

**Evaluation Report**  
**IOM Project Part I, Phase II, Strengthening the Indonesian National**  
**Police Through Institution Building, funded by the Royal Netherlands**  
**Embassy.**

**May-August 2007**

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# **Evaluation Report for IOM Project Part I, Phase II, Strengthening the Indonesian National Police Through Institution Building, funded by the Royal Netherlands Embassy.**

## **Foreword**

This evaluation of the IOM INP Institution Strengthening Project was conducted from May through July 2007. RNE representatives Hagar Ligtvoet, Said Fazili joined the evaluation team as observers in Aceh and Pontianak respectively, an initial meeting with IOM Police Project Unit and IOM Chief of Mission, and a meeting with the RI Chief of Police, his deputies and staff. Their findings, particularly in relation to internal IOM management, are incorporated in this report.

**Methodology:** The evaluation involved in-depth document review, including IOM proposals, reports, correspondence, training material, especially as related to Phase II of the project and the NAD addendum. Documents reviewed also included among others, RI Police Headquarters Strategic Plans (2005-2025, June 10, 2005; 2005-2009 Strategic Plan (revised), April 2007; the INP Five Year Plan for Polmas (Prolita Polmas); INP responses to Parliament (Komisi III DPR); LPEM-UI (University of Indonesia Institute for Economic Development and Planning) Academic Paper on Police Grand Strategy; RI Chief of Police Directives (especially SKEP 737/ October 2005 on the implementation of Community Policing as Policy and Strategy and ; SKEP 433,432,431 on the implementation of Community Policing among the various police functions); other relevant legislation such as the RI Police Laws (Act no. 2, 2002), MPR Decrees and Laws governing RI Security. Also consulted were media reports on security and policing, surveys of police performance in the public perception, NGO reports on the police.

Interviews and FGDs were conducted with IOM staff in Jakarta and in the pilot areas and some training sessions were observed.

The evaluation team conducted field visits to all pilot project sites (Situbondo, Pontianak, Bogor, Riau Islands/Barelang, Central Jakarta, Den Pasar, Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam). FGDs were held with trainers, trainees, police personnel at the provincial police headquarters (polda), polres (police district), polsek (sub-district precincts), Community Police Forums (CPFs, or FKPMs), and NGOs and other stakeholders (a.o., the press, Regional Commission on Human Rights, National Commission on Women, Regional Ministry of Justice office).

FGDs were held with the Asia Foundation-funded COP (Community Oriented Policing) Project run by the Human Rights Centre (PUSHAM) of Airlangga University. Also interviewed were The Asia Foundation staff in charge of the COP program and Partnership.

Interviews and discussions were held with police personnel at the National Headquarters (Mabes POLRI) in Jakarta (in particular with the Deputy of Operations and Staff, responsible for Community Policing), Human Resource Development, the Education and

Training Agency (Lemdiklat head and staff); Sespim; PTIK/PSP (Community Policing Centre at Institute of Police Sciences); RI Chief of Police, his Deputy and staff.

A special effort was made to integrate the gender aspect into the evaluation, particularly community policing and human rights issues directly relating to women in the community and the position of policewomen in the force, through a joint meeting with Derap Warapsari, Federasi-Apik, and policewomen (Pokja) with the RI Chief of Police, meeting with the Pokja Polwan (Working Group on Policewomen), and the APIK Federation.

Constraints on the evaluation had to do mainly with the challenges involved in evaluating such an enormous effort under narrow time limitations and an enormous build-up of documents. Management issues in NAD also consumed considerable time and energy. However, good facilitation by IOM staff on the ground and its excellent relations with the INP, helped greatly towards completion.

The team wishes to thank General Sutanto, RI Chief of Police for graciously giving time and thought to this evaluation; all INP personnel for their valuable contributions to the findings in this report; Kapolda NAD, Kom.Jen. Pol. (ret.) Bahrumsyah Kasman for his willingness to respond with humour to irritating questions; Kapolda Kalbar Brig. Jend. Pol. Zainal Abidin Ishak; to member of Parliament, Nursyahbani Katjasungkana S.H., for providing the team with material and keeping us in touch with current developments, and also for her strong support of democratic police reforms; to the Police Women and Federasi-APIK, who so kindly allowed access to their important meetings; to all IOM/Police Project Unit personnel who lent strong support and provided valuable information; to RNE staff Said Fazili and Hagar Ligtoet for their interest and support of the evaluation effort; to IOM Jakarta COM Steve Cook; and to all the participants in the series of FGDs, interviews and observations that took place with civil society organizations and individuals. Needless to say, yet necessary, this report would not have been possible without them. I thank also the members of the evaluation team, Pak Luthfi Dahlan and Ayi Bunyamin whose assistance and support have been invaluable.

## **Strengthening the Indonesian National Police through Institution Building 1, Phase II.**

### **Overview**

*“Ini adalah mandat yang tertinggi yang berasal dari rakyat yang diberikan pada POLRI.”* (“This is the highest mandate, originating in the people and handed to the Indonesian National Police.” 26 November 2004). With this statement, then Head of the Police Institute for Education and Training (Lemdiklat), Police Inspector General, Drs. Sutanto invoked the highest source of legitimacy for police reform and the significance of Community Policing and Human Rights Training. He followed this with the hope that the cooperation between the INP and IOM would not be treated as a mere project but that capacity building to forge a professional and modern police force would be recognized as a strategic activity: *“kami mengharapkan ini bukan sekedar proyek tetapi kegiatan strategis.”* It is a vision and a commitment that he carried with him when he was appointed Chief of Police of the Republic of Indonesia, arguably one of the largest and most powerful state institutions in the country today. Not long after, Gen. Sutanto issued a series of key policy decisions (Surat Keputusan Kapolri nos. 737, 431, 432, 433) outlining strategic steps to make community policing an operational reality with a structure to match. Following that, Parliament approved Polri budget allocations for community policing.

Today the efforts towards establishing a strong, democratic police force using the principles of Human Rights and Community Policing stand at a critical juncture. While General Sutanto remains in charge and continues actively to promote community policing, Human Rights and democratic policing as core values and practices for police reform, he is more than halfway through his tenure. This has raised questions among some stakeholders—including the donor—as to whether sufficient capacity has in fact been built into the police organization to ensure that the reforms will be sustained. Will it be possible for a new Chief of Police to simply issue another decree to obviate or dilute them? Will the thousands of police officers trained revert to old practices in the face of entrenched habits and continuing budget shortfalls? Will the practice of *mutasi* (transfers, redeployment) and the demands of the career path continue to undermine the commitment of good trainers?

Also to be taken into account are the challenges that are confronting the INP—and Indonesian society as a whole—as a result of its separation from the Indonesian Armed Forces (the TNI), and especially in light of the immense increase in international pressures for cooperation on counter-terrorism and broad regional security. The army’s dismal record of human rights violations have not made it an attractive counterpart, and it remains subject to various international restrictions on cooperation. For better or for worse, this leaves the police at the frontline of counter-terrorism measures. With its great human and natural resources, combined with porous borders and poor managerial control, Indonesia has become a favored site for transnational crime. Already tight police resources are stretched further to combat illegal logging, fishing, human trafficking and the like. In the long run, these measures will generate higher domestic product with a

positive impact on the national budget, but in the immediate term there is a fairly high risk of a backlash against the attack on traditional sources of police (and TNI, bureaucrat) income. In addition, the continued emphasis on separatist movements means that the police will continue to spend a significant percentage of resources and political capital on counter-insurgency programs. Increased high-tech support for surveillance techniques and tracking of civilians are readily extended to combat any group deemed to have tendencies labelled—often loosely and with weak legal justification—separatist.<sup>1</sup> The police are in a position to regain legitimacy lost over the New Order decades. And in many ways, in this era of cross-border, cyber- and even what we might call culture-crimes, the police are increasingly charged with the unprecedented task of patrolling the territory of nation as imagined community<sup>2</sup>. This is not to deny that police capacity-building in these policing roles is needed but, rather, to raise the question as to what pressures these developments may exert on democratic police reforms. Posed in another way, we might ask whether they constitute an argument for reinforcing and accelerating the pace of the democratic reforms already underway as one of the largest police forces in the world grows in strength.

On the other side of the capacity-building coin is the capability of the partner implementing organization—in this case, IOM—to support and strengthen the efforts towards reform. Granted, IOM is not the only organization contributing to the effort; it is, however, one of the largest to commit to democratic community policing and human rights and over the past 3-4 years, the organization has accumulated a significant body of experience and knowledge on the practice. The IOM Police Project essentially emerged out of the imminent collapse in 2003 of the UNHCR police project, which had reached the point at which the police to all intents and purposes had rejected the initiative. Astute preparations by IOM—and in this case particularly by Sarah Domingo—are to be credited with rescuing a project no-one wanted anymore, developing and managing it to its current position. The support of the COM for the project and his trust in the Unit has been a deciding factor for the continuation of the Project Unit's work and its position within the overall IOM structure. Other organizations working on SSR and particularly police reforms (a.o. Partnership, TAF) recognized that there has been no other organization able to undertake what IOM has achieved. The RI Chief of Police shares this view. In a very real way, the Project Unit at IOM grew with the police project. Starting from a skeleton crew, the Project Unit has grown to accommodate the dimensions of the growing police project. The cascading design of the trainings and the expansion from the original three pilot areas (Situbondo, Pontianak, Bogor) into seven (Barelang/Riau islands, Den Pasar, Central Metropolitan Jakarta, the saturation of the Bogor municipality and regency, and Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam) have meant an increased workload and a work force to match. This rapid growth has given rise to a

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<sup>1</sup> To his credit, and the credibility of the commitment of the force to the rule of law, the Police Chief has recently asked for clearer legislation on the definition of separatism. He has also stated that dealing with separatist movements remains within the purview of the *polda* (provincial police).

<sup>2</sup> The term “imagined community,” is, of course, Ben Anderson's. In *Imagined Communities*

number of management issues that must be resolved if the Unit is to continue offering the kind of support that has earned it the trust of its INP counterparts. One key recommendation from the first evaluation was to have a strategic planning session; this recommendation may have come at too early a stage and was not done; it is urgent to plan one now. Organizational issues between the Police Unit and the larger IOM structure seem to have been percolating for some time since the expansion of IOM Jakarta (i.e. not just the Police Project) and reached the surface during this evaluation period.

The RNE has been especially astute in envisioning the possibilities for supporting police reform through education and training in the principles of community policing and human rights, continuing to believe that there was a future for the project, and—emphasizing the need for sustainability and national ownership—ensuring that the initiative merged with INP initiatives, and encouraging civil society involvement. This support has no doubt made the difference between a limited “project” approach and a strategic approach to police reform in the context of good governance. Relations with the RNE as donor have been somewhat strained, partly due to communication gaps since the departure of the embassy official in charge when the project was first transferred to IOM and partly due to donor concern over the management of the project. Although in the large scale of things these may be seen as administrative wrinkles, they have caused considerable tensions, which, if left unresolved, could severely compromise a valuable contribution to Indonesia’s overall reforms.

On the whole, these managerial and organizational problems may be understood as growing pains in a project that has grown exponentially in three years. There are many lessons to be learned and best practices to be transferred both to the INP as to other organizations dealing with the INP. Apart from analyzing the problems, this evaluation will endeavor to identify some key strengths and lessons learned. The three most important areas are: 1. The project design and management; 2. The Program, with special emphasis on the trainings and CPFs/FKPM; 3. The Managing Change Component; 4. Gender; and 5. INP-IOM/Police Project cooperation with a view to sustainability and smooth transfer.

## **I. Project Unit Design and Management.**

### **Organizational structure.**

The Police Capacity Building Project is housed within a dedicated Police Capacity Project unit/division within the overall IOM structure (headed by Steve Cook, Chief of Mission), with executive power of the project in the hands of the National Project Manager (Sarah Domingo). In functional terms, the Project Manager answers to the Resource and Management Officer. Finances are controlled by the central Finance Office of IOM Jakarta, which handles finances for all IOM projects. A central Project Development Unit is in charge of monitoring and reporting for the Police Project but is now being phased out, with one staff member of Project Development gradually shifted into the Police Project to handle monitoring, and reporting (salary comes out of the Police Project budget). The designation of National Project Manager reflects the national scope of the project, as it deals with the Indonesian National Police and must work through them to access the provincial level police (*Polda*) and the district and sub-district level police (*Polres, Polsek*) or municipality/metropolitan (*Polresta, Poltabes*). The regional staff are responsible to the National Project Manager.

Directly under the National Project Manager is a working team consisting of:

1. Expert staff for police training (Community Policing, Human Rights, Gender and Cross-Cutting issues): 4 Consultants (P. Gaut, Sukamid, Fred Sumampow, Monica Tanuhandaru)
2. Police Liaison Officers (2: Ronny Lihawa, Imam Subandi)
3. Project Assistants (8 people) to provide on-the-ground assistance for the trainings and related activities (Edwin Madialesmana, Roy Sudjatmiko, Gina Noya, Robert Lihawa, Yulie Sujatmiko, Michel Mercado, Joaquin Rohi, Bima Fanggidae).
4. National Officer for CPFs (Jamet Ahsan).

In addition to the above, the working team also coordinates the core INP trainers who are the “Master Trainers” (now called National Trainers) and conduct the TOT with the guidance of the Expert Staff/Consultants.

The National Officer for CPFs is assisted by temporary staff (“on-call” staff) in each of the pilot areas, who keep in touch with the CPFs for reinforcement and monitoring. He is also responsible for developing training material and monitoring instruments for the CPFs.

The four job categories above report directly to the Project Manager (National).

The Consultant for Gender and Cross-Cutting Issues is responsible for co-coordinating the project assistants and the National Officer for CPFs. A senior project assistant also acts as technical coordinator for the trainings when required.

Some of the project assistants are assigned to specific police areas, others to administrative assistance in the Jakarta office, and one to the trainings at Police Headquarters (Mabes Polri/Lemdiklat and other police schools) in Jakarta.

In principle, coordinating meetings are held once every 3 months but because of the demands of the trainings at the provincial levels, meetings are often delayed.

A monitoring and reporting function within the Unit has only recently been put into place (as of April 2007), and is not full time. Prior to this, reporting and monitoring were under general IOM management (Project Development).

Finances are handled directly by general IOM management (Finance, under RMO) working with the National Project Manager.

The Aceh Police Project is part of the National Police Project (during the time of the Aceh visit, Susan Malone was NAD Project Manager) and the Aceh Project Manager is responsible to the National Manager. There is also an International Consultant, specialist in Community Policing (Henk van Zyl), who is Project Officer for NAD. At the time of the evaluation team's Aceh visit, most of the Aceh Project Manager's time was devoted to supervising the police training-center construction project (EU funds), with the Project Officer taking over the lion's share of the management responsibilities for the police training project.

### **Findings:**

There are clear management issues, both at the national and provincial level. Several of these concerns were already raised in previous reviews:

1. The 2004 Mid-term review, Phase 1 outlines some of the problems that plagued project management in the initial stages, particularly problems with the Project Manager role of the International Police Consultant. This problem was resolved and eventually management of the project was handed to Sarah Domingo. Two main concerns were raised in the review, firstly, micro-management: "good for the short-term, allowing greater flexibility and shorter response time when problems arise" but also raising "questions of sustainability for a longer-term project." Secondly, the review perceived that the "scope/range of the Police Capacity Building project is significantly more complicated and designed to have greater national impact than any other IOM projects.... The conventional IOM organizational set-up...may not be sufficient to handle both the decision-making and the tasking/work-flow, particularly pertaining to programmatic authority...."

The review recommended that the project unit be redesigned “to enable it to function as a sort of dedicated ‘field office’ to manage the Police Capacity Building Project” and further recommended strategic planning to clarify its role and position vis-à-vis national counterparts, to include a clear exit strategy. Further, the position of the national consultants needed to be more “strongly defined to enable them to play a better monitoring, enrichment and networking role.” Dedicated administrative assistance for the manager was strongly recommended.

The 2005-06 mid-term review identified a need for good information management: “As the project expands, good record keeping, documentation, and particularly information and communications management will become a key activity for the IOM Police Project. The additional staff member still to be hired should have a high level of experience in information management. This includes processing (and some number-crunching) the large amounts of paper work generated to enable better tracking, coordination and management of the numerous components of the project. Good information management also provides an important learning tool in the management and improvement of the trainings.”

This review also noted, “[t]he expansion of the project, particularly in light of the acceleration desired by the INP [is] likely to add to the managerial load” and recommended secretarial assistance for the project.

Several of these issues remain unresolved, and it was noted that the current program manager has to spend a substantial amount of time dealing with operational issues instead of management, while the overall IOM Jakarta management is too distant from the program to play a direct and meaningful role in program management matters.

There are several factors contributing to the management issues noted, they are:

1. The Police Project Unit is a semi-autonomous entity supported by the IOM Jakarta organizational structure. In effect, it is a **zone of interaction/engagement** between the IOM and the INP. This identity is neither overtly recognized nor clearly defined although it is a key element in what has made the Unit so effective in its work with the police. At some provincial levels, the Unit (or sub-unit) has office space within the Polda (Pontianak and Den Pasar) to facilitate work with the joint IOM/INP team. At the initial stage, the Jakarta Unit itself had office space within Lemdiklat, although tensions generated during the early days of the project made it advisable to withdraw to the main IOM Jakarta office. Coordination meetings are held with National Police Headquarters (Mabes Polri) to plan and coordinate joint activities, present reports and results, discuss problems and challenges, particularly with Lemdiklat, but also with the Deputy Chief for Operations (DeOps) and Deputy Chief for Human Resources Development (DeSDM), and the Deputy Chief of Police (Wakapolri), and occasionally the RI Chief of Police. A Unit staff member was also appointed by Chief of Police Instruction to the Working Team on Community Policing, which facilitated drafting the Chief of Police Decree (SKEP Kapolri, 737, 2005), *Community Policing as Policy and Strategy*. In addition, the

INP National trainers work closely with the Unit. The Unit presents quarterly reports to the INP.

The close interaction with the INP as participant beneficiaries also gives the Unit a unique organizational culture that sets it off somewhat from the rest of the IOM system and may lead to tensions with it. Yet it is what has made the Unit a trusted partner for the INP. Other organizations undertaking comparable work with the police have not gained the same access, and sometimes consider the Unit/IOM an interloper who merely do whatever the police want them to do. But even they recognize that the Unit has played a determinant role in the trainings and in facilitating the SKEP 737 Decree on Community Policing. To paraphrase the words of the RI Chief of Police—who has overseen the Unit’s performance since its inception—the Unit is the most strategic; it has taken Community Policing and Human Rights beyond discourse and implemented it. He wishes the program to continue and to cover all police regions in Indonesia (22 June 2007 meeting). Nevertheless, the Police Unit has yet to recognize the full potential of its unique position and to **think strategically** of its role in the common goal of ensuring the sustainable continuation and growth of the reform efforts.

2. In organizational structure, the Unit is a somewhat hybrid entity, being a combination of a conventional hierarchical structure (IOM Jakarta) with a more open, democratic structure with much lateral coordination, leading to greater flexibility in meeting contextual challenges and fast-response capacity (the Unit itself). In the experience of some project assistants, the Unit operates like an effective taskforce, with the project assistants as the “field coordinators.” However, lateral coordination among the sub-units (training consultants, project assistants, etc.) requires intensive participatory management techniques to be successful, and many of the staff are frequently away for long periods of time, rendering such techniques ineffectual. The Project Manager is the primary decision-maker and is accessible to all staff members. Again, this helps with speedy response but it also undermines coordinating efforts and increases the Project Manager’s burden.

3. Because of the undefined nature of coordination and lack of clear functional roles, there is a fairly high level of **task uncertainty**. This is particularly true for the Gender and Cross-Cutting Issues Consultant, who has been tasked with a coordinating role but is not provided clear decision-making authority.

4. Staff **TORs are comprehensive but lack focus**; lines of coordination and responsibility are not clearly drawn, especially as there seem to be missing functions, particularly “Team Leader” and/or “Project Coordinator” and “Team Coordinator.” For example, the TOR for the Project Consultant on Gender and Cross-Cutting Issues itemizes specific duties, a.o., coordinating with a Project Coordinator; TORs for Project Assistant include reporting to a Team Leader.

5. In practice, the consensus among the project assistants is that Monica Tanuhandaru is the coordinator for the Project Assistants, while Jamet Ahsan (National Officer for CPFs)

is the coordinator for the on-call staff in the field, who monitor and assist CPFs. The designation (PA coordinator) was circulated in an email from the Project Manager.

However the on-call staff also assist the Project Assistants (especially for trainings), while the Project Assistants also do monitoring work (visits to CPFs and writing reports on these).

6. The National Officer for CPFs coordinates the on-call (local, temporary) staff in the regions to monitor and assist the CPFs but the on-call staff also assist the Project Assistants (especially for trainings), while the Project Assistants also do monitoring work.

7. The Project Assistants play an important operational role, doing everything from booking tickets to filling in for trainers during the trainings, and offering advice. Several of them have good analytic, organizing and other skills but these are not being used to full advantage. To the Unit's credit, all Project Assistants are encouraged to follow the trainings as part of a learning process. They are encouraged to take decisive action; however, without a clear mandate for this, it is difficult to do so.

8. **Information management** is still very poor, although steps are being taken to improve the situation. The project generates a huge number of reports, notes (notulensi), statistics, etc., but has not yet found an effective way to manage them. Information is electronically distributed among staff to ensure equal access; however, without an adequate **retrieval** system, all the information simply piles up and can easily turn into cyber-garbage. A project assistant has been assigned recently to draw up bi-monthly reports but it is not clear how they fit into a system. Additional report-writing assistance comes from a staff member from IOM Project Development who in turn is assisted by a temporary staff. It is probably too early to tell, but it would appear that these reports are mainly for the donor rather than to enrich the Unit staff (for additional remarks and recommendations on the material generated, please refer to section E. below.). Appropriate indicators have yet to be developed for good tracking and analysis of the project activities and achievements. For the purposes of learning from the process, information management should be conceived of as an R&D activity, not merely as a project reporting activity. The translations into English of the monitoring reports and other material are not helpful for this purpose.

### **Recommendations:**

1. Review of the organizational structure to ensure it has the capacity and strength to carry out the Part 2, Phase II program.
2. Carry out a Strategic Programming session involving all staff and primary stakeholders.

**Strategic Programming for the IOM Police Capacity-Building Project Unit. 2007: Guidelines.**

This Strategic Programming is a forum for the Police Institution Strengthening Project (hereinafter referred to as the Police Unit) to discuss the findings and recommendations of the 2007 evaluation, to involve key stakeholders in the process, and to seek external and internal consensus on the decisions emerging out of the process. The output will be a refined overall plan of action for Part 2, Phase II of the INP Institution Strengthening Project in preparation for a transfer to the INP, to ensure that the IOM Police Unit has the organizational strength to carry out the task in the most efficient and effective manner. The overarching strategic plan informing the programming is SKEP 737, 2005: the Policy and Strategy for the Implementation of Community Policing. Supplemental references include SKEP 431, 432, 433 and the (Revised) Police Strategic Plan 2005-2009, Police Strategic Plan 2005-2014, and UU no. 2, 2002. The process is to be guided by an outside facilitator with an understanding of the project with the assistance of the evaluation team leader.

**Design of the Strategic Programming for IOM Police Project.**

The Strategic Programming comprises two phases, first of all to secure consensus from the primary stakeholders (in this case the INP and IOM); and secondly, to organize a two-day workshop.

1. *Presentation of the evaluation findings and recommendations to key INP decision-makers.* This presentation will involve the INP as the primary participating beneficiaries of the project in order to achieve a consensus on the findings and recommendations, on the position and role of the IOM Police Unit as primary implementer, and to secure INP commitment to the transfer of the project to the INP. The output will be a mandate for Part 2, Phase II IOM and INP activities towards a smooth and effective transfer.

2. *Strategic Programming workshop.* This is intended to elaborate the position/role of the IOM Police Project and to improve its management system to enable it to function as a better support unit for capacity building of the INP. This will be a two-day session.

**Strategic Programming Workshop**

**Day one:**

*Session I:* Presentation of the findings and recommendations of the consensus above.

Participants: All IOM Police Project Staff, key INP representatives, other stakeholders: Discussion of the operational implications of the recommendations, with input from INP and other stakeholders.  
Output: consensus on Part 2, Phase II overall design and implementation strategies for transfer.  
Time: half day (9 am – 12 noon).

*Session II:* IOM Police Project organizational and institutional development. Internal analysis.

Participants: All IOM Police Project Staff.  
Output: program management strategies.  
Time: half day (1-4 pm)

**Day two:**

*Session I:* Elaboration of the results of day one (externals and internals) and creating a log-frame, developing indicators (output and outcome) and work plan.

*Session II:* Program Management Design

Participants: All IOM Police Project Staff

Output: a log-frame using appropriate indicators, overall plan of action, work plans, revised Organizational Structure.

Time: 8-10 hours.

*Follow-up action:* work with INP institutions to develop a work plan for further cooperation.

*Note:* a detailed agenda for the workshop and preparatory steps required will be presented to IOM upon approval of the final evaluation report

Should a meeting with Kapolri/Wakapolri be difficult to organize within the time constraints, there should at least be official presentation of the evaluation findings and the results of the workshop.

3. **TORs** should be reviewed, discussed and rewritten to reflect functions required by the revised organizational design and the overall plan of action.

4. **SOPS** for the Unit should be in place and available in hard copy. Emails important to the management of activities should be followed up by hard-copy notices. Emails should also be systematized creating and using dedicated subject headings to simplify filing and retrieval.

5. The Unit requires a strong **Project Coordinator** working under supervision of the Project Manager in the running of the program. Some lateral coordination among Project Assistants is needed but should be reported to the Project Coordinator and managed accordingly, preferably using participatory coordinating techniques. The Project

Coordinator would also be responsible for the overall knowledge management of the project and should be responsible for ongoing monitoring, especially, at this time, of the CPFs. The Project Coordinator must have proven networking skills at the level of the INP and among civil society organizations, be familiar with Indonesian politics and socio-cultural dynamics.

6. The **Project Manager** should play a strong supervisory role within the Unit and manage the IOM-Police Unit interface. She should call regular formal meetings (e.g. weekly meetings), and should receive, review and approve regular reports and provide feedback where necessary. She should be assisted by an information management function who draws up reports for IOM and donors. She should also be assisted by an **administrative assistant/secretariat**. The Project should also weigh the possibility of a dedicated financial staff member.

7. The Unit should familiarize itself with key INP documents and regulations, in particular the various levels of Strategic Plans and consistently follow reports on police conduct and activities.

8. IOM Jakarta should recognize the Police Unit's history and current role and should take every step needed to ensure that it is able to make both the managerial and programmatic decisions it needs to make.

9. IOM Jakarta should consider gender mainstreaming. UNDP gender-mainstreaming guidelines would be a useful model to follow.

10. Additional international staff recruitment is not warranted at this time.

## II. Program Implementation.

### A. The Trainings in Human Rights and Community Policing.

On the whole, the IOM/Police Unit activities under the Community Policing and Human Rights training components have been on track. Additional activities under the managing change component have responded to INP needs and have been effective in reinforcing progress made. Most of the joint cooperative IOM/Unit-INP teams have worked together well, particularly at Lemdiklat and at the Poldas. The Unit now has offices within police headquarters in Bali/Den Pasar (Poltabes) and in West Kalimantan (Polda), which enable better coordination and will help to effect smooth transfer to INP at the provincial/district level. Commitment to the introduction and reinforcement of Gender into the trainings and related activities continues in a consistent manner. The Community Policing and Human Rights integration is proceeding at pace, with the two components brought together in a single manual. This draft manual is now being tested. The Police Project has now been expanded into Aceh to meet an earlier request from the INP to expand the project into conflict and post-conflict areas. The Police Unit cooperation with Partnership (Kemitraan) to support the Aceh Peaceful Elections initiative was particularly successful and the outcome is widely regarded as a major achievement for the INP/Polda NAD.<sup>3</sup>

#### Brief summary of achievements:

1. Police personnel trained in Community Policing and Human Rights (combined), July 2005 – December 2006: **6,053**

This number comprises:

National (or master) trainers: **495**

Bintara (in-service training): **5,030**

Trainers at SPN/Secapa/Sespim: **384**

The impact of the TOT/cascade method can be better understood by looking at the total number of Bintara trained in Human Rights and Community Policing through the 30 hour SPN curriculum from (start of project) 2004 to (projected) 2007, for a total of: **87,235**. When numbers from other schools are added (Akpil, Secapa, etc.), the total number reaches: **100,000** police personnel trained in CP/HR. This number does not include the roughly **6000** Polda NAD police personnel—2/3 of the NAD police force—who took the short Human Rights and CP training session to prepare them for the general elections in Aceh.

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<sup>3</sup> The NAD Chief of Police, Irjen, Pol. Bachrumsjah Kasman received a promotion; it was discussed at the Foreign Ministry and also during the regular Parliament-INP Chief sessions (*Penjelasan Kapolri pada Rapat Kerja dengan Komisi III DPR-RI*, 28 May 2007).

These represent personnel feeding directly into the operational system, generally at the polsek level.

At least in numerical terms, the training design is clearly effective. More importantly, especially in terms of impact, this number represents more than **25%** of the current force (roughly 367,130 in 2006), and it is a significant number, since **critical mass** is calculated at 20%.

Planned projections for the size of the police force show a marked reduction in recruitments for 2008 and 2009, i.e. 8,877 per year, which, factoring in reductions through retirement, etc., amounts to a total force of **400,000** by the end of 2009 (*Renstra (perubahan) Polri*, or INP (Revised) Strategic Plan, 2005-2009). Current career policy<sup>4</sup>, including streamlining the rank system, also tends to hold promotions at the lower ranks (rewarding with regular promotions within ranks), which makes it likely that a sizable number of personnel will be deployed at the polsek levels, in line with requirements of community policing. Continuation of the various trainings may push the figure closer to half the force trained in CP and HR within 2 years.

The sheer numbers have led to the belief among some mid and high police officials interviewed that this is a movement that cannot be rolled back. Such trainings are also currently in progress at the six pilot projects and in West and Southwest Aceh. [These numbers (and projections) have not yet been consolidated and included. They would push the numbers up significantly]

Through Lemdiklat, trainings also reach into the specialized training centers (Pusdiks): Pusdik Brimob, Gasum (general), Intel (intelligence), Lantas (traffic), Polair (marine, river). Brimob has had a notorious record of human rights violations and military-style assault on civilians. Thus, their exposure to Human Rights principles and Community Policing is of especial importance. This is being reinforced by the reforms taking place within the Brimob educational system and the definition of this special branch of the police force. The Tamtama rank is being gradually phased out and being replaced by Bintara as the unit is being redefined as a civilian force.<sup>5</sup> It was noted that some excellent trainers and supportive Kapoldas have a Brimob background.

The Community Policing and Human Rights materials have been fully integrated into the regular SPN curriculum.

In terms of **geographic spread**, HR and CP trainers are now working in 21 SPN (21 Poldas nation-wide), including SPN Seulawah (Aceh), SPN Jayapura (Papua), SPN Passo (Maluku), several SPN in Kalimantan; in South, Central, North and Southeast Sulawesi;

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<sup>4</sup> See *Rencana Strategis Kepolisian Negara Republik Indonesia Tahun 2005-2009 (perubahan)*, Peraturan Kepala Kepolisian Negara Republik Indonesia, No. Pol. 9, 2007. 26 April 2007. Mabes Besar Kepolisian Negara Republik Indonesia. (Hereinafter, *Renstra* 2007).

<sup>5</sup> See *Renstra* 2007.

NTT (Kupang), and Jakarta/Java; as well as at Sepolwan (School for policewomen) in Jakarta (see map attached).

To reinforce the SPN trainings, a training session for all SPN heads was conducted during the time of this evaluation.

## 2. Continued assessment and adaptation of the **training materials**.

- In May 2007, the Human Rights and Community Policing manuals were combined into one (draft) manual, tentatively titled *Training Manual on the Basic Principles of Human Rights in the Partnership between Police and Community*. This is in line with remarks made by a number of trainees that training in Human Rights laid the groundwork for Community Policing training and made many of the more complex topics easier to understand.
- A manual on training methods was produced in response to a Lemdiklat request for such material.
- A case-studies bank has been created at Lemdiklat for use in the HR and CP training sessions. These case studies also fill the need for case studies noted in the 2003 study of the Police Education and Training System.<sup>6</sup>
- Training material on Guidance and Counseling: a set of video material (on DVD) was produced on applied psychology/psychoanalysis (*Film Psikology Behavioristik; Film Psikologi, Psikoanalisa; Film Psikologi Humanistik*), at the request of Lemdiklat to fill the need for appropriate psychological care for SPN police cadets, in view of a marked increase in cases of depression and suicide.
- The Public Service Announcement video on Community Policing (“*Ketika POLRI menjadi Milik (MITRA) Masyarakat*”, “When the INP is owned by [becomes the partner of] Society”) produced by the Police Unit is also used as training material.
- The training materials have been distributed widely within the Lemdiklat system and are also available at Sespim/Sespati (schools for mid-level and high ranks). Through the trainings at the provincial/district levels (poldas, polres, polsek), they are also being distributed beyond the schools and there is a demand for more from other areas.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> H. Djaali et al., *Strategic Paper in Support of the Reform of the Indonesian Police Education and Training System including Recommendations*. Jakarta: Partnership Good Governance Reform, 2003.

<sup>7</sup> Also mentioned by RI Police Chief during evaluation interview.

- An important contribution is the draft manual on Gender training. It is still in process and thus far has been adapted to the specific conditions of Aceh. The gender component continues to be a part of the trainings and the Police Project Unit continues to encourage and facilitate increased participation of women police as trainers and trainees.
- A pocket manual on Human Rights was produced and for Polda NAD, an additional handbook on the MoU.

3. **Revising all SPN teaching materials** to reflect and reinforce Human Rights principles. This involves 33 teaching materials used in the curriculum. Revision of teaching material is also taking place at the Secapa (Officer Candidates). In addition, because graduates of the Secapa will become Polsek chiefs, the need was identified to include material on management tools in line with Human Rights standards in the field. The Secapa curriculum was also reviewed and revised modules of Secapa training materials have been produced and are now in draft form.

Thus far, out of the 10 components of education and training (from curriculum, training materials, syllabi, to training methods and trainers), the IOM/Police Unit has attended to at least half, the other components being training in budgeting, evaluation, training facilities, and students).

4. **Workshops for Master/National Trainers.** The core trainers used to be called Master Trainers and although the term is still commonly used, there is an effort to change the title to National Trainers. There is a core group of [ ] national trainers available for deployment to the Polda regions. Before departure, they meet as a group with the Consultants (Ibu Gaut, Pak Sukamid, Pak Fred Sumampow) for discussions and to draw up plans for the TOT. This is where they have the opportunity to discuss local content and draw on appropriate case studies. These workshops ensure that the material used is relevant to the local situation and also serve as refreshers for the core trainers. The workshops also facilitate sharing of experience among the trainers. In addition, refresher courses for trainers have been conducted to ensure retention and to handle contingency cases as they come up (e.g. trainers appointed by the SPN who haven't been through the original TOT).

5. Designing and introducing **assessment and evaluation.** The Police Unit has introduced an effective assessment and evaluation system into the Lemdiklat system, consisting of pre- and post-tests. In addition, the Unit has also assisted Lemdiklat in setting recruitment standards for trainers. These are useful additions to an education and training system that has suffered from a chronic lack of adequate assessment and evaluation.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> See analysis in H. Djaali et al., 2003.

For the pilot project Polda/polres and Polda NAD, the Unit has also introduced an evaluation system that includes observation by outside observers, generally from civil society organizations/NGOs, the National Commission on Human Rights (or the provincial equivalent, as in Pontianak), the National Commission on Violence against Women (Komnas Perempuan), the media, and also from related national agencies such as the provincial office of Laws and Human Rights.

In addition, before entering a new Polda area, the Police Project Unit have established the importance of conducting a Needs Assessment.

6. Conducting a local content workshop/seminar. This was begun in Aceh and would make a good model for use in other areas.

7. At the request of Lemdiklat, the Police Unit held a special workshop, “Training Guidance and Counseling with Human Rights Perspective for INP counselors” providing 290 counselors from Lemdiklat with guidance and counseling skills.

## **Findings:**

FGDs and interviews with police personnel/trainers who have gone through the trainings showed that the trainings were overwhelmingly received with enthusiasm and even pride in the reforms taking place, perhaps a sense of being part of something critically important to the police and to society at large. There were accounts of changed personal and unit behaviour (among operational personnel, including Sabhara and Babinkamtibmas), of ability to handle situations calmly (student demonstrations, citizens protests, local fights), and sense of responsibility instilled by the idea of discretionary authority in their hands. Also related were accounts of positive interaction with local communities, ability to resolve local tensions before they turned into open conflict/communal violence and “street” justice (*main hakim sendiri*).

Trainers who had followed the TOTs were equally enthusiastic and positive, and showed a belief in the reforms underway. Clearly SKEP 737 has had an impact, confirming that the changes come from the highest INP levels and that the trainings will not be in vain. There was also a sense that trainers and police personnel involved with training and education were beginning to gain more recognition and that they weren’t being punished for something. The new INP emphasis on education and human resources development/management and merit-based career paths<sup>9</sup> is the likely cause, as also association with the IOM Police Project.

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<sup>9</sup> See *Renstra* 2007.

Many trainers in the FGDs agreed that the Human Rights component made the CP module easier to understand. Some TOT trainees in Aceh felt that the pairing of a HR with a CP trainer was the best combination.

The local content workshop first begun in Aceh is an important development to be used in other areas. There should be more interactive tools, and the workshop would work better with a small group-plenary session format.

The IOM/Police Unit has invested in a working system and an appropriate tool-kit. Its close working relations with Lemdiklat will ensure a good gradual transfer to the INP.

In addition, recent introduction of Community Policing material into the Sespim/Sespati curricula has been undertaken. This is an important first step for sustainability and further growth, particularly as the trainings relate to the operational side of policing.

### **Challenges and Problems identified:**

Most of the expressed criticisms in the FGDs and interviews had to do with length of time (need for more time to explore local content) and in some cases, language difficulties (especially true for Aceh). The Kapolda NAD also mentioned that the human resources in Aceh can't be compared to Java because of the long conflict period, and that the same standards could not be applied easily. It was noted that the legal instruments cited in the manuals were hard to obtain, especially in the field.

A number of TOT trainees explained that their enthusiasm for police reform was tempered by lack of understanding of the principles of human rights and community policing among their immediate supervisors. Although most of the Kapolda/Kapolres met in the course of the evaluation showed support for the reforms, it was also noted that operational demands can conflict with the practice of community policing. It is becoming increasingly clear that first-line and mid-level managers require systematic exposure to human rights and community policing principles. In addition, there are as yet no systematic INP implementing instructions. While there has been training for commanders, the rotating system tends to undermine efforts limited to the pilot areas.

A serious case for concern arose around the matter of what, in Aceh, had come to be called the "two streams" (dua aliran), namely the "brown book" (IOM manual) and the "yellow book" the SKEPS (esp. 433). There is a clear conflict between the two concepts of the CPFs, the level at which they are to be established, and the ways in which they were to be formed and managed. This opens up the possibility of misunderstandings of the concept of community policing itself. In an interview, the Project Officer/International Consultant (Henk van Zyl) explained that this was due to a wrong understanding of the CPFs in the SKEP, that it was not possible to change the IOM concept, and that it was the SKEP that must be changed. As the CPFs are integral to the entire concept of community policing, this matter will be dealt with in more detail in the section on the CPFs. However, this raises a question as to the willingness to enter into a

productive discussion on matters of great importance and the ability to understand and deal with the local situation.

Although the training manuals have been revised, the problematic section on the CPFs remains. There has been criticism that the manuals are imposing a singular, uniform shape, ignoring local cultural strengths and institutions. Such an unexamined imposition is especially troubling in post-New Order Indonesia, which has revoked the controversial laws on uniform village administrative forms and exposes the Police Project to charges of imposing alien models.

The training manuals still suffer from sloppy proofreading and many typos remain in the text. This includes the Human Rights pocket manual.

The management disconnect between the Aceh office and the Jakarta/national office of the IOM Police Unit also has had a deleterious impact upon the trainings. There was no opportunity to gather the appointed trainers in Jakarta for preparations under the supervision of the National Consultants. This led to a problem in some sessions, when trainees brought up Aceh-specific cases with which the trainers were unfamiliar. TOT trainees wondered at this lack of familiarity with Aceh's recent history of conflict; such a disconnect can easily feed into the feeling that Aceh has been left behind the rest of the country. The diversity of Indonesia demands better attention to local content, particularly familiarity with at least some of the most important cases, and access to a good case-studies bank. This problem shows how important good overall coordination is to the success of the project.

SPN trainers remain attached to the Poldas and are thus subject to regular transfers. This is not directly a matter for the Police Unit to deal with but the Unit needs to take this into consideration as it decides on its trajectory over the next two years.

Furthermore, there appears to have been at least one case of a trainer coming into conflict with supervisors because the trainer was perceived to be prioritizing training duties and neglecting operational duties. The trainer has now left the force and it was not possible to gain better information.

With an eye to sustainability and further development, coordination problems in the educational system at INP headquarters will need to be addressed.<sup>10</sup> This important issue will be explored in the section on IOM/Police Project Unit-INP Cooperation below.

### **Recommendations:**

1. National coordination of the trainings is a key element in the success of the trainings and should be continued.

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<sup>10</sup> Most of the main issues have been raised in the Partnership paper, H. Djaali et al., 2003.

2. Efforts to make the trainings more responsive to local conditions should be continued and further developed, including collecting local case studies, ensuring trainers are familiar with recent histories of the locales, and adjusting the modules as necessary.

3. The revision of the training manuals remains a priority activity. Further editing is required to make sure that the language is appropriate; in particular it is important to avoid using foreign language terms, or if these are unavoidable, to make sure that they are clearly explained, perhaps in an appended glossary or list of key terms. All printed material must be carefully proofread to get rid of all typos. Because of the early stages of the program, revisions should be on-going. Gradually more attention should be given to incorporation of judiciously chosen local material to counteract the impression among some that the manuals are too “foreign”.

4. Distribute human rights legislation to all pilot police areas and make sure they are available at the SPN and other schools in the Lemdiklat system. Make them available online on a dedicated community policing interactive learning website (see recommendations under C. Managing Change below).

4. Related to the revision of the training manuals is the **urgent need to review the matter of the CPF model** presented. It is strongly recommended that the CPF model be restricted to the steps that have to do mainly with internal police activities (perhaps up to community profile), and that the steps pertaining to the establishment of CPFs as defined organizations (membership, organization name, constituting articles or AD/ART, and all mention of funds) be presented only as a possible activity and only when there are no other working community institutions. They can be included in an appendix and presented as an example. For further analysis of the CPFs, see section B, II, below.

5. Systematic training for managers/supervisors at the Polres and Polsek levels is a key element to the retention and development of human rights and community policing, and to police reform in general. Rather than play an endless game of catch-up with continuously rotating personnel, the Police Unit should begin immediate cooperative efforts with **Sespim**. This is where the future Kapolres are being trained. They come from all over Indonesia and, under the new INP decentralized posture, will hold a key role in the management of the police reform process. Sespim leadership and staff are extremely receptive and have formulated interesting initiatives, facilitating students to take advantage of their experience in the field. This will mean developing training material appropriate to the mid-level ranks (*pamen*), and for high ranks (*pati*), with emphasis on the managerial aspects of community policing towards democratic policing practices.

6. The rotation of police personnel, including trainers, exposes the **limitations of the pilot projects**. Even though saturation may be achieved, this is only temporary as new supervisors/managers come into the area. This situation also imposes limits on systematic monitoring efforts. It is recommended that the IOM/Police Project Unit seriously consider and prepare for **accelerated expansion of activities** and, if feasible, to implement nation-wide coverage, prioritizing in close consultation with the INP and their

strategy. Thinking strategically, over the next two years, if the SPN trainings continue at the present pace, well nigh half of the entire force will have received training. With Sespim in the picture, prospects for national coverage become quite feasible. During the FGD with KaSespim, the Director of Academic Affairs and senior Sespim/Sespati staff, it was explained that with 170 graduates per year (Sespim), within 2 to 3 years, it will be possible to have nation-wide coverage of all Polres at the top managerial level. If Sespati is included, nation-wide coverage at the Kapolda level is further reinforced. In this way, the impacts will be systematic and less vulnerable to the rotation system. While the idea of “local boy for local job<sup>11</sup>” found in the SKEP 737 and also mentioned in the *Renstra* 2007 is in keeping with most community policing concepts, its implementation over the next 2-3 years appears less immediately feasible as it would involve the training of roughly 14,000 babinkamtibmas per year over a period of five years (Prolita Polmas, CP 5 year plan) to cover the 70,000 villages now in existence, with the likelihood of additions as the regions grow. Without touching the higher echelons, retention of the principles and consistent practice remain questionable; more seriously, without the involvement of Polres level management committed to community policing, consistent monitoring of the babinkamtibmas is a remote likelihood.

Cooperation with Sespim to effect nation-wide coverage also makes strategic sense because in the restructuring of the INP towards decentralization of police services, the Polres is designated as the Basic Operational Unit (KOD or *Kesatuan Operasional Dasar*), charged with management and implementation of police operations, including community policing, with the Poldas as the top provincial managers (Poldas as fully competent units, *Renstra*, 2007). It is thus at these levels that intervention will produce desired results in the most effective and efficient manner, and where the sustainable impact of the trainings will be secured.

The IOM Police Project Unit has already cooperated with SCN-CREST to devise internal monitoring instruments for the INP on community policing and these have been gone through trial runs at Sespim. In addition, the Police Project has also facilitated survey methods at for the KKL (field practice) at Sespim. The Senior Police Project Liaison Officer gives lectures on community policing followed by small group discussions. Significantly, at the recent (June 2007) graduation ceremonies of the Sespim/Sespati, the academic presentation lecture (orasi ilmiah) was titled “Introduction to Democratic Policing.” These initial efforts are on the right track and should be enhanced with development of appropriate instructional material, initially by enriching the management material in the CP training manual, and Sespim instructor training. It should be clearly understood that community policing is an evolving science and that Research and Development will be an ongoing activity. Developing a website at Sespim on community policing linked to the Polri website will also be a possibility that IOM should seriously consider supporting.

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<sup>11</sup> The evaluation notes the overt gender bias and would like to recommend usage of the Indonesian language “orang” (person) instead of “boy.”

The library at Sespim is desperately outmoded and under stocked. Appropriate material on Community Policing, Human Rights and Democratic Security Management would be required. However, the school does have wireless Internet connections and it would be useful to support online institutional access to appropriate journals and databases not generally available through regular search engines as important research tools and provide training in online research. Such activities will be a vital contribution to creating a more intellectually stimulating environment and will do much to further the program outlined in the *Renstra 2007* towards the formation of a more intellectual, innovative and competent police force.

## **B. The Community Police Forums.**

The Community Police Forum (CPF) is an important element in the concept of community policing advocated by the IOM/Police Unit. Thus far, roughly **78** CPFs have been established in the six pilot areas and more are being formed as CP training proceeds in Aceh. In response to the 2005-6 evaluation's critique of the CPFs, the Police Unit hired a National Officer to be in charge of the CPFs with on-call assistants in the field to assist in monitoring. The Project Assistants also make the rounds of the CPFs and report on developments.

### **Findings:**

Serious efforts are being made to address the problems with CPFs identified in the 2005-6 evaluation and the Police Project Unit has followed the recommendation in hiring a staff member and assistants to focus on them. Among the most important contributions made thus far are:

The CPF National Officer has begun **“retraining” courses for CPFs** using new material developed especially to assist the CPFs in acquiring a better grasp of community policing principles and the nature and role of the CPFs, with an emphasis on analysis and problem solving. The material developed includes formatted monitoring tools for use in the field, training tools emphasizing the participatory methods, facilitating role for the police, and importantly, repositioning of the CPFs to counteract misunderstandings and tendencies towards vigilantism, opportunism and exclusivism. The material being developed and new participatory techniques also help to correct misunderstandings of community policing and the role of CPFs among the police.

The retraining sessions are highly appropriate. In a participatory manner, using a facilitator rather than a trainer, they explore Community-Police relations, seek locale-specific ways to create better relations, discuss CPFs, especially the extent of the authority, rights and responsibilities, and what is not allowed. This is followed by a session to identify local problems using the problem tree method to identify root causes. The sessions have included local government representatives (esp. from the kelurahan), babinkamtibmas, and even polsek/polres/poltabes representatives. It is a useful means of working towards stronger common understanding of community policing principles and practices. The sessions have received positive response from the police, including at the higher levels (e.g. Kapolres of Central Jakarta).

Other activities undertaken:

- presented lecture on CPFs for trainers at Secapa
- conducted problem-solving TOT for trainers
- conducted training on CPFs for 60 babinkamtibmas at Polres Jakarta Pusat.
- conducted TOT for CP trainers at Polda NAD.
- held a discussion on gender for CPFs in Pontianak

- at the initiative of Kapolsek Senin (Jakarta Pusat) organized CPF discussion on traffic problems including the parking attendants who were seen to be causing the problem

An important corrective measure taken through the retrainings is that the reliance on IOM funding for CPF members has been halted or drastically reduced. This attends to the problem identified in the 2005-6 evaluation of dependence on “funding” and misperception of IOM’s role in establishing CPFs. The polres/polsek now have access to national budget funds allocated for community policing to use as they see fit. Better ideas on the role of CPFs and community policing may help effective use of the money.

Recently, a **three-day seminar** was held to which representatives from all the CPFs, other organizations involved in setting up equivalent forums (JICA, The Asia Foundation), and police officers from the CPFs and Mabes representatives were invited to discuss CPFs from actual experience and to see where the various forms could be merged or dovetailed. No real consensus was achieved although sharing experiences and identifying problems among community representatives and with the police was valuable. This could also be the beginning of more regular, if far smaller, coordinating meetings to learn best practices and to try to work out a common *modus operandi*.

COP (Community Oriented Policing) working groups (*pokja*) have been formed by TAF in several areas, including Bali, Surabaya and Jogjakarta but they were mainly community groups working with the police rather than CPFs in which the police are active members. With the issuance of SKEP 737, some of these groups are beginning to ask police personnel (especially the *babinkamtibmas*) to join them. This was true in Surabaya where the Human Rights Centre of Airlangga University has organized several COP working groups. At an FGD with one COP group in Surabaya, it was clear that relations between the community representatives and the police (*babinkamtibmas*) were close and that cooperation with the police was felt to be a positive factor. Several meaningful activities had taken place, including the eradication of gambling using pigeons in the community.

On the INP side, a budget allocation has been approved for community policing activities, sent directly to the Polres. This has resulted in a proliferation of CPFs (FKPM) as the easiest and most visible way of demonstrating implementation of community policing. This is a significant commitment on the part of the INP and of Parliament.

Developments over the past year or so show that the concerns expressed in the 2005-6 (and in the 2004 report) evaluation were indeed warranted as understanding of CPFs and how they function within democratic policing is not well understood. In the *Renstra* 2007, there is a key phrase to assist with better understanding of CPFs, i.e. as consultative forums. The concept of the CPF has become so important that it has made its way into INP reports to Parliament, as in the 30 May 2007 consolidated report presented by the

Kabareskrim Polri on illegal logging, where the CPFs (FKPM) are listed as part of pre-emptive action.<sup>12</sup>

### **Challenges and Problems identified:**

The CPFs are the operational interface between the police and the communities. They are also one important point at which the trainings materialize into practice and in a very real sense are a form of social intervention towards reform, strengthening of civil society, and good governance at the local levels. Yet they have received precious little attention. Mistakes made in the implementation/mobilization of the CPFs could have negative impacts on community policing at the local level and without proper management could affect the entire process.

1. There are many inconsistencies in the practice of establishing CPFs. In itself this is not necessarily problematic as the CPFs should be flexible to adapt to the locale. However, this is an indication of deeper problems resulting from inconsistencies in the comprehension of community policing, differences of approach among donor/implementing organizations and application in the field, which is reflected in INP policy inconsistencies (in the various SKEPs; see also remarks under section I above, particularly on the imposition through the trainings of a single model).

2. There is little meaningful coordination among donors/implementing agencies on this crucial aspect of community policing, and almost no cross-learning process. Coordinating meetings are held but mainly deal with macro- and more general matters. The meetings do not engage at the micro- and meso- levels. There are no “working groups” established among donors/implementers to address particular issues. Currently, there are nearly 200 separate police initiatives with foreign funding and little coordination. SSR is becoming an industry, particularly in the wake of 9/11 and for Indonesia, the Bali bombings. Reform towards democratic policing becomes imperative and community policing plays an important part in securing genuine human security.

3. Though INP commitment to support establishment of CPFs is strong and reinforced by budget allocations, there remain many misunderstandings of community policing and the role of CPFs in the field. “Socialization” (i.e. distribution of material, instructions, meetings, etc) of the CPFs is still insufficient, and even in IOM/Police Project pilot areas there is no full coverage.

4. On the police side, there is still a sense that this is simply a new term for the old, conventional “Community Guidance” (Bimmas) program. In some cases, the police think that the CPFs are assistants that can be told what to do. Elsewhere, police complain that CPFs/community policing is only an added burden. There is still a disconnect

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<sup>12</sup> Kepala Badan Reserse Kriminal Polri, “Penjelasan Kabareskrim Polri pada Rapat Dengar Pendapat Dengan Panja Eks. BPPN dan Illegal Logging Komisi III DPR RI”, 30 Mei 2007.

between mid-level management and the field. The rotation system further reinforces the management disengagement.

5. Different stances within the INP on community policing are part of the problem, particularly with the lack of coordination between the investigative/criminal/traffic patrol units and community policing. This difference may be tracked also to coordinating issues in Mabes Polri, where instructions from operations can conflict with community policing principles. FGDs and interviews with INP at Mabes level and local levels brought this up. There is a sense among some that community policing threatens to undermine conventional police powers at precisely a time of crucial transition, including the separation from the military, but also the rise of horizontal conflict, rising poverty rates, terrorism, transnational crime, tensions with the military, threats accompanying the public exercise of democratic rights, insurgencies, etc.<sup>13</sup> The tension between twin aspects of policing in general (i.e. the strong arm of the law on the one hand and public service on the other) is innate to the social role of the police and community policing serves as a strong balance to police powers in democratic policing built on the principles of human rights. Community policing is thus not intended to erase the tension but serves to guide it into methods and practices that are protective of rights and human security while upholding the law. The tension is inherent and cannot be eradicated but needs judicious management. These fundamental issues need to be clarified within the INP to secure better management of security at local and national levels.

6. The PSP (Centre for Community Policing and Human Rights) at PTIK is in a state of suspension. It was expected that this would be the think-tank and primary facilitating point for coordination within the INP as well as coordinative action between INP and select civil society organizations/individuals, academics, and donor/implementing agencies. Its work on the draft SKEPs pertaining to community policing has been valuable and provided the driving force for the acceleration of community policing. However, its task remains unfinished and this comes at a time when the concept is accumulating momentum and being operationalized by the INP.

6. The proliferation of CPFs without appropriate training and management presents a major challenge. On the one hand, it is a way to ensure that community policing takes root everywhere and can be a strong step towards sustainability. On the other hand, without sufficient support, they will either remain ineffective or turn into tools for mobilization. Poor CPF management carries the risk of a backlash that only reinforces negative stereotypes of the police in the communities.

7. At some sites visited, membership in the CPFs did not pay attention to representation of different communities of interest; in one, all came from a single political entity.

8. Representation of women and other vulnerable groups remains poor, and CPFs are easily dominated by local elite/middle-class interests. CPFs are dealing with “social diseases” (*penyakit masyarakat*) like gambling, alcohol abuse and prostitution. Without

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<sup>13</sup> For valuable assessment of police priorities see *Renstra* 2007.

good comprehension of the social roots of these “diseases” the victims may be further victimized and CPFs become social cleansing agents rather than forums for communications and solving local problems.

9. The application of a single model means that there is little understanding of or room to accept local forms of community organization and their capacities. While the Police Unit is beginning to correct this, the training manuals continue to reinforce the use of a uniform model thus negating existing community strengths rather than transforming them through democratic principles.

10. Among the CPFs knowledge of human rights and principles of democratic policing is very limited. Care should be taken in monitoring and support to ensure that CPFs do not become militarized, i.e. turn into militia or vigilante forces. The role of the police within the CPFs is to be maintained and reinforced, without turning the forums into tools of the police. As yet, the local oversight potential remains unaddressed, although there are one or two indications from the field that this can work (e.g. reporting police misconduct to the kapolsek/kapolres and appropriate response). There has been little exploration of means to communicate instances of police misconduct, as for example, a complaints box that can be opened together with community representatives (could be lurah, RT/RW also) and local police progress reports based on the complaints registered and made available to the community.

### **Recommendations:**

1. The IOM/Police Unit should recognize that this is an important moment in the acceleration of community policing in the INP strategy. While filled with challenges, it is also an opportune moment that must be grasped.

2. IOM/Police Project Unit should seek appropriate ways to facilitate efforts to coordinate at all levels, including internally within the Police Project, at the donor/implementer level and with the INP/Mabes and in the field. INP approval and involvement is a crucial factor in this. Possible action:

Form small working groups among implementing agencies on CPFs and democratic community policing. These working groups should comprise staff actually working on community policing, with access to information on developments in the field and familiarity with concepts of community policing. These working groups should have quarterly meetings, map out CPFs—established by various implementers, by police, location, etc., identify problems, draw up best practices and lessons learned, share material developed. Cooperation with NGOs specializing in community organizing should be increased, and appropriate NGOs selected for this. From time to time, resource persons can be invited as needed, but the workshops should not turn into large seminars. If a seminar is called for at some point, this may be organized but the main point is to work on the urgent challenges posed by the CPFs and acceleration of community policing. As far as possible, INP at local levels should be involved. Results should feed into the

implementing agency systems and into the INP. The donor community, particularly in the SSR field, should recognize the urgency, support this activity and improve coordination within itself.

3. Training/facilitating material, particularly to reposition/reorient CPFs should continue to be refined and developed. This would include visual material, pocket books on human rights and the main principles of CPFs for the CPFs, posters on human rights and the main principles of CPFs.

4. The repositioning/reorientation should feed immediately into the CP trainings in the field and the sections on CPFs in the training manuals should be adapted ASAP.

5. TOTs for trainers should be continue, especially for National Trainers.

6. Seek ways to address the proliferation of CPFs and use the momentum to reinforce community policing. This should be addressed in the small working groups and within the Police Unit, and good cooperation with the INP is required.

7. Problems with representation of different communities of interest should be addressed.

8. Women's representation should receive more attention and ways should be sought to ensure that their voices are heard (this means not assuming that men automatically know what is best for women, or that traditional attitudes towards women should be reinforced).

9. CPFs are an aspect of community policing and possibly a key factor in the management of human, democratic security. Management gaps should be addressed by the INP, and every effort made to ensure that the appropriate material is available at all polda/polres/polsek.

10. The question of police oversight can be addressed productively and constructively at local levels. To date, this issue has only been addressed at the highest level (Kompolnas). Community policing, supported by decentralization measures of the INP, shifts the focus to the local levels where it ensures more direct community participation. Complaint boxes could be used but what will be the decisive factor is how they are used. The complaints box, for example, could be opened regularly before community representatives, the complaints discussed and suggestions made for improvements. The police might then plan action to be taken, and perhaps record this on a "wall newspaper" (*koran dinding*) at the polsek/kelurahan. Frequent visits by police management to listen to continuing problems and improvements and discuss them might also be considered. Such initiatives should be carefully planned and monitored, shared with the working groups and follow-up measures taken.

11. On the police side, the non-functioning of the PSP is a problem that should be addressed. However, it is wise not to think in terms of a single coordinating unit not directly within the Mabes structure. The PSP should be gradually revived but it would be best suited to more academic, conceptual studies of community policing, human rights

and democratic policing. A more immediately practical solution is to support development of CP/HR and democratic policing at Sespim, with emphasis on management of the initiative and its dynamics. Sespim is in a particularly strategic position not only because this is where Polres and Polda leadership is trained but also because it formulates strategy papers for Mabes Polri. It thus becomes a viable coordinating point for community policing and conventional operational policing. This would also address the mid-management problems in a sustainable manner. Whether or not it will be necessary to establish a dedicated centre for management of democratic policing/democratic security is a matter for the INP to discuss, although this evaluation strongly recommends it. To date, Sespim has received well-nigh no donor support although the restructuring of the INP and the increased need for new courses in line with INP strategy have placed increased burdens on it. If the INP believes it is necessary, this may be where donor support will help to make an enormous difference.

It is strongly recommended that the Police Unit, with the approval and cooperation of the INP, take steps to facilitate this initiative.

### **C. Managing Change (including the NAD initiative)**

The Managing Change component provides flexibility to the project, enabling it to respond appropriately and swiftly to INP requests and to initiate activities aimed at encouraging civil society awareness of and involvement in the reforms taking place. Most importantly, the component offers a way of managing changes strategically, and most of the activities undertaken under this item have had major impacts and furthered the goal of ownership and sustainability.

The activities undertaken under this rubric have been of strategic importance in facilitating the INP to consolidate gains and move towards sustainability. Some of the most significant are:

1. A series of workshops and seminars on INP National Policy and Strategy on Community Policing and Human Rights, from September 2005 through June 2006, which led to the issuance of the Community Policing decree (SKEP 737/2005). Later, related decrees, 431/VII/2006, 432/VII/2006, 433/VII/2006 were issued with less direct IOM involvement. The INP was assisted in distribution of the decrees.

2. The Public Service Announcement on Community Policing featuring the RI Chief of Police and RI Deputy Chief of Police.

3. Extension of the project into Polda NAD. This represents an important step in the development of the Police Project, underlines the vision required to grasp opportunities and the ability of the Unit to perform under politically challenging conditions. The Unit engaged in the following activities:

- facilitated Polda NAD to familiarize all NAD Polres with the MoU;
- worked in cooperation with Partnership to organize a one-day seminar to introduce mid-level police (Polres) to human rights principles;
- developed a plan to extend CP and HR training into Polda NAD;
- facilitated a Needs Assessment, which was formally presented by the Kapolda NAD;
- in cooperation with Partnership and Polda NAD facilitated the Aceh Peaceful Elections initiative, supported by rapid HR and CP trainings throughout Polda NAD to prepare police;
- conducting a local contents seminar;
- conducted TOT for Polda NAD CP and HR trainings;
- supported Polda NAD by construction of police training facilities in key Aceh areas (EU funded);
- conducting CP and HR trainings in the Western and Southwestern areas of Aceh.

4. Development of a Police Institutional Development Monitoring System for Community Policing (SIPPOP Polmas) by SCN-CREST.

## **Findings:**

### **1. The Aceh initiative:**

The management problems that came to a head during the initial days of this evaluation overshadowed the major achievements of the Aceh initiative. When the larger, strategic picture is taken into consideration, this initiative demonstrates the strength and effectiveness of the Police Project Unit and its national staff. It also demonstrates a strong commitment to police reforms stemming from the recognition that the police hold a central position in keeping the peace that goes beyond symbolic resonance because of its implications for the concrete practice of policing within the community. The successful outcome of the initiative was recognized nationally. Given the fact that the gubernatorial elections were won by a candidate identified by the security apparatus as being closely linked to GAM, and the perception that GAM gained political footing in the other local elections, the stakes were about as high as they could be.<sup>14</sup> The outcome also has contributed to the enhancement of the INP in its peacekeeping position. The Unit experience in working with the INP at all levels was a major contributing factor, particularly in this case by gaining the trust of Polda NAD, keeping the spotlight on the police rather than on its own supporting work, and effective management of a large and extensive project under tight time-limitations. Good networking skills, the ability to identify and build relations with appropriate police and civil society organizations were important to the success of the initiative.<sup>15</sup> Most important was the consistent pattern of bridging the communications gap between the police and civilian individuals and groupings, including activists with bad experiences with the police during the period of military authority (DOM), and women. This is an area in which the Police Unit has much to offer, as few other organizations, including local organizations, have the same perception of the importance of the role of a reformed police and/or have built these relations with the police. Such relations take time, perseverance and commitment to build. In addition, during the tsunami-response period in which IOM was involved, the national staff in Aceh consistently paid attention to specific police needs.

It is important to note that the management breakdown occurred when direct management of the project was transferred to a new manager once the peace had been secured and relations with Polda NAD had been established.

### **2. Facilitation of the draft decrees on community policing strategy and implementation:**

The facilitating work towards issuance of the RI Chief of Police Decrees on Community Policing (the SKEPs) is of especial significance to police reform and towards national democratic reforms. In its INP institution building efforts, the IOM/Police Unit

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<sup>14</sup> The post-referendum catastrophe in East Timor looms large, though the MoU made for a different political dynamics in Aceh.

<sup>15</sup> Securing TNI participation in the working group was also a key factor in the success.

recognizes the central role of the INP in moving towards the goal of human security. The crucial role of the Unit in this was confirmed in interviews and FGDs with other organizations working in police reform. However, FGDs and interviews with many parties, including INP staff at all levels, and study of the documents revealed inconsistencies among these important instruments for the implementation of community policing that have led to some confusion. Some of the inconsistencies stem from the fact that the documents were drafted by the PSP under the PTIK, an institution that is only tangential to the operational side (although the Deputy Chief for Operations was included). At this level, INP lines of coordination are not optimal. Conflicting statements on the form of the CPFs, their position and function vis-à-vis the police are most troubling and show inconsistencies in the understanding of the application of community policing principles.

### **3. The Public Service Announcement on Community Policing:**

This was the first public declaration by the INP (featuring the RI Chief of Police and Deputy Chief of Police) on its commitment to democratic police reform and is a major milestone in **public ownership** (rather than only INP ownership) of community policing, a key factor in sustainability and enhancing the legitimacy of the INP. Strong Unit **networking** with major media outlets enabled free broadcasts of the INP public outreach video on television around the 60<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the INP, even during the World Cup matches.

### **4. The Police Institutional Development Monitoring System for Community Policing.**

This monitoring instrument was developed and tested by Lemdiklat trainers and at Sespim and was further used by Sespim for field studies (KKL). The exercise in itself has paved the way towards better cooperation with Sespim.

#### **Recommendations:**

1. The Unit should use the Aceh initiative as a tool for drawing best practices and lessons learned as foundations for further strengthening its own capacity. Some of these include:

- facilitating dialogue between civil society and the INP at many levels on issues strategic to both civil society and the police. Some examples would be: on legal reforms/proliferation of Syaria-based local regulations, on gender—see note on gender below—on implications of high levels of inequality for human security (this is in line with INP analysis of elite positioning to grab resources, *Renstra*, 2007, e.g. Ch. I.b.2.g), natural resources, etc.;
- building cooperative teams with the police (example of forming the Pokja—working group—for the Peaceful Elections Initiative);

- the key importance of networking and knowing when and how to mobilize the networks;
- the importance of equal commitment to INP goals.

Regular INP-civil society small and consultative dialogues would go beyond the idea that community policing is mainly a public relations strategy and that building trust (a major INP concern, see *Renstra*, 2007) has to do largely with building a positive public image, and into practicable solutions for issues important to both sides.

2. Recognizing that public ownership of the police reforms is vital, the Unit should explore different ways of communicating achievements at regular intervals. Media campaigns should be used judiciously because there is always a risk of running into public distrust and heightening it unless there are real and significant achievements. Coordination with the INP is of course important. Smaller and more local media ventures should be explored, particularly with community radio. For example, community police talk show or radio “complaint box” with follow-up by the police, and wall newspapers (*koran dinding*) mentioned above. Again, coordination with police is important to make sure that they are ready. Several interviews revealed that the police have poor communication skills. This might be an area in which the Unit may make a major contribution to police capacity at not much cost.

A good police website on community policing would also be a strong contribution. This website could also gradually contain a complaints box. It should be linked to the Polri website (which in itself needs work).

3. Building networks should also include building a small support group for the Unit itself for consultation. It is important to identify a small number of key figures and to build bridges with them and to enlist them in this important task. This will further the goal of national public ownership.

Building networks and small working groups will also be a way of building concrete public oversight. While current work to support the Kompolnas is meaningful towards strengthening an institution to check and balance police power, the community policing perspective would indicate that less formal but real community groupings are needed.

4. The SIPPOP-Polmas monitoring system needs to be taken over by the police and suggestions for further development raised during the tests need follow-up. The participatory method is a meaningful contribution to democratic reforms within the INP and is in line with INP decentralization. The system can become important to management of changes within the police and would be most adaptable for use at the Polres level, which makes Sespim the logical venue for further development as a management tool.

## D. Special Note on Gender

The IOM/Police Project Unit is continuing its commitment to the inclusion of women police as trainers and trainees, including gender training, and developing manuals on gender for the trainings. Currently, the Police Training Consultant (P. Gaut) is an elected Commissioner with the National Commission on Violence against Women, which offers an additional avenue for increased women's participation in the nation-wide police reform effort, in particular for the protection of women and children. This is an area in which the police lack sufficient capacity to address the increasing threats on the security of women and children and the more visible public role women are playing, including in public expression of rights of free speech, defense of land and property, labour action, etc.

There are currently 459 Polres throughout the country and all are supposed to have RPKs (women's rooms to handle cases involving women and gender-related crime). These are all supposed to be staffed by a trained policewoman but many lack these human resources. Despite the emphasis on the possibility of policewomen's roles in more managerial positions and in fighting the new, less immediately physical types of crime such as transnational and white-collar crime (see *Renstra* 2007), Polres and Polda leadership is overwhelmingly male and little change has occurred. Policewomen, as is the case in many other organizations and state-institutions throughout Indonesia, are most likely deployed to administrative and treasury posts, though not at the highest decision-making levels (e.g. planning and budgeting at Mabes RI).

There are very few women's organizations working with the police, one of the most prominent being LBH-Apik/APIK Federation, which is working with the policewomen's organization Derap Warapsari on police-gender issues, funded by Partnership. The Police Unit supports these activities by joining meetings and discussions. One of the aims has been to push for the structural inclusion in the INP of the RPK (the women's room). Recently (6 July 2007), after a meeting with the group, the RI Chief of Police signed the decision to make it official.<sup>16</sup> At the meeting, also attended by policewomen in the Mabes hierarchy and Member of Parliament Nursyahbani Katjasungkana, the group discussed the possibility of regular admission of women into the SPN instead of the Sepolwan and increasing the ratio of female to male police officers (currently hovering around 3%). The Police Chief offered the possibility of improving and expanding the existing Sepolwan and of admitting women into regular SPN in selected regional locations, making sure women-friendly accommodations were available. He also presented the INP view that under current security conditions more demanding of physical force, the INP needs to keep the current gender ratios. He requested further information on the results of the survey on women police conducted by Derap Warapsari and suggested more studies. He also requested IOM assistance in this area and in providing related study and trainings.

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<sup>16</sup> Structural inclusion means budget allocations for the RPKs.

Derap Warapsari and Federasi-Apik have also drafted a RI Chief of Police Decision (SKEP) for gender mainstreaming at the INP. The draft is still at a very early stage and requires more work.

The Syaria-based local laws present a challenge to both the INP and women. The existence of the Wilayatul Hisbah (often referred to as Syaria police although they do not really have police powers) is but one example of situations in which the INP can be brought in to handle cases that violate national law. The Police Unit facilitated discussions on this in Aceh and these are extremely valuable because they involve the police in an area that immediately impacts them, whereas most other discussions on the subject tend to leave out the police.

### **Recommendation:**

It is recommended that the Police Unit continue its support of gender-based activities, particularly with Federasi-Apik/Pokja Polwan (supported by Partnership), Derap Warapsari and the National Commission on Violence against Women (Komnas Perempuan) in the long-term effort to improve female to male ratios in the INP. This improves police capacity in community policing, particularly in recognizing the gender roots and implications of different types of crime. In addition, FGDs and interviews in the field have shown that at certain times of the day, men are away at work and women thus become the main “eyes and ears” of the communities and their informal networks enable them to be alert to changes in their communities. In agrarian communities, women spend much time in the fields and have the opportunity to perceive threats to their property and well-being. However, male police tend to be positioned in the formal public spaces, which for many communities are male domains, meaning that male police will have difficulty in accessing a valuable community policing and human security resource. The same is true for village meetings, where women often sit on the far peripheries and do not speak up without facilitation. This is where policewomen have a meaningful role to play in community policing.

At the recent CPF forum organized by the Police Unit (July 2007), a women-only CPF from Bekasi presented their experiences, showing that they were much more effective than the men-only CPF. While this type of semi-formal gender segregation is to be avoided, there is a valuable lesson to be learned in terms of the kinds of initiatives and drive that women’s groups can have. FGDs that included women community members also showed that there could be especially good interaction between women and the police.

The *Renstra*, 2007 actually provides an opening for policewomen that needs to be factored into strategies promoting gender-mainstreaming and improved gender ratios in the INP. In the analysis of strengths and weaknesses, the strategy policy mentions a) the stronger role played by women in modern societies, the rights of women and the police weakness in fighting crime against women and children, and, within the police, the tendency to reinforce the subordination of women (1.b.4.c) while recognizing the increasing dominance of non-physical crime, which can be better handled by

policewomen (1.b.4.d). However, this is not translated into programmatic action, and is undermined by reductions in overall recruitment rates at least through 2009. On the other hand, while SPN male-female ratios continue to reflect entrenched gender bias, at higher levels of police education, policewomen appear to be gaining ground, if in small increments. At Akpol, out of 350 cadets, 50 are women; at Sespim there are currently 6.

A meaningful area to explore would be positioning women in high-level management positions, especially financial management and accountability. Indonesian policewomen have a reputation for honesty and being more resistant to bribery<sup>17</sup>, and Indonesian women on the whole are recognized as good money managers, which is why important ministerial and decision-making posts related to finance and trade are filled by women in the current presidential cabinet. With the very significant national commitment to police reform, the national budget allocation to the police has grown, making public financial accountability a test of police legitimacy. So too the state budget allocations to community policing delivered directly to the polres to be used at their discretion represent a huge challenge to the whole police force. The administrative and financial posts generally unwanted by male police officers are going to gain in importance as sound public accountability becomes a public demand, and those posts can also be seen as strategic positions for women to fill and to play a key role in police reforms. Decentralization further reinforces this.

Given the current INP/national view of the state of national security and threats to security and order, as well as entrenched male bias of the police force, the Police Unit should proceed gradually to enlist as much support as possible among key INP figures and institutions (this is not necessarily only at the highest levels) for improvements in the gender balance and gender sensitive action. Continuing to facilitate dialogue between the INP and women's organizations and leading women figures at all levels (i.e. not only among Jakarta-based groups) will be of immense help and will be a significant contribution to better dialogue between the INP and civil society, and to the legitimacy of the police in the public eye. Dialogue should not be limited to discussions with policewomen but should gradually include policemen.

It is recommended also that project assistants and on-call staff in the field be alert to important women in the communities and that the Unit devise ways of including these figures in the ongoing INP-community dialogue in informal ways adapted to the local situation. Recognizing influential women requires a somewhat different approach as influence is often exerted indirectly upon local public decision-making processes. Age is an important factor to take into consideration.

It is necessary to emphasize the importance of taking a gradual approach, forming and working with strategic alliances within the INP, and taking advantage of existing entry-points. Rather than taking a more openly confrontational approach, openings offered by

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<sup>17</sup> Report on Need Assessment, "Pentingnya Peningkatan Jumlah dan Peran Polisi Wanita dalam Kebijakan dan Strategi Pengembangan Pendidikan untuk Meningkatkan Kinerja Polri." Federasi APIK, Kepolisian RI dan Partnership, Jakarta 2007 (draft).

a.o., the *Renstra*, 2007 and by the RI Chief of Police statements can be used as strategic guidelines for supporting plans of action by women's groups.

Beginning to engage the police in small group dialogues with women's and other human rights organizations concerned with the proliferation of local regulations that contradict national laws protecting human rights and the rights of women will contribute to better understanding of the current legal situation and strengthen the commitment and role of the INP as enforcers of existing national laws protecting human rights. This would be in line also with the police program on the legal situation (*Renstra*, 2007, Ch IV. 29) which stresses human rights (a, d), Kapolri presentation to Commission III, DPR-RI, in which he identified the lack of legal synchronization as one of the obstacles to police reform, and police commitment to building a society and police force based on respect for the law. Issues such as these can be of national significance because they directly engage the question of the rule of law.

## **E. At the INP-IOM/Police Project Unit Interface**

Recognizing the limits of international cooperation, it is nevertheless necessary from time to time to venture into the intermediate zone that is created at the interface of the “beneficiary” and the donor/implementing agency. In particular, for such a centrally important national institution as the INP—not by any stretch of the imagination merely a recipient, especially so under its current strong and committed leadership—cooperative efforts are necessarily participatory and to be understood as efforts for the benefit of all, including the donor and implementing institutions. Donor/implementing agency exit strategies should be mindful of the need to effect as complete and operational a transfer as possible.

With this in mind, it is necessary to look also at some administrative/management obstacles to the implementation of community policing and human rights trainings, particularly towards ensuring a smooth transfer.

The problems with the Pusat Studi Polmas/HAM at PTIK have already been mentioned above, as also the impacts of putting that particular effort in an administrative limbo at a decisive moment in the expansion of community policing by the INP. This evaluation is cognizant of the risks attending international cooperation, and of the decisive action on the part of INP leadership to resolve the matter. Nevertheless, few follow-up steps were taken to consolidate the gains from the PSP while it was functional. The PSP presented an option for the transfer of the program and its current absence makes this somewhat problematic, and especially so looking at the larger picture of police reform beyond 2009. As explained above, initiatives taken with Sespim provide a solid alternative, perhaps more appropriate to the INP strategy for community policing than the PSP at PTIK. Sespim also operates as an INP think tank, drafting INP policies and charged with developing security management. It is thus well positioned to absorb the important task of refining the community policing regulatory instruments and policies.

The lesson learned from this experience is that a one-door policy is perhaps not the most useful way of preparing for transfer. The INP-IOM/Police Unit cooperation has been much more effective at Lemdiklat (which the present RI Chief of Police headed for several years, and significantly, at the start of the Police Project), and the continuation of the project has made it stronger and more resilient to the inevitable challenges. Adding Sespim to this cooperative venture will be an important step towards institution strengthening.

Yet coordination challenges remain within Mabes Polri. FGDs and interviews with INP raised the problems faced in the field by newly deployed graduates and also in the mentoring system.<sup>18</sup> Current INP action to cement police reforms promises to resolve some of these matters but will take time.

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<sup>18</sup> The effect of the mentoring can be deleterious to putting into practice the principles of community policing and human rights. This was first brought up during the 2004 evaluation by the Head of Lemdiklat at the time.

One area of concern raised during INP discussions was the disconnect between the operational side and the human resource education/management side within INP headquarters. It is not wholly reducible to mid-level and high-level management being unfamiliar with community policing, although this is part of the problem, because the obstacle lies in the coordination at the top level. This clearly lies far beyond the scope of the Police Project—although the term “institution building” is not to be taken lightly—but does impact the outcome of the trainings. It is quite likely that the acceleration demanded by the RI Chief of Police will provide the push towards better coordination. In anticipation of this, the roles of Lemdiklat and Sespim should be consolidated and strengthened.

It was noted during discussions that the distance between Sespim and Jakarta is sometimes more than physical. An effort to bridge the gap would be to invite select, committed individuals from INP and civil society to discuss key issues in community policing and organize regular small and medium discussions, and larger seminars.

The issue of coordination between the human resource development and management side on the one hand and the operational side on the other is also perceived at Lemdiklat. From the educational perspective, the key to change also lies in the hands of the operational side that is in charge of deployment and generates guidelines for job descriptions. It was felt that without better coordination between the two sides—by revising guidelines and job descriptions to name but one example—the whole effort would remain under the domination of the old patterns. Coordinative powers at the office of the Deputy RI Chief of Police need to be brought into this important discussion. The Educational Council (*Dewan Pendidikan*) also remains outside the Project loop. Most studies of the police educational system do not appear to address the interface with the operational demands and it is time to attend to this crucial matter. Currently, discussions are underway at Mabes Polri/office of the Deputy Chief of Police to address coordination for Community Policing. A strategic programming session involving the INP as primary stakeholders, all IOM/Police Unit staff and civil society representatives was held 9-10 August 2007 to present draft findings and recommendations, and to produce a logframe for Part 2, Phase II of the Project.

### **Recommendations:**

It is clear that the single entry-point has not worked very well. Coordination and systematizing of the various donor efforts in community policing has taken place only partially and should be continued with Sespim as the logical place and PSP Polmas taking on the academic side of community policing as an evolving field. No single model has been proven to be applicable to all situations. The South African model was devised out of specific demands of post-apartheid conditions. The diversity, geography and socio-political dynamics of Indonesia make it an ideal research and learning ground, positioning the INP and related academics to be significant contributors to the continued development of the field of democratic policing and human security management.

Thus, a better plan for coordinative efforts in the area of education/training would be to have several active points: Lemdiklat, Sespim, PSP Polmas, with the office of the Deputy RI Chief of Police in a strong coordinating position to bring in the Operational side (DeOps and staff) and the various international cooperation offices. Lines of communication between Lemdiklat, Sespim and PSP Polmas will support the effort as a whole, thus a common interactive website is useful. Diversifying and coordinating the different points will make the reform efforts stronger and less susceptible to derailment should one point fail. It will also help to bridge the education-operations gap.

The IOM/Police Unit has accumulated a sizeable store of data on the various aspects of community policing and human rights, and also on the process of establishing CPFs beyond the material in the training manual. This material is valuable and should be made accessible through systematizing to the INP partners. Once the material is recognized as a unique resource, it makes it imperative to devise good reporting methods from the field (no need to translate as translations often alter content to some extent), a sound system for information management, and perhaps developing the material further for an interactive website (Lemdiklat, Sespim, PSP Polmas). The material should eventually feed into the training manuals and other instructional material (including video, audio) and make its way into the library/documentation system of one or more of the coordination points.

## **F. Concluding Remarks**

The Community Policing and Human Rights program stands at the crossroads: it can have major nation-wide impact or remain stuck between the limits imposed by various projects. The Police Project efforts are beginning to have a tangible impact at various levels nationally, while the INP has taken the lead and is gradually building resources to continue the reforms. Planning for national coverage thereby takes on the dimensions of a priority issue. Close cooperation with the INP remains a key factor.

To complement this, recognizing the nature of the IOM/Police Unit as a zone of interaction is important and should be reinforced by the top-level IOM Jakarta decision-maker. The risk of being labelled “foreign intervention” is carried by all international cooperative projects, and this is no exception. But the Police Unit is less susceptible to the charges because it employs national trainers and consultants, many with an INP background. This also makes networking and building support groups within Indonesian society much easier. International consultants ideally should be hired only when there are no national alternatives; they should be short-term and play a supporting consultative role rather than a central managerial one. The lessons of the Aceh initiative show that establishing a parallel police project unit has a destabilizing impact on everything and ought not to be repeated. Planning and project development related to INP institution strengthening should be determined within the Police Project Unit before going up for approval through the regular IOM management channels, ensuring that management decisions are bottom-up rather than trickle-down. The same is true for personnel management: personnel classifications determined by IOM management need not be changed but the Police Unit should be able to modify them internally to accommodate the needs of the program. This may lead to an imbalance in pay-scales (national-international) between positions with similar decision-making authority and responsibilities but this aspect should not be the over-riding factor in making functional staff decisions that impact the performance of the Unit. For further trainings, it should be noted that imposition of social models from elsewhere without appropriate consultation and testing should not be allowed. The program has already run into problems because of this and additional misapplications could well jeopardize everything.

While the Police Unit emphasizes the focus on training, everyone involved should recognize above all that training and education are central to changes not only at the individual level, but also generate change throughout the INP system and into communities and the nation at large. For better or for worse—and one would wish to emphasize the former—the Police Unit is deeply involved in an effort impacting nation-wide change. Its actions have resonance not only among the police but also in Parliament, with broad implications for the rest of state institutions. The Unit itself is but a small element in the dynamics but good positioning will help it to maximize—at relatively little cost—the INP leadership initiatives. Barring sudden changes or emergencies, current conditions should prevail over the next two years (change of INP leadership, change in Parliament coinciding with the end of Phase II). There is time to make sure the foundations for reform are in place and strengthened.

The donor community is encouraged to take into account its own role in the changes and the potential influence of its decisions. Lack of good coordination at this level produces fragmented, at times conflicting, policies that create tension elsewhere and have a ripple-effect that is difficult to counteract. It should work to eliminate the potential for creating (sublimated) donor-client relationships, work sincerely towards empowerment of national institutions and civil society, and—especially for the SSR sector—towards the common goal of strengthening civil society, human rights and democracy.

In brief, the Police Project has had its share of mishaps and mis-steps but overall it has produced some sterling achievements. Continuation of phase II should serve to effect an elegant transfer to the INP. Most INP officials felt that a five-year extended presence was necessary to truly shore up the gains of the past three years.

Respectfully submitted,

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