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**A REPORT ON FOCUS GROUPS
AND A SURVEY
OF THE FORMER FAD'H
IN HAITI**

SUBMITTED BY:

SALLY PATTERSON

**BASED ON DATA COLLECTED BY:
SAINT DIC & SAINT DIC CONSULTANTS
PORT AU PRINCE, HAITI**

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
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**GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF THE
SURVEY OF 338 FORMER FAD'H**



EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

BACKGROUND: Central to the planning of "Operation Restore Democracy" was the demobilization of the Haitian armed forces (FAd'H) and the maintenance of public security in Haiti. To facilitate this transition, a demobilization program was instituted by the Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) through the International Organization of Migration. All former soldiers who registered for the demobilization program were given counseling and career assessments. After this intake phase, each man was assigned to one of ten vocational programs offered through local vocational schools in Port au Prince and other areas of Haiti, corresponding to where the soldier had been stationed or resided at the time of the demobilization.

Haiti's demobilization of the military presents a difficult case for examining the impact of dissolving an army because of the nation's violent military history and the oppressive image that the armed forces has among Haitian citizens. Until the election of President Jean Bertrand Aristide, Haitian leaders had always lived in the shadow of military rule, or had been ruled by military men. Unlike conflicts where the demobilization arose from a peace accord, or where there are both regular and irregular forces, Haiti's demobilization was of the entire army, whose mission included police functions as well as national defense.

Developed by the IOM as a subcontractor to USAID, the vocational training program was designed to complement the timeframe of Operation Restore Democracy and the exit strategy for the U.S. led Multi-National Force. The six month training was designed to meet the standard of the International Labor Organization and to be compatible with the Haitian Professional Training System currently in operation in Haiti. The mechanism which was set up was intended to provide an urgent response during a fragile transition period in order to assure stability for the Haitian reconciliation process. The participants were informed about the specific and limited scope of the project and about the nature of the commitment undertaken by IOM. A written training agreement specifying the benefits and obligations of the trainees was signed by each of the participants.

Because demobilization programs convey benefits on a class of individuals who are often considered to be the least deserving of special treatment, the demobilization of the armed forces in Haiti included a sensitive political component which involved the concurrence by the government of Haiti (GOH) to provide a training stipend to those soldiers who were removed from service. In addition, the pension benefit and savings issues remain areas of future contention and potential destabilization if left unresolved. The lack of advancement in the area of reconciliation and justice has also hampered the success of the reintegration of the former FAd'H into civil society.

The Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) has undertaken this opinion research with the former FAd'H to assess their attitudes toward the IOM training program, the allied services provided by IOM, and to explore their opinions vis-a-vis their social and economic reintegration into Haitian life. The survey was conducted by a local Haitian polling firm, with guidance by U.S. survey researchers in the drafting, implementation and analysis of the survey instrument.

METHODOLOGY: This survey and two focus groups were conducted by a Haitian polling firm, Saint DIC and Saint DIC Consultants. Using the IOM database on the beneficiaries of the program, a stratified random sample was established. The total targeted population of recipients is 4,866 covering six major vocational training centers for the program located in Port au Prince, Cap Haitien, Gonaives, Jacmel, Port au Paix and Les Cayes.

The original sample was based on a stratified random sample drawn from the geographic zones where the training centers were located. Based on this design, a sample of 360 was determined to be appropriate at the 95% level of satisfaction. It was also determined that Ex-FAd'H who refused the training and registrants who did not show up would also be included in the survey as control mechanisms.

The survey was conducted in Port au Prince from August 9-17, 1996; and in the provincial villages from August 19-24, 1996. On Monday, August 12, a series of security related incidents, that were attributed by public opinion and the media to elements of the former FAd'H, required a radical change in the protocol which had been developed.

After the publicity, it became very difficult to contact the participants selected to be part of the original sample. The majority of the addresses on the selected list were found to be incorrect. Verification with the local IOM Training Centers determined that their addresses for these participants were also incorrect. Some of the Training Centers had already ceased classroom activity for the summer vacation further complicating the process of identifying the participants.

The neighbors, colleagues and family of the selected participants became distrustful and also refused to assist the researchers in identifying the selected participants. Furthermore, a climate of hostility was found during certain visits and in certain areas (Cazeau, Varreux, Drouillard 2 and Village Solidarite) and there the hostility was escalated from verbal threats to physical threats.

To respond to these difficulties, Saint DIC and Saint DIC instituted the following practices:

1. They reinforced the security of their interviewers by requiring them to be escorted by the field supervisor and the program officer.

2. They revised the order of the questionnaire to focus on the questions related to the training program, prior to asking questions about political and social issues. For example, the general questions (demographics) and questions related to the training were placed in the first position and the sensitive questions about security and their economic situation were placed later in the interview.
3. The role of the IOM faculty was increased from serving as guides to the homes of the selected participants, to actively recruiting and identifying participants for the survey.
4. The time allotted for the completion of the surveys was shortened to avoid "the snowball effect" which would have further disrupted the viability of the survey and threatened the security of the interviewers. The three projected visits and the substitutions for the interviews were all completed in the same working day.
5. Interviews with former soldiers who declined the training and with those who enrolled but dropped out of the training were dropped from the sample.

The size of the final sample was 338 completed interviews, a reduction of 6.17% from the originally projected sample of 360. The change was due to the difficulties in identifying participants. Many substitutions were made in the original sample. Nevertheless, it is believed that the sample remained representative of the targeted audience and this was confirmed based on three additional criteria: age of the participant, length of service in the FAd'H and rank in the FAd'H.

Ninety-five times out of one hundred, results from samples of this size will yield results which differ by no more than about 5.4 percentage points in either direction from what would have been retained if it were possible to interview every participating FAd'H member. The comparison of smaller subgroups increases the margin of error. Because of the high homogeneity in the responses, it is very difficult to discern differences among sub-populations of this study group.

Of the approximately 7,000 members of the former FAd'H, 5,482 were processed through the IOM program. The ranking officers and leaders the FAd'H did not participate in this program. The former FAd'H who participated in the IOM training and reintegration program were primarily from Port au Prince and served in the lower ranks of the military. Sixty-three percent of the respondents served in the Interim Police Security Force (IPSF) prior to participating in the IOM training.

KEY FINDINGS: The majority of these respondents are in their thirties or late twenties, they have been in the military for six-ten years, although almost a quarter have served for

11-15 years. Forty-two percent of them are single; 34% are married and 23% are involved in free union relationships.

These participants are deeply concerned about the economic situation in Haiti. They are also concerned about their personal economic status and are not optimistic about any improvement over the course of the next 12 months. Although they believe their situation to be most difficult because they are former soldiers, they also believe that overall economic conditions in Haiti are not very good, and unlikely to improve in the immediate future.

These former FAd'H members are also very concerned about the overall security situation in Haiti. Their concern for their personal security increased during the time that the survey was being conducted. As reported in the methodology section, political events focused considerable attention on the former FAd'H at the time the survey was conducted. During the first three days of the survey, 12% responded that insecurity was a concern to them; after the August 12 media statements, this figure rose to 20% (bear in mind that the sample size from the first three days is very small, only 67 responses). Comparing the same data break, the reports of incidence of violence to them or their family increased from 18% to 27%.

Continuing attacks on the FAd'H since the middle of August suggest that this picture would probably be even more pessimistic at this time.

One in four report that they or a member of their family have been the victim of violence or the threat of violence in the last six months. (This figure is believed to be higher than the incidents of violence among the general population, which was estimated by Saint DIC and Saint DIC Consultants to be between 15-20%.) The number of incidents of violence increased after August 12, especially among the participants identified as corporals.

These former military were reluctant to offer specific recommendations for improving the security situation in Haiti. One-fourth (25%) refused to offer a suggestion, and almost another fourth (23%) indicated that it was a matter to be dealt with by the government. Of those who were willing to offer a recommendation, 17% suggested that the GOH should restore power to the FAd'H to deal with these matters. Interestingly, 7% of the respondents suggested that the government should give additional resources to the police to enable them to do their job properly. At the same time, 5% suggested that the government should hire competent people, which may imply that this small percentage considers the current security forces as "incompetent."

The participants are very satisfied with the training they received through the IOM. Eighty-two percent report that they were very satisfied with the faculty of the program; seventy-three percent report that they were very satisfied with the overall quality of the program.

Over 40% reported that they were dissatisfied with the length of the program. It is likely that this dissatisfaction is due to a desire for more skills training and a need for the stipend which was paid to participants in the program. Four out of five reported that the thing they liked best about the program was the skills that they acquired; but 94% also reported that the stipend was their only source of income during the training.

Some of the participants, especially mechanics, felt the 6 month training was inadequate because it didn't provide all of the skills and tools necessary to achieve employment in their chosen field. This criticism didn't reflect on their enthusiasm for IOM. Many wanted ORS and additional training from IOM, even without the stipend.

The majority of the respondents indicated that they thought the program was financed by the IOM; only 16% indicated that it was paid for by the U.S. government (USG). Only 1.5% thought it was paid for by the Government of Haiti (GOH). [Note: Within the context of the questionnaire, respondents were repeatedly queried about IOM which may have strengthened their understanding of the association between IOM and the program.]

The majority of these respondents have conflicting information about the pension issue. Although 81% lack the tenure of service to qualify for the pension and report that tenure of service is a requirement for receiving a pension; two-thirds believe that all soldiers are eligible for the pension. The reasons given include the belief that it is their money; that they must be indemnified and that they were demobilized by force, not by choice.

There is no strong evidence that these participants feel overtly discriminated against within their communities. They do report that it will be harder for them to find employment because they are former soldiers. They also acknowledged that they were treated differently in the training--but this was because they were separated from the other students, their training was shorter than the other students and they were in an IOM sponsored program.

Nevertheless, it is clear that they feel a strong financial crunch around their personal economic situation and their inability to find work. And they acknowledge that their role as former FAd'H contributes to these problems.

BACKGROUND

Central to the planning of "Operation Restore Democracy" was the demobilization of the Haitian armed forces (FAd'H) and the maintenance of public security in Haiti. Demobilization took place in three phases: Phase I began in October 1994, and lasted until the end of the year. During that time, the demobilization was voluntary. One hundred and eight seven soldiers signed up for retraining in International Organization for Migration (IOM) sponsored programs during this period.

After December 23, 1994, President Aristide announced that the army would be reduced to a force of 1,500 men. This decision resulted in the first of three official orders which ultimately disbanded the FAd'H. Phase II of the demobilization program began on January 25, 1995, with a nationwide demobilization scheme. By the end of March 1994 a total of 3,064 soldiers had left military service and had registered for training programs supported by USAID through a grant to the IOM.

The final phase of the demobilization process began in June 1995. Former FAd'H who had served in the Interim Police Force (IPSF) were given notice of their demobilization. This group comprised the last wave of soldiers to enter the demobilization program.

All soldiers who registered for the demobilization program were given counseling and career assessments. After this intake phase, each man was assigned to one of ten vocational programs offered through local vocational schools in Port au Prince or in other areas of Haiti, corresponding to where the soldier had been stationed or resided at the time of the demobilization. Over 5,800 soldiers were registered and processed through this program; of these, 4,866 completed the training program, 278 refused to participate and 338 abandoned their participation.

Haiti's demobilization of the military presents a difficult case for examining the impact of dissolving an army because of the nation's violent military history and the oppressive image that the armed forces has among Haitian citizens. Until the election of President Jean Bertrand Aristide, Haitian leaders had always lived in the shadow of military rule, or had been ruled by military men. Unlike conflicts where the demobilization arose from a peace accord, or where there re both regular and irregular forces, Haiti's demobilization was of the entire army, whose mission included police functions as well as national defense. The army was also viewed as an oppressive force, a force which prevented the evolution of a nascent democracy in Haiti.

Developed by the IOM as a subcontractor to USAID, the vocational training program was designed to complement the timeframe of Operation Restore Democracy and the exit strategy for the U.S. led Multi-National Force. The six month training was designed to meet the standard of the International Labor Organization and to be compatible with the

Haitian Professional Training System currently in operation in Haiti. The mechanism which was set up was intended to provide an urgent response during a fragile transition period in order to assure stability for the Haitian reconciliation process. The participants were informed about the specific and limited scope of the project and about the nature of the commitment undertaken by IOM. A written training agreement specifying the benefits and obligations of the trainees was signed by each of the participants.

Because demobilization programs convey benefits on a class of individuals who are often considered to be the least deserving of special treatment, the demobilization of the armed forces in Haiti included a sensitive political component which involved the concurrence by the government of Haiti (GOH) to provide a training stipend to those soldiers who were removed from service. In addition, the pension benefit and savings issues remain areas of future contention and potential destabilization if left unresolved.

The lack of a clear policy on the pension issue, coupled with difficulties in accessing financial resources, has left a difficult legacy to the GOH. If not satisfied, the legitimate demands of the former FAd'Hs concerning pensions and reimbursement of savings deposits, may be a further source of continued tensions and also hamper the success of their social reintegration.

The Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) has undertaken this opinion research project with the former FAd'H to assess their attitudes toward the IOM training program, the allied services provided by IOM, and to explore their opinions vis a vis their social and economic reintegration into Haitian life. The survey and two focus groups were conducted by a local Haitian polling firm, with guidance by US survey researchers in the drafting, implementation and analysis of the survey instrument.

METHODOLOGY

The Haitian firm of Saint DIC & Saint DIC Consultants was retained to conduct a survey and two focus groups at IOM on Rue Lamarre of the former FAd'H. The survey was designed to evaluate the impact of the "Reintegration Program" of the IOM component aimed at:

- assuring the pacific transition of the demobilized soldiers from the military into the civilian life;
- training the program participants in various technical skills to help them make a living in the informal sector and/or to help them in their search for a job in the private sector;
- urging the ex-military to participate actively in their reintegration into the civilian life; and
- promoting a climate of security.

Using the IOM database on the beneficiaries of the program, a stratified random sample was established by Saint DIC & Saint DIC Consultants. The total targeted population of recipients is 4,866 covering six major cities. The survey was conducted in the cities housing the vocational training centers for the program which are located in Port au Prince, Cap Haitien, Gonaives, Jacmel, Port au Paix and Les Cayes.

The original sample was based on a stratified random sample based on the geographic zones where the training centers were located. Based on this design, a sample of 360 was determined to be appropriate at the 95% level of satisfaction. It was also determined that Ex-FAd'H who refused the training and registrants who did not show up would also be included in the survey as control mechanisms.

OTI, IOM and a U.S. survey research specialist oversaw the sample construction, supervision and interview training. Questions were written by IOM, OTI and the consultant in French, reviewed by the U.S. consultant and translated into Creole by the contractor.

Protocols were established for contacting the IOM training centers, and through them to identify the targeted participant and conduct an in-home interview. Mechanisms for substitutions and exceptional cases were also developed.

Four teams of five persons each received training over a three day period in preparation for executing the survey. In each team there was a supervisor and four interviewers. Two field officers were also assigned to this project. Some IOM assistance was anticipated in fulfilling the objectives of this research project.

Face-to-face interviews were conducted in Port au Prince from August 9-17, 1996; and in the provincial villages from August 19-24, 1996. On Monday, August 12, press coverage of claims being made about the former FAd'H forced a radical change in the protocol which had been developed.

After the publicity, it became very difficult to contact the participants selected to be part of the original sample. The majority of the addresses on the selected list were found to be incorrect. Verification with the local IOM Training Centers determined that their addresses for these participants was also incorrect. Some of the Training Centers had already ceased classroom activity for the summer vacation further complicating the process of identifying the participants.

The neighbors, colleagues and family of the selected participants became distrustful and also refused to assist the researchers in identifying the selected participants. Furthermore, a climate of hostility was found during certain visits and in certain areas (Cazeau, Varreux, Drouillard 2 and Village Solidarite) the hostility was escalated from verbal threats to physical threats.

To respond to these difficulties, Saint DIC and Saint DIC instituted the following practices:

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3. The role of the IOM faculty was increased from serving as guides to the homes of the selected participants, to actively recruiting and identifying participants for the survey.
4. The time allotted for the completion of the surveys was shortened to avoid "the snowball effect" which would have further disrupted the viability of the survey and threatened the security of the interviewers. The three projected

visits and the substitutions for the interviews were all completed in the same working day.

5. Interviews with former soldiers who declined the training and with those who enrolled but dropped out of the training were dropped from the sample.

The size of the final sample was 338 completed interviews, a reduction of 6.17% from the originally projected sample of 360. The change was due to the difficulties in identifying participants. Many substitutions were made in the original sample. Nevertheless, it is believed that the sample remained representative of the targeted audience and this was confirmed based on three additional criteria: age of the participant, length of service in the FAd'H and rank in the FAd'H.

It was later determined that there was some bias in the sample toward participants who were still in the training program and those who had served in the Interim Police Security Forces (IPSF). Based on the homogeneity of the responses, it was felt that this bias did not substantially alter the overall findings of the survey.

Ninety-five times out of one hundred, results from samples of this size will yield results which differ by no more than about 5.4 percentage points in either direction from what would have been retained if it were possible to interview every participating FAd'H member. The comparison of smaller subgroups increases the margin of error. Because of the high homogeneity in the responses, it is very difficult to discern differences among sub-populations of this study group.

In early October, focus groups were conducted with two groups of demobilized soldiers. The focus group sessions were conducted at the IOM facilities at Rue Lamarre. Eighteen demobilized soldiers, recruited by IOM, participated in the two discussions. The discussions were lead by trained moderators employed by Saint DIC and Saint DIC Consultants. The discussion followed an interview guide which was jointly prepared by IOM, USAID/OTI and an American survey research consultant. It is characteristic of this culture, and the former soldiers specifically, to defer to a single individual to function as spokesperson in small groups such as these focus group discussions. For that reason, there seems to be a high degree of consensus among these participants, confirming the survey experience and findings. Excerpts from the survey are included throughout this report, printed in bold italics.

KEY FINDINGS

A. Profile of the Former FAd'H.

Of the approximately 7,000 members of the former FAd'H, 5,482 were processed through the IOM program. The ranking officers and leaders of the FAd'H did not participate in this program. The former FAd'H who participated in the IOM training and reintegration program were primarily from Port au Prince and served in the lower ranks of the military. Sixty-three percent of the respondents served in the Interim Police Security Force (IPSF) prior to participating in the IOM training.

TABLE 1: Rank of Soldiers Participating in Survey

Rank:	Soldier	110	33%
	First Class	18	5%
	Corporal	123	36%
	Sergeant	76	23%
	Other	11	3%
	Total	338	100%

The majority (49.1%) had been in the military for 6-10 years, although almost a quarter (23.1%) had served for 11-15 years and 16% had served for 16 to 25 years.

TABLE 2: Years of Service in the FAd'H

Years of Service	5 years or Less	32	9.5%
	6-10	166	49.1%
	11-15	78	23.1%
	16-25	54	16.0%
	25+	8	2.3%

The majority of the participants were in their late twenties or thirties. Forty-two percent of them are single. Thirty-four percent are married and 22.5% report they are involved in a free union. The majority (54.4%) have two children or less; 34% report having 3-5 children and 11% report that they have more than 5 children.

TABLE 3: Age of the respondents

Age	18-24	12	3.6%
	25-29	103	30.5%
	30-39	181	53.6%
	40-49	35	10.4%
	50-59	7	2.1%
	60+	0	0%

Younger former FAd'H members tend to be slightly more optimistic about the future than their older colleagues. They are more concerned about the insecurity in the country than they are about their economic condition (unemployed and without income). They are somewhat more likely to believe that the economic and security situation in the country will get better in the next 12 months and slightly more likely to believe that the training they have received will help them to find employment. For this group, the stipend was higher pay than they received when in the military.

Generally speaking, the former FAd'H have a higher level of schooling and/or vocational training than the majority of Haitians.

TABLE 4: Level of education/training

Level of Education	Elementary	5	1.5%
	Secondary	315	93.2%
	Tech/Voc	9	2.5%
	University	9	2.5%

B. Economic Situation of the Former FAd'H.

The economic situation is the gravest concern to these respondents. They are very concerned not only about the economic situation for Haiti in general, but also about their

personal financial situation. Most of the former FAd'H believe that the biggest problems facing the country at the present time are the high cost of living (31%) and unemployment (28%), followed by general insecurity (18%).

TABLE 5: Biggest Problems Facing Haitians

Biggest Problems		
High Cost of Living	105	31.1%
Unemployment	93	27.5%
Insecurity	61	18.1%
Political	23	6.8%
Other	17	5.0%
DK/NA	39	11.5%

They express little optimism that things will become better in the next 12 months. Although there is a high percentage of "Don't Know" in response to this question, this is believed to be a reflection of the high degree of uncertainty about the future as well as the uniqueness of this type of time consideration in the Haitian culture. According to the contractor, this type of response is consistent with other survey research asking Haitians to project forward in time.

TABLE 6: Economic Situation in Haiti in the Next 12 Months

Economic Situation in Country Next 12 Months		
Becomes Worse	110	32.5%
Stay Unchanged	61	18.1%
Be Better	31	9.2%
DK/NA	136	40.2%

This pessimism is also reflected in their assessment of their personal economic situation. Most of these participants describe their personal economic situation as being very bad (87.9%) and they have little optimism that their overall situation will improve in the next year.

Our economic situation is not good. We are hungry. When you ask your brothers to send something for you, they do. Friends help you too.

I have six children who are going to school on Monday, but I don't even have a gourde now.

No one is working. We depend on friends and family. We're not going to find jobs because soldiers who finished earlier didn't find jobs.

TABLE 7: Personal Economic Situation

Personal Economic Situation		
Very Bad	297	87.9%
Bad	15	4.4%
Relatively Good	17	5.0%
Very Good	4	1.2%
DK/NA	5	1.5%

Thirty five percent indicated that they expect their economic situation to become worse in the next year and 17.8% expect it to stay unchanged (very bad). Forty-two percent of the respondents indicated that they did not know what their economic situation would be in 12 months. This reflects the general uncertainty about the political, social and economic conditions in Haiti at this time (a perspective which is also the viewpoint of the general public according to other Saint DIC and Saint DIC research).

TABLE 8: Personal Economic Situation over the Next 12 Months

Next 12 Months		
Becomes Worse	120	35.5%
Stay Unchanged	40	17.8%
Be Better	17	5.0%
DK/NA	141	41.7%

C. Security Situation in Haiti and for the Former FAd'H.

These former FAd'H members are very concerned about the overall security situation in Haiti. Their concern for their personal security increased during the time that the survey was being conducted. As reported in the methodology section, political events focused considerable attention on the former FAd'H at the time the survey was conducted. During the first three days of the survey, 12% responded that insecurity was a concern to them; after August 12, this figure rose to 20% (although the sample size from first three days is very small, only 67 responses). Comparing the same data break, the incidence of violence to them or their family increased from 18% to 27%. Continuing attacks on the FAd'H since the middle of August suggest that this picture would probably be even more pessimistic at this time.

In order to improve the security situation in the country they should give us political asylum.

We also think that if they restore the army the problem of insecurity would be resolved.

We think that the police and the army should exist together because each has its own work to do.

Compared to one year ago, 43% believe that the security situation in the country has become worse in the past 12 months; 29% believe that the situation is unchanged from a year ago. Only 11% believe that the security situation has improved.

There is no security. Maybe there is for a small group but not for the majority of the population. There is no respect for the individual. No one is in authority.

On the whole, no one can live in this country, there is no security.

TABLE 9: Security Situation in Haiti for the Last 12 Months

Security Situation Last 12 Months		
Is Worse	147	43.5%
Is Unchanged	98	29.0%
Has Improved	36	10.7%
DK/NA	57	16.8%

One quarter of the participants (25.2%) indicated that they or the members of their families have been the victims of dishonest acts or acts of violence. Although the numbers are rather small, it would appear that these acts of violence tended to be targeted primarily to Corporals from the Former FAd'H. [Note: The statistical instances of violence toward Corporals reflected in the survey apparently is not consistent with other evidence of overall patterns of violence committed against former FAd'H.] Reports on the acts of violence were higher after August 12.

They say everything that's going on is caused by the demobilized soldiers.

I am less safe than others because I'm a former soldier. If you are relaxing at home and you hear someone knocking at the door you must hide or run away.

TABLE 10: FAd'H as Victims of Violence

Victims of Violence		
No	243	71.9%
Yes	85	25.2%
DK/NA	10	2.9%

These former military were reluctant to offer specific recommendations for improving the security situation in Haiti. One-fourth (25%) refused to offer a suggestion, and almost another fourth (23%) indicated that it was a matter to be dealt with by the government. Of those who were willing to offer a recommendation, 17% suggested that the GOH should restore power to the FAd'H to deal with these matters. Interestingly, 7% of the respondents suggested that the government should give additional resources to the police to enable them to do their job properly. At the same time, 5% suggested that the government should hire competent people, which may imply that this small percentage considers the current security forces as "incompetent."

TABLE 11: Recommendations to Deal with Security Problems

How to Deal with Security Problems		
Government Issue	77	22.8%
Empower FAD'H	59	17.4%
More Resources to HNB - Police	24	7.1%
Unity/Reconciliation	22	6.5%
Recruit Competent People	18	5.3%
Other	53	15.7%
DK/NA	85	25.2%

D. Attitudes toward the Vocational Training Provided by IOM

Understanding that many of the participants in this survey self-selected to be included in the survey sample, the responses to questions about the training program offered by IOM provide important insights into assessing the overall value of this program. At the time of the survey, 157 participants or 47% of the sample were still in the training program.

Overall, the participants are very satisfied with the training they received from IOM. They were most satisfied with the teachers and the overall quality of the program. They reported being dissatisfied with the length of the program.

TABLE 12: Satisfaction with IOM Program

Satisfaction with IOM Program			
Satisfied with	Yes	Acceptable	No
Quality of Program	73.4%	19.2%	5.9%
Length of Program	30.5%	23.4%	44.0%
Quality of Teachers	82.0%	13.0%	33.0%

Anecdotal information suggests that the participants realized that this certificate program is more compact than the normal training curriculum. It was also suggested that participants would have liked a longer apprenticeship or application component to the

training, something that would have allowed them to practice the academic training which they received. Some skeptics have suggested that the participants want to have an extended stipend to support themselves and their dependents. The data offers some support for both interpretations.

The training was good for us.

The training was good but it wasn't enough. It was too short. For example, we can't do big mechanical jobs because there wasn't much training.

There are people who spend five years learning and don't know everything.

Overwhelmingly, the participants appreciated the skills which they acquired through the training. Seventy-nine percent on a base of 267 respondents volunteered this as the best part of the training; only 3.3% said the allocation or stipend was the best part. When asked what could be done to improve the training program, thirty-six percent asked for more assistance in seeking work; and 34% requested a longer program.

TABLE 13: Suggested Improvements in Training

What Improvements Do You Suggest	OIM Seek Jobs	119	35.8%
	Program Longer	114	34.3%
	OIM/USAID Affair	22	6.6%
	More Assistance	25	7.5%
	More Serious Training	6	1.8%
	Other	28	8.6%
	DK/NA	18	5.4%

The participants believe that the training will help (61%) them to find a job but they acknowledge that they will have great difficulty (72%) finding work. The major reason offered (79% on a base of 243) was that they would have difficulty "because we are soldiers."

The training wasn't enough. You can't get a job with an IOM certificate.

We need money in our pockets to take care of ourselves because its not easy to reintegrate into civilian life.

Even if the program closes the ORS should continue.

These participants believe that they received the same training (58%) as others at the vocational training centers in terms of content. Of those who felt their training was different, volunteered responses suggested that it was different because they (the former FAd'H) were separated from the other students. Again, anecdotally it was reported that the IOM program was shorter than other programs available to non-IOM trained students.

Hope enables us to live. Since I am a mechanic today, my future would be better if they could open a small business for us or find a job for me.

IOM didn't reach its objective. The training was too short.

This sample included 157 participants who were still in the training at the time of the survey (46%). Of those who had completed the program (187 participants), 79% have participated in the advanced seminars; 76% have sought counseling or other services from ORS and 54% have received the tool kit. These percentages are clear indicators of a continued interest in support toward finding gainful employment. Satisfaction with each of these services is also very high.

Sixty percent believed that the IOM paid for the program; sixteen percent felt it was paid for by the US government. Only 1.5% believed that the Government of Haiti paid for the program.

E. The Stipend

To test respondent dependence on the stipend, two questions were inserted into the questionnaire at different points during the interview. According to one indicator, ninety-five percent of the respondents indicated that they had no other income during the training; and on the other indicator, 94% indicated that the IOM stipend was their only source of income.

TABLE 14: Income During Training

Income During Training			
Other Source of Income	No	320	94.7%
	Yes	15	4.4%
	NA	3	.9%
OIM Stipend Only Income	Yes	316	93.5%
	No	16	4.7%
	NA	8	1.8%

Forty-six percent indicated that the stipend was lower than the pay which they received in the military. One-third indicated that it was larger than the amount which they received in the military and one-fifth reported it to be about the same as they received in the military.

TABLE 15: Stipend in Comparison to Military Salary

OIM Stipend	Lower Than Army	156	46.2%
	Equal	67	19.8%
	Bigger	110	32.5%
	NA	5	1.5%

F. Reintegration into Civilian Life

Social reintegration was never part of the scope of work for the Demobilization and Reintegration Program, nor its objective. Nevertheless, there is great interest in the progress of the former Haitian soldiers to move into civilian life.

For these respondents, the most difficult aspect of reintegrating into civilian life will be the challenge of finding a job. Two-thirds reported that finding a job will be the most difficult aspect of the transition given the current economic environment in Haiti. Five percent reported that being accepted will be the most difficult aspect.

IOM started to reintegrate us but they haven't completed the job. We are hungry. IOM was supposed to reintegrate us into civilian life but it didn't do it completely.

If IOM wants to do something for us they should continue the program.

These respondents reported that as students of the IOM reintegration it will be difficult for them to find a job. Seventy-two percent reported that it will be difficult. Primarily because they are soldiers. Although a minority reported that they lack experience and that they have received no assistance from IOM in finding employment, what is clear from these responses is that social reintegration for these former FAd'H is still unrealized.

TABLE 16: Challenges of Transition

Most Difficult Aspect of Transition	Finding a Job	224	66.3%
	Returning to Civil Life	42	12.4%
	Be Accepted	16	4.7%
	Other	36	10.7%
	DK/NA	20	5.9%

Only 5% reported that they are currently employed. Of these respondents (16), fourteen indicated that they had worked more than 15 days in the last month.

What is still not clearly understood is how these former FAd'H are supporting themselves. Asked about the income they received last month, 53% indicated that they received between 1000-3000 gourdes, which is assumed to include most of the participants who were still in the training. An additional 39% reported that they earned less than 1000 gourdes. Only 8% reported earning more than 3000 gourdes.

G. The Pension Issue

Two-thirds of these respondents (66%) believe that all demobilized military are eligible for the pension. Thirty-one percent indicate this is so because all military put money into the pension fund; 25% report this is so because they were demobilized by force; and 27% report that it will be done according to age. Those with longer terms of service or who served as officers are less likely to believe that every demobilized soldier is eligible for the pension.

The pension fund is important for us and they must give it to us. When we were being demobilized, they gave us a leave of absence, and now they must give us all our money.

The money they deducted each month from the day you joined FAd'H to day you left it must be retained.

If we receive all the money they owe us we can live well with it.

If they pay government employees and they don't pay us they'll have a problem. We worked for that and we must get our money.

TABLE 17: Are all military eligible for pensions?

Are all demobilized military eligible?		
Yes	222	65.7%
No	97	28.7%
DK/NA	19	5.6%
Demobilized by force	83	24.6%
According to age	90	26.6%
Put \$ in fund	106	31.4%
Give pension & indemnify	24	7.1%
Other/NA	29	10.3%

Despite this strong belief that all military should be eligible, respondents also reported that years of service is a component of the eligibility requirements.

TABLE 18: Years of Service for Pension Eligibility

Years for Pension Eligibility		
+20	161	47.6%
16-20	23	6.8%
11-15	40	11.8%
6-10	82	24.3%
0-5	23	6.8%
Other	9	2.7%

Remembering that 82% of these respondents have fifteen years or less of service, it is clear that they understand that years of service contribute to the pension eligibility issue.

It is also clear that the arrangement made by former President Aristide to award pensions to those who were 40 years of age and had served for 15 years or more is not widely known to these respondents. Also clear, is the understanding that there is an equity issue involved here. Because they contributed to the program and because they were forcibly demobilized, these former FAd'H believe that they deserve added compensation. Forty four percent explained that "its our money" when they were asked why all soldiers should receive compensation.

SURVEY IOM EVALUATION PROGRAM
JULY 1996

Page 1

1-3 Questionnaire No.

4 Department

5 City

Name of Selected Person _____

Visit Result

6 Person Found 1. NO

If YES

7 1. Accepted 2. Refused (Why) _____

3. Other Specify _____

Name of Person in reserve: _____

8-9 Rank reserve:

Substit.unexpected:Name _____ Address _____

(The surveyor introduce himself to the person)

Good morning, Good afternoon, my name is _____
I am working in collaboration with IOM who is making that survey
to know the opinion of the demobilized soldiers about its
"Reintegration Program into civil life". As in a lottery, we
made a random drawing to find the name of the persons who will
have a chance to participate to that survey. Luckily, your name
has been chosen. Would you please give me a few minutes to
answer several questions about the program?

10 1. When you think about what could happen to this country
(5) in the future, Do you think that the economic situation
will be better, stay unchanged or will be worse in the
next 12 months?
1. Be better 2. Stay unchanged 3. become worse
9. Does not know 0. No answer

11 2. According to you, What is the biggest problem for the
(6) country right now?
(OPEN QUESTION, WRITE THE ANSWER VERBATIM)

9. Does not know 0. No answer

- 12 3. How do you consider your actual economic situation:
 (3) Very good, relatively good, Bad, Very Bad
 1. Very Good 2. Relatively good 3. Bad
 4. Very Bad 9. Does not know 0. No answer
-
- 13 4. Do you think that in the next 12 months, your economic
 (4) situation will be better, stay unchanged or become
 worse than today?
 1. Be better 2. Stay unchanged 3. Become worse
 9. Don't know 0. No answer
-
- 14 5. When you compare the security situation in the country
 (8) today and the one of a year ago, Can you tell that the
 IMP situation has improved, is unchanged, is worse?
 1. has improved 2. Unchanged 3. Is worse
 9. Don't know 0. No answer
-
- 15 6. During the past six months, Have you or a member of
 (7) your family be victim of dishonest act or of an act of
 IMP violence?
 1. Yes, We were victims 2. No, we were not victims
 9. Don't know 0. No answer
-
- 16 7. In your opinion, How the security question should be
 (9) dealt with in the country?
 (OPEN QUESTION, WRITE THE ANSWER VERBATIM)

 9. Don't know 0. No answer
-
- 17 8. Did you received a training in IOM Program when dismis-
 (10) sed from FADH/
 1. Yes 2. No (Go to Question 15)
-
- 18 9. Where did you received your training? (Do not read the
 (12) list of answers)
 1. Port au prince 4. Gonaives
 2. Cap-Haitien 5. Jacmel
 3. Cayes 6. Port de Paix
-
- 19 10. Which specialty did you choose? (don't read answers)
 (14)
 1. Auto Mechanic 5. Electronic 9. Refrigeration
 2. Carpenter 6. Mechanic A. Welding
 3. Computer 7. Mason
 4. Electricity 8. Plumber
-
- 20/23 11. When did you start your training?
 (15) Month _____ Year _____
-
- 24 12. Did you received a certificate at the end of the train-
 (16) ing?
 1. Yes 2. No

26 13. On top of the training, Which other IOM services did you received?
(17) 1. Post Training Seminar 2. Employment info service(ORS)
3. Material received (tools kit) 4. None

26 14. If the answer #13 is 1,2,3, What do you think of that service?

26 (18) Post Training Seminar 1. Good 2. Acceptable 3. Bad

27 Employment info Serv. 1. Good 2. Acceptable 3. Bad

28 Tool Kit 1. Good 2. Acceptable 3. Bad

29 15. If the answer to ⁽¹⁰⁾ Q8 is No. Reasons?
(DO NOT READ THE ANSWERS)

- (11) 1. Abandon Training courses 3. Lack of time
2. Little interest in Program 4. Find a job
5. Lack of money 6. Other
8. Don't ask the question

→ to 32 if
no 6 10

People who say Yes to #8

30 16. Are you satisfied of your training:
30 a) Quality 1. Yes 2. No 3. Acceptable
31 (19) b) Length 1. Yes 2. No 3. Acceptable
32 c) Teachers 1. Yes 2. No 3. Acceptable
8. Do not ask the question 9. Don't know 0. No answer

33 17. What did you like the most during the training?
(DO NOT READ THE ANSWERS)

- (20) 1. The allocation 3. Meeting with old friends
2. Skills acquired 4. insurance for the future
5. Others
8. Do not ask the question 9. Don't know 0. No answer

34 18. What do you suggest to improve IOM training?
(21) (OPEN QUESTION, WRITE THE ANSWER VERBATIM)

35 19. Do you think that the training received will unable you to find a job on the market?
(22) 1. Yes 2. No
8. Do not ask the question 9. Don't know 0. No answer

36 20. (If the answer to question 19 is No. Why?)
(23) (OPEN QUESTION, WRITE THE ANSWER VERBATIM)

8. Do not ask the question 9. Don't know 0. No answer

37 21. While in training, Did you received the same treatment
(24) of the other participants who were not IOM beneficia-
ries?
1. Yes 2. No

38 22. (If the answer to question 21 is No) Why?
(25) (OPEN QUESTION, WRITE THE ANSWER VERBATIM)

8. Do not ask the question 9. Don't know 0. No answer

39 23. Do you think that IOM students have more difficulties
(32) to find a job than other people?
1. Yes 2. No

40 24. (If the answer to question 23 is yes) Why?
(33) (OPEN QUESTION, WRITE THE ANSWER VERBATIM)

8. Do not ask the question 9. Don't know 0. No
answer

41 25. What was the most difficult aspect of your transition
(34) into civil life?
(DO NOT READ THE ANSWERS)
1. Find a job 3. Do not intervene directly
in life security or
2. Return to civil life 4. Be accepted by others as a
civilian
5. Others _____
9. Do not know 0. No answer

42 26. Are you working now?
(35) 1. Yes 2. No

43 27. (IF THE RESPONSE TO QUESTION 26 IS YES) In which
(36) branch?
(DO NOT READ LIST OF ANSWERS)
1. Auto mechanic 5. Electronic 9. Refrigeration
2. Carpentry 6. Gen. Mechanic A. Welding
3. Computer 7. Mason B. Other _____
4. Electricity 8. Plumber
8. Do not ask the question

- 44 28. How many days did you work last month?
(37) (DO NOT READ LISTED ANSWERS)
1. Less than 7 days 2. Between 7 and 15 days
2. More than 15 days 4. Did not work
-
- 45-48 29. How much money how you making per month?
(38) Gdes.
-
- 49 30. Are you looking for a job now?
(29) 1. Yes 2. No
-
- 50 31. (If the answer to 30 is Yes) In which branch?
(40) (DO NOT READ LISTED ANSWERS)
1. Auto mechanic 5. Electronic B. Refrigeration
2. Carpentry 6. Gen. Mechan. C. Welding
3. Computer 7. Mason D. Other _____
4. Electricity A. Plumber
8. Do not ask the question
-
- 51 32. How many time did you spend to find a job?
(41) (DO NOT READ LISTED ANSWERS)
1. Less than 1 month 3. More than 3 months
2. Two to three months 4. Never
9. Don't know 0. No answer
-
- 52 33. (If the answer is "More than 3 months or Never) (3 or
(42) 4) Reasons for that (DO NOT LISTED ANSWERS)
1. Training inadequate 3.No integration strategy at IOM
2. Not enough training 4.General situation of country
5. Military status
6. Other _____ 9. Don't know 0. No answer
-
- 53 34. What is your actual specialty?
(1) (OPEN QUESTION, WRITE THE VERBATIM ANSWER)
9. Don't know 0. No answer
-
- 54 35. What is your principal activity?
(2) (DO NOT READ LISTED ANSWERS)
1. Own Boss 3. Employee, Public sector
2. Employee, Private Sect. 4. Independent Worker
5. Student 6. Unemployed 7. Other _____
-
- 55 36. (If the answer is Own Boss Employed in public sector,
(26) or independent Worker (1, 2, 3, 4) In your daily acti-
vity how do you use your tool kit?
(DO NOT READ LISTED ANSWERS)
1. Very often 3. Sometimes
2. Often 4. Not at all
8. Do not the question 9. Don't know 0. No

answer

- 56 (37) This tool kit was it useful for you?
(26)
- 57 38. (If the answer to 37 is no) Do you still have it at home?
(27) (OPEN QUESTION, WRITE VERBATIM ANSWER)
8. Do not ask the question 9. Don't know 0. No answer
-
- 58 39. During the training, Did you have any other source of income besides the stipend?
(28) 1. yes 2. No
8. Do not ask the question 9. Don't know 0. No answer
-
- 59 40. Was IOM stipend your basic income?
(29) 1. Yes 2. No
-
- 60 41. The monthly stipend received during training was it lower, equal, or higher than your army salary?
(30) 1. Lower 2. Equal 3. Higher
-
- 61 42. Do you think that the training received was paid by the Haitian Government? the American Gov.? or by IOM?
(31) 1. GOH 2. US Gov. 3. IOM 4. Other
-
- 62 43. What do you think of the Pension Issue?
(43) (OPEN QUESTION, WRITE VERBATIM ANSWER)
9. Don't know 0. No answer
-
- 63-64 44. How many years of service do you need to be eligible to a pension?
(44) years of services 9. Don't know
-
- 65 45. In your opinion, Are all demobilized military eligible to the pension?
(45) 1. Yes 2. No
-
- 66 46. Why?
(46) (OPEN QUESTION, WRITE VERBATIM ANSWER)
-
- 67 47. Are old are you?
(47) Exact age _____
- | | | |
|----------|----------|------------|
| Category | 1. 18-24 | 4. 40-49 |
| | 2. 25-29 | 5. 50-59 |
| | 3. 30-39 | 6. 60 plus |
-

68 48. What is your academic level?
(48) 1. None 3. Secondary 5. Univ./Superior
2. Elementary 4. Tech./Vocational 6. Literate

69 49. What is your marital status?
(49) 1. Single 3. Free Union
2. Married 4. Divorced

70-71 50. How many children do you have?
(50)

72-73 51. Number of years of service in the FADH?
(51)

74 52. Were you a member of the IPSF?
(52) 1. Yes 2. No

75 53. What was your last rank? _____
(53)

76-82 54. What is you ID number at IOM?
(13) _____ 9. Do not know

83- 55. Are you a member of an organization?
(54) (DO NOT READ LISTED ANSWERS)
1. IOM former students ass'n 3. Former FADH union
2. RAMIRES 4. Others
9. Don't know 0. No answer

THANKS, THANKS A LOT. YOU HELP ME FILL OUT THE QUESTION-
NAIRE AND I APPRECIATE VERY MUCH THE CONVERSATION WE
HAD TOGETHER.

84-85 Interviewer first and last name

86 Supervisor Control 1. Yes 2. No

87-88 Supervisor first and last name

MODERATOR'S GUIDE
General Population Groups
REINTEGRATION PROGRAM

- I. Welcome, Introductions and Warm Up
- A. PURPOSE: To discuss local issues that affect your life. This research is being conducted for USAID (IOM???)//Other) to determine local community attitudes towards some of their programs in our communities.
- B. Guidelines for the discussion.
1. Feel free to make negative or positive comments. There are no right or wrong answers. Each comment and viewpoint is important.
 2. To help me accurately reflect your viewpoints, the session will be taped. If you object to taping, would you mind if my associates take notes? **[Introduce all non-participants in the room.]**
 3. Please talk one at a time to allow for full recording of your comments.
 4. I want to hear from everyone during this discussion. If you feel that you cannot participate in the discussion, please excuse yourself now.
 5. I know I will hear different points of view expressed here. I want to hear what is true for you even if you are the only one who feels this way. Don't let the group sway you, it is your viewpoint which matters to me.
- C. Self introduction. Please give me your name, what you do, where you live and how long you have been in this community.
- II. Opening Discussion--Economic Situation.
- A. How do you consider the economic condition in our country at this time? Is it good or bad?
- B. In the next 12 months, will the situation become better or worse? Why?
- C. What about your personal economic condition, is it good or bad? How do you support yourself and your family? Do you have a job? Do you receive help from family outside of Haiti?
- D. What do you think needs to be done to improve the economic situation in our country?

III. Security Situation.

- A. What about the security condition in this country at this time? Compared to 12 months ago, is it better or worse? In the next 12 months, will the situation become better or worse? Why do you think that?
- B. In the past six months, have you or your family been the victim of a dishonest act or an act of violence? What happened? Who do you think was responsible?
- C. Do you mostly feel safe in your community or are you fearful for the safety of your family and yourself?
- D. Do you feel the current police are enough or does Haiti also need a military? Why do you feel that way?
- E. What do you think needs to be done to improve the security situation in our country?

IV. Former FAD'H

- A. Were any of your neighbors in the military? What do you know about their lives?
- B. Were any of your family members in the military? How are they surviving since they were demobilized? Do you know if they participated in a training program with the IOM? Do they have work?
- C. Some political leaders have been very critical of the former FAD'H. Do you think the FAD'H is no longer a force to be feared or are they still a group to be feared at this time? Why?
- D. Do you think anything can be done to help bring the former FAD'H into the community as full citizens? What can be done?

V. Compensation and Benefits.

- A. Recently there has been some discussion about members of the FAD'H who did not receive the money from their pension and money that they put into savings accounts. Do you know anything about these issues? What do you know?

INSERT STATEMENT OF FACT:

- B. Do you believe that these funds should be restored to them? Why or why

not?

- C. **[IF THE CONVERSATION FOCUSES ONLY ON THE NEGATIVE, ASK:]**
If you had funds that you had set aside, would you want the government to restore these funds to you? How is that different from the situation with the former military?

VI. Closure.

- A. Our time is just about up. Is there anything else that you wanted to say about the topics we have discussed today?
- B. Did you enjoy the session? What did you enjoy most?
- C. What advice would you give me for other sessions like this one.

Thanks for your time and for your honest opinions. I've learned a lot from you today. You can pick up your payment now.