

OFFICE OF PROGRAMME EVALUATION

EVALUATION OF THE CANADIAN WARRANT PROGRAM

April 2000



IOM International Organization for Migration

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1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Canadian Warrant Program, under which IOM provides services such as transport, medical examinations and cultural orientation to the Canadian Government for refugees being accepted for resettlement in Canada, is of long-standing duration in IOM. It is one that IOM considers among the important and traditional services that the Organization has provided to its Member States since its beginning, and has amounted to an average of 2.7% of IOM's operational expenditures over the last five years.

In general, the evaluation — which focussed on the transportation services that IOM provides — has found the Program relevant to the goals of the Organization, the expressed needs of the Government of Canada, and the requirements of the refugees that it assists. The Program is cost-effective, but there is a continuing need to improve that cost-effectiveness.

On the other hand, while the Program is relatively efficient, there are some problems connected with overall planning and use of resources that have led the Program into deficit in most years examined.

Efficiency could be improved by increased planning, both internally and with the Government of Canada, and through the appointment of an individual or unit who would have a global overview of the Program. This global overview, currently lacking, should improve IOM's overall management of the Program and lead to the lowering and elimination of deficits.

Increased communication, particularly direct links between local service providers in Canada and IOM, should also support increased efficiency of service provision by enabling IOM to both address problems at an earlier stage and to analyse more effectively which are isolated problems and which are more general.

Both as a support to increased efficiency and to increase the available information which will support a global overview of the Program, a system of regularly collecting data on certain Program parameters is proposed. Should such a system prove beneficial in this Program, it should be expanded to other, similar programs complementing the existing self-evaluation system for other types of projects..

In reading this report, it must be remembered that IOM will need to discuss some of the recommendations with the Government of Canada and obtain their support in order to implement them.

In conclusion IOM has globally provided efficient and cost-effective services to the Government of Canada under this on-going Program, and that Government has expressed its general satisfaction with those services. If accepted and carried out, the changes recommended throughout the evaluation report should enable IOM to improve services provided, not just on a one-time basis, but continuously.

2. EVALUATION SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

The Canadian Warrant Program was proposed and selected as an evaluation priority for 1999. At the time that the evaluation was initially conceived, it was selected as a priority for three reasons:

- IOM had never evaluated one of its ongoing movement programs, which have consistently been the Organization's largest overall.
- Although IOM had introduced a system of self-evaluation for most projects, that system did not apply to movement programs, and there was an interest to see what might substitute for self-evaluation in such programs.
- To determine how this program might have been affected by the management changes undertaken by IOM.

Based on the above points, Terms of Reference were developed (see **Annex 1 – Terms of Reference**) and work was begun for the evaluation to take place in April and May of 1999. However, due to the crisis in Kosovo, the Canadian authorities requested a delay. The evaluation was then rescheduled for November and December, but was again postponed due to a decision by IOM senior management to dispatch the evaluator on a month-long assignment elsewhere. The evaluation finally took place in February-March 2000.

However, due to the two postponements, some data were gathered at different times, and consequently cover different time periods. For example, the data on invoicing and dispatch of warrants to Ottawa covers through the end of 1998 only, and the initial survey of IOM offices was done in Fall of 1999. Most of the movement and financial data was updated through the end of 1999.

Although the Canadian Warrant Program includes services other than transportation, such as medical examinations, orientation for Warrant holders, etc., it is transportation that is the major focus of this evaluation. The evaluation covers the years 1995-1999, in order to compare recent data with that contained in a report on IOM prepared by the Government of Canada in 1995. Those were also the years of substantial management changes in the Organization.

In carrying out the evaluation, records were examined, particularly movement and financial records. A survey of all offices involved in the program, as evidenced by those charging costs to the program's budget codes, was done. Interviews with officials of the Canadian Government and some representatives of non-Governmental organizations were made during a trip to Canada (see schedule attached as **Annex 2 – Canada Schedule**). Input was also received through the Canadian Council for Refugees (CCR), who queried their membership on IOM services. As a result of information obtained from the Canadian trip, two follow-up surveys on specific issues were sent to certain IOM offices. Field trips were also made to the IOM offices in New York and Nairobi. Semi-structured interview techniques were used throughout.

The report will look first at some of the traditional evaluation concerns before examining how the Organization's changes have affected the Program and what might be done to better monitor and 'self-evaluate' the Program in the future.

3. PROGRAM DESCRIPTION

IOM has been assisting refugees in their resettlement to Canada for many years; providing transport services for the most part, but also medical services, language training, and orientation. Services provided by IOM are paid for through a system of invoices supported by warrants signed by the refugees before their travel to Canada. Thus although the invoices are settled by the Government of Canada, it is the refugees who ultimately bear the cost. Both the services to be provided and the means of payment for those services are governed by a Memorandum of Understanding (**Annex 3**) signed in 1997, which updated one dating from 1991.

The level of this program, both in terms of movements and expenditures has been relatively constant since 1994, with the exception of 1999. In that year there was an airlift of approximately 5,000 Kosovars to Canada and the subsequent return of a large number of them to their homes. Over the period 1995-1999, excluding the 1999 Kosovo movement, the Program has averaged 2.7% of IOM's overall operational expenditures and 1.4% of movements, as per the following table.

Table 1. Canadian Warrant Program Compared to Overall IOM Operations

Operational expenditures (USD)	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999*	OVERALL
Canadian Warrant Program	6,615,006	6,341,260	6,482,869	5,315,053	4,782,403	29,536,591
Overall	197,300,000	187,000,000	210,900,000	218,700,000	271,784,000	1,085,684,000
% of Overall	3.35%	3.39%	3.07%	2.43%	1.76%	2.72%
Number of Movements	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999*	OVERALL
Canadian Warrant Program	9,414	9,104	7,997	6,130	6,633	39,278
Overall	955,900	750,300	370,100	254,300	430,684	2,761,284
% of Overall	0.98%	1.21%	2.16%	2.41%	1.54%	1.42%

*excluding special Kosovo program

IOM had no office in Canada, until a very small one was opened in 1999 to assist in the afore-mentioned Kosovo program. The activities of that office are limited to the Kosovo program, however. Overall negotiations on the Program are formally handled between the Canadian Mission in Geneva and IOM Headquarters, with some contacts between Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) in Ottawa — the Government Department responsible for the Program — and IOM Headquarters, and more frequent communications on operational issues between CIC and the IOM office in New York.

At the Headquarters level, there is an important dialogue on financial matters, including invoicing Program costs to CIC through the submission of warrants, and a yearly discussion that takes place on setting the level of the service fee. Discussion on broader operational matters also occurs primarily during visits of Citizenship and Immigration Canada representatives to Geneva. With the IOM office in New York the more frequent contact is mostly on practical matters. This system is generally seen by those directly involved — both at CIC and in IOM — as working well, and as affording sufficient channels of communication.

As in most IOM programs of this nature, much of the communication is between the Canadian High Commissions or Embassies and the IOM offices in the field, including arranging medical examinations for refugees, making bookings, etc. The Program is one that is well-established, and is one for which both the broad parameters and the specific details are well-known. This has led to a maintenance approach to the Program, with more attention being paid to those areas where changes are underway, e.g., either the opening of new processing posts, or changes in procedures.

4. RELEVANCE

Assistance to refugees being resettled in third countries is one of IOM's traditional services, and one that IOM has consistently offered to States since the creation of the Organization. In the Director General's first speech to the IOM Council in November 1998¹, he stated that "the transportation of migrants and their preparation for travel have constituted the core of IOM's activities throughout its existence". This assistance is consistently referred to by IOM Member and Observer States as one of the Organization's strengths. The delegate of Canada to that same Council Session of November 1998 stated that "it is in the delivery of services, including transport services, that IOM excels"².

The Program consists primarily of services provided under two of IOM's six service areas – movements and medical. Movement services in general, and the medical services associated with them, form the largest part of IOM's activities. According to document MC/1997 'Programme and Budget for 2000' (page 7), approved by the IOM Council in November 1999, the Movement Service Area — which includes expenditures for medical examinations associated with these ongoing programs — was expected to account for over 50% of IOM's operational expenditures in 2000. Over the period 1995-1999 the Canadian Warrant Program constituted an average of 2.7% of operational expenditures and 1.4% of movements (refer to Table 1).

It is not possible for IOM to assess the relevance of the overall Program to the Government of Canada. However, the review of IOM carried out by Consulting and Audit Canada in 1995³ recommended that "Canada maintain its usage of IOM services in regard to transportation", and that Canada investigate the "increased use of IOM transport services for the migration of nationals...". Comments made by Canadian officials in the course of the evaluation indicated that they considered that IOM services were relevant to them in meeting their goals for the Program.

No refugees were interviewed during the evaluation, but comments were received from service providers in Canada and from some refugees who responded to a request for information sent out by CCR. These comments indicated that services of the type provided by IOM were necessary — in most instances — for the refugee to be able to benefit from resettlement in Canada, as otherwise each refugee would need to arrange, and pay for directly, their travel to Canada and all of the associated requirements, e.g.

¹ MICEM/7/1998, p.3

² Canadian Statement to the 76th Session of the Council, 23-25 Nov., 1998, p.2

³ Evaluation of Canada's Membership in the International Organization for Migration, November 1995, p.9.

medicals. Thus the Program can be considered relevant to the needs of the refugee population served, as the bulk of this population find it difficult or impossible to arrange to travel to Canada on their own.

Conclusion

Overall, the services provided by IOM under this Program are relevant to the goals of the Organization, the requirements expressed by the Canadian Government, and the needs of the refugee population served.

5. EFFICIENCY

The definition of efficiency used in IOM evaluation guidelines is “how well resources in general are used to undertake activities and achieve objectives”⁴.

5.1 Stated Program Objectives

To examine this aspect of the Program, it is necessary to examine what might be considered to be the objectives. There are two basic documents that govern IOM’s services under the Program: a Memorandum of Understanding signed in November 1997, and a Canadian Government Operational Memorandum (OM) ‘Guide to Refugee Travel to Canada’ from February 1995, updated in January 2000.

5.2 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)

The MOU (**Annex 3**) lists the potential services that can be provided, how they are to be paid for, etc. The only specific administrative requirements listed are for IOM to provide information by the end of each year for a review of the service fee, for the Government to give periodic updates on numbers of refugees to be moved, and for IOM to provide copies of external audit reports. There is also a specific requirement that invoices for services rendered need to be submitted by IOM within 90 days of the refugees’ arrival in Canada.

The only requirement on the operational side is for the use of Canadian carriers unless such use would “result in an undue delay in departure, or an increase in fare”. From this it can be deduced that the timeliness of travel and the fare are both more important than the use of Canadian carriers.

IOM has generally met the requirement to provide information by the end of the year for the review of the service fee, although there have been some delays. For example, the information that should have been provided by IOM at the end of 1998 was provided only in May of 1999, with the explanation that the previous review had only been completed in May 1998. At this writing (April 2000) no review has been done for 1999. It should be noted that, due in large part to the crisis in Kosovo, the data submitted by IOM in May 1999 was only responded to by the Canadian Government in September 1999, and implemented in November of that year. This delay is not

⁴ ‘Evaluation Guidelines’ prepared by the Office of Programme Evaluation, Geneva, Dec. 1998, p. 3.

efficient on the part of IOM as the service fee increases requested by IOM have generally been agreed to by the Government of Canada, and delays in adjusting the service fee have thus contributed to the recurring deficits in the Program. Retroactive adjustments in the fee are not possible, as the fee is placed on the Warrant which is in principle completed at the time of departure.

Table 2: History of Service Fee

Year	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
Fee (USD)	45	*75	75	82	**100

*increase after significant change in the way IOM accounted for project costs

**introduction of cap of USD 400 per family unit

Recommendation:

IOM should more closely follow the schedule for the review of fees laid out in the MOU in an effort to better to match expenditures with income.

As far as two other specific elements in the MOU are concerned, firstly, the Canadian Government does provide information about the numbers of refugees expected to be processed and moved in any given year. However, there is no central record of how frequently those numbers are updated during the course of the year. Secondly, IOM does provide to the Canadian Government copies of the external audits conducted each year by sending two copies of the Annual Financial Report through the Canadian Mission in Geneva. This Report is an official document provided to the IOM Council on a yearly basis.

5.3 Invoicing:

IOM is generally meeting the standard for submitting invoices within 90 days. A sample of approximately 10% was selected from the more than 4,000 proflights for which invoices were submitted from 1995 to 1998. The chart in **Annex 4** shows that slightly under 4% of the invoices for the movements sampled were submitted with a delay of more than the 90 days required in the MOU. The delays are mainly due to the late submission of warrants from the field. This percentage remained relatively constant over the four years sampled. There was no one region or office to which the delayed transmission could be attributed, although in 1998 the bulk of the problems was with movements from Africa. Canadian Government interlocutors at the federal level have noted an improvement in the dispatch of invoices, but note that it “could always be quicker”⁵

Recommendation:

IOM should determine from those offices which have the greatest difficulty in meeting the 90-day requirement for submission of warrants, what steps will be needed to ensure more complete compliance with this requirement, and then implement these steps.

⁵ Meeting with officials in Ottawa, 14 February 2000.

Neither a review of the correspondence with CIC, nor discussions in Canada, revealed any significant problems with the way in which the warrants were completed.

On the other hand, certain interlocutors at the local level in Canada expressed a concern that refugees are arriving in Canada without completed warrants. This was an issue both because the refugees themselves are unaware of the extent of their indebtedness, and because the extent of their indebtedness affects their eligibility for certain other Government assistance which involves loans.

In order to determine which IOM offices have difficulties in handing over completed warrants to refugees before their departure for Canada a follow-up survey was done in March 2000. The results show that for refugees who depart from countries where there is no IOM office, or where processing of warrants is done in an IOM Mission in a country other than that from which the refugees depart, refugees generally do not depart with completed warrants. This is most often the case in Africa, due to IOM's limited field structure, but can also occur elsewhere.

In other instances, information needed to complete the warrant is not available in time for the refugee's departure, in which case the refugee either departs with no warrant, or with one in which the costs are not filled in. While it is mostly medical costs that are received with a delay, sometimes other costs are reported as outstanding at the time of departure.

It is not explicitly stated that all refugees should depart with a completed copy of their warrant, which is the basis for their repayment of the loan, nor was this raised as an issue by Canadian Government interlocutors at the federal level. However, the warrant is a legal undertaking and has importance in the Program.

While some of the difficulties caused by IOM's lack of offices in certain countries may be not be susceptible to cost-effective solutions, others may be. One of the most frequently mentioned problems was the lack of cost information on medical examinations, for which it should be possible to work out some solution which would permit warrants to be completed before departure. This could involve working with the doctors involved to speed up the billing process, or establishing an agreed-upon cost for certain procedures, where all that would be required was to know whether the procedure was carried out or not.

Recommendation:

For countries with an IOM office from which refugees depart, IOM should establish procedures by which it will be possible to ascertain all costs prior to the refugee's departure, so that completed warrants can be given to the refugee before their departure.

Conclusion:

Although in general IOM efficiently handles the invoicing of costs under this Program, there are areas where some improvements are needed, as per the two recommendations made above.

The question was raised during the course of the evaluation as to whether it would be feasible to move the process of invoicing the Canadian Government to the IOM office in New York. While in principle such invoicing could be done from there, access to a considerable amount of financial and operational information would be needed. That access could be provided, at a cost which has not been quantified but which would certainly exist. As most of the communication on the invoicing system is by mail, there are no particular savings to be achieved by doing this in New York. On the other hand, staff time in NYC would have to be charged to the Program to carry out this function, whereas at HQ, this function is one of many others carried out by a staff member charged to the Administrative budget.

It is noted that the Director of MMD announced in January that the Department would “get involved in reviewing Mission issued Prom Notes and Canadian Warrants to assist in ensuring that we meet PRM and CIC expectations in the issuance of these documents. A recent spot review showed that in many instances we disadvantage our clients”⁶. Should this review duplicate work now being performed by the Accounting Division, then it may well be more efficient for MMD to handle the invoicing.

Recommendation:

When MMD has finalized the system that they will be using to review the warrants, ASD and MMD should jointly determine if overall efficiency of the Program could be increased by having MMD handle the invoicing.

5.4 Operations Memorandum (OM)

The OM⁷ gives much more detail about how travel to Canada for refugees is to be arranged, with the first consideration clearly being cost – point 1.1 “Consideration should be given to airlines that provide the most cost-effective travel arrangements.” There are a number of other specific guidelines, ranging from number of refugees on a flight to time of arrival, all of which could constitute standards against which IOM performance could be measured. However, data is not collected by IOM in a way that results could be compared against what is expected.

A survey of offices taking part in this Program (**Annex 5**) showed that, almost without exception, services provided were only those foreseen in the MOU. The survey, carried out in the last quarter of 1999, was a repeat of one done in 1995. The earlier survey (**Annex 6**) showed that 24 IOM offices were providing services under the Program, compared to 37 in 1999; an increase of 54%. 5 offices were dropped, in Latin America and Asia, and 18 added in a wide variety of regions.

Conclusion:

As the only services that were being provided under this Program were ones that had been foreseen in the MOU, one criteria of efficiency can be considered as being met

⁶ Note to all Missions Worldwide concerning Operation of Movement Management in HQ in 2000, dated 5 January 2000.

⁷ Canadian Citizenship Immigration Operations Memorandum ‘Guide for Refugee Travel to Canada’, January, 2000.

in that program resources are not being devoted to activities outside the Program parameters.

5.5 Budgeting and accounting:

IOM offices expressed concern about how program financing (by service fees eventually paid by the refugee, rather than by budgets established yearly and covered by the Government) interacts with accounting for costs through the principle of projectization. These are related in that pressure to keep within the amount of the service fee could result in underestimating costs for this Program. This would affect the assessment of efficiency if other resources are being used to supplement those resources charged to the Program. However, the evidence in this respect was spotty, and no firm conclusions can be drawn, other than that such pressure, even if only self-imposed locally, exists.

Looking at the overall results for the Warrant Program over the past years, it can be seen that it has normally run a deficit from 1994 through 1998, with the exception of 1996. The trend in the size of the deficit has been downward, and in 1999 there has been a surplus. **Annex 7**).

The above comparison is of the overall program costs, including transportation. There can sometimes be a delay between the incurring of transportation costs and their payment, including some exchange rate fluctuations. Discrepancies can also arise between costs booked and those paid. Therefore a comparison was also made looking only at staff and office costs, which are booked in the accounts in a more timely fashion. This comparison also shows constant deficits, but also declining over time. In 1999, the deficit was less than 1% of expenditures (**Annex 8, Table 1**).

Making the same comparison for medical expenditures, the picture is somewhat less clear, with fluctuations between surplus and deficit. Overall, during the five years examined, there has been a deficit. The fluctuations may partly be due to the accruing of expenditures in one year for migrants who do not depart until the next year, or who never depart (**Annex 8, Table 2**).

To the extent possible IOM has balanced deficits in one of the four program codes used for the Program with surpluses in others. Deficits in the overall Program were covered from Discretionary Income, which is that part of the IOM budget that comes from unearmarked contributions from donors, interest, and the 9.5% overhead charge for projects.

Conclusion:

Resources have not been used efficiently, as there has always been a deficit in staff and office costs, as well as in other costs, which have however decreased over time, indicating that the situation is improving. Efforts need to continue to eliminate this recurring deficit.

5.6 Unreimbursed costs:

Another concern related to efficiency of the Program is how to cover processing costs that are not, for one reason or another, able to be invoiced through the warrant. This generally relates to the costs of medical examinations that are performed for refugees who do not subsequently depart and consequently for whom no warrant exists to which the costs can be charged. This is recognized between CIC and IOM Headquarters as being a problem, and provision is made each year in the service fee to cover a certain number of these costs. This provision was USD 24,000 in the last agreement, but it was included in the overall service fee, so is not apparent to Missions. There is no procedure established for Missions to charge these medical costs to a cost code, but rather something that is managed centrally when difficulties arise.

Recently CIC has agreed to reimburse IOM for additional costs for ground transportation, meals and accommodations for a caseload in Africa which had been particularly costly to move, due to the location. This may well serve as model for seeking direct reimbursement of costs, especially for medical examinations done at the specific request of the Canadian authorities, for which IOM is unable to recover the costs because the refugees do not depart. This would then replace the additional amount which has been added to the service fee of refugees who do depart to cover these unreimbursed costs.

Recommendation:

IOM should explore with the Canadian Government whether it is now possible to finance unreimbursed direct costs, especially for medical examination for refugees who do not depart, in some way other than by increasing the service fee for those refugees who do depart.

5.7 Communication:

Currently there is no direct channel of communication between IOM and local service providers in Canada. Whatever information on movements that IOM offices are required to provide is provided to, and through, the Canadian Government. The same is true in reverse for any questions or information that arise on the Canadian end, for example at the port of entry. This channel to IOM can be quite lengthy and is subject to certain amount of 'filtering' along the way, that is, individual problems or problems with specific offices not being passed on to IOM. The evaluator heard at the local level a number of complaints about IOM services that were not expressed at the federal level. This process is natural, but has had an effect on how efficient IOM can be in providing services.

One example of this is the number of hours required for transit at points on entry in Canada. The Operations Memorandum of 1995, point V.1.a), clearly states that four hours transit time are required at the port of entry in Canada. IOM's Movement Migration Manual issued in October 1998 just as clearly instructs IOM offices to allow two-and-one-half hours of transit time, an error on IOM's part. Nonetheless, it was only in October of 1999, over a year later, that this was corrected at the request of the Canadian Government. Given that the subject of transit time was raised as a

major problem at every port of entry visited, it is logical to assume that with a more direct link between IOM and the local service providers, particularly at the port of entry, the problem would have come to IOM's attention much earlier.

Certain other problems were brought up during the course of the evaluation, for example, problems caused if refugees do not have warrants with them on arrival, that could potentially have been addressed by IOM if known. Questions also arose about the services that IOM provides in transit airports in Europe. A fuller description of some of these problems is included in **Annex 12**.

One worth particular mention here is the need expressed by offices handling reception at the ports of entry for information on medical conditions that may impact the services the refugee may need on arrival. Chief among these concerns were refugees who arrive needing a wheelchair, for whom making arrangements at the last minute is difficult for both the refugee and the reception staff. Advanced pregnancies were also mentioned in this connection. While a thorough medical check on departure was not requested and could not be envisioned, there is a need for IOM offices to provide information on these types of physical conditions which are readily noticeable to the IOM staff assisting departure. Opening a direct line of communication would help to alleviate this problem.

As another indication of the level of problem-solving that might be necessary, the IOM office in Ottawa reports having received the following complaints since the office in November and December 1999.

Table 3: Complaints received by IOM Ottawa

IOM Office of origin	Luggage problems	No onward travel arrangements	Onward arrangements too early	Insufficient clothing
Rome	LSP – Nov			
Nairobi		LSP - Nov		
Islamabad	LSP – Nov			
Ankara	LSP – Nov			
Ankara	LSP – Nov			
Havana		LSP – Nov		
Ankara	LSP – Dec			
Vienna			CIC – Dec	
Nairobi				CIC – Dec
Rome	LSP – Dec			
Mexico			CIC – Dec	
Belgrade			CIC – Dec	
Total	6	2	3	1

*LSP – Local Service Provider

It was clear during discussions that the Government wanted to keep the channel of communication as is, that is, through the Government only. IOM should explore with CIC whether there would be some acceptable way to open a direct link with local service providers which would neither add significantly to the cost, nor result in IOM providing services not foreseen under the MOU, as has happened in the past.

With less expensive means of communication, e.g., e-mail, and the ability of IOM globally to access case information electronically, a limited arrangement could be envisaged, which would help IOM to be more efficient and improve services.

This could be most reasonably done from one of the IOM offices in North America, either Ottawa, New York, or Washington. The best possibility at this point seems to be New York, as the Canadian authorities have stated that the existing IOM office in Ottawa will close at the end of the Kosovo Program, which is of limited duration, and there already exist operational links between Canada and New York.

IOM New York would be sent flight data electronically, through IOM's system for communicating movement information internally (IDM). Such information, which would be the same as that sent to the Canadian High Commission or Embassy, would enable IOM New York to respond to questions from local service providers on individual movements. If there were no inquiries, the office would not need to act on the information, thus eliminating the need to process data unnecessarily. Questions that had to be passed to Missions overseas could be copied to a central office in the Canadian Government, ensuring that the Government was kept part of the information flow. Having one IOM office act as a communications point would provide IOM with the possibility to track problems, and enable the Organization to discern patterns and take early corrective measures, or even preventative ones.

Recommendation:

IOM should first determine internally what system could be set up to improve program efficiency through more direct communications, and then explore with the Canadian Government whether they would be willing to have such a system put into place.

One related and specific concern is the need expressed for the refugees to be given information that will be useful to them on their journey. Information such as what to expect to happen on the airplane (for example, the food is free-of-charge), what will happen in transit (they will be met and assisted), and what will happen on arrival at the airport in Canada.

While these are subjects that are covered in the briefings that some refugees receive before departing for Canada, not all refugees receive them. Orientation sessions were delivered in only six sites in 1999, covering refugees in eight countries. Subjects related to travel also form only part of the training given.

Recommendation:

IOM should, in coordination with CIC, design a one-page hand-out on travel information, which can be provided to refugees in their own language on departure.

5.8 Planning:

Responses to a variety of open-ended questions put to those Missions (see questions and analysis in **Annex 9**) raised only one additional concern related to efficiency, that is, a deficiency in planning. This refers to planning both at the IOM internal level,

and also with external partners, which means primarily with the local Canadian High Commission or Embassy. It was observed by several offices that improved planning could improve the efficiency of their operation of the Program.

This overall weakness in planning can be in some respect related to the deficits referred to earlier. Looking at planning and actual figures for movements (provided by IOM offices as part of the budget process only since 1997), it can be seen that there is some correlation between the accuracy in projecting movements and the deficit level. In the three years examined the lowest deficit occurred when IOM slightly underestimated the movement level, and the highest when IOM overestimated. This indicates that more accurate planning would help in eliminating the recurring deficits.

Table 4. Planned vs. Actual Movements

Year	Planned movements	Actual movements	Actual as % of expected	Deficit (USD)
1997	8368	7999	95.6%	(74,991)
1998	8065	6122	75.9%	(114,571)
1999	6305	6642	105.3%	(1,166)

It should also be noted that the level of admissions to Canada under this Program has for the last few years been rather steady at 7,300, although actual admissions have usually exceeded that number (see **Annex 10**). It can be questioned how IOM as an organization came to an estimate in excess of the overall planning figure provided by the Canadian Government.

It was observed from comments made by some offices that confusion existed about their responsibility for balancing their costs against the service fee. In fact, as is obvious from the submission made yearly by IOM to the Canadian Government the *per capita* costs vary substantially among IOM regions. For example, in 1998 the average ranged from USD 65 in Latin America to USD 103 in Africa and the Middle East (see **Annex 11**). The overall service fee is a global average, and not something to which each office is expected to adhere.

Conclusion:

Improving planning for the Program would likely enhance the ability of IOM to efficiently manage the Program, including bringing its finances into balance (see recommendation re overview and management).

5.9 Program overview and management

Within IOM, there is no one person or unit that has a good overview of the Canadian Warrant Program. There are effectively three points where some global oversight is exercised, guidance provided, or information channeled. Two of these are at Headquarters and the other in New York. At Headquarters, the financial management is handled by the Administrative Support Department (ASD), which monitors field accounts, budgets, invoicing, and the process of adjusting the service fee. The

Migration Management Department (MMD) has an overview of airline agreements, and usage of airfares and air carriers. The Head of Office in New York acts as an informal channel of communication between the Government and IOM on operational issues, taking a primarily reactive role. Please note that all of this is in reference to the normal, i.e., non-Kosovo, Program.

There is no individual or unit in the Organization who has a proactive role in the whole program, unlike two other, similar movement projects for the U.S. and Australia. For the US Program, see the attached letter dated 19 April 1999 in **Annex 13** from the Director General recognizing that “consistency and co-ordination are the keys to ensuring maximum efficiency and effectiveness for such global programs”⁸. This lack of an overview has likely contributed to some of the problems with the efficiency of the Program that have been noted.

Of the other two, similar Programs the US Program not such a good comparator, as the funding is not on a *per capita* basis. The Australian Program, which is on a *per capita* basis, does not run deficits on a year-to-year basis, but is adjusted every six months and can be adjusted retroactively to the previous period. The service fee is paid directly by the Government, rather than by the refugee. The Program does show a greater degree of centralization of management than the Canadian Program. However, the fact that the service fees are paid by the Government and not by the refugee means that it is possible to adjust the fee after the fact, something that cannot be done in the Warrant Program.

Conclusion:

In certain aspects, the Program operates relatively efficiently, as resources are dedicated to program activities, *per capita* costs are on a downward trend, and expenditures are being kept closer to budgets. However, improvements need to be made, particularly in planning (including defining required levels of service) communication, and establishing a centralized program overview.

Recommendation:

IOM should determine the person or unit most suited to maintain an overview of the entire program, enabling closer monitoring of movement levels, operational activities, and budgetary/financial issues. The cost of such monitoring should be established, and discussions with the Government of Canada should be undertaken to get their approval of such a plan.

While a more thorough analysis should be made by IOM, there would be some value in locating this person or unit in the same office in North America as the communications channel whose opening has been recommended above. It is through this channel that the operational problems will come to light, and having the person with the global overview located in the same office would bring benefits.

⁸ Circular letter sent to all Missions worldwide concerning IOM Movement activities, dated 19 April 1999.

5.10 Prepayment program

Although not part of the Warrant Program, an indication of possible problems with either the cost-effectiveness or efficiency of IOM's services comes from another movement program for Canada operated by IOM New York. This office receives inquiries from sponsors in Canada whose relatives are not eligible for the Warrant Program.

From 1990 through 1999, IOM New York received payment for 4,574 migrants who travelled, inquiries from sponsors of 1,690 migrants who did not then use these services, and made refunds to sponsors of 198 migrants. No reasons are known why certain sponsors did not contact the office again, and no records are kept of the reasons why sponsors requested a refund.

What can be noted from the records that were kept (**Annex 14**) is that a very large percentage of inquiries about movements from Africa, amounting to 67% of those who travelled, were never followed up on by the sponsor. This was much higher than from other areas, where the similar percentage did not exceed 32%.

According to the IOM staff member responsible for managing this activity, the two main problems mentioned by sponsors who request refunds are delays in making travel arrangements, and final airfares higher than those originally quoted.

While none of this data directly applies to the Warrant Program, it nonetheless supports the need to pay continuous attention to the issues of efficiency and cost-effectiveness.

6. COST-EFFECTIVENESS

The reference to cost-effectiveness in IOM evaluation guidelines asks one of two questions: "whether the objectives could be accomplished at a lower cost, or whether the results or benefits justify the cost"⁹. In this particular evaluation, the former has been chosen as the appropriate question to answer, as this is an evaluation of IOM services, rather than the overall program. The examination of whether the benefits justify the costs is one that only the Government of Canada could do.

One way of examining this issue is to look at whether the total cost of services provided by IOM under the agreement could be obtained more cheaply elsewhere.

6.1 Airfares

In first looking at airfares, a review of IOM done in 1995 for the Canadian Government¹⁰ estimated that an average of USD 483 per seat in airfare was saved by using IOM.

⁹ 'Evaluation Guidelines' prepared by the Office of Programme Evaluation, Geneva, Dec. 1998, p.3

¹⁰ International Organization for Migration – Review prepared by 'Consulting and Audit Canada', 1995, p.8

An updated comparison was made in 2000 which shows that for the same sample, the average saving on airfare alone was now USD 975. In the updated comparison, IOM fares were checked against what IOM reported as normal one-way economy fares, the lowest one-way fares that could be found through anonymous calls to a Canadian carrier, and the lowest one-way fares found on the website of a major Canadian travel provider. The more detailed analysis is found in **Annex 15, Table 1**. The parameters of this comparison were made as close as possible to the one done in 1995, and show that IOM provides even more savings to the Program than in 1995.

Additionally, both the IOM and the normal fares from 1995 and 1999 were compared. Of the 10 cities of origin, the IOM fare decreased in 9 of 10 cases, while the normal airfare decreased in only 5 of the cases, showing that IOM has continued to negotiate reductions, rather than simply tracking the changes in the normal fare (**see Annex 15, Table 2**).

This average savings in airfare can be compared to the average of all the costs in 1999 for all other services under the Program (medical examinations, processing costs, and staff and office costs) of approximately USD 122 *per capita* (**Annex 16**). Thus the analysis at this level concludes that the savings in airfare alone cover all of the rest of the costs of the Program. In other words, using one of the other providers of air tickets surveyed above would cost far more for the tickets alone than for all of the services provided by IOM.

Conclusion:

IOM is a cost-effective provider of transportation and related services to the Canadian Government under this Program.

In some markets IOM fares are not the lowest, and responses to the survey of IOM offices and the analysis of fares actually paid, show that IOM does generally keep track of the market locally. IOM uses fares other than the IOM fares, if those fares are lower and if they can be used in this Program. It should be noted that not all fares available in the market are usable in this Program, where travel is only one way and is subject to uncertainties which require flexibility to make changes and get refunds. Fares which are not refundable are not useful under this Program.

The fares that were paid by IOM offices throughout 1999 were compared to those fares that had been negotiated by IOM and those of which IOM Geneva (MMD) was aware that were available locally on the 'gray market'. 'Gray market' fares are those not generally published, but which can be obtained in the market and come with restrictions. The restrictions that most constrain IOM's use of these fares are penalties for changes after the ticket is issued, and the non-refundability of the ticket. However, there is no uniformity on these restrictions and some offices have found it possible to use such 'gray market' fares (see fares provided by MMD in **Annex 17**).

In general, this comparison, attached as **Annex 18**, was hampered by the way in which data is collected and kept in IOM for analysis at the HQ level. The financial data is kept in one system and the operational data on flights is kept in another. Although information from the two can be brought together, the information is frequently such that it is not useful for making comparisons. It is not possible to do so

directly through computerized reports, as the reports which the system can produce must further be manipulated and analyzed.

Another, even greater, barrier to the analysis is that the field offices enter data in an inconsistent way, so that it is not possible to segregate the data so that it could be used in the analysis. For example, the database may have data that an office has entered on the refugees' flight only as far as Toronto, while the wide variation in fares makes it obvious that the refugees have gone to different final destinations in Canada. Thus it is not possible to determine how often IOM is able to access the fares that air carriers have accorded the organization on the basis of data available in the various databases maintained at Headquarters.

Recommendation:

MMD should work with field Missions on improving the accuracy of the movement and financially related data that is provided electronically to HQ, so that this information can be more readily used for monitoring purposes.

It is possible to note that in cases where the data can actually be segregated, there are some offices where the fares being paid are higher than those that are available to IOM. In some cases this is reported to be due to lack of availability of seats on the preferred carrier, particularly when there are variations in the IOM fares (see again **Annex 17**). On the other hand, there are cases where IOM is using fares that are lower than the IOM fares.

It was noted earlier (Section 5.2, page 7) that the usage of Canadian carriers was a lesser consideration than cost and timeliness of arrival. As the above-mentioned annex shows in nearly all cases, the cost of using a routing involving a Canadian carrier is more expensive than using a routing without one. This is due largely to the lack of Canadian carrier service to the cities where most refugee travel originates, together with the lack of competitive airfares offered by another airline in combination with a Canadian carrier from those cities where refugees do depart. It is cheaper to use a single carrier to port of entry in Canada than to use two carriers.

Although IOM does not collect data on the number of refugees who arrive in Canada on a Canadian carrier, a proxy for the trend in usage can be found in **Annex 19**. This shows the percentage of transportation costs paid to a Canadian carrier, which excludes from consideration those instances where a Canadian carrier is used for a second leg, e.g., from a transit point in Europe to Toronto, as it is the originating (i.e., non-Canadian) carrier which is paid for the whole journey. Although this understates the actual usage of Canadian carriers, as the data collection has not changed significantly from 1995 to 1999, the trend is valid. This shows the percentage of transportation costs paid directly to Canadian carriers has diminished from just under 50% in 1995 to less than 20% in 1998.

Conclusion:

While overall there is good cost-effectiveness on the part of IOM in making sure that low fares are negotiated, there is room for improvement in making certain that offices

are able to make use of these fares, which requires additional monitoring on the part of MMD.

6.2 Service Fees

It is also possible to compare the cost of providing the services under this Program with those provided by IOM under other, somewhat similar programs. In a letter to the Canadian Mission in Geneva dated 19 December 1995, IOM compared the service costs and movement levels for four programs where transportation services were provided. These numbers have been updated for 1999 and compared in the table below, and do not track fluctuations between 1995 and 1999.

Table 5: Service fee comparison among four programs

Government	Cost per Movement USD		Movements	
	1995	1999	1995 (Jan-Jun)	1999 (Jul-Dec)
Canada	95	*90	4,222	**3,827
Australia	138	124	1,958	1,574
USA	118	140	44,164	42,162
Sweden	87	90	2,354	1,756

* the actual agreed-upon fee is USD100 *per capita*, but with a maximum of USD400 per family. In order to make the figure comparable to other figures in the table, IOM's proposed amount of USD90 was used, as this figure was calculated by the Canadian Government to be closely equivalent to the approved USD 100 *per capita* with a USD 400 ceiling.

**excluding movements ex-Kosovo.

Over the period examined above, the *per capita* cost for movements to Canada in US dollars has been reduced, leading to the conclusion that IOM makes efforts to keep costs down, thus promoting cost-effectiveness. This conclusion holds true in spite of the shift in numbers from one region to another. Looking at IOM's reports to CIC covering 1995-1999, there is no consistency as to which region has higher *per capita* costs. The number of refugees moved in the two periods under consideration were roughly similar, which avoids any question of differences brought about by differences in the overall scale of movements.

Conclusion:

In general, while IOM provides the services required by the Government of Canada on a cost-effective basis and has maintained that effectiveness over time, an effort which needs to be continued.

7. CHANGES IN INTERNAL OPERATING ENVIRONMENT

There were two main changes in that way IOM manages itself that have affected the Canadian Warrant Program. These are the processes of projectization and decentralization

Projectization — which attempts to assure that the costs of each activity undertaken by the Organization are allocated to the appropriate program or project — was introduced in 1994 as a measure to deal with IOM's structural underfunding. It was intended through this process that "projects will become 'cost centers' which attempt to be self-supporting".¹¹

This initiative led to a series of discussions with the Government of Canada during which the services that had been provided by IOM to that point, and the cost of those services, were reviewed. These discussions eventually led to an updated Memorandum of Understanding that was signed in November 1997. Through projectization, IOM has been able to link program expenditures more closely with program income, and thus provide to all concerned a clear picture of what it costs to provide the services.

In general, proposals made by IOM for increases in service fees under this program have been accepted by the Government of Canada. In the period since projectization has been established — and thus more accurate recognition of costs has occurred — there have been three increases.

The other major element affecting the management of this project been decentralization, whereby field offices are encouraged, to the extent possible, to take full responsibility for the activities carried out in that office. Decentralization was piloted with three Missions in 1994, and was expanded to all Missions in mid-1995. However, worldwide programs such as the Canadian Warrant Program were not included in this phase of decentralization, and oversight of the Program continued to be exercised by the Regional Bureaus at Headquarters.

The review of movement programs that took place in 1996 was directed mostly to activities carried out at Headquarters, rather than in the field. While the review resulted in a reorganization of work at Headquarters, the only immediate impact on the field was the establishment of Area Resource Centers (ARCs) to act as points of reference on movement issues. ARCs did not have supervisory authority, nor were any additional resources provided to handle this additional function. When offices involved in the Program were surveyed in 1999 no office mentioned making reference to ARCs, although several mentioned what were at that time SROs (Sub-Regional Offices).

In 1998 the responsibility for program management and oversight was passed to the Sub-Regional Offices. As of January 2000, the four project codes which make up this Program are listed as having 7 project co-ordinators.

These two concurrent processes moved the management of the Program in IOM from a centralized structure where the costs to operate the Program were not well known, to one where responsibility and accountability are internally diffuse but where there is a better handle on costs. The Program has not had any serious problems through this series of changes, but there is evidence that the designation of an individual or unit with a complete Program overview could help the Organization make better use of the improved cost information without recentralizing actual management of the

¹¹ (IOM Instructions on Projectization, December 9, 1993).

Program. This is in recognition of its global scope, its ongoing nature, and its importance to IOM.

8. MEASURING SUCCESS IN THE FUTURE

While all information collected during the course of the evaluation leads to the conclusion that IOM is carrying out the Program in a cost-effective and — to a certain extent — efficient way, there is some room for improvement, particularly in overall planning and monitoring of the Program.

It has already been recommended that there should be one person or unit with an overview of the Program. As an additional support to monitoring for this and eventually other similar programs, certain indicators, or standards of service, should be established. These service standards should be done centrally in cooperation with the Canadian authorities, and adapted to each location. These service standards would serve as the substitute for self-evaluation as carried out in projects developed according to the logical framework approach.

There are a number of issues that were brought up in the course of the evaluation that would lend themselves to this sort of monitoring system. For example, the time lapse in submitting warrants as invoices, the number of unreimbursed medicals, the percentage of completed warrants handed over to refugees before their departure. Other possible service standards can be found in **Annex 20**. The number of indicators would necessarily be limited, given that work, and therefore costs, would be incurred to collect and report the data. However, indicators should be decided on centrally, and could vary from year to year. If this system is found to be useful in the Canadian Program, it could well be extended to other, similar programs.

The indicators should be adapted to the local situation. For example, if the percentage of completed warrants handed over to refugees be selected as one of the areas on which to concentrate, the actual percentage may vary. In some Missions 100% adherence to the standard is reasonable while in Missions that are responsible for departures from several countries and where meeting the standard of 100% would be difficult and costly, a lower number would be set. Choosing the percentage of refugees travelling at the lowest fare may require differing percentages among offices.

At the end of the period selected, most likely a year, the offices concerned would report to the person responsible for the overview of the Program, who would discuss the results with the Canadians and agree on the standards for the next period.

Some of the advantages of such a system are to:

- improve the capability of having an overview of the Program
- promote planning within IOM, and between the Canadian Government and IOM
- have agreement not only on what services are to be provided, but the standard at which they are to be provided
- enable Program progress to be tracked locally and globally against agreed-upon standards

- have regularly collected data upon which decisions can be based.

While this system will require some additional tasks for Missions, these are tasks mostly related to record-keeping, some of which may already be in place. For example, there is already a form that is used by Missions to dispatch warrants to Headquarters. This form lists the warrants individually, the date of departure, the costs, etc. To track the time between the refugee's travel and the dispatch of the warrant to Geneva would only require noting the date on which the warrants were sent and collecting the data.

As another example, if one of the data items to be collected is the percentage of refugees who travel on the lowest fare, IOM already collects the data on fares for reporting to Geneva, and could use this information to compare with the lowest available fare. If the results of this data collection show that IOM is only able use the low fare offered by a carrier for 20% of the movements, this may indicate that additional negotiations are needed. While this is something that would be obvious to the office involved, it would not be visible to fare specialists at HQs, nor would a pattern of a problem with a particular carrier in several offices be evident unless this information is collected in a systematic way.

Recommendation:

IOM should institute, in cooperation with CIC, a system of agreeing on 'service standards', collecting data on those standards, and reporting on them. Such a system will work to promote clear communication, adherence to standards, and improve service to the Government of Canada and to the refugee population served.

9. SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

9.1 Conclusions

- 1.** Overall, the services provided by IOM under this Program are relevant to the goals of the Organization, the requirements expressed by the Canadian Government, and the needs of the refugee population served.
- 2.** Although in general IOM efficiently handles the invoicing of costs under this Program, there are areas where some improvements are needed.
- 3.** As the only services that were being provided under this Program were ones that had been foreseen in the MOU, one criteria of efficiency can be considered as being met in that program resources are not being devoted to activities outside the Program parameters.
- 4.** Resources have not used efficiently, as there has always been a deficit in staff and office costs, as well as in other costs, which have however decreased over time, indicating that the situation is improving. Efforts need to continue to eliminate this recurring deficit.
- 5.** Improving planning for the Program would likely enhance the ability of IOM to efficiently manage the Program, including bringing its finances into balance.
- 6.** In certain aspects, the Program operates relatively efficiently, as resources are dedicated to program activities, *per capita* costs are on a downward trend, and expenditures are being kept closer to budgets. However, improvements need to be made, particularly in planning (including defining required levels of service), communication, and establishing a centralized program overview.
- 7.** IOM is a cost-effective provider of transportation and related services to the Canadian Government under this Program.
- 8.** While overall there is good cost-effectiveness on the part of IOM in making sure that low fares are negotiated, there is room for improvement in making certain that offices are able to make use of these fares, which requires additional monitoring on the part of MMD.
- 9.** In general, while IOM provides the services required by the Government of Canada on a cost-effective basis and has maintained that effectiveness over time, an effort which needs to be continued.

9.2 Recommendations

- 1.** IOM should more closely follow the schedule for the review of fees laid out in the MOU in an effort to better match expenditures with income.
- 2.** IOM should determine from those offices which have the greatest difficulty in meeting the 90-day requirement for submission of warrants, what steps will be needed to ensure more complete compliance with this requirement, and then implement these steps.
- 3.** For countries with an IOM office from which refugees depart, IOM should establish procedures by which it will be possible to ascertain all costs prior to the refugee's departure, so that completed warrants can be given to the refugee before their departure.
- 4.** When MMD has finalized the system that they will be using to review the warrants, ASD and MMD should jointly determine if overall efficiency of the Program could be increased by having MMD handle the invoicing.
- 5.** IOM should explore with the Canadian Government whether it is now possible to finance unreimbursed direct costs, especially for medical examination for refugees who do not depart, in some way other than by increasing the service fee for those refugees who do depart.
- 6.** IOM should first determine internally what system could be set up to improve program efficiency through more direct communications, and then explore with the Canadian Government whether they would be willing to have such a system put into place.
- 7.** IOM should, in coordination with CIC, design a one-page hand-out on travel information, which can be provided to refugees in their own language on departure.
- 8.** IOM should determine the person or unit most suited to maintain an overview of the entire Program, enabling closer monitoring of movement levels, operational activities, and budgetary/financial issues. The cost of such monitoring should be established, and discussions with the Government of Canada should be undertaken to get their approval of such a plan.
- 9.** MMD should work with field Missions on improving the accuracy of the movement and financially related data that is provided electronically to HQ, so that this information can be more readily used for monitoring purposes.
- 10.** IOM should institute, in cooperation with CIC, a system of agreeing on 'service standards', collecting data on those standards, and reporting on them. Such a system will work to promote clear communication, adherence to standards, and improve service to the Government of Canada and to the refugee population served.

EVALUATION OF IOM SERVICES PROVIDED UNDER CANADIAN WARRANT PROGRAM

Terms of Reference

Background – For many years, IOM has provided services to refugees and other designated humanitarian classes accepted by the Government of Canada. Provision of these services is governed by a Memorandum of Understanding, and while there is frequent contact between the Government of Canada and IOM, there has not been an evaluation of IOM’s involvement. The way in which these services have been provided is presumed to have been affected by the changes which the Organization has undergone in the last few years, and one of the purposes of the evaluation is to verify that assumption. One of the changes that has occurred is the introduction of an evaluation policy requiring that all projects be evaluated. However, current guidelines do extend to service provision programs, such as this “warrant program”. This evaluation will attempt to bring such programs into the evaluation framework of the Organization.

I. Overall purpose - To review IOM services provided to the Government of Canada under the Memorandum of Understanding for refugees and designated humanitarian classes, assessing the main services and formulating appropriate recommendations.

II. Specific objectives

- A. To assess the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of the services provided and recommend improvements in IOM’s provision thereof.
- B. To assess how the provision of services has been affected by IOM’s change process.
- C. To identify what IOM can do to measure its success in providing services in this and similar programs.

III. Activities to be undertaken during preparation, travel, and follow-up phases

- A. Examine existing documentation
 - 1. Statistics
 - 2. Financial records
 - 3. Program records
- B. Interview appropriate individuals to explore the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of IOM services, ascertaining what concerns exist, and soliciting ideas contributing to improvements.
 - 1) IOM staff
 - a) IOM Geneva, including MMD and FPC

b) IOM field missions, including one or two departure points, and New York

2) Canadian authorities

a) Federal, including Citizenship and Immigration Canada

b) Selected provincial authorities, as identified by the Federal Government

c) Selected local receiving offices

d) Canadian Mission in Geneva

3) NGOs in Canada

IV. Resources

A. Headquarters

1) Evaluation Unit

a) Staff time of Unit needed to prepare for and undertake evaluation, plus produce final report

b) HQ administrative and office costs associated with preparatory work and finalizing report

c) budget proposed for the evaluation, including DSA and travel, up to \$4,000

3) MMD/FPC/NYC

a) Assistance in accessing information related to both program and organizational changes that have affected it.

V. Output

A draft report will be produced within one month of completion of fieldwork, outlining the primary findings, conclusions, and recommendations.

<p style="text-align: center;">Agenda Evaluation of IOM Processing in Canada February 14th – 17th, 2000</p>
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Monday, February 14th, 2000
Ottawa ON

10:30 am:	NHQ 365 Laurier Ave. W Boardroom 800N Ottawa ON	To attend:	Rick Herringer Bill Lipsit Lillian Zadravetz Madonna Thibeault Carol Pascoe Eric Côté
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2:00 pm:	IOM Ottawa Office 905-75 Albert St.	To attend:	Ahmad Fahim (IOM officer) Louise Bélanger
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Travel Arrangements for the Day:
Leaving Ottawa 6:00pm to Montreal
Approximate time of arrival: 8:00 - 8:30pm

Tuesday, February 15th, 2000
Montreal QC

10:00	Canadian Council for Refugees 6839 Drolet	To attend:	Janet Dench
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1:00 pm	MRCI Dorval Airport	To attend:	Pierre Reymond Madeleine Picard
		By phone:	Marie-Annick Larrieu Claude Mantha Suzanne Jutras

Travel Arrangements for the Day:
AC FLT/137 — 15 FEB '00 Montreal/Toronto 1600/1727

Wednesday, February 16th, 2000
Toronto ON

10:30 pm:	COSTI Reception Centre 100 Lippincott Street Toronto ON	To attend:	COSTI – Carolina Gajardo CIC - Grace Hsu-Holmes
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1:30 pm:	IRIS Toronto Pearson Airport T2	To attend:	Asha Jasdeo Staff
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Travel Arrangements for the day:
AC FLT115 — 16 FEB '00 Toronto/Vancouver 1705/1905

Thursday, February 17th, 2000
Vancouver BC

9:00 am: CIC Vancouver Regional Office
 Vancouver BC
 RHQ Program
 800 Burrard St.


To attend: Alvin Hamm
 George Varnai

11:00 am: VIA
 Vancouver BC

To attend: CIC – Elizabeth Hsu
 CANN – Francis Chan

2:30 pm: CIC Toronto Regional Office
 Vancouver BC
 RAP Program
 1148 Hornby

To attend: CIC – Jenny Able
 Anne De Vent
 Anthony Maekawa
 ISS – Catherine Samson

Chart: Invoicing Time Lapse

SURVEY OF SERVICES PROVIDED 1999

ANNEX 5

MISSION	ACCRA	ADDIS	ALMATY	AMMAN	ANKARA	ATHENS	BAKU	BANGKOK	BELGRADE	BOGOTA	BRUSSELS	BUDAPEST	CAIRO	DAKAR	GUATEMALA	HAGUE	ISLAMABAD	KAMPALA	LIMA	LONDON	LUSAKA	MANILA	MOSCOW	NAIROBI	NEW YORK	PARIS	PRETORIA	QUITO	RIYADH	ROME	SAN JOSE	SAN SALVADOR	SARAJEVO	TEHERAN	TIRANA	VIENNA	ZAGREB			
9. Obtaining of travel documents and documentation for transit countries	Y	N	N	Y	O	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		
10. If required, arrangements for internal travel to point of departure.	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	
11. Obtaining exit permits	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	
12. Waiver of payment of departure fees and/or airport taxes	N	N	N	Y	N	Y/N	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	
13. Final pre-embarkation medical control/check	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	N	
14. Preparation of local departure forms	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	
15. Delivery of entry documents (travel document and visa) to refugees	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
16. Assistance to authorities in departure controls and to carriers in assisting with seat selection	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y
17. Check-in baggage	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
18. Provision of escorts	N	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y

CANADIAN WARRANT PROGRAM
ANALYSIS OF OVERALL DEFICITS
1994-1999

ANNEX 7

(negative amounts indicate deficits, positive amounts are surplus)

SURPLUS/DEFICIT WITHIN REGIONS

	351-CCA	354-CCA	355-CCA	358-CCA	TOTAL
1994	-35,051	-83,223	-203,815	-3,491	-325,580
1995	36,625	-113,360	-78,804	0	-155,539
1996	170,851	-33,114	53,297	13,207	204,241
1997	-99,571	-9,639	9,547	21,640	-78,023
1998	-70,478	33,970	-12,068	-22,668	-71,244
1999	-7,329	0	84,761	0	77,432
	-4,953	-205,366	-147,082	8,688	-348,713

TRANSFER OF SURPLUS FROM ONE REGION TO ANOTHER

	351-CCA	354-CCA	355-CCA	358-CCA	TOTAL
1994					0
1995					0
1996	33,114	-33,114			0
1997	-31,187		9,547	21,640	0
1998	-33,970	33,970			0
1999	-7,329		7,329		0
	-39,372	856	16,876	21,640	0

FINAL FINANCIAL STATUS

	351-CCA	354-CCA	355-CCA	358-CCA	TOTAL
1994	-35,051	-83,223	-203,815	-3,491	-325,580
1995	36,625	-113,360	-78,804		-155,539
1996	137,737	0	53,297	13,207	204,241
1997	-68,384	-9,639			-78,023
1998	-36,508		-12,068	-22,668	-71,244
1999			77,432		77,432
	34,419	-206,222	-163,958	-12,952	-348,713

CCA 351	Refugees from Europe to Canada
CCA 354	Refugees from Latin America to Canada
CCA 355	Refugees from Asia to Canada
CCA 358	Refugees from Africa and Middle-East to Canada

ANALYSIS OF SERVICE FEE
AND MEDICAL PROCESSING DEFICITS

ANNEX 8

TABLE 1

Analysis of Staff and Office Costs

351-CCA

Year	Staff and Office Costs	Service Fee Income	Surplus/ Deficit
1994	322,053	267,434	-54,619
1995	449,663	311,848	-137,815
1996	444,984	349,416	-95,568
1997	491,270	362,897	-128,373
1998	382,639	292,482	-90,157
1999	316,951	276,975	-39,976

354-CCA

1994	163,324	22,342	-140,982
1995	147,766	8,617	-139,149
1996	57,000	17,361	-39,639
1997	12,553	10,314	-2,239
1998	16,845	21,779	4,934
1999	19,621	16,906	-2,715

355-CCA

1994	335,760	78,590	-257,170
1995	182,938	53,744	-129,194
1996	61,752	90,608	28,856
1997	44,929	80,267	35,338
1998	40,752	46,944	6,192
1999	59,710	108,478	48,768

358-CCA

1994	24,612	24,785	173
1995	36,262	41,603	5,341
1996	118,777	90,345	-28,432
1997	123,409	143,692	20,283
1998	147,067	111,527	-35,540
1999	125,757	118,514	-7,243

Total

1994	845,749	393,151	-452,598
1995	816,629	415,812	-400,817
1996	682,513	547,730	-134,783
1997	672,161	597,170	-74,991
1998	587,303	472,732	-114,571
1999	522,039	520,873	-1,166

TABLE 2

Medical Processing Deficits

Medical Costs	Reimburse-ments	Surplus/ Deficit
273,292	242,737	-30,555
379,309	359,539	-19,770
249,180	270,933	21,753
212,686	171,248	-41,438
154,891	131,080	-23,811
155,862	179,025	23,163

6,973	12,585	5,612
9,281	3,656	-5,625
4,371	10,587	6,216
8,084	5,211	-2,873
5,002	23,409	18,407
3,725	4,531	806

13,583	47,725	34,142
10,959	25,517	14,558
15,354	24,817	9,463
14,402	14,924	522
12,907	8,706	-4,201
41,816	37,259	-4,557

17,372	19,273	1,901
44,971	32,661	-12,310
69,299	64,643	-4,656
76,852	89,895	13,043
70,116	45,818	-24,298
85,696	56,564	-29,132

311,220	322,320	11,100
444,520	421,373	-23,147
338,204	370,980	32,776
312,024	281,278	-30,746
242,916	209,013	-33,903
287,099	277,379	-9,720

CCA 351 Refugees from Europe to Canada
 CCA 354 Refugees from Latin America to Canada
 CCA 355 Refugees from Asia to Canada
 CCA 358 Refugees from Africa and Middle-East to Canada

ANALYSIS OF RESPONSES TO OPEN-ENDED SURVEY QUESTIONS

Analysis of responses to open-ended questions sent to IOM offices whose accounting records indicated an involvement in the Canadian warrant program in 1999. Responses were received from 37 missions.

In general, no major problems were brought to light. The issues that were raised were those of how the program is financed and how costs are accounted for. In general, those offices more involved in the program had more information to offer. A certain lack of planning, both at the IOM internal level, and also with external partners, could be noticed from the responses.

1a. What kind of reporting, if any, do you do to the Canadian Embassy/High Commission?

Offices in general report to Canadian offices overseas on very concrete matters, sending statistics, information about refugees leaving, etc. Only in very few offices was there any mention of reporting on the flow of refugees, the “pipeline”.

1b. Are there any agreements, written or otherwise, about the kind of info the Embassy/High Commission wants?

There were no such agreements reported, other than the requirement to advise the High Commission or Embassy of the planned departure of refugees a sufficient time in advance.

1c. What sort of feedback do you get from them? How often?

Feedback was reported as being received by the missions where there are a larger number of movements, but was nearly always described as being “as needed”, rather than anything regular.

2a. How do IOM fares compare with fares available locally in the market, not only in amount, but also in conditions applied?

Generally, offices report that IOM fares are competitive, both in level and conditions applied. However, there are certain markets where IOM fares are not competitive, in which case missions report using fares that are available on the open market.

2b. How often do you survey the local market for airfares?

There was a wide range of answers, including a large number of indefinite ones, such as “regularly”, “permanently”, etc. Offices with lower movement levels reported checking fares when booking requests only when booking requests received. Those who reported checking fares on a periodic basis most often reported doing so every 3-6 months.

3a. What kind of information is available to do planning, particularly budgeting?

Most missions reported basing planning on discussions with the Canadian missions, generally limited to an overall number for the year, or historical movement patterns. Budgeting was based on IOM internal guidelines

3b. What is your responsibility for balancing staff and office costs against the Canadian service fee?

There was again a range of answers for this, largely related to the size of the program in the office. Several of the smaller offices said that they had no responsibility for this balance. Some of the larger offices reported trying to balance expenses with the projected service fee income, others to ensure that expenses were appropriately broken down monthly according to numbers of movements. There were comments that the service fee was not sufficient to cover the level of services provided.

4a. With whom in IOM do you have the most frequent contacts on this Program?

Most of the reported contacts were with IOM Geneva, with MMD and associated units, plus FPC. In the field, certain missions reported contact with ROs, while others with the departure or transit missions concerned. A few reported IOM New York, and some mentioned the “project coordinator”, which is a different person for each of the project codes that comprise this program.

4b. When problems are encountered, who is the most likely to be able to solve them?

There is again a wide range of answers to the question, as the offices make distinctions about the type of problem and who is likely to be able to solve it. There is a tendency to try to solve problems locally and regionally, but HQ is also frequently mentioned as being able to help.

5a. What constitutes “success” in this program, i.e., how do you know what the program is supposed to accomplish?

Success was generally conceived of as having two components: firstly, the following of program requirements, with meeting the movement targets being specifically mentioned, and secondly humane treatment of the refugees. There were 6 missions that did not answer either part of this question at all, the only question where there was a total lack of response from any office.

5b. How do you monitor progress of the program?

Progress is generally monitored by statistics on departures and financial records, assumed to be a comparison of keeping within budget allocations. In some instances feedback was mentioned as a source of monitoring, although there was no indication of any system being in place to seek feedback.

6. What could be done to make the program run more efficiently?

While a number of country-specific suggestions were made, the following suggestions have more general application:

- Better planning between partners at the local level (Canadian, UNHCR, IOM).
- Increased ability to get all costs covered, especially medical costs for those who do not depart.
- Getting costs covered right away, rather than waiting for refugees to depart.
- Clearer idea within IOM of what the program is about (raised by offices handling fewer movements).
- Better local agreements with airlines.

PLANNED VS. ACTUAL MOVEMENTS 1996-1999
(information provided by CIC, Canada)

ANNEX 10

	1996		1996 Percent	1997		1997 Percent	1998		1998 Percent	1999		1999 Percent
	Planned	Actual	Achieved									
NEW YORK	0	0	n/a	0	0	n/a	0	0	n/a	0	1	n/a
DETROIT	0	0	n/a	0	0	n/a	0	0	n/a	0	4	n/a
HONG KONG	0	8	n/a	0	8	n/a	5	5	100.00%	6	0	0.00%
SYDNEY	0	1	n/a	0	0	n/a	0	0	n/a	0	0	n/a
SINGAPORE	15	16	106.67%	0	4	n/a	11	11	100.00%	0	0	n/a
MANILA	10	1	10.00%	0	7	n/a	0	0	n/a	0	0	n/a
NEW DELHI	40	53	132.50%	200	172	86.00%	323	321	99.38%	325	345	106.15%
BANGKOK	150	159	106.00%	140	139	99.29%	36	36	100.00%	35	39	111.43%
COLOMBO	0	1	n/a	0	3	n/a	0	0	n/a	0	1	n/a
PORT OF SPAIN	0	0	n/a	0	2	n/a	0	0	n/a	0	0	n/a
BUENOS AIRES	0	5	n/a	0	3	n/a	1	1	100.00%	0	0	n/a
MEXICO CITY	50	65	130.00%	50	24	48.00%	25	23	92.00%	15	10	66.67%
BOGOTA	20	20	100.00%	20	0	0.00%	20	32	160.00%	90	100	111.11%
GUATEMALA	105	85	80.95%	70	85	121.43%	95	98	103.16%	60	50	83.33%
HAVANA	0	0	n/a	0	135	n/a	105	109	103.81%	15	13	86.67%
BELGRADE	2300	2614	113.65%	2000	2054	102.70%	1600	1620	101.25%	930	899	96.67%
BUDAPEST	150	132	88.00%	0	0	n/a	0	0	n/a	0	0	n/a
VIENNA	1750	2182	124.69%	1700	1771	104.18%	1250	1276	102.08%	1600	1533	95.81%
KIEV	0	0	n/a	0	0	n/a	55	50	90.91%	5	6	120.00%
MOSCOW	100	66	66.00%	400	377	94.25%	290	292	100.69%	40	34	85.00%
BUCHAREST	0	0	n/a	0	5	n/a	0	0	n/a	0	0	n/a
BONN	125	67	53.60%	80	373	466.25%	1500	1530	102.00%	1725	1730	100.29%
LONDON, ENGLAND	0	0	n/a	0	0	n/a	3	3	100.00%	5	5	100.00%
PARIS	0	0	n/a	0	0	n/a	100	78	78.00%	40	25	62.50%
ROME	35	27	77.14%	0	1	n/a	0	4	n/a	0	1	n/a
ANKARA	500	428	85.60%	450	285	63.33%	322	323	100.31%	550	566	102.91%
NAIROBI	305	439	143.93%	530	647	122.08%	450	404	89.78%	725	616	84.97%
PRETORIA	110	138	125.45%	70	63	90.00%	50	57	114.00%	50	51	102.00%
ABIDJAN	15	32	213.33%	0	25	n/a	0	1	n/a	0	0	n/a
ACCRA	20	11	55.00%	160	55	34.38%	60	73	121.67%	80	77	96.25%
CAIRO	50	90	180.00%	130	232	178.46%	330	311	94.24%	300	305	101.67%
ISLAMABAD	600	638	106.33%	400	474	118.50%	350	360	102.86%	525	550	104.76%
TEL AVIV	0	9	n/a	0	2	n/a	0	4	n/a	0	1	n/a
DAMASCUS	100	155	155.00%	200	205	102.50%	325	326	100.31%	375	334	89.07%
RIYADH	300	353	117.67%	450	466	103.56%	43	43	100.00%	0	0	n/a
Other	450		0.00%	250		0.00%	-49		0.00%	-196	21	-10.71%
			n/a			n/a			n/a			n/a
Total	7,300	7,795	106.78%	7,300	7,617	104.34%	7,300	7,391	101.25%	7,300	7,317	100.23%

NOTES ON MEETINGS HELD IN CANADA

Consolidated notes from meetings in Canada and e-mails received subsequently through CCR

Meetings included 6 staff of CIC National Headquarters, 12 staff of Immigration Field Offices, one Canadian High Commission representative, and 8 NGO representatives. Through CCR, e-mails were received from 4 NGO representatives and 7 refugees, who had all been sponsored by World University Services Canada.

Communication

CIC is in general pleased with the communications that they have with IOM, both at Geneva HQ and in New York and Washington, the closest major IOM offices to Ottawa. No significant problems came to light at this level.

Involving IOM in planning was generally conceded to need strengthening.

In general, the channels of communication on refugee arrivals are centralized through National Headquarters. Notifications of refugees arriving in Canada come to NHQ and from there are sent to various offices across Canada, depending on where the refugee is going and how they are travelling.

Normally there is no direct contact between any of the local offices in Canada dealing with refugees and IOM, with the exception of the Kosovo program, where there was direct contact with IOM operational staff in Canada. Those involved in the non-Kosovo program have been advised to contact NHQ in case of questions or difficulties with transportation.

For warrants which are issued in Canada, generally signed by the sponsor, CIC offices are instructed to be in contact with the IOM office in New York in order to make transportation arrangements.

Staff at the ports of entry visited expressed interest in having direct contact with IOM in order to ask questions and get last-minute difficulties sorted out.

Additional needs expressed:

- Get notification of arrival well in advance, a minimum of 10 days, which is not always respected.
- Get information on cases with special needs, particularly wheelchairs.
- Information sheets for refugees on what they can expect during travel and reception would be useful.

Transport

This was the most widely commented upon, as was expected.

At the national level the concern was for planning for transportation, and for IOM being able to move the number of refugees expected, for which latter point IOM was given high marks, for 1999 in particular.

At the local level the concerns expressed were around the issues of :

- Routings – easier if all Quebec-destined refugees enter Montreal, and only those destined to Quebec
- Costs – IOM fares sometimes seen as expensive (this may be related to refugees who arrive without any idea of how much they owe)
- Timely notification – respect for 10-day notification, immediate notification of changes in booking, e.g., in transit overseas
- Respect for transit times at port of entry

Specific requests were:

- Access to IOM fares in Toronto for refugees who change destinations on arrival
- Avoid arrivals who have stand-by reservations, rather than confirmed
- Advise refugees that they do not have to pay for the food on the plane
- Make arrangements so that Muslim refugees are able to eat on board

It should be noted that, with the exception of NHQ staff, there is no direct communication with IOM. This means that local offices, particularly those at the ports of entry, must go through several steps to get information from IOM, roughly local office to NHQ to Canadian High Commission to IOM sending office and then back along the same channel. This understandably is more time-consuming than a channel with fewer steps.

Warrants

Warrants are reviewed by NHQ on receipt, and not too many problems are noted, although they could always be quicker.

Concerns were expressed at how many costs needed to be put on the warrant, leading to heavy repayment expenses for the refugees.

The major problem noted with warrants noted by some local offices is that some refugees arrive without them, or with warrants that are partially blank, that is without any information on costs.

Baggage

These problems were most noted by staff at the ports of entry. Mostly the problems are centered around:

- Refugee responsibility to handle own bags – POE offices are not staffed to move large amounts of baggage around, relying on the refugee to do so themselves, or to have the money to hire porters.
- Groups who arrive with group leader carrying all baggage claim tags – if one bag in a group of 50-60 is missing, it is almost impossible to determine the tag number of the missing bag.
- Paying for excess baggage – no government funds to do so, and domestic airlines may not be willing to carry excess without payment.

Pets

This was not an issue.

Medical

In general this was not an issue, and those interviewed seemed not to have much information.

Bribery was brought up as an issue by two people, not that IOM was involved, but that panel physicians were, and the question was raised about whether the refugees could approach IOM with this problem.

The more widespread concern was to get more information on physical conditions, which would have an immediate impact on arrival and settlement, specifically those arriving in wheelchairs, and women who are visibly pregnant.

There was some recognition that the lack of reimbursement to IOM for medicals of those who do not travel is an issue.

Orientation

This was not a focus of the evaluation, but some points did surface during the course of the meetings.

One recurring theme was whether the refugees had any information about what was going to happen to them on their trip and on arrival.

Another point particularly from persons directly involved in the initial settlement is that they would like to know what the refugees have been told overseas, one person mentioning that the refugees used to get a certificate of how many lessons in the manual they had covered.

There was some recognition that it is not always possible to get refugees, in the very difficult time that they are going through, to focus on what is being said to them, but recognition of this state may promote use of techniques that have been proven useful in such situations.

Visibility

As the interview guidelines had been distributed to the interviewees by NHQ, some questions were interpreted differently than intended. While this was clarified during the meetings, one unintended consequence of the area of concern headed “visibility” was a lot of praise for the IOM bag as a help in identifying refugees. This in spite of the fact that some refugees put them away in their luggage, reportedly because they do not want to be visibly identified as refugees.

On a broader point, and unsurprisingly, IOM was not very well-known among the people interviewed. They knew that IOM made transportation arrangements, but other knowledge was dependent on their position. NHQ people knew IOM well, with the regional CIC staff slightly less knowledgeable, followed by local CIC offices and NGOs.

NUMBERS AND PERCENTAGES
OF SPONSOR
PREPAID MOVEMENTS TO CANADA

ANNEX 14

SPONSOR PREPAID TO CANADA 1990-1999				TRANSPORTATION WARRANTS ISSUED IN CANADA USED BY NEW YORK 1993?-1999										
				YHZ	YOW	YMX	YEG	YVR	YWG	YYZ	YQM	YXE	YYC	TOTAL
358-810		355-810		ALBANIA	2									2
BURUNDI	2	CAMBODIA	11	BELGRADE			2					1		3
DAKAR	4	CHINA	2	BRAZZAVILLE				3						3
EGYPT	62	INDIA	4	BURUNDI		2								2
ERITREA	1	IRAN	5	DHAKA			5							5
ETHIOPIA	600	JAPAN	2	DJIBOUTI		9								9
GHANA	8	LAOS	3	ELSALVADOR		3								3
GUINEA	5	PHILIPPINES	276	ETHIOPIA		23	10	4						37
IVORY COAST	3	SINGAPORE	42	HONDURAS					2					2
JORDAN	4	THAILAND	1024	IRAN			2	7						9
KENYA	841	TOTAL	2294	JOHANNESBURG					4					4
LEBANON	2	354-810		KENYA		1					1			2
MALAWI	8	CHILE	15	NICARAGUA					1					1
NIGERIA	1	COSTA RICA	4	NIGERIA		5	1							6
DJIBOUTI	32	EL SALVADOR	43	PAKISTAN		5				6				11
RWANDA	6	GUATEMALA	11	PERU		3		3						6
SAUDI ARABIA	44	HONDURAS	16	RWANDI		4								4
SOMALIA	8	PANAMA	2	TANZANIA			4				1			5
SUDAN	160	PERU	22	UGANDA				1					5	6
SYRIA	19	TOTAL	113	VIETNAM			11							11
TANZANIA	8	351-810		WARSAW				7						7
TOGO	6	AUSTRIA	2	ZAIRE		29	11	8		15				63
UAE	2	BELGIUM	2	ROMANIA			2							2
UGANDA	12	BELGRADE	63	ZAMBIA		1								1
YEMEN	21	BOSNIA	20	TOTAL	2	85	35	22	24	7	21	2	1	5
ZAIRE	77	CYPRUS	2	Below are number of cases who did not use IOM service and those who requested a refund (1990-1999)										
ZAMBIA	1	FRANCE	2											
TOTAL	1937	GREECE	3											
355-810		ITALY	60											
HONG KONG	156	SOVIET UNION	23	351-810	74	230	32.2				20	230	8.7	
INDONESIA	138	SWEDEN	2	354-810	37	113	32.7				3	113	2.7	
MALAYSIA	253	TURKEY	51	355-810	307	2294	13.4				107	2294	4.7	
PAKISTAN	378	TOTAL	230	358/810	1272	1937	65.7				68	1937	3.5	
				TOTAL	1690	4574	36.9				198	4574	4.3	

IOM FARES - 1999

CITY	Lowest IOM/FARE			IOM fare to YYZ			Normal OW	Grey Market		Grey Market on
	Airline	Fare	Taxes	on Canadian carrier	Taxes	Fare	Airline	Fare	Canadian carrier	
NBO	KL	700	24	AF/AC	850	30	1749			
	AZ/SN	713	20							
JNB	LH	597	17	AF/AC	954	22	2069	AF	862 ?	
VIE	average	433		AF/AC	646	26	1605	LH	200	
FRA	AC	324	4	AC	324	4	1407			
ZRH	LH/AC	286	15	AC	283	10	1600	AF	337	369
ROM	CP	288	9	CP	288	9	1133			446
SGN	LH	699	4	LH/AC	951	4	1403			
	AF	700	9	AF/AC	1011	9				
BKK	BA	540		AF/AC	832	9	1181	BA	571	
				LH/AC	748	4				
				CP	681					
ZAG	OU/AC	522	11	OU/AC	522	11	1676	KL	429	
BEG	ExBUD - MA	422	13	AF/AC	548	21	1505	AZ	294	
	plus BUS	25								
BOG	AA	314	78				628	CO + AA	628 ?	
CAI	AF	620	77	LH/AC	684	72	1378			
KHI	KL	574	58	SR/AC	777	56	873			
ISB	KL/PK	577	47				873			
IST	KL	490	20	LH/AC	1008	19	2016	KL	490	
AMM	AF	523	75	LH/AC	653	70	1309			

Analysis of Fares to Toronto

Analysis of fares to Toronto from selected cities – comparison of what was paid on average in 1999, and what the lowest fares on record at HQ are. The comparisons are of adult fares only and include all taxes paid as part of the ticket cost.

In general, the comparison was hampered by the way in which data is collected and kept in IOM for analysis at the HQ level. The financial data is kept in one system and the operational data on flights is kept in another. Although information from the two can be brought together, the information is frequently such that it is not useful for making comparisons. It is not possible to do so directly through computerized reports, as the reports which the system can produce must further be manipulated and analyzed.

Another barrier to the analysis is that the field offices enter data in an inconsistent way, so that it is not possible to segregate the data so that it could be used in the analysis. For example, the database may show that an office has entered data on the refugees' flight only as far as Toronto, while the wide variation in fares makes it obvious that the refugees have gone to different final destinations in Canada. Thus it is not possible to conclude on the basis of existing data at Headquarters how often IOM is able to access the fares that air carriers have accorded the organization.

Comments on individual offices follow:

Amman – fares reported to Toronto by Amman varied from USD 359-480. However, no refugee was reported as travelling beyond Toronto, which taken together with the variation in airfare leads to the likely conclusion that any leg traveled beyond Toronto was not reported. Thus a comparison with expected fares to Toronto was not possible.

Belgrade – the fares ranged from USD 288-946 and all final destinations were reported as being Toronto. This is not credible and is certainly due to the non-reporting of the legs that these refugees traveled in Canada, particularly as within a single proflight in January the fares ranged from USD 425-837.

Bogota – only a single carrier combination was used from Bogota – Avianca from Bogota to Miami and Air Canada from Miami to Toronto. Yet, the variance within the year was significant, with the highest reported fare approximately 4 times the lowest. Even discarding the extremes, there were those refugees who paid nearly twice as much for their travel as others. Although fares were quoted in Columbian pesos, the serious variation in fares cannot be attributed solely to fluctuations in exchange rates, which progressed rather steadily throughout the year. The fares, on the other hand, fluctuated within the year, with someone who traveled in early June paying twice as much as someone who traveled in late April, as well as someone who traveled in late June. While 8 adult passengers (of 65) paid more than 50% in excess of the median fare, only 1 paid a fare which was 50% less than that same median. The very highest fares were paid shortly before the Easter and Christmas holidays. However, as with so many other countries, no conclusion can be drawn from the data, as there is no indication as to the final destination in Canada.

Cairo – the data shows a large variation in fares among those whose destination is purportedly Toronto. Differences of up to 40% within a single flight were noted. Some flights did indicate travel beyond the port of entry in Canada (7 proflights out of 33), and 19 of 33 flights, or 56%, were booked to ports of entry other than Toronto. This supports a conclusion that IOM is not able to take advantage of the lowest fares offered by the carriers. On the other hand, it could also be concluded, from the variation in fare within a single proflight, and the establishment of different blocks within the proflight (which normally signal different destinations), that there is again a lack of consistency in recording final destinations. It is not possible to ascertain from the computer records which is the correct explanation for the higher-than-expected fares.

Islamabad – although it appears that the office correctly records the final destination, the fares to Toronto fluctuated substantially during the year. IOM recorded no wide swings in exchange rates during the year. However, over the course of the year, the average fare paid to Toronto on a proflight basis was less than USD 3 higher than the lowest fare which should have been obtained by IOM (USD 627 vs. USD 624).

Istanbul – no flights onward from the port of entry in Canada are recorded, while substantial differences in fare are shown. No comparisons can be drawn about fares paid to Toronto.

Johannesburg – for the limited number of flights with a final destination of Toronto, the average fare using Air France was USD 862, which is what is listed as the gray market fare, rather than the IOM fare of USD 976. For Lufthansa, the situation was the opposite. Rather than the fare of USD 614 which should have been available, the average fare paid was USD 925. However, only 7 of 47 flights used Lufthansa. It would appear that there is margin for improvement as regards LH

Karachi – although there were only a small number of flights from this city, the fares on average are approximately the same as what are known to be the negotiated fares.

Nairobi – this office records the data in a way that makes it possible to segregate fares paid to Toronto only. For Air France, the average paid was USD 733, against the negotiated fare of USD 880. The few (4) flights on Alitalia cost USD 912, on average nearly USD 200 more than the negotiated fare of USD 733. On KLM, against an expected fare of USD 724, the office paid an average of USD 727. There was only one flight each on Sabena and Lufthansa, both more expensive than expected, although not as much as the flights on Alitalia.

Rome – there was only one flight from Rome, but the fare paid was approximately twice as much as the negotiated fare.


Vienna – the fare paid on the one flight from Vienna was USD 230, which was much less than the IOM fare of USD 433 and approximately the gray market fare of USD 200.

Zagreb – although the way that this office recorded the information made it difficult to interpret, nonetheless, for the 7 proflights that could be identified as going to Toronto, the average fare on Air Canada was US \$433, with an average of US \$183

paid in addition to Croatian Airlines for the leg from Zagreb to the connection point. This total of \$616 is higher than the \$533 expected.

Zurich – of the very few flights from this city, there were none where the final destination was Toronto, so no comparison was possible.

Movements of Canadian Warrant Holders to Canada - International Air transportaion Costs (3-501)										
CarrierOrigin	1995		1996		1997		1998		Total	
Canadian Carriers	2,522,298.71	47.82%	1,652,935.16	32.08%	1,424,988.42	30.53%	641,832.36	18.25%	6,242,054.65	33.54%
Others	2,752,119.09	52.18%	3,500,153.17	67.92%	3,242,393.04	69.47%	2,874,117.47	81.75%	12,368,782.77	66.46%
Total International Costs	5,274,417.80	100%	5,153,088.33	100%	4,667,381.46	100%	3,515,949.83	100%	18,610,837.42	100%
Domestic Transportation Costs (3-502) in Canada										
Canadian Carriers	22,268.34		14,212.94		14,002.26		39,610.73		90,094.27	
Canadian Carriers Total transport Costs	2,544,567.05		1,667,148.10		1,438,990.68		681,443.09		6,332,148.92	



INDICATORS TO USE AS STANDARDS OF SERVICE

- Number of meetings with CHC
- % of completed warrants handed to refugees pre-departure
- % of refugees travelling at lowest fare
- % of refugees arriving in Canada on AC/CP
- % of warrants dispatched to HQ within 2 months
- % of complaints received
- % of refugees moved within 30 days of being 'travel ready'
- % of refugees booked to 'correct' POE, e.g. Province Quebec cases to YUL, non-Quebec cases to other POE
- % of flights notified to Canadian Mission
 - less than 10 working days
 - 10 to 20 working days
 - more than 20 working days
- % of departure cables sent same day
- % of unreimbursed medicals