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EVALUATION OF THE USAID OFFICE OF TRANSITION INITIATIVES AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR MIGRATION HAITI COMMUNAL GOVERNANCE PROGRAM

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I. EVALUATION OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY

A. Goals of the Communal Governance Project (CGP)

As expressed in the evaluation Scope of Work, the CGP set for itself the following goals:

- Rapid, visible results through the countryside;
- Decentralized, flexible implementation;
- Responsiveness to Haitians at the local level;
- Emphasis on process - so that each project involved civic education for the participating community; and
- Implementation of approximately 300 public works projects.

In financing the CGP, OTI's overall goals were:

- Facilitate the restoration of effective democractic rule;
- Help the Haitian people move from a society of intimidation toward an atmosphere of popular participation; and
- Promote greater decentralization of government as a first step toward greater development;

B. Objectives of this Evaluation

Objectives of this evaluation, as expressed in the Scope of Work, are:

- A qualitative assessment of the effectiveness of the CGP in achieving its broad goals of facilitating the return of democratic rule, reducing the atmosphere of intimidation, and promoting decentralization and popular participation in governance;

- An evaluation of the performance of IOM in undertaking the CGP;

- A determination of the appropriate next steps for the CGP; and

- A presentation of policy-relevant lessons learned as to whether, and under what conditions, a flexible, community-targeted intervention such as the CGP can and should serve as a part of a rapid response assistance strategy in other situations of political transition.

C. Evaluation Methodology

The guiding stated goal of the CGP was the enhancement of democratic processes in Haiti. Specific activities were a means to that broader end. The evaluation team therefore focused less on

the technical or managerial dimensions of CGP projects than on the generic question of the manner in which activities contributed to democratization in the project regions.

Principal components of the evaluation methodology are: 1) orientation and briefings by US Government personnel both in Washington and Haiti; 2) interview guides and topics; 3) field research teams and organization; 4) distribution of interviews, and 5) data analysis methods.

1. Interview Guides and Topics

To ensure coverage of the SOW and comparability of information, interview guides were developed. For each region two types of questions were posed: generic questions about the functioning of the regional bureau and 'mairies', and specific questions about individual sub-projects.

Topics in the regional interview guide included: IOM team composition, Haitian and UN staff, program start-up, relationship with other organizations, foreign military presence, project selection criteria, project support, the shift from Phase I to Phase II, and project phase out.

Topics in the sub-project interview guide: source of project idea, nature of community groups, government involvement, community contribution, participatory processes, technical support, sustainability, contributions by other organizations, and attitudes Phase 1 vs. Phase 2, and attitudes toward: IOM, quality of life, government, security, freedom of expression, voting, and migration.

Interview duration: Interviews at both the regional and sub-project level lasted between 45 minutes and 2 hours, depending on the depth of the questioning, and the enthusiasm of the groups interviewed, which tended to be high. Group interviews were with between 2 and 5 people, with on occasion numerous observers (400 on one occasion).

2. Field Research Team and Organization

Field research personnel consisted of 11 people as follows:

4 consultants from MSI;
1 representative from IOM in Geneva;
1 representative from USAID-Washington's LAC Bureau;
1 representative from USAID-Haiti;
1 consultant to USAID-Haiti; and
3 Haitian social scientists/creole interpreters.

The evaluation team set for itself the goal of visiting six regional offices and sub-offices, and ended up visiting eight. To permit more time in each region, we split up into 6 sub-teams. Two

members of the overall team were fluent in creole, and the three Haitian researchers listed above were hired to accompany team members not fluent in creole.

Each field team made two field trips of 3 days, and the field work was preceded by a one day field trip by 8 members of the group, and followed by a case-study visit by one member of the group. A total of approximately 42 days work spent doing interviews, and making observations in the field.

3. Distribution of Interviews

Regional level interviews were carried out in 8 'mairies', and sub-project interviews were carried out for 98 sub-projects in 15 communes. Since groups interviewed (without counting passive observers) averaged at least two individuals, the number of people interviewed amounted to at the very least 200 people. Effort was made to include women in the interviews, and approximately 50 women were actively included in the interviews.

An effort was made to include substantial numbers of sub-projects of the following types: 1) Phase 1 and Phase 2; 2) successful and unsuccessful; 3) community based and municipal government infrastructure; 4) projects carried by and for women. Sub-projects studied were determined in approximately equal measure by: 1) IOM staff, 2) MSI staff, and 3) chance encounter.

	Phase 1	Phase 2	Total
San Marc, Petite Riviere, Verette, Dessalines	8	7	15
Fort Liberte, Derac, Ouanamimthe	9	2	11
Jacmel	12	2	14
Petit Goave, Gran Goave, Miraguan	13	7	20
Gonaives, Port de Paix	3	2	5
Hinche, Thomassique, Pignon	23	4	27
Mirebalai	4		4
Thomaseau		2	2
	72	26	98

4. Analysis Method

Analysis of information collected through the more than 100 interviews is still underway, and consists primarily of summing up information "horizontally" across interview guide items, or item clusters.

5. Technical Note

In this document "Phase 1" refers to that phase of project activities in which the emphasis was on projects and there were on the whole few linkages to elected authorities. "Phase 2" refers to the program's current modus operandi, in which a community's access to IOM project resources is contingent on prior scrutiny and approval of their proposals by a commune-wide council, created under IOM auspices, that includes municipal authorities (majistra), rural elected authorities (kazek), and one elected representative (mam) from each rural section.

II. FACILITATING THE RETURN TO DEMOCRACY

The restoration of a democratically elected government, freedom of expression, and security from violence was caused first and foremost by the arrival of foreign troops. The CGP in turn effectively worked within the newly opened political space to reinforce democratic behaviors throughout the country. Democratization was facilitated differentially in each of the program's three major stages.

A. Three Stages

Stage I: Early civic education events brought people out to discuss political and developmental issues during the early months after President Aristide's return. Because they occurred at the end of a three year difficult political period, they were well attended in at least some regions visited by the evaluation team. The decision to move into a user-driven small project phase, which combined participative processes with concrete results resulted in dropping civic education events from the CGP program.

Conclusion. CGP's adult civic education activities came at a strategically useful time and contributed to democratization by giving people an opportunity to publicly discuss formerly prohibited topics.

Stage II: As CGP strategy evolved, CGP operated principally through pre-existing Haitian rural and urban groups, rather than through newly formed, "ad hoc" groups. CGP resources financially empowered the groups to pursue the resolution of practical problems of high local priority: schools, latrines, potable water systems, and the like.

Conclusion: The Phase 1 projects contributed to democratization by permitting well-organized groups to finally begin problem solving activities after years of inaction due to repression. In putting emphasis on pre-existing groups, rather than the formation of new groups, CGP took advantage of an important existing resource. The shift into a concrete, micro-project mode was in harmony with the perceived and real needs of the Haitian population.

State III: After the parliamentary and local elections, CGP shifted its *modus operandi* and began working directly with local elected officials. Elected local government authorities (mayors and CASECs) were linked with representatives of community organizations in structures designed, in principle, to enhance accountability, transparency, and responsiveness in the distribution of IOM resources. This effort has been underway for only four months, but evidence to date suggests that the majority of local government officials that are

working with the CGP have become more responsive to the needs of constituents -- meeting with community organization leaders and community members more regularly, engaging in dialogue on local priorities in many cases for the first time, and implementing local development projects with CGP resources.

Conclusion. Had CGP not shifted into Phase 2 mode, the level of democratic and open dialogue between elected officials and their constituents would be lower in project communities, and in most cases would probably not have occurred.

B. The Reduction of Intimidation

1. Finding. Those interviewed attributed the marked reduction of intimidation that has occurred throughout Haiti since September, 1994 to the Multinational Force and to the later U.N. military presence, rather than to CGP. Nonetheless, several of those interviewed suggested that by participating in the CGP, they put into practice their new freedom of expression and freedom to organize. Participation of project participants in the meetings and fora organized by the MSI team during this evaluation dramatically reinforce this finding.

Conclusion: The CGP contributed to reducing the atmosphere of intimidation by providing a forum within which the limits of community organization for development could be tested and consolidated.

2. Finding: CGP sponsored many municipal improvement projects that were often done with little community participation and which appear to fall outside the rubric of socio-economic development activities. Nonetheless they can be seen as compatible with CGP democracy enhancement goals. For example, painting all 'casernes' and former military establishments UN blue and white, instead of FADH yellow, was a low-cost but highly symbolic contribution heralding a new era. Similarly, improving physical prison conditions so that prisoners had at least basic rights also contributed to this new democratic image. Rehabilitated prisons and courthouses provided a psychological boost to beleaguered judicial and legal personnel, particularly in small towns. Moreover, to many Haitians in towns where prison and law enforcement personnel are located, rehabilitated prisons and police stations together with the presence of the Interim Police and Security Force (IPSF) made real the abstract concept of public safety and protection from criminal elements.

Conclusion: The municipal improvement projects occurred at a strategically important point in time, and conveyed important symbolic messages that the atmosphere of intimidation experienced under dictatorship had truly ended.

3. Finding: At present, project beneficiaries are extremely nervous about the departure of the international military force and believe that the present stable and secure environment will not last beyond the UNMIH departure. Many of those interviewed were concerned that sufficient disarmament has not taken place, and a small but emphatic group of respondents fear that after UNMIH leaves Haiti may experience civil war, and chaos, as well as an increase in common thievery.

Conclusion: The fear and physical insecurity that continue to be felt in Haiti are due to factors largely outside the control of a civilian program such as CGP.

C. Popular Participation and Decentralization.

1. Findings. A core requirement for CGP projects was community participation. The CGP had the good fortune of working in an organizationally-rich country. Pre-existing community organizations were encouraged to participate in the CGP. For many groups, the completion of a successful water, school, or latrine project was often the first concrete activity that they had ever implemented.

Conclusion: The insistence on popular participation was perhaps the CGP's main strength and principal accomplishment. Program emphases on the ideals of participatory modes of decision-making may not have been realized in every project, but the program's vocal commitment to these ideals did reinforce democratic modes of interaction in most project communities.

2. Finding: It was frankly admitted to us that many of the urban municipal projects discussed above were done with little bona fide community participation. City-hall, courthouse and jail refurbishment programs, for example, were often done under direct management, supervision, and logistical support of the US Special Forces, with salaries paid from CGP funds. The embellishment of city halls, plazas and cemeteries was likewise done principally with salaried labor.

Conclusion: It probably would have not been productive to insist on heavy infusions of volunteer labor for urban infrastructure projects which are at best of indirect benefit to individual households. Though official project policy did not recognize the distinction, regional field teams acted correctly and pragmatically in not adhering to narrow definitions of community participation for projects such as jailhouse refurbishment.

3. Finding: In very broad terms, the CGP promoted decentralization by deploying its own offices and its micro-project

resources throughout the country. In doing this it was following the patterns established by many prior projects and NGOs in Haiti, which had also funneled most of their resources to regional offices to break the monopoly of Port-au-Prince constituencies. In working directly with community organizations, the CGP supported a constituency for decentralized service delivery. Moreover, the benefits of the restoration of democracy in Haiti were shared throughout the country, in 113 of Haiti's 133 communes via the CGP.

Conclusion. In terms of Haitian developmental history, the CGP was among those programs contributing directly to decentralization of service delivery and resource distribution.

D. CGP and the Haitian Government.

Background: Originally, the CGP had planned to work closely with local governments as soon as local elections took place. However, as the elections were progressively delayed, a strategic decision was made to bypass formal government channels in areas where "legitimate" Mayors did not exist. In those areas project approval and implementation, and to enter instead into direct contact with individual urban and rural citizen groups. In areas where popular Mayors remained, consultation was generally useful and positive.

After the June 1995 elections, and the August-October 1995 installation of newly elected mayors and CASECs, the CGP began systematically to engage local officials and initiate activities toward the goal of strengthening local government units.

1. Findings: As explained by IOM Port-au-Prince staff, the shift into Phase 2 was done in the light of several important considerations. Among them are the following.

Newly elected local officials were to take office in August-October 1995, permitting the CGP program at last to more systematically begin implementing one of its major original mandates: support of locally elected officials as a vehicle for democratization.

The OTI-funded CGP would eventually end, and to increase the likelihood of sustainability a role for local government as a provider of resources and services had to be allowed.

Conclusion: Though most project beneficiaries interviewed expressed skepticism, there were compelling reasons for the CGP switch into a program mode that entailed interaction with and support of representatives of the local government.

2. Finding: Several IOM staff were originally skeptical of the transition from the Phase 1 strategy of working directly with local groups to the Phase 2 approach of involving elected local officials in decision making. Despite initial doubts, however, the clear consensus among CGP staff now is that Phase 2 constitutes a conceptual and managerial improvement over Phase 1.

   Conclusion: Despite popular misgivings concerning Haitian Government entities, the switch to Phase 2 was more compatible with the understandings which project staff have of the overall purpose of the CGP.

3. Finding: Among the 100s of Haitians who participated in group interviews during this evaluation, there is a wide-spread "wait and see" attitude regarding not only local government, but also regarding the parliament, the central government, and the Haitian National Police that prevails throughout the country at this time.

   Conclusion: There is an understandable mistrust by Haitians for their Government apparatus that was at best mildly affected by electoral processes. The mistrust can not be removed by a brief program such as the CGP. The goal of programs such as the CGP should be defined, not as that of encouraging Haitians to trust their leaders, but of creating structures and procedures which permit them to monitor these leaders. The Phase 2 communal committee system established under the CGP was a step in this direction.

4. Finding: Predictably, the mayors on the whole were in favor of increasing their say in the activities which were being funded -- i.e. favored a switch into Phase 2. IOM was aware of that working exclusively through mayors could not ensure participative decision making. CGP therefore designed a structure intended to guarantee a voice, not only to the mayors, but also to elected members of the rural population.

   Conclusion: The communal committee system designed by IOM provided a built in system of checks and balances between rural and town constituencies, a system that actually functioned well in several of the communes.

5. Finding: Several CGP field staff in favor of the switch toward collaboration with the local Government nonetheless expressed disapproval of the abruptness of the manner in which it was done. The timing of the switch was governed by deadlines set in the Port-au-Prince office, rather than through case-by-case assessment of the capacities of individual communal leaders to see if minimal criteria are met.

Conclusions:

On the one hand, the decision to shift from Phase 1 to Phase 2 must be understood in the light of the short life which the program was believed to have, and the curtailing of the resources available. On the other hand, the abruptness of the shift injected an air of urgency into complex organizational processes that are ordinarily done with more preparation and caution in most other development programs.

6. Finding: Despite pressures and problems, IOM staff succeeded in a feat that many would have thought undoable in the short time frame available. Agreements with mayors were signed, needs were prioritized, communal committees were formed, unprecedented dialogue has occurred between the elected and their constituents, and numerous Phase 2 projects are now underway.

Conclusion: The jury is still out on the sustainability of the CAC committees, particularly in light of resource constraints and upcoming local elections to be held pursuant to communal and municipal assemblies. But IOM Port-au-Prince and field staff have to be congratulated on their "can-do" ability to identify a mid-course correction, set a plan, and establish an efficient delivery system to carry out the plan in record time.

E. Other Facets of Democracy and Governance

Background. In addition to the explicit and ambitious goals set out for the CGP, there are a number of other facets to democracy and governance that merit examination. We recognize that definitions and theories of democracy are numerous and hesitate to attempt to engage in the theoretical debate. Nevertheless, there are several concepts associated with democracy and governance work that are useful for this evaluation and that have not been discussed above, namely: accountability, transparency, equity, accessibility, empowerment, and reconciliation.

1. Accountability

Finding: As with any community development effort, there were allegations that community leaders and/or elected government officials were using CGP funds for their own benefit, but these cases were the exception rather than the rule. By using strategies such as dealing in checks not in cash, requiring community contributions in advance of the delivery of CGP materials, setting stringent deadlines for accomplishments and if deadlines were missed reprogramming funding, the CGP

field staff have developed effective methods of ensuring accountability.

Conclusion: Although there is wide variation across field offices, the majority of CGP programs reinforced the principle of accountability in the use of resources -- both accountability to IOM for accomplishing results, and accountability to members of the community for delivering services and using funds responsibly.

2. Transparency

Finding: Most project beneficiaries were able to explain why the decision was made to fund one micro-project over another, and who was responsible for the decision, evidencing that the CGP achieved a sufficient level of transparency in its policies and decision making. Under Phase 1, the CGP worked directly with the community to make the decision. Now under Phase 2, mayors, CASECs, and elected representatives of community organizations are responsible for the decisions, with CGP's input and guidance. As discussed above, beneficiaries expressed more concern over the transparency of decision making under Phase 2 compared with Phase 1, and generally preferred the ease, timeliness, and transparency of dealing directly with the CGP and IOM without the involvement of local government officials.

Conclusion: The CGP, particularly in Phase 1, generated a sense of confidence as to the absence of unstated personalistic or partisan criteria for access to project resources.

3. Equity

Finding: During Phase 1, the "first come, first serve" nature of micro-project funding resulted in unintended inequities in benefit distribution. The inequities were noted in the following domains.

- In at least some regions, town inhabitants on the whole got a disproportionately higher percentage of projects than the majority living in rural sections.
- People on main roads received a much higher percentage of projects than those living off of main roads.
- Protestant groups in several regions got a disproportionately higher percentage of IOM resources than majority Catholic groups.

CGP field staff were not unaware of these inequities. But because there was a rush to disburse funds in certain periods

of Phase 1, these inequities were tolerated for the sake of project speed.

Conclusion: Correctly, speed and practicality were uppermost concerns for IOM managers. However, even under crisis conditions, managers of development projects should be aware of the statistical prevalence of different sectors and their differential rates of response to project inputs. Measures should be taken to prevent undue capturing of project resources by minority sectors. CGP certainly succeeded in getting out of Port-au-Prince, and in some regions at least there was a respectable number of projects that benefited distant communities rarely affected by development program. But the above mentioned types of skewing did occur.

4. Gender

Finding: The vast majority of projects funded by IOM unleashed benefit flows that went equally to men and women: schools, latrines, roads, water systems, and the like. When talking about the benefits of projects, people often referred to children as the prime beneficiaries.

Conclusion: IOM's projects benefited men, women, and children. That is, there was no evidence of bias in the choice of projects that would benefit one gender or age group more than another, except for perhaps a bias toward projects in which children are viewed (or were at least described by respondents) as the prime beneficiaries, such as schools and latrines.

5. Commune Wide vs. Locality Specific Benefit Flows

Finding: The projects recommended by communal committees in Phase 2 tend to be more communal in character -- public schools, markets, and the like -- than the projects of Phase 1 which tended to focus on the needs of smaller groups.

Conclusion: The CAC prioritization procedure (and the diminishing of resources) may make it more difficult for small groups to get approval for those highly valued projects that benefit individual hamlets or households (latrines, potable water systems, and the like) rather than commune wide benefit flows. Because both types of projects are valuable, if resources permitted the ideal type of program mode would be the mixed mode mentioned earlier, in which the collectivized granting mechanism of the CAC operates simultaneously with some variant of the more decentralized and agile granting mechanisms of CPG's Phase 1 activities.

6. Reconciliation

Finding: Many CGP beneficiaries stated that the organizations to which they belong include people of diverse political views, and that they have put aside political differences in order to resolve development priorities. And we did receive the impression that when valued resources were present, people of different political ideologies or religious convictions would work together. Nevertheless, we can maintain a respectful skepticism on whether our questions on this subject elicited frank and open responses. A number of micro-projects appeared to suffer from problems potentially rooted in political disputes. However, in the short time available to learn about each micro-project, we were not confident of our ability to discern the real nature of the disputes.

Conclusion. An important tool for village-level reconciliation will be resource flows that make it materially worth while for persons with differing views to work together. Nonetheless there are clearly still problems to be resolved, problems whose details could not be unearthed in our brief visits.

Finding: Some people who had worked with the program under Phase I expressed concern that under Phase 2, only organizations that share the same political views as the CASEC or mayor will receive funding for micro-projects. No longer is the "apolitical" foreign institution the decision-maker on whether micro-projects are funded, but instead choices are made by elected local officials, beholden to supporters and only some beginning to struggle beyond Haiti's legacy of patron-client local governance.

Conclusion: The legacy of intergroup competition and suspicion of all Haitian public institutions is still strong. If the CGP has made a dent in that, it is a very small dent. People's preference for dealing with foreigners rather than with fellow Haitians is viewed by most development workers as problematic and/or offensive. But the underlying mind set has objective strong historical causes, and is not likely to disappear in one generation.

Finding: To avoid concerns over the CGP's political neutrality, and to prevent the involvement of staff in sensitive, conflict-ridden local dynamics, a strategic decision was made to avoid involvement in the parliamentary and local elections. There were some within the CGP that felt that non-partisan support to fragile electoral processes was central to the democracy enhancement goals of the CGP. Yet a decision was taken not to get involved in supporting elections.

Conclusion: IOM's decision to establish guidelines against involvement in electoral process was in retrospect justified. Though such involvement might make sense in other countries, the CGP strategy of pursuing democratization through material involvement in projects has shown to be an effective strategy for Haiti, with its strong material needs and its resource of thousands of well-organized grassroots groups.

III. PERFORMANCE OF IOM

A. Why OTI and IOM?

Finding. The were two unique features that gave a special character to the institutional arrangement that was implemented in the course of this program.

a. The project was based in Washington, in the newly established Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI), whose role was to address many of the political emergency issues found in Haiti. OTI was granted flexible "notwithstanding" monies, not encumbered by the same administrative requirements governing USAID's ordinary overseas program operations.

b. To implement the CGP, an international agency with little development experience in Haiti was selected.

Finding: The following factors were presented to the team as the reasons for OTI involvement in Haiti.

a. The unusual character of the Haiti situation, including urgent political matters plus plans for what could have been a violent military invasion seemed in line with OTI's special institutional mandate.

b. The USAID Mission in Haiti, after years of crisis, was already too overworked and understaffed to energetically take on the additional tasks that would be required by demobilization and communal governance.

c. There was a sense (particularly in the OTI office) that, even if the Mission were able to respond, USAID's traditional way of approaching problems would not be appropriate for immediately addressing and rapidly fluctuating crisis situation.

Conclusion: There were solid institutional reasons justifying OTI involvement as the principal actor in the DRP and CGP activities. This judgment, however, leaves open for further discussion and analysis the question of whether the specific institutional arrangements adopted were the most effective, particularly with respect to interaction between OTI activities and more conventional development activities of the USAID Mission in Haiti.

3. Finding. The non-competitive choice of IOM, rather than one of the NGOs with a long development track record in Haiti and in USAID projects, was explained to be the result of several factors, including the following:

a. In order to simplify its management burden, the Mission wanted a single implementing agency willing and able to do both community development and demobilization. We were told that the Haiti-based NGOs were willing to do the former, but not the latter. IOM was responsive to mission preference in this matter.

b. Both the Haiti mission and OTI had positive contacts with IOM. An example was IOM's demobilization program in Mozambique.

c. It was suggested that the use of an international organization, rather than an American NGO, would lend an international character to the sensitive demobilization and communal governance activities to be undertaken.

Conclusion: In light of the factors discussed above, the choice of IOM as the implementing agency was a valid institutional decision to facilitate rapid action and simplified management.

B. IOM Managerial Achievements

1. Findings. The program achieved the remarkable feat of providing highly valued services to all regions of Haiti, and to 113 out of the nation's 133 communes in its brief 18 month life. In its well organized documentation system IOM reports having engaged more than 2,000 community groups representing well over 50,000 Haitians in community improvement projects. The highly varied nature of these sub-projects, and the different character of the groups "engaged" render the evaluation team somewhat cautious in assessing the meaning of some of the figures presented in the monthly reports. But there is absolutely no doubt that this program has had unprecedented success in mobilizing highly valued resources to tens of thousands of beneficiaries all over Haiti.

Conclusion. The evaluation team's field visits left them impressed with the success which IOM staff, in Port-au-Prince and in the regional field offices, had in carrying out their mandate for rapid action affecting ordinary Haitians generally bypassed in development activities.

2. Finding: The CGP program has a well organized managerial structure emanating from Port-au-Prince. There is a full time and experienced project coordinator representing OTI. From the IOM side there is a chief of mission dealing with policy, management, and GOH issues. There is a National Coordinator for the CGP who functions as actual program manager, a Field Accounting Coordinator who regularly visits field sites for administrative support, and a ~~Coordinator of Press Relations~~ responsible for the data base, plus other requisite support

Documentation Officer

staff.

3. Finding. The program has a computerized data base system documenting its expenditures and activities. Each project, activity, or event was coded for commune, locality, type of activity, name of implementing group, community contribution, IOM contribution, dates of implementation and other variables. Evaluation team members were presented with precise and well organized information on all subprojects. In retrospect the team wished that simple information had also been gathered and clearly coded on each project for gender ratios and religious affiliation of participants, town vs. village location of the project and on-road vs. off-road location, and other variables which would have permitted assessment of benefit distribution.

   Conclusion. The CPG project was well managed and documented.

4. Finding. The program moved from a managerially freer mode to one in which procedures were more carefully spelled out. By February 19, 1995, shortly after the arrival of the OTI Project Coordinator, administrative, financial and operational procedures were standardized and simplified. By May 10, 1995 a detailed field operations manual was prepared. This manual was frequently updated. Monthly progress reports began to be circulated.

   Conclusion. The emergence of stricter managerial control, combined with the documentation mentioned above, constituted a great administrative improvement without robbing the field teams flexibility to respond to particular needs in a given region.

5. Finding. Popular reactions to projects, particularly Phase 1 projects such as schools, water systems, latrines and the like, are highly laudatory. The expressions of praise which the evaluation team heard from Phase 1 project participants throughout the country were virtually unanimous and highly convincing. Beneficiaries of IOM projects praised especially the following aspects of the program:

   a. Rapidity of decision-making. Proposals were reviewed rapidly, sometimes on the same day, and positive or negative decisions were communicated immediately. This was for most groups both unprecedented and astounding.

   b. Political impartiality. We heard widespread expressions of cynicism concerning the hidden partisan dynamics that have governed local governmental responses to request for aid. IOM staff in contrast were praised for their impartiality to the political (or religious) antecedents of those proposing projects.

c. Compliance with agreements. On several occasions we heard IOM praised for coming through on everything that it promised. On no occasion did we hear from project participants that IOM failed to comply with its part of the agreed on quid-pro-quo.

Conclusion: Among its beneficiaries IOM has earned for itself a well deserved, highly positive, and uncontested reputation.

6. Finding: Attention was given to groups with special needs.

a. Several IOM offices exhibited significant creativity in assuring that groups with special needs participated in the project. Widespread benefits clearly accrued to children and adolescents, who are now safer and more comfortable learning in more than 500 schools that were renovated or construction nationwide. In many cases, youth were involved in the implementation of school projects, especially in site cleaning and carrying materials, thus learning the value of volunteerism early in life. The team also notes involvement of youth -- including pre-schoolers in at least one case in Ouanamimthe -- in a number of "public space" activities such as park clean-ups and beautification. This may indirectly promote civic pride and responsibility.

b. A second group needing basic attention was prisoners. Reports by human rights groups throughout the three-year crisis, and at the entry of the MNF, underscore the inhuman conditions in which Haitian prisoners were kept. There was severe overcrowding of antiquated facilities, and lack of segregation of sexes meant that women prisoners were subject to indiscriminate rape and sexual abuse. Frequent escapes also kept neighboring communities in fear. IOM's specific contribution to collaborative MNF/IOM/UN prison renovation, while not always easy to desegregate, must be considered positive. The improved conditions assure male and female prisoners' basic human rights, and also improve the safety of neighboring communities.

c. Finally, the special efforts of several regional offices to include physically challenged youth and adults in the project must be lauded. For example, in Cap Haitien children from a school for the blind and deaf were active in constructing gabion baskets for a drainage ditch outside their school.

Conclusion. The program was unusually successful in terms of leeway given to field staff, and accomplishments achieved, in creatively addressing special needs groups.

C. Other Issues and Concerns

There were of course issues and concerns that arose as OTI and IOM rushed to implement their program.

1. Washington Management's Role: Particularly in the days before there was a full-time OTI representative in Haiti, OTI/Washington involvement in management was more intense than is ordinarily the case in overseas projects. Despite the presence of a resident USAID Mission, many of these issues concerned personnel which would appear to have been better left to IOM.

2. Field team concerns: In our conversations with field teams we encountered different sources of frustration which can be briefly listed. They are not necessarily the fault of managerial shortcomings. In many instances they are an inherent part of the hectic conditions under which the project functioned.

   a. Shifting policies. IOM's emphasis on rapid response and flexibility was more than justified. But this led to periodic re-ordering of priorities on the part of central staff. We encountered varying levels of concern among field staff. The Port-au-Prince office indicates that field staff were consulted on major shifts in policy, and there is evidence supporting this contention. The field staff often felt, however, that they were reacting to shifting policy changes directed suddenly from above.

   b. Project pressures. Field team staff reported that during the height of Phase 1, they felt pressure from the Port-au-Prince office to maximize the number of development of projects in order to benefit Haitians in a short time frame. The Port-au-Prince office, though clearly interested in quality, seems to have inadvertently created the impression that individuals and field teams would be judged as much by the quantity of their projects.

3. Geographic distribution of sub-projects: Within regions the geographic distribution of subprojects varied considerably, depending on transportation available to staff, and whether the office gave cash. In general, areas where cash was given had a greater geographic distribution of projects because the IOM staff was not responsible for logistics. (This created other concerns however about accountability.) In areas where the IOM office procured and transported materials, most projects tended to be in towns and along roads in order to facilitate access.

4. Less participation in urban areas. Although there appeared to

be more projects in cities and towns than in rural areas, IOM team members in Port-au-Prince and field offices expressed their belief that the project has generally been "more successful" in rural areas than in urban areas. When probed, the definition of "more successful" seemed to pertain to community participation at all levels, from project initiation to provision of volunteer labor to continuing maintenance of a new or improved facility. The team's sample was not large enough to provide any definitive conclusions in this regard, and the IOM database found that coding by "urban" or "rural" was too subjective and dropped it early on. However, given the fact the urban poor in Haiti -- as in most countries -- tend to be more politicized and frequently more volatile than their rural cousins, the team made a special effort to ask "what works" in terms of fostering democratic development among the urban masses.

5. Urban vs. rural. The team was cautioned that urban problems and thus needs are often more complicated than those in rural areas. The IOM staff underscore that there is certainly less clearly defined communal "ownership" in urban areas, and that urban populations tend to look more toward government to solve problems rather than work them out themselves.

6. Atypical transitional volunteerism. What does seem to work in urban areas, at least in the short-term, are the "public spaces, public safety" type of projects -- clean-ups and beautification, libraries, drainage, prisons, etc. These are all spheres where government and the people are clear about the fact that the government has responsibility for the space. However in the transition situation, the community seem willing to pitch in and help government with this responsibility.

Conclusion: Stimulating community action in urban areas was more difficult than in rural areas, and management needed to plan accordingly. Future programs may adopt a strategy of starting with broad-based activities to build community confidence, while trying to identify non-political groups with which to work.

7. Short contracts and insecure funding. It was stated to us by some field teams that willingness to expend developmental resources on short-term events was due to a belief that project monies had to be disbursed by the end of a six month grant period, at which time CGP would close its doors. Had they known that the project was going to last for one to two years, some regional team staff stated that they would have reserved a larger percentage of program longer-term funds for development activities. As of this date (Feb. 1, 1996), field teams are still unsure about whether their contract will end on March 31, 1996 i.e. whether they should begin closing down

IV. IOM STAFF

A. Recruitment

1. Finding: Initial staff recruitment was done in a procedurally unusual fashion that reflected the special nature of the program.

   a. IOM was contracted in a grant agreement as the implementing agency. Under ordinary circumstances the implementing agency has full responsibility for the recruitment of staff. However, partially because of the special nature of this transition initiative, OTI/Washington played a more active role in the recruitment of staff than is normally done, even by standing overseas missions in relation to grantees or contractors.

   b. Lists of names were generated, often by OTI/Washington, and sent to the IOM office in Haiti for review and agreement.

   c. It was thought that the program was to last for only six months. Many of the earliest personnel contracts, however, were for only three months. We were told that this was done in order to place those hired on a probationary status, and allow management to reassess their performance after three months.

2. Finding: The original criteria for hiring expatriates as reported to us, were to some degree problematic, in part because of the shifting assumptions about the nature and length of the entire program and of the activities which it was to undertake.

   a. Haiti development experience and fluency in Creole, or at least French, were valued from the outset. Several persons who had lived and worked in Haiti and who therefore met those requirements were hired. They have stayed with the program throughout its life and have, by common consensus, been among the most effective regional field managers.

   b. Some, however, placed a high priority on experiences in "political activism" and "election experiences". In retrospect, long after the program's shift into a micro-project managerial mode, this requirement is seen as flawed.

   c. It has been pointed out to us that at least some of those hired for their political activism background lacked acceptable qualifications and experience in international

project management that are generally required for such positions.

d. Some of these people functioned well. But others did not. Their inexperience in development and management led to administrative difficulties.

Conclusion: The early assumption that political activists would perform better in this transition situation than those equipped with experiences in development and international has proved to be incorrect in some cases.

3. Finding: The recruitment of Haitian staff was done through radio announcements and word of mouth, using criteria which were technically stricter and more germane to the tasks which they would have to accomplish. And the subsequent assignment of Haitian United Nations Volunteers to several communes was done following strict professional criteria. The incumbents of those positions struck the evaluation team as possessing outstanding qualifications.

4. Finding: Regional field directors were at liberty, not only to hire their own staff, but also to set their salaries. At program start-up, there were no hiring guidelines regarding salary schedules.

Conclusion: Part of this dilemma may have been produced by IOM/CGP failure to consult with the local USAID office on procedural matters, or to follow IOM salary scales and recruitment policies. Salary schedules for different job descriptions had already been fairly well established. The early program assumption that CGP was at liberty to ignore bureaucratic precedents may have been partially at fault.

B. Training

1. Finding: The haste with which the program was deployed, along with the periodic shifts of priorities in program objectives, complicated attempts to deliver appropriate training. IOM functioned for an entire year without a professional training coordinator. During this time, training was delivered on an ad hoc basis, with no overall strategy or needs assessment to draw on. With the appointment of a training coordinator in October 95, the situation has improved dramatically.

Conclusion: Considering the absence of a formal, integrated training component, IOM did an admirable job in preparing team leaders for their work in the field.

2. Finding. Early training efforts (October, 1994) for the first group of eight team leaders consisted of a three-day orientation, aimed at getting the teams up and running, and

out to the field, post-haste. Planners predicted that once established at their sites, with local staff on board, they would be in a better position to assess appropriate local training needs. Since many of these early hires had participated in the preliminary field assessment, which allowed them to view the Haitian reality outside of Porte au Prince, they had an advantage over the second group that came in thee months later. Three months after their initial orientation, the first group was summoned back to Porte au Prince for a 3-day de-briefing, giving them an opportunity to share lessons learned, and in effect further their training.

Unlike the first group, the second group, which arrived in December, 1994, was given a three week orientation, which included topics of greater practical use. In spite of its length, there were no sessions on project design and management. At that time the program emphasis had not yet formally shifted from civic education to micro project development; thus training skills in this area had not been anticipated.

Conclusion. The training of the second group was a substantial improvement over that of the first group, but still required more management training.

3. Finding. While training events did occur before October '95, it was then that a professional in-house training coordinator, and former field officer, was pointed. With Phase 2 underway, field staff required intensified training in community linkages, in the organization and management of meetings, setting priorities, group facilitation, project identification and management, and accounting procedures. To date, over 40 training sessions have been delivered. These on-going trainings are held at regional IOM offices and mairies, and attract anywhere from 15 to 50 participants. They are delivered by the IOM training coordinator, with help from local staff and utilize a variety of adult learning techniques, including case studies, role plays,and group discussions.

Conclusion. With the shift into Phase 2, training in CGP has become more systematized and more relevant

Conclusions: While training was weak early on, it did improve eventually. One of the major contributions of CGP may be the preparation of a highly trained cadre of Haitian professionals and semi-professionals.

V. APPROPRIATE NEXT STEPS FOR THE CGP

Background.

Democratic processes which do not deliver services are of little value to rural areas. Therefore the CACs' success depends largely on obtaining funds and resources, not only from IOM, but also from the Government of Haiti and other donors. IOM's Phase 2 projects are seen as merely a prelude to that longer and important task.

Clearly, the long term viability of the CACs rests on two assumptions: (1) the GOH will be willing and able to respond to well articulated requests for financial support and (2) the communes will also be able, largely on their own and as a result of CGP and other inputs, to access external donors.

Both of these are highly problematic assumptions that must be critically examined in the light of our findings.

A. The of Public Sector Responsiveness Assumption

1. Finding: The mayors and their offices are reported to be without funding. They have been in office for four months and have yet to receive their first paycheck. They have no operational budget. The few taxes collected are returned to Port-au-Prince. Office furniture and supplies have often consisted of excess USG property. Their municipal buildings have sometimes been refurbished and painted with the financial and logistical support of foreign troops.

   Conclusion: It is a questionable assumption to say that the Haitian Government, which fails to pay even the meager salaries of its mayors, will be responsive to a CGP-trained municipal citizens' committee requesting support for irrigation systems, roads, and other infrastructure and services.

B. The External Donor Receptiveness Assumption

Background: The CGP Phase 2 strategy envisions that CACs approach foreign donors to solicit additional funds. CGP projects are merely small "seed money" to permit the execution of visible projects which help CACs to function and which presumably enhance their credibility in the eyes of external donors and their own constituents.

1. Finding: Thus far many Communal Action Plans, while officially prepared by the CAC, have in reality been prepared more by IOM field staff and are simple community wish lists.

   Conclusion: The likelihood that the ordinary CACs independently will be able to prepare convincing fundable

proposals is remote. If CGP is extended to September, 1996, CACs will be better trained in this regard, but the problem will remain.

2. Finding: Funding organizations generally prefer to create their own organizational systems, rather than adopt those created by predecessors. OTI made very little use of the institutional memory of USAID/Haiti. In a similar vein, the follow-on local government components of the USAID Democracy Enhancement Project, which is a major candidate for CGP handoff, indicate they do not envision IOM's CAC system as central to its approach.

   Conclusion: It is unlikely that the ordinary CAC will have the capacity to prepare fundable proposals. Even if they were capable, the likelihood of external funding agencies responding to them is unproven.

   Conclusion: As the CGP will continue for another six months until September 1996, the most promising strategy for promoting post-project continuity is to give the CACs practice in approaching other donors. CGP asked each of its field staff to form committees and generate communal action plans. Now as the program continues, it might consider requiring each of its field offices to generate one or two proposals to be submitted to other funders. Whether a commune can or cannot land funds with IOM still present could be a good test of sustainability.

3. Finding: There are several possible targets for proposals generated by the CACs. Major donor projects -- FAES, ECHO -- that provided small projects in rural areas were either slow to start-up (ECHO) and/or had more complicated approval processes (FAES). However, the larger donor efforts are beginning to come on stream, and the combined major donor resources directed at decentralized localities throughout Haiti should exceed US$50 million in the next 2-3 years. In order that the impact of these funds be maximized, increased donor coordination is indicated.

4. Finding: During Phase 1 and Phase 2, CGP built and installed systems and infrastructures without much attention to maintenance systems over the medium and long term. Mechanisms for maintenance and repair of schools, pumps, roads, and the like were left without community management or resources.

   Conclusion. In terms of project activities (as distinct from the grant-generating activities mentioned above), CGP might consider focusing on the development of maintenance systems for projects already completed, rather than undertaking new projects. A landscape dotted with crumbling structures or inoperative water systems will not create confidence in the

democratic processes undertaken by CGP.

C. Hand-off of Generic Participatory Processes

The evaluation team distinguished between specific project systems instituted (such as the CAC), and the generic processes that these systems were meant to facilitate.

1. Finding: In the process of generating a truly impressive number and variety of concrete sub-projects, CGP also put a large number of participative decision making and collaborative processes in motion.

Conclusion: Several generic Phase 2 elements of CGP may now be picked up by a variety of other funding sources in a longer-term development mode. Given the array of donors and programs summarized later in this section, CGP's "next steps" should include consolidation of gains from IOM's transition effort so that others can move them into a sustainable development mode. This consolidation should comprise:

1) finishing outstanding Phase 1 and Phase 2 micro-projects so that groups are left with successes;

2) continuing to refine Communal Improvement Plans, where selected micro-projects are developed to a fundable proposal level, where other donors/NGOs/interested parties can move them forward;

3) assuring that interested Mayors are provided names of potential follow-on partners, descriptions of types of assistance provided, along with addresses, and phone/fax numbers.

D. Transferring Resources/Leveraging Funds

1. Finding: IOM Field Offices were open and responsive to working with international and indigenous NGOs in Haiti, including those funded by USAID and those with independent funding. This collaboration leveraged more funds for projects that one agency alone have not be able to do, and in many cases introduced the community to other sources of funding that are likely to continue when IOM phases out.

Finding: The Haitian Parliament is working on the enabling legislation for local governance, which will include the provision for election of Communal, Departmental, and Inter-Departmental Assemblies.

Conclusion: The positive experience gained by the CACs meshes

nicely with the constitutionally mandated procedures that will now be the subject of parliamentary discussion. CAC experiences may provide a basis for action in Commmunal Assemblies in particular.

2. Finding: CGP placed staff, and/or support to National-UNV's as Mayor's Liaison Officers with local government officials and institutions at the field office level. The on-going U.N. HABITAT Phase 2 program plus institutional strengthening efforts under USAID's bilateral program (DEP), and possible other donor funding (World Bank) might carry these efforts further.

F. CGP Phase Out

Finding: The evolution of CGP is occurring at the same time that Haiti is completing critical steps to democracy including: 1) transfer of the Presidency from Jean-Bertrand Aristide to Réné Preval; and 2) transfer of United Nations' Peacekeeping to a much smaller Haitian National Police.

Conclusion: It is an appropriate time for the CGP efforts to phase out, consolidate success, and for OTI to take the lessons learned on to the next critical transition country.

VI. LESSONS LEARNED

One has to be exceedingly careful in presenting any policy related lessons learned from the CGP experience in Haiti to other political transitions because of the unique political, military, economic and social characteristics encountered in Haiti, and the equally complex situations that will inevitably be encountered in other parts of this diverse world. However, with that strong caveat in mind, it is possible to present some lessons learned from the Haiti OTI/IOM experience. These can be briefly summarized as follows:

1. In complicated political transitions such as that in Haiti, it is absolutely necessary to address not only the military requirements, but also the underlying political, economic and social ills that have brought about the disaster. These latter issues must be pursued with equal vigor in order to prevent a recurrence of the emergency. It is shortsighted to think that these root causes will disappear of their own accord. The history of Haiti certainly makes this point.

2. While the United States should not be seen as the sole arbiter in these cases, as the lone superpower the U.S. will have to show genuine concern, interest and, where important interests are at stake, as in Haiti, major leadership in helping to solve the basic problems. This does not in any way relieve the people and government of that nation, as well as other interested parties and donors, from their responsibilities to share the burden, particularly in the real world of budgetary stringencies. The international effort working with the democratically elected Haitian officials appears to reflect well this approach.

3. The part of the U.S. Government which has the preponderant expertise in working in such difficult developing country situations managing complicated programs and substantial resources is the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). One must quickly add, however, that these multifaceted political transitions require an array of skills and resources, necessitating the active involvement of and prominent roles by many other U.S. Government agencies, not the least of which is the Department of Defense and the U.S. military, the Department of State, and others, depending on the particular circumstances of the issues involved.

4. Whereas USAID has generally distinguished itself well in both emergency and development situations overseas, the heavy burden of many of its procedural regulations and pertinent laws do not always lend themselves well to prompt and flexible action in political transitions. It is reasonable to assume that, in the post-Cold War era, local "hot spots" such as Haiti will become the more common occurrence requiring some form of U.S. or multilateral intervention. Therefore, USAID needs to adjust to this new

reality, and has made an earnest effort to do so in the form of the newly created Office of Transitions Initiatives (OTI) which is mandated to lead USAID in this direction. However, to maximize the use of resources within USAID and improve management, OTI needs to better integrate its operations into the other parts of USAID, including the resident overseas missions where they exist as well as other parts of the agency.

5. Security is paramount to the operations of OTI-like programs. That was certainly the case in Haiti, but such security may not be realistic in other situations where the U.S. or other military forces are not present to keep the peace. In those circumstances, it is problematic that a community-baed OTI program could function effectively.

6. USAID can and should forge an effective alliance with U.S. and foreign military forces in order to better achieve common objectives. USAID brings critical development and management experience to a situation while the military can provide resources, transport and security. The program in Haiti plus numerous other examples (Philippines, El Salvador, Vietnam, etc.) bear this out.

7. OTI programs need to assume a minimum period of operation (e.g., one year) to allow adequate planning and more effective management. Tranching funds and agreements in smaller portions, as occurred in Haiti, injects too much uncertainty and some inefficiency of resources into the program. Also, because of the short-term nature of OTI programs vis a vis the long term democratization issues themselves, OTI projects must include plans for the transition to longer term projects of USAID and other donors.

8. While the overriding goal may be support of a political process, inevitably the foundations will be built on the proper management of human and/or material resources. To ensure th latter, appropriately qualified and experienced management an technical personnel must be recruited throughout all stages an areas of the effort to handle this administration effectively Without effective management to guide the operation, the democrati process goals will suffer.

9. Because so many of these crisis interventions such as t CGP take place in tragically impoverished regions like Hait substantial resource transfers must be part of the assistar provided. It is simply unrealistic to expect to facilitate democratic process when people are hurting. Therefore, adequ budgetary funding is needed to demonstrate the tangible benefits the political changes, which can be most effectively pursued in context of concrete material activities.

10. In designing these political transition programs, must always have the wisdom and the humility to consider caref

the needs of the affected people. Solutions developed from afar are rarely relevant on the ground, and will need to be tested and adjusted accordingly, as occurred in Haiti. Also, different strategies may be required to meet the needs of different populations within a country (e.g., rural-urban, gender, ethnicities).

11. Working with local community groups as participants and beneficiaries leads to a more informed and effective project. Particularly where local governments are lacking or need development as in Haiti, such a multifaceted approach, involving both NGO's and government, is also a very useful check on some of the deficiencies of that governmental structure, while at the same time trying to build confidence and bring about real changes in government.

12. While OTI has "notwithstanding" authority in the use of its special funding, it should strive to the maximum extent possible to incorporate into its program as much of the sound development and management criteria and practices of the more traditional operations of USAID. Gender sensitivity, accountability, logical frameworks, and personnel administration are just a few of the elements that come quickly to mind which will strengthen OTI's projects without slowing down or impeding activities.

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Communal Governance Programme

Selected Programme and Haitian social / political events



19/9
MNF intervention

Transition Team members begin to arrive in Haiti

15/10
return of Aristide

Field assessment and training conducted.

Hurricane Gordon

Debriefing held, mission focus and guidelines refined

Miragoane office established

Projects begun

Field offices established in Delmas, Cap Haitien, Gonaives, Hinche, Jeremie, Leogane, Petit Goave

Local govt mandate expires

Field offices established in Les Cayes, Port-de-Paix, Derac, Mirebalais, St-Marc et Jacmel

Intensive training for new field staff.

Admin. /Project guidelines finalized and distributed.

31/3
MNF turn-over to MINUHA

National Senior staff training held

Reporting guidelines modified

Regional Team meetings held in Les Cayes and Gonaives

Regional meeting held in Jacmel

Pre-authorization amount raised from $2,000 to $3,000

17/6
1st Local Gov election

Miragoane office closes

2st Local Gov. election

Teams finish accepting new projects

Project extention meeting held

New Local Gov. Sworn in

Phase II plans finalised

All Local Gov. functional

2nd phase process begun.

Community meetings are held and CAC's are established

The field offices in Jacmel, Mirebalais, Derac and Leogane are closed.

The field offices in Hinche, Jeremie and Port-de-Paix are downsized to sub-offices

Participating Mairies (24) sign Memorandums of understanding

17/12
Presidential election

CAC plan drafts submitted.

2nd phase projects finalized and approved

*Cancelled projects were deleted from our records.

- Haitian Social/Political events

- CGP events