-pages.pdf

⁵³ Also reported in: IOM (April 2021), *Addressing Drivers of Migration and Displacement across the Humanitarian, Development and Peace Nexus: IOM’s Experience with Case Studies from Bangladesh and Ethiopia* (draft).

within strategic plans, in addition to the lack of M&E frameworks being developed for strategic plans in general by COs/ROs. The draft indicators framework to accompany the Strategic Results Framework does have two HDPN indicators, on CCAs and funding, but nothing on integrated programming or planning.⁵⁴ Key areas of HDPN, such as “Putting people at the centre” and “Strengthen national and local capacities” are reflected across the indicators of the Framework. Concerning monitoring progress towards collective outcomes, the Somali CO was an example where they contributed to the creation of the M&E framework for the National Development Plan and submits M&E results to clusters and government working groups. There was also limited integration of assessing IOM’s HDPN approach within evaluations carried out at the country-level.

Figure 12: M&E



6. Leadership and coordination

This dimension of HDPN operationalization was supported by IOM CO leadership that advocates for HDPN approach and CO structures that enable synergies between interventions. Some half of surveyed IOM staff reported that their CO/RO establish mechanisms to avoid silos and enable synergies “Always” (24 per cent) and “Often” (31 per cent) indicating that internal coordination was not yet optimal. There was consensus amongst IOM staff interviewed that CoMs, deputy CoMs and programme coordinators were central to encourage pillars (and projects and programmes within) to work together across the nexus and adopting a HDPN approach in general. However, the role of CoM varied depending largely upon the individuals as there were no known requirements and/or guidance for them on HDPN and their responsibilities.⁵⁵ For example, in one of the case study countries, there was a recent change in the CoM and both staff and external stakeholders noted the change in priority given to internal coordination and HDPN, that could not be only due to different management styles. As the 2019 IOM Nexus Case Study report indicated, senior management with diverse experiences facilitates “synergistic programming”:

“Staff in senior management positions with diverse experience, potentially spanning DOE and DMM portfolios and/or in a range of humanitarian and development contexts, is conducive to a vision of more synergistic programming.”⁵⁶

The 2022 JSC Light Review found that there needs to be stronger engagement amongst country-level UN leadership with accountability currently lacking:

⁵⁴ See IOM (14 December 2021), Strategic Results Framework Indicators (draft). The Framework will be accompanied by Organizational Effectiveness Results framework where it is anticipated there will be indicators on integrated programming.

⁵⁵ The CoM Handbook (2016) pre-dates the conception of HDPN but also contains limited guidance on the role of CoM in internal coordination.


⁵⁶ IOM (March 2019), Op. Cit. (Ginette Kidd), p. 25.

"Guidance in and of itself is not enough, however, unless there is a significant push by agency leadership to engage strongly in support of Nexus operations. Such a push should go beyond a simple instruction and ensure that there is some vertical accountability by country agency leadership to the agency for Nexus results."⁵⁷

Examples were also seen where IOM had taken leadership roles that promoted a HDPN approach, in addition to co-leading the CCCM cluster. In Iraq, the CO was the co-chair of the Durable Solutions Working Group. In Cameroon, the CO had led in the development of a HDPN roadmap for the UN Country Team (UNCT).

The role of ROs in championing a HDPN approach varied widely and was also dependent upon the orientation and priorities of the ROs according to IOM staff interviewed. The RTS were seen by IOM staff as having an important role in promoting a HDPN approach through reviewing CO project proposals and supporting existing projects. However, they were limited in their inputs on HDPN given that their roles largely reflect IOM specializations, e.g. crisis response, labor mobility, etc. and therefore they did not have the possibility to input into all planned projects across the spectrum of IOM activities.

Figure 13: Coordination



7. Partnerships


This dimension was operationalized through establishing diverse partnerships to promote sustainability and national ownership and local leadership. The majority of surveyed IOM staff reported that their CO/RO were enhancing local leadership in their programming “Always” (36 per cent) and “Often” (38 per cent) and establishing diverse partnerships to encourage sustainability and national ownership “Always” (33 per cent) and “Often” (33 per cent).

IOM staff and stakeholders interviewed commented that IOM mainly had partnerships with governments and other UN agencies. In its development pillar IOM was strong in building national ownership with governments, which was also seen in some recovery, transition, and stabilization projects. However, IOM staff highlighted that the organization still favored direct implementation by its own staff for many projects, that limited the development of local capacity. Further, partnerships established by IOM with local and national actors, such as NGOs and civil society organizations (CSOs) tended to be as contracted service providers. Very few examples were seen where L/NGOs or CSOs had an equal status partnership with IOM, as this L/NNGO representative commented:

⁵⁷ Ruedas, M. & Almgren, O. (May 2022), *Op. Cit.* p. 9.

“We have been an implementing partner with the IOM and other UN agencies and often our voices are not heard; only in 2022 do we have our first partnership with equal status to the UN agencies - and this was at the insistence of the donors”.

Figure 14: Partnerships




8. Funding and finance

This dimension was operationalized through funding proposals/appeals reflecting full spectrum of IOM programming and requesting flexible and multi-year funding. The majority of surveyed IOM staff reported that their CO/RO were designing funding proposals/appeals that reflect the full spectrum of the IOM programming “Always” (27 per cent) and “Often” (36 per cent). As stated above, some positive examples were seen of recent appeals that did reflect the full spectrum of IOM programming. However, IOM staff interviewed said they were limited in this respect both due to the siloing of pillars and projects/programmes within the COs and lack of nexus funding available (that they were aware of).

Some half of surveyed IOM staff reported that their CO/RO designing funding proposals/appeals request flexible and multi-year funding “Always” (9 per cent) and “Often” (47 per cent). IOM staff interviewed commented that there were limited opportunities to apply for flexible and multi-year funding with many donors still granting one-year funding periods. Although some donors had moved to multi-year funding, in some cases it still involved one-year funding allocations.

Designing joint proposals and appeals with other UN partners was less common with only 4 per cent of surveyed staff responding “Always” and 53 per cent “Often”. Examples were seen where IOM had joined other UN partners in projects successfully, such as with UNDP and UN-Habitat for the Saameynta Programme in Somalia. IOM staff interviewed explained there was still a tendency in IOM to work alone which limited the number of joint proposals.

Figure 15: Funding



Checklist for HDPN operationalization – case study countries

Factors	Colombia	Iraq	Somalia
<p>1) Shared vision and collective outcome</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Contribution to collective outcome processes</i> • <i>Participation in multi-stakeholder HDPN relevant forums</i> • <i>Development of timely country/regional strategies which integrate crisis considerations</i> • <i>Integration of programming for migration and displacement within UN Sustainable Development Cooperation Frameworks</i> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strong multi-sectoral approach for Venezuelan migration crisis through the Interagency Group for Mixed Migration Flows (GIFMM) coordinated by IOM and UNHCR. • Colombia Crisis Response Plan 2022 shows activities across the nexus but with limited links to development • IOM CO participates and contributes to collective outcome processes (UNSDCF) • UNSDCF 2021-25 integrates migration programming and priorities including humanitarian, recovery and peacebuilding response strategies. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No agreed collective outcomes between government of Iraq and UNCT • Contribution to UNSDCF 2020-24 • Contribution to COPs mainly in context of Durable Solutions (DS) framework which IOM co-chairs with UNDP, (DSWG) and DSTG co-chaired with NRC (operational arm) • DS is now included as an extra pillar of UNSDCF • Iraq Crisis Response Plan 2022-2023 integrates elements of all HDPN pillars 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • IOM CO participates and contributes to collective outcome processes (such as UNSDCF, 2019 JSC piloting and government fora). • IOM participates in HDPN relevant forums led by UNCT and/or government • IOM country strategy (2021-24 – in draft) integrate crisis considerations. • The UNSDCF 2021-25 integrates migration programming and priorities
<p>2) Assessment and analysis</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Undertake joint risk-informed, gender-sensitive analysis of root causes</i> • <i>Undertake multi-sectoral/joint assessments</i> • <i>Participate in Common Country Analysis (CCA)</i> • <i>Participate in joint recovery and peace building assessments (where relevant to context)</i> • <i>Carrying out systematic conflict analyses (use of MCOF context</i> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • IOM Colombia participate and contribute throughout the CCA • IOM present in relevant external forums • DTM data largely used for Venezuelan migrant response. Currently in test phase for new tracing mechanism through WIFI hotspots requiring logins to capture information about migrants. • Use MCOF for all programming. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Assessments undertaken through DTM (shared and relevant to external forums) • DTM incorporates Risk and Return Indexes and tailored to the transitional context. • Strengthens national data- DTM data and analysis is used by government • Participation in CCA • Carries out systematic conflict analysis in the context of 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Some joint assessments carried out by IOM with other partners, such as on IDP site assessments. • IOM Somalia participates in CCA • IOM present in relevant external forums • DTM data largely used for humanitarian programming and less so for development and peace pillars. • Not all data collected by projects is shared/used by other projects.

<p><i>analysis and conflict sensitivity guidance)</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Contribution of IOM assessments/analyses to relevant external forums</i> • <i>Integration of development and peace-relevant data within DTM</i> • <i>Interoperability of data across IOM programmatic units</i> • <i>Strengthen national data collection, analysis and information management capacities</i> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • IOM Colombia supported the government in the development of the national data collection Victims Single Registry – which includes IDP’s and other victims of armed conflict. 	<p>community stabilisation programming</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Issue raised of limited interoperability of project data across programmatic units. 	
<p>3) Planning and programming</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Undertake country-level multi-year planning and programming</i> • <i>Adopt inclusive strategic planning with representation across programmatic and support units</i> • <i>Integration of conflict analysis and risk assessment in planning</i> • <i>Ensure planning is consistent with priorities of local and national authorities</i> • <i>Holding of mission retreats and/or strategic senior management meetings (for reflection/exchange)</i> • <i>Inclusion within project proposals of a section on how the project contributes to reducing needs, risks and vulnerabilities and broader sustainable peace and development outcomes</i> • <i>Prioritise/mainstream accountability to affected populations (AAP) in programming</i> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Colombia Crisis Response Plan 2022 includes stabilization and peacebuilding on a national and local level. Focus on 3 crises: armed conflict, natural disasters, mixed migration. • Annual response plan for the Venezuelan crisis involves the programmatic areas to respond to different needs. • IOM Colombia emergency response department incorporates emergency and stabilisation to ensure long-term response. • Strong in development-stabilization and integration (PDET and victims’ law). • Strong partnership with government on migrant crisis (Venezuela). • Three programmes in peace building component - reintegration and recruitment 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Complementarity in programming but not as a strategic “approach” • Some country-level multi-year planning and programming- e.g. TRD • Integration of conflict analysis and risk assess in planning “where donors require it” • Limited systematic strategic planning • Competition for funding between projects is widely noted • Working with the government and UNDP on return and reintegration of displaced Iraqis as part of peacebuilding and stabilization portfolio. • Evidence of AAP in some programmes • Livelihoods programme contribution to broader peace and development outcomes 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Through its four-year strategic plan, IOM Somalia carrying out multi-year planning. • Planning is inclusive across units although COVID-19 reduced opportunities for retreats/meetings on strategy review/revision. • Conflict analysis and risk assessment included in planning to some extent. • Strategic plan directly references priorities of national authorities. • AAP strong in some areas (e.g. CCCM cluster and IDP work) but not consistently used in all projects. • Governance/institutional strengthening and capacity building present in some projects, notably those of transition and recovery. • IOM is working on a returns project to facilitate voluntary

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Inclusion of governance and institutional strengthening considerations in humanitarian programming (e.g. management of access to water)</i> • <i>Use of community/area-based programming</i> • <i>Reinforcement of government capacities to deliver services in programming</i> • <i>Non-creation of parallel structures and services in programming</i> • <i>Adopt mutually reinforcing programming across IOM areas of expertise</i> • <i>Use of approaches to enhance local leadership in programming</i> • <i>Programming addresses root causes and drivers of displacement (e.g. safety and security, climate change, etc.)</i> • <i>Programming creates foundations for development and peace (e.g. transition and recovery)</i> • <i>Use of capacity strengthening initiatives (e.g. diaspora engagement) to reduce needs, risks and vulnerabilities</i> 	<p>prevention, institutional strengthening for victims and for peace.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Assist government with the development and implementation of victims' law. • Conflict analysis and risk assessment included in planning. • For emergency preparedness, IOM supports government institutions with development of guidelines and procedures, capacity strengthening activities in the areas of shelter management, CCCM, protection, and prevention of risk of human trafficking. • In peacebuilding and community stabilization, IOM supports the government in the implementation of the policy for victims of the armed conflict and the development of strategies to facilitate the human rights reparation processes. • IOM Colombia has also supporting the Peace Accord, mainly through the implementation of the government's Peace with legality Policy. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • With DS, the government has set up a committee to implement the national plan. The donors have requested that there is national ownership and consultation • Siloed programmes and extent of synergies between programmes limited by this. 	<p>returns through the durable solutions network, which involves a variety of peace, humanitarian and development workers.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Some examples seen of community-based programming, e.g. durable solutions. • IOM Somalia avoids creating of parallel structures and services in programming, although sometimes challenging given limited government services • Examples seen of IOM project collaborating, but challenges seen in collaboration between projects and across pillars. • Programming has started to look at root causes / drives such as new climate change project and some durable solutions projects. • Transition and recovery projects are carried out in Somalia. • Diaspora engagement and capacity strengthening used for some initiatives although not across all projects. • IOM participation in the inter-agency Anticipatory Action Framework to address the risk of drought.
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<p>4) M&E</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Existence of country/regional level M&E capacity • Contribution of CO/RO to monitor progress towards collective outcomes • Inclusion of M&E frameworks in all strategic plans • Use of evaluations to facilitate learning • Adaption of SDG indicators in crisis contexts • Use of community-based M&E systems 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 32 Staff working on M&E on a project and programme basis under Planning, Support and Communications Unit. • Information, Monitoring and Evaluation Group (GIM+E) with all the M&E teams of the CO coordinated by PSC • Database available main lessons learned, and recommendations of the evaluations carried out • Open exchange sessions among colleagues, and hold sessions to socialise the results internally • All activities are in line with UNSDCF with a results framework that aggregates the programmatic work of the mission and has a fully defined M&E framework 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Large central M&E unit in Iraq. • Indicators for collective outcomes not yet developed, (but data available) • M&E currently being developed for country strategy (none specifically for HDPN) • Evaluations to facilitate learning are planned • Partial evidence of adaption of SDG indicators in crisis context • The Community Stabilization unit has developed a master logframe to shape current and future programming as well as standardized indicators • No noted use of community - based M&E 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • M&E capacity mainly within pillars / projects; with RO M&E capacity in support • IOM contributes to the M&E Framework for the National Development Plan and submits M&E results to clusters and government working groups • Current strategic plan does not have indicators or an M&E plan but states “IOM will continuously monitor performance and results within ongoing programmes in line with the Strategic Plan and based on IOM’s Strategic Results Framework” • Examples seen of community-based M&E
<p>5) Leadership and coordination</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Appoint senior staff who possess the appropriate skills and experience to operationalize HDPN • Presentation of IOM publicly that emphasizes IOM activities across the HDPN spectrum • CO structures that avoid silos and enables synergies • IOM (co-chair of sector/cluster) function advocates for HDPN approach 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • IOM staff have long-standing experience in Colombia • IOM leading GIFMM together with UNHCR • IOM co-leads the Regional Interagency Platform (R4V) together with UNHCR • IOM leads CCCM working group, co-leads the early recovery cluster, and actively participates in the protection, health, education, WASH, food security and information management working groups 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Recent high turnover of senior leadership within CO • Externally IOM seen to have no common HDPN narrative with differing leadership styles • Silos within CO often obstruct synergies, but new structure and new strategy potentially enable better synergies • IOM co-leads the CCCM cluster • IOM co-leads DS Working Group and DS Technical Group 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • IOM CO staff experienced and respected by peers • IOM presents publicly its activities across the HDPN spectrum although less visible on development pillar (reflecting context) • CO structure largely replicates HDP pillars • IOM co-leads CCCM cluster which positively positions HDPN • IOM Somalia is part of IOM’s coordination of the Migrant

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> IOM Colombia contributes to Humanitarian Needs Overview and HRP exercises. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> IOM is coordinator and secretariat of UN Network on Migration 	Response Plan for the Horn of Africa and Yemen.
<p>6) Partnerships</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <i>Establishes diverse partnerships to promote sustainability and national ownership</i> <i>IOM positioned as HDPN actor through bilateral and multilateral exchanges</i> <i>Key messages developed to articulate IOM's engagement in humanitarian and political programming, including Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR) and stabilization</i> <i>Use of stakeholder mapping and capacity assessment exercises</i> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Strong collaboration with government as an implementing agency and resource for information and technical support For migration coordinates with ministry of foreign affairs, president's agency for socioeconomic integration, ministry of interior, ministry of labour, ministry of health For peace building with ministries, and specific units for peace building; also with victims unit, extraordinary jurisdiction called JEP, national agencies for land, and national agency for integration of ex-combatants, in addition to the UBPD (Unit for the Search of Missing Persons) and CEV (Truth Commission), within the Comprehensive System for Peace. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Good partnerships in Peacebuilding and stabilization projects Strong livelihood partnerships with the government on reintegration of IDPs Many "partnerships" with L/NNGO but as implementing partners/service providers NGOs feel "crowded out" and not included in UN partnerships 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> IOM Somalia has diverse partnerships although aside from those with the authorities, UN agencies and INGOs, most are transaction, including "downstream" use of L/NNGOs as implementing partners/service providers IOM positioned as HDPN actor although donors may know only of IOM's work in a given pillar and not across all pillars (depending upon what they are funding) IOM messaging mainly focused on humanitarian response and stability
<p>7) Funding and finance</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <i>Engagement with key donors during strategic plan development</i> <i>Partnerships with states within scope of their development strategies</i> <i>Funding proposals/appeals reflect full spectrum of IOM programming</i> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Traditionally, Colombia CO funded largely by Colombian government until 2020 Formerly, 60% from government, now changed to over 70 % funding from cooperation Main donors now: US donors (USAID, PRM, INL (main three), 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Some engagement with donors during planning but priorities largely driven by donor interests. Cases seen where funding proposals reflect full spectrum of IOM programming (but in response to a donor) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> IOM Somalia and RO Nairobi engages with key donors, but not necessarily in strategic plan development (as far as this evaluation was aware). IOM Somalia liaises and works with the Somali authorities in supporting their development strategies.

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Funding proposals/appeals request flexible and multi-year funding</i> • <i>Diversification of funding sought by COs</i> 	<p>JTIP (counter trafficking), CDC (disease prevention), but also Spain, Canada, Japan, South Korea, EU</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • For migration mostly annual funding but for peace building multi-year funding • Donor meetings based on government priorities from national plans as well as bilateral meetings with donor community to decide on support 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Donors confirm that their funding structures do not encourage the use of the full spectrum of IOM programming. • Large donor base and includes Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, South Korea, Switzerland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, UK, USA and European Union 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Some funding proposals do reflect a broader spectrum of programming across the nexus. • Donor base expanded and includes Germany, Japan, Sweden, Switzerland, the Netherlands, UK, USA, European Union and African Development Bank. • Funding is also sought for multi-years but not always available; often its multi-year funding with annual allocations
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HDPN presence in 17 IOM country strategies, plans roadmaps and country crisis response plans and appeals

#	Document	HDPN explicitly mentioned	External collaboration	Internal collaboration	Contextual analysis	Comprehensive programming	Local & national capacity	Owl RE Analysis
1.	Somalia Strategic Plan – 2021-2024 (draft)	Yes	Yes	Partially	Partially	Partially	Yes	The plan encourages a HDPN approach although the objectives and outcomes are structured around IOM pillars (emergency and post-crisis, transition and recovery, migration, governance and development) with limited linkages between them. AAP mentioned in particular reference to CCCM Cluster role. A gender-sensitive analysis is missing from the context analysis.
2.	IOM Country Strategy for Mozambique 2021-2023	Yes	Yes	Partially	Partially	Partially	Partially	The strategy features HDPN as “implementing approach” – the full spectrum of IOM’s activities is present and organized around the pillars – although links are only partially made. Little focus on local/national capacity and context analysis lacking gender-sensitive analysis. AAP mentioned in reference to CCCM.
3.	IOM Turkey Mission Strategy 2021-2025	Yes	Yes	Partially	Partially	Partially	Yes	The strategy takes a multi-sectoral contextualized approach to programming. Crisis response notes importance of linking

#	Document	HDPN explicitly mentioned	External collaboration	Internal collaboration	Contextual analysis	Comprehensive programming	Local & national capacity	Owl RE Analysis
								humanitarian assistance with development through increased collaboration between relevant actors. HDPN focused programming and approach in Northern Syria. Strategy notes continued engagement with partners, and direct engagement with local communities.
4.	IOM Nigeria Strategic Plan 2018- 2021	Yes	Partially	Partially	No	Partially	Partially	Limited nexus applicability (“HDPN” mentioned once then Humanitarian- Development nexus). Some activity in coordination and inter-agency bodies. No context analysis. Strategy to play a key role in forging partnership with a wide range of international and local development partners. Engagement with affected communities mentioned.
5.	IOM Libya Strategic Plan 2021- 2024	Yes	Yes	Partially	Partially	Partially	Partially	HDPN noted once. Operational in all three pillars but programmatic areas are separate. Engagement with national and local authorities, CSOs and international community as a “cross-cutting modality of intervention.”

#	Document	HDPN explicitly mentioned	External collaboration	Internal collaboration	Contextual analysis	Comprehensive programming	Local & national capacity	Owl RE Analysis
6.	IOM Country Strategy for Egypt 2021- 2025	No	Yes	Partially	Partially	Partially	Partially	MIGOF, GCM and SDG main frameworks for strategic priorities. Collaboration in support of development outcomes. Strategy aligned with UN priorities for development cooperation as outlined in UNPDF. Contextual analysis includes risk of climate change. Little on local/ national partnerships
7.	IOM Comprehensive Action Plan - Afghanistan and Neighbouring Countries 2021- 2024	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	HDPN as a framework approach in complex multi-dimensional crisis. The 4 strategic objectives are interlinked and cover the nexus. They also act as entry points for joint analysis and collective outcomes. Goal of multi-year funding to support long term programming in context of the crisis.
8.	IOM Iraq Country Strategy 2018-20	No	Yes	Partially	Partially	Yes	Partially	Programming across HDPN and under different areas (Humanitarian, durable solutions, stabilization etc.) but little complementarity supported. Collaboration with UN/other actors and development of local capacity and context all under distinct pillars.

#	Document	HDPN explicitly mentioned	External collaboration	Internal collaboration	Contextual analysis	Comprehensive programming	Local & national capacity	Owl RE Analysis
9.	Colombia Crisis Response Plan 2022	No	Yes	Partially	Yes	Partially	Yes	Active across the HDPN. Crisis response plan (and programming) organized under humanitarian pillar and addressing longer term impacts of crisis; lacks links to development pillar. External collaboration across the nexus.
10.	Yemen Crisis Response Plan 2022	Yes	Yes	Partially	Yes	Partially	Partially	Main HDPN approach through community stabilisation, moving from emergency to recovery. Response plan does not make links to full spectrum of IOM's activities. Main external collaboration/ coordination through humanitarian response frameworks.
11.	Nigeria Crisis Response Plan 2022	Yes	Yes	Partially	Yes	Partially	Partially	Vision addresses progress towards durable solutions, integrating nexus, with peacebuilding separate. Response plan does not make links to full spectrum of IOM's activities. Support for national/local authorities, CSOs in disaster preparedness.
12.	Somalia Crisis Response Plan 2022	Yes	Yes	Partially	Partially	Partially	Partially	Mention of HDPN with focus on humanitarian and recovery activities. Response plan does not make links to Somalia Strategic Plan

#	Document	HDPN explicitly mentioned	External collaboration	Internal collaboration	Contextual analysis	Comprehensive programming	Local & national capacity	Owl RE Analysis
								and full spectrum of IOM's activities. Little focus on AAP and context analysis lacking gender-sensitive analysis.
13.	Libya Crisis Response Plan 2022	No	Yes	Partially	Partially	Partially	Partially	Presence across HDPN mainly humanitarian and recovery, stabilisation. Response plan does not make links to Libya Strategic Plan 2021- 2024 and full spectrum of IOM's activities. AAP in relation to community approach.
14.	Venezuela Crisis Response Plan 2021	No	Partially	Partially	Partially	Partially	Partially	Predominantly Humanitarian response in context of COVID19. Strong gender focused programming.
15.	Roadmap for Northern Mozambique Accelerating the Triple Nexus Programming in 2022	Yes	Yes	Yes	Partially	Yes	Yes	"Roadmap" includes a theory of change to accelerate the HDPN approach. Programmes organized around 4 strategic outcomes, covering whole range of HDPN interventions and simultaneous programmatic engagement. AAP included. Contextual analysis includes root causes but gender analysis missing. Use of disaggregated data to inform evidence-based programming by HDPN actors.

#	Document	HDPN explicitly mentioned	External collaboration	Internal collaboration	Contextual analysis	Comprehensive programming	Local & national capacity	Owl RE Analysis
16.	Flash Appeal - Ukraine and neighbouring countries, April 2022	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Partially	Yes	Appeal shows evidence of very good external collaboration of IOM with other actors including national/local authorities. Emergency programming the main focus (as appropriate) with some links implied to other pillars, such as on border management, trafficking in persons, reintegration, cash programming and health and how these activities have “pivoted” to respond to crisis. AAP integrated in response.
17.	Iraq Crisis Response Plan 2022-2023	Yes	Yes	Yes	Partially	Yes	Yes	The responses plan shows a very good range of IOM activities across the pillars. Contextual analysis missing gender analysis.

Summary results:

	HDPN explicitly mentioned	External collaboration	Internal collaboration	Contextual analysis	Comprehensive programming	Local & national capacity
IOM country strategies, plans roadmaps and country crisis response plans and appeals (17 documents)	71%	94%	62%	62%	62%	71%

Scale explained:

Factor	Explanation
<i>HDPN explicitly mentioned</i>	HDPN or nexus explicitly mentioned in the document
<i>External collaboration</i>	Document supports IOM's participation and collaboration with external actors (i.e. other UN agencies, INGOs, national authorities and CSOs) in support of collective outcomes
<i>Internal collaboration</i>	Document support collaboration and complementarity between IOM pillars and projects
<i>Contextual analysis</i>	Document shows evidence of a contextual analysis that is joint risk-informed, gender-sensitive and includes/references analysis of root causes
<i>Comprehensive programming</i>	Document supports people-centred approach, full spectrum of IOM programming reflected
<i>Local & national capacity</i>	Document supports development of local and national capacity through partnerships and coordination
<i>Scoring:</i> "Yes" are scored as 1; "No" as 0; "Partially" as "0.5". Percentages are then calculated based on these scorings, for example: Yes-9; No-4; Partially-4. This calculates as 9 for "Yes" and 2 for "Partially": 11 out of 17 = 65%	

ANNEX 1: Evaluation Terms of Reference

EVALUATION OF IOM'S INSTITUTIONAL APPROACH TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE HUMANITARIAN DEVELOPMENT PEACE NEXUS

Commissioned by: Office of the Inspector General (OIG), Central Evaluation Function, OIG/Evaluation

Managed by: OIG/Evaluation

1. EVALUATION CONTEXT

Since decades, IOM has been assisting migrants and displaced populations during crises paying close attention to the contribution of migration to development and combating the adverse drivers of migration and facilitators of irregular migration through sustainable development interventions. In Council document "IOM Strategic Planning: Toward the Twenty-First Century" (1995)⁵⁸ IOM identified nine expected results linked to the strategy, among which the "resolution of migration crises in ways which contribute to stabilization and development" remains relevant today more than ever.

During the same period, IOM has diversified its activities to support displaced populations, migrants and communities impacted by crises (including natural disasters) through direct humanitarian assistance, protection, and the contribution to peace building efforts and development⁵⁹. In 2012, IOM has developed the Migration Crisis Operational Framework (MCOF)⁶⁰ at the request of IOM Member States, in keeping with their growing interest in and concerns with the consequences of complex and often large-scale migration flows and mobility patterns caused by crises, as well as with their impact on communities.

The MCOF was designed to provide the Organization with a holistic and inclusive response to the complex nature of crises, by looking into all phases - before, during and after crises, and reflecting IOM's broad spectrum of response spanning humanitarian, peace and security, development, and migration management actions. The framework has been structured to closely link with and complement the mandates of other agencies and existing humanitarian, development and peacebuilding systems and approaches, strictly ensuring that it does not replace or duplicate existing mechanisms and acts in full coordination with other actors. Building on the OIG evaluation of MCOF conducted in 2019, an addendum to the MCOF is nearing finalization through an organization-wide consultative process recognizing international developments since 2012 and ensuring the framework

⁵⁸ See Annex I of Council document MC/INF 274, 4 November 2004: [MC/INF/274 - IOM Strategy: Current and future migration realities and IOM's role](#)

⁵⁹ IOM initiatives included registration of displaced populations and affected migrants, camp management, distribution of non-food items, relocation and resettlements, social, economic, health and psychological assistance to affected populations and communities, with a focus on those receiving returning displaced populations and migrants, stabilisation and development interventions to combat the adverse drivers of migration, demobilisation of soldiers and their reintegration into the civil society, as well as through the rehabilitation and construction of infrastructures, land distribution and community work to improve economic and social cohesion.

⁶⁰ <https://www.iom.int/mcof>

remains fit-for-purpose. It further reinforces IOM's Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus (HDPN) approach to reduce needs, risks and vulnerability and build resilient and peaceful societies.

The IOM Strategic Vision published in 2019⁶¹ and covering IOM's work for the period 2019-2023 reiterates the importance of a holistic approach, from its responses to emergencies and disasters (including prevention, preparedness, and risk reduction) to the development of transition and community stabilization programmes as part of IOM's commitment to strengthen the HDPN and bring the different elements of IOM's related work together. Also, IOM's Institutional Strategy for Migration and Sustainable Development highlights the importance of the HPDN and the articulation of collective outcomes⁶² across humanitarian development and peace actors' initiatives for the achievement of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

Since 2020, IOM is adhering to the recommendations and principles of the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD/DAC) on the HDPN (or the Triple Nexus). Its document "DAC Recommendation on the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus" of 2020⁶³ states that "Nexus approach refers to the aim of strengthening collaboration, coherence and complementarity. The approach seeks to capitalize on the comparative advantages of each pillar – to the extent of their relevance in the specific context – in order to reduce overall vulnerability and the number of unmet needs, strengthen risk management capacities and address root causes of conflict", while ensuring immediate humanitarian needs continue to be met.

Internationally, other key initiatives have emerged in recent years to help strengthen responses through the nexus. The outcomes of the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit and the associated Agenda for Humanity initiatives have sought to improve collaboration across the humanitarian-development nexus within a "new way of working", while the twin resolutions on sustaining peace adopted by the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly in 2016 broadened the effort to work in an integrated fashion on the development, peace, security, and human rights pillars to support prevention, address the root causes of conflict and promote sustainable peace and development.

The same level of attention to HPDN was paid within the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) as an inter-agency forum for coordination, policy development and decision-making involving the key UN and non-UN humanitarian partners. The debate on the nexus has also gained considerable momentum in international strategic initiatives such as the 2030 Agenda and related Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the Global Compact on Migration (GCM) for a more holistic and interconnected response to crises, with the UN Secretary General making the nexus an important element of the UN agenda and of the reform of the UN Development System.

References to the HDPN can be found in the United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework and its 'Cooperation Framework Companion Piece - Humanitarian-Development- Peace Collaboration' of July 2020, in the 'Management and Accountability Framework of the UN Development and Resident Coordinator System (MAF)'⁶⁴ or in the Resolution of the General Assembly of 21 December 2020 on the 'Quadrennial comprehensive policy review of operational activities for development of the United Nations system'.⁶⁵ In 2016, IOM became a related organisation of the UN

⁶¹ <https://publications.iom.int/books/strategic-vision-setting-course-iom>

⁶² 'Collective outcomes' referring in particular to UN/ IASC approach.

⁶³ <https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/public/doc/643/643.en.pdf>

⁶⁴ <https://reform.un.org/content/development-reform>

⁶⁵ See § 36 - <https://www.undocs.org/a/res/75/233>

System facilitating the calls for coordinated and integrated approaches within and outside the UN family.

2. EVALUATION OBJECTIVE

Given the increased focus on HDPN and its strategic importance inside and outside of IOM, the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) in consultation with the Department of Operations and Emergencies (DOE) and the Department of Migration Management (DMM) decided to include a thematic and strategic evaluation of IOM's holistic approach and contribution to the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus in the OIG biennial evaluation plan 2021-2022.

The overall objective of the exercise is **to evaluate IOM's integrated strategic approach, operationalization of and contribution to the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus and to provide recommendations on how to strengthen IOM's work across the HDPN to better address the needs and expectations of crisis affected populations.**

More specifically, the evaluation will analyze the internal synergies and institutional steps taken by IOM for an effective and sustained adherence to the HDPN approaches, principles and recommendations agreed upon by the international community and the UN. The analysis will include IOM's decision-making and management protocols for comprehensive and collaborative responses to crises and post-crisis engagements, IOM's approach to risk-informed development and crisis prevention, as well as external synergies with UN agencies and organizations. The evaluation will also cover an analysis of IOM operational responses, its contribution to regional and national initiatives, in particular within the UN Country Teams (UNCT), and the level of understanding and professionalism IOM staff has in regard to HDPN.

The evaluation will develop a Theory of Change (ToC) of IOM policies, strategies and initiatives relevant to HDPN and how they are contributing to reach the overall intent, objective(s) and recommendations agreed upon within the UN and by the international community as specified in the first section above. In that regard, the ToC will focus on methods and tools and the expected changes and outcomes that the IOM HDPN approach will bring in IOM's responses to crises, considering however that each context may differ.

The target audience for this evaluation includes IOM management, IOM staff involved in HDPN activities at Headquarters (HQ) and in the field, as well as interested donors, Member States, and international and local partners.

3. EVALUATION SCOPE

The evaluation will analyze IOM's global efforts using the OECD/DAC criteria of relevance, coherence effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability⁶⁶. It will also include an analysis of the integration of IOM cross cutting themes of gender, accountability to affected populations, environment and human rights-based approaches in the strategic papers and guidance related to the HDPN, whenever applicable⁶⁷.

In addition, the evaluation will select a sample of programmes that can properly illustrate IOM's contribution to the HDPN and use them as case studies, as well as IOM evaluations with analysis of the HDPN (or of the Humanitarian—Development Nexus), not necessarily limited to the selected case

⁶⁶ <https://www.oecd.org/dac/evaluation/daccriteriaforevaluatingdevelopmentassistance.htm>

⁶⁷ On IOM's cross-cutting themes in Evaluation, see IOM M&E Guidelines, Chapter 5: <https://publications.iom.int/books/iom-monitoring-and-evaluation-guidelines>.

studies. This analysis will try to identify best practices and constraints in operationalizing the nexus, including possible cases when the use of the HDPN approach was challenged. The sample of operations and countries to be selected as case studies will be further discussed at the inception phase and will include five to seven interventions, such as IOM programmes in Kosovo⁶⁸, Nigeria, Bangladesh, Iraq, Somalia, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) or Haiti. Training, roll-out, development and issuance of related guidance will also be examined in that regard. The period covered by the evaluation will mainly include initiatives implemented since the World Humanitarian Summit of 2016 but is not limited to it.

The evaluation is not intended to provide a detailed analysis of the performance, impact and sustainability of the selected programmes and/or activities implemented by IOM's offices, but to identify fields of activities where IOM can have a major impact on strategic approaches and international responses, and how sustainability can be enhanced given the fragility and complexity of peace building and the recurrent problem of protracted crises.

4. EVALUATION CRITERIA AND QUESTIONS

More specifically, the evaluation will answer the following questions:

Relevance:

- Are IOM's HDPN definition(s), approach(es) to risk informed development, crisis prevention and areas of intervention aligned with internationally agreed HDPN definitions, standards, recommendations and/or principles and their application in other UN organizations?
- Are IOM's HDPN approaches properly considering the goals and objectives of the GCM and SDGs? And those of the UN development system and IASC reforms?
- Are there any constraints to HDPN approach for IOM as a '*multi-mandated*' organization? *What is IOM's comparative advantage across the HDPN?*
- Are IOM's tools and guidance relevant for IOM offices to undertake risk-informed and gender-sensitive analysis of root causes and structural drivers of conflict in the framework of HDPN?
- Do IOM HDPN related guidance and activities properly include analysis of cross-cutting issues?

Effectiveness:

- How effective is IOM in working with other stakeholders for a comprehensive and coordinated approach of the HDPN and in operationalizing the nexus across different contexts (global and across those illustrated by the case-studies for instance)?
- What are the policies, systems and/or strategies put in place by IOM to promote its comparative advantage in addressing HDPN activities and in linking them for effective responses in the respective fields - humanitarian, development, and peace building?
- To what extent does IOM HDPN approach integrate humanitarian principles, do no harm, and conflict sensitive approaches to avoid unintended negative consequences and maximise positive effects across programming in at risk, fragile and crisis settings?
- How effective is IOM in promoting HDPN strategic partnerships with a broad range of actors and collaboration with states, civil society, private sector, other international agencies and local actors?
- Are IOM's communication tools and knowledge management products effective to raise internal (IOM) and external (other UN bodies, states, beneficiaries) awareness on HDPN?

⁶⁸ References to Kosovo shall be understood to be in the context of United Nations Security Council resolution 1244 (1999).

- Are IOM field offices engaging with target population before writing project proposals and coordinating them with other UN agencies?
- What systems are in place to learn lessons and highlight good practices in the implementation of the HDPN, and how are they promoted inside and outside the Organization?

Coherence:

- How does IOM guarantee interactions with and between other projects and programmes and institutional HDPN initiatives implemented, both in terms of internal and external coherence?
- How is coherence (internal and external) guaranteed in the design and implementation of HDPN related projects and programmes in the field?

Efficiency:

- How does IOM promote fundraising activities related to HDPN work?
- Are the systems in place to support field offices in fundraising activities related to HDPN efficient and cost-effective?
- Is IOM efficient in enhancing staff expertise and supporting staff development in that field?
- Are IOM's corporate investments in HDPN supporting its work related to the nexus with a view to decreasing the risks of crises that undermine development, while ensuring immediate humanitarian needs continue to be met?

Impact

- What is the impact of IOM-HDPN work on key policy processes at global, regional and country levels, including for integrating migration and displacements into HDPN coordinated approaches?
- What is the impact of IOM's structural and strategic changes related to HDPN since the World Humanitarian Summit on the organizational culture and way of working in the field of migration and HDPN, especially at the level of IOM country offices?
- What is the impact of IOM's HDPN work on its capacity to be a reference in HDPN related activities?

Sustainability

- How does IOM approach sustainability in the framework of the HDPN?
- To what extent does IOM invest in local actors/first responders for local, sustainable and resilient responses and for supporting HDPN local approaches?
- Do IOM offices consider that IOM HDPN approach can lead to sustainability in peace building and development efforts avoiding protracted crises and focus on long-lasting humanitarian responses?
- Can sustainability be enhanced by working across the UNCTs with HDPN?

5. METHODOLOGY, ROLES AND TIMEFRAME

The evaluation will be conducted by an external consultant(s) under the responsibility of OIG. The methodology will consist of an extensive documentation review, interviews with key staff and partners and electronic surveys. The methodology will cover the main objectives pursued by IOM as defined in the references mentioned in the Evaluation Context section, including the OECD/DAC recommendations.

DOE and DMM will provide relevant documentation to help answering the evaluation questions and identify the internal and external structures, processes, policies, strategies and programmatic approaches utilized to implement and manage HDPN work.

In collaboration with OIG, DOE and DMM will provide a list of key persons to interview inside and outside of IOM, which will be finalized in coordination with the consultant. With COVID-19 restrictions in mind, the interviews will be carried out remotely (by phone, MS Teams, electronically via email or through similar means). If the recruited consultant(s) is(are) based in Geneva, some face-to-face interviews may be considered with Headquarters staff, COVID-19 measures permitting. Interviewees' inputs will be fully confidential.

OIG will further discuss with DOE and DMM the sampling of activities, projects, programmes and evaluations that can be used as case studies or illustration of IOM's work integrating a HDPN approach and/or partial approaches covering for instance only humanitarian and development nexus, or humanitarian and peace building nexus. OIG will also discuss with DOE and DMM the conduct of electronic surveys, and in collaboration with the consultant(s) OIG will develop survey material and finalize the target groups that will be surveyed. Two different surveys may be developed to cover the data collection needs, one internal focusing on IOM and the other on external partners.

As the evaluation will not look at the performance of individual projects and programmes currently implemented in the field, there is no need to organize field visits. This is also in line with COVID-19 travel restrictions. The analysis of the selected sample of case studies will be based on documentation review, existing evaluations, and interviews. The level of details and modalities for including them in the evaluation report will be discussed with DOE, DMM and the consultant(s).

The use of various data collection tools (documentation review, interviews, mapping, surveys) will facilitate triangulation of information collected, thereby increasing the reliability of the findings, lessons learned, good practices and recommendations that will be presented in the evaluation report.

A draft evaluation report will be sent to DOE and DMM for comments after having been cleared by OIG. The evaluation is expected to start in October 2021 and a final report should be made available in March 2022 at the latest. OIG will cover the costs for the recruitment of the external consultant(s) and will be responsible for the overall implementation and management of the exercise.

6. ETHICS, NORMS AND STANDARDS

IOM abides by the [Norms and Standards](#) of the UN Evaluation Group (UNEG) and expects all evaluation stakeholders to be familiar with the [Ethical guidelines for evaluation](#) of UNEG and the consultant(s) with the [UNEG code of conduct for evaluation in the UN System](#) as well. UNEG documents are available under IOM Evaluation Webpage www.iom.int/evaluation.

7. EVALUATION DELIVERABLES AND TIME SCHEDULE

The consultant(s) is(are) expected to provide the following deliverables:

- Inception report outlining data collection processes and analysis and including an evaluation matrix with further refinement of evaluation questions.
- Draft and final evaluation reports of no more than 50 pages (excluding annexes).
- Evaluation brief (template provided by IOM) and draft management response.

Below is an indicative work plan for the conduct of the evaluation.

Activity	Timeframe/deadlines	Indicative Working Days for consultancy	Who is responsible
Inception phase (including launching meeting)	October 2021	8 days	Consultant(s)
Review of the inception report	End of October, beginning of November 2021		OIG/DOE/DMM management team
Documentation review, surveys, and interviews	October to December 2021	20 days	Consultant(s)
Evaluation draft report	January 2022	7 days	Consultant(s)
Review of the evaluation draft report	End of January, beginning of February 2022		OIG/DOE/DMM management team
Finalization of the evaluation report and material	End of February, beginning of March 2022	5 days	Consultant(s)
TOTAL DAYS CONSULTANT		40 days	

8. CONSULTANT(S) QUALIFICATIONS

- At least 15 years of evaluation experience (or 10 years evaluation experience and advanced degree in social and political sciences).
- Experience with at least five humanitarian, development, peace building nexus related evaluations, as well as with migration and/or displacement evaluations.
- Advanced knowledge and skills in categorization, mapping and mixed methods.
- Knowledge of French and Spanish languages is an asset.

9. SUBMISSION OF APPLICATION

IOM is looking for proposals from service providers to deliver the outlined products. Service providers are requested to submit the following:

- A proposal with description of the approach, methodology, activities, work plan, deliverables and consultant(s) experience and expertise matching the ToR.
- Two examples of similar work.
- Three references.
- The budget in USD should include a detailed breakdown of costs per activity, personnel costs, and any other costs relating to the implementation of the tasks outlined in the ToR.

- An indicative cost can be included for potential travel to Geneva for presenting the findings, but the organisation of the visit will be dependent on COVID-19 restrictions.

Contract period: October 2021 to March 2022.

Potential conflict of interest should be declared.

Only shortlisted candidates will be notified. IOM reserves the right not to accept any tenders submitted.

Proposals must be submitted via email sent on or before midnight **18 October 2021 (Geneva time)** to the following email address eva@iom.int.

Should you need any additional information, please send us your queries in writing to eva@iom.int.

ANNEX 2: List of documents reviewed

Centre for Humanitarian Action (October 2020), *The triple nexus in practice: challenges and options for multi-mandated organisations*.

Development Initiatives (February 2021), *Supporting longer term development in crises at the nexus: Lessons from Somalia*.

Fanning, E., & Fullwood-Thomas, J. (2019), *The Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus: What does it mean for multi-mandated organizations?* Oxfam.

FAO (2021), *Evaluation of FAO's contribution to the humanitarian–development–peace nexus*.

Global Nutrition Cluster (2020), *Review of Opportunities for Strengthening Humanitarian and Development Linkage for Nutrition – Afghanistan Case Study*.

IASC (May 2020), *Light guidance on collective outcomes*.

IASC (October 2020), *Issue Paper: Exploring Peace within the HDPN*.

IASC (November 2021), *Mapping good practices in the implementation of Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus approaches, Country Briefs and Synthesis Report, 2021*.

IOM (ND), *Introduction to HDPN*, Presentation.

IOM (2016) *Chief of Mission Handbook*.

IOM (2017), *Project Handbook*.

IOM (2019), *Operationalizing the Humanitarian–Development–Peace Nexus: Lessons learned from Colombia, Mali, Nigeria, Somalia and Turkey* (Liam Perret).

IOM (March 2019), *The Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus in Practice, An IOM report based on five country case studies* (Ginette Kidd).

IOM (2020), *IOM Institutional Strategy on Migration and Sustainable Development*.

IOM (2020), *Internal guidance for DOE on the HDPN*.

IOM (2020), *The HDPN Driver Project*, Infosheet. MiRAC

IOM (2020), *Community Stabilization – An approach for facilitating progress towards durable solutions and operationalizing the Humanitarian–Development–Peace Nexus: Lessons from Zimbabwe, Ethiopia and Somalia*. Migration Research Series, No.66.

IOM (2020), internal guidance on donors and the HDPN (various).

IOM Iraq (2020), *The Triple Nexus and Community Stabilization in Iraq*.

IOM (December 2020), *HDPN*, Infosheet.

IOM (2020), *Global Report 2020 - Operations and Emergencies*.

IOM (2020), *Strengthening engagement with local actors: A toolkit for IOM staff*.

IOM (27 April 2020), *Adopting a comprehensive approach to internal displacement: Operationalizing the triple nexus*. Standing Committee on Programmes and Finance, Twenty-eighth Session, S/28/7.

IOM (2021), internal guidance on donors and the HDPN per Sectors and Clusters (various).

IOM (April 2021), *Addressing Drivers of Migration and Displacement across the Humanitarian, Development and Peace Nexus: IOM's Experience with Case Studies from Bangladesh and Ethiopia* (draft).

IOM (June 2021), *Addressing drivers of migration and displacement in Central America and the Caribbean across the Humanitarian, Development and Peace Nexus* (draft).

IOM (1 December 2021), *Leveraging global frameworks, Training Concept, Post pilot roll-out*.

IOM (2022), *Framework for Diaspora Engagement in Humanitarian Assistance*.

IOM (2022), *MCOF framework (MCOF 2.0)*

JSC (N.D.) *JSC Review: Refined Recommendations for 7 countries*.

NYU (December 2019), *The Triple Nexus in Practice: Toward a New Way of Working in Protracted and Repeated Crises*.

OECD-DAC (February 2019), *DAC Recommendation on the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus*.

OECD (2022), *Interim Progress Review of the DAC Recommendation on the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus*.

Slim, H. & Bradley, M. (2013), *Principled Humanitarian Action & Ethical Tensions in Multi-Mandate Organizations*, World Vision.

UNICEF (March 2021), *Formative Evaluation of UNICEF Work to Link Humanitarian and Development Programming*.

UNHCR (December 2020), *Discussion Papers 1- 4 UNHCR's Engagement in Humanitarian-Development Cooperation*.

Other documentation consulted included IOM appeals, plans, press releases and websites.

ANNEX 3: List of Interviewees

No	Name	Position	Organization
Global external stakeholders			
1.	Dan Screiber	Nexus advisor	OECD-DAC
2.	Emanuele Bruni*	Health Cluster Coordinator	WHO
3.	Hugh Macleman	Nexus advisor	UNDP
4.	Keiko Matsuo	Interagency Coordination and Humanitarian Partnerships Officer	UNFPA
5.	Marie France Bourgeois	Nexus advisor	UNDCO
6.	Orla Kelly*	Department of Foreign Affairs, government of Ireland	Donor
7.	Rachel Scott	Senior Nexus advisor	UNDP
8.	Souadou Bah	Intern	UNDCO
9.	stephanie Loose	Nexus advisor	UN Habitat
10.	Carina Staibano	Senior Policy Specialist, SIDA, government of Sweden	Donor
11.	Christine Detaille	Ministry of Foreign Affairs, government of Belgium	Donor
12.	Stefano Berti	Senior Policy Advisor Fragility & Peacebuilding (UN-IFI), Division Global Institutions, SDC, government of Switzerland	Donor
Colombia			
13.	Anjalina Sen	<i>Coordinadora Regional , PRM, USA</i>	Donor
14.	Diana Olarte Pinilla	<i>Dirección General, Grupo de Cooperación Internacional y Alianzas Estratégicas</i>	Government
15.	Fabián Cárdenas	<i>Coordinador de Migraciones y Recuperación</i>	Cruz Roja Colombia
16.	Ivone Ramos	<i>Agencia Presidencial de Cooperación Internacional</i>	Government
17.	Joan Sebastian Diaz	<i>Equipo Coordinación Clúster de Protección</i>	UNHCR
18.	Juan Munevar	<i>Oficial de Planeación Estratégica a.i.</i>	UN Resident Coordinator Office
19.	Laura Gutierrez	<i>Dirección General, Grupo de Cooperación Internacional y Alianzas Estratégicas</i>	Government
20.	Omar Adrian Gonzalez De La Hoz	Nexus advisor	UN Resident Coordinator Office
21.	Alessia Schiavon	<i>Jefa de Mision Adjunta</i>	IOM CO
22.	Camilo Leguizamo	<i>Coordinador programa de victimas</i>	IOM CO
23.	Carolina Urueña	<i>Coordinadora Unidad de Planeación</i>	IOM CO
24.	Rigoberto Mesa	<i>Director de Programas Migracion ai.</i>	IOM CO
Iraq			
25.	Irene Vojáčková-Sollorano	Deputy Special Representative for Iraq	UNAMI
26.	Corinne Duriaux	Junior Programme officer, Swiss Embassy, Jordan	Donor

27.	Earl Zimmerman	Director, Office of Refugee and IDP Affairs, Embassy of the United States of America, Baghdad, Iraq	Donor
28.	Emily Lyons	Humanitarian Officer, DFAT, Australia	Donor
29.	Julien Peissard	Programme Officer Iraq & Syria, Swiss Embassy, Jordan	Jordan
30.	Maanasa Reddy	Durable Solutions Technical Working Group Co-Coordinator	NRC
31.	Signe Jepson	Head of Inter-Cluster Coordination Unit	OCHA
32.	Bradley Mellicker	Senior Regional Emergency and Post-crisis Specialist	IOM Iraq
33.	Claire Lyster	Livelihoods Programme Manager, Enterprise Development	IOM Iraq
34.	Clementine Favier	Head, Transition and Recovery Division	IOM Iraq
35.	Giovanni Cassini	(former) Head of Programmes	IOM Iraq
36.	Homera Cheema	UN Network on Migration (Iraq) Secretariat	IOM Iraq
37.	Katy Snowball	Head, Partnerships and Coordination Division	IOM Iraq
38.	Nellie Ghusayni	Head, Migration Health Division	IOM Iraq
39.	Robert Odhiambo	M&E officer, Coordination, MEAL	IOM Iraq
40.	Roeland De Wilde	Head, Preparedness and Response Division	IOM Iraq
41.	Siobhan Simojoki	Head, Peacebuilding and Stabilization Division	IOM Iraq
42.	Yoko Fujimura	Senior Coordinator, Durable Solutions	IOM Iraq
Somalia			
43.	Ali Mohamed Ali Klay	Programme Director, GREDO	National NGO
44.	Eliane Provo Kluit	Head of Community Recovery and Extension of State Authority (CRESTA) - UNSOM's Stabilization Unit	UNSOM
45.	Jo Nickolls	Head of the UN Integrated Office	UN Resident Coordinator Office
46.	Tendai Matemadombo	Durable Solutions Unit Director	UN Resident Coordinator Office
47.	Daniel Norfolk	Community Stabilization Project Manager	IOM CO
48.	David Womble	Senior Program Coordinator TRD	IOM CO
49.	Laura Bennison	Durable Solutions Coordinator	IOM CO
50.	Mohamed Abdelazim	Senior Program Coordinator Emergency / Post Crisis Pillar	IOM CO
51.	Yuko Tomita	former Head of PDSU	IOM CO
Ukraine			
52.	Anh Nuygen	Chief of Mission	IOM Ukraine
53.	Marco Chimenton	Emergency and Stabilization Programme Coordinator	IOM Ukraine
54.	Johannes Fromholt	Program Officer, Preparedness and Response	IOM Ukraine
55.	Alexander Doggen	Regional Operations and Emergencies Coordinator	RO Vienna
IOM Headquarters			
56.	Alina Narusova-Schmitz	Head, Policy Coordination Unit	IOM HQ

57.	Angela Staiger	Senior Humanitarian Policy Advisor	IOM HQ
58.	Angelica Broman	Senior Advisor, HDPN	IOM HQ
59.	Cecile Riallant	Head, Migration and Sustainable Development	IOM HQ
60.	Cemre Barsbay	Policy Support Consultant, HDPN	IOM HQ
61.	Christophe Franzetti	Chief Evaluation	IOM HQ
62.	Danila Bogdan	PRD	IOM HQ
63.	Fernando Medina	Head, Transition and Recovery	IOM HQ
64.	Fouad Diab	Head of Global CBI Support Team	IOM HQ
65.	Ginette Kidd	MCOF and GCP Advisor	IOM HQ
66.	Jeff Labovitz	Director, DOE	IOM HQ
67.	Kerry-Lynn Maze	Sr. Knowledge Management Coordinator, GMDAC	IOM HQ
68.	Marina Manke	Head, Labour Mobility & Human Development	IOM HQ
69.	Tamara Keating	Senior Policy and Liaison Officer	IOM HQ
70.	Tristan Burnett	Deputy Director DOE	IOM HQ
71.	Ugochi Daniels	Deputy Director General	IOM HQ
IOM Regional / Representative Offices			
72.	Angeline Wambanda	Regional Monitoring & Evaluation Officer	RO Bangkok
73.	Diego Beltrand	Special Envoy to the Regional Response to the Venezuela Crisis	RO Panama
74.	Justin MacDermott	Senior Regional Policy and Programme Coordinator	RO Nairobi
75.	Laura Smith	Associate Monitoring & Evaluation Officer	RO Nairobi
76.	Liam Perret	Programme Officer (Peace and Security)	IOM Office to the UN, NY
77.	Martin Schmitt	Regional Monitoring & Evaluation Officer	RO Costa Rica
78.	Michael Newson	Senior Regional Labor Mobility and Human Development Specialist	RO Vienna
79.	Natalia Perez	Regional project development officer	RO San Jose
80.	Nina Stuurman	Regional Emergency and Post Crisis Specialist	Ro Cairo
81.	Patrice Quesada	Senior Regional Emergency and Post-crisis Specialist	RO Brussels
82.	Poonam Dhavan	Senior Migration Health Policy Advisor	IOM Washington DC
83.	Sarah Lynn Harris	Regional Monitoring & Evaluation Officer	RO Vienna
84.	Zohoor Ahmad	Regional Monitoring & Evaluation Officer	RO Cairo
IOM Country Offices (other than case study countries)			
85.	Jenny Wright	Programme Support Consultant	IOM Tunisia
86.	Lara White	Head, Migration Management Division	IOM Afghanistan
87.	Oscar Matarin	Emergency Coordinator	IOM Cameroon
88.	Rafaelle Robelin	Senior Emergency Preparedness and Response Officer	IOM Pakistan
89.	Sarama Tamoto	HDP Nexus Specialist	IOM Cameroon

ANNEX 4: Evaluation matrix

Key Evaluation Questions	Indicators	Data Collection Tools	Sources of Information
Relevance			
1. What is the relevance of IOM's HDPN definitions and principles to the mandate and work of IOM?	Level of relevance of IOM's HDPN definitions/principles for the mandate and work of IOM.	Document review Interviews	Documentation Internal and external Interviewees
2. Is IOM's HDPN approach properly considering the goals and objectives of the GCM, SDGs, UN development and IASC reforms?	Extent to which IOM's HDPN approach considers goals and objectives of GCM, SDGs, UN development and IASC reforms.	Staff survey	Selection of IOM project staff, RTSs, CoMs/RDs
3. Are there any constraints for IOM as a 'multi-mandated' organization concerning HDPN? What is IOM's comparative advantage across the HDPN?	Identification of constraints for IOM as 'multi-mandated' organisation due to HDPN; identification of any comparative advantage of IOM for HDPN.		
4. Do IOM HDPN related tools and guidance properly include analysis of cross-cutting issues?	Level of analysis of cross-cutting issues within IOM HDPN related tools and guidance.		
5. Do the available tools and guidance support IOM country offices in undertaking risk-informed and gender-sensitive analysis of root causes and structural drivers of conflict in the framework of HDPN?	Level of support within available tools and guidance for COs to undertake risk-informed and gender-sensitive analysis of root causes and structural drivers of conflict.		
Effectiveness			
6. To what extent has IOM operationalized its HDPN approach at the country-level in shared vision and collective outcomes, assessment, and analysis, planning and programming, M&E, leadership and coordination, partnerships,	Extent to which HDPN approach is operationalized at country-level (case studies and other contexts) in; 1) Shared vision and collective outcomes	Document review Interviews Staff survey	Documentation Internal and external Interviewees

<p>funding and finance?</p> <p>7. What factors have facilitated or constrained IOM in operationalizing HDPN?</p> <p>8. What are the IOM policies, tools, guidance, systems and/or strategies in place to support the operationalization of HDPN?</p> <p>9. To what extent and how precisely does IOM HDPN approach uphold humanitarian principles, and integrate do no harm, and conflict sensitive approaches to avoid unintended negative consequences and maximize positive effects across programming in at risk, fragile and crisis settings?</p> <p>10. Are IOM's communication tools and knowledge management products effective in promoting the HDPN approach within IOM and externally (other UN bodies, states, beneficiaries)?</p> <p>11. Are IOM field offices engaging with target population in line with Accountability to Affected People commitments and in coordinating with other UN agencies?</p>	<p>2) Assessment and analysis 3) Planning and programming 4) M&E 5) Leadership and coordination 6) Partnerships 7) Funding and finance</p> <p>Identification of factors that have 1) facilitated or 2) constrained IOM in operationalizing HDPN.</p> <p>Identification of policies, tools, guidance, systems and/or strategies in place to support the operationalization of HDPN.</p> <p>Extent and precision to which IOM HDPN approach 1) upholds humanitarian principles⁶⁹ 2) integrates do no harm and conflict sensitive approaches in at risk, fragile and crisis settings.</p> <p>Feedback from IOM staff and external stakeholders on level of effectiveness of IOM's communication tools and knowledge management products in promoting the HDPN approach.</p> <p>Extent to which IOM country and regional offices are engaging with target population 1) in line with Accountability</p>	<p>Analysis of IOM country/regional strategies and country crisis response plans</p>	<p>Selection of IOM project staff, RTs, CoMs</p> <p>Selection of IOM country/regional strategies and country crisis response plans</p>
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⁶⁹ IOM's Principles for Humanitarian Action: Humanity, impartiality, independence, neutrality.

12. What systems are in place to learn lessons and highlight good practices in the implementation of the HDPN, and how are they promoted inside and outside the organization?	to Affected People commitments and 2) in coordination with other UN agencies. Identification of 1) systems in place for lessons learnt/good practices on the implementation of the HDPN and 2) efforts to promote them internally and externally.		
Coherence			
13. How does IOM ensure both internal and external coherence of its HDPN approach?	Level of internal (within IOM) coherence and external (outside of IOM) coherence of IOM's HDPN approach.	Document review Interviews Staff survey	Documentation; Internal and external interviewees; Selection of IOM project staff, RTs, CoMs/RDs
Efficiency			
14. How does IOM fundraise for its HDPN approach? 15. Are there systems in place to support field offices in fundraising activities related to HDPN? And if so, are they efficient and cost-effective? 16. Is IOM efficient in enhancing staff expertise and supporting staff development in the field for HDPN? 17. Are IOM's corporate investments in HDPN sufficient to meet its agreed upon principles, and not at the detriment of its humanitarian imperative?	Identification of initiatives/actions for IOM to fundraise for its HDPN approach. Identification of 1) systems in place to support field offices in fundraising activities related to HDPN and 2) and feedback on their efficiency and cost-effectiveness. Level of IOM's support for staff expertise and development in HDPN. Comparison of IOM's corporate investments in HDPN to its principles and the humanitarian imperative ⁷⁰ .	Document review Interviews Staff survey	Documentation Internal and external Interviewees Selection of IOM project staff, RTs, CoMs/RDs

⁷⁰ Principles of HDPN are understood to be the 11 Recommendations Principles of the OECD-DAC HDPN recommendation (<https://www.oecd.org/dac/conflict-fragility-resilience/infographic-humanitarian-development-peace-nexus.htm>); the "humanitarian imperative" is understood as "The humanitarian principles remind us that the **humanitarian imperative** of saving lives, alleviating suffering and preserving dignity must prevail; and that our actions must not be used or hijacked for political gain." (source: <https://emergencymanual.iom.int/entry/15815/ioms-humanitarian-policy-principles-for-humanitarian-action-pha>).

Impact			
18. What is the impact of IOM-HDPN work on key policy processes at global and regional levels, including for integrating migration and displacements into HDPN coordinated approaches?	Identification of instances/examples where IOM has impacted key global and regional policy processes.	Document review	Documentation
19. What is the impact of IOM's HDPN structural and strategic changes since the World Humanitarian Summit on IOM's organizational culture and way of working at the country-level?	Identification of changes to IOM's organizational culture and way of working in relation to HDPN since 2016.	Interviews	Internal and external Interviewees
20. What is the impact of IOM's HDPN work as a reference for stakeholders?	Feedback from external stakeholders as to IOM as reference for HDPN.	Staff survey	Selection of IOM project staff, RTSS, CoMs/RDs
Sustainability			
21. How does IOM build sustainability within its HDPN approach?	Identification of initiatives/actions to build sustainability within IOM's HDPN approach.	Document review	Documentation
22. To what extent does IOM invest in local actors/first responders for local, sustainable and resilient responses in support of HDPN local approaches?	Level of investment at the country-level in local actors/first responders in support of HDPN.	Interviews	Internal and external Interviewees
23. Do IOM country offices consider that IOM's HDPN approach can contribute to sustainability in peace building and development efforts avoiding protracted crises?	Perception of IOM COs as to whether IOM's HDPN approach can contribute to sustainability in peace building and development efforts avoiding protracted crises.	Staff survey	Selection of IOM project staff, RTSS, CoMs/RDs
24. What factors can support sustainability of IOM's HDPN approach?	Identification of factors that support sustainability of IOM's HDPN approach.		