

Office of Programme Evaluation

**EVALUATION OF PHASE III OF THE PROGRAMME
FOR THE RETURN OF QUALIFIED AFRICAN
NATIONALS**

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IOM International Organization for Migration

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1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Return of Qualified African Nationals (RQAN) programme is intended to facilitate the return to Africa of nationals of that Continent. Candidates for the programme have the knowledge and skills required to make a contribution to the development of the country to which they wish to return but lack the means to effect that return.

The programme is a complex one, carried out in Recruitment Missions in Europe and North America, and in several Placement Missions in Africa. The Central Management of RQAN is located in Nairobi, and the programme is managed from there, although in a relatively decentralized manner.

There have been numerous difficulties encountered in the programme, many of which were beyond the control of its management, particularly the changes in the political situations in some of the countries originally targeted by the programme. Other management difficulties were the result of the complicated nature of the programme and its broad geographical coverage. Some problems — such as difficulties with the database — were related to certain management decisions and can serve IOM as valuable lessons for the future.

The programme is in line to meet its reduced overall targets (originally 999, reduced to 631), but has taken significantly longer to do so than foreseen in the project document – five years in actuality vs. four years planned. The effectiveness of the programme in meeting targets varies greatly from country to country, and is related both to the overall situation in the country of return and to the efforts of the programme staff.

Sustainability of the programme will be generally related to the benefits derived from the contributions at the workplace and beyond of the individuals who have been returned under it. The impact at the workplace is being reported on separately in a survey carried out by Central Management. The 'ownership' of the programme by governments is almost non-existent, although the benefits are understood and welcomed. There is almost no evidence that the activities of the programme itself will be continued by the governments of the countries concerned, in spite of efforts to provide exposure and training. This is in large part due to the very limited input that countries of return have in the programme.

As there are beneficial impacts from the programme, which are confirmed by the survey, IOM should continue assisting in the return of qualified nationals. In doing so, it will first of all be necessary to get greater ownership of the process by concerned governments, among other things by greater involvement in programme execution and by contributing concretely to it. Careful analysis of the benefits of central management vs. a more decentralized approach will be needed.

When reading this evaluation report it should be borne in mind that it is a reflection of the programme status in the Summer and Fall of 1998, when the bulk of the information was gathered. The impact survey, which is contained in a separate report, was carried out in the Fall of 1999. This evaluation report and the impact survey are being issued simultaneously, and should be read jointly, to gain a more comprehensive understanding and assessment of the programme impact.

2. EVALUATION SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

Programme Management requested that an internal evaluation of RQAN Phase III be accomplished in 1998, and it was consequently begun in the Summer of that year. Terms of Reference (**Annex I**) were developed, limiting the evaluation to examining productivity and output at the Mission level, assessing cost-effectiveness (also at the Mission level), evaluating impact at the workplace, and assessing the effectiveness of Central Management strategies and techniques. As RQAN is a very large and complex programme, and considering the limited resources of the Evaluation Unit, the geographic coverage of the evaluation was also limited.

Field visits were made to three of the Placement Missions (Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Ethiopia), one Recruitment Mission (London), and the Central Management office in Nairobi. Interviews were sought with programme partners, a small number of returnees, and programme staff in the Placement and Recruitment Missions visited. Only programme staff were interviewed at the Central Management office. Interviews with partners and returnees were on a semi-structured basis. The interview guide is attached as **Annex II**. Lists of external partners and returnees interviewed are included in the annexes pertaining to those field visits. Furthermore, based on information obtained from the visits to Placement Missions, a list of questions was submitted to Placement Missions not visited.

The extensive documentation on the programme was reviewed as well, as was the database maintained by Central Management.

In order to examine impact at the workplace, a consultant based in Nairobi was retained in September of 1998. As that consultant was unfortunately ill-suited to the task, in spite of having the appropriate credentials, the process had to be re-started in January 1999. Subsequently it was found that this second consultant was not going to be able to dedicate sufficient time to the programme, resulting in the recruitment of a third consultant. Although this consultant has worked well, the results of the survey were only available in December and the report itself in late January 2000. The delay in issuing the evaluation report due to the postponement of the impact survey means that the findings of the evaluation will only be useful in the development of future programmes, rather than adjusting the direction of RQAN III.

3. HISTORY AND PROGRAMME CONTEXT

IOM's programme 'Reintegration of Qualified African Nationals' began as a pilot project in 1983, targeting three countries – Kenya, Somalia, and Zimbabwe. Its objective stated that "...the return of highly qualified African nationals residing in the industrialized countries will strengthen the economic technical and scientific development of the African countries participating in the project..." (IOM evaluation report 1986).

The initial grant under the Agreement (signed on 15 April 1983) was for ECU 3.3 million, and planned to assist 200 qualified nationals to return over a two-year period. This was later expanded to 300 persons over four years — although the budget remained the same — due to lower than expected administrative and operational costs during the first three years of the programme.

In 1984 and 1985, the administrative cost per case was USD 3,700, and the average reintegration cost USD 3,876, meaning that administrative costs were 48.8% of overall costs for those years, against a budgeted 35.8%. (Note: this project was being run simultaneously with another, similar project financed by the US.) IOM evaluated the project in 1986, including a survey of returnees.

After project completion in December 1986, and in order to sustain momentum, the EU provided a bridging grant of ECU 450,000 to cover the period January-October 1987. A total of 351 returns were accomplished under Phase I.

In October 1987, funds were approved for a second phase of the project, to return 300 nationals to six 'target' countries, plus an additional 120 to 'non-target' countries. The budget for this phase was ECU 7.3 million.

A 1991 external evaluation reported the project objectives as being to:

- a) facilitate return of qualified African nationals residing abroad;
- b) enhance the role and utilization of qualified national personnel;
- c) assist developing countries in encouraging voluntary return migration;
- d) and mitigate the adverse effects of the brain drain."

The external evaluation conducted in August-November 1991 was input for an evaluation seminar held in Harare in February 1992.

619 African nationals were returned under Phase II of the programme, which ended in 1992.

Between the end of Phase II in 1992 and the start of Phase III in 1995, the EU made available ECU 730,000 to bridge the two phases. This period ran from 7 August 1992 through 31 July 1993, and assisted a total of 100 returns.

The agreement for Phase III signed in November 1994 and was budgeted at ECU 13,430,000, from which the bridge funding was deducted. The programme started in January 1995, initially intended to cover 11 target countries over a period of four years. At the time of the evaluation, there were 8 target countries, and the expected length of the programme had been extended to five years.

4. PRODUCTIVITY AND OUTPUT

The Terms of Reference for this element of the evaluation specify “to assess the programme’s productivity and output against established indicators at the Mission level“. To carry out this assessment, Operational Plans and monthly reports submitted by every Mission covering the period January-June 1998 were examined. These plans, a sample of which is attached as **Annex III**, are divided into eight areas, ranging from ‘A. Programme Significance’ to ‘H. Liaison Relations’. The objective in each area is the same programme-wide, but the activity indicators of achievement, resources, and operational activities vary from Mission to Mission. The purpose of establishing the plan is to establish concretely what each Mission needs to achieve in the six-month period in order to attain the overall objective of what has now become a 5-year programme.

4.1 Monthly Reporting:

The monthly reports (sample attached as **Annex IV**) follow the format of the operational plan, and are intended to allow both the local project manager and Central Management to assess progress made towards reaching the concrete goals for those six months. Over the course of the programme, this should ensure that the overall objectives and programme purposes are met.

These reports were examined for the period January-June 1998. Central Management keeps track of the compliance of the Missions with this reporting requirement (**Annex V**). Most Missions are in fact compliant, although reporting is not always done on a monthly basis. With the exception of Guinea-Bissau — where the uncertain political situation may be assumed to have had an effect on the ability of the one-person office there to adhere to this administrative requirement — all Placement Missions were in compliance. Of the four Recruitment Missions, Washington and Pretoria were not in compliance, making it impossible to assess their progress against indicators.

For those Missions that submitted the required reports, an analysis was done covering the period January through June 1998. The analysis of each country's reports is contained in **Annex VI** (Monthly Report Analysis). Columns list the activity indicators of achievements contained in the Operational Plan, a summary of the results reported by the Missions, and very brief comments, which compare the indicators against the results.

In general, although the quality and completeness of the reports varied widely, their actual measurement of output against indicators was limited, which in turn limited the ability to assess productivity. The greatest benefit derived was when indicators had been quantified, showing clearly whether or not they had been attained. However, even where such indicators could have been of a quantifiable nature, there were many instances where the words 'increase' was used, without specifying what would constitute an increase. 'Maximum number' and 'accelerate' also found their way into the indicators, terms again implying that they could have been quantified and made more measurable, but weren't.

Indicators referring to areas which were inherently less quantifiable conformed even less to widely-recognized standards for indicators. These were primarily Programme Significance, Institution Building, and Liaison Relations. Phrases such as 'maximum support', 'raise awareness', and 'tries to reinforce' appear in the indicators, making the assessment of whether that indicator had been met or not quite subjective.

Having the above comments in mind, and recalling that the analysis of specific Missions is found in **Annex VI**, overall progress against Mission-level indicators can be summarized as follows:

- A. Programme significance – the indicators are intended to show that the RQAN programme is indeed responding to the human resource needs of the country. They attempt to measure the level of analysis of the country's manpower needs, the adjustment of priority sectors based on the analysis, and maintaining contacts with other efforts which also attempt to address manpower needs. However, the patchy information in the reports does not indicate that much progress is being made in programme significance, using the indicators established.
- B. Promotion and recruitment – this is the section which includes efforts to develop new job offers and new candidates, and includes a relatively large number of verifiable indicators, nearly all of which were unachieved. As this represents the pool of future returns, the lack of achievement of the indicators could either indicate problems in achieving future movement targets, or that the indicators are not closely-linked to progress towards meeting programme goals.
- C. Selection and departure – this looks at the internal programme process of actually getting a candidate selected and ready to go. Activities related to self-

employment cases are also included here. There was a relatively high rate of achievement of the indicators in this section.

- D. Placement and return – all indicators were related to the return process and many were quantifiable. The success rate was quite mixed from Mission to Mission.
- E. Follow-up and reintegration support – all Placement Missions had indicators related to their ability to get completed follow-up forms from individual returnees. For those Missions where information was provided, there were problems with meeting the indicators. Other indicators related to the ability of the Mission to provide adequate post-return support. While some of these were creative, little or no information was reported for them, making an assessment difficult. Some indicators for Recruitment Missions depended on receiving reports from the Placement Missions, which was not reported as happening during this period.
- F. Monitoring and evaluation – there is little commonality among the wide range of indicators in this section, which cover everything from quantifying returns to assessing the integration of returnees. Although indicators were aimed at checking progress of the programme, there was frequent overlap with indicators under other sections. It was generally difficult to determine what Central Management wanted to be included in this section, as there was such wide variation of indicators from office to office.
- G. Institution building – While this is more developed in Point 4.4 and Table 4, reported progress towards building institutions was very limited.
- H. Liaison relations – the indicators ranged from the very ambitious — for example, trying to get governments to undertake some activity, through awareness-raising — to much less ambitious, for example, meeting with government officials. There was little information against which to assess progress, and as with monitoring and evaluation, a lack of a consistent pattern that would give a clear impression of the overall goal that this section was intended to achieve. Reported results did not help to clarify this situation.

Conclusion: The meaning and use of indicators is not well-understood within the programme, with the possible exception of objectives which were in any event of a more quantifiable nature, e.g., number of departures, number of candidate files, etc. While training had been provided to local project managers at a workshop in Lisbon in March of 1996, follow-up was obviously needed.

An additional problem in using these reports is that in many cases the information provided in the report did not have much observable relation to the indicators established, again hampering the assessment required by the TORs. A table

showing Mission-by-Mission comparisons in this respect can be found at the end of **Annex VI**.

In view of the problems in using the indicators and information provided against them, it is useful to look at the number of returns as an overall indicator of programme success. Although this measure looks at only one aspect of the programme itself, it is nonetheless an aspect which is very concrete and therefore easily compared, and on which all Missions are in fact measured. This particular output is also the culmination of a whole other series of outputs related to the analysis of the needs of the job markets, the assessment of candidate appropriateness for the country's needs, in fact the culmination of the dual processes of recruitment and placement. A ranking of active Missions at the time of the evaluation follows.

Table 1: Ranking of Missions by Percentage of Returns against Targets

COUNTRY	Actual Returns as of 30.06.98*	Expected Returns at Programme End*	Actual Returns As % of Expected
ZIMBABWE	55	45	122%
G. BISSAU	56	59	95%
GHANA	62	68	91%
UGANDA	58	70	83%
ETHIOPIA	32	45	71%
CAPE VERDE	21	31	68%
ZAMBIA	25	43	58%
KENYA	39	80	49%

*taken from the Implementation Report covering the period January-June 1998

Conclusion: Indicators established at the Mission level to measure progress against overall programme goals are of limited use. However, taken as a whole, and understanding that the actual goals themselves must be found elsewhere, a very general assessment can be made about the programme's four specific objectives as found in the Technical Cooperation Agreement (Annex 1A, point 2.3). Of 631 placements expected by the end of the project, Central Management reported that 443 had been achieved, or 70%. Given that the project has been extended by one year, it can be assessed that it will take significant effort for the projected level of placements to be met. The development and use of priority sectors supports that the specific objective of placement in meaningful positions is being met. This objective and the integration component are more directly assessed in the survey. It cannot be said that much progress has been made towards strengthening countries' institutional framework, and overall is not likely to be achieved.

4.2 Follow-up reports on returnee reintegration:

The collection of follow-up reports, although covered in the indicators associated with Section E, 'Follow-up and Reintegration Support', is nearly always reported as being less than satisfactory, with difficulty in getting the reports completed. No Placement Mission has obtained full returnee compliance with this measure, which is not applicable for Recruitment Missions.

Attached as **Annex VII**, is an overview of the rate of returnee compliance with this particular requirement. (The data on which that annex is based is from January 1999, so the numbers of returns is not the same as that in other annexes, which are from June 1998. However, the analysis is based on the percentage of forms due, not overall numbers.) Looking only at those forms that were due at the time of this report, Missions range from 32%-91% in getting the 12-month forms returned (average 45%), and from 0%-83% on the 24-month forms, with an average of 27%. For countries where no Placement Mission exists, e.g., Angola and Guinea-Bissau, the rate of return is uniformly 0%. The return rate is based on those forms that are eventually returned, and says nothing about the timeliness of the return.

This lack of success in obtaining specific forms, while important, is not fully reflective of the overall follow-up effort that were observed in the three Placement Missions visited. It was apparent in each office that there was contact with the returnees on an ongoing basis to monitor their progress. Such contacts included those initiated by the Mission and those by the returnee. In each Mission, there was substantial knowledge of the situation of the individual returnee that spoke of personal contact, not simply familiarity with the file.

Given the apparent ability of local project managers to contact the returnees, there are other ways in which the assessment of reintegration can be done, for example, by having IOM staffed trained to fill out the form based on a conversation with the returnee. This is being done already, and was discussed as an alternative means to this end at the Mombasa workshop in May 1998. However, this should be done in a more systematic way, impressing on the staff member doing so the need for precision and consistency in the way questions are asked, responses noted, etc. There may as well be other ways, not involving the use of the form at all.

Conclusion: The current system of follow-up at 12 and 24-months does not produce fully satisfactory results, and moreover is not fully reflective of the efforts made by Placement Missions in conducting follow-up.

Recommendation: Taking into account the relatively low usage of the 12- and 24- month follow-up forms and the wide variation in success in follow-up, reintegration should be assessed through direct contact with the returnee (by phone or in person rather than by mailing the form).

4.3 Returnees' Associations

The promotion of the formation of an association of returnees is part of the workplan of some of the Placement Missions during the period examined, under Section E. 'Follow-up and Reintegration Support'. This represents local Project Management's response to a recommendation of the external mid-term evaluation, although IOM is not undertaking "the additional administrative and financial burdens inherent to formal establishment of Returnees Associations in target countries".*

- Ethiopia – there was a first meeting of returnees (found under G. 'Institution Building')
- Ghana – the association was registered as an NGO
- Zambia – a meeting with the interim committee of returnees was held
- Zimbabwe – the initial meeting of group was cancelled
- Cape Verde – not part of indicators
- Kenya – same
- Uganda – same
- Guinea-Bissau – no report

Conclusion: Each office has made an assessment as to whether or not the development of an association would be useful in promoting reintegration locally. This is in line with the recommendation of the mid-term evaluation that the programme be adapted to local conditions. There is no evidence of any of these recently-formed associations having an impact.

4.4 Sustainability:

The other general area of programme output could be considered to be in the area of sustainability; that the benefits of the programme would continue after the project ends. In one sense, the extent to which the returnees remain in the country, continue to work in the sector to which they were returned, and thus presumably contribute to the development of the country, could be a measure of the sustainability of programme benefits. The impact survey results show that 64% of those responding have been at the workplace between 2 and 5 years.

Although not directly applicable to Phase III, a survey done by the IOM Mission in Zambia in 1995 of those returned under Phase II of the programme (1989-1993) showed that 75% of the 63 who returned were still in the country and still working.

This section will examine outputs that might reasonably be associated with the project purpose "to assist and encourage African countries in the establishment/strengthening of an institutional framework to promote the voluntary return of their highly qualified, qualified and skilled nationals".

* IOM RQAN Report "Response to Draft Report on Mid-Term Evaluation Findings", 24 April 1997, point 8.1.9, p.8.

These outputs should be most associated with Section G of the operational plans and reports entitled 'Institution Building'. Although the sections on 'Programme Significance' and 'Liaison Relations' might also be associated with promoting sustainability, Section G is the only one that addresses this aspect directly.

Table 2: Monthly Reports – Section G: Institution Building

Mission	No. of Indicators	Indicator clear	Indicator unclear	% Clear Indicators	No results reported	Achieved	Not achieved	Impossible to assess
Placement Missions								
Accra	3	2	1	75%	1	0	1	1
Addis Ababa	2	1	1	33%	0	0	1	1
Harare	3	1	2	72%	1	0	1	1
Kampala	3	3	0	61%	2	1	0	0
Nairobi	2	0	2	19%	0	0	2	0
Lusaka	3	2	1	37%	0	2	0	1
Praia	2	0	2	67%	1	0	0	1
Recruitment Missions								
Lisbon	2	2	0	58%	2	0	0	0
London	3	3	0	71%	0	0	3	0
Total Section	23	14	9	61%	7(30%)	3 (13%)	8(35%)	5(22%)
Overall	213	122	91	57%	63 (30%)	39(18%)	62(29%)	49(23%)

With 8 sections in the plan and reports (A-H), the 23 total indicators in Section G is about what might be expected (average per section is 26). The percentage of usable indicators is also very close to the overall average, as are the percentages of indicators in each of the assessed as achieved, not achieved, etc.

In addition, a more detailed look at the indicators listed in this Section and the achievements noted against them (summarized below) does not provide any degree of confidence that the institutionalization of the RQAN programme within the government of the country of return is likely to happen.

Ethiopia - 1 meeting of the Support Group; Working Group suspended

Ghana – new structure for a smaller Support Group approved

Cape Verde – 2 Support Group meetings; report to General Counterpart

Zambia – several activities of Support Group reported; General Counterpart nominated and trained

Zimbabwe – 2 Support Group meetings; discussions with stakeholders re. extension

United Kingdom – 1 meeting with Zambian High Commission

Portugal – no results reported

Uganda – on-going training of 2 Officials

Kenya – Support Group suspended; discussions with General Counterpart on formation working group

In those four Missions visited (individual reports are attached as **Annex VIII**) there was further support for the overall analysis that the project purpose of strengthening the institutional framework was unlikely to be achieved, according to the indicators established for those offices.

It may be interesting here to examine the indicators of achievement under the general heading of ‘sustainability’ that were established at the programme level by Central Management (**Annex IX**). These speak almost solely about government counterparts being ‘invited to attend’ meetings or training, being ‘acquainted’ with procedures, and ‘experience gained’, all of which could have been reasonably assessed as having been achieved, had those been the indicators used for this particular evaluation.

Instead, the indicators established by the Missions tended to require more from the government counterpart concerned, such as ‘direct RQAN implementation’, ‘apply principles and techniques’, or more concerted action from IOM as in ‘train...Officials’ or ‘establish closer cooperation’. The choice of Mission level indicators as the basis for the evaluation thus had an effect on how the element of sustainability was assessed.

Conclusion: Programme benefits are likely to be sustained to the extent that those returned under the programme remain employed in the country in priority sectors. Governments are not likely to sustain programme activities.

5. COST EFFECTIVENESS

Cost-effectiveness in the context of this evaluation is defined as the comparison of outcomes and the costs required to produce them. Among other things looked at are elements of comparison among various Missions, a comparison of Mission’s costs against budgets, and the programme’s cost against the cost of other potential means to the same end, i.e., the return of skilled human resources to the country.

Firstly, as mentioned in the previous section, the output of each Mission can be categorized into three broad areas: actual returns, with all the processes associated with the return; reintegration; and sustainability. Of these outputs, that which lends itself most easily to an assessment of cost-effectiveness — and which consumes the bulk of the programme’s resources — is the one culminating in the return of an individual.

Over half of the expenditures under the RQAN programme are for what IOM terms 'processing costs', that is those costs directly associated with an individual case; primarily transportation, installation, and integration costs. Of the USD 8.77 million recorded as spent for this programme during the period 1994–1998, USD 4.85 million, or 55%, was for processing costs.

Table 3: 1994 – 1998 Expenditures

Category of costs	USD amount	Percentage of expenditure
Staff costs	2,452,170	28.0%
Office costs	1,126,673	12.8%
9.5% overhead	341,889	3.9%
Processing costs	4,850,289	55.3%
Total	8,771,023	100.0%

Source: IOM accounting records

This can be compared with two other, relatively similar programmes managed by IOM: the Return of Qualified Nationals to Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the Return of Qualified Nationals to Nicaragua (**Annex X**). Although a much more detailed analysis would need to be made before drawing firm conclusions, it can be seen that the percentage of expenditures on operational costs is lower in RQAN than in the other two programmes, where it was 72.8% and 64.5% respectively. Perhaps the most notable difference between RQAN and the other two programmes is that RQAN returns people to many countries, whereas the others only return people to one, thus reducing the need for multiple Placement Missions.

For the two previous versions of the programme, a similar analysis can be made, but with a slightly different breakdown. Rather than a differentiation between costs for programme benefits paid directly to the returnees vs. staff and office costs, the TCAs call for reporting based on direct and indirect costs. The difference is primarily in how certain staff and office costs are considered, with some staff and office costs considered 'direct support costs'.

Using this breakdown and comparing with percentages from the two previous phases of the programme, it can be seen that spending on direct costs in the first two phases was substantially lower than in the third phase (**Annex XI**). An evaluation done by an external consultant in 1992 showed that direct costs (roughly equivalent to operational costs above) were 50.4% of total costs in Phase I and 66.5% of overall costs in Phase II. In phase three, the percentage spent on direct costs was 85.0%, according to a report provided to the backstopper by IOM Headquarters (**Annex XII**). It is assumed that the categories considered as direct and indirect costs did not vary significantly between phases, as the 1992 report did not indicate how these costs were divided.

Processing costs are the cost of those items provided directly to the returnee (transportation, professional goods, etc.), are determined by the needs of individuals, on a case-by-case basis, and constitute the assistance package, which has a generally agreed-upon maximum of approximately USD 10,000. Such costs

are not particularly suitable for comparison among Missions, as they have little to do with measuring cost-effectiveness.


Staff and office costs provide a better way to look at cost-effectiveness among Missions. An office-by-office comparison between those costs and the number of movements is attached as **Annex XIII**. The data is shown year-by-year and also for a three-and-a-half year period (January 1995-June 1998). Even though this is a somewhat crude comparison, it does nonetheless highlight some offices for which there has been no obvious output for the investment, e.g., the amount of money spent in Belgium and Germany whilst producing almost no movements. In 1996, the second year of the programme operation, over USD 100,000 was spent in those two offices, producing a total of 1 return. Although project management has discontinued RQAN support by those offices, a question could be raised about either the analysis of the target population done before the project began, or the execution afterwards. In any event the investment of so much for a return of so little can in no way be considered cost-efficient.

Lesson Learned: Before considering whether a programme should support an IOM office in a country, the possibilities for success should be thoroughly analyzed, and necessary corrective action to adjust activities should be taken in a timely manner.

In terms of *per capita* staff, office, and overhead costs, the programme has steadily reduced these costs over time.

Table 4: Staff and office costs per movement

	Year	Spent	Per Capita Cost	Movements
	1995	918,851	15,842	58
	1996	1,340,658	9,059	148
	1997	753,654	4,486	168
	1998	343,374	4,459	77
TOTAL	1995 - 1998	3,356,537	7,471	451



Source: IOM Accounting Records

Other than the somewhat obvious country situations mentioned above, a closer look at the measure of cost-efficiency contained in **Annex X** requires that the *per capita* figures should be adjusted by some measure to take into account the differing costs for IOM to operate in these countries, as those costs vary significantly. No widely available scale comparing the general costs of operating in these countries was found, so two internally-available comparators were used: the IOM post adjustment scale, which accounts for the variation among countries in the living costs for Officials; and local salary scales. The post adjustment scale is the same as that used by UN agencies, and the local scale is generally based on the UN local scale as well.

It should be noted that where Officials were assigned to the RQAN programme in a Placement Mission, the costs of the Officials assumed overwhelming significance in the overall costs of running the programme in that Mission, as shown in the following table:

Table 5: Breakdown of Staff Costs – 1 January 1995 – 30 June 1998

Mission	USD Staff Costs Total	USD Staff Costs – Officials	% of Total
Placement Missions			
Accra	195,316	179,239	91.8%
Addis Ababa	103,290	99,457	96.3%
Harare	36,437	21,570	59.2%
Kampala	107,539	97,746	90.9%
Nairobi	54,936	39,163*	0%
Lusaka	208,992	186,199	89.1%
Praia		0	0%
Recruitment Missions			
Lisbon		0	0%
London	236,402	33,033	13.9%
Washington	161,867	11,449	7.1%
Total	1,984,186	1,069,253	53.9%

This adjusted comparison is shown in **Annex XIV** and the overall comparisons summarized in the table below which compares the target countries and major countries of recruitment. Those which are no longer countries of return or recruitment are not included. The table uses a comparison adjusted for post adjustment for Officials. This is not an ideal comparison, as the use of Officials in the programme varies widely from Mission to Mission as seen above. However it does offer a means of comparison among one of the costs associated with the programme using a scale that is established through the UN system. Unfortunately, there are a number of factors that are not accounted for by this comparison so that its value is uncertain. Some of these factors are:

- There may be countries other than Zimbabwe, Uganda, and Ethiopia where Associate Experts have been recruited to work on the programme, whose costs were thus not charged to the programme.
- In the Missions that were in part supported by the Administrative Budget, where there was an official paid for by that budget, it is not known how much work that official did on the RQAN programme without needing to charge costs to it.
- Post adjustment is not completely accurate in comparing mission costs when the percentage of programme costs spent on Officials varies so widely from Mission to Mission.

* the only costs for officials are as from 1998, when the Central Management moved to Nairobi, so it is assumed that these costs are associated with Central Management and not with the Placement Mission.

- This comparison under-emphasizes the work of those Missions that concentrated on outputs less associated with the number of returns, e.g., particularly those outputs associated with developing the ability of the government counterpart to carry on with the programme.

Table: 6 Comparison of Mission *per capita* costs

% of office budget in 1997	Office	1995-98 Expenses	1995-98 Movements	1995-98 USD/capita	Post adjustment rate 30/06/98	Adjusted <i>per capita</i>
N/A	Guinea-Bissau	44,400	58	766	1.279	599
4	South Africa	34,030	30	1,134	1.108	1,024
2	Kenya*	73,303	47	1,560	1.224	1,274
6	Zimbabwe*	96,654	60	1,611	1.068	1,508
84	Portugal	203,826	101	2,018	1.205	1,675
N/A	Angola	17,232	7	2,462	1.408	1,748
70	Great Britain	413,327	156	2,650	1.514	1,750
12	USA	275,435	134	2,055	1.119	1,837
39	Uganda	146,460	58	2,525	1.312	1,925
N/A	Cape Verde	54,913	21	2,615	1.176	2,224
N/A	Congo	12,042	4	3,011	1.348	2,233
13	Ethiopia*	126,173	35	3,605	1.186	3,040
13	Ghana*	264,974	63	4,206	1.206	3,488
13	Mozambique	90,990	12	7,583	1.204	6,298
45	Zambia	314,133	33	9,519	1.213	7,848
1	Germany	74,194	4	18,549	1.355	13,689
2	Belgium	63,997	0	63,997	1.368	46,781
N/A	Geneva	1,056,727	17	62,160	1.520	40,895
	Other movements (no staff and office costs)		73	0		
	Other costs (no budget)	6,737				
	Total of column	3,325,147	900	3,695		

Conclusion: One can make some rough assessment about this limited measure of cost-effectiveness based on the above table, such as the offices in Zimbabwe and Portugal were relatively more efficient in the use of programme resources than those in Mozambique and Zambia. However, due to lack of a good method of comparing general costs of operating in various countries, this comparison must not be made into something more than it is, and should not, for example, be used to strictly rank offices from most cost-effective to least.

Another measure of cost-effectiveness could examine the relative performance of the offices against the budgets established for them by Central Management. A chart showing the performance of the various offices for 1997 is attached as **Annex**

* Acted not only as Placement Missions, but also as Recruitment Missions for intra-regional movements.

XV. Overall the RQAN programme spent 91% of the amount budgeted under Staff and Office costs for 1997, with the percent of budget spent in each Mission ranging from 80% to 123%. The chart also shows how much of the budget of the office was provided by this programme. This percentage varies quite significantly from 1% to 84% (see table above). While it would have been interesting to extend this examination of budgeted vs. actual costs to other years, this was not possible as budget revisions for individual offices in 1995 and 1996 were not submitted to Headquarters, and thus the financial records contain insufficient information that could be used to make the comparison.

Lesson Learned: Budgets for Missions should be consistently prepared and revised and reflected in the usual IOM financial records. Not only will this help in current internal communication, but it will also serve later as a clear record of what was done.

In the context of performance vs. budget, it should be noted that IOM supplements the budget foreseen under the Technical Cooperation Agreement in a number of ways. The most important of these are the agreements that IOM has with some of its Member states under which staff — known in IOM as ‘Associate Experts’ are provided to the Organization free-of-charge. Since this programme has been in existence, RQAN has made substantial use of this group of staff. At the time of the evaluation, there was an Associate Expert running the IOM office in Zimbabwe and one involved in managing the programme locally in both Ethiopia and Uganda. Although records were not produced, Central Management estimates that there have been as many as 10 Associate Experts involved in the programme over the years. Because IOM does not pay the costs of these staff, they do not appear as staff costs in any of the comparisons. If IOM had had to recruit and pay for these staff, the comparisons of cost-effectiveness would have been different, in some cases significantly so.

The other way in which IOM supplements the programme budget is through an assignment of its own budgetary resources to the programme. Such assignments have been made as follows:

Table 7: IOM financial contribution to RQAN

1995	1996	1997	1998	Total
USD 130,000	USD 30,000	USD 200,000	USD 200,000	USD 560,000

This again has had an impact on the overall cost-efficiency as measured against the budget originally foreseen. However, as this amount is only 3.6% of the original budget of ECU 12.7 million (USD 15.7 million at the exchange rate of 1.24 in the

agreement), the impact is not large. It has not been determined to which offices these resources have been assigned over the years.

Conclusion: RQAN is operating within the overall budget foreseen, partially by supplementing from resources other than the EU. As budget revisions at the Mission level are not being consistently recorded, an analysis of mission performance against budget is less useful.

The third way to attempt to examine the cost-effectiveness of the programme is to look outside the programme at the other ways in which the need for the qualified human resources could be met. This has proved much more difficult to assess, requiring as it does the quantifying of costs for other possible approaches.

One approach would require an analysis of the cost to the country of not having these human resources present. To develop such analysis was far beyond the scope of this evaluation, and although frequent references to the need for qualified human resources were found in the literature, neither usable data to quantify this lack nor studies addressing this issue were discovered (see **Annex XIX**). Another would be to look at the other ways in which such persons might have returned to the country. In general, these would be intra-company transfers, recruitment from abroad by the private sector, and recruitment from abroad by the government. Cost data on these options was not readily available. In fact no data at all has been found on the question of intra-company transfers.

For recruitment agencies in the private sector, some limited information on costs has been obtained through IOM Placement Missions. Agencies recruiting internationally were reported in Zambia, Uganda, and Ghana. Zambia and Cape Verde reported definitely that none existed, and in Ethiopia IOM has been approached by a private recruitment agencies interested in cooperating with RQAN on recruitment from abroad. The fees of recruitment agencies were based on a percentage of the salary of the position to be filled ranging from 8%-25%, with the possibility of some out-of-pocket costs above that, e.g., for advertising. At least some of the companies recruit internationally, but their success in placement is not known.

From the very limited information available, it appears that the cost of simply administering recruitment through a private agency would be cheaper than through IOM. The overall average staff and office cost incurred for one placement in the RQAN programme is approximately USD 7,500. If the agency's fee (which would be the equivalent of IOM's staff and office costs) were 25% of the first year's salary, the highest fee quoted, this IOM cost would imply a salary of USD 30,000 per year. According to the (limited) data on salaries in the database, this level of salary was very rarely reached in the positions to which IOM is returning people under RQAN. Any comparison is also made more difficult by the lack of information as to just what services are provided by such recruitment agencies, and how those compare with those of RQAN. However, the uncertain success of private agencies in

international recruitment, the lack of such agencies in all countries, and in particular the fact that the company for whom the individual is recruited would have to bear the fee, combine to make it unlikely that recruitment agencies could broadly substitute for the RQAN programme, even though the administrative cost for recruitment may be lower in most cases.

In the public sector, it appears that in most countries government recruiting from abroad was very limited, and was not at a government-wide level, but rather at the individual ministry or university level. Use of the informal expatriate networks abroad, or use of the country's High Commissions or Embassies, were the most-frequently mentioned ways of identifying candidates. The most common cases in which international recruitment was reported were those where donor funding was available for the position. Only Ethiopia was reported as organizing recruitment drives abroad, e.g., teachers from India.

The most common benefits offered to those recruited abroad — who are not always nationals of the country doing the recruiting — are a return air ticket and housing. Rarely are additional incentives reported as being offered.

It was not possible to quantify the costs to the governments in carrying out such recruitment because of the difficulty in collecting information on this subject from governments. One Placement Mission only offered the estimate that such costs to the government would perhaps be 25-30% of those of recruitment agencies.

Conclusion: Although there may be other means to achieving the same end as the RQAN programme — that is return of qualified expatriates — it is unlikely that either private sector recruitment or recruitment by the government alone could substitute for RQAN.

6. EFFECTIVENESS OF CENTRAL MANAGEMENT

The fourth element of the Terms of Reference is to assess the effectiveness of Central Management strategies and techniques. RQAN is a programme carried out in a large number of countries on three continents, and yet it is structured as a single project – complicated, but uniform. This design, combined with the structure, has required a number of mechanisms to enable the programme to be carried out in individual countries in a uniform way.

Most of Central Management's strategies and techniques flow from this conception of this programme as a global one, requiring that the programme's objectives be understood and executed uniformly by all Missions. This has resulted in a very centralized approach to the programme, with elaborate control mechanisms in place to guide and correct Missions.

The major elements supporting this approach are as follows:

- Approval of certain decisions by Central Management
- Exchange of information through systemized reporting requirements and feedback from Central Management
- Centralized database
- Development through instruction manual and amendments, training and field visits

6.1 Approval

The external mid-term evaluation found that this centralized approach was flawed from the design phase, and that the programme should have been more flexible and tailored to the needs of the individual countries. It recommended that “on the basis of approved workplans and budgets, decision-making should be fully decentralized from Geneva HQ to Placement Missions and Recruitment Missions. Geneva’s role should be to monitor progress and to provide technical and backstopping support as required.” The response of Central Management to this recommendation was by and large to agree that decentralization “...will be gradually increased.”

For the most part, it appears that this gradual decentralization has happened. Although there are still a great many pieces of information that must flow between Central Management and the Missions, there is only one point in the processing of a normal case at which actual approval must be sought from Central Management. This is when the Reintegration Agreement — which lays out the agreement between the returnee and IOM on the components of the assistance being provided — is submitted to CM for approval. Missions visited reported that they have been pleased with the response time on this approval, although some delays were experienced during Central Management’s move from Geneva to Nairobi.

The other points at which approval must be sought are in the planning process, where agreement must be reached on the budget for the year, and on workplans, both approvals of which are in line with the mid-term evaluation.

Conclusion: The process of Field Missions getting approvals from Central Management was found to be appropriate.

6.2 Exchange of information, including feedback

Whatever the analysis of the programme design, the fact that each Placement Mission places candidates from a number of Recruitment Missions and each Recruitment Mission deals with even more Placement Missions requires — for the sake of efficiency — a certain uniformity in process and documentation. It would,

for example, be inefficient for each Placement Mission to have its own forms and processes, which each Recruitment Mission must then keep track of.

Missions can, and do, adapt themselves to the local situation. For example, the Placement Missions visited had for the most part given up on developing job offers for the Recruitment Missions to fill. Overall, the rate of success had been so low that these Missions considered that it was not a productive use of their time. In Ethiopia, only two of the 33 returnees had been recruited to fill positions developed by the Placement Mission. The others either were placed in positions after having been recruited for the priority sector, or had identified their own positions. At the same time Placement Missions did update the priority sectors so that candidates were placed in those sectors in accordance with programme requirements, although there was some question about how uniformly this was done. The UK Mission had some priority sectors from 1995 listed as current.

In order to sustain a reasonable flow of communication between Missions, common processes and forms must be utilized, while the processes used by each Mission within the country in which it operates can be much more flexible. This is generally what is happening in the programme, where the exchange of information between Missions is highly structured. The forms that are generally assessed by the project managers more positively are those that give information on individual cases, and those assessed less positively are those reporting to programme management.

For the workshop held in Mombasa in April 1998, project managers from participating Missions were asked to rate the value of the various forms used within the programme. A summary of these assessments is attached as **Annex XVI**. It should be noted that one of the eight Placement Missions (Guinea-Bissau) and three of the four Recruitment Missions (Portugal, South Africa, and the United States) were not present at this workshop for various reasons, including newly-recruited staff members and expected end of involvement of the Mission in the programme. Of the eight Missions present, five provided the written feedback requested on the utility of the forms. A concrete outcome of the discussion among all project managers present was that nearly all of the forms had to be maintained in order to support the programme as designed. This group of managers identified only one form for elimination, after commenting negatively on these time-consuming reporting requirements.

Of course, this is all in the context of two things: accepting the existing programme design, which calls for it to be centrally managed; and the lack of an accessible common database. As mentioned earlier, the programme design is not a focus of the evaluation, and the use of the database will be discussed later.

Although the process of approval was not found to be burdensome, there are some questions about the extent to which feedback and guidance was given to Missions, for example, on the submission of monthly reports. Central Management certainly monitored the performance of the Missions as to the submission of reports (see

Annex V cited earlier), but there was less evidence of feedback to the Missions on their reports during the period under consideration. Much of this was stated to be due to other Central Management priorities during the time covered by the reports studied, particularly the move to Nairobi, preparation for the evaluation workshop, and departure of a key staff member.

However, some of this was reportedly due to the Missions requiring much less in the way of guidance and feedback. This was not borne out by the analysis of indicators in Section 4, where it was clear that the Missions could have used much more feedback on how to establish indicators. The lack of plans from two offices, and the very uneven quality of the reports raise the question of the seriousness with which they were taken.

In addition, it was observed that the monthly reporting on recruitment, selection and placement appeared to be a useful tracking tool. However, reporting on less concrete indicators, such as programme significance, institution building and liaison, where there was less to report on a monthly basis, led to forms with blanks or where the same texts were repeated from month to month. Reporting at this level might have been more usefully done at longer intervals.

Conclusion: Given the structure of the programme, and in the absence of a commonly-shared database, the organized sharing of information on cases among the offices involved through exchange of forms is an appropriate way for the programme to be managed. Reporting to Central Management on programme progress was of varying value.

One problem is the lack of financial information shared by Central Management with the Missions. Financial information, particularly the status of NIP funds, was kept rather closely by Central Management, and Missions had generally not been able to advise local interlocutors of the status of those funds. This continued to be true during this evaluation, even though the lack of such information was noted as problematic in the mid-term evaluation carried out in 1997 (draft evaluation report, page 35, point 4.2.6).

Lessons Learned: for programmes where local government and donor representatives have an interest in the financial status of a programme reports on that status should be regularly shared with all Missions involved.

6.3 Staff Development and Training

During the implementation of phase III of the RQAN programme, there have been a number of formal training activities, workshops, etc.:

- Preparation for Phase III implementation – Harare, December 1994
- Institution-building workshop – Lisbon, March 1996
- Promotion and recruiting workshop – Geneva, July 1996

- RAF Management workshop – Cairo, May 1997 (partially charged to RQAN programme)
- Evaluation Workshop – Mombasa, Kenya, April 1998

For only one of the first four workshops are some limited records available from Central Management, but no detailed reports or minutes. As of September 1999, no report on the April 1998 Workshop was available, although a draft was provided in August 1999.

A problem in relying heavily on this workshop approach is related to the turnover of staff. For example, in the case of indicators, problems with which were mentioned earlier, training was provided on this at the workshop held in Lisbon in 1996. However, assuming that the report of the meeting was addressed to the attendees (no list of attendees was available), only 4 of the 11 trained at the meeting were still working in the programme at the time of the evaluation.

Given the length of the programme and the number of offices covered, it is inevitable that there would be staffing changes and other difficulties. This has not been observed to create major problems, although there is no evidence that this has been considered in the overall design of the project, but rather as part of normal, ongoing management. In some instances of staff changes, there has been overlap provided, in others continuity has been provided by the Chief of Mission, who has overall responsibility. This has not always worked, for example in the case of the Recruitment Mission in Washington, where there was a gap of two months in 1998 between the departure of the experienced local project manager and the arrival of the new one, which certainly had an effect on the recruitment process, as evidenced in Table 1. Because of this gap and resulting lack of overlap between the two, the new project manager was sent to the Recruitment Mission in London for one week of training in July of that year.

Conclusion: Central Management has paid careful attention to training and staff development. However, given the long duration of the programme, and associated staff turnover, follow-up to ensure that the results of that training was passed on to successors needs to form part of on-going management.

6.4 Field visits

Central Management staff made a number of missions to field offices. For the sake of giving a complete picture, visits made by the backstopper are included as well. Visits by the backstopper to Geneva Headquarters and by Central Management staff to the EC are not included in the table, although both were numerous. Details of Central Management staff trips were taken from records kept by Headquarters unit that is not part of the programme, and only start from the beginning of 1998, when Central Management moved to Nairobi. There have been no trips made by Central Management staff from Nairobi since 1998.

Table 8: Visits to Field Missions by Central Management and Backstopper

Mission	Visits by Central Management [*]	Visits by Backstopper
Placement Missions		
Angola		
Cape Verde		Sep 1996
Ethiopia		Apr 1996
Ghana		
Guinea-Bissau		
Kenya	Nov 1995(2)	Apr 1996
Mozambique	Jan 1996 , Oct 1996	Jan 1996**
Sierra Leone		
Uganda	Nov 1995, Oct 1996	Apr 1996
Zambia	Nov 1995, Jan 1996**	Jan 1996**
Zimbabwe	Nov 1995, Jan 1996**	Jan 1996**
Recruitment Missions		
Belgium	Jul 1996	
Germany		
Great Britain	Nov 1995, Dec 1996	Feb 1996
Portugal	Mar 1996	Sep 1996, Apr 1998
South Africa		
United States	Apr 1997	

Such visits are unevenly spread, both over the duration of the programme and the geographical coverage of the offices. While it is understandable that there should be a concentration of travel at the beginning of the programme, that there should have been no visits to Placement Missions by either Central Management or the backstopper from the Fall of 1996 through June 1998 is a definite gap. There were at least some Placement Missions that were having difficulty attaining their objectives during that period.

The Technical Cooperation Agreement states (Annex 1A. 4.3.b) that “technical and managerial backstopping monitoring will be carried out at IOM Headquarters and in selected groups of target countries on a 7-8 months interval basis. Backstopping monitoring will be carried out jointly by an external expert and IOM project personnel in the receiving countries who will assess available data and the results of the sample surveys.” A gap from October 1996 through June 1998 obviously does not meet this criteria.

It should be noted that, during the period mentioned there were two workshops held that involved the programme. One was in Egypt in 1997, but did not appear to be programme-specific, as it was a management workshop for managers of all projects in Africa (list of attendees not available). The other, an evaluation workshop in

^{*} Lupoli, El Nour, McMahon

^{**} Joint visit by backstopper and Central Management

Mombasa, Kenya, in April 1998 was quite programme-specific, and was attended by most Missions where the programme was active at that time.

For the only full year during this period where no visits to Placement Missions were made, the lack of funding was apparently not a problem, as only 91% of the overall budget for staff and office costs was spent, leaving some USD 70,000.

Conclusion: Backstopping monitoring visits to field missions were heavily weighted towards the beginning of the project in 1996, and were almost non-existent in 1997 and 1998. This was not in accordance with the requirements of the project document.

6.5 Information exchange

6.5.1 Database/computer software

RQAN was designed to be supported by a database, which would be shared by all Missions, and through which Missions would be able to access data. The database was further intended to support the process of matching candidates and job offers. It has not fulfilled any of those functions.

Instead, the process, which was conceived of as in large part occurring electronically, happens on paper. Extensive paper files are kept in all Missions visited, and duplicated at Central Management. It is assumed that a similar situation is in existence at all other Missions as well, as there is currently no other way of tracking cases. This cannot be considered to be efficient use of resources. Substantial duplication of effort has resulted, both in the mechanics of dealing with paper files, and in keeping track of statistics.

While it can be understood why the computerized database is not used as designed, in large part because of the difficulties in electronic communication between many locations, it is less understandable why these problems could not have been foreseen during the design phase. Certainly the difficulties in managing a shared database could have been known to the Organization, and the locations of the various offices and the problems in communication could have been anticipated.

Even being used as it is, as a stand-alone database, there are significant problems. One of these is the major lack of flexibility in the use of the information. It is nearly impossible to get the programme to do anything that was not foreseen in the beginning, particularly to produce any reports other than the standard ones. While in theory there is a query function that should be able to overcome some of the limitations, this function was never linked to the database and would necessitate a certain amount of re-programming. The only way found around this limitation that has served the purposes of the evaluation was to define what data was of interest

and request that this data be transferred to a spreadsheet from which it could be more easily and flexibly analyzed.

Another disturbing factor is the number of data entry errors encountered in the database. While the evaluator did not cross-check the database with the paper files at random, a large number of errors were uncovered in the course of the analysis. It is impossible to determine precisely how these might have come about, but it is clear that there is a lack of verification of data on entry.

Because Missions lack access to the database they naturally resort to keeping their own records, according to the needs of their office. Such records, generally created in a computer, either as a spreadsheet or word processing document, are not verified with the centrally-maintained database, with resulting problems. In both Zambia and Ethiopia, two of the three Placement Missions visited, the local office and the Central Management had different numbers of returns. It is true that there was only a difference of one in each case, but as there were only about 30 returns to each country, verification should not be a time-consuming process.

In Zambia, one of the returnees listed in the database as having returned to Zambia had actually returned to Zimbabwe. In Ethiopia a case who had actually returned in March 1997, and whose costs had presumably long been paid for, was listed in the database as not having returned yet. This last case certainly would call into question the accuracy of any reporting of average costs. Although Central Management does send Missions reports asking that they verify numbers of returns, in the two cases listed above this did not result in correct figures, even though the caseloads are relatively small so that checking would, for the Placement Missions, be a relatively easy task. It has not been determined why these two discrepancies were not corrected. The data on number of returns for the third country visited, Zimbabwe, matched.

In preparing for a modest analysis of the time that elapsed between candidate approval and travel for the Zambian caseload, some discrepancies were noted in 8 cases (of a total caseload of 26 returned). Central Management was asked to investigate the discrepancies, which were either missing dates, or dates that did not correspond to the expected order, i.e., approved, matched, departed. One of the cases was found to be in order, as no match date is entered for self-employed cases. One of the cases was found to be in the wrong caseload, as it was a return to Zimbabwe, not to Zambia. Of the 22 dates that were expected to have been entered for these 8 cases (3 dates for most), one date was missing and 7 were entered incorrectly. While this was not a randomly selected sample, it may be indicative of problems with the accuracy of the database in that 7 cases (27%) of the Zambian caseload had at least one data entry error. In addition, of the 22 dates that were expected for these 8 cases, 36% were missing or wrong.

In addition to the data entry errors uncovered, there was a conceptual flaw as well in that one case was confirmed through a check of the paper files to have a match

date before the approval date, which according to the logic of the programme should not happen. It would have seemed worthwhile to have included a certain number of logical checks in the database, so that these errors could have been reduced, e.g., that the match date cannot be before the approve date.

For the larger database (424, not including the Zambian cases mentioned above), there were questions raised in 56 cases where the expected order of dates either did not occur, or dates were missing (**Annex XVII**). Of these 56, all dates were verified in 11 cases, which means that the dates were entered correctly, although for various reasons they did not occur in the expected order. This means that 45 cases or 10% of the caseload had data entry errors in one of these three date fields.

Conclusion: The database is not being used as designed, is not sufficiently flexible to meet changing needs, and contains levels of errors that are not acceptable.

There is another related problem. There is no systematic way for the Placement Mission to advise Central Management of the sector in which the case is taking up employment. The relevant piece of data in the database is in fact the intended sector of employment, not the actual. This leads to discrepancies in classification, as Central Management must guess in which sector the case will actually be working. As an example, for Zimbabwe, a comparison of the database and the June monthly report from the Mission shows the same number of returns; 57. However, the breakdown into sector is quite different:

Table 9: Sectoral Breakdown for Zimbabwe Caseload

Sector	Central Management	Mission report
Private	19	30
Public	33	27
Independent	4	0
Not classified	1	0
Total	57	57

Even if one assumes that the independent (self-employed) cases are in the private sector, the numbers are not particularly close, and could certainly raise questions about the data, where it comes from, and for what purpose it is used. The monthly reports for Zambia and Ethiopia did not give a breakdown between the sectors, but data collected in Ethiopia also indicates that this is a problem, with numbers for private and public sector not matching.

There is another difficulty with the way in which IOM tracks, reconciles, and reports financial data on individual cases. At the time that a case departs from the country of recruitment, Central Management enters in the database the amount of assistance that has been provided – the total assistance package. This is the

amount that is used by them in reporting, and for the cases that had travelled at the time of the evaluation, the database showed an average assistance package of USD 8,962. For the same time period, IOM accounting records showed an average of USD 8,822 *per capita*, a difference of USD 140 per case, or approximately USD 63,000 overall.

While there are certainly good reasons for this, prime among them the fact that, although reintegration assistance is agreed to in the overall package referred to earlier, it is only paid out in the country of destination and frequently over a period of time. IOM's system is such that offices in countries do not raise an obligation for the total to be paid in their accounts, but rather record it when it is paid out. However, it is generally recorded in such a way that there is no means for Central Management to link the expense with an individual case, leading to reconciliation problems between the accounts and the database.

Changing IOM's system of field accounts to ensure that obligations are raised and accounted for just for this programme is not necessary, as there is a relatively painless way for more information to be put in the accounts that would promote the reconciliation. This would be to include the proflight number, a unique identifier, in the particular accounting entry. This is already being done in some offices, but not all.

Conclusion: Some data, e.g. sector of employment and financial data on individual cases, that would be useful for the programme is not being collected in the most effective way.

Lesson learned: When a software programme is being designed by IOM for the needs of a specific project, there should be a careful balance between the specifics of the project as foreseen in the initial stages, and the flexibility that is likely to be required due to changes in the project as it goes along. This is particularly true when projects are carried out over a long period of time. Logical checks on data should be included.

7. ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS

The scope of the evaluation was intentionally limited, given the size and history of the programme and the finite resources that could be assigned to the evaluation.

Nonetheless, there were certain things that recurred during the course of the evaluation that, although falling outside of the Terms of Reference, merit observation.

7.1 Contribution of governments to the programme

The mid-term external evaluation noted that it did not seem to be very likely that the programme would be taken over by governments when RQAN ended, citing complexity of procedures and funding. Certainly there was no evidence that there would be any continuation of the programme by the governments involved, although in London the Public Service Commission of Ghana was reported to be more actively involved in recruiting. In general, there is a distinct lack of 'ownership' on the part of the governments of the countries of return, not in the sense of the lack of awareness and participation, but the lack of any sort of drive to move forward and push the programme.

The difficulty in carrying on with the programme that government representatives most often mentioned was that they would be absolutely unable to match the benefits offered under the programme. A logical corollary of this was that there was no point in worrying too much about the continuation as it would in any event be impossible.

On an on-going basis, governments contribute little of a concrete nature to the programme. The major part of what they do 'contribute', their NIP, they have little control over, which is not the case for other EU-funded programmes. The National Authorizing Officer (NAO) is not required to sign off on programme disbursements, nor is the local EU programme officer. In fact, as mentioned elsewhere in this report, the Placement Missions do not even have the information that would allow them to advise either the NAO or EU officer of the status of the NIP funds. This certainly does not encourage 'ownership'.

On the other hand, all governments had the possibility to provide air tickets for expatriates who were recruited to take up jobs in the country. Government representatives state that they are interested in the return of their own nationals, for all of the reasons that the programme cites as benefits. Would it not be possible for the government to contribute the cost of the return ticket? When questioned, those representatives stated that, due to existing regulations it would be difficult for only certain returning citizens to be provided with air tickets and not others. However, this subject was not discussed exhaustively with any of the governments, so other possibilities may well exist. It would also seem possible that private companies could be asked to do the same, as a small — and one-time — contribution to the return of an employee.

If a similar programme is attempted, there will need to be greater government involvement both in its design and in their contributions to it. IOM's role in any future programme may well be more one of coordinating various inputs and less of direct project execution.

Recommendation: Should IOM consider developing a further programme, substantially greater ownership should be sought from the other partners

through requiring on-going concrete contributions, such as the provision of airline tickets.

7.2 Gender

Neither the Technical Cooperation Agreement nor the IOM project proposal makes any mention of gender issues, nor was there evidence that gender considerations formed any part of the day-to-day activities of the programme. Although not explicitly stated in the programme, there is a way in which gender issues may be addressed: the assistance package is always an individualized one, resulting from a certain amount of negotiation between IOM and the returnee. This provides an opportunity for the special needs of all returnees to be considered, including those of women returning.

In the programme, 23% of the returnees were women (see **Annex XVIII**), compared with 31% under Phase I and 20% under Phase II.

7.3 Relationship between success and overall situation in the country of return

Looking at the various target countries in which the programme operated, or attempted to, the vast differences in outcome — particularly as regards the number of returns — did not seem to be fully related to the effort made or funds expended. For example, the enormous disparity between the situations in Guinea-Bissau and Zambia cannot be ascribed solely to the efforts of IOM. In Guinea-Bissau, some USD 45,000 in staff and office costs was spent in 1995-1998 to move 58 persons. In Zambia, the comparable figures were USD 315,000 for 33 returns. Even recognizing that the staff costs assumed by the office in Zambia were considerable, these costs were for an experienced staff person who had successfully run the programme in another country. It was also clear from the evaluation visit that strenuous efforts were being made to make the programme work (**Annex VIII - Zambia**).

One potential way to account for this difference is to compare the general situation in the countries. The RQAN programme has never claimed to play a major part in the returnee's decision to go back, but rather a means of making possible for the returnee to carry out that decision, presumably made for other reasons. It is thus logical to examine whether there are measures of the overall situation in a country that are associated with success at meeting return targets for individual countries.

Such measures could thus potentially be useful in making assessments of which countries are likely to be relatively more successful in carrying out such programmes. Unfortunately, research did not reveal any measures that were particularly associated with outcome. (Some of the results of that research are attached as **Annex XIX**.)

Conclusion: It is clear that the factors prompting a decision to return are outside the control of the programme itself. If those factors can be more closely defined or quantified it may be possible to modify the programme to account for them. The programme could, for example, reduce the assistance package in countries where there is a higher likelihood that qualified nationals will return and increase it in countries where additional incentives may help. Such measures may lead to not implementing the programme where chances of return are low, or as a further basis for adjusting numerical targets.

Lesson learned: The more that IOM knows about the factors that prompt the actual decision to return — which return programmes are designed to enable the returnee to carry out — the greater the likelihood that programmes can be more closely targeted to the situation of individual countries and thus increase their success.

8. CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND LESSONS LEARNED

8.1 Conclusions

1. The meaning and use of indicators is not well-understood within the programme, with the possible exception of objectives which were in any event of a more quantifiable nature, e.g., number of departures, number of candidate files, etc. While training had been provided to local project managers at a workshop in Lisbon in March of 1996, follow-up was obviously needed.
2. Indicators established at the Mission level to measure progress against overall programme goals are of limited use. However, taken as a whole, and understanding that the actual goals themselves must be found elsewhere, a very general assessment can be made about the programme's four specific objectives as found in the Technical Cooperation Agreement (Annex 1A, point 2.3). Of 631 placements expected by the end of the project, Central Management reported that 443 had been achieved, or 70%. Given that the project has been extended by one year, it can be assessed that it will take significant effort for the projected level of placements to be met. The development and use of priority sectors supports that the specific objective of placement in meaningful positions is being met. This objective and the integration component are more directly assessed in the impact survey report. It cannot be said that much progress has been made towards strengthening countries' institutional framework, and overall is not likely to be achieved.
3. The current system of follow-up at 12 and 24-months does not produce fully satisfactory results, and moreover is not fully reflective of the efforts made by Placement Missions in conducting follow-up.

4. Each office has made an assessment as to whether or not the development of an association would be useful in promoting reintegration locally. This is in line with the recommendation of the mid-term evaluation that the programme be adapted to local conditions. There is no evidence of any of these recently-formed associations having an impact.
5. Programme benefits are likely to be sustained to the extent that those returned under the programme remain employed in the country in priority sectors. Governments will not be able to sustain programme activities.
6. One can make some rough assessment about this limited measure of cost-effectiveness based on the above table, such as the offices in Zimbabwe and Portugal were relatively more efficient in the use of programme resources than those in Mozambique and Zambia. However, due to lack of a good method of comparing general costs of operating in various countries, this comparison must not be made into something more than it is, and should not, for example, be used to strictly rank offices from most cost-effective to least.
7. RQAN is operating within the overall budget foreseen, partially by supplementing from resources other than the EU. As budget revisions at the Mission level are not being consistently recorded, an analysis of Mission performance against budget is less useful.
8. Although there may be other means to the same end sought by the RQAN programme — that is return of qualified expatriates — it is unlikely that either private sector recruitment or recruitment by the government alone could substitute for RQAN.
9. The process of Field Missions getting approvals from Central Management was found to be appropriate.
10. Given the structure of the programme, and in the absence of a commonly-shared database, the organized sharing of information on cases among the offices involved through exchange of forms is an appropriate way for the programme to be managed. Reporting to Central Management on programme progress was of varying value.
11. Central Management has paid careful attention to training and staff development. However, given the long duration of the programme, and associated staff turnover, follow-up to ensure that the results of that training was passed on to successors needs to form part of on-going management.
12. Backstopping monitoring visits to field missions were heavily weighted towards the beginning of the project in 1996, and were almost non-existent in 1997 and 1998. This was not in accordance with the requirements of the project document.

13. The database is not being used as designed, is not sufficiently flexible to meet changing needs, and contains levels of errors that are not acceptable.
14. Some data, e.g. sector of employment and financial data on individual cases, that would be useful for the programme is not being collected in the most effective way.
15. It is clear that the factors prompting a decision to return are outside the control of the programme itself. If those factors can be more closely defined or quantified it may be possible to modify the programme to account for them. The programme could, for example, reduce the assistance package in countries where there is a higher likelihood that qualified nationals will return and increase it in countries where additional incentives may help. Such measures may lead to not implementing the programme where chances of return are low, or as a further basis for adjusting numerical targets.

8.2 Recommendations

1. Taking into account the relatively low usage of the 12- and 24- month follow-up forms and the wide variation in success in follow-up, reintegration should be assessed through direct contact with the returnee (by phone or in person rather than by mailing the form).
2. Should IOM consider developing a further programme, substantially greater ownership should be sought from the other partners through requiring on-going concrete contributions, such as the provision of airline tickets.

8.3 Lessons Learned

1. Before considering whether a programme should support an IOM office in a country, the possibilities for success should be thoroughly analyzed, and necessary corrective action to adjust activities should be taken in a timely manner.
2. Budgets for Missions should be consistently prepared and revised and reflected in the usual IOM financial records. Not only will this help in current internal communication, but it will also serve later as a clear record of what was done.
3. For programmes where local government and donor representatives have an interest in the financial status of a programme, reports on that status should be regularly shared with all Missions involved.
4. When a software programme is being designed by IOM for the needs of a specific project, there should be a careful balance between the specifics of the project as foreseen in the initial stages, and the flexibility that is likely to be

required due to changes in the project as it goes along. This is particularly true when projects are carried out over a long period of time. Logical checks on data should be included.

5. The more that IOM knows about the factors that prompt the actual decision to return — which return programmes are designed to enable the returnee to carry out — the greater the likelihood that programmes can be more closely targeted to the situation of individual countries and thus increase their success.

Terms of Reference for the Evaluation of Phase III of the Programme for the Return of Qualified African Nationals

1. Overall

To evaluate IOM's Return of Qualified African Nationals (RQAN) programme in light of its overall objectives, describing and assessing its main features.

2. Specific Objectives

2.1 To assess the programme's productivity and output against established indicators at the mission level.

2.2 To assess the cost-effectiveness (costs against outputs) of the programme at the mission level.

2.3 To evaluate the programme's impact at the level of the workplace.

2.4 To assess the effectiveness of the programme's Central Management strategies and techniques.

3. Activities to be undertaken

3.1 Review of documentation

3.11 Programme documentation

3.111 IOM internal reports

3.112 Correspondence with the programme sponsor

3.113 Correspondence with the programme's backstopper

3.12 Financial documentation

3.13 Statistical information from programme database

3.2 Survey of employers

3.21 Definition of population to be surveyed

3.22 Development of survey implement

3.23 Provision of instructions for carrying out survey by programme staff

3.24 Data entry and analysis

3.3 Interviews with programme and other IOM staff

3.31 Country level – IOM programme officers, plus other staff involved in the programmes

3.32 Central programme management

3.4 Interviews with a selection of people external to IOM.

- 3.31 Government counterparts
- 3.32 Programme beneficiaries – both returnees and government officials being trained
- 3.33 Representatives of the donor
- 3.34 Support groups, or the equivalent, if existing

3.5 Analysis of information obtained

4. Resources

4.1 EVA

- 4.11 Time of evaluator and support staff, as needed
- 4.12 Half of the budget for the evaluation, up to \$5,000

4.2 RQAN CM

- 4.31 Access to staff and programme records
- 4.32 Logistics assistance for field visit
- 4.33 Half of evaluation budget, up to \$5,000

4.3 Country Missions

- 4.31 Assistance in setting up meetings, particularly those external to IOM
- 4.32 Access to programme staff and records
- 4.33 Logistics assistance for visits, including for travel, lodging, communication
- 4.24 Any interpretation assistance needed for external visits
- 4.25 Completion of employer surveys

5. Output

A draft report will be produced within one month of either the end of field travel, or the completion of the survey, whichever comes last, covering the elements contained in the terms of reference.

A. Guide for interviews with employers and returnees

Introduction

Doing internal evaluation - getting information on programme to determine how it is doing and see if any improvements could be made

List of 8 questions to which I would ask your frank and open response

Results of this interview will be kept confidential

- 1) Could you please briefly describe how you came to know about the programme ?
When was this ?
- 2) Why did you decide to use the programme ?
- 3) From your experience, what was it about the programme that worked best for you ?
- 4) On the other hand, what was it about the programme, or parts of it, that could have worked better ?
Any suggestions as to how the programme might be improved ?
- 5) If this programme did not exist, what alternatives would you have found ?
- 6) How would you assess the efficiency of the programme, for example in its responsiveness to changes in your needs
its management
providing clear and useful information
time elapsed from start to finish
- 7) What do you think is the primary contribution of the RQAN programme to the country ?
How important is it ?
Are development funds well spent on this ?
- 8) Would you be willing to take part in a survey (fill out questionnaire) on this programme ?

B. Guide for interviews with institutional partners

Introduction

Doing internal evaluation - getting information on programme to determine how it is doing and see if any improvements could be made

List of 9 questions to which I would ask your frank and open response

Results of this interview will be kept confidential

- 1) Could you please briefly describe your connection with the programme ?
How became involved ?
How long ?
- 2) Through that connection, what have you observed about how the programme works that has gone/is going well ?
- 3) On the other hand, what have you seen that may indicate that the programme, or parts of it, do not work so well ?

- 4) Over the time that you have been involved with the programme, have you seen any changes in it?
responsiveness to changes in environment?
- 5) How would you assess the efficiency of the programme, for example its
management
delivery of services
clarity and usefulness of the information provided, etc ?
- 6) What improvements might you suggest in the programme ?
- 7) What do you think is the primary contribution of the RQAN programme to the country ?
How important is it ?
Are development funds well spent on this ?
- 8) If this programme did not exist, what alternatives could be found?
More or less effective ?
More or less costly ?
Other advantages/disadvantages ?
What would be the consequences of discontinuing it ?
- 9) Would you be willing to take part in a survey (fill out questionnaire) on this programme ?

RQAN OPERATIONAL PLAN : JANUARY to JUNE 1998
A. Programme Significance ()
A.1 Objectives -

- To establish and maintain a significant place in the country's human resource development efforts by focusing on meeting its priority manpower needs
- To complement the country's other manpower development programmes

A.2 Activity Indicators of Achievement

(! Please note : the numbering of activity indicators of achievement does not necessarily reflect the importance / hierarchy of the respective activity !)

1. Assessment of priority sector's relevance and consistency for Zimbabwe's national manpower and human resources development programmes
2. Identification of and liaison with national and international actors implementing manpower and human resources development programmes
3. Collection and analysis of information on Zimbabwe's economic and manpower conditions, plans and trends likely to influence RQAN programme prospects and/or output

A.3 Resources

	%	USD
Staff Time	5	
Operational Cost		0.00

A.4 Operational Activities
Activity
Time-Frame

1. Analyse the national labour market through newspaper advertisements and employers' feedback in order to assess priority sectors and control demand-driven approach monthly
2. Liaise with national and international actors implementing human resources development and manpower programmes and establish complementary linkages with RQAN efforts if applicable
3. Record and up-date expatriate work permit statistics, public sector establishment records, manpower planning reports, economic impact of structural adjustment programmes if available

B. Promotion and Recruitment ()***B.1 Objective -***

- To develop and apply promotional measures that most effectively and cost-effectively attract suitable candidates and employers to using the programme's services

B.2 Activity Indicators of Achievement

1. RQAN and IOM promotion through publications in various media
2. Improvement of RQAN and IOM notoriety through participation in various events and establishment of contact network
3. Contacts with African Embassies and High Commissions in Harare in order to raise awareness of RQAN benefits under the intra-regional or non-target country component
4. Provision of updated RQAN information to Zimbabwean Embassies and High Commissions through Government counterpart network
5. Maintenance of candidate roster and utilization of CARF

B.3 Resources

	%	USD
Staff Time	15	
Operational Cost		0.00

B.4 Operational Activities-**Activity****Time-Frame**

1. Implement and monitor RQAN/IOM press and media relations (interviews, articles, reports, etc.) bi-monthly
- 2A. Attend conferences, professional exhibitions, diplomatic corps meetings if applicable
- 2B. Contact professional associations and bodies covering actual priority sectors if applicable
- 2C. Contact potential public and private sector employers interested in benefiting from RQAN services if applicable
3. Promote RQAN benefits with Harare-based African Embassies and High Commissions in view of recruitment of intra-regional candidates bi-monthly
4. Forward up-dated RQAN information to Zimbabwean missions abroad to be determined
5. Maintain candidate roster by deleting or adding candidates and utilize the candidate approval and rating form (CARF) monthly

C. Selection and Departure ()***C.1 Objective -***

- To recruit and select African nationals who a) possess knowledge and skills that are in scarce supply in the recipient country, b) wish to return to Africa on a long-term basis, c) require programme assistance in order to be willing and/or able to effect a timely return, and d) have a relatively high probability of placement within the programme's time-frame

C.2 Activity Indicators of Achievement

1. Selection of intra-regional candidates
2. Provision of information to regular candidates
3. Pre-Assessment of Business Plans submitted by prospective self-employment candidates
4. Liaison and cooperation with EMPRETEC in implementation of SE component
5. Pre-Departure preparation of future returnees

C.3 Resources

	%	USD
Staff Time	5	
Operational Cost		0.00

C.4 Operational Activities-**Activity****Time-Frame**

- | | |
|--|------------------|
| 1. Provide information to, select and process intra-regional candidates | monthly |
| 2. Provide information to regular candidates | monthly |
| 3. Assess Business Plans from prospective SE candidates | if applicable |
| 4. Maintain regular contacts with EMPRETEC | bi-monthly |
| 5A. Provide information from future employers to RM in the process of returnee's pre-departure preparation | if applicable |
| 5B. Re-edit and improve Zimbabwe Country Info Sheet | to be determined |

D. Placement and Return ()***D.1 Objective -***

- To place appropriately trained and experienced African nationals in employment a) for which locally available people are in scarce supply, and b) in which they have an opportunity to make a contribution
- To assist African nationals with the appropriate background and necessary resources to establish self-employment

D.2 Activity Indicators of Achievement

1. Return of 12 candidates to private sector - public sector employment
2. Return of 2 self-employed candidates
3. Job-Brokering activities

D.3 Resources

	%	USD
Staff Time	15	
Operational Cost		0.00

D.4 Operational Activities-**Activity****Time-Frame**

- | | |
|--|----------------|
| 1. Place 2 candidates in private or public sector positions | monthly |
| 2. Place 1 SE candidate | every 3 months |
| 3A. Identify suitable job vacancies and transfer relevant information to RM through EOARF | if applicable |
| 3B. Apply on behalf of candidates for positions with potential private and public sector employers (spontaneous applications or reply to an advertisement) | monthly |
| 3C. Implement and monitor the reminder system | monthly |
| 3D. Submit job offer forms (JOF) to employers and RM | if applicable |
| 3E. Implement RQAN interview procedure | if applicable |

E. Follow-Up and Reintegration Support ()***E.1 Objectives -***

- To track returnees' personal and professional reintegration; and assess their progress as individuals and as a group

- To respond as appropriate to returnees' needs for support and assistance with their reintegration

E.2 Activity Indicators of Achievement

1. Individualized contact with returnees at least every 3 months (first year returnees) or 6 months (after first year)
2. Mission level survey : follow-up statistics (follow-up questionnaires, score sheets, summary sheets)
3. RQAN returnees establish association designed to contribute directly or as SG adviser to reintegration process of returnees
4. Provision of assistance to returnees

E.3 Resources

	%	USD
Staff Time	10	
Operational Cost		0.00

E.4 Operational Activities-

Activity

Time-Frame

1. Contact returnees by phone or personal meeting and enquire about personal and professional situation, concerns, needs monthly
- 2A. Distribute and analyse follow-up questionnaires returned by returnees 12 and 24 months if applicable
- 2B. Report follow-up score sheets and summary sheets to RQAN June 1998
CM
3. Provide assistance to returnees in establishment of association to be determined
4. Provide assistance to returnees in case of specific requests (counselling on training facilities, facilitating bureaucratic procedures, helping to establish contacts, etc.) monthly

F. Monitoring and Evaluation ()

F.1 Objectives -

- To monitor and assess the programme's performance and output at country- and programme-levels
- To evaluate the programme's impact at the workplace level

F.2 Activity Indicators of Achievement

1. Assessment of placement status against indicative target for candidate placement
2. Assessment of placement status against optimal distribution ratios
3. Monitoring of programme output through Activity Indicators Checklist and Monthly Report

F.3 Resources

	%	USD
Staff Time	5	
Operational Cost		0.00

F.4 Operational Activities-**Activity****Time-Frame**

1. Assess number of actual returnees, matched and approved candidates monthly
2. Assess optimal distribution ratios (priority sectors, public-private sector, IOM match-pre matched, gender distribution ratio, etc.) monthly
3. Monitor missions output and performance through utilization of Activity Indicators Checklist and Monthly Report monthly

G. Institution-Building ()**G.1 Objectives -**

- To provide target country governments with the opportunity to learn, apply and institutionalise programme principles and techniques
- To involve key persons who hold responsibility for manpower development and/or utilisation in working to strengthen institutional capacities to promote the voluntary return of nationals from abroad

G.2 Activity Indicators of Achievement

1. Counterpart Training in view of institutionalization of RQAN principles at counterpart Ministry level
2. Support Group Meeting to be reviewed and transformed into a smaller, more efficient, interested and pro-active structure
3. Sustainability efforts to be redesigned towards concrete and efficient input to extension of RQAN life-span

G.3 Resources

	%	USD
Staff Time	15	
Operational Cost		400

G.4 Operational Activities-**Activity****Time-Frame**

- | | |
|---|------------------|
| 1A. Invite Government counterpart(s) to regularly participate in RQAN planning and implementation | monthly |
| 1B. Train counterpart institution staff in programme techniques | bi-monthly |
| 2. Re-organise Support Group Meeting | February 1998 |
| 3. Re-organise Sustainability Meetings | to be determined |

H. Liaison Relations ()**H.1 Objective -**

- To solicit and encourage maximum support from recipient country governments and European Union delegations for the programme's objectives and activities

H.2 Activity Indicators of Achievement

1. Information of Government and EU officials on RQAN implementation, development and statistics
2. Assessment of the Government's and the EU's support for RQAN and interest to extend / renew the programme
3. Government of Zimbabwe formally approaches the EU or other potential donors to solicit extension of RQAN phase III or renewal under phase IV - Pledge given by EU and/or donors

H.3 Resources

	%	USD
Staff Time	10	
Operational Cost		100

H.4 Operational Activities-**Activity****Time-Frame**

- | | |
|--|------------|
| 1. Share RQAN Monthly Report with Government and EU officials | monthly |
| 2A. Meet with Government counterpart in the Ministry of Labour | bi-monthly |

2B. Meet with representatives of other RQAN-relevant key Government institutions bi-monthly

2C. Meet with representative of EU delegation bi-monthly

3A. Discuss with counterparts and NAO in view of their approaching the EU in order to solicit RQAN extension to be determined

3B. Approach potential donors to solicit extension of RQAN to be determined

Summary IOM HARARE - RQAN III : January to June 1998

Activity	% - Time	USD - Cost
A - Programme Significance	:	5
B - Promotion & Recruitment	:	15
C - Selection & Departure	:	5
D - Placement & Return	:	15
E - Follow-Up & Reintegration Support	:	10
F - Monitoring & Evaluation	:	5
G - Institution Building	:	15
H - Liaison Relations	:	10
<u>TOTAL</u>	80*	500

(* the remainder of staff time is used for other activities as per terms of reference Head of Office - IOM Harare)

Date : 22 January 1998
IOM - Harare

Thomas Weiss

IOM HARARE

RQAN PHASE III - ZIMBABWE - MONTHLY REPORT JUNE 1998

A. Programme Significance ()

A.1 Expected Output -

Please refer to the RQAN Operational Plan 1st half 1998 for Zimbabwe.

A.2 Activities

Assessment of priority sectors

The u/m established priority sectors and critical manpower shortage areas are regularly confirmed by potential private and public sector employers, representatives of local manpower development programmes and government institutions as well as permanent job advertising campaigns in the national press.

Upon discussion with the Zimbabwe Surveyor General (Ministry of Lands and Agriculture), the priority sector of Architecture has been extended to also incorporate Land Surveying and Cartography. Although the UoZ is producing approximately 15 graduates per year in this discipline, the Department of the Surveyor General confirmed that specialist computer-literate experts and professionals are still in a critical need.

Public sector :

- * Health = medical doctors with all specialisations or general practitioners, dentists, nurses, physio- and occupational therapists (attention ! - non-national MDs can only be considered if they have substantial professional experience)
- * Education = teachers, lecturers, professors and associate professors in technical and non-technical disciplines for universities, polytechnics, teacher's training colleges, secondary schools
- * Agriculture = all specialisations

Private sector :

- * Mining = mining engineers, mining technicians, general geologists, economic geologists
- * Engineering = civil engineers, electrical engineers, mechanical engineers, information technology and computer scientists
- * Finance and Accounting = general accountants, financial officers, auditors, bank managers, business consultants, marketing specialists, NGO administrators and specialist fund-raisers
- * Agriculture = all specializations
- * Architecture, Land Surveying / Cartography = all specializations, especially experts conversant in high technology and computer-based programmes
- * Communication = external and internal communication managers, public relations officers
- * Industrial Development = all specializations in the technical as well as the R+D related fields

A.3 Actual Output

Planned activities have been undertaken partially during the present reporting period.

A.4 Analysis, Comment, Questions

With respect to the private / public sector placement ratio as well as the optimal distribution ratio and bearing in mind that the opening up and liberalisation of Zimbabwe's economy is creating an increasing need for qualified Zimbabwean experts and professionals in the private profit-making and non-profit-making sector, recruitment efforts for suitable RQAN candidates should be concentrated on persons returning towards private enterprises and their high demand volume-priority sectors (see RQAN Monthly Report April 1998) as well as self-employment.

➔ Considering the long-term tendency to diminish the presence of expatriates in Zimbabwe and the approaching end of RQAN phase III, RMs should try to continuously increase the numbers of selected and recruited Zimbabwean nationals for return to their home country in order to provide IOM Harare and its counterparts with valuable arguments in view of negotiations with the donor community regarding the extension and / or renewal of the programme.

B. Recruitment and Promotion ()

B.1 Expected Output

Please refer to the RQAN Operational Plan 1st half 1998 for Zimbabwe.

B.2 Activities

Other contacts

RQAN, and IOM in general, was promoted through personal contact with the following key persons :

Mr Landau - Secretary of the **Rotary International - Zimbabwe Branch**

Mr Kanafi - **Deputy Ambassador State of Israel Embassy - Zimbabwe**

Deputy Director of MASHAV - **Center of International Cooperation at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs - State of Israel**

Mr Manzou - **Desk Officer International Organizations - Zimbabwe Ministry of Foreign Affairs**

Mrs Audie Klotz - **Professor Political Sciences University of Chicago**

Mr Matanda - **Chairman of the Zimbabwe Agricultural and Rural Development Authority (ADA)**

Professor Chinyanga - **Deputy Director - University of Zimbabwe School of Medicine**

Candidate roster

The following candidates were added to our-data base and their completed CARF sent to the relevant RM :

- * Mrs Shingairai FERESU (ZIM) - ex USA - education-health / epidemiologist
- * Dr Marcus DAHN (LIB) - ex USA - education / lecturer
- * Dr Maria MUPANOMUNDA (ZIM) - ex USA - health / medical doctor

No candidate was deleted from our-data base

Promotion of RQAN benefits with African diplomatic missions in Harare

The following African Embassies and High Commissions resident in Harare have been contacted and informed about our return programme in order to raise awareness regarding RQAN benefits under the intra-regional and non-target country component :

- **Kenya** : follow-up visit / the HC has reiterated his strong interest in RQAN programme and promised to forward information to Kenyan residents in Zimbabwe, he was also requesting information material on migration issues in Africa which were provided

B.3 Actual Output

Planned activities have been accomplished partially during the present reporting period.

B.4 Analysis, Comment, Questions

N/A

C. Selection and Departure ()

C.1 Expected Output

Please refer to the RQAN Operational Plan 1st half 1998 for Zimbabwe.

C.2 Activities

Self-Employment candidates

The total number of returned SE candidates under RQAN phase III is of 3 persons. Several other already returned candidates have shared their strong interest in entering into SE, particularly several medical doctors desiring to enter into private practise upon completion of their supervision period of duty in public sector hospitals.

Regular SE returnees :

* Mr Saki MAFUNDIKWA (ZIM) - ex USA - engineering and education
=> has returned on 21 June 1998

Post-return SE candidates :

* Dr Wilson MANDERE (ZIM) - ex IND - returned as surgeon in 1995 to work with Harare Central Hospitals
=> has completed SE BP and financial forecast which were forwarded to EMPRETEC for appraisal under the post-return SE assistance component

* Dr Chiedza JOKONYA (ZIM) - ex NAM - returned as paediatrician in 1997 to work with Mutare Provincial Hospital
=> has been provided with new SE information package

Other SE

Lunch meeting with EMPRETEC counterpart, Mr Mukubvu (30 June) - various points of discussion :

* introductory visits to EMPRETEC by returnees = visits for Mr Mpfunya and Mr Mafundikwa have been arranged for July 98

* submission and discussion of new RQAN SE monitoring procedures =>

- new monitoring forms (which were established on base of documents initially provided by EMPRETEC Zimbabwe and IOM Harare)

- new monitoring schedules : EMPRETEC is to conduct the first visit at Dr Tregidgo's business premises in order to test the new monitoring procedures as well as their viability and feasibility / according to time-frame and workload of this first experience, the service fee might be re-negotiated

* copies of streamlined appraisal guidelines for RQAN BPs and the re-shaped BP outline have been provided

* ideas on the new RQAN phase IV have been shared and discussed with EMPRETEC which is extremely favourable to extension of programme and subsequent increase in SE activities (please see G3)

C.3 Actual Output

Planned activities have been accomplished partially during the present reporting period.

C.4 Analysis, Comment, Questions

➔ As a recruitment mission for intra-regional candidates, IOM Harare has assisted 1 candidate in returning to her country of origin (Uganda). Continued efforts are made in order to increase awareness amongst potentially interested intra-regional candidates ex-Zimbabwe to target or non-target countries.

D. Placement and Return ()

D.1 Expected Output

Please refer to the RQAN Operational Plan 1st half 1998 for Zimbabwe.

D.2 Activities

Applications on behalf of candidates

Job vacancies are regularly identified by IOM Harare and forwarded to RMs, potentially interested public and private sector employers regularly submit job offers. However, due to approaching the completion of the RQAN III revised target of return to Zimbabwe, spontaneous job applications have ceased to be sent out to employers.

Since May 1998, IOM Harare only forwards application files to employers who have an assessed interest in and understanding of the programme through prior employment of RQAN returnees.

EMPRETEC is presently trying to recruit a business advisory services specialist with international exposure. The application details of the following candidates have been made available to Mr Mukubvu :

- Dr Christoper HOKONYA (ex-ROK)
- Mrs Rosie CHEKENYA (ex-UK)

The application details of Mr Elias CHIKAGO (ex ZAM) have been forwarded to the General Surveyor of Zimbabwe, Mr R. Chigumete and the manpower situation in this particular priority sector discussed (please see A2). Information about procedures in terms of placement have been forwarded to IOM Lusaka.

Dr Maria MUPANOMUNDA's (ex USA - health) alleged employer, the UoZ School of Medicine, has been contacted and her status discussed. Contrary to her indications, the job with the Department of Physiology has not yet been secured. The candidate is urgently requested to contact the chairman of this department, Professor Musabayane, and to inform him about her willingness to return and to reintegrate this department. The information was extended to RM.

Candidate's feedback on comprehensive Job Offers

The following matched candidates have decided not to take up the positions which have been identified on their behalf by IOM Harare :

- * Mrs Thelma KATSERE - ex UK - health / nurse : no longer interested in working in the area of nursing as candidate has additional expertise in social work (IOM Harare has informed RM that this is an area in which it is extremely difficult to identify positions !) => application pending
- * Dr Stephen MACHADO - ex USA - agriculture / research officer : has decided to undergo post-doctoral training with Texas University / upon completion of the course (12/98) he is apparently interested in the SE component => application pending
- * Dr Gordon MTETWA - ex USA - health / medical doctor : has "some issues to resolve before he can go back", IOM Harare is questioning seriousness of this candidate => application pending

!!! RM are kindly requested to double-check applicant's genuine interest in returning back home after submission of a complete job offer in order to prevent similar cases to happen again. Every time, IOM Harare obtains a job offer from an employer on behalf of a candidate who finally refuses to come back, the programme's credibility is questioned by interlocutors and counterparts !!!

Job Offer Forms

Job Offer Forms on behalf of the following candidates have been received by employers, endorsed by Government counterpart and forwarded to relevant RM :

- * Mr Robert CHIMEDZA - ex USA - lecturer in education
- * Mrs Jacqueline SIBANDA - ex UK - public relations manager
- * Mrs Pamela MAUCHAZA - ex UK - accountant

Job Offer Forms on behalf of the following candidates have been forwarded to employers, IOM Harare is still to get a feedback :

- * Mrs Shingairai FERESU - ex USA - UoZ School of Medicine

Pre-Departure Forms

Pre-Departure Forms for the following candidates have been completed after discussion with future employers and sent to relevant RM :

- * Mrs SIBANDA - First Mutual Life Insurance

** D.3 Actual Output*

Planned activities have been accomplished partially during the present reporting period.

D.4 Analysis, Comment, Questions

N/A

E. Follow-Up and Reintegration Support ()

E.1 Expected Output

Please refer to the RQAN Operational Plan 1st half 1998 for Zimbabwe.

E.2 Activities

Contacts with and follow-up of returnees + provision of specific assistance (if required / applicable) :

- * Dr Timely CHITATE : has well returned and received her first salary supplement as well as a support letter in order to help her overcome difficulties connected to the schooling of her children.
- * Dr Chiedza JOKONYA : everything is in order / has received comprehensive information on SE component

* Dr Wilson MANDERE : his BP has been forwarded for appraisal to EMPRETEC / he has been provided with a support letter enabling him to identify accommodation as he has been ordered by Harare Central Hospital to vacate the apartment occupied by him on their premises => the hospital does not issue permanent accommodation to returning residents. RM please note that national medical doctors are provided with *in situ* accommodation by public sector hospitals for a maximum of up to 12 months (if ever they are accommodated) !!!

* Mr Martin MANTHANDO : has well returned and received first salary supplement as well as information package on SE

* Mr Saki MAFUNDIKWA : has well returned / will be paid the SE loan in July / introductory visit to EMPRETEC is scheduled on the 21 July

* Dr Rangarirai MASANGANISE : everything is in order / is worried about shipment as date of return is delayed - IOM Harare is working on the problem

* Dr Medicine MASIIWA : everything is in order / the employer (FES) is presently trying to identify a more stable position for him in one of their agricultural projects

* Mr Tulani MHLANGA : requested and received letter of support in order to facilitate his research for a new accommodation

* Mr Farai MPFUNYA : everything is ok / introductory visit to EMPRETEC is scheduled on the 20 July

* Mrs Jennifer MUDEREDZI : has come back to Zimbabwe after having been to the UK in order to sort out luggage problems (independent from IOM !) / finally took up work with Parirenyatwa Hospital and School of Medicine as lecturer in occupational therapy / was informed about SE component

* Dr Munyaradzi RUMHIZHA : everything is in order now, candidate is on ZIM Airforce payroll and working in Parirenyatwa Hospital / however he envisages to possibly follow-up professional alternatives with hospitals run by the Catholic Dominican Convention in Harare which provide better salary and working conditions

* Dr Mavis SAMKANGE : has well returned and will be starting to work soon / has received first salary supplement

* Dr Temba SHONHIWA : has well returned and received the first salary supplement / experiences problems with his employer as the UoZ is still closed due to recurrent student's strikes and manifestations

12 and 24 months reintegration questionnaire

Several questionnaires have been returned by returnees. The Score and Summary Sheets will be sent to RQAN CM as soon as a significant number will be received.

Candidates who did not yet reply are followed-up by mail or over the phone and are reminded of their obligation to respond as per the signed Integration Agreement.

E.3 Actual Output

Planned activities have been undertaken partially during the present reporting period

E.4 Analysis, Comment, Questions

➔ Returnees are systematically made aware of RQAN's post-return assistance possibilities regarding the funding of locally-based training courses directly related to their professional performances as well

as the retro-active/post-return self-employment scheme. Candidates who request so are provided with the new BP establishment guidelines as well as examples of cash-flow projections and profit-loss statements.

F. Monitoring and Evaluation ()

F.1 Expected Output

Please refer to the RQAN Operational Plan 1st half 1998 for Zimbabwe.

F.2 Activities

All RQAN-related activities listed in sections A / B / C / D / G / H have actively contributed to the Actual Output F.3

F.3 Actual Output

Arrivals

During the reporting period, 4 candidates have returned :

- * Dr Timely CHITATE (ZIM) - ex IND - general management / finance manager - DN Design Studios - Harare
- * Mr Saki MAFUNDIKWA (ZIM) - ex USA - engineering / self-employed = Institute of Visual Arts - Harare
- * Mr Martin MANTHANDO (ZIM) - ex UK - architecture / senior architect - Form Design Architects - Harare
- * Dr Mavis SAMKANGE (ZIM) - ex UK - health / medical doctor - radiologist - Parirenyatwa Hospital - Harare

☺ a total of 57 candidates has returned to Zimbabwe under RQAN Phase III ☺

Expected arrivals

The following candidates are expected to return within the next months :

- * Dr Robert CHIMEDZA - ex USA - education / education lecturer (17 August 98)
- * Mrs Shingairai FERESU - ex USA - health / epidemiologist
- * Dr Bige KILONGOLA - ex UK - health / surgeon (pending FRC decision)
- * Mrs Pamela MAUCHAZA - ex UK - general management / accountant (19 August 98)
- * Dr Maria MUPANOMUNDA - ex USA - health / physiologist
- * Dr Ophard MUPANOMUNDA - ex USA - health / paediatrician
- * Mr Socrates OPIO - ex POL - health / pharmacist (pending FRC decision)
- * Mrs Jacqueline SIBANDA - ex UK - communication / public relations specialist (22 July 98)
- * Dr Hazel SIRINGWANI - ex GER - health / medical doctor (July 98)
- * Dr Richard SOZI - ex UK - health / surgeon (pending FRC decision)

Optimal Distribution Ratios

Sector	No of placements	%
Health	22	38,5
General Management	11	19,25
Agriculture	8	14,0
Education	8	14,0
Engineering	5	8,75
Industrial Development	1	1,75
Architecture	1	1,75

Tourism	1		1,75
	57		99,75
Public/Private Ratio	PRI 52,5 % (30)	PUB 47,25 % (27)	
Type of returnees	Regular 78,75 % (45)	Intra-Regional 15,75 % (9)	SE 5,25 % (3)
Gender distribution	Men 68,25 % (39)	Women 31,5 % (18)	
Host country of returnees	UK 49,0 % (28)	USA 17,5 % (10)	
	CAN 10,05 % (6)	RSA 10,05 % (6)	
	INDIA 3,5 % (2)	KEN 1,75 % (1)	
	NAM 1,75 % (1)	GHA 1,75 % (1)	
	RUS 1,75 % (1)	GER 1,75 % (1)	

F.4 Analysis, Comment, Questions

➔ The initial overall placement target for Zimbabwe under RQAN phase III (1995 - 1998) was of 45 returns => this initial target for Zimbabwe has been reached in January 1998

➔ IOM Harare has been granted an additional 20 returns from the non-target country pool until the end of RQAN phase III in December 1998 => the overall placement target is thus to be readjusted to 65 returns

➔ A total of 8 candidates remains to be returned under RQAN phase III

➔ Respecting the demand - supply criteria and attempting to diversify sectors of return, IOM Harare welcomes the return / expected return of professionals to the "new" sectors of Industrial Development, Architecture and Communication

G. Institution-Building ()

G.1 Expected Output

Please refer to the RQAN Operational Plan 1st half 1998 for Zimbabwe.

G.2 Activities

Stakeholder Analysis

Definition of stakeholder = "a stakeholder has an assessed or supposed interest, and can be or actually is more or less directly involved, in the successful implementation or execution of an operational activity having a well defined objective"

As per the Mombasa workshop's recommendations and discussions, IOM Harare has identified the following levels of stakeholders :

X) => Initiative and Directive Implementing Level :

* IOM as institution

* IOM CM

* IOM Country Mission

Y) => Funding and Control or Monitoring Level :

* donors : e.g. government in sending and receiving country, bilateral cooperation institutions, international inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations, national NGOs, etc.

* representatives of funding providers in recipient countries : e.g. EU delegate

* internal and external evaluators

Z) => Actor Level

* in recipient country : private and public sector employers, employer's associations, counterpart ministry, government institutions specialised in human resources development, private sector institutions specialised in human resources development, media, SE cooperation partners

* in sending country : counterpart ministry, employer's associations, educational institutions, media

* returnees

Those stakeholders which can be contacted at the Zimbabwe country level will be met, interviewed and their interest assessed in terms of support for RQAN phase IV. Common goals are to be discussed and negotiated and potential obstacles to a future smooth implementation of phase IV to be identified and addressed at this early stage.

G.3 Actual Output

Discussion with Stakeholders

* The principal government counterpart, **Dr Gutsa - Ministry of Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare** (meeting on 4 June), is strongly supporting a RQAN phase IV and highly welcomes the incorporation of new programme aspects as per the Mombasa workshop in future project proposals improving RQAN IV attractiveness for potential donors : country-specific approach, introduction of service fee concept, regional outreach and linkage, gender sensitivity, emphasis on SE component, etc.

* The **EU Acting Delegate to Zimbabwe, Mr Laerke** (meeting on 2 June), commended the overall success of our RQAN programme but is, however, doubtful about the EU's funding availability for an extension. His arguments were the following :

- RQAN is already implemented for a unusually long life-span

- the Government of Zimbabwe has not financially contributed to the programme's implementation

Mr Laerke recommended to approach other potentially interested donors and to evaluate their interest.

* The **EMPRETEC counterpart, Mr Mukubvu - national assistant director** (meeting on 30 June), has been informed about RQAN extension and renewal strategies and has expressed his entire satisfaction with IOM - EMPRETEC cooperation up to date. He is extremely interested in seeing the SE component to be extended and furthermore developed under a future phase IV.

G.4 Analysis, Comment, Questions

The 8th Support Group Meeting (and last under RQAN phase III) is planned to take place in the 3rd quarter of 1998

H. Liaison Relations ()

H.1 Expected Output

Please refer to the RQAN Operational Plan 1st half 1998 for Zimbabwe.

H.2 Activities

Government counterpart in Ministry of Labour

RQAN Monthly Report May 1998 has been addressed to Ministry of Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare

Meeting with Dr Gutsa to discuss, *inter alia*, RQAN extension into phase IV and provide and updated implementation review (please see G3)

Meeting with Mr Mutapuri, for update on RQAN training and discussion about extension possibilities and strategies

EU Delegation

RQAN Monthly Report May 1998 has been addressed to EU Delegation.

Meeting with Mr Laerke, Acting Delegate EU Delegation in Harare, and Mrs Valette, EU - RQAN Desk Officer, to discuss future programme options and provide an update on implementation status (please see G3)

Other contacts

Contacts with potential donors in view of possible extension of RQAN programme :

The **Ambassadors** of the following countries / Representatives of the following Inter-Governmental Organization's have been met and informed about IOM activities in general and the RQAN programme in specific, in view of their support and potential to soliciting funds for a country-specific extension of the programme :

- UNESCO / Pakistan / UK / Israel

H.3 Actual Output

Planned activities have been accomplished partially during the present reporting period.

H.4 Analysis, Comment, Questions

➔ Support to RQAN phase III by government counterpart in the Ministry of Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare, by Government counterparts in other key Government institutions and by representatives of the EU Delegation in Zimbabwe is permanent.

Harare, 8 July 1998
Thomas Weiss

CENTRAL MANAGEMENT REPORT TRACKING

FIELD MISSION	OPERATIONAL PLANS 1998				MONTHLY REPORTS 1998												F/UP SSS	
	JAN-JUNE	JUL-DEC	MID-POINT ASSESS		JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	12 MTH	24 MTH
			J-J 98	J-D 98														
ACCRA	Y		Y		Y	C	Y	C	Y	C							X	X
ADDIS ABABA	Y		Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y							X	X
BISSAU	X		X		X	X	X	X	N/A	N/A							X	X
HARARE	Y		Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y							X	X
KAMPALA	Y		X		Y	Y	Y	Y	C	C							INC	INC
NAIROBI	Y		Y		C	C	Y	Y	C	C							X	X
LUSAKA	Y		X		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y							X	X
PRAIA	Y		Y		Y	Y	Y	X	Y	Y							INC	INC
LISBON	Y		Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y							N/A	N/A
LONDON	Y		Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y							N/A	N/A
WASHINGTON	X		X		X	X	X	X	X	X							N/A	N/A
PRETORIA	X		X		X	X	X	X	X	N/A							N/A	N/A

Y = RECEIVED

X = EXPECTED BUT NOT RECEIVED

INC = INCOMPLETE BECAUSE NOT ALL RETURNEES CONTACTED RESPONDED

C = COMBINED WITH REPORT FOR PREVIOUS MONTH(S)

CAPE VERDE

Activity Indicators of Achievement	Assessable	Reported results (Jan-Jun monthly reports)						Comment	Assessment
		Jan	Feb.	March	April	May	June		
A. Programme Significance									
A1. Regularly updated priority sectors, taking into account orientations on economic policy	No	See A5. ..		Pub. Sector OK – concent rate on priv. Sect.				Impossible to assess.	IM
A2. Regular exchange of information and ideas with other programmes dealing with issues related to human resources.	No	June – contacts with IOM London to exchange ideas on making programme more widely known to Cape Verdians in Europe						Not achieved.	NA
A3. Mission has database of the needs for qualified and highly qualified professionals of public and private sectors not available locally.	Yes	Discussions with Municipalities. Info. gathered include dbase on HR needs by each municipality						Achieved.	A
A4. Mission follows economic sector trends, through analysis of job supply and demand via mass media channels	No							No results reported	NR
A5. Government Counterpart (GC) and Support Group (SG) give their opinion about priority sectors every time there is an updating.	Yes	Jan. - SG mtg. to update priority sectors- accent on Tourism/Industry/Services sectors – cuts in pub. Sector						Achieved.	A
A6. The professionals that return to the country within RQAN programme occupy posts in priority sectors which cannot be filled by local personnel due to shortage of professionals with suitable profile.	Yes	Feb. – study of municipalities on training needs shows inability to meet the human resources needs for mid- and high-qualified personnel (budget limitations).						Results reported not directly related to indicator.	NR
B. Recruitment and Promotion									
B1. Each month one or two employers contact IOM Mission looking for professionals with suitable profile to fill the vacant posts they have in their institutions which locally there is a shortage in the market.	Yes	Jan. - Contacts with hotel chain looking for administrators June - Promotion suspended until highly candidates already on roster are placed. No new posts identified until then.						Not achieved.	NA

B2. On a quarterly basis there is an increasing number of people who are aware of the services offered by the RQAN programme.	No	April - Distrib. of pub. mats. at 2 nd Cong of Cape Verdian Emigrants May - Presentation of prog. at Forum for Enterprise Dev. org. by Chamber of Commerce of Industry and Services (Sotavento & Industry				Impossible to assess indicator based on results reported.	IM	
B3. Each new activity achieved by IOM Mission in the context of RQAN is broadcast	Yes	Feb. - IOM interviewed by Radio Diffusion du Portugal				Impossible to assess.	IM	
B4. Every two months at least one of the newspapers with major circulation in the country publishes an article about the RQAN programme.	Yes	No mention				No results reported.	NR	
B5. Professionals from target African countries who live in Cape Verde contact IOM for information on the RQAN programme	No	March - 2 Angolan cand				Impossible to assess.	IM	
B6. Every two months one professional from an African target country applies for the RQAN programme.	Yes	Jan. - 2 returns				Not achieved.	NA	
C. Selection and Departure								
C1. At least two candidates are selected for placement in the African target countries, in the context of the intra-regional component.	Yes	Prom. activities suspended due to lack of info on destination countries. Awaiting feedback on 3 cand submitted to Angola and G. Bissau	Contacts reestab. with IOM Luanda – file of 1 Angolan candidate re-opened. 1 cand. called for interview	2 cand. submitted			Unclear if “selected” is equivalent to “submitted”. If so, then indicator achieved.	A
C2. All candidates selected meet the programme criteria.	Yes	Ok – 3 cases closed in June (limited placement opportunities/lost contact with 1 cand./1 returned on own).				Assessed by mission as achieved.	A	
C3. All candidates are screened by the Recruitment and Placement Missions, according to criteria established by the RQAN Programme, before being approved	Yes	Jan. – 2 cand. added to roster.				Results reported not connected to indicator.	IM	

C4. The assistance package attributed to each candidate is determined according to his/her real needs and by information provided by employer through PM.	Yes	Assist. with installation problems for 2 returnees Jan. 2 cand. processed Feb. – 4 cand. processed March – 4 cand. processed					Same	IM
C5. All candidates are duly informed about their obligations to IOM as well as about the living conditions in the country of return.	No						No results reported.	NR
D. Placement and Return								
D1. Candidate placement is oriented by the proportion of distribution established for each priority sector.	Yes	4 vacancies identified	3 vacs. identif. 1 cand. (SEN) approved 2 returns	4 returns	No report for April	5 cand. submitted (2 new)	Results not related to indicator.	IM
D2. About 12 candidates are placed in institutions/enterprises which integrate the priority sectors, to occupy eligible vacant posts.	No	3 job offers 2 placements 2 returns	2 placements 2 returns	4 placements 4 returns		1 return 2 placements 3 cand. sub 1 return	10 placements. Not achieved.	NA
D3. Of the 12 candidates placed: - 4 occupy posts in the private sector - 7 occupy posts in the public sector - 1 is self-employed	Yes		2 pub. Sector returns	4 pub. Sector returns (+1 intra-reg.)			Reported results make it impossible to assess if proportion attained.	IM
D4. Of the 4 candidates that occupy posts in the private sector, 2 of them identified his/her own job.	Yes						No results reported.	NR
D5. Of the 7 placements in the public sector, 1 is pre-matched.	Yes					1 Pre-matched (see D1)	If 7 of the placements were in the public sector, then this achieved.	A
E. Follow-up and Reintegration Support								
E1. All the returnees are contacted either personally or by phone, at least one each quarter, during the first year.	Yes		3 returnees contacted 1 contacted mission. No problems encountered in reint.	6 returnees contacted by phone		7 returnees contacted by phone. 3 12/24 forms sent	Impossible to assess on data reported.	IM

E2. All the returnees complete the follow-up of reintegration after the first year of return to the country.	Yes	5 of 6 resp. received.						Not achieved.	NA
E3. The dossier of each returnee contains the record of the subjects discussed during the contacts that take place quarterly, as well as the responses to the survey if returnee has been back more than one year.	Yes	No mention						No results reported.	NR
E4. The possible problems that come up during the process of integration, encountered at a personal, family or professional level, are resolved.	Yes	Satisfactory reintegration reported – one case of difficulty with transfer of know-how reported.						Achieved.	A
F. Monitoring and Evaluation									
F1. Mission orients its action by the indicators and previously defines the results to be achieved.	No	OK						Self-assessed as achieved.	A
F2. Mission has a semi-annual operational plan approved by HQs as well as a monthly one	Yes	Prepared and sent to CM						Achieved	A
F3. Each month the activities of RQAN programme are reported and evaluated by the Mission itself; the reports and evaluations are transmitted to HQs.	Yes	OK						Not achieved. Report for April not sent.	NA
F4. Mission assesses the progress against the 'Operational Plan' and adjusts its implementation on a monthly basis, taking into account the established aims.	Yes							No results reported.	NR
F5. At the end of the semester, Mission evaluates RQAN programme and transmits results to HQs.	Yes	In May all returnees and employers informed of forthcoming RQAN evaluation (details of objectives/content and results)						Only normal monthly report sent. Impossible to assess.	IM
F6. The pre-established semi-annual and monthly plans and reports reflect the economic changes or any other change with implications for RQAN.	No	OK						Self-assessed as achieved.	A

G. Institution Building									
G1. The Government Counterpart and the members of the Support Group know the principles and techniques of RQAN and participate in its implementation, by giving advice, opinions and by presenting proposals and suggestions.	No	Jan. - SG mtg. – programme objectives realistic Feb. First mtg. with new SG member from Min. of Educ., Science and Culture			May -Reported to GC on Mombassa Workshop. Monthly report to PF and EC Del.			Good cooperation with SG. Results reported not directly related to indicator	IM
G2. The members of the Support Group apply principles and techniques of programme in the respective institutions	No							No results reported.	NR
H. Liaison Relations									
H1. Government Counterpart, National Authorizing Officer and other Government representatives, as well as European Union Delegation, receive information about the RQAN Programme and make themselves available for meetings requested by Mission.	Yes	Op. Plan sent to FP Min. Econ. Coop. and GC	Mtgs. at DGCI to discuss training requirements & opportunities with other countries (no training plan exists)	Mtg. with new Head of EC Deleg. to inform about prog- FP, GC and EC Deleg. receive monthly reports.			IOM part. in UNHCR mtg. following events in Bissau – PF and GC informed	Impossible to assess on results reported.	IM
H2. GC, NAO, as well as EUD support the implementation of the Programme giving opinions about its impact.	No	Mtg. with FP planned	FP informed IOM of HR planning sit. & difficulties due lack budget.					Impossible to assess.	IM

While the indicators are well thought-out in the sense of being designed to give an overall picture of the programme, they unfortunately suffer from a lack of specificity that would allow them to be accurately assessed. There is also the problem that the results reported sometimes do not refer very directly to the indicator itself, further complicating the assessment.

ETHIOPIA

Activity Indicators of Achievement	Assessable	Reported results (Jan-Jun monthly reports)						Comment	Assessment
A. Programme Significance		Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	June		
A1. RQAN programme significance and its relevance to human resources development activities underway in the country increased among international/national institutions	No	Mtgs with 5 Amb. Spkr of House and attended mtg UN agency head and World Bank	Mtgs. with 9 Amb. Mtg. UNDP/GTZ UNFPA)	Mtgs. UNDP/ECA UNAIDs			Attended many mtgs. due to conflict but not on RQAN	Although the output "Meet with agencies to increase program significance" was assessed by mission as achieved, this is not possible to confirm from the documentation. Meetings were held, but increased significance is not mentioned. Neither is RQAN's increased relevance to human resource development activities in Ethiopia mentioned.	IM
B. Recruitment and Promotion									
B1. Programme promotion increases target group	No		5 enquiries	Presentation to 2 NGOs promotion. mats. to Uni Maine	Presentation to 140 NGOs			Assessed by mission as on target, but from activities undertaken, no way to confirm any increase in target.	IM
B2. Programme promotion increases job offers	No	Mtgs Mining sector & Inst. Agric Research	14 c.v.s submitted to employers	15 c.v.s submitted to emp.	Disc. Employment agency 10 cvs submitted	7 cvs submitted to emp.	+20 cvs. Submitted	Same	IM
C. Selection and Departure									
C1. Candidates screened based on realistic placement opportunities of the country	No	3 new cand	2 new cand	2 new cand	2 new enquiries	4 new cand	6 new cand	Assessed by mission as achieved. Consistent use of CARF supports this assessment.	A
C2. Increase of intra-regional candidates ex-Addis Ababa	No	Interviewed to Angolan cand. but not suitable. 1 SE intra-reg. Candidate (Uganda) placed						Assessed by mission as achieved. No indication whether this represents an increase.	IM
C3. Assessment of SE business plans for appropriateness	Yes	Assessment 2 B.Ps.	Assessment 2 B.Ps.	-	-	-	Assessment 2 SE cand. & BPs	Assessed by mission as achieved.	A
D. Placement and Return									
D1. Placement rates accelerated to progress towards meeting the long-term indicative target)	No	Job brokering for 6 cand.(3 rejected – 1 matched) 2 returned	Job brokering for 3 cand. 1 returned	Job brokering for 3 cand.	Job brok. for 3 cand.	Job brok. for 4 cand – follow-up Education Min.	3 Jos received and cand. informed and 3 cand matched with potential JOs	Although not contained in indicator, one activity states 6 candidates should be returned January/June 1998. Only three did so. No placement rates are specified anywhere, so their acceleration rate cannot be assessed.	IM

D2. Returnees placed in sectors/job types that complement the Governments development efforts and priorities, i.e. education, health and agriculture	Yes							Assessed by mission as on target. Nothing in report to support, as returnees' sector is not mentioned.	NR	
D3. Placement in private sector increased	No	Ongoing participation in UN Inter-Agency working group on private sector development. IOM made presentation on RQAN to June meeting. Strengthened contacts with private sector employers							Assessed by mission as on target. Although not in report, 2 of 3 returnees in this period were in private sector, higher than historical rate.	IM
E. Follow-up and Reintegration Support										
E1. Regular contact with returnees (for first 6 months return)	No	Ongoing contacts							Assessed by mission as on target, but "regular" not supported.	IM
E2. Periodic contact with returnees (post six months)	No	Ongoing contacts							Same	IM
E3. Returnees reintegration process supported through specific measures taken to help returnees solve problems.	Yes	OK – but major difficulty with housing (country not programme problem) and custom duties Legal action re. shipment effects of 1 returnee							Assessed by mission as on target. Specific instances given of assistance.	A
E4. Survey responses indicate that at least 60% of returnees satisfied with IOM reintegration support service	Yes	9 12/24 month survey forms sent out	Phone call follow-up	Resp. rate increased to 60% - 75% report satisf. with reint.	Followed-up 2 returnees	Follow-up 6 returnees	Prep. Eval. Summary for 6 cand.	Although 12 and 24 month survey forms were sent out, there was no indication in the reports whether or not the 60% target was met.	NR	
F. Monitoring and Evaluation										
F1. Activity indicators adapted/modified to monitor and improve programme performance	Yes								There is nothing in the reports about this at all. This section in the reports is devoted to 12 and 24 month surveys of returnees.	NR
G. Institution Building										
G1. The counterpart and support group members direct RQAN implementation through providing advice and support	No		First mtg of Support Group		In May – discussion with 2 returnees on possibility setting up Returnee Association and circular letter sent to all returnees inviting them to attend a meeting. June meeting could not agree on need for formal association Three volunteers to investigate options and report back in Oct.			Mission's analysis "achieved as planned" is not supported by results reported. No mention is made of counterpart at all.	IM	
G2. Selected working group members complete report on identifying modalities for sustaining RQAN activities beyond 1998.	Yes			5 th WG meeting held		Suspended WG activities		"Achieved as planned" cannot be sustained as an assessment. It seems clear that this never happened.	NA	

H. Liaison Relations				
H1. Regular contact with EU Adviser and Govt. Counterpart	No	Three contacts with the EU mentioned and one with the counterpart.	Impossible to assess.	IM
H2. Regular efforts to solicit/reinforce support of key institutions representing the Government, private sector and programme priority sectors	No		Contacts with such institutions reported in January and February only, but under activity A.	NA

Six reports covering one month each.

In general, results reported by means of these monthly reports did not suffice to support the mission's own assessment of achievements. Those indicators that dealt with more specific issues, such as returns, were easier to assess. Even so, sometimes it was not possible to do from the reports themselves, and other sources of information had to be used. This was more possible with Ethiopia, as it was one of the missions visited.

GHANA

Activity Indicators of Achievement	Assessable	Reported results (Jan-Jun monthly reports)	Comment	Assessment
A. Programme Significance				
A1. RQAN priority sectors consistent with existing manpower development programme/activities	Yes	Govt. has attempted to identify priority sectors, but no manpower development plan. Original priority sectors being used	3 bi-monthly reports for this period repeat same information, word for word	IM
A2. Current RQAN implementation linked to other existing manpower development programmes promoted/implemented by Govt. and/or other development agencies.	Yes	Partially achieved	No supporting info given. No mention of any activities.	NR
A3. Relevant correspondence exchanged between IOM, Govt, Support Group or other agency involved in Manpower Development Programmes showing concrete coordinated efforts to meet priority manpower needs in the country.	Yes	Not achieved	No mention of any activities.	NR
B. Recruitment and Promotion				
B1. All African Embassies in Ghana are contacted and briefed about RQAN programme potential benefits either as non-priority countries or under the I-R scheme.	Yes	Not achieved. Most Diplomatic Heads not available. for direct contact More contacts with African representations in Europe needed	Not achieved. Activities are focused on I-R scheme, as quota for returns to Ghana is filled, except for S-E cases.	NA
B2. At least six African Embassies respond to PM promotion efforts and at least three African Embassies take/initiate concrete steps towards RQAN Programme services.	Yes	Not achieved. No results from contacts with 4 embassies.	Not achieved.	NA
B3. At least three prospective candidates either under I-R or to non-priority countries are identified and two successfully recruited.	Yes	Not achieved. One I-R candidate placed	Not achieved.	NA
C. Selection and Departure				
C1. Through coordinated efforts of PM, RM's, RQAN CM and recipient country at least two candidates are selected under I-R scheme or to non-priority countries.	Yes	Not achieved. Only one I-R candidate placed	Not achieved.	NA

C2. A total of five SE candidates selected.	Yes	Partially achieved. 1 business plan approved, and 6 under review. In the absence of a key staff member of the company reviewing the plans, delays were encountered	Not achieved.	NA
C3. All seven candidates above selected commit themselves to return to their country by the end of the June 1998.	Yes	Not achieved.	Not achieved.	NA
D. Placement and Return				
D1. Country indicative target (5 candidates) met as scheduled and candidates are all placed in a priority sector where they can make a contribution and transfer skills/knowledge.	Yes	Partially achieved. 2 returns	Not achieved. Sectors mentioned, but that they were priority sectors has to be assumed, as not stated.	NA
D2. A total of two candidates (either I-R or non-priority country) are to be placed by June 1998 meeting all required programme criteria.	Yes	Not achieved. No placements.	Not achieved.	NA
D3. A total of four SE candidates are successfully assisted to establish SE Activity in Ghana by June 1998.	No	Partially achieved. Two S-E candidates returned.	Not achieved. No information on "successfully assisted to establish"	NA
E. Follow-up and Reintegration Support				
E1. 80% of returned candidates are gainfully employed and fairly satisfied with their personal and professional reintegration. 90% of SE candidates are successfully engaged in their SE activities.	Yes	Achieved. Monthly meeting of 10 returnees. Office regularly in contact with majority of returnees who are satisfied with return. Initial reintegration problems decline over time	The indicator is quite specific as to numbers, although "fairly satisfied" and "successfully engaged" are open to interpretation. However, none of the reported information pertains to the indicators, so there is no support for saying "achieved".	NR
E2. Established returnee association (GARP) gradually institutionalized within the framework of new SG membership contributing to the overall programme development and reintegration process of returnees in particular	No	Partially achieved. GARP registered as NGO open to all beneficiaries of IOM programs.	Not achieved. There is no mention of a connection between the GARP and the SG, so result of "partially achieved" is questionable.	NA
E3. 80% of follow up questionnaires are returned (of which 70% positive).	Yes	Partially achieved. Four of the seven 12-month follow-up forms sent out have been received. Nine of the fourteen 24-month follow-up forms have been received.	There is no basis for stating "partially achieved". 80% is either achieved or not, and it was not. There is no mention of % positive.	NR

F. Monitoring and Evaluation				
F1. Programme implementation remains consistent with target and objectives set at RQAN CM level and country level.	Yes	Partially achieved	Impossible to assess.	NR
F2. 80% of RQAN candidates' contributions make relevant impact at workplace level.	Yes	Achieved	There is absolutely no evidence to support this.	NR
F3. 70% of contacted employers express satisfaction over RQAN returnees contribution and impact at workplace level.	Yes	Partially achieved	There is no mention of any activities carried out that would support this stated result.	NR
G. Institution Building				
Activities very limited due to constant increase in US resettlement program commitments.				
G1. Government Counterpart shares relevant information on non-RQAN returnees sponsored and assisted by Govt. with PM showing that RQAN principles have also been applied in selection of those candidates by GC (PSC).	Yes	Not achieved.	Not achieved.	NA
G2. Gradual transformation of existing Ghanaian Secretariat into a fully institutionalized RQAN unit within GC proceeding in coordination with PM, GC and SG.	No	Partially achieved. Chairman Public Services Commission (PSC) approved New Chart of SG membership – functions remain unchanged	In view of the lack of clarity of the indicator, impossible to assess	IM
G3. Complete review process of current SG membership and its transformation into a more flexible (smaller) and proactive institution. SG role and objectives also revised accordingly.	Yes	Partially achieved	Implied by result stated under G2, but results not specifically mentioned..	NR
H. Liaison Relations				
Deteriorating staffing situation and lack of resources for RQAN jeopardize implementation.				
H1. Govt. pledge to finance the return of a given number (to be agreed in due course) of qualified nationals beyond current programme implementation using RQAN principles learnt at PM training sessions.	Yes	Partially achieved	Indicator is worded in such a way as to be impossible to “partially” achieve. Apparently no pledge was received, so not achieved..	NA

H2. EU Delegation takes into consideration the possibility of a programme extension tailored to the country's manpower needs and placement potential.	No	Not achieved, but constant consultations with GC, NAO and EU	Not achieved.	NA
H3. Other donors approached respond with a pledge of financial support to RQAN programme as a whole or to some specific aspect of its implementation (i.e. SE scheme).	Yes		Not achieved.	NA

Global Analysis: Clearly the mission has done very well in meeting its overall targets for return, with 62 returnees by February 1998. During the period covered by the reports, other concrete indicators were by and large not met. Other indicators, of a “softer” nature, were much harder to analyze, and many of the results reported as being either “achieved” or “partially achieved” were not supported by any information in the reports. Furthermore, many of the indicators were worded in such a way that it would be quite difficult to in fact determine if they had been met,

For example, indicator G2, “Gradual transformation of existing Ghanaian Secretariat into a fully institutionalized RQAN unit within GC proceeding in coordination with PM, GC and SG”, is problematic in the use of the term “fully institutionalized”. This term could be interpreted differently by different people and may be deserving of its own indicators. The use of the phrase “gradual transformation” is also unusual in an indicator.

Although a clue to the relative lack of success in achieving the goals set out in the operational plan is contained in the overall comment about the staffing situation and lack of resources, it is not completely convincing. The budget for the project would presumably have been approved sometime in 1997, well before the operational plan was generated in February of 1998, and the plan could have been better adjusted to fit available resources.

Overall, the mission did not meet the objectives established as measured by the indicators of achievement set out in the operational plan. Additional precision in establishing indicators and making them realistic would be useful. It was obvious as well that there was a great deal of “boilerplate” involved with exactly the same information being reported in all three of the bi-monthly reports. This was in some instances quite appropriate, but more often it was confusing. However, in terms of institution-building, the formal establishment of an association of returned professionals, and its first meeting, must be considered a very positive achievement.

KENYA

Activity Indicators of Achievement	Assessable	Reported results (Jan-Jun monthly reports)						Comment	Assessment
A. Programme Significance									
A1. Compile relevant information on Kenya's human resources needs that can be met through RQAN recruitment, taking into account Programme principles and parameters.	No	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	June	No information in report to indicate achievement	NR
A2. Monitor and analyze Kenya's economic reform process, in the context of the IMF/World Bank Structural Adjustment Programme, and its impact on both public and private sector developments.	Yes	Deteriorating economic situation – World Bank withholding loans and investors withdrawing. Dismal socio-economic/political situation deterrent to returnees						Analysis of political economic situation and impact achieved.	A
A3. Maintain regular contacts with both Government and private sector officials through the network of the IOM/GOK Support Group and Government Counterpart, in order to promote and reinforce RQAN's place in human resources development efforts as undertaken by the Government of Kenya.	No		5 meetings listed (non-government) See B1. Contacts with Kenyan Min. Foreign Affairs and Int. Coop.	Met with “number of officials” in public and private sectors and “solicited their opinion on current developments in the Kenyan labour market”.			No indication any meetings were “to promote and reinforce RQAN's place”. Uncertain if achieved or not.	NR	
B. Recruitment and Promotion									
B1. A maximum number of new employers, both in the public and private sector, will be sensitized on the RQAN Programme, receiving in-depth briefing on the Programme and its advantages. Employers to be contacted will be selected according to the placement needs of the RQAN candidates currently on roster for Kenya.	No		Meetings with employers: Jomo Kenyatta University, African Centre for Tech. Studies, Kenyan Assoc. of Manuf., Fed. Kenyan Emps, Rockefeller Foundation and HR manager of House of Manji.	‘Awareness strengthened among regular and potential employers’ One US and 1 UK candidate promised to promote programme whilst travelling back to these countries			“Maximum” was further specified in monthly reports as 84. Only 7 were contacted, according to reports. No indication of selection criteria. Not achieved.	NA	

B2. A maximum number of new RQAN intra-regional candidates will be approached by the IOM Nairobi Office and briefed on the possibilities of relocating to countries of origin under the intra-regional component of the Programme.	No	All visitors to office receive info on programme. RQAN returnee network used to promote programme.						Judged by programme manager as not requiring any “major promotional activities”. “Maximum” not specified. Unable assess achievement.	IM
C. Selection and Departure									
C1. A maximum number of RQAN intra-regional candidates will be recruited by IOM Nairobi during the period January – June 1998. Candidates should be highly qualified and meet human resources needs of priority sectors in placement countries.	No	Enquiries by ‘high number of Ugandans in Kenya but mainly teachers (difficult category to place)						“Maximum” not specified. Report does not indicate that any were recruited. Not possible to assess.	IM
C2. Of the total number of RQAN intra-regional candidates to be recruited, at least one candidate will be interested in returning to his native country on a self-employment venture.	Yes	Strong interest of Ugandans in SE component but did not qualify Ugandan candidates carefully screened as trip Nairobi-Kampala only costs USD 15.						Assuming that “screened” equals “recruited”, then this indicator achieved.	A
C3. Recruitment of one RQAN intra-regional candidate to return to a non-target country is aimed at.	Yes							Nothing in report.	NR
D. Placement and Return									
		Jan	Feb	March	April	May	June		
D1. In view of the total number of 80 RQAN international returns to Kenya to be realized during the third phase of the Programme (Jan. 1995 – Dec. 1998), IOM will undertake a maximum effort to identify suitable job opportunities for the RQAN candidates currently on roster for Kenya. IOM Nairobi hopes to successfully return and reintegrate a maximum number of RQAN candidates during the period Jan.- June 1998.	No		1 return	3 returns.				Indicator made more specific in report that COM has requested 5 returns per month – not achieved.	NA

D2. A maximum number of RQAN candidates is to be matched with priority vacancies in both the public and private sector in Kenya. Potential employers will be selected according to the placement needs of individual RQAN candidates currently on roster for Kenya.	No				16 matched candidates as of June 1998	Given number of returns expected and that there were 11 matched at beginning of period, assess as not achieved.	NA
D3. At least one successful application for self-employment should be among the RQAN candidates to return to Kenya during the period Jan. – June 1998.	Yes					Nothing in reports.	NR
E. Follow-up and Reintegration Support							
E1. Keeping track of returnees' personal and professional reintegration by requesting individual candidates to complete and forward follow-up questionnaires, in accordance with established RQAN procedures.	No		'dominant impression' that all returnees are satisfied with positions and work conditions		12/24 follow-up questionnaires sent to 13 returnees. 10 responses. Absence of negative feedback. "Less than 3% 12-month stay, 4% of 24 month change jobs."	Achieved.	A
E2. Responding, as appropriate, to individual returnees' needs for support and assistance with their reintegration.	No					Unable to assess. No information in report.	NR
F. Monitoring and Evaluation							
	—					The indicator established in the operational plan has nothing to do with what is reported. Confusion reigns. Assessment impossible.	—
F1. Successful return and reintegration of a maximum number of RQAN candidates currently on roster for Kenya during January – June 1998. At least one successful application for self-employment should be among the RQAN candidates to return.	No		Output far below schedule Insufficient cand. on roster/job brokering too slow, difficult socio-economic and polit. Situation. Cands. not in a hurry to return			Impossible to assess	IM

F2. Recruitment of a maximum number of RQAN intra-regional candidates during the period January – June 1998. Of these candidates, at least one will be interested in returning to his/her native country on a self-employment venture.	No					Same	IM
F3. Contacts with employers of RQAN returnees in order to evaluate their impact on the immediate work environment within the institute, university or private company.	No					Same	IM
G. Institution Building							
G1. IOM Nairobi continues to involve IOM/GOK SG members in its work in the context of implementing RQAN III in Kenya and is seen to make regular efforts at drawing the Government's attention to the Programme's benefits, both actual and potential, for Kenya and the Government's broader policies on manpower development.	No		SG activities suspended in July 1997 due to declining interest of members. Efforts to revive SG activities unsuccessful	Mtg. with GC to review SG membership & formation small working group. Requested status report to brief Min. of Labour.		According to information contained in report, this indicator was not achieved.	NA
G2. IOM Nairobi tries to reinforce ties with GoK through the IOM/GoK Support Group, in order to positively influence the Government's assessment of the value of the RQAN Programme, but returning highly qualified Kenyans to national institutes, universities and private enterprises, where they can be seen to make a significant contribution towards the country's development.	No					Limited info in report leads to assessment of not achieved.	NA
H. Liaison Relations							
H1. Regularly contact and meet the designated desk-officer of the European Commission of the European Union in Nairobi	No	Contacts handled by SRO Head, and RQAN Programme Manager.				No info in report. Unable to assess.	IM
H2. Brief the desk-officer of the European Commission on the progress made under Phase III of RQAN	No					Same	NR

H3. Brief other Embassies, including Embassies from donor countries, on RQAN, in order to strengthen support for the Programme's implementation within foreign Embassies	No		Same	NR
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One report covering 1 month (including 2 months of previous period as well), one covering two, and one covering three.

Analysis was partially complicated by the fact that the first report for this period also covered the last two months of the previous operational plan, where the indicators were not the same. However, the fact that at least some of the indicators changed from the previous period is a sign that they are not blindly repeated from one period to the next.

As in most other programme sites, indicators of achievement were very poorly formulated. "Maximum number" has no place in an indicator, and needs to be replaced with a specific number; "maximum effort" is not something that can be assessed as achieved or not. Indicators are to give more specificity to goals or objectives which, being either more general, or process-oriented, are more difficult to assess.

Results reported singularly unrelated to indicators of achievement, leading to questions about whether this report was considered by the country project management to be worthwhile. This may be related to the fact that senior programme management staff was located in Nairobi as of the beginning of the reporting period studied, and was presumably more aware of developments in the programme in Kenya. However, the reporting on, and analysis of, the situation in Kenya as it affects the programme was pertinent.

PORTUGAL

Activity Indicators of Achievement	Assessable	Reported results (Jan-Jun monthly reports)						Comment	Assessment
A. Programme Significance	—	Specific numbers of candidates matched and returned. Feb. meeting with Prime Min. of Guinea Bissau. March mtg. Amb. GB and Min. Econ and Finance re progress on RQAN. GB wants to promote programme more actively (raised question of Membership). Presentation at meeting in Cape Verde of diaspora group.						Indicators not established However, substantial data, other information and analysis was provided under this section in the first four monthly reports. There was a notable change in the level of information between the April and May reports.	—
B. Recruitment and Promotion									
B1. Intensify and reinforce the links/ties with Student's Nucleus, NGO's, African Associations, namely Cape Verdean Associations	No	103 Assocs contacted by phone	7 mtgs. with expat. mtgs. with Cape Verde nats. 44 phone calls . 22 info. Packs sent out. 2 Sao Tome nats. registered	7 mtgs. with African Students Nucleu. 7 phone calls. 4 info packets sent out.	2 mtgs. African Assocs. 12 phone calls to Assocs. 9 RQAN info pack. Social event attended.	1 mtg. NGO. Creation of dbase of NGOs working with PALOPS working on dev. coop. 2 unsuccessful phone calls – 3 info packs sent to Assocs.	Clearly achieved. Some confusion in reporting between activities and actual output, as there is overlap between the two as well as inconsistencies.	A	
B2. Contacts with media: national newspaper, African newspaper, magazines, radio and television	No	Feb. COM and IOM Correspondent. Cape Verde interviewed on radio for African Lusophone countries						Even though indicator not quantified, can be assumed as not achieved. Please note result here was reported under Programme Significance, not under Promotion.	NA
B3. Contacts with Consulates of Target and Non-Target Countries	No							No contacts with Consulates reported. Not achieved.	NA

C. Selection and Departure		Jan	Feb	March	April	May	June		
C1. Identify highly qualified/qualified candidates that meet the requisites and profiles of employers in destination countries through a co-ordinated promotion of recruitment system (backed by realistic job offers to be produced by the placement missions).	No	4 cand. matched and 4 pre-matched with JOs sent	1 cand. matched and 2 pre-matched apps. sent	3 cand. matched and 2 pre-matched apps. sent	1 cand. matched 10 pre-apps. sent 2 cand. approved	1 cand. matched 1 pre-apps. sent. 1 cand. approved.	2 cand. matched	Assumed to be achieved, although indicators not quantified.	A
C2. Accelerate the departure processing of candidates through permanent coordination with the PM's as well as speed up and at the same time decentralise the approval of reintegration packages for approved candidates.	No	Ongoing concern about lack of response from Mission in Angola. Instability in GB reported in June as delaying departure of one candidate.						Impossible to assess, as reports do not cover this. However, problems are reported.	NR
C3. Ensure sustained feedback on the reintegration process of the returnees, with a view to providing up to date information to potential candidates, Embassies of participating countries and media.	Yes							Nothing reported. Not achieved. Implied problems in getting feedback from PMs.	NR
D. Placement and Return	—							No indicators established. Not a placement mission.	—
E. Follow-up and Reintegration Support									
E1 100 returnees recruited by the Mission are still working in the same institution at the end of their first year	Yes	No results reported.						No results reported. Concern was raised in report about getting information from PMs.	NR
E2. The 100 returnees, both individually and as a group, have had limited problems with their social and professional reintegration	Yes	Nothing reported						Same.	NR
F. Monitoring and Evaluation									
F1. Evaluate the 100 (as of June 1998) departed candidates through the Follow up forms to assess the programme's impact.	Yes	Nothing reported						No results reported. Required reporting from PMs.	NR
F2. Assess level of transmission of knowledge, and estab. of new management techniques in the employing institutions.	Yes	Same						Same.	NR
G. Institution Building									
G1. Train five officials from the Embassies of the participating countries in the	Yes	No results reported.						Same	NR

Programme's recruitment and selection mechanisms.				
G2. Produce a training manual on the implementation of this type of programme	Yes	Same.	Same.	NR
H. Liaison Relations	—		No indicators established. However, some activities related to liaison were reported under Programme Significance.	—

Six reports covering one month each.

Where the mission chose to report, the report contains clear information and excellent analysis. Obviously seen by local project management as a means of communicating programme results to others in the programme, not just to Central Management.

However, there were quite a number of indicators established for which absolutely no results were reported, making the overall report very uneven. It is not clear why this should be so, for example, perhaps there was some agreement with CM to modify the plan, without this actually having been done on paper. There is some uncertainty about when the plan was actually done, as it already refers in point B1 to the results of the backstopping mission of April 1998, implying that it was done after that time.

The inconsistencies are puzzling.

There were also a number of indicators established which required that information be obtained from Placement Missions. There is no evidence that this was received, evidence of a gap in communication between missions. Such a gap could have been before the indicators were established, in that it would have been prudent to determine in advance whether the information was likely to be obtainable, or after they were established, in that the mission had reasonable expectations that such information should have been forthcoming.

Staff time dedicated to the programme is listed under one section only, and is 75% for one staff and 100% for another (presumably, as two separate lines are quoted). There is no breakdown among sections.

UGANDA

Activity Indicators of Achievement	Assessable	Reports Jan. – June 1998	Comment	Assessment
A. Programme Significance			Indicators in reports for first two months appear to be different from those in plan.	
A1. Review and update the Country priority sectors for RQAN job placement; relevant and consistent with the national manpower development and human resource needs.	Yes	5 meetings of Core Group of Support Group met to review priority sector – updated priority list in June. Good attendance and motivation of group members	Assess as achieved.	A
A2. Update the RQAN job-bank roster and review the job types within identified priority sectors with the aim of filling skill gaps and manpower shortages within the labour market in Uganda.	Yes	7 job offers added to roster. 5 Business plans developed. Imbalance public v. private sector. Freeze on recruitment teachers. High demand for finance and banking sector, but difficulty in identifying suitable candidates.	Assess as achieved.	A
A3. Maintain contacts and closer collaboration with relevant government entities eg. Minlab, MPED, and other implementing agencies of human resource development and capacity building programme in order to explore synergies between complimentary programmes such as TOKTEN, TCDC etc.	No	Discussions with Director of GTZ in Kampala – poss. recruiting candidates in Germany. Distribution RQAN promotion materials.	No evidence in reports that anything was done to achieve this.	NR
A4. Anchor the programme to the private sector through effective collaboration with the Private Sector Foundation (PSF), Federation of Uganda Employers (FUE) and other relevant private sector agencies and make it more relevant to the dynamics of the macro-economic environment as well as fulfilling the manpower needs of the private sector;	No	Discussion with banks on business plans for Self-employer returnees.	Same as above.	NR

B. Recruitment and Promotion		Jan.	Feb.	March	April	May	June		
<p>B1. To contact at least 10 employers / stakeholders to sensitize them about rqan and the need to recruit labour considerations (i.e.skilled and qualified personal) instead of social considerations.</p> <p>NB. Social considerations has been identified to play a significant role in recruitment and selection for job placement in Uganda.</p>	Yes	OK – increased awareness of programme through response to vacancies and promotion materials						Same as above.	NR
<p>B2. To apply for at least 12 vacancies in priority sectors advertised in the local dailies (New Vision & The Monitor). It is expected that at least this approach will result in one immediate and two future positive responses whilst at the same time sensitising potential employers about RQAN.</p>	Yes	Applied for 5 vacancies. 23 job brokering letters sent – few employers approach RQAN with job offers but awareness of programme increasing						Information included in Section F, Monitoring and Evaluation	NA
<p>B3. Bearing recent increased demand from potential employers, it is envisaged that at least 3 concrete job offers would be added to our RQAN job bank roster each month.</p>	Yes	7 Job offers in 3 months, plus 5 SE candidates.			None reported in last 3 months			Not achieved (12 of expected 18). Results reported under Section D, Placement and Return.	NA
<p>B4. Establish further and effective relationships/contacts with other UN, IGO and NGO partners to promote IOM as a complete participator in the field country co-ordination.</p>	No	Follow-up on Inter–agency coordination meeting with UN & other international organizations. At March meeting at UNICEF IOM gave briefing on RQAN.						Difficult to assess on the information provided.	IM
<p>B5. Publicise local activities in local media periodically and contact Human Resources Managers to raise awareness of the RQAN programme and in order to attract even better responses from the private sector employers. Continue distribution of RQAN publicity brochures in response to enquiries and visits.</p>	No	Feb. - Interview with Editor of local newspaper ‘New Vision’. “Other actors in the human resources field have been very cooperative and receptive to setting up contacts and passing on of information”.						Assess as not achieved, as evidence of only one interview.	NA

C. Selection and departure								Not applicable	
D. Placement and Return									
D1. Reach the target of 18 returns (successful placements) in 6 months.	Yes	12 (returns) successful placements in 6-month period. Unable to reach target due to freeze on teachers and pre-matched cases.						Not achieved. One section of the June report cites 12 returns, the other 11.	NA
D2. Encourage and familiarise returnees with the self-employment component of RQAN III.	No	10 enquiries. 10 Business plans pending (medical doctors)						Results reported impossible to assess against indicator.	IM
E. Follow-up and Reintegration Support		Jan	Feb	March	April	May	June		
E1. Maintain the response rate of survey questionnaires received from returnees at above 90%.	Yes	8 forms sent – no response 6 phone calls	8 quest. sent - 2 phone calls	Still awaiting 19 resp. 3 phone calls	Received 6 questionnaires of 19 expected – 14 phone calls Spoke to candidates on phone – v. difficult to get responses to follow-up questionnaires			Not achieved. Rate of return 32%, not 90%	NA
E2. Regularly analyse and incorporate in the monthly reports the information provided in the questionnaires.	Yes							Not achieved. Results of phone contacts reported, but not analyzed.	NA
E3. Update strategies of placement with the information provided by the returnees especially with regards to their work and social reintegration.	Yes							Nothing reported.	NR
F. Monitoring and Evaluation									
F1. Attend and involve IOM other UN partner organisations' country co-ordination meetings.	Yes	See B.4						Only one activity mentioned. Not achieved.	NA
F2. Assess the implementing Ministries' judgement of the programme by keeping the Ministry informed of the level of the programme in Uganda.	No							No information..	NR

F3. Assess and monitor IOM Kampala's implementation of projected activities not in operation for January – June 1998.	No	Reporting on results of job-brokering activities.	Excellent, but only covers one thing. Uncertain about indicator "activities not in operation". Not achieved.	NA
G. Institution Building				
G1. 1. Conduct weekly training of counterparts in Ministry of Labour and Social Services.	Yes	Ongoing training of 2 officials	Jan – finish end March Feb – finish 2 nd week April Mar.- on-going Jun – finish July. While indicator is met, continuing slippage in end date is very curious.	A
G2. Establish closer co-operation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the end result to facilitate publicity of the RQAN Programme to their Diplomats abroad.	Yes		Nothing reported.	NR
G3. Supply the necessary RQAN publications to the concerned Ministries.	Yes	Proactive support group submitted its first operational plan.	Nothing reported.	NR
H. Liaison Relations				
H1. Discuss RQAN implementation in Uganda with the Desk Officer in the Ministry of Labour and Social Services.	No	Renewed discussions on IOM-GOU Agreement	Results do not address indicator.	IM
H2. Discuss RQAN implementation in Uganda with the Desk Officer at the European Union Mission to Uganda.	No	Minimal contact but EU Desk officer briefed in March.	Same	IM
H3. Set up discussions with Ministry of Foreign Affairs on further ways of co-operation with regards to using the Embassies as advertising tools.	No	Contacts with German and Danish representatives to discuss promotion of programme.	Not achieved as stated, but seems as though skipped step of discussing with Ministry and went directly to governments.	NA

Three reports covering one month each, and one covering three months.

Good job of establishing indicators that are relatively specific, including making them numeric where possible. However, the results sometimes did not address the content of the indicators.

However, the connections between the objectives and the indicators are sometimes not well made. For instance, under Section G, Institution-Building, there is substantial reference made to the Support Group and actions taken by programme management to improve the way of working of the group. While this is certainly germane to the programme, and to the objectives established for this section, it has absolutely no relevance to the indicators. A similar problem exists in Section H, Liaison Relations. This calls into question the way in which the indicators have been used in this exercise.

In total, it was a bit difficult to assess whether the mission had met the indicators. Much of what was reported seemed positive and in line with the programme, but not with the indicators.

UNITED KINGDOM

Activity Indicators of Achievement	Assessable	Reported results (Jan-Jun monthly reports)						Comment	Assessment
		Jan	Feb	March	Apr	May	June		
A. Programme Significance									
A.1. Ensure RM 100% aware of priorities for placement as set by PMs	Yes	40 cand. screened	35 cand screened	46 screened	41 screened	30 screened	31 screened	No evidence that this happened. Not achieved.	NR
A.2. Ensure 100% candidates meet priority sectors as set by placement missions	Yes							Given that 12% of candidates screened were rejected, there is indirect evidence that this indicator was achieved. Reference to use of CARF also indication.	A
A.3. Ensure 100% of the candidates have the ability and experience of transferring knowledge	Yes							Same	A
B. Recruitment and Promotion									
B.1 Renew contacts with all target country Embassies	Yes	Activity curtailed due to heavy workload	Ditto		Prep. Mombasa. Seminar	Contacts with UG/Zimb/CV Some Zamb.		Only 4 countries mentioned.	NA
B2. Place five articles in the media promoting the programme	Yes	Rev. activity.	—	—	—	—	—	No activities reported.	NR
B3. Add to the roster monthly 10 target country candidates; 6 non-target country and 4 self employment candidates	Yes		12/3/4	11/4/2	7/22/4	10/5/1	0/0/0	Not met (48 of 60 target countries, 35 of 36 non-target, and 21 of 24 SE - if “approached” is the equivalent of “add to roster”).	NA

C. Selection and Departure	—							Data in this section refer strictly to Job Offers and pre-departure processing. This has no obvious connection with the indicators.	—
C1. 70% of candidates fall within a sector as identified by the optimal distribution ratios	Yes	5 Jos 6 SE	4 Jos (poss +8)	5 Jos 1 SE	2 Jos 1 SE	5 Jos 1 SE	3 Jos 3 SE	Unable to assess level of achievement.	NR
C2. 100% of candidates selected wish to return, and are able to return to their country of origin on a long term permanent basis	Yes							Same	NR
C3. 100% of candidates require programme assistance in order to effect a timely return	Yes		7 T 3NT 1 SE	3/3/0	2/3/0	4 T 4 NT 0 SE	5 T 5 NT 1 SE	Same	NR
C4. 100% of assistance packages are prepared in cooperation with the PM and the returning candidate	Yes							Same	NR
D. Placement and Return									
D1. Rate of placement will be kept to a period of six months (i.e. the time between a case being approved and Job Offer)	Yes			Aver. Rate 9 months Median 6				Although March report promises analysis of caseload, it was not forthcoming. Data to assess this indicator not available from report.	NR
D2. Rate of departure will be kept to a period of three months (i.e. time between Job Offer and departure)	Yes			3.6				Insufficient data to assess.	NR
D3. Returns over the six month period will rise to 20 per month; 10 target country candidates, 6 non target and 4 self-employment candidates	Yes	4/2/1	5/2/0	6/2/1	3 NT returns	5/0/0	6/0/0	Overall average 6.2. Indicator not achieved.	NA
D4. All non target country candidates will be issued with a briefing to guide them in seeking employment	Yes	-						No information on which to assess.	NR

E. Follow-up and Reintegration Support		Jan	Feb	March	Apr	May	June		
E.1 100% of candidates receive appropriate pre-departure counselling based on analysis of regularly updated data received from P.M on a quarterly basis.	Yes	'most'	OK	Guide-lines on shipment s prep.	Guide-lines revised	Rev. dept. info. files		"Most" is not "100%"	NA
E2. 100% of candidates are given regularly updated country information sheets, IOM mission details and reminded of their ongoing obligations to RQAN	No	'most'	OK			OK		Same	NA
E3. Every attempt is made to deal with post departure problems promptly and effectively	No	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK		Assessed as achieved but no information to substantiate	NR
F. Monitoring and Evaluation								Results under this section were repeated, word for word, in all six of the monthly reports, including stating that "two passengers were invited to the office". This stretches credulity, that there should be exactly two such passengers each and every month. Furthermore, results reported did not relate to indicators.	—
F1. Ensure potential needs and impact is taken into account and assessed for all non-target country placements.	No							No results reported.	NR
F2. Regular analysis of feed back from PM which will assist us in monitoring the progress of returnees in their professional and personal reintegration.	No							Same	NR
F3. Once a month OD charts are analysed and conclusions are incorporated and implemented into the London work plan.	Yes							Same	NR

G. Institution Building							No action taken under this section, but reports noted that it needed reconsideration.	—	
G1. Five target country missions take action towards participating in RQAN activities.	Yes	June -Mtg with Gambia HC						Not achieved.	NA
G2. OM London will identify an official through the High Commission/Embassy designated the contact person responsible for RQAN activities.	Yes							Same	NA
G3. A training programme will be drawn up in collaboration with five identified P.M.s	Yes							Same	NA
H. Liaison Relations							Same three general activities repeated in each month, without any verifying details. Not very credible.	—	
H1. Raise awareness of RQAN within the UK Government..	No	Feb. DG visit						No results reported.	NR
H2. Raise the level of understanding of RQAN principals for overseas EU missions . (e.g. Irish Govt)	No	June COM Lon accomp. BRU SRO to Ireland						Same	NR
H3. Raise awareness of RQAN activities within the recipient country High Commissions and Embassies	No	—		Contact Nigeria and Cote d'Ivoire	OK	—	Mtg Ghana HC	Same	NR

Six reports covering one month each.

The indicators established by the mission are really quite good - clear, quantifiable where they need to be, and possible to assess. Unfortunately, information in the report does not closely track the activity indicators established. For most of the sections, no relevant information is included, leading to a very high proportion of indicators that can neither be assessed as achieved or not achieved. Information provided is mostly related to lists of cases added to, or deleted from, the candidate roster.

Additionally, there are two sections where exactly the same activities are reported from month to month, which is not particularly credible, even if it is correct.

Although IOM London has said that additional information related to the indicators was provided to CM in other kinds of reporting, such information should have been included in these reports as well.

ZAMBIA

Activity Indicators of Achievement	Assessable	Reported results (Jan-Jun monthly reports)						Comment	Assessment
A. Programmeme Significance		Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	June		
A1. Improved cooperation with Public Service Commission in its implementation of the Civil Service Reform Programmeme	No	PSC placed advert on behalf Min. Agriculture in Feb. No activity after that.						It is impossible to know if the one result reported represents "improved cooperation".	IM
A2. Cooperation with MLSS's Expatriate Quota Committee for the private sector	No	No stats avail. to justify collaboration. EQC not relevant due to Govt. liberalization. Policies. Zambianization policy difficult to implement						As EQC informed that they were no longer relevant, this indicator would also be irrelevant.	NA
A3. Cooperation with recruitment agencies in the private sector	No	Meeting and verbal agreement with one agency. Little progress						As indicator not quantified, impossible to assess.	IM
B. Recruitment and Promotion									
B1. Placement of the Zambian RQAN programme on the internet	Yes	Work commenced on web site Jan. – material ready for submission SG Correction pub. Materials Prog. Slow Materials approved by SG at meeting 6 May.						Not achieved, although significant efforts made.	NA
B2. Circulation of the updated "Returning to a Changing Gambia" brochure to Zambian nationals outside Zambia	Yes	Material ready for submission SG but not acceptable quality. Material corrected and approved by SG at meeting 6 May.						Same	NA
B3. Publication of Newsletter containing the achievements or contributions of selected returnees	Yes							Not achieved.	NA

C. Selection and Departure										
C1. Cooperation with Recruitment Mission in the selection and departure process	No	1 highly qual. Cand. Recd	Awaiting result of IOM London meeting with Zambian HC	Info. on 15 cand. rec'd – 5 selected by RMs but only 3 endorsed UNZA returned 2 cand. More cand. arriving at RMs but don't get further than sub. pre-app. forms	Info on 3 cand. rec'd from IOM Pretoria				There was certainly exchange of information, which could be interpreted as indicating cooperation.	A
C2. Increase the rate at which CARFs reach RMs	No	Only 2 PHFs rec'd in Feb. – 1 already placed (?) Acted on 6 CARFS, CVs & PHFs Significant .increase in pre-apps. from Zambians in Botswana						Insufficient data to assess "increase".	IM	
C3. Provision of information on jobs and candidates where and when available to facilitate the selection process	No							No information to assess whether achieved or not.	NR	
D. Placement and Return										
D1. Placement of at least 2 Zambian professionals per month	Yes	0 placements 1 cv submitted	1 placement	0 placement	1 placement 2 cvs submitted	4 placement 9 cvs submitted	0 placement	6 placements of 12. Not achieved.	NA	
D2. Return of at least 7 Zambian nationals within the period	Yes	2 returns	1 return (from Botswana)	1 return (from UK)	0 return	2 returns (UK, Botswana)	1 return	7 returns. Achieved.	A	
D3 Return of 1 SE candidate within period								Not achieved.	NA	
E. Follow-up and Reintegration Support										
E1 Retention of high percentage of returnees in Zambia	No	Most pleased with reintegration and decision to return Retention rate unchanged but one UTH returnee. gone to Japan for study						No information. Unable to assess.	NR	
E2. Successful use of non-financial incentives to facilitate returnees' reintegration	No	Returnees. would like additional equipment/ training to facilitate reintegration. Met with interim committee of Returnees Assoc. of Zambia – disappointed with lack of progress in setting up Association. Successful use of government appeal process to aid one returnee						No citing of non-financial incentives. Not achieved.	NA	

E3. Ability to respond to short-term locally-based training needs of returnees	No	1 submitted request – too expensive -						Unable assess. “Ability” may exist, but not demonstrated.	IM
F. Monitoring and Evaluation									
F1. Steady progress towards achieving quota allotted to each priority sector	No	11 candd added roster (tot. 40)	1 added to roster (tot. 41)	0 added to roster	0 added to roster	0	0	Quotas were reallocated during period. Progress was made. Achieved.	A
F2. Return of 13 Zambian professionals during the planned period	Yes	2 returns	1 return	1 ret	0 ret.			See indicator D2 Not same target number. This was not achieved.	NA
F3 Retrieve responses to all follow-up questionnaires 12 and 24 months after return	Yes	Collecte d all response s but one	Analysis responses	1 response rec'd	0 resp.	0 resp.	0 resp.	Appears to have been achieved during the first quarter, but not the second. Not achieved.	NA
G. Institution Building									
G1.Consolidation of the gains made by the SG's active participation in programme implementation	No		SG starting to take independent decisions	Negs. with SG reps. Zambia Medical Assoc. & Institute of Management – good mtg. SG to consider 3 reports	No activity		Ongoing legal problem with 1 candidate was finally resolved due to intervention of SG.	“Consolidation of the gains” makes indicator impossible to assess, although from the reports, it appears that the SG is in fact active. .	IM
G2. Establishment of a permanent Government Counterpart to continue the implementation of the programme after 1998	Yes	Trainee counterpart – corrected report for submission to SG. Report submitted to SG – another trainee counterpart nominated as new Secretary to SG. MOL confirmed as counterpart.						Counterpart seems permanently established. Achieved.	A

G3. MLSS to take a firm decision to nominate 1 or 2 persons to be fully aware of principles and techniques of programme so as to firmly sustain it after 1998	Yes	MLSS nominee did not present for training	Disc. on choice and for training MLSS CT nominee					While decision was made to nominate person, it is unlikely that this alone will lead to programme being sustained. Indicator achieved.	A
H. Liaison Relations									
H1. Achieve maximum support and cooperation from the EU Delegation in the implementation of the programme	No		Met EU rep. at SG meeting	EU del. Assessed RQAN during IOM DG's visit Lusaka				Although indicator is imprecise, would assess as not achieved.	NA
H2. Achieve maximum support and cooperation from the National Authorizing Officer (NAO)	No		Min. contacts possible	Delayed submission to SG counterpart trainee report – another counterpart to be nom. Meeting with NAO held in March				Hard to assess, as perhaps “maximum cooperation” is in fact one meeting.	IM
H3. Achieve maximum support from the Government Counterpart and the MLSS	No							Not possible to assess.	IM

Six reports covering one month each.

Given the size of the office (3 persons) and that most activities are carried out by the COM, when the COM is on leave or occupied with other tasks, very little is done.

The indicators are a mix of those that are quite precise and possible to assess with those that are not at all possible to assess. This is not only because of the way that they are written, but also because the information that would be necessary to make that assessment is not provided in the report.

Overall, even though the reports themselves do not address the activity indicators of achievement, it is quite possible from the reports to get a reasonable sense of how the program is doing, what the problems are, etc. In that sense the reports are of interest and presumably of benefit to project management.

ZIMBABWE

Activity Indicators of Achievement	Assessable	Reported results (Jan-Jun monthly reports)	Comment	Assessment
A. Programme Significance				
A1. Assessment of priority sector's relevance and consistency for Zimbabwe's national manpower and human resources development programmes	Yes	Two changes in priority sectors, described and supported.	Achieved	A
A2. Identification of and liaison with national and international actors implementing manpower and human resources development programmes	Yes	Liaison with five organizations.	Achieved	A
A3. Collection and analysis of information on Zimbabwe's economic and manpower conditions, plans and trends likely to influence RQAN programme prospects and/or output	Yes	Analysis there, but same from month to month; 1996 government report on foreign recruitment analyzed.	Not achieved. Only slight evidence of information being collected and analysis same.	NA
B. Recruitment and Promotion				
B1. RQAN and IOM promotion through publications in various media	No	7 articles or programmes	Good, but as indicator not quantified, unable to say if achieved	IM
B2. Improvement of RQAN and IOM notoriety through participation in various events and establishment of contact network	No	25 events participated or meetings held	Good, but as indicator not quantified, unable to say if achieved	IM
B3. Contacts with African Embassies and High Commissions in Harare in order to raise awareness of RQAN benefits under the intra-regional or non-target country component	No	13 meetings	Good, but as indicator not quantified, unable to say if achieved	IM
B4. Provision of updated RQAN information to Zimbabwean Embassies and High Commissions through Government counterpart network	Yes	None reported	No achievement reported.	NR
B5. Maintenance of candidate roster and utilization of CARF	Yes	Ongoing additions to roster with CARF and occasional deletions	Achieved	A

C. Selection and Departure				
C1. Selection of intra-regional candidates	Yes	9 contacts with potential intra-regional	“Contacts” does not equal “selection”, and indicator not quantified, so impossible to say.	IM
C2. Provision of information to regular candidates	Yes	Information provided to 12 regular candidates	Achieved	A
C3. Pre-Assessment of Business Plans submitted by prospective self-employment candidates	Yes	9 BPs handled; not clear if all of them “pre-assessed”	Achieved	A
C4. Liaison and cooperation with EMPRETEC in implementation of SE component	Yes	3 meetings detailed	Achieved	A
C5. Pre-Departure preparation of future returnees	No	No results	Not achieved	NA
D. Placement and Return				
D1. Return of 12 candidates to private sector - public sector employment	Yes	13, but results listed in Part F	Achieved	A
D2. Return of 2 self-employed candidates	Yes	2 (included in 13 above), but results listed in part F	Achieved	A
D3. Job-Brokering activities	No	135 activities listed (can have multiple activities for same candidate)	Good, but indicator not quantified, so unable to say if achieved	IM
E. Follow-up and Reintegration Support				
E1. Individualized contact with returnees at least every 3 months (first year returnees) or 6 months (after first year)	Yes	59 contacts listed; unable to determine if required intervals adhered to	Good, but uncertain if achieved	IM
E2. Mission level survey : follow-up statistics (follow-up questionnaires, score sheets, summary sheets)	No	Reports late and incomplete; difficulties reported	Presumably unachieved, but indicator does not state what is to be done with things listed	IM

E3. RQAN returnees establish association designed to contribute directly or as SG adviser to reintegration process of returnees	Yes	Initial meeting of group cancelled	Not achieved	NA
E4. Provision of assistance to returnees	No	Assistance provided to 8 returnees	Good, but indicator not quantified. Assuming assistance should be provided to all returnees, as only 8 of 13 got assistance, not achieved.	NA
F. Monitoring and Evaluation				
F1. Assessment of placement status against indicative target for candidate placement	Yes	Every report does so	Achieved	A
F2. Assessment of placement status against optimal distribution ratios	Yes	Optimal distribution listed; no assessment	Not achieved	NA
F3. Monitoring of programme output through Activity Indicators Checklist and Monthly Report	Yes	Done	Achieved	A
G. Institution Building				
G1. Counterpart Training in view of institutionalization of RQAN principles at counterpart Ministry level	No	No training activities described	Nothing reported	NR
G2. Support Group Meeting to be reviewed and transformed into a smaller, more efficient, interested and pro-active structure	Yes	Two meetings held; no indication of review and transformation	Not achieved	NA
G3. Sustainability efforts to be redesigned towards concrete and efficient input to extension of RQAN	No	Discussions held with stakeholders about successor programme (assumed same as programme extension)	Unable to assess	IM
H. Liaison Relations				
H1. Information of Government and EU officials on RQAN implementation, development and statistics	No	Monthly reports distributed	Probably achieved, although indicator is not quantified.	A

H2. Assessment of the Government's and the EU's support for RQAN and interest to extend / renew the programme	Yes	Meetings held and briefly assessed	Achieved	A
3. Government of Zimbabwe formally approaches the EU or other potential donors to solicit extension of RQAN phase III or renewal under phase IV – Pledge given by EU and/or donors	Yes	No report	Nothing reported.	NR

Six reports covering one month each.

Reports were generally very detailed and specific about what had been accomplished, but as the corresponding indicator did not always indicate a numerical target, it was difficult to assess whether the good results reported represented fulfilment of the indicator or not. There were a few indicators where the accomplishments did not always relate to what the indicator had required. As usual the most difficulty was experienced with less concrete indicators. However, in general the use of indicators seemed to be relatively-well understood.

MONTHLY REPORT ANALYSIS

Mission	No. of Indicators	Indicator verifiable*	Indicator unverifiable*	% Verif. Indicators	No results reported	Achieved	Not achieved	Impossible to assess
Placement Missions								
Accra	24	20	4	83%	8	0	14	2
Addis Ababa	18	6	12	33%	3	3	2	10
Harare	29	19	10	66%	3	12	6	8
Kampala	23	13	10	57%	7	3	9	4
Nairobi	21	4	17	19%	8	3	5	5
Lusaka	24	9	15	37%	2	5	11	6
Praia	36	24	12	67%	8	9	6	13
Recruitment Missions								
Lisbon	12	7	5	58%	8	2	2	0
London	26	19	7	71%	16	2	8	0
TOTAL	213	121	92	57%	63	39	62	49

* This assessment was based on the evaluator's best judgement as to whether it was possible to assess — either in principle or in practice — whether the indicator was met. This is not to imply that every indicator considered as verifiable was in fact a good indicator.

**RESULTS OF 12 AND 24-MONTH
FOLLOW-UP**

ANNEX VII

Country	Indicative targets	12-month total	12-month not received	12-month % not received	12-month received	12-month % received	24-month total	24-month not received	24-month % not received	24-month received	24-month % received
Cape Verde	31	11	1	9%	10	91%	6	1	17%	5	83%
Ethiopia	55	26	12	46%	14	54%	14	10	71%	4	29%
Guinea-Bissau	59	39	39	100%	0	0%	14	14	100%	0	0%
Angola	7	6	6	100%	0	0%	3	3	100%	0	0%
Ghana	68	59	26	44%	33	56%	45	39	87%	6	13%
Kenya	80	33	8	24%	25	76%	19	8	42%	11	58%
Uganda	80	41	26	63%	15	37%	16	11	69%	5	31%
Zambia	43	21	6	29%	15	71%	13	4	31%	9	69%
Zimbabwe	65	38	26	68%	12	32%	19	19	100%	0	0%
total/average	488	274	150	55%	124	45%	149	109	73%	40	27%
Non-target	143	75	73	97%	2	3%	46	45	98%	1	2%

O:scott/rqan/Follow-up % (% of due forms sheet)

ETHIOPIA COUNTRY NOTES

Background

IOM has been returning qualified African nationals to Ethiopia only since the beginning of RQAN III in 1995. As of 30 June 1998, there have been 33 returnees to Ethiopia, which represents 7% of the total returned as of that date.

The IOM office in Addis Ababa is situated in the UN compound, although in a rather out-of-the-way location, as the premises were carved out of the library building. Nonetheless, there appear to be benefits to the office in being in the compound, in respect to security and services. Staff working on RQAN are the Head of the Office (part-time) as project manager, one Associate Expert and one locally-recruited staff (both full-time).

The RQAN programme is one of two main programmes undertaken by the office in Ethiopia, the other one being resettlement of refugee cases. In 1998, 9.3% of the total budgeted staff and office costs are charged to the RQAN programme. This does not seem to be in accordance with the total observed amount of staff time dedicated to the programme. However, if the budget for the Associate Expert is taken into account, then RQAN accounts for 34.1% of the budget, which seems more realistic.

Activities undertaken

During a three-day visit to Addis Ababa, in addition to wide-ranging discussions with project management, a total of 8 semi-structured interviews were held (of 11 scheduled) with

- The government counterpart
- Two employers of returnees (one private, one public)
- Three returnees (one private, one public, one self-employed)
- The EU programme officer
- A representative of UNDP

The interview guide is attached to the general report as Annex II. The agenda for the visit to Ethiopia is at the end of this note.

During the visit case records were examined for content. Accounting records were reviewed for the sole purpose of ascertaining what accounting information is provided to IOM Headquarters.

Return targets

The original target for returns to Ethiopia was established at 45, compared to which target 33 have arrived as at 30 June 1998.

Returns have been distributed among the priority sectors as follows:

Sector	Public	Private	Total
Agriculture	3	1	4
Mines Energy	2	0	2
Urban Development, Housing, Building and Construction	1	5	6
Water Resources Development			0
Transport and Communication			0
Health	1	1	2
Education	8	2	10
Finance *	2	1	3
Hotel and Tourism *	0	1	1
Social Services*	2	1	3
Rural Development*	0	1	1
Other* (geometeorologist)	1	0	1
Total	20	13	33

*Not a current priority sector

It is interesting to note that the Central Management database shows only 32 returns over time, and that the breakdown in that database shows 9 private sector (including 1 self-employment) and 23 public sector. The lack of consistency between locally-maintained records and the central database could call into question the accuracy of the reports produced which rely on that database.

Over time, there has been no general trend in the proportion of public sector to private sector returns (data from Mission records).

Year	Total returns	Public	Private
1995	3	2	1
1996	12	7	5
1997	13	9	4
1998 (6 months)	5	2	3

Adherence to established procedures

There are a significant number of forms established by Central Management to guide and monitor the RQAN programme which is implemented in three Recruitment Missions and eight Placement Missions. A list of these is included in Annex XIII.

Project management in Ethiopia in general makes very consistent use of all forms and reporting tools that are applicable to placement missions, and reports that, by and large, they are found useful and not unduly time-consuming.

There has been some lag in the use of the 12- and 24 month follow-up with returnees on reintegration, but follow-up with returnees to encourage them to return their forms is ongoing.

The limited number of interviews that were conducted with returnees and employers evidenced reasonable satisfaction with the way in which the programme has been implemented. However, due to various last-minute cancellations, the number of returnees interviewed was much more limited than originally planned.

Negative comments about the programme from the persons interviewed were limited, even though these interviews were conducted in the absence of project management and with a promise of confidentiality.

The office in Addis Ababa spends a relatively large percentage of time (estimated at 25%-30%) on promotional activities directly related to the RQAN programme. These activities include interviews in the mass media, visits to representatives of diplomatic missions, employers and their organizations, etc. A forum which brought together members of the Support Group and returnees, for example, garnered substantial press coverage.

Nearly all of the candidates that have returned to Ethiopia have either made the initial contact with the employers themselves or had a job identified for them by IOM after their application. Only two returnees have been recruited by an IOM Recruitment Mission in a developed country for a position identified by IOM Addis Ababa. With this record, local project management has limited the use of project resources in developing specific job offers for recruitment missions to occasionally sending notices obtained from local newspapers. With one major employer, Addis Ababa University, more regular contact is maintained.

Statistics kept by project management reveal that of the 58 candidates whose files were closed by IOM Addis Ababa, four were closed because the programme was not a significant factor in the return, as they returned on their own. The majority of cases were closed because the candidate either was not a national of Ethiopia, which effectively prevents placement in Ethiopia (24 candidates), or could not subsequently be located (9 candidates).

It would certainly appear to be the case for Ethiopia that positions in priority sectors are not the limiting factor, but rather the lack of qualified Ethiopian candidates. Within the context of a demand-driven programme, it certainly is more efficient to focus programme resources on the limiting factor, the candidates, rather than on the positions.

Cost-effectiveness

The way in which the accounting for the RQAN programme is handled does not lend itself to an easy analysis of the “internal” measure of cost-effectiveness, that is whether the programme is delivering the outputs foreseen at the cost which was budgeted.

IOM Addis Ababa has the following pieces of financial information available to it:

- The proposed budget, and by inference, its approval
- A record, the “Matched Candidate Registration Form”, of what the recruitment mission has agreed with the candidate on the distribution of the financial package

- Office accounting records, which show disbursements made by the office in the course of a month

While these records suffice for the office to monitor expenditures against their approved budget, this in no way enables the office to have a complete picture of the financing of the programme. There is thus no way for local programme management to answer questions from the sponsor, government, or anyone else, about the overall cost-effectiveness of the programme. During the evaluation visit, in a meeting chaired by the government counterpart, a question was raised about where expenditures under the programme stood, which the IOM office is in no way able to answer through the information available locally. Even the semi-annual report to the EU made by IOM Central Management does not contain any information which would enable this and similar questions to be answered.

By the same token it was not possible for the evaluator to make any judgements about whether the programme was operating within budget, other than in a most limited way, i.e., by comparing local budget with local expenditures.

Looking externally, there are other ways in which candidates for vacant positions can and are being recruited. The Government of Ethiopia does recruit expatriates: for example, recently the Ministry of Education recruited abroad. Addis Ababa University also does hire from abroad and provides round-trip tickets. There is a Federal Civil Service which has established procedures for filling vacancies in the Civil Service, which include written tests and interviews. These procedures are also followed by the country's Missions abroad.

Certainly there are employment agencies operating in Ethiopia which may include recruitment from abroad, and IOM was recently approached by one to collaborate in hiring from overseas. No hard data has been found on what each of these alternatives may cost.

In discussions with the government, it appears that in their recruitment of expatriates for the public sector, the government provides an air ticket, plus housing and modest salary supplements, which would cost far less than the package of benefits offered by IOM. The government is currently unable to provide air tickets to returning nationals, except those who went on fellowships and are returning within the allotted time.

Relationship with Central Management

The Addis Ababa office has had a generally positive response to Central Management directives, as is evidenced by substantial compliance with planning and reporting documents instituted by CM. The office generally finds that such tools are appropriate to the programme, and reports that CM has normally been prompt in responding to requests, provides feedback and advice on reports submitted. However, in the last months, due to staffing changes in Nairobi, response time has increased and feedback diminished.

It was reported by IOM Addis Ababa that the transfer of the CM from Geneva to Nairobi went smoothly, with sufficient information and guidance in advance of the move. Correspondence from CM reveals that advance notice was given, but also that full responsibilities were not again taken up by CM in Nairobi until 10 March 1998, representing a slippage of some 5-6 weeks beyond the end January date originally foreseen.

Significance of IOM as a factor in return

Of the 3 returnees interviewed during the visit, one would have stayed in the country of application or gone to another country, one would have returned anyway, and one didn't know.

The assistance offered by the RQAN project most often mentioned as significant was the financial assistance

Support group

As a result of the mid-term evaluation, the recommendations of which were reported to the Support Group, an intensive effort was been made to address the issue of sustainability. A small Working Group was formed from the members of the Support Group and this Working Group held 5 meetings between November 1997 and March 1998. Terms of Reference were developed and a plan of action was agreed upon. At the time of this evaluation, progress was halted as a result of the insistence of the counterpart to receive an answer from the EU on the question of the programme extension. This response was reportedly received by the counterpart only in late July, and the Working Group is expected to resume its work, assuming that RQAN CM approves the requested budget.

Although the members of the Support Group do not received any payment, the Working Group members will be reimbursed travel costs and paid a small per diem.

In addition to this Working Group, there has been an initial effort by IOM to assist in the formation of a returnees' association. An initial reception was sponsored in late June and all 33 returnees invited, of whom 11 attended and discussed how best an association might be formed. The experience of GTZ in setting up an association of those who returned from Germany was that it took three years for the association to be formally established and recognized by the government. As a result of the meeting, it was decided that the group would start strictly on a social basis and evolve gradually to a more formally recognized group, which could then have the possibility to officially represent the group's interest. A group of three returnees volunteered to work together to move the process of forming this group forward.

ETHIOPIA (27 - 29 July 1998)

SCHEDULE OF MEETINGS

Monday, 27 July

- 11.00 Dr. Hailu Ayale, Academic Vice President, AAU – Employer Public Sector
- 14.00 Dr. Hailemariam Yidegiligne, East Africa Special Eye Clinic – Returnee

Tuesday, 28 July

- 09.00 Ms. Hanna Baldwin, EU Counterpart
- 10.30 Mr. Negatu Mereke, Human Resource Development and Social Affairs Dept., Ministry of Economic Development and Coop. Govt. Counterpart
- Afternoon at IOM
- 18.30 Mr. Foad Youssef, International Centre of Insect Physiology – Returnee

Wednesday, 29 July

- 09.30 ?
- 11.30 Ms. Haregewein Ashenafi, Lawyer – Self-employed returnee
- 14.30 Dr. Yilma Sileshi, Faculty of Technology, Electrical Dept, University of Addis Ababa
- Returnee
- 16.30 Mr. Christian Lehembre, UNDP Deputy Resident Representative

UNITED KINGDOM COUNTRY NOTES

The London Mission is centrally located, within close proximity to government offices. Missions of various countries are scattered, but seemed to be more or less accessible. The IOM office is near an underground line. The office is staffed by the Head of Office, three full-time staff members, and two interns receiving modest remuneration. Most of the work of the office is connected with the RQAN programme, although the 1998 approved budget only charges 43% of the Staff and Office costs to the RQAN budget. This seems to be unrealistically low in view of the activities observed, but may be accounted for by the use of interns. Also, as the 1998 budget was done when there was only one full-time staff member it is obviously not a good measure.

Sustainability

The likelihood that the activities of this programme will be sustained after IOM involvement ceases is low. In the three diplomatic Missions visited (the Missions of those countries in Africa visited), there was no evidence of any ability to carry out the functions performed by IOM under this programme. The level of familiarity with the programme varied from Mission to Mission, but this may have been influenced by the timing of the visit, i.e., during August.

While Mission interlocutors appreciated the programme, and saw its value, any question of sustainability foundered on the recognition that the government did not have the money to provide the kind of incentives that the RQAN programme did. There was no idea that funding by the EC of such benefits might in fact be a possibility, using NIP funds, so that a combination of EU funds and government execution might be possible, as well as use of IOM for technical assistance, rather than programme execution.

Although not one of the Missions visited, IOM staff reported that the Ghanaian Mission has a staff member from the Public Service Commission currently doing limited recruitment. This could perhaps provide a basis for sustainability in the future.

Processing activities

A review of the most recent priority sectors revealed that IOM London had on file for nearly all target countries lists those sectors as of 1995. Uganda's list was updated in November 1996, Kenya's in April 1997, and Zimbabwe's in May 1998. This does not correspond with the information that placement Missions provided, which would indicate more recent reviews of those sectors. There would seem to be a substantial breakdown in communication among the Missions in this area.

Staff members reported that there is not a great deal of attention paid to the priority sectors, as in any event, such sectors are relatively broad and most candidates fit within them. The office generally believes that, if candidates are good, they should be sent along to the placement Missions to see if they can find a job for them.

Cases do get rejected because of the « significant factor » element. Various responses on the pre-application form are used for this, e.g., whether any scholarship or external assistance has

expired, if the applicant is on leave from employment, the type of assistance required, and what applicant will do if RQAN not approved, etc.

It is commonly agreed among programme staff that the RQAN programme is not the reason for candidates to decide to return home, but rather the means that enables the decision to return to be carried out. Answers from the three candidates interviewed in London all supported that view of the programme. (This was also commonly supported by interviews in Africa.)

No statistical data is available on the number of cases rejected and why. Indeed, apart from what is contained in the monthly reports, there is almost no statistical data available in the Mission whatsoever. The Mission is aware of the centrally-managed database and assumes that statistical information can, and should, be obtained from Central Management.

London does use the Proflight number and date in their accounting reports, so that tracking expenses by case is possible through the accounts. (This was not done in any of the placement Missions.)

Promotion activities

These activities are relatively limited, and are quite general in nature. Highest priority is given to processing candidates.

Generally, in the UK promotional activities consist of encouraging candidates to promote the programme, plus disseminating information through embassies, High Commissions, and community associations. Although placing articles in the press is considered by the Mission to be a reasonable promotion strategy, this has not been a priority. For countries outside the UK, activities are confined to encouraging candidates to promote the programme and contact with some embassies of target countries.

There are almost no recruitment activities as such, other than passing on vacancy announcements, job offers, etc., received from placement Missions through the channels listed above. Recruitment is not done through paid media, as there are no funds available. Recently there have been a few applicants who reported learning of the programme through the Internet

A theory was offered as to why the UK Mission was successful in actually recruiting for returns to Bosnia and not under RQAN. (Under the programme for Bosnia the Mission receives job offer and successfully recruits based on those offers.) The theory had three elements :

- Post-conflict situation means that there has been a recent and dramatic difference in the situation on the ground

- The group being targeted left en masse and relatively recently, making them easier to contact

- The group is under significant pressure to return.

Relations with Central Management

During the move to Nairobi, there were some difficulties in communications. However, there have been no lasting problems, and it is functioning well after the initial period.

The UK Mission has sensed recently increased encouragement for the various Missions to work together as a team, rather than everything needing to flow through Central Management and CM being very much in control of everything. The UK Mission sees a continuing need for the staff to be involved in policy development, with increasing delegation of authority and assumption of responsibility.

There was however concern about insufficient flexibility in project design, and unrealistic expectations about the ability of the programme to make quick changes in direction. One example of this was a question that had recently arisen about whether to continue to process candidates for Zimbabwe. The target is nearly reached, and, if not lifted, some cases in the pipeline may have to be refused. This was related to a similar occurrence in Ghana, where there was some confusion when the programme was somewhat abruptly modified when the target was nearly reached. Activities of recruitment Missions, particularly those related to initial contact with candidates, are affected by such changes very early in the process, and so sufficient lead time is required.

However, the only thing that now must be approved by CM is the assistance package, and, since the move to Nairobi, this approval has been received much more quickly (2 days vs. 2 weeks). There is still some uncertainty what Missions are authorized to do, e.g., with a report on a recent visit to London from a placement Mission, the London Mission was uncertain if they were authorized to send this report to other IOM Missions.

There exists a lack of clarity on what can be expected in the way of assistance from other (non-RQAN supported) offices for this programme. IOM London is responsible for the processing of cases in all parts of the world except North America, sub-Saharan Africa, and Portugal. There is no uniformity of view among IOM offices in those areas as to what help they are required to provide to RQAN cases and what cost-sharing arrangements are.

UNITED KINGDOM (13 - 14 August 1998)

SCHEDULE OF MEETINGS

Thursday, 13 August

- 10.30 Meeting with Mr. Osman, Commercial Counsellor, Ethiopian Embassy
- 14.30 Meeting with Mrs. Pavelyn Musaka, Deputy High Commissioner of Zimbabwe

Friday, 14 August

- 11.00 Meeting with Mr. Martin Mawanambale, Second Secretary, Zimbabwe High Commission

Meetings with RQAN applicants:

- 14.30 Rosie Chekenya
- 15.00 Tesfaye Wolde
- 15.30 Chela Silwamba

ZAMBIA COUNTRY NOTES

Background

IOM has been returning qualified African nationals to Zambia since 1989, when it was one of six target countries in which the second phase of these programmes were implemented. Under RQAN II, 63 persons were returned to Zambia. As of 30 June 1998, there have been 27 returnees to Zimbabwe under the current programme, which represents 6% of the total returned as of that date.

The IOM office in Lusaka is situated in the central business district in modest premises. Staff consists of the Head of the Office, who is also the project manager, and two locally-recruited staff, one acting as programme assistant and accountant, the other as general support staff.

The RQAN programme is the primary one undertaken by the office in Lusaka. The only other projects offer assistance in resettlement of refugees to the United States and Canada. In addition, the Head of Office serves as liaison to the SADC Employment and Labor Sector, which is based in Lusaka. Although approximately 80% of the work of the office is related to RQAN, only 38.5% of the total budgeted staff and office costs are charged to the RQAN project, with an additional 55.3% of costs being supported by IOM's discretionary income. This represents an IOM contribution to the programme.

Activities undertaken

During a three-day visit to Lusaka, in addition to wide-ranging discussions with project management, a total of 12 semi-structured interviews were held with

- The government counterpart
- Two employers of returnees (one private, one public)
- Three returnees (one private, two public)
- A representative of the technical institute
- The EU programme officer
- The National Authorising Officer
- The deputy resident representative of UNDP
- Two additional members of the support group (one private, one public)
- The Public Service Management Division

The interview guide is attached to the general report as Annex II

The agenda for the visit to Zambia is at the end of this note..

During the visit case records were examined for content, as were minutes of the support group meetings. Accounting records were reviewed for the sole purpose of ascertaining what accounting information is provided to IOM Headquarters.

Return targets

The original target for returns to Zambia was established at 43, against which there have been a total of 27 at 30 June 1998, or 62.8%. Considering that the programme was originally to

have ended by 31 December of this year, to reach the target would have required 16 returns in 6 months, which would have been highly unlikely, given current returns.

The programme in Zambia faces a problem in that the number of returnees who accept a job offer and complete their processing, and who in the end refuse to return, is relatively high. There have been 11 candidates in this category, which is a refusal rate of 28.9%. This compares to no cases that have refused to return in Zimbabwe.

Over time, there have been no discernible trends in the sector of return:

Year	Total returns	Public/private ratio
1995	3	3/0
1996	12	10/2
1997	6	6/0
1998 (6 months)	6	3/3

Adherence to established procedures

There are a significant number of forms established by Central Management to guide and monitor the RQAN programme which is implemented in three Recruitment Missions and anywhere from 7-9 Placement Missions, depending on when the count is taken (Angola was dropped as a target country as of 1 July 1998, and IOM has suspended its presence in Guinea-Bissau due to the current instability there.) A list of these forms is included in Annex XIII.

Project management in Zambia in general makes consistent use of all forms and reporting tools that are applicable to placement missions, but finds the reporting tools to be rather time-consuming.

There has been some lag in the use of established procedures and reporting as far as the 12- and 24-month follow-up with returnees on reintegration. This is the result of difficulties in getting returnees to return their forms. Although forms have been sent out to the returnees, the simple sending of forms is not usually sufficient to ensure adequate response, even though returnees are required to complete and return these forms as part of their reintegration agreement. The Head of Office recognizes that follow-up is required.

The limited number of interviews that were conducted with returnees and employers did not reveal any evidence of dissatisfaction with the way in which the programme has been implemented. Rather the comments were generally favorable. It was quite apparent throughout the evaluation visit that the Head of Office was familiar with those who had returned and had had contact with them after return.

There were no negative comments about the speed at which the programme was able to organize the return, although one returnee commented on the length of time that it took for Central Management to approve his case. It should be noted here that there are no statistics kept on the average length of time that it takes for a case to be processed, from the time that the application is approved to the time that they return. A manual calculation made from the database on the Zambia caseload shows the following average times between points in the process:

	Approve/Match	Match/Depart	Approve/Depart
IOM located job	85	75	160
Found own job	108	24	132
All	94	56	149

For the four returnees interviewed the average time between approval and departure was 236 days, substantially above the average, so any positive comments could not be attributed to this small group having been processed at a faster than normal pace.

The Head of Office in Lusaka has undertaken a number of promotional activities, which have included interviews in the mass media, visits to representatives of diplomatic missions, employers and their organizations, etc. The single activity that produced the most response in terms of candidates was a recruitment mission to Botswana with two members of the Support Group. A proposal for a similar mission to London was not carried out as the Zambian community there refused to meet with the representatives.

Statistics kept by project management indicate that of the 23 candidates whose files were closed by IOM Lusaka, 11 were closed because the candidate refused to return. Others were closed because the available information on the candidate was insufficient, they took up another job, or because the candidate could not subsequently be located.

Two particularly difficult refusal cases were reported in the private sector. After the job offer had been accepted, the employer had gone to considerable lengths to prepare for the return, by securing housing, buying a car, organizing office space, etc., only to have the candidate refuse to return at the last minute. This naturally creates problems for the programme's credibility, and could influence the decision of others in the private sector whether to use RQAN programme services or not. No specific reasons were offered for the refusals, just that it was probably due to "conditions in Zambia".

It would certainly appear to be the case for Zambia that positions in priority sectors are not the limiting factor, but rather the lack of qualified Zambian candidates. Support for this can be found in the number of expatriates working in technical assistance projects in 1995. The two sectors of health (305) and education (672) accounted for substantially more placements than have been made under RQAN in its more than three years of work. It certainly is more efficient to focus programme resources on the limiting factor, the candidates, rather than on the positions.

Cost-effectiveness

The way in which the accounting for the RQAN programme is handled does not lend itself to an easy analysis of the "internal" measure of cost-effectiveness, that is whether the programme is delivering the outputs foreseen at the cost which was budgeted.

IOM Lusaka has the following pieces of financial information available to it:

- The proposed budget, and by inference, its approval
- A record, the "Matched Candidate Registration Form", of what the recruitment mission has agreed with the candidate on the distribution of the financial package
- Office accounting records, which show disbursements made by the office in the course of a month

While these records suffice for the office to monitor expenditures against the approved budget, it does not give the office a complete picture of the financing of the programme. There is thus no way for local programme management to answer questions from the sponsor, government, or anyone else, about the overall cost-effectiveness of the programme. Even the semi-annual report to the EU made by IOM Central Management contains little information which would enable that question to be answered.

By the same token it was not possible for the evaluator to make any judgements about whether the programme was operating within budget, other than in a most limited way, i.e., by comparing local budget with local expenditures. These are by far the smallest part of expenditures.

Looking externally, there are other ways in which candidates for vacant positions can and are being recruited. The private sector, particularly international firms, can recruit through their own networks. No local private recruitment agencies that recruit internationally were identified. The Government of Zambia does still occasionally hire internationally, but no longer has recruitment drives. To the extent that recruitment is done, it is through their embassies, and is rather more reception of individual request than an organized effort. In the past the Government was able to offer inducement allowances, but now all they can do is pay for airfares. No data could be discovered on what any of these alternatives may cost.

In discussions with the government, it appears that in their recruitment of expatriates for the public sector, the only benefit that is provided is the provision of an air ticket. This is of course far less than the package of benefits offered by IOM, but is nonetheless a benefit. The government appears to be currently unable to provide air tickets to returning nationals.

Relationship with Central Management

The Lusaka Head of Office has had a positive response to Central Management directives, as is evidenced by generally good compliance with planning and reporting documents instituted by CM. However, he feels that the programme in Zambia needs more support from Central Management in order to meet its goals. He finds that, although Central Management appropriately is concerned with the overall direction of the programme, more specific assistance to Zambia is needed.

Significance of IOM as a factor in return

Of the 4 returnees interviewed during the visit, all stated that they would have stayed and worked, either legally or illegally, in the country of application if RQAN assistance had not been available. The assistance offered by the RQAN project most often mentioned as significant was the financial assistance. On the other hand, it was clear that these four had made a decision to leave (and in three cases to return home – the fourth is a non-Zambian), and that RQAN was what enabled them to carry that decision out.

Support group

A review of the minutes of the Support Group meetings reveals that they are reasonably well-attended. Members are paid a “sitting fee” for attendance, which they have recently proposed be increased. The interest of the private sector representatives does appear to be somewhat limited, as shown by their attendance.

While the Support Group has been active in trying to devise ways to develop the programme, the most notable achievement, the production of a brochure to publicize the programme, took somewhat over two years to bring to fruition. From the minutes, it appears that the delay was due in large part to the private sector members who had been tasked with the development of the brochure.

Another idea, the inclusion of a representative of returnees' association in the work of the Support Group, although first mentioned in the minutes of the 20 March 1996 meeting, has yet to happen. Thus active interest and support has not yet translated very efficiently into concrete results.

Although not strictly applicable to RQAN III, the IOM office in Lusaka did a follow-up survey on those individuals who returned under the previous phase, which took place from 1989 to 1993. The status of the 63 returnees at the end of 1995, two years after the programme was closed, was as follows:

Status	Number	Percentage
Remained with original employer	40	63.5%
Remained in country, new employer	7	11.1%
Left the country	6	9.5%
Deceased	4	6.3%
No trace	6	9.5%

The overall retention rate to the country of 75% two years after the programme ended can be considered good, although no indicator of achievement was established against which that percentage could be measured.

There is underway in Zambia a restructuring of the public service, which, if it proceeds as planned, could have some implications for the RQAN programme. What is planned is a reduction in the numbers employed in the public service, from around 139,000 to 80,000 over the period of two years. Part of the savings from this reduction would go to improve the conditions of service of those who remain, to approximate 75% of remuneration in the private sector. Such improvements, if carried out, could make the public service a more attractive option for returning Zambians.

ZAMBIA (18-22 July 1998)**SCHEDULE OF MEETINGS****Saturday, 18 July**

19.00: Arrival Lusaka

Monday, 20 July

09.00 Discussions at IOM Lusaka

13.00 Lunch break

15.00 Meeting with Mrs. Joan Pilcher, EU Officer-in-Charge of RQAN Phase III and EU Representative of the RQAN Support Group

Tuesday, 21 July 1998

08.30 Meeting with Mrs. Celestina Kabalu, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Finance and Development, National Authorising Officer of EU Projects (at EU Commission)

09.15 Meeting with Mr. I. Wamulwange, Principal Inspector – Teacher Training and Support Group Member representing Ministry of Education

10.00 Meeting with Mrs. Joan Nonde, Deputy Executive Director, Zambia Federation of Employers, Representative of the Support Group

10.45 Meeting with Mr. Darlington Kapasu, RQAN beneficiary and Manager, Barclays Bank of Zambia, Ltd.

11.30 Meeting with Dr. Gabriel Bwembya, Lecturer, Chemistry Dept., University of Zambia

12.15 Meeting with Dr. Oliver Lulembo, Project Officer and RQAN beneficiary, Irish Aid, Embassy of Ireland

13.00 Lunch Break

14.00 Meeting with Mr. Arthur Yoyo, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Labour and Social Security.

15.30 Meeting with Mr. Michael Soko, Assistant Resident Representative, UNDP

16.0 Meeting with Dr. Joshua Kanganja, Permanent Secretary, Public Service Management Division

Wednesday, 22 July

0.8.15 Meeting with Director of Personnel (Employer), Barclays Bank of Zambia, Ltd.

09.00 Meeting with Dr. Mutenda, Executive Director (Employer), UTH

09.45 Meeting with Mrs. Maureen Daura, Dept. Economics, University of Zambia

ZIMBABWE COUNTRY NOTES

Background

IOM has been returning qualified African nationals to Zimbabwe since 1983, and it was one of the first three African countries in which these programmes were implemented. Under RQAN I, 235 persons were returned to Zimbabwe, which was 67% of the total returned. In RQAN II, 151 persons returned under the programme, or 24% of the total under that programme. As of 30 June 1998, there have been 57 returnees to Zimbabwe, which represents 12% of the total returned to all countries under RQAN III as of that date.

The IOM office in Harare is situated in the central business district in modest premises. Staff consists of the Head of the Office, who is also the project manager, and two locally-recruited staff, one acting as programme assistant and accountant, the other as general support staff.

The RQAN programme is the primary one undertaken by the office in Zimbabwe, but other projects include offering facilitated passage schemes, primarily to students, and assisting in resettlement of individual refugee cases. Approximately 15% of the total staff and office costs are charged to the RQAN project. However, when the appropriate percentage of the Head of Office's time is included, this rises to 75%. As the Head of Office is an Associate Expert, his cost is not charged to the project.

Activities undertaken

During a three-day visit to Harare, in addition to wide-ranging discussions with project management, a total of 13 semi-structured interviews were held with

- The government counterpart
- Four employers of returnees (two private, two public)
- Five returnees (two private, two public, one self-employed)
- A representative of the technical institute
- The EU programme officer
- A representative of UNDP

The interview guide is attached to the general report as Annex II.

The agenda for the visit to Zimbabwe appears at the end of this note.

During the visit case records were examined for content, as were minutes of the support group meetings. Accounting records were reviewed for the sole purpose of ascertaining what accounting information is provided to IOM Headquarters.

Productivity

Making reference to the indicators established by the programme under the heading "Implementation", the programme in Zimbabwe can be confirmed to be operating with high productivity.

Return targets

The original target for returns to Zimbabwe was established at 45, which target was met in January 1998. A revised target of 65 was established, which local project management expects to have met by the end of the third quarter of 1998 (as at 30 June, returns stand at 57).

Returns have been distributed among the priority sectors as follows:

Sector	Public	Private	Total
Health	16	6	22
General Management	1	10	11
Agriculture	3	5	8
Education	7	1	8
Engineering	0	5	5
Tourism	0	1	1
Industrial Development	0	1	1
Architecture	0	1	1
Total	27	30	57

Over time, returns have shown greater sectoral diversity and an increasing emphasis on the private sector:

Year	Total returns	Sectors of return	Public/private ratio
1995	8	2	6/2
1996	12	5	5/7
1997	24	5	10/14
1998 (6 months)	13	7	6/7

Adherence to established procedures

There are a significant number of forms established by Central Management to guide and monitor the RQAN programme which is implemented in three Recruitment Missions and eight Placement Missions. A list of these is attached as Annex XIII.

Project management in Zimbabwe in general makes very consistent use of all forms and reporting tools that are applicable to placement missions, and reports that they are found useful and not unduly time-consuming.

Feedback is generally received from missions to whom these forms are sent. One management reporting form that was reportedly never responded to was the mid-term report on progress to objectives established in the 6-month operational plan. This particular report is a brief summation of what has already been reported in the monthly reports required, and its value should be verified by CM.

Where there has been significant lag in the use of established procedures and reporting is in the 12 and 24 month follow-up with returnees on reintegration. This is the result of inadequate follow-up with returnees to encourage them to return their forms. Although forms have been sent out to the returnees, the simple sending of forms has generally not proven sufficient to ensure adequate response, even though returnees are required to complete and return these forms as part of their reintegration agreement. The Head of Office recognizes this as a weakness which requires follow-up.

The limited number of interviews that were conducted with returnees and employers evidenced considerable satisfaction with the way in which the programme has been implemented. The most notable comments related to the follow-up that has been conducted by the Harare office after return. It was quite apparent throughout the evaluation visit that the Head of Office was very familiar with those who had returned and had had considerable contact with them after return. All returnees spoke very warmly of the personal contact with the Head of Office and the follow-up provided after return. Similar comment were received from the employers, but more related to communication before return. One of the most appreciated activities of the programme was in keeping the employer informed about the status of the candidate and the return. While the candidates interviewed can by no means be viewed as a representative sample, the consistency with which those interviewed mentioned the high degree of satisfaction with the communication of information by IOM gives some weight to this component as a programme strength.

As well as communication, the speed at which the programme was able to organize the return also received uniformly favorable comment. However, it should be noted here that there are no statistics kept on the average length of time that it takes for a case to be processed from the time that the application is approved to the time that they return. It could thus be that the limited number of interviewees were processed at a faster pace than average.

It was very hard to elicit any negative comments about the programme from the persons interviewed, even though these interviews were conducted in the absence of project management and with a promise of confidentiality. There was an extraordinary degree of satisfaction with the programme and the way in which it was run, even though there were concerns expressed about the general situation of the country, problems in adjustment, etc.

The Head of Office in Harare spends a relatively large percentage of time (estimated at 25%-30%) on what may be termed promotional activities, in great part directly related to the RQAN programme, but also general activities aimed at raising the profile of the Organization which serves the RQAN programme as well. These activities include interviews in the mass media, visits to representatives of diplomatic missions, employers and their organization, etc. The single activity that produced the most response in terms of candidates was a brief programme on the BBC. While it is difficult to ascribe increases in returns to any one activity, the intensified outreach on the part of the IOM mission in early 1997 coincided with an increase in returns as well, as movements in the first 6 months of that year were 8, and in the second half of the year there were 16, or double. In the only full other year for which arrivals can be compared, 1996, arrivals were evenly split between the two halves of the year.

Nearly all of the candidates that have returned to Zimbabwe have either made the initial contact with the employer themselves or had a job identified for them by IOM. In only one of the 57 cases returned by IOM has a candidate been recruited by a mission in a developed country for a position identified by IOM Harare. With this record, local project management

has judged the use of project resources to develop specific job offers for recruitment missions to fill to be ineffective and thus has discontinued that activity.

Statistics kept by project management reveal that of the 58 regular candidates (non-intra-regional) whose files were closed by IOM Harare, 5 were closed either because the programme was not a significant factor in the return or because they were not in a priority sector. The vast majority of cases were closed because the candidate either took up another job, either in Zimbabwe or another country, or because the candidate could not subsequently be located.

It would certainly appear to be the case for Zimbabwe that positions in priority sectors are not the limiting factor, but rather the lack of qualified Zimbabwean candidates. Support for this can be found in the issuance in 1996 of 989 temporary work permits for expatriates. Even if numbers for private companies, churches, and non-governmental organizations are eliminated, there were still 385 permits issued for expatriates to work in the public sector and parastatals, a number which dwarfs the 12 persons that RQAN returned that year. It certainly is more efficient to focus programme resources on the limiting factor, the candidates, rather than on the positions.

Cost-effectiveness

The way in which the accounting for the RQAN programme is handled does not lend itself to an easy analysis of the “internal” measure of cost-effectiveness, that is whether the programme is delivering the outputs foreseen at the cost which was budgeted.

IOM Harare has the following pieces of financial information available to it:

- The proposed budget, and by inference, its approval
- A record, the “Matched Candidate Registration Form”, of what the recruitment mission has agreed with the candidate on the distribution of the financial package
- Office accounting records, which show disbursements made by the office in the course of a month

While the available records suffice for the office to monitor expenditures against the approved budget, this in no way enables the office to have a complete picture of the financing of the programme in the country. Only the kind of information provided in the above table gives some of that data for expenditures on candidates, but nothing on staff and office costs. Without this there is thus no way for local programme management to answer questions from the sponsor, government, or anyone else, about the overall cost-effectiveness of the programme. During the evaluation visit, the EU representative mentioned that she had recently raised a question about where expenditures under the programme stood, which the IOM office was not able to answer through the information available locally. Even the semi-annual report to the EU made by IOM Central Management does not contain any financial information which would enable that question to be answered.

By the same token it was not possible for the evaluator to make any judgements about whether the programme was operating within budget, other than in a most limited way, i.e., by comparing local budget with local expenditures. As local costs are by far the smallest part of expenditures, such a comparison is of limited utility. It does, however, demonstrate that local management is keeping within the budget that they control

Looking externally, there are other ways in which candidates for vacant positions can and are being recruited. The Government of Zimbabwe has a Committee on Foreign Recruitment,

chaired by the Government Counterpart, which monitors foreign recruitment. The Department of Public Service, Labour, and Social Welfare issued a report in January 1998, covering 1996, showing a 33.9% decrease in the number of temporary employment permits issued for foreigners in 1996 as compared to 1995. Even with this decrease, the number of permits issued was 898, compared to which IOM returned 12 persons in that year.

Certainly there are employment agencies operating in Zimbabwe which may include recruitment from abroad. There are also intra-company transfers in the private sector, and, in the public sector, the recruitment of expatriates to fill necessary positions, for which the government provides transportation. No hard data has been compiled on what each of these alternatives may cost, as such information was not found.

In discussions with the government, it appears that in their recruitment of expatriates for the public sector, the only benefit that is provided is the provision of an air ticket. This would of course cost far less than the package of benefits offered by IOM, but the government is currently unable to offer to provide air tickets to returning nationals. The actual recruitment does not appear to be done globally by a single government entity, but rather by the entity involved. In one specific example, the University of Zimbabwe has the possibility to recruit overseas through membership in various associations of universities, at a cost to them which is less than making their own recruiting trips or arranging for the candidates to travel to Zimbabwe for an interview. However, the evaluator was unable to quantify the cost to them of recruiting through these associations. They would also pay for the airfare of the person being hired, but not for other items covered by RQAN, such as shipment of household effects.

Relationship with Central Management

The Harare Head of Office has had a generally positive response to Central Management directives, as is evidenced by substantial compliance with planning and reporting documents instituted by CM. He finds that generally such tools are appropriate to the programme. He reports that CM is prompt in responding to requests, provides feedback and advice on reports submitted. The Harare office has also been permitted to increasingly act in an independent fashion within the programme. One potential area for yet increased independence on the part of the mission would be avoiding the requirement for CM to approve the integration agreement.

It was reported by IOM Harare that the transfer of the CM from Geneva to Nairobi went smoothly, with sufficient information and guidance in advance of the move. Correspondence from CM reveals that advance notice was given, but also that full responsibilities were not again taken up by CM in Nairobi until 10 March 1998, representing a slippage of some 5-6 weeks beyond the end January date originally foreseen.

Significance of IOM as a factor in return

Of the 5 returnees interviewed during the visit, one would have stayed in the country of application, two would have gone to another country, one would have delayed return to accumulate more money, and one would "have come back much poorer and perhaps packed it in after a year".

The assistance offered by the RQAN project most often mentioned as significant were the financial assistance and the information provided by IOM, about the programme, the situation in the country, the response to specific questions, etc. The candidates expressed a much higher level of confidence about their return knowing that there was an institutional resource in-country to which they could turn.

Support group

There was unanimous praise for the Support Group meetings as a way of exchanging information among all stakeholders in the programme, including returnees and employers. It is also used as a means of verifying priority sectors. It seems to have been successful at building support for the programme among stakeholders, but there is little evidence of its having had an effect beyond that limited group. In fact the inability of IOM to be able to attend as an observer the meetings of the Foreign Recruitment Committee, which is chaired by the Government Counterpart, is evidence of the Support Group's limited impact.

The only attempt that the SG made at sustainability, setting up a sub-committee to explore the issue and make recommendations, was not successful, and only had one meeting.

ZIMBABWE (14 - 17 July 1998)**SCHEDULE OF MEETINGS****Tuesday, 14 July**

- a.m. Arrival Harare
- p.m. Preparation of Evaluation

Wednesday, 15 July

- 08.00 IOM Harare — morning session with RQAN III programme management
- 09.00 Meeting with Mrs. Gopal — public employer (Ministry of Health counterpart – Ministry of Health and Child Welfare, Principal Executive Officer)
- 11.30 Meeting with Mrs. Muranda — public employer (University of Zimbabwe counterpart – Director of Public Relations)
- 13.00 Meeting with Dr. Lindiwe Sibanda — private employer (Managing Director of Linds Agricultural Services)
- 14.30 Meeting with Dr. Gutsa — public employer (principal Government counterpart – Ministry of Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare/Chief of Labour Research and Statistics office and Chairman of Foreign Recruitment Committee); Dr. Mutapuri (principal Government trainee – Ministry of Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare/Assistant Chief of Labour Research and Statistics Office)
- 17.30 Meeting with Mr. Mukubvu — self-employer - technical institution (Assistant National Director of EMPRETEC)

Thursday, 16 July

- 08.45 Meeting with Mr. Tulani Mhlanga — public sector returnee (Principal Medical Laboratory Technologist, Parirenyatwa Hospital)
- 10.45 Meeting with Dr. Ntando Tebele — private sector returnee (Senior Consultant in Livestock Division, Linds Agricultural Services)
- 14.30 Meeting with Mrs. Sumie Utsunomiya (Special Assistant to the UNDP Res. Rep. and UN Res. Coordinator Dr. Lopes)
- 16.30 Meeting with Dr. Munyaradzi Rumhizha — public sector returnee (Senior Registrar, Cardio-Vascular Surgeon, Parirenyatwa Hospital)

Friday, 17 July

- 09.30 Meeting with Mrs. Caroline Valette (Attaché, RQAN Desk officer, Delegation of the EU Commission in Zimbabwe)

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- 11.30 Meeting with Mrs. Angela Noonan — private sector returnee (Programme Manager, NCR Zimbabwe) and Mr. Francis Madyara — private sector employer (Professional Services Coach)
- 14.30 Meeting with Dr. Robert Tregidgo — self-employed returnee (Managing Director of First Phase Enterprises (Pvt) Ltd.)

Saturday, 18 July

p.m. Departure Harare

Terms, Definitions, Baselines and Benchmarks
for RQAN III Terminal Evaluation

Term and Definition	Baseline of Comparison	Indicators (Benchmarks) of Achievement	Means of Verification
<p>Sustainability (<i>programme's transferability</i>) – The programme can be said to have made acceptable advancement towards sustainability if the programme has created the possibility for its knowledge and influence to be sustained by 1) providing host government officials and relevant institutions with the opportunity to learn, apply and institutionalise programme principles and techniques; 2) inviting the involvement of key persons who have responsibility for manpower development and/or utilisation in working to strengthen institutional capacities to promote the voluntary return of nationals from abroad; 3) leaving a potential network of returnees, who hold the capacity to encourage the continued return from abroad of trained and experienced nationals like themselves; 4) providing the opportunity for the SE TI (in countries where this applies) to strengthen its capacity to support nationals returning from abroad to establish SE.</p>	<p>1) Participating institutions' traditional / previous / current (during Phase III) norms and practices.</p> <p>2) Institutions' recognised weaknesses/ obstacles / knowledge or skills gaps</p>	<p>1) Government Counterpart Institution staff are invited to attend structured and/or participatory training in programme techniques.</p> <p>2) Representatives of other institutions are invited to attend advisory meetings, structured and/or participatory training, and individualised discussions through which they can learn programme principles and techniques.</p> <p>3) At least 70% of counterparts are acquainted with procedures required for the recruitment and placement of nationals residing abroad.</p> <p>4) Returnee contact information is maintained and shared with the GC Institution. Returnees are invited to serve as information sources and resource persons.</p> <p>5) In target countries where SE returns have taken place, the TI has gained experience in advising and assisting nationals returning from abroad to establish SE upon return.</p>	<p>1) Government Counterpart training plans and reports of training</p> <p>2) Support Group Meeting minutes</p> <p>3) Monthly Reports</p> <p>4) Institution Survey</p>

COMPARISON OF COSTS AMONG THREE QUALIFIED RETURN PROJECTS

Year	Cost Type	Nicaragua	RQAN	Bosnia	Grand Total
		771-243	802-243	RQN-800	
1994	STAFF COSTS	97,978	86,327		184,305
	OFFICE COSTS	44,769	90,938		135,706
	OHD ALLOCATION	13,561	16,840		30,401
	PROCESSING COSTS	652,189	54		652,243
1994 Total		808,497	194,158		1,002,655
1995	STAFF COSTS	153,958	558,490		712,448
	OFFICE COSTS	27,544	280,704		308,248
	OHD ALLOCATION	17,243	79,723		96,966
	PROCESSING COSTS	259,498	455,262		714,760
1995 Total		458,243	1,374,180		1,832,423
1996	STAFF COSTS	165,217	890,823	69,083	1,125,123
	OFFICE COSTS	15,716	344,526	59,680	419,922
	OHD ALLOCATION	17,189	117,358	12,233	146,779
	PROCESSING COSTS	122,145	1,278,345	595	1,401,085
1996 Total		320,266	2,631,053	141,591	3,092,909
1997	STAFF COSTS	81,483	455,831	256,568	793,882
	OFFICE COSTS	21,913	230,775	135,667	388,354
	OHD ALLOCATION	9,823	67,127	37,262	114,212
	PROCESSING COSTS	128,862	1,586,742	714,428	2,430,032
1997 Total		242,081	2,340,475	1,143,925	3,726,480
1998	STAFF COSTS	129	460,699	288,620	749,448
	OFFICE COSTS		179,730	162,542	342,272
	OHD ALLOCATION	12	60,841	42,860	103,713
	PROCESSING COSTS	47,491	1,529,886	2,134,354	3,711,731
1998 Total		47,632	2,231,157	2,628,376	4,907,165
Grand Total		1,876,718	8,771,023	3,913,891	14,561,632

Total Processing Costs	1,210,185	4,850,290	2,849,377	8,909,851
% Processing Costs	64.48%	55.30%	72.80%	61.19%

Phase I - Direct and Indirect Costs (1983 - 86/87)

PHASE I Country	No. of Returnees	Direct Costs USD	Indirect Costs*	Total	Dir %	Indir %	Indirect Per Capita	Overall
								Per Capita
3 Countries	351	1,580,268	1,552,729	3,132,997	50.4%	49.6%	4,424	8,926

Phase II - Direct and Indirect Costs (1987 - September 1991)

PHASE II Country	No. of Returnees	Direct Costs USD	Indirect Costs*	Total	Dir %	Indir %	Indirect Per Capita	Overall
								Per Capita
6 + non-target	619	4,094,225	2,063,134	6,157,359	66.5%	33.5%	3,333	9,947

Phase III - Direct and Indirect Costs (1995 - 1998)

PHASE III Country	No. of Returnees	Direct Costs USD	Indirect Costs*	Total	Dir %	Indir %	Indirect Per Capita	Overall
								Per Capita
11 + non-target	539	7,161,305	1,261,812	8,423,117	85.0%	15.0%	2,341	15,627

* excludes monitoring and evaluation

Source: *Phases I and II - RQAN Final Report (Amershi, Consultant, January 1992)*
Phase III - IOM Financial Report, March 1999

RETURN OF QUALIFIED AFRICAN NATIONALS
SUMMARY REPORT - COST ESTIMATE AND FINANCING PLAN

January 1995 - December 1998

I	DIRECT COSTS	EXPEND.	EXPEND.	BUDGET
1	Direct support to returnees	USD	ECU	ECU
1a	Direct support to returnees from industrialized countries to target countries	3,302,996	2,663,706	
1b	Direct support to placed cases on intra-regional basis	251,300	202,661	
1c	Costs of cases exceeding the indicative number plus costs of returnees to other countries	1,173,326	946,231	0
1d	Direct support to self-employed cases (in loan form)	116,382	93,856	
	Sub total I.1	4,844,004	3,906,455	
2	Direct programme activity costs for the recruitment and placement of returnees			
2a	Direct support costs for predeparture assistance / programme information, dissemination, identification, pre-selection, recruitment and counselling	762,349	614,798	
2b	Direct support costs for job identification and placement	576,815	465,173	
2c	Direct support costs for project monitoring and followup of the reintegration process	708,622	571,469	0
2d	Direct support costs for activities related to self employment	156,839	126,483	
2e	Collection and assessment of available manpower plans for development priorities in the field of socio-economic development	10,243	8,260	0
	Sub total I.2	2,214,868	1,786,184	
3	Institutional building / counterpart training	102,433	82,607	
	Sub total I.3	102,433	82,607	
	TOTAL I.	7,161,305	5,775,246	8,899,000
II	INDIRECT / ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS			
1	African ACP countries (General office/communications/transport)	719,253	580,043	
2	Industrialized countries (same as above)	542,559	437,548	

	TOTAL II.	1,261,812	1,017,590	2,498,396
III	EVALUATION, MONITORING (TECHNICAL AND MANAGERIAL BACKSTOPPING) AND AUDITING			
1	Evaluation			
1a	Monitoring and surveys (including midterm)	3,137	2,530	
1b	Backstopping missions	68,644	55,358	
1c	End of project evaluation seminar			
	<i>Sub total III.1</i>	<i>71,781</i>	<i>57,888</i>	
2	External auditing (one)	0		
	<i>Sub total III.2</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>0</i>	
	TOTAL III	71,781	57,888	1,373,331
	GRAND TOTAL EXPENDITURES	8,494,898	6,850,724	12,770,727
	GRAND TOTAL INCOME RECEIVED THROUGH 1998	8,150,725	6,573,165	
	NET UNDERFUNDING CARRIEDFORWARD	344,173	277,559	

Footnotes:

- General note: Exchange rate 1ECU : USD1.24
- Office costs for ACP countries includes O/H and office costs incurred on behalf of missions at HQ.
 - Ops costs for self-employed and intra-regional cases are included under industrialized countries since costs are covered at HQ.
 - Point 1.1c. includes HQ ops costs for 1995
 - Actual expenditures were reclassified from IOM accounts in order to prepare the above presentation in the original line items of the Budget. While the reclassification process is detailed, below is a brief summary which should provide you with their principal categories (in USD): ("administrative" includes staff, office, and related costs, "operational" includes payments to returnees)

Budget line items:

	<u>Administrative</u>	<u>Operational</u>	<u>Total</u>
Part I	2,317,301	4,844,004	7,161,305
Part II	1,261,812	0	1,261,812
Part III	71,781	0	71,781
Total	<u>3,650,894</u>	<u>4,844,004</u>	<u>8,494,898</u>

**EXPENDITURE/MOVEMENT DATA
1995-1998**

ANNEX XIII

Office	1995 Expense	1995 Movements	1995 \$/capita	1996 Expenses	1996 Movements	1996 \$/capita	1997 Expenses	1997 Movements	1997 \$/capita	1998 Expenses	1998 Movements	1998 \$/capita	1995-98 Expenses	1995-98 Movements	1995-98 \$/capita	Sum of '95-'98 (from totalling 4 columns)
Angola	9,817			3,426	3	1,142	2,788	3	929	1,201	1	1,201	17,232	7	2,462	17,232
Belgium	21,223			48,432		48,432	-5,709		-5,709	45			63,997	0		63,991
Cape Verde					7	0	28,821	4	7,205	13,256	10	1,326	54,913	21	2,615	42,077
Congo	5,159		5,159	6,883	2	3,442		1	0		1	0	12,042	4	3,011	12,042
Ethiopia*	37,788	3	12,596	40,531	12	3,378	32,175	16	2,011	15,669	4	3,917	126,173	35	3,605	126,163
Geneva	352,986			456,535	4	114,134	149,612	13	11,509	97,583	0		1,056,727	17	62,160	1,056,716
Germany	2,082		2,082	55,045	1	55,045	17,041	3	5,680	19	0		74,194	4	18,549	74,187
Ghana*	100,624	21	4,792	128,551	29	4,433	25,856	11	2,351	9,927	2	4,964	264,974	63	4,206	264,958
Great Britain	111,759	32	3,492	119,052	41	2,904	102,950	47	2,190	79,550	36	2,210	413,327	156	2,650	413,311
Guinea-Bissau	2,675	2	1,338	2,227	13	171	27,901	33	845	11,594	10	1,159	44,400	58	766	44,397
Kenya*	11,512	8	1,439	20,953	16	1,310	27,215	15	1,814	13,608	8	1,701	73,303	47	1,560	73,288
Mozambique	3,433	1	3,433	55,720	5	11,144	31,835	5	6,367		1	0	90,990	12	7,583	90,988
Portugal	36,403	2	18,202	85,552	36	2,376	64,500	43	1,500	17,349	20	867	203,826	101	2,018	203,804
South Africa	3,485		3,485	8,919	6	1,487	12,014	10	1,201	9,606	7	1,372	34,030	30	1,134	34,024
Uganda	816	7	117	70,330	8	8,791	59,545	32	1,861	15,757	11	1,432	146,460	58	2,525	146,448
USA	56,525	21	2,692	83,272	59	1,411	89,446	44	2,033	46,177	10	4,618	275,435	134	2,055	275,420
Zambia	122,302	3	40,767	114,951	12	9,579	68,717	6	11,453	8,146	6	1,358	314,133	33	9,519	314,116
Zimbabwe*	39,163	9	4,351	38,401	13	2,954	15,196	25	608	3,878	13	298	96,654	60	1,611	96,638
Other movements (no staff and office costs)		7	0		29	0		24	0		13	0		73	0	
Other costs (no budget)	1,099			1,878			3,751			9			6,737			
Total of column	918,851	116	7,921	1,340,658	296	4,529	753,654	335	2,250	343,374	153	2,244	3,369,547	900	3,744	3,356,537
Total (in summary page)	918,911			1,352,696			753,724			343,436			3,368,803			

*Countries of destination who also recruited some intra-regional candidates

Kenya expenditures were \$72,788 in the first 6 months of 1998. Much of the increase was due to the shift of Central Management to Nairobi in January 1998. As no figures are available breaking down the cost of Central Management functions vs those of Kenya Project Management functions, Kenya was arbitrarily assumed to have had for January-June 1998 one-half of the expense level of the full year 1997, which was \$27,215. The difference, \$59,180 was added to Geneva, as representing Central Management functions.

Financial Data (O:scott/rqan/financial - working per capita)

**PER CAPITA COST ADJUSTED
FOR DIFFERENCES IN COST OF LIVING**

ANNEX XIV

Office	1995-98 Expenses	1995-98 Movement	1995-98 \$/ Post adjustment rate	30/06 Adjusted per capita	Office	Adjusted by Office	Local salary	Local salary adjt	Unadjusted per c	Adjusted b	Movements/salary
Guinea-Bissau	44,400	58	766	1.279	599 Guinea-Bissau	599 Guinea-Bis	\$7,260	1.07260	766	714	9.48
South Africa	34,030	30	1,134	1.108	1,024 South Africa	1,024 South Afric	\$9,588	1.09588	1,134	1,035	8.45
Zimbabwe*	96,654	60	1,611	1.068	1,508 Zimbabwe*	1,508 Zimbabwe'	\$2,577	1.02577	1,611	1,570	1.60
Portugal	203,826	101	2,018	1.205	1,675 Portugal	1,675 Portugal	\$19,054	1.19054	2,018	1,695	9.44
USA	275,435	134	2,055	1.119	1,837 Angola	1,748 Angola	\$12,684	1.12684	2,462	2,185	5.15
Angola	17,232	7	2,462	1.408	1,748 USA	1,837 USA	\$30,180	1.30180	2,055	1,579	14.68
Uganda	146,460	58	2,525	1.312	1,925 Great Britain	1,750 Great Brita	\$31,605	1.31605	2,650	2,013	11.93
Cape Verde	54,913	21	2,615	1.176	2,224 Uganda	1,925 Uganda	\$6,173	1.06173	2,525	2,378	2.44
Great Britain	413,327	156	2,650	1.514	1,750 Cape Verde	2,224 Cape Verd	\$11,736	1.11736	2,615	2,340	4.49
Kenya*	73,303	47	1,560	1.224	1,274 Congo	2,233 Congo	\$10,260	1.10260	3,011	2,730	3.41
Congo	12,042	4	3,011	1.348	2,233 Kenya*	1,274 Kenya*	\$10,028	1.10028	1,560	1,417	6.43
Ethiopia*	126,173	35	3,605	1.186	3,040 Ethiopia*	3,040 Ethiopia*	\$4,813	1.04813	3,605	3,439	1.34
Ghana*	264,974	63	4,206	1.206	3,488 Ghana*	3,488 Ghana*	\$6,674	1.06674	4,206	3,943	1.59
Mozambique	90,990	12	7,583	1.204	6,298 Mozambique	6,298 Mozambiq	\$9,072	1.09072	7,583	6,952	1.20
Zambia	314,133	33	9,519	1.213	7,848 Zambia	7,848 Zambia	\$2,939	1.02939	9,519	9,247	0.31
Germany	74,194	4	18,549	1.355	13,689 Germany	13,689 Germany	\$47,993	1.47993	18,549	12,533	2.59
Geneva	1,056,727	17	62,160	1.52	40,895 Geneva	40,895 Geneva			62,160		
Belgium	63,997	0		1.368	0 Belgium	46,781 Belgium	\$34,067	1.34067		0	
Other movements (no staff and office costs)		73	0						0		
Other costs (no budget)	6,737										
Total of column	3,325,147	900	3,695								

*Countries of destination who also recruited some intra-regional candidates

Financial Data Adjusted (O:scott/rqan/financial - per cap rank)

**RQAN - PERCENTAGE OF OFFICES'
BUDGET SPENT**

ANNEX XV

Office	1997 RQAN budget	1997 expenses	% spent	1997 office budget	RQAN as % of office b	1998 RQAI	1998 exper	% spent	1998 office RQAN	as % of office budget
Angola	0	2,788				10,000	1,201	12%	10,000	100%
Belgium	20,000	-5,709	-29%	1,099,850	2%		45			
Bulgaria		68								
Cape Verde		28,821					13,256			
Germany	20,000	17,041	85%	3,796,003	1%		19			
Egypt		2,823								
Ethiopia	30,000	32,175	107%	238,000	13%	30,000	15,669	52%	321,700	9%
Great Britain	93,000	102,950	111%	133,550	70%	120,000	79,550	66%	187,600	64%
Ghana	30,000	25,856	86%	232,000	13%	15,000	9,927	66%	337,150	4%
Greece							9			
Guinea-Bissau		27,901					11,594			
Geneva	246,640	149,612	61%			19,000	38,403	202%		
Kenya	30,000	27,215	91%	1,287,080	2%	176,000	72,788	41%	1,358,900	13%
Mozambique	30,000	31,835	106%	225,800	13%					
Portugal	80,700	64,500	80%	95,650	84%	39,500	17,349	44%	120,050	33%
Slovakia		860								
Uganda	68,000	59,545	88%	175,000	39%	30,400	15,757	52%	247,800	12%
USA	89,000	89,446	101%	733,300	12%	70,000	46,177	66%	602,150	12%
South Africa	9,750	12,014	123%	232,550	4%	10,000	9,606	96%	370,000	3%
Zambia	65,000	68,717	106%	144,650	45%	45,000	8,146	18%	134,600	33%
Zimbabwe	15,000	15,196	101%	253,900	6%	15,000	3,878	26%	138,500	11%
	827,090	753,654	91%			579,900	343,374	59%		

753724 (in summary page)

343436 (in summary page)

Bud% (O:scott/rqan/financial-don't touch - bud%)

**RATING OF FORMS
USED IN PROGRAMME**

ANNEX XVI p.1

Form/Procedure	Purpose	Category	Harare	Kenya	Ethiopia	Cape Verde	U.K.	Average
Integration Agreement	contract between IOM and returnee	Case	1	1	1	1	1	1.00
Pre-Application	first application by interested candidates	Case	2	1	1	1	2	1.40
Operational Plan	programme performances measured against target	Reporting	2	1	2	1	1	1.40
SE Pre-Assessment Checklist	pre-assessment of BP ?	Case	3	1	1		1	1.50
SE Candidate Approval Form	approval form of SE candidates	Case	2	1	2		1	1.50
CARF	candidate approval and rating form	Case	2	1	2	1	2	1.60
PDP	pre-departure preparation form	Case	2	1	2	2	1	1.60
Follow-Up Forms (12 &24 Mos)	evaluation of returnee's reintegration	Case	2	1	1	2	2	1.60
Departure Message	information if candidate has departed and details	Case	1	1	1		4	1.75
Form 1	registration of candidate's application	Case	2	1	3	1	2	1.80
Form 3	registration of matched candidate	Case	2	1	2	1	3	1.80
Form 4	registration of financial assis. package + dep. details	Case	2	1	1	3	2	1.80
Form 2	registration of job vacancy	Case	2	1	3	1	3	2.00
Dossier Checklist	record of application forms and documents	Case	2	1	2		3	2.00
Monthly Report	monthly summary and analysis of RQAN activities	Reporting	1	2	2	3	2	2.00
Optimal Distribution Ratios	distribution of priority sectors	Reporting	3	1	2	1	3	2.00
EOARF	employment opportunity and rating form	Case	2	1	4	2	2	2.20
F-U Score Sheet	summary of returnee's reintegration over given period	Reporting	3	1	2	3		2.25
F-U Summary Sheet	summary of returnee's reintegration over given period	Reporting	3	1	2	3		2.25
Indicators Checklist	inventory of activities	Reporting	2	4	2	2	2	2.40
Candidate Assessment Form	assessment of candidate's eligibility	Case	2	2	3		3	2.50
Activity Indicators	assessment of activities	Reporting	2	4	3	2	2	2.60
Average by office			2.05	1.36	2.00	1.76	2.10	1.86
Note: Representatives of the Missions of Ghana, Uganda and Zambia, although present at the workshop, did not complete the forms								

1=Extremely, 2=Very, 3=Somewhat, 4=Not at All

DATABASE PROBLEMS

ANNEX XVII

CAN_	last name	first name	mission	destination	apovved date	matched date	match/apprc date	depart	match/dep.	approve/depart
001	ADDO-ASHONG	Michael Ayisi	GB	GH	2/23/95	9/1/95	188	6/17/95	-74	114
001	ADJEI	Franklin Owusu Asafo	GB	GH	4/3/95	9/1/95	148	6/17/95	-74	74
001	MAGARA	Geraldine Mary	GB	UG	3/15/95	2/23/95	-22	3/27/95	34	12
001	MATUMBA	Kabeya	GB	ZW	2/3/95	9/1/95	208	3/29/95	-152	56
001	NYIRENDA	Lemba Davy	US	ZM	4/24/95	9/1/95	127	7/28/95	-33	94
001	NDJARAKANA	Moses	US	NA	7/25/95	9/1/95	36	8/9/95	-22	14
001	OLE-TAKONA	James	US	KE	5/15/95	3/15/95	-60	5/28/95	73	13
001	OLE-RONKEI	Morompi	US	KE	4/24/95	4/13/95	-11	6/25/95	72	61
001	KANNAE	Lawrence	US	GH	2/7/95	9/6/95	209	7/24/95	-42	167
001	BETRU	Getachew	GB	ET	9/10/97	9/8/97	-2	12/10/97	92	90
001	SHENJE	Ruka	GB	ZW	3/17/95	9/12/95	175	8/10/95	-32	143
001	MKANGANWI	Ndodini	GB	ZW	2/22/95	9/12/95	200	8/8/95	-34	166
001	ONEK	Leonzio Angole	GB	KE	3/23/95	9/12/95	169	5/17/95	-115	54
001	AMANKWAH	Charlotte	GB	GH	5/9/95	9/12/95	123	7/1/95	-71	52
001	MAGANGA	Charles Masauko	GB	MW	7/10/95	10/12/95	92	9/18/95	-24	68
001	NDJEUNGA	Jupiter	US	CM	11/1/95	10/17/95	-14	6/5/96	228	214
001	MURANGI	Vezuvira	US	NA	11/1/95	10/17/95	-14	1/23/96	96	82
001	KISHE	Anne Jestina	US	TZ	4/1/96	2/1/96	-60	12/30/96	329	269
001	MOSSEBO	Dominique Claude	GB	CM	9/18/95	10/17/95	29	9/22/95	-25	4
001	WAWA	Yosa	GB	UG	11/22/95	11/6/95	-16	12/29/95	53	37
001	ALBERTS	Peter	ZW	ZW		12/19/95	34549	1/14/96	25	34574
001	TESFAYE	Yoseph	US	ET	6/20/96	7/30/96	40	7/10/96	-20	20
001	BAGAH	Daniel Anleu-Mwine	US	GH	9/19/95	3/15/95	-184	4/27/96	402	218
001	OGWANG	Bob Humphrey	ZA	UG	6/13/96	5/24/96	-19	7/5/96	41	22
001	YIRGA	Solomon	US	ET	6/27/96		-34737	9/9/96	34809	72
001	MARTINS	Ismael Dos Santos	PT	AO	6/24/96	11/11/96	137	11/2/96	-9	128
001	DJALO	Amaro Iaia	PT	GW		1/12/98	35292	2/8/98	26	35318
001	KAMBE	Alfred Kakutsyo	US	UG	9/11/96	3/3/97	172	2/11/97	-22	150
001	EHUI-AMOA	Virginie	US	CI	12/11/97	12/10/97	-1	12/17/97	7	6
001	DE ANDRADE BARROSO	José Pedro	CH	MZ	11/4/96	8/12/97	278	8/8/97	-4	274
001	ASSAM	Joel	CH	CM	11/20/96	10/20/96	-30	12/19/96	59	29
001	MUGISHA	*** Rujagaata Xavier	ZA	UG	12/19/96	12/6/96	-13	1/1/97	25	12
001	TAVARES MENDES	Rosa Maria	PT	GW		1/1/97	34921	8/10/97	219	35140
001	MARAKA	Athanasius Mark	KE	UG		8/11/97	35141	5/15/98	274	35415
001	YATTARA	Moussa	CH	ML	4/4/97		-35014	5/22/97	35062	48
001	SILVE LIMA DE SOUSA	Denisa	PT	CV	7/8/97	2/26/98	228	2/25/98	-1	227
001	MUTANDI	Robson	US	ZW	4/10/97		-35020	12/1/97	35251	231
001	THOMPSON	Issac	US	GH			0	2/19/98	35329	35329
001	PHOOFOLO	Mpho Wycliffe	US	LS		9/9/97	35169	10/8/97	29	35198
001	AYALEW	Teklewold Alemayehu	US	ET		8/1/97	35131	9/17/97	46	35177
001	JIRIRA	Nancy	GB	ZW		5/15/97	35055	7/17/97	62	35117
001	DO ROSARIO LIMA	Laniela Maria	PT	GW	9/17/97	9/12/97	-5	10/26/97	44	39
001	MUGERWA	Ann Deborah	ZA	UG	9/16/97	9/15/97	-1	10/29/97	44	43
001	LULEMBO	Oliver	ZA	ZM	2/24/98	9/30/97	-144	2/28/98	148	4
001	MASANGANISE	Rangarirai	GB	ZW	12/10/97	12/31/98	380	5/1/98	-239	141
001	MENDES	Mario Ambrosio	PT	GW			0	2/1/98	35311	35311
001	KOROMA	Thomas Matthew	GB	ZM	11/21/97	10/31/97	-21	1/23/98	83	62
001	RUMHIZHA	Munyaradzi Amos	GB	ZW	10/31/97		-35220	3/5/98	35345	125
001	TAAL	Maimuna	GB	GM	12/8/97	12/5/97	-3	1/6/98	31	28
001	MUGERWA	Bob Enock	ZA	UG	8/6/97	2/16/97	-170	3/4/98	378	208
001	MWENJE	Edias	GB	ZW	12/22/97	12/12/97	-10	1/15/98	33	23
001	MANTHANDO	Martin	GB	ZW		4/6/98	35376	6/1/98	55	35431
001	BYARUGABA	Justus	GB	UG	12/17/97		-35267	2/27/98	35337	70
001	NANFA BATCHAKUI	ERIC CHRISTIAN	GB	CM		1/5/97	34925	2/26/98	411	35336
001	KAYEMBE	JEAN-Marie	BE	ZR	3/26/98	1/22/98	-64	4/18/98	86	22
001	OBOH-OBUYA	Gershon	GB	UG	4/23/98	4/20/98	-3	6/7/98	47	44

NUMBER AND SEX OF RETURNEES

PHASE I - 1983 - 1987					PHASE II - 1987 - 1991 (Sept.) (Target)				PHASE III - 1995- 1999 (June)			
COUNTRY	NOPs	Male Cands.	Female Cands.	TOTAL PHASE I	NOPs	Male Cands.	Female Cands.	TOTAL PHASE II	NOPs	Male Cands.	Female Cands.	TOTAL PHASE III
Totals		242	109	351	1186	374	93	467		346	105	451
Percentages		69%	31%	100%		80%	20%	100%		77%	23%	100%

TOTAL PHASE II Non Target Countries (26) = 152 returnees

Source Phases I and II: IOM-Geneva, Sept. 1991 - Costs Breakdown

RQAN RESEARCH

Source	Quote
<p>World Bank – Dakar Leaders’ Forum June 20-21, 1998</p>	<p>Re. Education : Africa made great strides in education in the 1960s and 1970s, when primary school enrolment rates more than doubled. But, in the 1980s, enrolments fell again and did not rebound until the 1990s. As a result, only 15 of Africa’s 48 countries are at or near universal primary education . One in two adults are illiterate, and the situation is worse for women.</p> <p>Africa invests more funds in education than other regions (4.4% of the national budget compared with 3.3% in East Asia and 3.8% in South) but does not get as much for its money. Secondary education systems are too small to provide the mid-level skills needed to prepare African students for university or make African workers competitive quickly. Only 4% of students have access to university. Institutions of higher learning are not sufficiently developed to build capacity in research or in relevant professions such as technology, the sciences and public information.</p> <p>Re Capacity Building : Many African countries have exported talent because they are unable to offer a rewarding and remunerative career to skilled professionals. Economic growth, private sector development, and civil service reform should help to correct this. Sustained efforts will also be necessary to make educational systems more relevant to modern needs, to use innovative methods to train mid-level technicians and professionals, and to revitalize Africa’s universities.</p>
<p>World Bank – The Profitability of Investment in Education (G. Psacharopoulos, 1995)</p>	<p>Re : Education : The internal rate of return of an education project can be estimated from either the private or the social point of view. The private rate of return can be used to assess the equity or poverty alleviation effects of public education expenditures, or the incidence of the benefits of such expenditure. The social rate of return summarizes the costs and benefits of the educational investment from the state’s point of view, i.e. includes the full resource cost of education rather than only the portion that is paid by the recipient of education.</p> <p>The ‘social’ attribute of the estimate rate of return refers to the inclusion of the full resource cost of the investment (direct cost and foregone earnings). Ideally, the social benefits should include non-monetary or external effects of education (.e.g. lower fertility or lives saved because of improved sanitation conditions followed by a more educated woman who never participates in the formal labour market.</p> <p>Given the scant empirical evidence on the external effects of education, social rate of return estimates are usually based on</p>

	<p>directly observable monetary costs and benefits of education.</p> <p>Jamison and Lau (1982) found that, other things being equal, four years of education for farmers translates to a nearly 10 percent increase in physical agricultural output.</p> <p>Chou and Lau (1987) repeated the Jamison and Lau (1982) production function methodology for Thailand and upheld the results. They found that one additional year of schooling adds about 10 percent to farm output. In East Asia, for example, one additional year of education contributed over three percent to real GDP.</p>
<p>United Nations Economic and Social Council –A Framework Agenda for Building and Utilizing Critical Capacities in Africa, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 30.4. – 3.5.1996</p>	<p>Towards more efficient utilization of human resources :</p> <p>The problem of unemployment and underemployment in the African economy has proven to be intractable and persistent over the years. Smallholder agriculture which is the largest employing sector in the economy is beset by problems of low productivity, low skill levels and low application of science and technology to production. The low-productivity informal sector is next in importance to the agricultural sector and provides a haven for the majority of Africa’s urban labour force. The formal wage sector has been losing its labour absorption capacity over the years as a result of problems of efficiency and productivity in manufacturing, government and organised agriculture. There are serious problems of unused capacity in the form of unemployed professionals – doctors, pharmacists, engineers, in Africa’s cities. Not only does this idle capacity constitute a waste of investment, but it amounts to withholding of vital inputs which could go into producing or further strengthening development capacity.</p> <p>In 1990, Africa had to create 11 million new jobs just to absorb the natural increase in the labour force.</p> <p>Over the years, there has occurred deep erosions of workers’ wages and salaries. This has led to low morale and, consequently, low worker productivity. Particularly in the public service and tertiary educational institutions, salary scales have acted as a disincentive and contributed in no small measure to fuelling the brain drain. The latter scourge which afflicts almost every African country further compounds the region’s problems of skill shortages and worker productivity.</p> <p>Re: Mobilizing Resources for Developing Human Capacities</p> <p>A good part of the capacity building bottlenecks in African countries is caused by financial resource constraints. The general trends in funding education, health, sanitation, housing, etc. over the last decade amount to a disinvestment in human capital formation. In 1990-91, for example, military expenditure as a percentage of combined education and health expenditure stood at 43%, having grown from 27% in 1960.</p>

	<p>This trend ought to be reversed so that significantly more resources are released for allocation to sectors that relate directly to human capacity building, such as education, training, health, housing etc.</p> <p>While the primary responsibility for building and strengthening human capacities rests with the African countries themselves, the international community has a major role to play in supporting measures designed to build and more effectively utilize human capacities in Africa.</p> <p>Technical assistance, which is provided by the international community, amounts to between a quarter and a third of ODA to Sub-Saharan Africa. It is now accepted that what amounts to a rather high level of investment in capacity building has fallen far short of expectations in terms of effectively building and strengthening institutional and human capacities. The international community should therefore review this strategy for capacity building in African countries with a view to ensuring that it becomes more effective and has greater impact in the region's socio-economic development endeavours.</p>
<p>African Brain Drain, Raymond J. Smyke, Ed., Working Group on Refugees of the European Association of Development & Training Institutes, march 1996</p>	<p>Re Brain Drain:</p> <p>There's been an amazing brain drain from Africa. The rest of the world has benefited from this, but it's not been to the benefit of Africa (Jaycox, 1993, p.73). Brain drain as commonly understood in development and labour literature refers to the departure for other countries of university trained persons and others who have received a costly and specialized education. This education is often paid for by the state with the legal or implied understanding that the skills and knowledge gained are to be used for the benefit of the nation. <u>In the LDCs in Africa this education represents an enormous investment by the state in its citizens.</u></p> <p>Jaycox observes 'African governments, in many cases, have pushed away professional talent that was trained at very, very high cost. In many cases this is just the result of very poor economic performance. Government can't pay these talented people, and they are not going to spend their lives working for nothing and not even having the psychological rewards of working in a dynamic, forward-going society.</p> <p>The 95 state universities in Sub-Sahara Africa serve a population estimated by the UN in 1992 to be just under 500 million people (493.3). In addition, there are 22 state universities in the Republic of South Africa serving a population of 40 million, and in North Africa there are 33 universities for 147.7 million people making a total of 150 state universities for a continental population of 681.7 million, projected to grow to 1,582.5 billion by the year 2025. By comparison, there are 95 universities in the UK serving 57.7 million people and projected in the same time frame to grow to 60.3 million (International Handbook of Universities, 1993).</p> <p>- Details about student unrest because of difficult conditions etc.</p>
<p>The Africa Competitiveness Report, 1998, World Link Publications, UK</p>	<p>The Africa Competitiveness Report 1998 measures the competitiveness of 23 countries in Africa based on estimates for their medium-term economic growth.</p>

	<p>The countries that have done well in the index, by and large, are those which avoided the extreme economic and political turmoil that trapped many countries in Africa during the 1970s and 1980s. The middle performers, as a rule, are reforming but still recovering from a long period of poor economic performance. One surprise to many may be the classification of well-known reforming countries, such as <u>Ghana and Uganda</u>, as ‘middle performers’. This is less curious when one remembers that in both countries, even after a decade of overall stability, real per capita GDP levels remain lower now than they were in 1970.</p> <p>Those middle performers not in recovery stage are often countries with relative stability but sporadic reform policies. Kenya, for example, has had since 1993 a period of reform interspersed with faltering government commitment to liberalization, characterized by the economic unrest surrounding the electoral activity of 1997. Similarly, <u>Zambia</u> has started and stopped reform several times since the early 1990s.</p> <p>Competitiveness and human welfare: We see a strong correlation between the UN Human Development Index and our Competitiveness Index. This trend is particularly strong among the top performers, with the link present but less pronounced among those which are less competitive. The HDI calculated annually by the UN to measure general human welfare, is based on life expectancy, literacy, school enrolment rate and real per capita GDP. The competitiveness index devotes less than one-sixth of its weighting to these variables. The strong correlation between the Competitiveness Index and the HDI, particularly when there is such little direct overlap in underlying data, further illustrates the strong benefits in human wellbeing of national competitiveness (and, no doubt, the contribution of human development to the achievement of a competitive economy).</p> <p>Improvement and optimism indices: Are features unique to this report, which we include in order to demonstrate business communities’ attitudes towards the much-talked about reforms and growth on the continent. It is particularly interesting to note that in general the best reformers – Uganda, Tanzania, Mozambique, Ghana, as well as Egypt, finish at the top of the improvement index. These same countries tend to do well in the optimism index as well. The indices were constructed from nearly 30 ‘direction of change’ questions in a survey questionnaire.</p>
World Investment Report 1997	<p>Foreign Direct Investment –Trends in Africa Africa’s share of developing-country inflows has more than halved, from 11 per cent during 1986-1990 to 5 per cent during 1991-96. This suggests that Africa has not participated in the surge of FDI flows to developing countries.</p> <p><i>Transfer of technology and contribution to human resources development</i> – Although there are a number of firms in SADC countries with modern production processes, the generally low level of technological capability and sophistication of manufacturing in most of these countries makes it difficult for many local firms to absorb such transfers (Lall et al., 1996).</p>

	<p>There is also a paucity of hard evidence available on the contribution to human resource development (which usually takes place through vocational training of unskilled and semi-skilled workers) in South African affiliates in SADC member States as well as in the form of improvements in management capabilities, technical know-how and entrepreneurial abilities through formal and informal channels of learning.</p> <p><i>Re Ability to restructure:</i> Lower levels of education limit the ability of most countries in the region to implement a restructuring process, to increase productivity and to absorb transnational corporation assets.</p>
World Development Report 1997	Human Development Index – ranking of RQAN target countries.
US Dept. State Background Notes: Cape Verde, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Zambia, Uganda,	

HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INDEX

TARGET COUNTRY	HDI value 1992	Ranking	HDI value 1993	Ranking	HDI value 1994	Ranking	HDI value 1995	Ranking
CAPE VERDE	0.536	123	0.539	122	0.547	123	0.591	117
ETHIOPIA	0.227	171	0.237	168	0.244	170	0.252	169
GHANA	0.482	129	0.467	129	0.468	132	0.473	133
GUINEA-BISSAU	0.293	163	0.297	161	0.291	163	0.295	164
KENYA	0.481	130	0.473	128	0.463	134	0.463	137
UGANDA	0.329	158	0.326	155	0.328	159	0.340	160
ZAMBIA	0.425	136	0.411	136	0.369	143	0.378	146
ZIMBABWE	0.539	121	0.534	124	0.513	129	0.507	130

TARGET COUNTRY	INDEX							
	Classification		Competitiveness		Improvement		Optimism	
			Ranking	Score	Ranking	Score	Ranking	Score
CAPE VERDE	n/a							
ETHIOPIA	Middle performer		17	-0.25	17	9.09	5	15.43
GHANA	Middle performer		9	0.09	5	18.51	8	13.89
GUINEA-BISSAU	n/a		n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
KENYA	Middle performer		13	-0.15	9	13.98	13	11.45
UGANDA	Middle performer		14	-0.16	1	22.69	3	18.88
ZAMBIA	Middle performer		12	-0.09	10	13.35	6	15.06
ZIMBABWE	Low performer		20	-0.4	6	18.37	16	9.55

N/A = not available

The Africa Competitiveness Report 1998 measures the competitiveness of 23 countries in Africa based on estimates of their medium-term economic growth, controlling for levels of initial income. Market size, natural resource endowments and other characteristics of interest to business are subordinated in this index to economic growth, which represents a better estimate of the medium-term health of national economies.

There is a strong correlation between the United Nations' Human Development Index and the Competitiveness Index. ...The strong correlation between the Competitiveness Index and the HDI, particularly when there is such little direct overlap in underlying data, further illustrates the strong benefits in human wellbeing of national competitiveness (and, no doubt, the contribution of human development to the achievement of a competitive economy).

The 'improvement' and 'optimism' indices are used to demonstrate business communities' attitudes towards the much talked-about reforms and growth on the continent.

The indices were constructed from nearly 30 'direction of change' questions in the survey questionnaire.

Countries that have done well in the index, by and large, are those which avoided the extreme economic and political turmoil that trapped many countries in Africa during the 1970s and 80s.